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SHABARA-BHĀṢYA

Vol. III

ADHYĀYAS IX–XII



Śabarasvāmin

SHABARA-BHĀṢYA

Vol. 3

Translated into English by

GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ



IN THREE VOLUMES

Vol. III

ADHYĀYAS IX–XII



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INTRODUCTION.

My life's work is finished, with the completion of this work. I am thankful that I have lived to complete it. But it is sad to contemplate that the only two persons who set me the task—my literary 'mentor', Babu Govinda-dasa of Benares, and Dr. G. Thibaut of Heidelberg, my colleague at the Muir College,—are not here to rejoice with me. The only thing I can do therefore is to dedicate this to their memory.

My thanks are due to the Baptist Mission Press, with which it is a pleasure to work, and then to my pupils at the Allahabad University, Pandit Ksētrēsha Chandra Chattopādhyāya and Dr. Umesha Mishra, for help of various kinds.

An elaborate Introduction—I am unable, and unfit, to write. I have therefore noted a few interesting bits of information that I have been able to glean from the Bhāṣya, relating to its Author.

Residence.

(*a*) On p. 74 (Text Vol. I)—under Su. 1. 3. 18.—Shabara speaks of the 'Southerners' as 'Dark-skinned, large-bodied and red-eyed'.

(*b*) Under su. 1. 3. 20.—he speaks of the '*Māthura*' 'resident of, or born at, Mathurā'.

(c) Under su. 1. 3. 1.—the author appears to be familiar with details regarding the eating of parched rice; he says—'One should eat the *parched Ṣaṣṭikā Rice* with milk; but if he eats parched *Shāli* Rice, he should pour curds over it' [दही-चूड़ा of मिथिला].

(*d*) Under su. 2. 3. 3.—the author says—'Such usage would not be contrary to the usage of the *Āndhras*'—On this Kumārila comments that what the Bhāṣya refers to is the usage of the Dravidas; who have been spoken of as '*Āndhra*', because both the peoples belong to the *South*.

(*e*) Under su. 9. 2. 51. and in one or two other places also, the author uses the expression 'From the Himālaya down to Kumārī' (in the sense of *throughout the country*).

(*f*) Under su. 10. 6. 43. the author says '*Dīrghaiḥ kēshaiḥ shobhano dēvadattaḥ*'.

From the above data, no definite conclusion can be deduced. But if Kumarila's remarks (under (*d*) above) are relied upon, Shabara would appear to be more conversant with the *North* than with the *South*;—and (*f*) also may be taken as indicating greater familiarity with the extreme North, where *long hair* was worn. Did he belong to *Kashmir* or to the further West—*Takṣashilā* ?

Time.

Under 6. 1. 12. Shabara quotes the well-known verse of the *Manusmṛiti*—

भार्या दासश्च पुत्रश्च निर्धनाः सर्व एव ते ।
यत्ते समधिगच्छन्ति यस्य ते तस्य तद् धनम् ॥

introducing it with the words—एवं च स्मरन्ति. This would make the author posterior—by a long way—to the great Law-giver.

We have not been able to find anything more definite than this in Shabara's own work—relating to his time.

He is believed to have been a contemporary of the Great 'Vikramāditya'; in fact, an old-standing tradition among Pandits would make him the king's father—

ब्राह्मण्यामभवद्वराहमिहिरो ज्योतिर्विदामग्रणीः
राजा भर्तृहरिश्च विक्रमनृपः क्षत्रात्मजायामभूत् ।
वैश्यायां हरिचन्द्रवैद्यतिलको जातश्च शङ्कुः कृती
शूद्रायाममरः—षडेव शबरस्वामिद्विजस्यात्मजाः ॥

Varāhamihira, I am told, has now been definitely assigned to the 4th century A.D.; the personality of "Vikramāditya" is still shrouded in mystery;—it would not be far wrong to conclude therefore that Shabara lived before the 4th century A.D. This would fit in with his *posteriority* to "Bhagavān Upavarṣaḥ", and *priority* to Prabhākara, Kumārila and Shankarāchārya.

Works.

No other work by Shabara is known, except this *Bhāṣya* on the *Mīmānsā-Sūtras*; but even so, in the body of this Bhāṣya itself, we find distinct mention of another work named '*Saṅkarṣa*'. The expression—'*Saṅkarṣē vakṣyati-vakṣyatē*'—'this will be explained in the *Saṅkarṣa*'—is found in two places:—(1) under Su. 10. 4. 32. and (2) under Su. 12. 2. 11.

Now we have to see what this '*Saṅkarṣa*' is. In the year 1894, Mahāmahopādhyāya Rāma-mishra Shāstri brought out an edition of the '*Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍam*', in the 'Pandit' of Benares, which purports to be a comparatively modern commentary (written perhaps in the 17th century) on Adhyāyas XIII, XIV, XV and XVI of Jaimini's Sutras, written by one Bhāskara-Bhaṭṭa, and known as '*Bhāṭṭachandrikā*'. From this the name '*Saṅkarṣa*' would appear to stand for the 'supplement' to Jaimini's Sutras, which are popularly known to contain only *twelve adhyāyas*. At the time that the '*Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍam*' was published, there was a general suspicion that the work was a spurious one; though references to the name were found in Rāmānuja's Shrī-Bhāṣya (3. 3.). It was felt that the Sutras, under the *Kāṇḍa*—if Jaimini wrote them—could not have been left uncommented upon by Shabara and other writers. After the lapse of these 40 years, that suspicion appears to have been dispelled; at least so far as the existence of a work of the name of '*Saṅkarṣa*' is concerned, which Shabara knew of, and commented upon.

On looking into the published *Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa*, we find that what Shabara refers to in the first point of reference under 10. 4. 32. actually appears in the work under Su. 14. 4. 20. (page 65). Shabara has said under 10. 4. 32.—श्विष्टकृद्विकारश्च वनस्पतिरिति सङ्कर्षे वक्ष्यते; and in the *Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa*, in 14. 4. 20., we find the words वनस्पतिश्विष्टकृद्विकारत्वात्. There does not appear to be much doubt as to the identity of the two references. The second point of Shabara's reference is under Sutra 12. 2. 11., where we read औषधार्थां अवहननार्थां वा यथा पत्नी इति सङ्कर्षे वक्ष्यति. In the *Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa*, the only relevant passage appears under Su. 13. 1. 11. But the identity of the two references is not equally clear.—There thus can be no doubt that there is a section (of Jaimini's Sutras, perhaps) under the name of '*Saṅkarṣa*', and that it has been commented upon by Shabara. Here is an interesting point of investigation for manuscript-hunters and researchers.

Interesting Points.

(*a*) Under Su. 5. 1. 20., we have some sort of an indication of the nature of the daily meals: (1) Morning—*Apūpa*, cakes; (2) midday—various kinds of food, 'mixed food'; (3) afternoon—*Modaka*, sweets. Apparently there was no evening meal.

(*b*) Under Su. 6. 1. 4., Shabara speaks of 'Dogs fasting on the fourteenth day of the month, and kites fasting on the eighth day'.

(*c*) Under Su. 9. 1. 41., Shabara speaks of the Mīmāmsaka's 'Siddhānta' as 'not liked by the *Yājñikas*'.—The difference of opinion between theory and practice seems to have already set in at that early age.

(*d*) Under Su. 10. 3. 44., Shabara speaks of द्रव्यं गुणः कर्म अवयव ....—Where we have an echo of the Vaishēṣika '*Padārthas*'.

(*e*) Under Su. 10. 3. 45., three kinds of 'wages' are mentioned: (1) व्यापारतः; (2) फलतः; (3) वचनतः. Does the last stand for 'thanks'?

(*f*) Under Su. 7. 1. 4., we find the expression गङ्गायां गावः, instead of the well-known गङ्गायां घोषः.

(*g*) Medicinal prescriptions—

(1) For eye-disease, eat मुद्गौदन, Rice with Mudga pulse,—under Su. 7. 1. 8.

(2) For stomach-disease, *milk*, or *ewe's milk*, or *milk of Bel-fruit* (different readings)—under the same Sūtra.

During the last several centuries,—at least, from the time that the several '*Darshanasaṅgrahas*' began to be compiled, people have written and talked of the '*Ṣaṭ darshana*', the 'six systems of Philosophy'.—These six 'systems of Philosophy (Indian) have been declared to be—(1) '*Sāṅkhya*', (2) '*Yoga*', (3) '*Nyāya*', (4) '*Vaishēṣika*', (5) '*Mīmāmsā*'

and (6) '*Vedānta*'.—Such has been the long-established tradition. As a matter of fact, however, one would not be far wrong in saying that there are only *three* 'systems', and each 'system' is presented to us in the form of three 'pairs',—each member of the pair being 'complementary' of the other.

For instance, '*Sāṅkhya*' and '*Yoga*' form one pair,—the theoretical 'philosophy' being supplied by the former and the practical method of realising these 'philosophical' truths being taught by the latter; it is for this reason that in the older literature both these systems bore the common name of '*Sāṅkhya*'; but later on, when people began—and wrongly began—to separate the two, the former came to be designated as '*Nirīshvara-Sāṅkhya*' '*Sāṅkhya* without God'—on the ground that the 'Sāṅkhya' texts do not posit an '*Īshvara*',—and the latter as '*Sēshvara-Sāṅkhya*' (*Sāṅkhya* with God)—on the ground that the *Yoga-sūtras* do posit an *Īshvara*, even though only for the purposes of worship and meditation.

The case of '*Nyāya*' and '*Vaishēṣika*' is somewhat different. The *Sūtras* of both 'systems' contain 'philosophical' matter; though even here much of the 'philosophical' factor has been borrowed from, or taken for granted as expounded by, the sister system; and the *Nyāya-bhaṣya* has declared that such of the *Vaishēṣika* doctrines as are not actually denied in *Nyāya* should be taken to be accepted by the latter, [vide—Bhāṣya on *Nyāyasūtra* 1. 1. 4]. The avowed aim also of the *Sūtras* of *Nyāya* appears to be the propounding of a scheme of investigation and discussion regarding the truths of philosophy; as in their opinion, any knowledge acquired by other methods remains shaky until it is confirmed by such investigation. Thus there is sufficient reason for regarding the *Nyāya* and *Vaisēṣika* also as complementary.

Lastly as regards '*Mīmāmsā*' and '*Vedānta*', there has never been any justification for regarding them as two distinct 'Systems'. They have been always known as '*Pūrva*' (Preliminary) *Mīmāmsā* and '*Uttara*' (Final) *Mīmāmsā*. The *Pūrva-Mīmāmsā* has never claimed to be a '*darshana*, a 'system of philosophy'; in fact, so far as the *Sūtra* is concerned, it does not take note of any philosophical' topic. If the later commentators have introduced such topics as the 'soul' and the '*Apūrva*', it is only as corollary to its main and one topic of '*Dharma*'. If there is no '*Apūrva*' and if there is no 'soul', there can be no point in understanding or performing *Dharma*, one's Duty; hence these have been set forth; the 'Soul' has been specially emphasised; but simply asserted; and the earlier writers have deliberately referred the student to the sister-system for detailed information. Says *Kumārila* at the end of the *Ātma-vāda* section of the *Shlokavārtika*—

इत्याह नास्तिक्यनिराकरिष्णुरात्मास्तितां भाष्यकृदत्र युक्त्या ।

दृढत्वमेतद्विषयः प्रबोधः प्रयाति वेदान्तनिषेवणेन ॥

That is—' with a view to set aside *Atheism* (which in Indian Philosophy stands for the view that "There is no soul, there is no region other than the physical earth"), the author of the *Bhāṣya* has asserted the existence of the Soul on the basis of reasons; the knowledge of this (Soul) attains

confirmation by the study of the *Vedānta*'. Here 'Vēdanta' evidently stands for the Upaniṣads and their study incorporated in the *Brahmasūtras*.

We are alive to the fact that later on differences between the two systems cropped up regarding small details; but there has never arisen any controversy on the main issues. The Vedānta finds its ultimate sanction in the Vedic texts, and as regards the authority of the Vedas, it accepts the conclusions of the sister-system. For all *practical* purposes, the Vedāntin accepts the tenets of the *Mīmāmsā*;—hence the saying '*Vyāvahārē bhaṭṭanayaḥ*' current among writers on *Vedānta*.

The above facts also account for the designation of *Mīmāmsā* proper as '*Pūrva*' and of that of the *Vedānta* as '*Uttara*'. For the enquiry into *Brahman*—'*Brahmajijñāsā*',—and this enquiry can be carried on only on the basis of Vedic texts,—it is necessary that the authority and reliability of the Veda should be established beyond doubt, and then, that certain methods of interpreting those texts should be elaborated, in order to prevent confusion in course of the study of the vast mass of Vedic material. These two requirements have been met by *Mīmāmsā* proper; and on the basis of this '*Pūrva*', *Preliminary*, *Mīmāmsā*, the Vedantin has raised his edifice of *Vedānta* proper, called on that account the '*Uttara*', *Final*, *Mīmāmsā*. And it is interesting to note that on the subject of *Mokṣa*, the final aim of man, the views of the great *Mīmāmsaka* do not differ much from the orthodox 'Vedānta' view.

Of course, one cannot be blind to the fact that among the later controversies, this 'brotherhood' (or 'sisterhood') was lost sight of, and greater stress began to be laid upon differences regarding non-essentials than on agreements regarding essentials.

This is how the idea of the 'Six Systems of Indian Philosophy' came to be evolved. This also is the reason why there is practically no 'philosophical' topic discussed by Jaimini in his *Sūtras*.—Having propounded the subject of his enquiry, *Dharma* (Sūtras),—he provides a definition of this *Dharma* as 'what the Veda enjoins as beneficial' (*Sūtra* 2),—it explains why the ordinary means of Cognition, Perception, Inference and the rest, cannot be of much use in this connection (Sū. 4),—and how *word* (Verbal Authority) can be the only infallible guide in this matter (Sū. 5);—he then explains in the rest of the first *Pāda*, how and why the Veda is to be accepted as an infallible source of knowledge;—this is followed, in the rest of *Adhyāya* I, by a detailed examination of the question as to which portions of the *Veda* are to be regarded as actually laying down what should be done or what should not be done. Having thus cleared the ground in the first *Adhyāya*, he proceeds in the remaining eleven *Adhyayas* to set forth in detail the methods of interpreting Vedic texts.

Unfortunately for modern Hindus, the examples that Jaimini chose for illustrating his rules of interpretation were all from sacrificial Rituals. Naturally during his time, every Brāhmaṇa was familiar with these Rituals, and hence they were regarded as providing most suitable illustrative examples. Latterly, however, Sacrificial Ritual has gradually all but disappeared from the life of the Hindus; and this has led to the neglect of the study of the

Mimamsā-shāstra. Even so, it continues to be recognised that the rules that Jaimini evolved are still found useful in the interpretation of Law-texts; and they have been so widely used that there is no important Legal Digest which does not draw upon the 'Nyāyas' of Jaimini. One of these 'Nyāyas',—rather the misunderstanding of it—has altered the whole trend of the Law of Adoption in Bombay, even in our own day. [See Preface to the writer's 'Hindu Law in its Sources', Vol. II].

It is hoped the translation now placed before the public will go some way towards the dispelling of certain misconceptions that have gained ground in the learned legal world of the present day. I know this hope is much too extravagant. But who knows?

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THE END.

ADHYĀYA IX.

PĀDA I.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *At the Agnihotra and other sacrifices, the Details are prompted by,—laid down for the purpose of accomplishing—the 'Apūrva', Transcendental Result.*

SŪTRA (1).

THAT WHICH IS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE SACRIFICE IS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR; AS THAT IS WHAT IS ENJOINED; HENCE THE EMBELLISHMENT OF THE SUBSTANCES MUST BE REGARDED AS PROMPTED BY THAT; SPECIALLY BECAUSE IT IS MEANT FOR THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

In the Eighth Discourse we have finished the consideration of particular cases of *Transference of details*; we are now going to deal with cases of '*Ūha*', 'Modification', (of Details).—'Modification' is of three kinds—as bearing upon (1) the *Mantra*, (2) the *Sāman*, and (3) the *Saṁskāra* (Embellishment).—It is this Modification that will be the main subject of consideration (in this, the Ninth Discourse), though other subjects also are going to be dealt with, some by way of Introduction and others as arising out of the main theme.

[We have seen that in several cases, the Details of one sacrifice are transferred to another sacrifice. In some cases, it so happens that the particular detail so transferred does not quite fit in with the other details of the sacrifice to which it has been transferred. In this case therefore, the detail transferred is 'modified' to suit the exigencies of the sacrifice to which it has been transferred. It is this 'modification' that is going to be dealt with in Discourse IX.]

(A) [*First Explanation.*]

As a necessary preliminary to the Discourse, what we have to consider first of all is the following matter, in regard to the *Agnihotra*, the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* and the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, in connection with which separate details have been prescribed.—In regard to these the question that has to be considered is—Are these Details prompted by (performed for the purpose of accomplishing) the *Transcendental Result*,—or by the *Sacrificial Act*?—If they are prompted by the Transcendental Result, then alone can Modification be possible; if, on the other hand, they are prompted by the

Sacrificial Act, then there would be a commixture of the Details.—" How so ? "—All sacrifices are *sacrificial acts* ;—hence when any Details are enjoined in reference to the genus 'sacrifice', which is what is denoted by the root 'to sacrifice',—they naturally appertain to *all sacrifices* [if the details are prompted by the *Sacrificial Act*] ; [so that in this case there would be no justification for any 'modification'] ;—if, on the other hand, the Details are prompted by the Transcendental Result, then, as each sacrifice leads to a distinct Transcendental Result, the Details laid down in connection with a specific Transcendental Result, could become connected with another such Result only in a specific form ; hence in this case, 'Modification' would be possible (and necessary).

[*A preliminary objection is raised*]—" All this has been already discussed and finally settled in Discourse VII (*Adhikaraṇa* I of *Pāda* I) ".

Answer—That same conclusion is again recalled here for the purpose of introducing the following discussions.—Or, the present discussion may be taken as meant for explaining things not already explained on the previous occasion.—

" What is that thing ? "

It is this—that *the Embellishment of the substances must be regarded as prompted by that, specially because it is all meant for that purpose.*—For one who is going to expound 'Modification', the assertion of this fact is necessary because it is only thus that Modification is possible ; this fact was not asserted on the previous occasion (in Discourse VII), as there was no need for it there ; all that was considered there was the question whether the Details were restricted to each Context—or were they all to be employed in all cases ?—The consideration of this question would be possible in both cases—i.e. if the details are prompted by the Transcendental Result, as also if they are prompted by the Sacrificial Act ;—but it could not be so if the Embellishment of substances were for the purposes of the Transcendental Result ;—and it is this latter fact that is established here ;—on the previous occasion, the fact of the Details being prompted by the Transcendental Result,—even though not mentioned in the *Sūtra*,—had been taken up for the purpose of facilitating the business of discussion.—Thus then there is no needless repetition here (of what has already gone under Discourse VII).

(B) [*Second Explanation.*]

Or, what we are going to discuss later on is a totally different question : —Are the details *contingent* upon the sacrificial act, but *prompted* by the Transcendental Result ?—Or are they both *contingent* upon, and *prompted* by, the Transcendental Result ?—And for the present, we are only considering the question whether the Details are *prompted* by the Transcendental Result or by the Sacrificial Act ?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—" the Details are prompted by the *Sacrificial Act* ;—why so ?—because it is with the term 'to sacrifice' that the entire Procedure is correlated,—the meaning of the

injunctions being—'In this manner should the sacrificial act be performed' or 'such and such a result should be brought about by the Sacrificial Act performed in such and such a manner'."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta* :—*That which is the objective* of the act denoted by the root 'to sacrifice' (i.e. the Sacrificial Act) *is the principal factor* ; it is that which is enjoined as to be accomplished (by the Sacrifice); and the Procedure should appertain to that which is meant to be accomplished (by the Act).—It has been argued that—"the details are correlated with the root 'to sacrifice'".—Our answer to this is as follows :—Whatever *Embellishment* is there—in the substances, as also in the Sacrificial Act,—*must be regarded as prompted by that*,—i.e. prompted by the Transcendental Result (to be accomplished by means of the Act of *Sacrifice*), *because it*—the Sacrificial Act—*is meant for that purpose* ; the substances also are related to the Details only as related to the Transcendental Result,—not on their own account. Because there is no mutual need between the *Details* and what is denoted by the root ('to sacrifice'); it is by *what is denoted by the affix* (*Injunctive*) that the Procedure is needed,—the form of the requirement being—'in what manner is the *Desired Result* to be accomplished ?',—and not 'what is the form of the *Sacrifice* ?'—From this it follows that the Procedure should be connected with that which is *meant to be accomplished* ; and it is the Transcendental Result that is *meant to be accomplished* ;—hence the Details should be taken as prompted by the Transcendental Result.

(C) [*Third Explanation.*]

In regard to the same instances, we proceed to discuss the question—Are the Details *contingent* upon the *Sacrificial Act*, and *prompted* by the *Transcendental Result* ? Or are they both *contingent* upon, and prompted by, the *Transcendental Result* ?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows :—"The Details are *contingent* upon the Sacrificial Act, and *prompted* by the Transcendental Result ?—Why so ?—Because nothing can be *contingent* upon, as well as *prompted* by, the same thing ; the *Prompter* of the Details is that for the purpose whereof they are performed; and their *Contingent Cause* is that during whose existence they are performed ;—and one and the same word cannot express the idea that 'the details are performed for the purpose of the Transcendental Result', as also the idea that 'they exist while the Transcendental Result exists' ; in fact the words expressive of the Details being for the purpose of the Transcendental Result would be entirely different from those expressive of them as existing while the Transcendental Result exists.—On the other hand, if the Details are taken as *contingent* upon the *Sacrificial Act*, then there is the verbal expression 'The Result should be accomplished by means of the sacrifice in such and such a manner (by adopting these details)' ; which means that when the *sacrifice* is there, then the Details help in the accomplishment of the Transcendental Result,—

but if the sacrifice is not there, then they do not render any such help.—From this it follows that the Details are *contingent* upon the Sacrificial Act, but *prompted* by the Transcendental Result."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta* :—*That which is the objective of the sacrifice is the principal factor*,—i.e. that which is meant to be accomplished by means of the Sacrificial Act ;—because that is what is enjoined as leading to the desired result ;—hence all the embellishment that there is—in connection with the Sacrificial Act and the substances appertaining thereto,—should be regarded as *prompted* by the *Transcendental Result* ; because all those embellishments are performed with the view that they are conducive to that Result ; and they are not concerned with the accomplishment of the Sacrifice ; in fact, in the entire body of texts laying down the act, the Embellishments are correlated with what is denoted by the (Injunctive) affix ; as it is this latter, and not what is denoted by the verbal root, that stands in need of such correlation.—From this it follows that the Details are *contingent* upon, as well as *prompted* by, the Transcendental Result.

It has been argued that "it is not possible for the Transcendental Result to be the *Prompter* as well as the *Contingent Cause*, as the verbal expression in the two cases must be entirely different".—Our answer to this is as follows :—That the Transcendental Result is the prompter of the Details is what is declared in the scriptural texts themselves ; as for the fact of its being also the contingent cause, that is not expressed directly by the words of the text ; but it follows from the generally recognised fact that when one thing is prompted by another, the latter is also the contingent cause of the former ; for instance, the Garden is the *prompter* as well as the *contingent* cause of the payment of the wages to the *Gardener* ; because it is only when the Garden is there that wages are paid to the Gardener ; and the man is related to the wages for the purpose of maintaining the Garden.

From all this it follows that it is the Transcendental Result that is the *prompter* as well as the *contingent* cause of the Details.

Adhikaraṇa (2): '*Prokṣaṇa*', '*Besprinkling*', *is prompted by the Transcendental Result.*

SŪTRA (2).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Things that are done in connection with an 'Embellishment' are for that purpose, and hence the detail in question should be regarded as prompted by that (Embellishment)."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'One threshes the corn with pestle and mortar that have been besprinkled; one grinds it with the grinding slab and stone that have been besprinkled'.

In connection with this, there arises the question—Is the 'besprinkling' prompted by the *threshing* and the *grinding*?—Or by the Transcendental Result?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The 'besprinkling' which *is done in connection with an 'Embellishment'*—in the form of the 'Threshing and Grinding',—*should be regarded as prompted by that*—i.e. by that Embellishment.—'*Threshing* and *Grinding* being embellishments, how can the *Besprinkling* be regarded as prompted by them?'—*Because they are for that purpose*; as a matter of fact, one thing is said to be the 'prompter' of another when the latter serves to accomplish the former; so that, if it is the Transcendental Result that is accomplished by the *Besprinkling*, then this *Besprinkling* should be regarded as prompted by the Transcendental Result; but if it is the *Threshing and Grinding* that are accomplished by the *Besprinkling*, then the *Besprinkling* should be regarded as prompted by the *Threshing* and *Grinding*.—From the *Context*, it follows that it is the Transcendental Result that is accomplished by the *Besprinkling*,—while from Syntactical Connection, it is clear that the *Threshing* and *Grinding* are accomplished by the *Besprinkling*;—and Syntactical Connection is stronger in authority than Context.—[Hence it follows that the *Besprinkling* is prompted by *Threshing* and *Grinding*]."

The following objection is raised against the *Pūrvapakṣa*—'The *Besprinkling* may be done at the *Threshing* and *Grinding*; and it may yet serve the purpose of accomplishing the Transcendental Result [so that though it may be *contingent* upon the *Threshing* and *Grinding*, it would be *prompted* by the Transcendental Result]. In this way the Syntactical Connection and the Context, both would be honoured'.

To this the *Pūrvapakṣin* makes the following answer—"It is not possible to honour both (Syntactical Connection and Context). The mere fact of a certain thing being mentioned in a certain context does not necessarily imply that that thing has been laid down for the sake of the subject-matter of the Context; all that the fact of a thing mentioned in a certain Context

means is that it is syntactically connected with the subject-matter of the Context; and it is from this Syntactical Connection that it follows that the thing is meant to serve the purposes of that subject-matter. [This is what happens in regard to the relation between the *Besprinkling* and the Transcendental Result]. On the other hand, the Syntactical Connection of the *Besprinkling* is with the *Threshing* and *Grinding* which are directly perceptible (mentioned in the text);—this direct Syntactical Connection (of the *Besprinkling*, with the *Threshing* and *Grinding*) sets aside its indirect (inferred) Syntactical Connection with the subject-matter of the Context (i.e. Transcendental Result). Nor is it possible for the *Besprinkling* to be syntactically connected with both (Transcendental Result and *Threshing* and *Grinding*) at one and the same time; because when it is syntactically connected with one, it has all its requirements fulfilled through that, and hence there is no reason for connecting it with anything else.—Thus, no Syntactical Connection of the *Besprinkling* being possible with the subject-matter of the Context, it cannot be held to serve the purpose of the Transcendental Result."

Objection to the Pūrvapakṣa—'The *Threshing* and *Grinding* do certainly serve the purpose of accomplishing the Transcendental Result; and as the *Besprinkling* subserves the purposes of the *Threshing* and *Grinding*, it must be taken as helping the Transcendental Result'.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers—"It is true that the *Besprinkling* helps the Transcendental Result indirectly (mediately); but that does not make it 'prompted by the Transcendental Result'. There are two kinds of subsidiaries that help a subsidiary—(1) that which is connected with a particular subsidiary on the ground that this subsidiary is peculiar to a certrain Transcendental Result, and (2) that which is connected with the subsidiary inherently on its own account, irrespectively of any connection with a Transcendental Result:—Now of these two kinds, that set of Details alone is regarded as 'prompted by the Transcendental Result' which is connected with the particular subsidiary through its relationship to the Transcendental Result;—and such a set of Details has to be 'modified' in the Ectype or in other cases where the subsidiary is used for the same purpose. In the other case, however, where the connection of the Detail rests upon the form of the subsidiary itself (independently of any Transcendental Result),—the Detail is regarded to be 'prompted by itself'. Even though, even in this latter case, the subsidiary equipped with the particular detail does bring about a Transcendental Result, yet the Transcendental Result, being thus accomplished, does not become the cause (the incentive, the prompter) of the employment of that Detail; that is, it is not by reason of the presence of the Transcendental Result by itself that the particular Detail is employed.—In this latter case, either in the Ectype or in any other thing, the Transcendental Result not being there, there is no 'modification'.—Such being the case, the right course can be determined only on the basis of Syntactical Connection; that is, if the Syntactical Connection signifies that the Transcendental Result is the cause (of the Employment of the Detail), then that Detail has to be regarded as

'prompted by the Transcendental Result'; if it signifies that the subsidiary itself is the cause of the employment of the Detail, then that Detail has to be regarded as 'prompted by the subsidiary'.—It has been already pointed out that, in the case in question, the idea of the detail being prompted by the Transcendental Result is based upon *Context*, while that of its being prompted by the subsidiary itself is based on *Syntactical Connection*.—Hence it follows that the *Besprinkling* is prompted by *Threshing* and *Grinding*, and that whenever there are *Threshing* and *Grinding*, they have to be accompanied by *Besprinkling*."

SŪTRA (3).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE DETAIL IN QUESTION WITH THAT THING IS DUE TO ITS CONNECTION WITH THE 'SACRIFICE'; HENCE THE DETAIL SHOULD BE REGARDED AS PROMPTED BY THE 'SACRIFICE'; SPECIALLY BECAUSE THE EMBELLISHMENT IS FOR THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

It is not true that the *Besprinkling* is prompted by *Threshing* and *Grinding*. In fact, it is because there is connection between '*that thing*'—i.e. *Threshing* or *Grinding*,—with the Transcendental Result,—that the former is related to the *Besprinkling*; that is, the connection between the *Treshing-Grinding* and the Embellishment of *Besprinkling* is brought about through the accomplishment of a particular Transcendental Result,—and not through the *Threshing-Grinding* itself.—Why?—Because the *Threshing* and *Grinding* by themselves serve no useful purpose; hence if the *Besprinkling* were prompted by them, that also would be useless. Hence the *Besprinkling* cannot be regarded as prompted by *Threshing* and *Grinding*.

Objection—"The *Threshing* and *Grinding* are helpful to the Transcendental Result; they are not useless."

Answer—[According to the *Pūrvapakṣa*] there is no connection between the *Besprinkling* and the Transcendental Result; in fact (under this view), even if the *Besprinkling* were not done, the *Threshing* and *Grinding* would not fail in bringing about the Transcendental Result. So that, even though the *Threshing* and *Grinding* were helpful to the Transcendental Result, the *Besprinkling* connected with those two would serve no useful purpose.

Opponent—"That purpose for which the *Threshing* and *Grinding* are done can be accomplished by these two when they are connected with the *Besprinkling*, not otherwise. [In this way, the *Besprinkling* serves a most useful purpose.]"

Answer—There is no scriptural text declaring that this is so.

Opponent—"This same text that we are considering declares this.—How?—It says that—'One threshes the corn with the pestle and mortar *that have been besprinkled*; one grinds the corn with the grinding slab and stone *that have been washed*';—this clearly means that 'what is done by the

Threshing and the *Grinding* is done by them as connected with *Besprinkling*'; and thus the *Besprinkling* is really connected with what is brought about by the *Threshing* and *Grinding*,—not with these".

Answer—It is not so. If it is true that what is brought about by the *Threshing* and *Grinding* becomes connected with *Besprinkling*,—then there can be no connection of the *Besprinkling* with that thing at all. Because that thing is brought about by the *Threshing* and *Grinding*; what then is there that would be brought about by the *Besprinkling*?—If the connection were meant to be that "the Transcendental Result is brought about by the *besprinkled* (implements, Pestle, etc.)",—in that case it could not be said to be brought about by the *Threshing* or the *Grinding*.—If it be urged that —"the connection of these two also is asserted (to be what brings about the Transcendental Result)",—then the assertion of several connections would lead to syntactical split.—Thus then, we conclude that, inasmuch as by being connected with the *Threshing* and the *Grinding*, the *Besprinkling* would become useless, it must be taken to be connected with the Transcendental Result, on the basis of *Context*.

Opponent—"In that case, there would be no connection with the *Threshing* and *Grinding*."

There would certainly be connection with them, we reply.—"How?"—In the case in question, when the man proceeds to do the *Threshing*, there are two results accomplished—(1) the act of *Threshing* itself, and (2) the preparation of the Rice; and indirectly there comes about the accomplishment of a peculiar Transcendental Result; because the preparation of the Rice is a help rendered to the Transcendental Result,—and this help is meant to be rendered by the act of *Threshing*; and thus the *Besprinkling* comes to be connected with it (but indirectly).—Though it is true that, if the *Besprinkling* is connected with the act of *Threshing* itself, such connection would be one that is directly asserted; but in that case it would become useless (as explained above); hence we have recourse to the indirect connection; specially because such Indirect Indication is something perceptible and as such more reasonable than the assumption of something entirely imperceptible. In fact, the *Threshing* is not an *indirect* subsidiary bringing about the Transcendental Result; the help that it renders (by preparing the Rice) is a perceptible one, and, through some invisible capacity, it renders that help in the right manner. Even if the *Besprinkling* did bring about the Transcendental Result, in so far as it would be connected with mere *Threshing*, and not with any kind of benefit rendered by itself,—it would serve no useful purpose at all. Hence the *Besprinkling* should be taken as connected with a particular benefit through the act of *Threshing*. It is for this reason that even when an act other than *Threshing* serves the same purpose as the *Threshing*,—it takes the *Besprinkling*; for instance, in the case where the rice is prepared by tearing away the husks with nails, —where the *Besprinkling* is done to the nails.

From all this it follows that all details like Besprinkling are prompted by the Transcendental Result.

Adhikaraṇa (3): (Represented by another interpretation of *Sūtras* 2 and 3).

The varying degrees of tone or pitch—High and Low—are prompted by the Subsidiary Transcendental Result.

Bhāṣya.

The two *Sūtras* 2 and 3 may be taken as embodying the following *Adhikaraṇa* :—

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice; in connection with that, it is laid down—'At the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* sacrifice, one should recite with as much voice as one likes,—at the *Prāyaṇīyā*, with low voice,—at the *Ātithyā*, with still lower voice,—at the *Upasads*, silently'.

In regard to this, there arises the following question :—Are all these details (regarding the Pitch of Voice) prompted by (to be adopted for the purpose of bringing about) the Final Main Transcendental Result (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*)? Or by the subsidiary Transcendental Results of the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and other subsidiary sacrifices?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view (embodied in *Sūtra* 2) is as follows :—"The Detail in question is used in connection with the subsidiary Transcendental Result of the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and other subsidiary sacrifices,—but this Transcendental Result only serves as an 'Embellishment' of the Main Final Transcendental Result (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*);—from this it follows that the said Detail subserves the purposes of this Final Transcendental Result;—and this shows that the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and the other subsidiary sacrifices also only subserve the purpose of that Final Result; specially because it is only the Final Result that brings the fruit of the Sacrifice,—and it is this Fruit which is understood to be what is to be accomplished by means of the Sacrifice; this cannot be said of the subsidiary Transcendental Result, which brings no fruit at all".

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta* (embodied in *Sūtra* 3)—It is because the Final Transcendental Result is related to '*that thing*'—i.e. the set of subsidiary sacrifices, *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and the rest,—that Details like those under consideration become connected with that Result. From this it follows that details like these are prompted by the subsidiary sacrifices. In this sense we would have the Direct Assertion of the Vedic Text; while in the other sense, recourse would be necessary to indirect figurative interpretation.—Nor is the Transcendental Result of the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and other subsidiary sacrifices entirely useless; it actually helps the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice. As a matter of fact, the subsidiary Transcendental Result of the *Prāyaṇīyā* and other subsidiary sacrifices would never be accomplished without some such Detail as that under consideration,—as in the

case of the act of *Threshing* and *Grinding* (in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*).—It might be argued that—"this subsidiary Transcendental Result would come about without any such Detail".—But that is not possible.—Why?—Because that Transcendental Result also is cognised only by means of the Vedic Word; in fact, before the Vedic Text appears, the fact that 'there is such a thing as the Transcendental Result in question' is not known by any other means of cognition;—hence in matters like these, which are amenable to only one means of Cognition in the shape of the Vedic Word, we have to accept as true what that word says;—and in the case in question the Vedic Word clearly asserts that the Detail in question is helpful to the subsidiary Transcendental Result of the *Prāyaṇīyā* and other subsidiary sacrifices,—and not to the Main Final Transcendental Result.—On the strength of the same Vedic Word, it also follows that the subsidiary Transcendental Result continues to exist undiminished and intact until the accomplishment of the Final Main Transcendental Result; so that the Detail subsisting in it will not pass on to the Final Result; and yet even so, it serves a useful purpose.—From all this it follows that Details like those in question are prompted by the subsidiary Transcendental Results.

Question—"What is the purpose served by all this discussion? What happens if either the *Pūrvapakṣa* or the *Siddhānta* view is accepted?"

Answer—In connection with the *Ashvamēdha* sacrifice, we read—'The *Traidhātavīyā* takes the place of the *Dīkṣaṇīyā*';—now if the details relating to the Pitch were prompted by the Final Transcendental Result (as held by the *Pūrvapakṣa*),—then, as tied down to that Result, the detail laid down in connection with the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* would have to be adopted at the *Traidhātavīyā* which takes the place of the *Dīkṣaṇīyā*;—if, on the other hand, the detail in question were prompted by the subsidiary Transcendental Result of the *Agni-Viṣṇu-offering*,—then, inasmuch as the Final Transcendental Result would not be the Transcendental Result of the *Agni-Viṣṇu-offering*,—the Transcendental Result of the *Traidhātavīyā* would not become connected with the Detail in question.

Adhikaraṇa (4): *Details relating to the 'Fruit' and the 'Deity' are prompted by the Transcendental Result.*

SŪTRA (4).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The Fruit and the Deity also [have the character of being the prompter of details]."

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices laid down in the text—'Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices'. In connection with these we find a certain detail connected with the 'Fruit', as also one connected with the Deity; for instance, the Detail connected with the *Fruit* (Heaven) is the *Mantra*, '*Aganma svaḥ*, etc.', and the Detail connected with the Deity (*Agni*) is the *Mantra*, '*Agnērujjiti—manūjjēṣam*, etc.'

In regard to these details, there arises the question—Is Heaven the prompter of the act (reciting of the *Mantra*) which is connected with Heaven? and *Agni* and other deities are the prompter of the act (reciting of the *Mantra*) which is connected with those deities?—Or in both cases, the act is prompted by the Transcendental Result?—If the first *mantra* is construed to mean that 'We have reached Heaven', and the second *mantra* to mean that 'We have passed over the glories of *Agni*, etc.',—then the act would be regarded as prompted by *Heaven* and by *Agni*, etc.;—on the other hand, if the first *mantra* is construed to mean that 'We have obtained the fruit of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*', and the second *mantra* to mean that 'We have passed over the glories of the deities of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*',—then the act would be regarded as prompted by the Transcendental Result.

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The act in question should be regarded as prompted by *Heaven* and by *Agni*, etc.—Why?—Because of the force of the *mantra*-text; that is, it is understood that that should be declared (to be the prompter) which is spoken of by the *Mantra*;—and the *Mantra* directly speaks of *Heaven* and of *Agni*, etc., and it is only by indirect indication that it can speak of *the Fruit and Deities of the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*.—Hence it follows that the Detail in question must be taken as prompted by the Fruit and the Deities spoken of by the *Mantras*—i.e. *Heaven* and *Agni*, etc."

SŪTRA (5).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT SO; BY REASON OF THE INJUNCTION, IT IS SUBSERVIENT TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL RESULT.

Bhāṣya.

It is not true that the Detail in question is prompted by the Fruit and the Deities; as a matter of fact, *by reason of the Injunction*, it should be *subservient to the Transcendental Result*; that which is enjoined as bringing about the Fruit is what is connected with the Details of Procedure:—it is the Transcendental Result,—and not *Heaven* or *Agni* and other Deities,—that is enjoined as bringing about the Fruit; so that, if the reciting of the *Mantras* were for the sake of Heaven or the Deities, it would have to be taken as serving some invisible purpose, and that too, through indirect indication;—on the other hand, if the mention of the Fruit and the Deities be taken as subservient to the Transcendental Result, then a visible purpose becomes served, through the encouragement (that is afforded to the Performer). And when according to this latter view, a visible purpose is found to be served, it cannot be right to assume a Transcendental Result as proceeding from the assertion of the Heaven, or of *Agni* and other deities. The Fruit and the Deities being accepted by both parties to be expressed by the words of the *Mantras*, there is no indirect indication, so far as those are concerned.—From all this it follows that Details like those under consideration are prompted by the Transcendental Result.

Question—"What is the use of all this discussion?"

Answer—According to the *Pūrvapakṣa* view, at the *Saurya*-sacrifice, the *Mantra* should be used without any modification; while in accordance with the *Siddhānta*, the *Mantra* should be modified into the form '*Aganma brahmavarchasam*' (in place of '*aganma svaḥ*'), and '*Sūryasyojjitim*, etc.' (in place of '*Agnērujjitim*, etc.').

As regards the Deity, we have the following *Adhikaraṇa*.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *Dēvatādhikaraṇa: Details are not prompted by the Deity.*

SŪTRA (6).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"THE DEITY SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PROMPTING (THE DETAILS OF SACRIFICE), BECAUSE THE FEEDING IS FOR THE SAKE OF THE DEITY,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE GUEST."

Bhāṣya.

[The *Pūrvapakṣa* starts off with objecting to the *Siddhānta* of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, so far as the Deities are concerned]—"It is not true that *Agni* and other deities are not prompters of details; as a matter of fact, all the deities should be taken as prompting all the details.—How?—*Because the feeding is for the sake of the Deity*; what is called a 'Sacrifice' is only the *feeding of the Deity*; what is done at it is that an eatable substance is offered to the Deity; apparently the *sacrifice* is found to be declared as an act of *giving* (offering), of which the Deity is the recipient; and such a *recipient* is more desired even than the *objective* which has been defined as 'the most desired'; hence the Deity cannot be regarded as a subordinate factor (as asserted in Sū. 5); on the contrary, the *substance* and the *act* (of offering) are subordinate to the Deity.—Then again, the *sacrifice* is a form of worship of the Deity; and in ordinary life, we find that the act of worship is always subordinate to the object worshipped.—The case in question should be treated like that of *guests*; that is to say, whatever service is rendered to the Guest is regarded as prompted by the Guest; similarly in the case in question, whatever is done in course of a sacrificial offering to the Deities should be taken as prompted by those deities]."

Says the *Pūrvapakṣin's* Opponent—'By arguing as you do, you admit that the Deity has a material body and also actually eats (the offerings)'.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers—"Certainly, the Deity has a material body and also eats (what is offered).—'How so?'—(*a*) Because of the *Smṛti-text*,—(*b*) because of Custom, and—(*c*) because of the Indicative Texts.—(*a*) The *Smṛti-texts* clearly declare that the Deity has a material body, and we regard *Smṛti-texts* to be authoritative;—(*b*) then again, it is customary with people to treat the deity as with a material body; for instance, they paint, and speak of, *Yama* with a mace in his hand, of *Varuṇa*, with a noose in his hand, and of *Indra*, with a thunderbolt in his hand;—from this customary treatment of the Deities also we infer the validity of the *Smṛti-texts* (describing the material bodies of deities);—(*c*) lastly, we have the following indicative text—'*Jagṛbhmā tē dakṣiṇam indra*

hastam' ['O Indra, I take hold of your right hand']; as a matter of fact, it is only one having a body who has a *right* and a *left* hand;—then again, there is the following text—'*Imē chit indra rodasī apārē yat sagṛbhmā maghavan kāshirittē*' ['O *Indra, Maghavan*, this illimitable Earth and Heaven you hold in your fist']; the term '*Kāshi*' means *fist*; and this also is possible only for one who has a human body;—then again, there is the text—'*Tuvigrivo vayodaraḥ subāhurandhaso madē indro vṛttrāṇi jighnatē*'; this speaks of '*grīvā*', 'neck'; '*udara*', 'stomach'; and '*bāhu*', 'arms',—all of which is indicative of a human body.—From all this it follows that the Deity has a material body.

"The Deity also eats (what is offered).—'How do you know that?'—(*a*) Because of *Smṛti-texts*, (*b*) because of Custom, and (*c*) because of Indicative Texts.—(*a*) There are *Smṛti-texts* speaking of Deities as actually eating what is offered;—(*b*) people treat of Deities as if they actually ate what is offered,—as is clear from the fact that they offer to them various kinds of food;—(*c*) lastly, the following texts indicate the Deity as actually eating—(1) '*Addhi indra piba cha prasthitasya*' ['O *Indra*, please *eat and drink* of what has been offered'];—(2) '*Vishvāsanāni jaṭharēṣu dhattē*' ['He puts into his stomach all kinds of food'];—and (3) '*Ekayā prati ghā pibatsākam sarāṁsi triṁshatam*'."

Says the *Pūrvapakṣin's* Opponent—'The Deity cannot be regarded as eating what is offered. If it did eat it, then the quantity of the offering would diminish'.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers—"What the Deity partakes of is only the *essence* of the food; like the Bee.—'How do you know this?'—As a matter of fact, what has been offered to the Deity becomes insipid; and from this it follows that the Deity partakes of the *essence* of the food".

SŪTRA (7).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE OF THE OWNERSHIP OF WEALTH."

Bhāṣya.

[The *Pūrvapakṣin's* Opponent may argue as follows]—(*a*) 'If the Deity were the owner of any wealth, and (*b*) if it were pleased on being worshipped,—then alone there would be some justification for the worship of the Deity to be performed for the purpose of pleasing that Deity. As a matter of fact, however, neither of these two facts is true [i.e. (*a*) the Deity is *not* the owner of any wealth, and (*b*) the Deity is *not* pleased at being worshipped].'

This is the Argument that is answered by the *Pūrvapakṣin* in the present *Sūtra*—"As a matter of fact, the Deity is actually the owner of wealth.—'How do you know that?'—(*a*) From the *Smṛti-text*, (*b*) from Custom, and (*c*) from Indicative Texts.—(*a*) The *Smṛti-texts* declare that the Deity

owns wealth ;—(*b*) The Custom of having such names as '*Dēvagrāma*' ('the Deity's village'), '*Dēvakṣētra*' ('The Deity's field'), lends support to the said declaration of *Smṛti-texts* ;—(*c*) lastly, there are Indicative Texts also showing Deities as owners of wealth : (1) '*Indro diva indra īshē pṛthivyām, indraḥ apāmindra it parvatānām, indro vṛdhām, indra inmēdhirāṇām, indraḥ kṣēmē yogē, havyē indraḥ*' ['*Indra* is the master of Heaven, of the Earth, of the Waters, and of the Hills ; the master of trees, of *medhiras* (animate things ?), master of welfare, of activity, of offerings'] ;—again, (2) '*Īshānamasya jagataḥ svēshamīshānamindra tasthuṣē*' ['Indra the master of the moveable and the immoveable'].

"Similarly (*a*) from *Smṛti-texts*, and (*b*) from *Custom*, we also learn that Deities are actually pleased. (*a*) *Smṛti-texts* distinctly declare that 'Deities are pleased ;'—(*b*) it is customary to speak of '*Pashupati* being so pleased with such and such a man, that a son has been born to him', of '*Varuṇa* being so pleased with him, that wealth has been obtained by him'.—(*c*) Similarly we have Indicative Texts also to the same effect—'*Āhutibhiriva hutādo devān priṇāti*,' '*Tasmai prītā iṣamūrjam niyachchhanti*' ['One who makes the offerings pleases the deities with those offerings'; 'Being pleased with him, the Deities reward him with wealth and strength]'."

SŪTRA (8).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"IT IS FROM THAT TOO THAT IT ACCRUES."

Bhāṣya.

"*It is from that*—i.e. the Deity—*that it*—the fruit—*accrues*—to the worshipper ; when a man worships the Deity with sacrifice, then that Deity brings him into contact with the Fruit (the reward).—'How do you know this ?'—From the *Smṛti-text* and from *Custom*. There are *Smṛti-texts* declaring that 'the Deity rewards the Sacrificer with the Fruit'.—This *Smṛti* declaration is confirmed by such customary declarations as—'*Pashupati* was worshipped by him, and therefrom he got a son'.—There are Indicative Texts also to the same effect—(1) '*Sa it janēna sa vishā sa janmanā sa putrairvājambharatē dhanā nṛbhiḥ devānām yaḥ pita ramā vi vāsati shraddhāsanā haviṣā brahmaṇaspatim*' (?) ;—(2) '*Tṛpta ēvainamindraḥ prajayā pashubhistarpayati*' ['Being satisfied, *Indra* satisfies him with cattle and offspring'].—From all this it is clear that the Deity becomes pleased with the gift of offerings and with the singing of the praise of its good qualities,—and becoming pleased, it rewards the man with the desired fruit ;—which proves that the deity *Agni* is the dispenser of the fruit of that action by which it has been pleased, and with which it rewards the performer of that act ;—that any other deity, *Sūrya* for instance, is not able to give that fruit ;—all this,—as to who gives what,—is learnt from the Vedic text ; and the Vedic text, in this particular case, speaks of *Agni*, not of *Sūrya*."

SŪTRA (9).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT IS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE SACRIFICE THAT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR; BECAUSE THE MATTER IS ONE THAT CAN BE DETERMINED ONLY BY THE VEDIC WORD; AND THE DEITY IS SPOKEN OF ONLY AS A SUBORDINATE FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*', 'in reality', signifies the rejection of the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.

What has been asserted above,—to the effect that the Deity is the prompter of details,—is not true; because, as a matter of fact, *it is the objective of the sacrifice*,—that is, the *Apūrva*, Transcendental Result, produced by the sacrifice,—*that should be regarded as the principal factor.*—"Why so?"—*Because the matter is one that can be determined only by the Vedic word*; in reality, what gives the Fruit is the prompter of the act; and what it is that gives the fruit can be learnt only from the Vedic text, *not* by means of Sense-perception or any other means of cognition;—the Vedic word clearly states that the Fruit proceeds from that which is denoted by the root 'to sacrifice',—not from the Deity.—"How do you know that?"—We learn it from the fact that it is the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices* that are spoken as the Instrument, in the text, '*Darshapūrṇamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajēta*'; so also in the text '*Jyotiṣṭomēna svargakāmo yajēta*'; in all such texts we find the '*sacrifice*', not the '*deity*', spoken of in connection with the 'desire for Heaven'.

Says the Opponent—"What the root 'to sacrifice' denotes is an act dealing with a substance and a deity [i.e. 'Sacrifice' is the act consisting of *the offering of a substance to a Deity*]".

True, that is so; but *the Deity is spoken of only as a subordinate factor*; the *Substance* and the *Deity* are both accomplished entities; while what is denoted by the root 'to sacrifice' is something that *has to be accomplished*; and whenever an *accomplished entity* and a *thing to be accomplished* are spoken of together, the former is mentioned only for the purposes of the latter.—From this it follows that the Deity cannot be regarded as the prompter of details.

It has been argued that—"the Deity is more '*desired*' even than the Objective, which is the *most desired*".—We do not deny the fact that the Deity is 'desired' (intended to be expressed); in fact, whenever a term denotative of a deity appears either with the (deific) nominal affix or with the Dative affix, it is at once recognised, on the basis of Syntactical Connection, that the Deity spoken of is 'desired'; but on the basis of Syntactical Connection, it is also recognised that the Fruit is connected with what is denoted by the root 'to sacrifice'; and from the Direct Assertion of the Vedic text, it is this latter—the *Sacrifice*, not the *Deity*,—that is recognised as Instrumental (in the bringing about of that Fruit). Even though it is true that the *Sacrifice* is for the sake of the *Deity*,—that

does not set aside the fact of the *Sacrifice* serving the purpose of bringing about the Fruit;—it is the Fruit that is the purpose of (desired by) the Man; all our activity is with a view to our own purpose,—and not to that of the Deity;—from this it follows that we would not have recourse to any activity on the prompting of the Deity; as for the Recipient (i.e. the Deity) of the offering of sacrifice being 'desired',—that also is possible in reference to the fruitful sacrifice, and only when this *Sacrifice* is instrumental (in the bringing about of that Fruit).

It has been argued that—"*Sacrifice* is the *worship of the Deity*, and in ordinary practice one who is worshipped is the principal factor."—But the matter in question need not be as it occurs in ordinary practice; in the case in question it is the *worshipping of the worshipped* that forms the principal factor.

As a matter of fact, therefore, *that* should be regarded as the prompter of Details which brings about the result; and hence *the objective of the Sacrifice* (i.e. the Transcendental Result) is what should be regarded as the prompter of the Details.

Further, in accordance with the *Pūrvapakṣa* view, it becomes necessary to admit that the Deity has a material body and eats what is offered,—because no 'offering' or 'eating' can be possible for one who has no body or does not actually eat.—In support of this view,—that the Deity has a material body and eats what is offered,—it has been argued that there are (*a*) *Smṛti-texts*, (*b*) *Custom*, and (*c*) *Indicative texts*.—This however is not right; because the *Smṛti* is based upon *Mantra* and *Athavāda* texts (of the *Veda*); it is a well-known fact that the knowledge that is derived from *Smṛtis* is on the basis of *Mantra* and *Arthavāda* texts; and we are going to show later on that the *Mantra* and *Arthavāda* texts do not lend support to any such notion (as that 'Deities have material bodies and eat the offerings').

Says the Opponent—"If the *Mantra* and *Arthavāda* texts do not lend support to any such notion, then the *Smṛti*-texts in question cannot be based upon those *Mantra* and *Arthavāda* texts".

Answer—The *Mantra* and *Arthavāda* texts afford a basis for the said declaration in *Smṛtis* only for those who look at the mere surface of those texts; those however who look into the texts carefully find out that the notion is actually set aside by the texts. And yet the notion (obtained from a superficial study of the *Mantra* and *Arthavāda* texts, even though set aside by their careful study) comes to be regarded by some people as the basis for the *Smṛti-declaration*.

It is on this same *Smṛti* again that the *Custom* (adduced by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) is based.

As regards the *Indicative text* (adduced by the *Pūrvapakṣin*)—'*Jagṛbhmā tē dakṣiṇam indra hastam*' (speaking of the 'right hand' of *Indra*),—it does not mean what it has been taken to mean—that '*Indra* has got a right hand'; what it means is that 'we have taken hold of what is Indra's right hand'; hence this sentence does not afford the notion that *Indra* has hands. —"If that is not so, then no such assertion is possible that 'we have taken hold of the hand'; because this assertion clearly implies the existence of

the hand,—'the hand exists, which we have taken hold of'."—This is not possible; even though *Indra* may have a hand, yet the assertion that 'we have taken hold of the hand' does not pertain to a perceptible fact; to this extent, the assertion is certainly an impossible one; under the circumstances, the assertion can only be taken either as an absurd statement or as a merely eulogistic declaration:—And this explanation is equally possible in our view also.—It might be argued that "the assertion has been made by a person who actually took hold of *Indra's* hand".—Our answer to that is that no such idea can be entertained; as that would imply that the Veda (as represented by the text in question) has had a beginning in time.—Nor can the text be taken as asserting that 'Some one took hold of *Indra's* hands'; as there can be no authority for such an assertion.—"From this text itself we deduce by implication that there *was* a person who took hold of the hand."—That cannot be right; because it is possible for untrue assertions also to be made; as in the case of such ordinary assertions as 'Ten pomegranates', 'Six cakes', and so forth.

For one who holds the view that '*Indra* has a material body', the addressing of that deity by the term '*Indra*' can only be for the purpose of invoking him,—and the invoking can be only for speaking to him; now any such speaking would be reasonable only when it had been ascertained that the Deity addressed is related to the speaker;—as a matter of fact, however, it is not recognised by any means that the Deity addressed is so related; and so long as this has not been recognised, the invoking must be useless.—"We recognise, on the basis of the text itself, that the Deity is invoked."—It has been already explained that there can be no justification for the assuming of Hands and other limbs, if there is to be an assumption of unseen (transcendental) factors.—In fact, it cannot be definitely ascertained (from the words of the text) that the particular Deity is being invoked; for the simple reason that there is no means available for ascertaining this. From this it follows that the words of invocation are not for the purpose of being *addressed*, but only for the purpose of indicating (the Deity);—and under the other view also—that 'the Deity has no material body'—the words would be regarded as serving the same purpose of indicating (the Deity).—Under the circumstances, the Vocative Ending would be taken as serving the purpose of eulogising: the sense of the eulogy being—'The Deity is such an efficient instrument of accomplishing the desired result that it accomplishes it, on being invoked, in the same manner as beings endowed with intelligence (body and other things)'. Thus it is by being treated as an intelligent being that the Deity (*Indra*) is invoked by means of a word with the Vocative Ending; and having been indicated by means of the invoking word, the Deity is told 'we have taken hold of your hand',—which only means 'we are dependent upon you'; and this only serves the purpose of reminding us that 'we should proceed to perform the rites in honour of this particular Deity, *Indra*'.

[As for the text that has been quoted by the *Pūrvapakṣin* on p. 138 of the Text—'*Imē chit indra rodasi*, etc.'],—what this means is 'O *Maghavan*, so praiseworthy is your fist that you hold within it the remote and

illimitable Heaven and Earth';—and here what is eulogistically spoken of as the 'fist' does not really exist; there is no proof for its existence. Then again, what the words of the Text also mean is, not that 'such a large fist is actually there', but that 'if you had a fist it would be large'; that is, 'You have a fist of a totally different kind and for a different purpose,—and even so that other fist of yours is large'.—"But praise is possible only through the mention of qualities that really exist."—Not necessarily; because even one who is not possessed of human limbs (and faculties) is eulogised as possessed of human limbs (and faculties); for instance, in such texts as the following:—(a) '*Ētē vadanti shatavat sahasravat abhikrandanti haritēbhirasabhiḥ viṣṭvāgrāvāṇaḥ sukṛtaḥ sukṛtyayā hotushchit pūrvē haviradya-māshata*' [where speech is attributed to *stones*];—(b) '*Sukham ratham yuyujē sindhurashvinam*' [where the river *Sindhu* is spoken of as having yoked the chariot].—From all this it follows that the Vedic texts (quoted) do not necessarily lead to the presumption that Deities are like human beings.

Similarly the other text quoted—'*Tuvigrīva indraḥ*, etc.'—does not mean that '*Indra* has a neck'; what it means is that 'if *Indra* has a neck, it must be large'; for the actual existence of the *neck*, there is no proof at all. Nor can the praise of the *neck* lead to the Presumption of its existence; because, even without resembling human beings (in the possessing of a neck), it would be possible for the Deity to be eulogised as such.—Then again, in the same sentence there are the words—'*Indro vṛttrāni jighnatē*';—now when the term '*indraḥ*' (as occurring here) has become connected with the two words here ('*vṛttrāṇi*' and '*jighnatē*'), it cannot be construed with the other words '*tuvigrīvaḥ*' and the rest; as that would render it necessary for the words '*indraḥ*' to be taken twice—(1) '*Indra* should be regarded as *tuvigrīva, with large neck*', and again (2) '*Indra* kills the *Vṛttras*'; and such a construction would involve a syntactical split; and yet what we find in the Veda is a single complete sentence. This character of the sentence is preserved only if the character of 'having a large neck' and the rest is not taken as enjoined in reference to the Deity, and the said character is taken as mentioned only for the purposes of praise.

Similarly, the sentence—'*Andhaso madē īdṛsho vṛttrāṇi hanti*'—is only predicative of the *Killing of Vṛttra*.

The sentence '*Bāhū tē indra romashau, akṣī tē indra piṅgalē*' also speaks only of *Indra's* arms as 'covered with hair'; and of Indra's eyes being 'tawny',—it says nothing regarding the *arms* and the *eyes* being actually there in existence.

There is a text which speaks of the actual presence of the *Eyes* (*of Indra*)—'*Chakṣuṣmatē shṛṇvatē tē bravīmi*' ['I address you, *who have eyes* and who hear'];—but this also is not meant to connect the *Eyes* (with *Indra*), but to connect the *addressing* with him;—this is what is meant by the clause 'I address you who have Eyes'; and here also it is for the purpose of eulogising the Deity that the *eyes* are spoken of as if they were actually present.—"How do you know this?"—We deduce this from the presence of the Dative Ending; if we took the sentence as laying stress

upon what is expressed by the basic noun (and not by the Dative Ending), then there would be a syntactical split,—as there would be two predications —(1) 'You have eyes', and (2) 'I address you who have eyes'.

From all this it is clear that there is no *indicative text* which points to the fact of Deities being like human beings.

Nor is there any 'feeding' or 'eating' in the case of sacrifices; in fact, the Deity never eats; hence the argument adduced (under Sū. 6) that "Feeding is for the sake of the Deity" is not true.

The '*Smṛti*', '*Custom*', and '*Indicative texts*' that have been put forward in support of the view that Deities actually eat the offerings,—are all refuted by the fact of the Deities having no material body.

Further, if the offering were made to the Deity actually eating it, then the substance offered would diminish in quantity.—Nor is there any proof for the statement that "Deities partake only of the essence of the food, like bees"; in the case of *bees*, we actually see that they take up the mere essence (of flowers); we do not see any such thing in the case of Deities. Hence we conclude that Deities do not eat the offerings.

As for the statement that "what has been offered to Deities becomes insipid" (which has been cited as proof of the fact that the essence of the offering is eaten by them),—this does not affect our position; as it is by reason of being exposed to the air, and of becoming cold, that the substance becomes insipid.

Further, the Deity does not own any thing; and not *owning* anything, how could it *give* anything?—It has been argued that—"there are (*a*) *Smṛti-texts*, (*b*) *Custom*, and (*c*) *Indicative texts*, which show that Deities do actually possess things".—But that is not so; because (*a*) as for the *Smṛti-text*, it has its source in *Mantra* and *Arthavāda* texts, as already explained above.—(*b*) As regards the *Custom* of having such names as 'the village of the Deities', 'the field of the Deities',—all this is purely figurative; as a matter of fact, anything can be said to be possessed by one only when he has the power to make such use of the thing as he likes; and Deities certainly have not the power to make such use of the village or the field as they like.—From this it also follows that the Deity cannot give anything; all that happens is that when the worshippers of the Deity have made an offering to it, out of this act of offering there comes prosperity to those worshippers.

It has been argued that—"there are texts indicative of the fact that Deities *own* things,—'*Indro diva indra ishē*' (which speaks of the Heaven as being possessed by *Indra*), and so forth".—But when we actually see that Deities do not possess anything, we conclude that all such statements are purely figurative.—Says the Opponent—"It is on the authority of Vedic declarations that we hold that Deities possess things; and from the well-known fact of Temple-priests making use of various things we conclude that such use is according to the wish of the Deities".—This is not right; what is vouched for by direct Perception is that the things are used according to the wish of the Temple-priests themselves (and not of the Deities);—this fact cannot be got rid of.—In fact, even those who speak of the Deities

as possessing the things, do not deny the will of the Priests (as determining the actual using of the things); in fact, they themselves say that 'the Deity does as the attendant priests wish'; and that person who follows the will of another and who cannot make use of the things according to his own wish cannot be the *owner* of those things.—Lastly, the text in question cannot be taken as a Direct Assertion (of a fact); in fact, on account of its speaking of the Present time, and by reason of its stating what is contrary to perceived facts, it has to be taken as a purely eulogistic declaration; and so long as the text can be taken as purely eulogistic, it cannot justify the statement that "on the strength of Direct Assertion, Deities should be regarded as possessing things".

Lastly, it is not a fact that the Deity unites people with the fruit of their acts,—for the sake of which they would worship it.—As regards (*a*) the *Smṛti*, (*b*) *Custom*, and (*c*) *Indicative texts* that have been put forward in support of the view that Deities are pleased and reward (the performer),—we have already answered the '*Smṛti-text*' and the '*Custom*'. As regards the *Indicative text*—'Pleased with him, the Deities reward him with wealth and strength',—this also does not lend support to the Opponent's view; as this text occurs in connection with an entirely different injunction, which lays down that 'one should avoid passing by the right'.—Similarly, the text—'Being satisfied, *Indra* endows him with cattle and offspring',—all that this lays down is the offering to *Indra*.

From all this we conclude that the Deity is not the prompter of any sacrificial detail.

SŪTRA (10).

IN THE CASE OF THE GUEST, HE IS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR, AS HIS SATISFACTION IS THE MAIN CONSIDERATION; IT IS NOT SO IN THE CASE OF THE SACRIFICIAL ACT.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 6) that the case in question is like that of 'guests'. This remains to be refuted.

What is done for the Guest must be regarded as *prompted* by the Guest; because in the honouring of guests, what is enjoined is that the guests should be pleased; the injunction being that 'the Guest is to be treated in such a manner as to please him,—Gifts may be made to him, or he should be fed,—whatever else he wants should be done,—he should not be forced to do what he does not wish to do'.—In the case of the *Sacrificial Act*, however, there is no such injunction of *pleasing* (the Deity).—Hence there is no analogy between the case of *Guests* and that of the *Sacrificial Act*.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): '*Substance*', '*Number*', '*Reason*', *and* '*Aggregate*' *are not prompters of details.*

SŪTRA (11).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*] "'SUBSTANCE', 'NUMBER', 'REASON', AND 'AGGREGATE' ALSO [SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE PROMPTER OF DETAILS]; BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF DIRECT ASSERTION."

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* we have the text—'Sprinkles the *Vrīhi-corns*';—(*b*) in connection with the same (sprinkling) there is the *mantra*; 'There are three *Paridhis* and three *Fuel-pieces*';—(*c*) in connection with the same sacrifices, we have the text 'One should approach the *Paurṇamāsi* with the *Chaturhotṛ-mantra*, and the *Amāvāsyā*, with the *Pañchahotṛ-mantra*';—(*d*) in connection with the *Varuṇapraghāsa*, forming part of the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifices, there is the text—'Offers the oblation with the winnowing-basket, because food is prepared by its means'.—[In (*a*) the act of *Sprinkling* is mentioned along with the particular *substance* '*Vrīhi-corn*';—in (*b*) the act is spoken of along with the particular *number*, 'three';—in (*c*) the act is spoken of in connection with the two *aggregates* or sets of sacrifices that go to make up the '*Pūrṇamāsa*' and '*Amāvāsyā* sacrifices;—in (*d*) the act is mentioned along with a *Reason*, 'because food is prepared by its means'].

In regard to all this, there arises the question—Are the acts of (*a*) *Sprinkling*, (*b*) *Reciting of the particular mantra*, (*c*) *the Approaching of the Paurṇamāsi and the Amāvāsyā*, and (*d*) *the Offering of the oblation with the winnowing-basket*, to be taken as prompted (respectively) by (*a*) the *Substance* (Vrihi-corn), (*b*) the *Number* (Three), (*c*) the *Aggregates* (or two sets of sacrifices), and (*d*) the *Reason* ('because food is prepared by means of it')?—Or are they prompted by particular Transcendental Results?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The various acts are to be taken as prompted by the *Substance* and the rest.—(*a*) In the case of the text 'Sprinkles the *Vrīhi-corns*', through *Context*, the act should be regarded as prompted by the Transcendental Result, while through *Syntactical Connection*, it should be regarded as prompted by the *Substance* (*Vrīhi-corn*); in fact, the *Sprinkling* has been mentioned along with the *substance*; and even then there is the further indication that the Accusative Ending in the term denoting the *substance* ('*vrīhin*') clearly signifies that the act of *sprinkling* is prompted by the *Substance*.—(*b*) Similarly in the case of the text 'Three *Paridhis*, etc.', it is understood to mean that what is denoted by the term 'three' should be uttered, on the strength of the *mantra-text*;—and it is a particular number (*three*) that is denoted by the term 'three',—and this number is denoted by the term by Direct Denotation; on the other hand, if we referred it to the Transcendental

Result connected with it, it would involve recourse to Indirect Indication,—as in that case the sense would be that 'as many the *Paridhis* so many should be spoken of'.—(c) Similarly, in the case of the text 'offers the oblation with the winnowing-basket', Syntactical Connection connects the act with the *Reason*.—How so?—Because what the text means is that '*because* food is prepared by its means *therefore* the thing should be connected with the offering of the oblation', and thus it lays down, in connection with the offering of the oblation, an article which is used in the preparation of food. It is only through *Context* that the act could be taken as prompted by the Transcendental Result; the meaning of the text in this case would be—'Because this oblation brings about the Transcendental Result, therefore it should be offered with the Winnowing-Basket'.—In all cases Syntactical Connection is more authoritative than Context; and hence in the present case, the Context should be set aside. The advantage in this case is that the text comes to mean that 'the oblation should be offered with any articles—the *Darvi*, the *Pithara* and the rest—that are used in the preparing of food'; and in this manner the 'preparing of food' becomes specially effective.—Against this, the following objection may be raised—'Under Discourse I (*Padā* ii, *Sūtra* 26 *et seq.*), it has been declared that the sentence in question ('Because food is prepared by its means') is not to be taken as laying down a *reason*, and that it is to be taken merely as a commendation of the *Winnowing-Basket*'.—The answer to this is that it is true that it has been so declared; but it is only *after* the act in question has been proved to be prompted by the Transcendental Result that the text can be taken as purely commendatory, on the ground that the same sentence cannot contain the injunction of the Winnowing-Basket for the offering of the oblation, as well as the statement of a Reason. [And it is still to be proved that the act is prompted by the Transcendental Result].—(d) In the case of the text—'One should approach the *Paurṇamāsī* with the *Chaturhotṛ* and the *Amāvāsyā*, with the *Pañchahotṛ*',—inasmuch as the act is spoken of along with the *Aggregates* (of sacrifices), it should be regarded, through this *Syntactical Connection*, as prompted by those *Aggregates*; and this sets aside the notion of its being prompted by the Transcendental Result, which notion could be based upon the indirect indication of the Transcendental Result, through *Context*.—From all this it follows that the acts in question are to be taken as prompted by the *Substance*, the *Number*, the *Reason* and the *Aggregate*."

SŪTRA (12).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"IN THE EVENT OF DETAILS BEING PROMPTED BY THE PURPOSE (TRANSCENDENTAL RESULT), THERE COULD BE NO RESTRICTION THROUGH SUBSTANCE."

Bhāṣya.

"If Details like those in question were prompted by the Transcendental Result, then, *there could be no restriction*—of details—*through substance*.

For instance, we have the text—'One should satisfy Mitra-Varuṇa, *with milk*,—Mathin, *with flour*,—Hāriyojana, *with fried grains*,—Shukra, *with gold*,—Pātnīvata, *with Clarified Butter*'; if this meant that Mitra-Varuṇa is to be satisfied *with milk* because that Deity is connected with the Transcendental Result of the main sacrifice,—then, on the same ground of all other Deities, Indra-Vāyu and the rest, being connected with the Transcendental Result of the main sacrifice,—they would all have to be satisfied *with milk*; and in this way all the substances might be used in connected with all the Cups (dedicated to all the Deities); and under the circumstances, there could be no sense in the restriction (in the above-quoted text) of substances in reference to Mitra-Varuṇa and other Deities.—From this also it follows that the *Sprinkling* and other Details are prompted by the Substance (Number, Reason, and Aggregate)."

SŪTRA (13).

[SIDDHANTA]—IN REALITY, THE PURPOSE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE PROMPTER OF THESE (DETAILS); AS THE OTHERS HAVE NOT BEEN ENJOINED, AND THEY ARE SUBSERVIENT TO THE SAID PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.

The Details in question cannot be taken as prompted by Substance and the rest;—because it is the '*Purpose*' that is the prompter of these details. By 'purpose' here we mean *the Transcendental Result*; all the Details are subservient to this Transcendental Result; because it is this Result that has been declared to be what should *be accomplished*;—and that which has been declared to be *what should be accomplished* is what is connected with the details of procedure.—As for the *others*—Substance, Number, Reason, and Aggregate,—these have not been enjoined as *to be accomplished*;—in fact, they have been enjoined *as subservient to the Purpose*; i.e. they have been mentioned only as subservient to the *Purpose*,—the Transcendental Result.—"What if it is so?"—Well, if it is so, then, inasmuch as these have not been enjoined as *to be accomplished*, they cannot be connected with the Details of Procedure.

Says the Opponent—"As a matter of fact, the Details in question have been mentioned along with the *Vrīhi-corn* and other things, and they must be connected with these latter;—then again, the Accusative Ending (in '*Vrīhin*') clearly shows that the particular Detail (*Sprinkling*) is prompted by the *Substance* (*Vrīhi*),—and the same ending (in '*Paurṇamāsīn*') shows that the particular detail (Mantra-reciting) is prompted by the *Aggregate* (of sacrifices);—and in the case of the other two texts, the fact of the particular details being prompted by *Number* (in the case of the text 'Three *Paridhis*, etc.') and by *Reason* (in the case of the text 'Offers the oblation with the Winnowing-Basket') is ascertained by means of Indicative Texts and of Syntactical Connection."

We say—No; because if this were so, then a Result would have to be assumed.

From all this it follows that the Details in question are prompted by the Transcendental Result.

Objection—"But even so, the exact form of this Transcendental Result will have to be assumed."

True, it has to be assumed; but this can be done by connecting it syntactically with the subject-matter of the Context. In your view, on the other hand, the Syntactical Connection would have to be with a declaration of Results, which does not occur in the Context at all.

"But, *Context* cannot set aside either *Syntactical Connection* or *Direct Assertion*."

True, it cannot set aside these. But the reason why your view has to be rejected is that there is no fruit of the action in that case; so that your interpretation being found to be impossible on the ground of uselessness, the *Sprinkling* and other Details would come to be enjoined, without any obstruction, by the passage laying down the entire procedure occurring in the same Context.

"Even though the Detail is connected with the Transcendental Result, it comes to be prompted by the same substance, *Vrīhi* (and Number, Reason, and Aggregate); so that what is it that is being urged?"

What if that be so?

"If that is so, then the connection of the *Substance, Number, Reason*, and *Aggregate* does not become ignored, and yet no Result has got to be assumed."

Our answer to this is as follows:—What you propose is not possible; because in the sentence 'Sprinkles the *Vrīhi-corns*', what is directly denoted is the *genus* '*Vrīhi-corn*',—and it is spoken of, either for the purpose of (indirectly) indicating the *particular Vrīhi-corn*, or for indicating a particular means of accomplishing the Transcendental Result; its purpose would be served by the indication of either one of these two things; and hence, it cannot be taken as indicating both. If, however, it be taken as indicating the particular substance (*Vrīhi-corn*), then, in the first place, there is this difficulty of having recourse to indirect indication, and (in the other case) there is the necessity of having to assume a distinct Result. In view of these two difficulties it becomes established that the genus ('*Vrīhi-corn*') has been mentioned only for the purpose of pointing out a particular means of accomplishing the Transcendental Result. And what is that means as characterised by the genus '*Vrīhi*'? That means is that the substance out of which Rice is obtained should be *sprinkled*; so that what renders the thing the efficient means (of accomplishing the Result) is, not its *being a substance*, but, its being *a thing out of which Rice is produced*.

This same reasoning may be applied to the case of *Number* (Reason, and Aggregate) also.

From all this it follows that the *Sprinkling* and other Details are prompted by the Transcendental Result.

SŪTRA (14).

[*Answer to Sū.* 12]—THERE WOULD BE RESTRICTION ON THE BASIS OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL RESULT ITSELF.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued above (under Sū. 12) that—" in the event of Details being prompted by the Transcendental Result, there could be no restriction through substance ". The answer to that is as follows :—The requisite restriction would be secured on the basis of the fact that (as explained above) the Genus (mentioned) serves the purpose of indicating a particular means (of accomplishing the particular Transcendental Result) ; so that, in connection with the Transcendental Result that is accomplished by the offering to *Mitra-Varuṇa*, the offering would be of *Milk* ; and, yet this particular Transcendental Result would not be accomplished by the offering to *Indra-Vāyu* ; hence the details of this latter offering to *Indra-Vāyu* could not be admitted on the basis of the Transcendental Result accomplished by the offering to *Mitra-Varuṇa* ; because the offering to *Indra-Vāyu* is an entirely distinct act leading to an entirely different Transcendental Result.—Thus it is that the requisite restriction would be secured *on the basis of the Transcendental Result.*

SŪTRA (15).

IF THE DETAILS WERE PROMPTED BY 'SUBSTANCE' AND THE REST, THEN IT WOULD APPERTAIN TO THE THINGS UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.

Bhāṣya.

For one who holds that the *Sprinkling* and other Details are prompted by Substance (Number, Reason, and Aggregate), a particular detail would have to be adopted *under all circumstances* ; that is, for instance, the *Sprinkling* would have to be done even to those *Vrīhi-corns* that are cooked for ordinary food ; and yet this cannot be admitted even by you (the *Pūrvapakṣin*). Thus this is a serious objection against the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.

SŪTRA (16).

"IT WOULD APPERTAIN TO ONLY THAT WHICH IS RELATED TO THE CONTEXT ",—IF THIS IS URGED [THEN THE ANSWER IS AS GIVEN IN THE NEXT SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya.

The Opponent might argue thus—" You have urged that the Detail would come to appertain to the thing under all circumstances.—But in reality, it would appertain to that only which is related to the particular Context ; so that the Context would be duly preserved and the contingency of the Detail pertaining to the thing under all circumstances would be avoided."

SŪTRA (17).

THAT CANNOT BE; AS SUCH IS NOT THE DECLARATION OF THE VEDIC TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

What has been suggested is not possible; because the declaration contained in the Vedic text is not to the effect that 'The *Vrīhi-corns related to the Context* should be prepared and sprinkled'.

"But this is what is deduced in view of the preservation of the Context."

We say—No. When the *Context* has been set aside by *Syntactical Connection*, it dare not restrict the admission of Details.—Even if the Context be not set aside, it does not possess the capacity to restrict the details. In fact, what is enjoined as *to be done* is something that *should be done*,—and not that which should be done only as related to some qualifying factor. Hence the Preparation or the Sprinkling that is enjoined is *not* only for such *Vrīhi-corns* as are connected with the particular sacrifice (in whose Context the injunctive text occurs).

SŪTRA (18).

"IT WOULD BE DUE TO OCCASION", IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer would be as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

"If you think that the *Context* cannot specify the *Vrīhi-corns* (to be sprinkled),—all right; *it would be due to the occasion*; i.e. the *Adhvaryu* priest would be able to judge from the occasion that 'this corn is meant to be cooked for food, and that is for the purposes of offering', and would then proceed to *sprinkle* that alone which is meant for being offered."

SŪTRA (19).

WHEN THEY ARE ALL EQUAL, 'OCCASION' CANNOT SERVE THE PURPOSE (OF SPECIFYING);—NO RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN ENJOINED; IN FACT, THE RELATIONSHIP (LAID DOWN) IS BETWEEN THE PURPOSE OF THE SACRIFICE AND THE VRĪHI-CORNS STANDING QUITE APART. FOR THESE REASONS, IT IS THE 'OBJECTIVE OF THE SACRIFICE' [THAT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE PROMPTER OF THE DETAILS].

Bhāṣya.

All *Vrīhi-corns*—those for food and those for offering—*are equal*; there are no such as are specifically meant for being offered.—"But those

that have been *prepared* are meant for being offered ".—This would be true, and would remove the incongruity in so far as it related to the Sprinkling and other subsequent details ; but it would still remain in force in regard to the *Preparation* itself. Because as regards the Preparation, there are no corns mentioned in the same Context ; as a matter of fact, the relationship laid down is between the *Vrihi-corns standing quite apart* (in a different context) and '*the purpose of the Sacrifice*', in the shape of *Preparation*.—" How so ? "—This is clear from the following text—'*Aparēṇa gārhapatyam prāgīṣam ano'vasthitam bhavati, tasya dakṣiṇam chakram āruhyānaso'dhi nirvapati*' [' Behind the *Gārhapatya* Fire, slightly to the east, there is the Cart, ascending the right wheel of this Cart, he prepares the corns '].

Thus the objection (urged in Sū. 15) still remains—that, according to the *Pūrvapakṣa* view, the Detail would appertain to the thing under all circumstances. Hence for reasons already stated before (under *Sūtras* 13 and 14), we conclude that the *Sprinkling* and other Details are prompted by the Transcendental Result.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *At the Agniṣṭoma, the 'silence' is prompted by the 'Previous Factors'.*

SŪTRA (20).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE 'SILENCE', BEING RELATED TO THE POSITION, SHOULD APPERTAIN TO THOSE (SUBSIDIARY TRANSCENDENTAL RESULTS),—BECAUSE OF THE DECLARATION OF THE VEDA,—AND BECAUSE IT SUBSISTS IN THAT.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Tsarā vā ēṣā yajñasya, tasmād yatkiñchit prāchīnamagnīṣomīyāt tēna upāṁshu charanti*' ['This is the Sly Tactics of the sacrifice, hence whatever is prior to the *Agnīṣomīya*, at *that* they act in silence'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the 'silence' prompted by (due to) all those (subsidiary) acts that are prior to the *Agnīṣomīya* offering? Or by the Final Transcendental Result (of the main *Jyotiṣṭoma*)?

On this question, the apparent *Siddhānta* is as follows:—This detail ('silence'), *which is related to the position*, is prompted by all those subsidiary Transcendental Results (of the subsidiary acts) preceding the *Agnīṣomīya*-offering, which help the Final Result directly,—and also by that (Transcendental Result) which brings about the embellishment of the principal substance offered.—"How is that?"—*Because of the declaration of the Veda*; i.e. the Vedic text connects, with the particular detail in question, only those factors which have been indicated as being within well-defined bounds of space [viz.: 'prior to the *Agnīṣomīya*'],—the clear meaning of the text being that 'they act *in silence* in connection with those factors that happen to be in the said position (prior to the *Agnīṣomīya*)'.

Says the Opponent—"But the use of the particular detail in question is indicated by *Syntactical Connection*, not by the *Direct Declaration* of the text."

We do not say that it is not indicated by *Syntactical Connection*; what we mean is that it is *syntactically connected* with what is *directly asserted*, not with, either what is pointed out by the Context, or with what is indirectly indicated, or with what is assumed.

The Opponent argues—"We admit that the Detail in question is related to the subsidiary Transcendental Results; but we do not admit that it is related also to that Transcendental Result which brings about the embellishment of the principal substance.—'Which is that?'—It is that which brings about the embellishment of the principal substance and exists at the previous place."

Our answer to this is as follows:—*Because it subsists in that*;—that is, because *it*—i.e. Transcendental Results like the subsidiary ones—*subsists in that*—i.e. in the *prior position*.—There is a hymn called the '*Somapari-*

vahaṇīya', from which it is clear that the Transcendental Result is related to the Position.

There is another text—'*Praṇītāḥ praṇēṣyan vācham yachchhati tām saha haviṣkṛtā visṛjati*' ['When going to fetch the *Praṇītā* vessels, he restrains his speech,—he unchains it in the company of the Preparer of the Sacrificial offering'];—here also the 'speech-restraint' is a detail related to those factors that are in the particular position (prior to the *Fetching of the Praṇītā Vessels*),—and not to the Final Transcendental Result.—Exactly the same is the case with the '*silence*' that we are discussing.

SŪTRA (21).

[*The Pūrvapakṣin objects to the Siddhānta*]—"BUT IT SHOULD APPERTAIN TO THE [FINAL TRANSCENDENTAL RESULT OF THE] MAIN SACRIFICE; BECAUSE IT IS CONNECTED WITH THAT."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('but') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

"It is not true that the 'silence' appertains to those factors that are related to that position.—'To what then does it appertain?'—It should appertain to the Final Transcendental Result.—'Why so?'—*Because it is connected with that*; there is connection with that,—i.e. with the Sacrifice—spoken of in the sentence—'*Tsarā vā ētad yajñasya yat prāchīnam agnīṣomīyāt*'; which is to be construed as '*Yajñasya yat prāchīnam*' ('that which is prior to the sacrifice'),—and not as '*Tṣarā yajñasya*' ('It is the *Tsarā* of the sacrifice').—'Why so?'—Because if the word '*Yajñasya*' qualifies (and is taken along with) '*prāchīnam*' ('what is prior'), then it becomes a part and parcel of the injunctive word; and thereby becomes conducive to a particular activity. In the other construction, it becomes part of a commendatory statement and as such, serves no useful purpose, because 'a mere statement serves no useful purpose' (as declared under *Sūtra* 1. 2. 19).—Then again, the term '*prāchīna*' ('prior') directly denotes a particular portion of the sacrifice, and it is only indirectly that it indicates the sacrificial details; and when there is a conflict between Direct Denotation and Indirect Indication, it is the Direct Denotation that should be accepted. From this it follows that the detail in question appertains to the *prior position*;—it is with this that it is connected through Direct Assertion,—not with the *factors appearing at that prior position*; as with these latter, its connection could be based only upon Indirect Indication.—In fact, even if the word '*Yajñasya*' were part of a purely commendatory statement, even so it would be the *Prior Position* that would be connected with the Detail in question; by Direct Assertion; and the *factors occurring at the prior position* would, even in that case, be connected only by Indirect Indication. Hence the only right view to take is that the detail in question is prompted by the main sacrifice (i.e. the Final Transcendental Result).—Lastly, the help

rendered (by the detail) to the Final Transcendental Result is directly perceptible: viz.: if the performer performs all that goes prior to the *Agniṣomīya*, *in silence*—i.e. with slow effort,—he does not become fatigued and hence performs the various rites of the *Sutyā Day* with comparative ease.—From all this it follows that the Detail in question is prompted by the Final Transcendental Result."

SŪTRA (22).

[*Pūrvapakṣin's argument continued*]—"IT IS THUS TOO THAT THE DESCRIPTION BECOMES APPLICABLE."

Bhāṣya.

"As a matter of fact, the description contained in the sentence—'*Tsarā vā ēṣā yajñasya yat prāchīnamagnīṣomīyāt*'—is applicable only to the one factor that occupies the entire space [i.e. the main sacrifice];—'*tsarā*' means *sly tactics*; the meaning of the text therefore is—'Just as, when the Bird-Catcher proceeds to catch a bird, he adopts the *sly tactics*, stepping slowly, fixing his eyes upon the bird, and making no noise,—all with the intention of taking the bird unawares,—in the same manner, in the case in question, with a view to take the sacrifice unawares, one should adopt silence';—And as in the case of the Bird-Catcher, the place where he steps slowly is not for the sake of that *Place*, but for the sake of catching the Bird sitting at that place,—similarly in the case in question, the *silence* is adopted, not for the sake of the factors occupying the place in question, but for the sake of the (main) sacrifice that occupies the whole place.—If one takes the term '*tsarā*' (sly tactics) as qualifying the *sacrifice*,—for him the commendatory statement—'*Tsarā eṣā yajñasya*',—all the more clearly indicates that the Detail is prompted by the Final Transcendental Result;—the meaning being—'As the *Sly Tactics* is to the Bird, so is *Silence* to the Sacrifice'."

SŪTRAS (23-24).

[*Pūrvapakṣa argument concluded*]—"IF IT BE URGED THAT—'WHAT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED IN REGARD TO THE TEXT SPEAKING OF THE PRAṆĪTĀ-VESSEL SUPPORTS THE SIDDHĀNTA VIEW',—THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT THAT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE THE SACRIFICE IS NOT MENTIONED THERE AT ALL."

Bhāṣya.

"It has been argued (under Sū. 20) that 'What has been explained in regard to the text speaking of the *Praṇītā-Vessel*, etc. etc.';—and this has to be refuted,—(which is done in Sū. 24):—It is not right that 'the Detail should appertain to the factors occupying that place, and not to the Final Transcendental Result'; because in the sentence quoted (speaking of speech being unchained when going to fetch the *Praṇītā*-vessels), the connection of the 'speech-restraint' does not imply any connection between the said factors and any parts of the sacrifice;—for the simple reason that

the Sacrifice is not mentioned there at all; i.e. the correlative term 'sacrifice' is not found in the sentence quoted.—'But it has been just pointed out that it is while *performing the sacrifice* that the *Adhvaryu* and the *Sacrificer* restrain their speech'.—Our answer to this is that the same would hold good also in the case of the detail pertaining to the sacrifice occupying the entire space.—'How so?'—The two men restrain their speech for the purpose of spreading out the sacrifice; and while they are restraining their speech, and their minds are not distracted, they would perform the various items without committing mistakes; so that not a single item, or part of an item, becomes omitted;—on account of his speech being restrained, the *Adhvaryu* will have his mind concentrated on the work and will, therefore, not commit any mistakes in regard to any item of the performance; the Sacrificer also, with his speech restrained, will have his mind not distracted by anything else, and will thus be able to apprise the priest if the latter happen to make any mistakes. As for the Sacrifice, it is spread out by means of its subsidiaries coming in uninterruptedly; and the Sacrifice is not spread out by 'speech-restraint' through its own parts and subsidiaries, if it is done at the time alone. In fact, the Sacrifice, by itself, is not connected with the 'spreading out'. Hence what has been urged is possible also if the Detail is prompted by the subsidiaries; the sense being that 'When the *Adhvaryu* and the *Sacrificer* restrain their speech, they become like Prajāpati and then proceed with the Sacrifice (as Prajāpati proceeds with creation); so that they do it for this visible purpose—not for any invisible (transcendental) purpose'; this is what follows from the use of the Present Tense—'Just as we know that the Sacrifice is duly performed by means of the restraining of speech'."

SŪTRA (25).

[*Siddhāntin's answer to the Pūrvapakṣa arguments*]—IN REALITY, THE DETAIL SHOULD APPERTAIN TO THE FACTORS OCCUPYING THE SAID POSITION ; BECAUSE NO AGGREGATE HAS BEEN ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* takes up the thread of the *Siddhānta* set forth above (under Sū. 20) and answers the arguments put forward by the *Pūrvapakṣin* in the intervening *Sūtras*.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view just set forth. It is not right to regard 'Silence' as prompted by the Final Transcendental Result; in fact, it is clear that it is prompted by all those factors that are 'prior to the *Agnīṣomīya-offering*'.—"Why?"—*Because no aggregate has been enjoined*; by 'aggregate' here we mean the whole set of the repeated sacrificial offerings with the 'Cups'; and there is no injunction to the effect that any part of that 'aggregate' is to be connected with 'Silence'; because the sentence is not to be construed as '*Yajñasya yat prāchīnam*' ['that which is prior *to the Sacrifice*'], it is to be construed as '*tsarā eṣā yajñasya*' ['This the sly tactics *for the Sacrifice*'].—"Why

so ?"—Because the term '*tasmāt*' ('therefore') comes between (the terms '*yajñasya*' and '*prāchīnam*') [which two therefore cannot be construed together].

But even if the 'Sacrifice' were connected with 'prior',—then too the *Silence* could not be regarded as prompted by the Final Transcendental Result. Because the term '*yat*' (in the text '*yatkiñchit*, etc.') does not stand for the *Place* (or *Position*); what it stands for are the factors occupying the Position; if it had stood for the *Position* itself, then the form of the expression should have been '*Yat prāchīnam agniṣomīyāt*' ('*That which* is prior to the *Agniṣomīya*'), and not '*yatkiñchit*, etc.' ('*whatever* is prior to the *Agniṣomīya*'); because the latter form is used when repetition is intended, and there is repetition only when there are several factors concerned, not when there is only one; and the *Position* is one only, while the Factors occupying the Position are several;—from which it follows that the 'Silence' is connected with these *Factors*, not with the *Position*.—"But how do you know that *Repetition* is meant ?"—It is clearly indicated by the expression '*yatkiñchit*'.—"But the term '*Kim*' (in '*Kiñchit*' meaning *what*) implies *ignorance*".—Certainly the particular details (of the several factors in the Sacrifice) are *not known*, and it is these that are indicated as *meant to be known*; and it is only when there are several factors that, there are general and particular details. From all this it is clear that it is the Factors occupying the said Position that are indicated by the *Repetition* (expressed by '*yatkiñchit*'),—and it is these factors that are connected with *Silence*.

The Opponent raises a fresh objection—"In connection with the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and other subsidiary sacrifices of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there has been enjoined a characteristic detail different from 'Silence', in the following text—'*Yāvatyā vāchā kāmayēta tāvatyā dīkṣaṇīyāyāmanubrūyāt prāyaṇīyāyām mandrataramātithyāyāmupāṁshūpasatsu*' [where we have several terms, *high*, *slightly lower* and so forth laid down]; under the circumstances, how could 'Silence' alone be adopted at these [as it should be, in accordance with the *Siddhānta* view] ?"

Answer—That characteristic detail which is laid down in the text just quoted would apply to cases where the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and other sacrifices form the principal sacrifice; because these sacrifices are spoken of along with the term 'principal'; so that the 'silence' would come in those performances of these sacrifices where they do not form the principal sacrifice; because of the general injunction (that 'silence' is to be observed in all that comes prior to the *Agniṣomīya*).

The purpose served by the present discussion is as follows:—At the *Kuṇḍapāyināmayana*, performances laid down in such texts as 'They offer the *Agnihotra* for a month' come 'prior to the *Agniṣomīya*'; and if the *Pūrvapakṣa* were accepted, then these would have to be connected with 'Silence'; while they would not be so connected, if the *Siddhānta* view were accepted.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *In connection with the laying of the Fire-altar, the 'stirring' of the Fire should be done only once.*

SŪTRA (26).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" BEING AN ACCESSORY OF THE 'FIRE', IT SHOULD BE REPEATED WITH EACH BRICK; BECAUSE IT IS A COLLECTION, LIKE THE 'PAURṆAMĀSĪ'."

Bhāṣya.

There is the rite of 'Fire-laying' (setting up of the Fire-altar) laid down in the Text.—' *Ya ēvamvidvān agnim chinutē*' [' Knowing this, one lays the Fire ']; in connection with that same Rite, the following is laid down—' *Hiraṇyashakalasahasrēṇāgnim prokṣati, Dadhnā madhumishrēṇāgnim prokṣati, Vetasashākhayā avakābhishchāgnim viprakarṣati, Maṇḍūkenāgnim viprakarṣati*' [(*a*) ' Sprinkles the Fire with a thousand gold-pieces ',—(*b*) ' Sprinkles the Fire with Curds mixed with honey ',—(*c*) ' Stirs the Fire with a *Vētasa-stick* and with the *Avakā-sticks*',—(*d*) ' Stirs the Fire with the frog '].

In regard to this, there arises the following question—[When the Fire-altar is being set up] are the *stirring* and the *sprinkling* to be done to each Brick (in the altar)? Or, are they to be done only once for all?

The point to be considered first is—Does the word ' Fire ' (in the text quoted) stand for the *collection of Bricks*? Or for some other substance (*whole* in itself)? For, if it stands for the *collection of Bricks*, then, inasmuch as there would be no ground for singling out any *one* brick to which the *stirring* and the *sprinkling* could be done, they would have to be done to every one of the bricks; if, on the other hand, the term ' Fire ' stands for something (an entire whole) different from the (individual) *Bricks*, then, they would be done only once.

On the main question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—" The *Stirring* and the *Sprinkling* should be done to every one of the Bricks.—' Why?'—Because the term ' Fire ' stands for the *collection* (of Bricks).—' How is that deduced?'—It is deduced from the fact that there is no other substance; there is absolutely no other substance which could be taken to be denoted by the term ' Fire '; so that (if the acts were not done in connection with the Bricks) what would be there in which the Fire could be deposited? —' But how do you know that there is no other (entire) substance?'—This follows from the fact that the thing spoken of is different in character from an *entire substance*; an object is regarded as one *entire whole*, when by the pulling of any one part of it, the whole object becomes pulled.—' What is the meaning of this?'—If, in the act of pulling a substance by the hand, only that part of it becomes pulled out with which the hand is connected, then the object is not an *entire whole* by itself. ' Why should

such be the conclusion?'—Because the likelihood is that another part of it also would be similarly pulled out.—If, even in such circumstances, it be held that the *entire substance* becomes pulled,—then it might be possible to pull out the component parts of that substance which, in itself, has no component parts.—Nor will it be right to hold that the acts that are laid down are in the nature of connection with what is in conjunction with something else (i.e. the Bricks in conjunction), irrespectively of the substance being an *entire whole*. It will not be right to say so, because until the faggot of wood has been tied up with a rope, the pulling of any one piece of wood does not lead to the other pieces being pulled up. It is only in a case where a thing is conceived of as 'one' by reason of the combination of a number of things, and there is no idea, either direct or inferred, of these being the component parts of that 'one thing'—there alone it is said that 'another substance (one entire whole) has come into existence'.—Now, in the case in question (of the altar made of Bricks), it is found that that brick alone comes out which is actually pulled, and the other bricks do not come out;—the points of junction between the bricks are also clearly perceived; from this it follows that there is no cementing of the component particles (bricks) and hence it cannot be any one entire substance distinct from the Bricks.—When it is laid down that 'The Fire-altar is to be set up with bricks', it is only the setting up that should be done with the bricks;—but there is no visible purpose served by the mere setting up of the bricks;—hence what is understood to be particularly marked is the *collection* of those bricks that have been set up for the purpose of depositing the Fire;—such being the case, the *Sprinkling* and the *Stirring* should be done to all the bricks.

"*Like the Paurṇamāsī*;—in the case of the injunction 'One who knowing this, performs the *Paurṇamāsī*, one who knowing this, performs the *Amāvāsyā*' (which lays down the *Paurṇamāsī* and *Amāvāsyā* Sacrifices), what are actually performed are the *Āgnēya* and all those acts that go to make up the '*Paurṇamāsī Sacrifice*',—and not any Sacrifice distinct from those,—so in the case in question also [what are to be dealt with by *sprinkling* and *stirring* are all the *Bricks* that go to make up the *Fire-Altar*, and not any substance distinct from them]."

SŪTRA (27).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE DONE TO THE FIRE [-ALTAR], BECAUSE IT IS ONE SUBSTANCE; THE OTHERS (BRICKS) ONLY SUBSERVE THE PURPOSES OF THAT SUBSTANCE.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') sets aside the view set forth above.

It is not right that the *Sprinkling* and the *Stirring* should be done to each of the Bricks;—they should be done once only. We proceed to explain this—As a matter of fact, what is erected with the Bricks is something different from the Bricks themselves;—it is in that thing that the Fire is to be

deposited;—and it is that thing which is denoted by the term '*Agni*', 'Fire' (in the text under consideration).—"How so?"—When it is laid down that 'One sets up the Fire-altar with bricks', the *bricks* are clearly mentioned as subserving the purposes of something different from themselves; the Instrumental Ending in the word '*iṣṭakābhiḥ*' ('with bricks') clearly shows that the Bricks subserve the purposes of something different from themselves. If the mere *setting up* (of the Bricks, and not the bringing into existence of a new object) were meant by the Injunction, then that *setting up* could only be an embellishment for the Bricks,—and in that case the correct ending to be used would be the *Accusative*, and that would set aside the *Instrumental* Ending.—From all this it follows that a new object, something different from the individual Bricks, is made (when the Fire-altar is set up);—in this the Fire is to be deposited;—and it is for the purpose of this new object that the *Bricks* and the *setting up* are there.

Says the Opponent—"We have already explained that because this explanation is not possible that another view (the *Pūrvapakṣa* view) has been taken up."

Answer—It is not true that the explanation (suggested by us) is not possible; in fact, the fact of the object (Fire-altar) being a single *unitary entity* is clearly perceptible; and this would not be possible if the term stood for the *several bricks* (that go to make up the Altar). Nor are the points of joining between the bricks visible when they have been covered with plaster. Hence, inasmuch as, even when there is a mixture (in the Altar) of baked and unbaked bricks, the notion that *it is one thing*, that is present, it follows that it is an object different from the individual Bricks, meant as a receptacle for the Fire.

In fact, the idea that there is a cementing of the Bricks is also due to the idea that the altar is a *single entity*.

As for the argument that—"(in the case of a single object) the pulling of one part leads to the pulling of the whole thing",—it is true that in the case of several things cemented together, there is dismemberment; but things are of two kinds—some are immovable (inanimate), some movable (animate); it is in the case of the former that there is dismemberment (on pulling); for instance, when the tree is pulled by the leaf, the whole tree does not become pulled,—because it is an immovable thing; similar is the case with the thing in question,—*the Fire-altar* being an immovable thing.

From all this it follows that the *Sprinkling* and the *Stirring* are to be done once only.

SŪTRA (28).

IT IS BECAUSE THERE IS AN AGGREGATE OF INJUNCTIONS THAT THE CASE OF THE 'PAURṆAMĀSĪ' IS TREATED LIKE THAT.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—"In the case of the injunction 'One who knowing this, should perform the *Paurṇamāsī*, etc. etc.', there is nothing

distinct from the *Āgnēya* and other component sacrifices,—and that the same should be the case here also".—The answer to this is that it is only right that the case of the *Paurṇamāsī* has been treated like that; because what is laid down there is only an act (the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice) which is only an aggregate of the several enjoined acts (*Āgnēya* and the rest),—and there is nothing else to be brought into existence by means of that Act; in the present case, on the other hand, there is a distinct object (laid down as to be set up, in the shape of the *Fire-altar*).—Hence there is no analogy between the case of the *Paurṇamāsī* and the present case.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *That the 'Patnīsaṁyāja' should be the last item applies to those 'Ahan' (Diurnal Offerings) which precede the Final 'Ahan-offering'.*

SŪTRA (29).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THAT THE PATNĪSAṀYAJA SHOULD BE THE LAST ITEM APPLIES TO ALL, AS THERE IS NO DISTINCTION."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Dvādashāha*, which consists of a set of 'Diurnal Offerings',—laid down in the text, '*Dvādashāhēna prajākāmam yājayēt*' ['If one desires offspring, he should make him offer the *Dvādashāha* Sacrifice'];—in connection with that, we read—'The Diurnal Offerings are completed with the *Patnīsaṁyāja-offering* as the last item'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are all the Diurnal Offerings meant to end with the *Patnīsaṁyāja*? Or only those that precede the Final Diurnal Offering?—This question is raised in connection with all the Diurnal Offerings with the exception of the *tenth* one; as this latter has been declared by a clear text to end with the '*Mānasa*'-offering.

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"All the Diurnal Offerings should be taken as ending with the *Patnīsaṁyāja*.—Why?—*Because there is no distinction*; when the text lays down that 'the Diurnal offerings are to end with the *Patnīsaṁyāja*', it lays it down without any distinction; nor is it possible to make any distinction; hence it must apply to all the Diurnal Offerings".

SŪTRA (30).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, FROM THE INDICATIVE TEXT IT IS CLEAR THAT IT APPLIES TO THE OFFERINGS PRECEDING THE FINAL ONE.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

That they should end with the *Patnīsaṁyāja* should apply to those Diurnal Offerings that precede the Final One.—Why so?—Because of the Indicative Text; there is the following indicative text—'*Patnīsaṁyājāntāni ahāni santiṣṭhantē—na barhiranupraharati asaṁsthito hi tarhi yajñaḥ*' ['The Diurnal Offerings should end with the *Patnīsaṁyāja*; one should not withdraw the fuel, as the Sacrifice is not yet completed'];—this clearly indicates that the *Patnīsaṁyāja* should be the last item in those Diurnal Offerings *where the Sacrifice is still incomplete*.—"How so?"—Because the *incompleteness* of the sacrifice has been put forward as a reason; the meaning of the text being—'*because* these Diurnal Offerings are incomplete, therefore

the *Patnīsaṁyāja* should be the last item in them';—and the *completeness* of the Sacrifice comes on the last day (with the Final Diurnal Offering).—Then again, we find 'incompleteness' spoken of in connection with those Diurnal Offerings of which the *Patnīsaṁyāja* forms the last item; from this it is clear that 'incompleteness' and 'having *Patnīsaṁyāja* as the last item' are meant to be co-substrate;—and 'incompleteness' has been found to be there before the Final Day;—from that we conclude that 'having the *Patnīsaṁyāja* as the last item' should also apply to the offerings preceding the Final One.

SŪTRA (31).

[*Objection*]—"IN FACT, IT IS ONLY A COMMENDATORY STATEMENT, JUST LIKE THE STATEMENT OF THE 'INITIATION' IN CONNECTION WITH 'NOCTURNAL COMPLETION'."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the *Siddhānta* view.

"It is not right that the character of having the *Patnīsaṁyāja* as the last item should be applied to the Diurnal Offerings preceding the Final One; it should be taken as applying to all the Diurnal Offerings, as there is no distinction.—It has been argued that—'*Incompleteness* is found mentioned in connection with those in whom the *Patnīsaṁyāja* forms the last item,—and as the sacrifice is incomplete before the Final Diurnal Offering, we conclude that the character of having the *Patnīsaṁyāja* as the last item should also be restricted to those preceding the Final Offering'.—But this cannot be right; as this view is not based upon any Injunction, nor upon any other proof; hence this view should be treated as a mere fantasy.—Then, it has been argued that '*incompleteness* has been put forward as a reason'.—That also has no force; as it has been already explained that such statements are 'merely eulogistic' (*Sūtra* 1. 2. 23).—Nor again is there any co-substrateness between *incompleteness* and the *character of having the Patnīsaṁyāja as the last item*; because the latter character, of having the *Patnīsaṁyāja* as the last item, has been directly declared by the Vedic text as applying to *all* Diurnal Offerings; while the applicability of *incompleteness* (of all Diurnal Offerings) to only those offerings that precede the Final One is only deduced from reasoning.—Lastly, the statement that 'The Sacrifice is incomplete' is purely *commendatory*, eulogising the character of having the *Patnīsaṁyāja* as the last item; the meaning being as follows—'The Sacrifice is incomplete,—it is found that it takes a long time to complete it,—because it takes a long time to complete it, let it be curtailed, and let the Diurnal Offerings end with the *Patnīsaṁyāja*';—as a matter of fact, each of the Diurnal Offerings is complete in itself; and yet they are spoken of as *incomplete* simply with a view to eulogise the character of ending with the *Patnīsaṁyāja*; as a matter of fact, every one of the offerings is complete in itself, as the *Avabhṛtha* (Final Bath) and the other rites in connection with them are all to be duly performed.—In fact, the statement in question

should be treated exactly like the statement of 'freedom from the fetters of Initiation', which is commendatory of 'finishing at night'. That statement is as follows—'The man who is initiated is put in the fetters of *Varuṇa*; the Day and Night are the fetters of *Varuṇa*; if one finishes the sacrifice during the day, he does not become free from the fetters of *Varuṇa*; it should be finished at night; thus is the man freed from the fetters of *Varuṇa* and also from all harm to himself;'—the phrase 'he is not freed from the fetters of *Varuṇa*' means that he is not free from the restrictions imposed by the Initiation; these restrictions are removed by the Final Bath. Or, the statement that 'he is freed from the fetters of *Varuṇa*' may be taken to mean that many of the restrictions are given up;—In the same manner in the case in question all that 'incompleteness' means is that 'it takes a long time to finish it'."

SŪTRA (32).

[*Answer*]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT SHOULD BE (AS ASSERTED IN THE SIDDHĀNTA); BECAUSE THE INJUNCTION IS NOT IN SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ANYTHING; IF IT WERE TAKEN WITH THE FINAL OFFERING, THAT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE INDICATIVE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*vā*' ('as a matter of fact') implies the rejection of the view set forth (in Sū. 31).

That the *Patnīsaṁyāja* should be the last item should pertain to only those offerings that precede the Final One; because the said character has not been enjoined with special reference to the Final Offering; the injunction that the *Patnīsaṁyāja* should be the last item is in reference to the *Diurnal Offerings in general;—if this were applied to the Final Offering, it would be contrary to the Indicative Text.*

Question—"How is this proved by reasoning (as apart from the Indicative Text)?"

Answer—What the statement—'The Diurnal Offerings are completed with the *Patnīsaṁyāja* as the last item'—means is that the rest of the rites is to be omitted. What is meant by 'completing', 'finishing', is that its performance is not continued,—that the action of the performer in relation to it ceases;—when all the Diurnal Offerings are being performed together, it is inevitable that one should stop at some part of one offering and take up those of the other;—there being no restriction as to when this stoppage should come, the text in question lays down the restriction that the stoppage should be at the *Patnīsaṁyāja*.—Now the visible purpose served by this stoppage is to secure the simultaneous performance of the details of the various offerings. In a case therefore where this purpose is not found to be served, there can be no justification for assuming an imperceptible result; and hence in that case the offering is *not* to end with the *Patnīsaṁyāja*.—This is exactly what is found to be the case with the

Final Offering,—in connection with which the aforesaid need (of securing simultaneity with the details of the succeeding offering) does not arise.—It is by this process of reasoning that we come to the conclusion that those offerings alone are to end with the *Patnīsaṁyāja* which precede the Final One; and this conclusion is further strengthened by the indicative text 'The sacrifice is incomplete' (as shown above, under Sū. 30).

Adhikaraṇa (10): *In the case of such injunctions as 'Should recite the first verse thrice', the reference is to the 'position' of the verse.*

SŪTRA (33).

THE REPETITION OF THE SĀMIDHĒNĪS SHOULD APPERTAIN TO POSITION, ON ACCOUNT OF PRIORITY.

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices; in connection with these, the following declaration is made in reference to the *Sāmidhēnī* verses—'*Triḥ prathamāmanvāha, triruttamāmanvāha*' ['Recites the first thrice; recites the last thrice'].

In regard to this, there arises the following question—What is laid down here,—does it appertain to the order of the verses as they occur in the *Ṛk-text* (of the *Saṁhitā*),—the meaning being, that what is to be recited thrice is the verse '*Pra vo vājā*, etc.' (which in the *Saṁhitā-text* appears before the other *Sāmidhēnī verses*)?—Or does it appertain to the *Position* of the Verse,—the meaning being that any Verse—not necessarily the one appearing first in the *Saṁhitā-text*—that occupies the first position at the actual recitation, is to be recited thrice?—"Why should there be any doubt in this matter?"—The doubt arises from the fact that both are possible: If the text quoted is interpreted to mean that 'among the *Sāmidhēnī* verses that which occurs first in the *Saṁhitā-text* should be recited three times', then what is laid down must appertain to the *Ṛk-text*; on the other hand, if the text is interpreted to mean that 'that should be recited thrice which is endowed with priority', then what is declared must appertain to the *Position*.

On the said question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"What is laid down should be taken as appertaining to the *Ṛk-text*.—'Why?'—Because *priority* (denoted by the word '*prathamām*', 'first', in the text) is related to the *individual* (verse), as it is the individual (verse) that is to be repeated.—'How do you know that this is so?'—We learn this from the use of the Feminine Gender (in '*prathamām*'); it is only an individual that can be called 'feminine'; hence the use of the Feminine Gender could be explicable only if the *priority* (expressed by the basic noun in the word '*prathamām*') were a qualification of an individual; and in that case that individual verse could be connected with the repetition.—On the other hand, if the meaning were taken to be that 'that is to be repeated thrice which comes first at the time that the verses are being actually recited',—then no *particular individual* would be meant to be repeated; [as there can be no certainty as to which particular verse would occupy the first position at any particular recitation; so that the exact denotation of the term '*prathamām*' would remain vague and uncertain, and hence

no definite particular individual verse would be meant]; and in that case, the use of the Feminine Gender would be inexplicable.—Further, this latter interpretation would also involve a syntactical split, as the sentence would contain two statements—(1) '*Anything* that has been uttered first should be repeated thrice', and (2) 'The *verse* that has been recited first should be repeated thrice'.—In our view, on the other hand, what is laid down in the text appertains (directly) to *that verse which is characterised by priority*; so that there being a single predication, there is no syntactical split.—Lastly, it is the Feminine Entity (*Ṛk*, verse) that is connected with 'priority' through the *Direct Denotation* of the words, while the Repetition is connected with it only through *Syntactical Connection*.—From all this it follows that what should be repeated thrice is the particular verse '*Pra vo vājā*, etc.', wherever it may occur at the actual Recitation."

Against the above *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—What is laid down in the text is that there should be three recitations of '*the first of the Sāmidhēnī verses*',—and this refers to, and is determined by, the *first position*, and not by the genus (the inherent characteristic) of any particular verse.—"Why so?"—As a matter of fact, there is no verse in the whole of the *Ṛgveda* which is *named* 'Prathamā' ('First') [and directly denoted by this term],—which could be repeated thrice; so that in the case of the *Pūrvapakṣa* view, the term '*prathamā*' ('first') of the text would have to be taken as *indirectly indicating* a particular verse; while in the case of the other view (i.e. the *Siddhānta*), the word '*prathamā*' is taken in its directly denoted sense (of that which occupies the *first position*);—and Direct Denotation is superior to Indirect Indication. Hence our view is the right one.

It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that—"Direct Denotation supports the *Pūrvapakṣa* view, as is clear from the use of the Feminine Gender; secondly that the *Pūrvapakṣa* does not involve a Syntactical Split; and lastly, it is only in accordance with the *Pūrvapakṣa* view that the use of the Feminine Gender is explicable".

Our answer to this is as follows—As a matter of fact, the Gender and Number of all adjectival terms are determined on the basis of the things that they qualify; so that, even if no particular individual were actually denoted as to be qualified (by the adjective '*prathamām*'), any Gender that would appear there would serve as the receptacle of that quality; as for instance, '*shuklaḥ*' is Masculine, '*shuklā*' is Feminine, and '*shuklam*' is Neuter; similarly '*shuklaḥ*' is Singular, '*shuklau*' is Dual, and '*shuklāḥ*' is Plural.—Though in the case of such expressions as '*Shuklām shāṭimānaya*' ('Bring the white piece of cloth'), what is predicated (by the term *shuklām*) is, not the *bringing of the cloth and other factors*, but only the relationship of the quality of *whiteness* [because the *bringing*, etc. is already otherwise known], and any specification by the particular Gender is not intended [because the *cloth* has no real gender],—yet the Feminine Gender is mentioned merely by way of *reference*—'*Shuklāmānaya*'; and as this is only by way of *reference*, there is no syntactical split. Such being the case, even though in the case in question, the connection of *priority* (denoted by the term '*prathama*', 'first',

with the Feminine Gender) is directly expressed by the word '*prathamām*',—yet what the *Repetition* is related to is mere *Priority*, not the Gender. If the connection of the *Repetition* with *Gender* were predicated by the word, then the mention of 'priority' would have to be regarded as a mere *reference*; for, if the connection with 'Priority' also were predicated, then there would be Syntactical Split.

Then again, it cannot be disputed that the term denoting the Feminine Gender qualifies the basic noun (with which it appears),—and that the Feminine affixes, '*Ṭāp*' and the rest, are added to such basic nouns as belong to the Feminine Gender; and there can be no connection between the qualification of one word with another word; e.g. in the expression '*Rājapuruṣo gachchhati*', the qualifying term '*rājan*', which qualifies '*puruṣaḥ*', has no connection with the term '*gachchhati*'.—When, however, the 'priority' is connected with the 'Repetition', the Feminine character which is already known (as qualifying the 'verse', '*ṛk*') is merely *referred to*; it is a well-known fact that all the sentences known as '*Sāmidhēnī* are *ṛk* (verses),—and the term '*ṛk*' is of the Feminine Gender. So that the very basis of the first sentence that is uttered (as *Sāmidhēnī*) is a *Ṛk*;—and it has been already pointed out that the Gender and Number of adjectival terms are determined on the basis of those of the receptacle (or basis) of the qualifying factors expressed by them;—so that, even when the *Ṛk* (verse) is not qualified (by the term '*prathamā*'), it will retain its Feminine gender [and hence there can be no need for *predicating* it through the term '*prathamām*'];—hence the sentence in question should be interpreted as —'The first sentence that is uttered should be repeated thrice,—and that first sentence is the *Ṛk* known as *Sāmidhēnī*';—thus it is clear that in the sentence '*Triḥ prathamāmanvāha*' ['Recites the first three times'], we have a mere *reference* to the Gender which is already (otherwise) known.

The whole of the passage in question reads thus—'*Triḥ prathamāmanvāha, triruttamām, tāḥ pañchadasha sampadyantē*' ['One should recite the *first one* three times; one should recite the last one three times; thus they become *Fifteen*']—[The number of verses called '*Sāmidhēnī*' is *eleven*; in certain texts, it having been laid down that 'one should recite *fifteen Sāmidhēnīs*,' the passage in question lays down the way in which this number 'fifteen' is to be made up; there are eleven original verses,—by repeating the first and the last thrice, there are four additional verses, and thus the number *Fifteen* is secured].—Thus the 'three-fold repetition' has been laid down for the securing of 'Fifteen *Sāmidhēnīs*';—this repetition must be of a complete *Ṛk* (verse), not of only a part of it; because it is the complete *Ṛk* that serves the purpose of 'Kindling the Fire' (*Samindhanavatī*, by virtue of which it is called '*Sāmidhēnī*').

From all this it follows that the text in question contains a mere *reference* to the (Feminine) Gender, and hence what is laid down appertains to *Priority*, not to the *Ṛk* (verse).

Adhikaraṇa (11) (A): *In connection with the 'Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa' Sacrifices, which have to be performed throughout one's life, the 'Ārambhaṇīyā-Iṣṭi' is to be performed only once.—Or (B)—The Ārambhaṇīyā-Iṣṭi is an 'Embellishment' of the Performer.*

SŪTRA (34).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"When the main Sacrifice is repeated, the Ārambhaṇīyā must be repeated, like the Prayājas."

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices laid down in the text—'Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices': in connection with these sacrifices, the *Ārambhaṇīyā-Iṣṭi* [Preliminary Sacrifice] has been laid down in the text—'One who desires to be an eater of much food should offer the cake baked on eleven pans to *Agni-Viṣṇu*, Cooked rice to *Sarasvatī*, the Cake baked on twelve pans to *Sarasvat*, and the Cake baked on eight pans to *Agni-Bhagin*'. In this connection some people declare the *Bhagin* to be the constant factor (in all the offerings).—That the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices have to be repeated has also been laid down in the text—'Throughout life, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*'.—

Now, in connection with this repetition of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, there arises the question—Is the *Ārambhaṇīyā* also to be repeated (with each performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*)?—Or not?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"It should be repeated; i.e. it should be performed several times.—'Why so?'—Because thus alone does the injunction of the performance become obeyed.—'*Like the Prayājas*',—the *Prayāja-offerings*, which are parts of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, are repeated with each performance of these latter,—similarly the *Ārambhaṇīyā* also, being a part of those sacrifices, should be repeated with each performance of those sacrifices".

SŪTRA (35).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, it should be performed once only because it is connected with 'Commencement', and the 'Commencement' is one only, the performance (of the main sacrifices) extending throughout the man's life.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

It is not right that the *Ārambhaṇīyā* should be repeated; in fact, it should be performed only once.—" Why ? "—*Because it is connected with 'commencement* (*ārambha*)'; the *Ārambhaṇīyā* is connected with the *commencement* of the performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*,—and the *commencement is one only*—for all the performances of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, throughout the man's life—" How so ? "—Having installed the Fires, one makes the declaration to the effect—' At each *Parvan* (New Moon and Full Moon) I shall perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* ';—it is when he has thus made up his mind that he would perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices that he performs the *Ārambhaṇīyā*,—the said *making up of the mind* being the '*ārambha*', 'commencement'; and this is common to all the performances of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*; as the whole series of performances throughout the man's life forms a single 'performance' (of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*; in accordance with the aforesaid determination of the man).—Even if the first step taken towards a performance be regarded as its '*ārambha*', 'commencement',—then too, all the subsequent performances are done by the man who has taken that first step.—So that in any case, the *Ārambhaṇīyā* should be performed once only.

ADHIKARAṆA (11) (B): *The Ārambhaṇīyā is an 'Embellishment' of the Performer.*

Or, we may interpret the *Sūtras* (34) and (35) in the following manner.

Bhāṣya.

It is acknowledged on all hands that '*ārambha*', 'commencement', is the first factor in the act.—Now, in connection with the *Ārambhaṇīyā-Iṣṭi* (which is performed before the performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* is commenced), the question is—Does the performance of the *Ārambhaṇīyā* accomplish the first factor of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* ?—Or, does it mean that, when a man is going to commence—i.e. perform, for the first time, the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*—the performance of the *Ārambhaṇīyā* renders him fit for the said *commencement* ?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa view* (as set forth in Sū. 34) is as follows:—" From the *Context* it is clear that the *Ārambhaṇīyā* is to be performed at the commencement of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices; if it were taken as bearing upon the performer, then a distinct result would have to be assumed;—hence, inasmuch as each performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* would be distinct, the *Ārambhaṇīyā* should have to be performed in connection with the performance of each *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*; just as the *Prayājas* are repeated with each *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*.—[Hence the conclusion on the question is that the performance of the *Ārambhaṇīyā* fulfills the first step in the performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*] ".

As against the above, the *Siddhānta* view (as set forth under Sū. 35) is as follows:—The *Ārambhaṇīyā* should be performed once only.—" Why ? "

—Because of the connection between the *man* (performer) and the *commencement*; that is, the *Ārambhaṇīyā* is enjoined as to be performed when the Performer is going to *commence* the performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa.*—"How so?"—The word '*nirvapēt*' ('should offer') clearly establishes a connection with the Agent (Performer); so that the denotation of the particular effort (activity, which is expressed by the Injunctive Ending) of the Agent is really what is meant to be expressed in its own form; in the other case, if what is denoted by the word (as a whole) were meant to be enjoined (and not the *effort* or *activity* of the Agent), then the denotation of that *effort* would have to be regarded as not meant to be expressed in its own form; it would, in fact, have to be taken as *referring* to what has been already enjoined in the sentence laying down the entire performance (of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*).

It has been argued that—"if it were taken as bearing upon the Performer, a distinct result would have to be assumed".—Our answer to that is that no such distinct result would have to be assumed; as that performer would be taken as meant by the injunction of the entire performance (of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*) who has already performed the *Ārambhaṇīyā*;—such being the case, the performer having become, at the very first performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, 'one who has performed the *Ārambhaṇīyā*', remains so throughout all the lifelong performances of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* [i.e. throughout his life he remains 'one who has performed the *Ārambhaṇīyā*']. When going to perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* for the first time, the man performed the *Ārambhaṇīyā* and thereby became 'one who has performed the *Ārambhaṇīyā*'; and when going to take up the second and subsequent performances of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, he still remains 'one who has performed the *Ārambhaṇīyā*' and hence fit for carrying on the performances.—It might be urged that—"if the *Ārambhaṇīyā* has been performed on the same day that the performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* is going to be commenced, then alone can the performer of the latter be regarded to be 'one who has performed the *Ārambhaṇīyā*,'—and at the second and subsequent performances of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, as he would not have performed the *Ārambhaṇīyā* on the same day as those performances, he could not be regarded as 'one who has performed the *Ārambhaṇīyā*'."—The answer to this is that by having performed the *Ārambhaṇīyā* on the same day as the (first) performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, the man *has* become 'one who has performed the *Ārambhaṇīyā*',—even in relation to the second and subsequent performances of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*; and hence fit for proceeding with those performances.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *In the 'Nirvāpa-Mantra', there should be no 'modification' of the terms 'Savitṛ', 'Ashvin', and 'Pūṣan'.*

SŪTRA (36).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE SUBSIDIARY CHARACTER OF MANTRAS IS BASED UPON THE FACT OF THEIR EXPRESSING A CERTAIN MEANING."—
[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT WHAT IS NOT ENJOINED IS NOT ADMISSIBLE; AS IT IS ONLY WHAT HAS BEEN ENJOINED THAT IS EXPRESSED (BY THE MANTRA).

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, where the following *Nirvāpa-Mantra* is used—'*Dēvasya tvā savituḥ prasavē' shvinorbāhubhyām pūṣṇo hastābhyām agnayē juṣṭam nirvapāmi*'. [Here we have the names of three Deities—(1) *Savitṛ*, (2) *Ashvins*, and (3) *Pūṣan*, in addition to the principal Deity, *Agni*.] [As an *Ectype*, a modified form of this, we have the *Saurya* sacrifice where the principal Deity is *Sūrya*].

In regard to the use of the said *Mantra* at the *Saurya* sacrifice, there arises the question—When the said *Mantra* comes to be used at the *Saurya*, should the terms '*Savitṛ*', '*Ashvin*', and '*Pūṣan*' be modified into terms signifying the *Sūrya*? Or should they be not modified at all [the *Mantra* being used in the same form as at the archetypal sacrifice]?

In order to consider this question, it is necessary to consider the following—Do these words ('*Savitṛ*', '*Ashvin*', and '*Pūṣan*') denote things that form part of the sacrifice? Or those that do not form part of them? —If the former, then they have to be modified (at the *Saurya*); if the latter, then, they have not to be modified, they have to be used in the original form unmodified.

We shall consider both these questions together.

The *prima facie* (*Pūrvapakṣa*) view on this appears to us to be as follows:—"The terms in question do denote things forming part of the sacrifice.—'Why?'—In fact the only perceptible purpose served by the words of a *Mantra* is that they express things forming part of the sacrifice. Thus while no perceptible purpose is served by the expressing of things that do not form part of the sacrifice,—a clearly perceptible purpose is served by the expressing of those that do form part of it. Consequently the terms in question can serve a visible purpose only if they are denotative of things that form part of the sacrifice.—'In what way could the words of the *mantra* in question be denotative of things forming part of the sacrifice?'—They could do so if the terms '*Savitṛ*', '*Ashvin*', and '*Pūṣan*' denoted *Agni* and other deities (of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice),

or if the deities named '*Savitṛ*' and the rest were deities of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice. In order to avoid the necessity (otherwise inevitable) of the words of the *Mantra* being taken as serving only unseen (transcendental) purposes,—either of the two alternative views may be accepted —viz. (1) the *Mantra* may be regarded as laying down *Savitṛ* and other deities for the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, or (2) the terms '*Savitṛ*' and the rest may be taken as denoting *Agni* and other deities already related to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*. As both of these views serve useful purposes, either one of them may be accepted.—The Opponent might argue thus—' From the *Mantra* it is clear that *Savitṛ* (*Ashvin* and *Pūṣan*) are only parts of what is spoken of in the concluding words *Agnayē juṣṭam nirvapāmi* (where the Deity *Agni* is mentioned); such being the case, even if the terms—*Savitṛ* and the rest—were to denote *Agni* and other deities (of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*), they would not add anything to the Deity already expressed by the terms *Agni* and the rest themselves. Nor is it necessary that the sacrifice can be helped by only those deities laid down in the *Mantra* which are denoted by the terms *Savitṛ* and the rest'.—The answer to this is as follows:—The various parts of the *Mantra* would be so many distinct sentences (each sentence speaking of one of the Deities, *Savitṛ*, etc.);—of these the clause '*juṣṭam nirvapāmi*' would be common to, and construed with, all those sentences;—those sentences can be subsidiary to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices only if offerings are made at them to these deities spoken of in the sentences; and it is on this basis that there is the Presumption that the deities spoken of in the *Mantra* are actually laid down for the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*.—Thus then, we conclude that either the terms '*Savitṛ*' and the rest should be taken as denoting *Agni* and the other Deities, or the said distinct sentences (constituting the *Mantra* in question) should be treated as optional alternatives to the sentence speaking of *Agni*."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The terms in question ('*Savitṛ*', '*Ashvin*', and '*Pūṣan*') should not be modified. There is no modification unless the factor in question is enjoined; as the *Mantra* *speaks of only what has been enjoined*. Hence we deal with the question in the following manner:—The terms '*Savitṛ*' ('*Ashvin*' and '*Pūṣan*') are *not* denotative of things forming part of the sacrifice (*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*).—"Why so?"—Because no such act has been enjoined in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* of which the Deities are *Savitṛ*, *Ashvin*, and *Pūṣan*; nor are the terms '*Savitṛ*', '*Ashvin*', and '*Pūṣan*' known to be denotative of such things as *Agni* and the other Deities.

Says the Opponent—"It has been already explained that one or the other of these two conclusions must be accepted on the ground of Presumption. That is to say, it is only if there is (at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*) some act of which *Savitṛ* and the rest are deities,—or, if the terms '*Savitṛ*' and the rest are denotative of *Agni* and the other deities (of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*)—that the use of the sentences speaking of *Savitṛ* and the rest can be explained;—because, as a rule, that Deity alone is to be expressed by the *Mantra* who is the Deity (recipient) of a certain offering;—it is also admitted that the terms '*Savitṛ*' and the rest appear

in the *Nirvāpa-mantra* only for the purpose of expressing things;—they are explicable therefore only if they express the deities of the offerings,—not otherwise;—it is also well known that the deities of the offerings (at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*) are *Agni* and the rest;—and hence it follows that the words '*Savitṛ*' and the rest are denotative of *Agni* and other deities".

Our answer to this is as follows:—If the terms in question were to become meaningless (useless) if one of the two facts (asserted by you) were not presumed, then it might be assumed that '*the subsidiary character of Mantras is based upon the fact of their expressing things*'.—As a matter of fact, even in the absence of the presumption of the said facts, the terms do not become meaningless (useless). Hence there can be no authority for presuming either of the two facts put forward.—Then again, (in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*) no such deities have been enjoined as bear the names in question ('*Savitṛ*', '*Ashvin*', '*Pūṣan*');—hence *what is not enjoined is not admissible*—as to be modified; specially because the *Mantra* speaks only of what has been enjoined.

It has been argued that—"In the text in question, Deities are what are expressed by the expressive terms, and no useful purpose is served by the expressing of such deities as have not been spoken of (enjoined)".—This has got to be refuted; it is this refutation that is set forth in the following *Sūtra*:—

SŪTRA (37).

IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THERE IS NO EXPRESSING OF THOSE (DEITIES); IT IS FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE THAT THE WORD IS USED.

Bhāṣya.

It is for this reason,—on this account,—*that there is no expressing*—*by the terms* '*Savitṛ*' *and the rest*,—*of those* (deities) that have not been laid down (in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*).—"For what purpose then is the term used?"—It is used for the purpose of the *Nirvāpa* (the act of offering); the words of the *Mantra* being explained as follows—(*a*) '*Dēvasya savituḥ prasavē*',—i.e. 'The *dēva savitṛ*', the Sacrificer, having brought forth (the offering),—(*b*) '*ashvinorbāhubhyām*',—i.e. by the arms of the sacrificing couple (the Sacrificer and his wife), with a view to the engaging of the services (of the Priests); the Sacrificer and his wife are called '*Ashvins*', because at the Fire-installation Rite, they have given away an *ashva* (Horse),—or because they *enjoy*—'*ashitavantau*'—the fruits of the sacrifice; thus the term '*bāhu*' stands for the man's own arms;—(c) As for '*Pūṣan*', the Sacrificer himself is regarded to be *Pūṣan*, on the ground of his *supporting* ('*puṣṇāti*') the Priests.—Thus every one of the terms in the *Mantra* is found to be eulogistic of the act of *offering*.

Says the Opponent—"Why cannot the words '*Savitṛ*' and the rest be taken out of their context and explained as denoting the deities *Savitṛ*, *Ashvins*, and *Pūṣan*, appearing in another Context? As they would be

taken out of their Context on the basis of Indicative Power, they could certainly set aside the limitations of the *Context* ".

Answer—It is case-endings accompanying the terms '*Savitṛ*' and the rest that make these terms adjectives qualifying something else; the denotation of the basic nouns however remains the same; and as this is expressed by the *direct denotation* of the term, it naturally sets aside what is merely indicated by *Indicative Power*. What Indicative Power does is to transfer the terms to another Context where *Savitṛ* and the rest do actually appear as deities,—this transfering being done on the understanding that the expressing of the meaning of the basic noun could only be for the purpose of mentioning the Deity,—on the ground that these deities do not figure in the sacrifice (*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*) that forms the subject-matter of the Context.—On the other hand, what the *Direct Denotation* of the case-ending does is to show that what is expressed by the basic noun is a qualification of something else; and this something else is (the Sacrificer) spoken of by a word in the Context itself (as explained above). *Direct Denotation* is always more authoritative than *Indicative Power*. Hence the terms in question cannot be taken out of their Context.

Says the Opponent—"If the terms '*Savitṛ*' and the rest stand for the *Sacrificer*, then why should there be no modification of them at the *Sattra* (where there is no *Sacrificer* apart from the officiating Priests)?".

Answer—The sentence is meant to serve the purpose of *worshipping*, not that of *permitting* (the Priests); the *worshipping* of the *unworshipped* is something that ought to be done; it serves a visible purpose. As for the *permitting*, that has already been done by the Sacrificer when he *appointed* the Priest; so that the doing of the same thing over again could only be taken as serving some unseen purpose.—Then again, in the expression '*justam nirvapāmi*' the verb '*nirvapāmi*' denotes the *doing of worshipping*;—the phrase '*savituḥ prasavē*' speaks of the *permitting* which has already been done, for the purpose of qualifying something else; in fact, even without the *permitting*, the Priest would certainly perform the *offering*, which is expressed directly by the word (of the text, '*nirvapāmi*'); but no *sacrifice* is anywhere spoken of as to be performed by a priest who has not been *worshipped*.—Thus then, inasmuch as the terms '*Savitṛ*' and the rest are meant for the purposes of *worshipping*, they should not be '*modified*'.

Adhikaraṇa (13) (A): *In the Mantra 'Agnayē juṣṭam nirvapāmi', the word 'agnayē' should be modified when used at the Ectypal Sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (38).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Being a term denoting quality, that also should be treated similarly."

Bhāṣya.

In the same sentence that we have been considering ('*Dēvasya tvā*, etc.'), the last words as used at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* are—'*Agnayē juṣṭam nirvapāmi*'.

In regard to these words there arises the question—When this *Mantra* is used at the ectype (the *Saurya* sacrifice, for instance), should the term '*agni*' also (like '*savitṛ*', etc.) be not modified, as that also is not denotative of anything that forms part of the sacrifice? Or should it be modified, because it is denotative of something that forms part of the sacrifice?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"If the question is as stated, then, inasmuch as the term '*agni*' also *is a term denoting quality, it should be treated similarly* (i.e. like the words '*savitṛ*' and the rest), and be regarded as *not* denotative of anything forming part of the sacrifice. —'Why so?'—In this same sentence, the terms '*savitṛ*' and the rest are *not* denotative of anything forming part of the sacrifice (as has been explained in the *Siddhānta* of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*); under the circumstances, if the term '*agni*' also were not denotative of anything forming part of the sacrifice, there would be uniformity, and uniformity is always desirable. Whenever the determining factors are similar, it is on the basis of that reason alone that we should have uniformity;—in the case in question, the determining factors *are* similar;—e.g. in the case of the terms '*savitṛ*' and the rest, 'what is expressed by the words in question does not figure in the sacrifice'; and in the present case also, what is expressed by the words '*agnayē juṣṭam nirvapāmi*' does not figure in the sacrifice; because what is expressed by the words '*agnayē juṣṭam nirvapāmi*' is *the offering of what has been 'juṣṭa'* (enjoyed or worshipped), and at the sacrifice, there is no such *offering of what has been enjoyed (or worshipped)*; in fact, what should be offered is what has been *not enjoyed*, and it is by the offering that it becomes enjoyed (or worshipped).—Hence it follows that the term '*agni*' also is *not* denotative of anything forming part of the sacrifice. And here also, the use of the term '*agni*' would be for the purpose of what follows,—i.e. for the purpose of eulogising the *offering*.—From all this it is clear that at the ectype, the term '*agni*' also should not be 'modified'."

SŪTRA (39).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT SO; BECAUSE IT DOES FORM PART OF THE SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

What has been said above is not right; because as a matter of fact, the words '*agnayē juṣṭam nirvapāmi*' do denote something that forms part of the sacrifice.—" But it has been already explained by us that what these words express is *the offering of what has been enjoyed*, and there can be no offering of what has been already enjoyed ".—Our answer to that is that the sentence in question does not express *the offering of what has been enjoyed*; what is expressed by it is *the making of the thing 'enjoyed' by the act of offering it*, the meaning being 'I am making the thing *enjoyed* by *Agni*'. In this way the sentence serves a visible purpose.

Thus, the determining factors in this case *not* being similar to those in the case of the terms '*Savitṛ*' and the rest, the right course is *not* to treat the two cases as uniform; and hence it follows that the term '*agni*', as denoting something forming part of the sacrifice, should be 'modified'.

Or, the two *Sūtras* 38 and 39 may be taken as embodying the following *Adhikaraṇa*—

(13) (B): *In the Mantra used in putting the Rice upon the Stone-slab, the term 'dhānya' should be modified.*

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we have the text—'*Dhānyamasi dhinuhi dēvān—iti dṛṣadi āvapati*' ['*Thou art Paddy, satisfy the Deities*—saying this, he should put the grains on the stone-slab'].—In regard to the term '*dhānya*', there arises the question—Does it denote something forming part of the sacrifice? Or not?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa*, as contained in Sū. 38, is as follows:—" The term '*dhānya*' appears to be *one denoting a quality*, and as such, it could not be denotative of anything forming part of the sacrifice.—In fact, the term '*dhānya*' denotes the *Paddy*;—and the *Paddy* is not put on the stone-slab for pounding;—the term '*dhānya*', in fact, stands for the *unhusked grain*;—while what is put on the slab is the *Rice* (husked paddy-grains);—hence though what is put on the slab (and which forms part of the sacrifice) is the *Rice*, yet the word in the text expresses the *Paddy*; so that what is expressed by the term '*dhānya*' is something which does *not* form part of the sacrifice;—and hence its use can only serve an unseen purpose; consequently there should be no modification of this term when the *Mantra* is used at the Ectype."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*, as set forth in Sū. 39:—The above view is not right. In fact, what is denoted by the

term '*dhānya*' does form part of the sacrifice;—the term denotes *Rice*, by indirect indication, on the basis of the fact that *Rice* is a product, a modified form, of *Paddy* (*Dhānya*);—just as in the expression—'*Kāshikēṣu shālayo bhujyantē gāvaḥ piyantē*' ['In the Kāshī-country paddy is eaten and *Cows* are *drunk*'], it being found that if these words were taken in their literal sense (*cows being drunk by the men*), it would necessitate the assumption of an unseen result (the stated meaning being absurd),—the word ('*gāvaḥ*', 'cows') is taken in its indirect figurative sense (as standing for *cow's milk*).—From this it follows that the term '*dhānya*' is really denotative of something that forms part of the sacrifice, and hence it should be 'modified' when the *Mantra* is used at the Ectypal Sacrifice.

The purpose served by this discussion is as follows:—There is the sacrifice known as '*Shākyānāmayanam ṣaṭrimshatsavatsaram*' ('a sacrifice performed by the *Shākyas*, lasting for thirty-six years');—in connection with this sacrifice, we read—'At the end of each day, the Master of the House goes out to hunt, out of the flesh of the animals that he kills are made the cakes used at the *Savanīya* offerings'.—At this offering the *Mantra* '*Dhānyamasi dhinuhi dēvān*' would have to be used in its *unmodified* form, —in accordance with the *Pūrvapakṣa*; whereas, in accordance with the *Siddhānta*, it would be modified into the form—'*Māṁsamasi dhinuhi dēvān*'.

Adhikaraṇa (14): *In the use of the 'Iḍopahvāna-mantra' there should be no modification of the term 'Yajñapati'.*

SŪTRA (40).

Even in a case where it has been enjoined, if it subserves the purposes of something else, there should be no 'Modification';—as in the case of Injunctions.

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, laid down in the text—'One desiring Heaven, should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices';—in connection therewith is the *Iḍā-nigada*, beginning with the expression '*Idopahūtā*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 7. 1. 2), where we read—'*Daivyā adhvaryava upahūtāḥ, upahūtā manuṣyāḥ, ya imam yajñamavān yē cha yajñapatim vardhān*' ['The divine priests have been invited, invited have been the men, those who protect this sacrifice and those who help the Sacrificer to prosper'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 6. 7. 4).

In regard to this, there arises the question—When this *Mantra* is used at a Sacrifice (*Satra*) where there are several 'Sacrificers',—should the term '*yajñapatim*' ('sacrificer') be modified (into its plural form)? Or should it be used in its unmodified form?

In connection with this, the first question to consider is—Does the term '*yajñapati*' ('sacrificer') denote something forming part of the sacrifice? Or does it denote something *not* forming part of the sacrifice? —"How would it be denotative of something forming part of the sacrifice?" —If the statement regarding the 'prosperity of the sacrificer' is helpful to the sacrificer, then the term 'sacrificer' denotes something forming part of the sacrifice; if on the other hand, the statement is merely eulogistic, then the term 'sacrificer' is *not* denotative of anything forming part of the sacrifice.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The term 'Sacrificer' denotes a thing that forms part of the sacrifice and hence it should be 'modified'. "Why?"—As a matter of fact, sacrificers are encouraged by the statement regarding the 'prosperity of the sacrificer';—thus 'prosperity of the sacrificer' is spoken of by means of words independently of the term '*iḍā*';—hence the notion of that 'prosperity of the sacrificer' is the direct cognition, while if it were taken as a mere praise of the *Iḍā*, it would be only indirect; so that, the sentence cannot be taken as a praise of the *Iḍā*, as that would be very remote from the real objective. From all this it follows that the term '*yajñapati*' should be 'modified'. Because [when there

are several *sacrificers*, if the term 'Sacrificer' were used in the singular number, the *Mantra* would speak of the 'prosperity' of only *one* of them; so that] that individual *sacrificer* whose 'prosperity' would not be spoken of, would not be embellished with the embellishment of *encouragement* (which is what is done by the *Mantra*);—hence it is necessary that all the *sacrificers* should be spoken of for the purpose of being embellished by the encouragement;—and when all of them have to be spoken of, the plural number must be used [that is, the term '*yajñapatim*' in the original *mantra* must be *modified* into the plural form '*yajñapatīn*']".

In answer to the above *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*Even in a case where it has been enjoined, if it subserves the purposes of something else, there should be no modification*, as *in the case of Injunctions*. (Sū.);—i.e. even when that which forms part of the sacrifice has been enjoined, if it is meant to be done for the sake of something else,—and not for its own embellishment,—it is always used in its unmodified form; and such a factor should not be 'modified'; *because it subserves the purposes of something else*. That is to say, in the case in question the *yajñapati* (sacrificer) is spoken of for the purpose of qualifying the 'prosperity', and the 'prosperity' is spoken of for the purpose of eulogising the *Iḍā*.—"How do you know this?"—It is deduced from the fact of the *Mantra* in question being syntactically connected with the *Iḍopahvāna* text (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 7. 1. 2), and also from the fact of the *Iḍā* being the subject-matter of the Context.

It has been argued that—"The assertion of the 'prosperity of the sacrificer' is understood as serving the purpose of encouragement, independently of the term '*Iḍā*';—the meaning being that 'those men have been invited who would lead the sacrificer to prosperity'."—The answer to this is as follows:—Beginning with the words—'*Sa yo haivamvidvān iḍayā charati*', the text goes on to say—'*atha pratipadyatē iḍopahūtopahūteḍopasmā iḍāhvayāmi iḍopahūtā*'.—From this it is understood that the text of which this forms the beginning is the '*Mantra of the Iḍā*',—and in the middle of this *Mantra* occur the words beginning with '*upahūtā manuṣyāḥ*' and ending with '*yajñapatim vardhān*'.—Thus from this *text*, it follows that the *Mantra* is to be pronounced for the purpose of 'inviting the *Iḍā*', and (from its words) it is capable also of 'inviting the *Iḍā*'; on the other hand, there is no text to the effect that 'the *Mantra* should be pronounced for the purpose of encouraging the Sacrificer'; the *Mantra* has the capacity to speak of it; but the mere presence of the capacity does not determine the use of *Mantras*, without the help of actual declarations. In doing what we have suggested, the Context, pertaining, as it does, to the *Iḍā*, becomes duly honoured, and Syntactical Connection with the *Iḍā* also becomes secured.—For these reasons, the interpretation of the sentence should be—'such men have been invited as are capable of leading the Sacrificer to prosperity'; to this end, all that is necessary is that 'prosperity' should be spoken of as qualified by the 'sacrificer';—so that even if a single *sacrificer* has been mentioned, the purpose of the said qualification becomes accomplished;—consequently, *there should be no 'modification'*.

As in the case of Injunctions; i.e. as in a case where the *Sacrificer* is enjoined as the subordinate factor, the Injunction becomes fulfilled by any sacrificer (one or many, without restriction); for example, in the case of the Injunction 'The Post of *Udumbara*-wood should be made as tall as the Sacrificer',—or 'The Sacrificer should start with *Shukra*'.

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *In the 'Sūktavāka', which is used in making an oblation of the grass-bedding, the term 'Yajamāna' ('Sacrificer') should be modified.*

SŪTRA (41).

IN A CASE WHERE HE IS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR, THERE SHOULD BE 'MODIFICATION'.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, the use of the *Sūktavāka* has been laid down in the text—'*Sūktavākēna prastaram praharati*' ['With the *Sūktavāka*, one should offer the grass-bedding']; in this connection we read—'*Ayam yajmāna āyurāshāstē*' ['This sacrificer seeks for longevity'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—In the case of an Ectypal Sacrifice where there are several 'Sacrificers', should the word '*yajamānaḥ*' (Singular) be modified (into '*yajamānaḥ*', in the Plural) ?—Or not ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows:—"The term '*yajamānaḥ*' should be used in its unmodified form; in so doing, the indication of the word becomes honoured. Then again, the term does not denote anything forming part of the sacrifice; because the assertion that 'the sacrificer seeks for longevity' subserves the purposes of something else; as no visible purpose of the sacrificer himself is served by this 'seeking for longevity';—it follows therefore that the 'seeking for longevity' is meant to serve some invisible purpose. Under the circumstances, the 'seeking for longevity' as qualified by the 'sacrificer' becomes accomplished by the mention of even a single *Sacrificer* as found in the *Mantra-text*; [so that there is no need for the change into the plural form];—just as it is in the case of the injunction 'The Post of *Udumbara*-wood should be made of the same size as the Sacrificer',—so in the case in question also.—From all this it follows that the term '*yajamānaḥ*' should be used in its unmodified form."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—There should be change—modification,—*in a case where the Sacrificer is the principal factor.*—"In what way is the Sacrificer the predominant factor?"—There is the text—'With the *Sūktavāka*, one should offer the grass-bedding'; now the '*Bedding*' becomes offered 'with the *Sūktavāka*', if the *Sūktavāka* expresses the *means* or the *fruit* of the 'offering of the Bedding';—the fruit of the 'offering' has been indicated in the declaration '*The Sacrificer is seeking for longevity*—by means of this act'; and thus it is that the *Bedding* comes to be offered by the *Sacrificer*. Such being the case, if there is any *Sacrificer* who is not mentioned as the principal factor, then the said *offering of the Bedding* will not have been made by him; consequently (in a case where there are several sacrificers) it becomes necessary to mention all the sacrificers collectively; and when all are mentioned, the Plural ending must be used; hence there must be modification of the term '*yajamānaḥ*' (into '*yajamānāḥ*').

Adhikaraṇa (16): *In the 'nigada-mantra' used in inviting the Subrahmaṇyā Priest, there is to be no 'modification' of the term 'harivat'.*

SŪTRA (42).

It should be regarded as qualified by that (one modification) alone; as there is no connection with those things.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice; in connection with which the '*Subrahmaṇyā-nigada*' has been laid down in the form—'*Indra āgachchha, hariva āgachchha, mēdhātithērmēṣaḥ*, etc.'—In connection with the *Agniṣṭut*, it is laid down that 'The *Subrahmaṇyā* is addressed to *Agni*'. Hence in the latter case, when the aforesaid *Subrahmaṇyā-nigada* is recited, the term '*indra*' is modified into '*agni*'.—Now the question arises in regard to '*hariva āgachchha*' and other terms in the *mantra*—Are these to be modified or not?

The view that presents itself as the most reasonable one is as follows:—*It should be regarded as qualified by that one modification*;—'*qualified by that*'—i.e. qualified by the single qualification that 'there is modification of the term *indra*',—and the rest of the *mantra* should be taken as to be used in its unmodified form.—"Why so?"—*Because there is no connection with these things*; i.e. these words have no connection with 'these things'—i.e. with the character of being '*harivat*' and so forth; that is to say, as a matter of fact, the qualities of being '*harivat*' and the rest do not subsist in *Indra*; there is no proof for the idea that they subsist in *Indra*; even though non-existent in Him, they are spoken of as belonging to Him. It is only in this interpretation that the words retain their *Direct Denotation*; in any other interpretation, recourse would have to be had to *Indirect Indication*; that is, the term '*harivat*' and the rest would, in that case, be taken, not as *denoting* the character of being '*harivat*', but as *indicating*, through that character, some other quality which really subsists in *Indra*.—It might be argued that—"If, as first explained, the terms denote qualities that do not subsist in *Indra*, then they retain their direct denotation and they shall not *indicate* any quality really subsisting in *Indra*".—In that case it comes to our own view.—Hence the conclusion is that the quality (not subsisting in *Indra*) is spoken of (as subsisting) only for the sake of some invisible (transcendental) result; and hence the words must be used in their unmodified form. The best explanation therefore is as follows:—The statement '*Indra āgachchha hariva āgachchha*, etc.' imposes upon *Indra* the qualities of being '*harivat*' and the rest,—the sense being that 'Indra, equipped with these qualities, tends to bring about prosperity'. It is

possible for *Agni* also to be connected with the said qualities in the same manner (i.e. by imposition).—Hence we conclude that the words expressing those qualities should be used in their unmodified forms.

The Opponent might argue thus—"On the basis of this text itself, which speaks of the qualities as actually subsisting in *Indra*, it should be understood that these qualities *are* present in that *Deity*".

Our answer to that is that, even though the qualities are not actually present in *Indra*, the said assertion can be explained as being a mere eulogy (in which even non-existent qualities are attributed);—just as in the assertion 'Devadatta is *Indra*, he is *Bṛhaspati*'.

SŪTRA (43).

[*Objection*]—"WHAT IS URGED MIGHT BE TRUE ONLY IF THE ACTS (DENOTED BY THE QUALITIES IN QUESTION) WERE NOT THERE", —IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

[Says the Opponent]—"If your view is that 'the terms "*harivat*" and the rest should be used in their unmodified form',—then what we would urge is that this might have been so, *if the acts denoted by the qualities in question were not there*; that is to say, if those qualities did not really subsist in *Indra*; as a matter of fact however, all these qualities do subsist in *Indra*, having been brought about by his actions. For instance,—(*a*) As regards the phrase '*hariva āgachchha*', the Bright and the Dark Fortnights are the '*Haris*' of *Indra*, in the sense that by means of those two he takes up all things;—(*b*) *Indra* has been called '*mēdhātithērmēṣaḥ*' on account of the fact that having become a *ram* (*mēṣa*), he took away *Medhātithi*, the son of *Kaṇva*;—(c) *Indra* is spoken of as '*vṛṣaṇashvasya mēnē*' on account of the fact that he loved *Mēnakā*, the daughter of *Vṛṣaṇashva*;—(*d*) '*Gauravaskandan*', is based upon the fact that having become a *white deer* (*gauramṛgaḥ*), *Indra* drinks the *Soma* from the forest.—These words of the text therefore describe qualities that are actually present in *Indra*. Thus the terms '*harivat*' and the rest denote qualities that actually subsist in *Indra*; and hence they should be taken as pronounced with a view to bring about the idea of *Indra*; so that there is no need for assuming any transcendental result.—Thus the meaning of the text would be as follows—'O *Indra*, please come—You, who are endowed with the qualities of being *Harivat* and so forth'. The Indirect Indication involved in this interpretation is certainly more acceptable than the assumption of a transcendental result (involved in the *Siddhānta* view).—From all this it follows that the terms '*harivat*' and the rest should be modified."

SŪTRA (44).

[*Answer*]—NOT SO; BECAUSE THE WORDS SERVE A DIFFERENT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be as has been suggested. As a matter of fact, the terms '*harivat*' and the rest serve a different purpose; that is, they serve the purpose of eulogising *Indra*; it is for the purpose of eulogising him that *Indra* is addressed as '*Harivat*' and the rest; as we have already explained above. And for the purpose of eulogising, the same terms could be applied to *Agni* also.

It has been argued that "the qualities spoken of are actually present in *Indra*, as indicated by such assertions as that 'the *Pūrvapakṣa* and the *Aparapakṣa* are the two *Haris* of *Indra*', and so forth".—But this is not right. Assertions like these do not predicate the actual presence of the two *Haris* in *Indra*; as the sentence is construed as 'the *Bright* and the *Dark Fortnights* are the *Haris* of *Indra*', because in support of the assertion, a reason is adduced 'since by means of these, he takes up all things';—but it is not known that *Indra* takes up all things by means of the two fortnights; and it is only a well-known fact—and not one that has itself got to be proved—that can serve as a reason. As for the well-known fact that the two fortnights *take up*—i.e. destroy—all things, in the sense that all things finish *in time* [and the two *Fortnights* only represent *Time*],—in this sense there is no difference between *Indra* and *Agni*; as in that sense, the words are applicable to *Agni* also.

If it be held that—"the words actually predicate the fact of *Indra* being one who *takes up all things* (*hartṛ*)",—then, in that case, there would be a syntactical split; as it would be necessary to predicate also the fact that 'these two are *Indra's Haris*'.—If this is not predicated, then the incongruity urged above remains there—that is, there is no difference between *Indra* and *Agni*.—If it be held that "what are predicated are the Dark and the Bright Fortnights as belonging to *Indra*,—and these two being *Hari*, *Indra* comes to be spoken of as *Harivat*",—then the objection urged before remains—that the fact adduced as a reason is not well known at all. —Then again, the text contains the term '*vai*', which is never used in connection with what is predicated; as it has been found to convey the sense of what is said being well known; for instance, in such expressions as '*na vai strēṇāni sakhyāni santi*' ['There is no friendship with women'].

Similarly, as regards the expressions '*Mēdhātithērmēṣaḥ*' and the rest, all this has the appearance of a statement of historical facts; and if they were taken literally in that sense, then it would imply that the *Veda* (as represented by these expressions) has had a beginning in time; and this would be highly objectionable.—If it be said—"Be it so [the Veda may have had a beginning in time]",—then, in that case, no authority would belong to it, and hence the statement regarding 'the ram of *Mēdhātithi*, the son of *Kaṇva*' need not be accepted as true.—Then again,

throughout the passage what is enjoined (and predicated) is the *Nigada-mantra*; hence if anything else also were taken as predicated, there would be a syntactical split.

From all this it is clear that the qualities spoken of do not subsist in *Indra*, and hence the words, not denoting anything subsisting therein, should be used in their unmodified forms.

This conclusion however is not accepted by the *Yājñikas* (Persons learned in sacrificial lore); as they do modify the words in question—reading the *mantra*, in the case of the *Agniṣṭut*, as '*Agna āgachchha rohitāshva vṛddhabhāno dhūmakēto jātavēdo vicharṣaṇa*'.

ADHIKARAṆA (17): [As embodied in the same *Sūtras* 42–44 interpreted differently].

There is to be no modification in the mantra 'Tasyai shṛtam, etc.'

Bhāṣya.

We are citing another text (as to be dealt with by the same *Sūtras* as the above).—

There is the *Sādyaska* sacrifice; in connection with which it is said—'*Sāṇḍastrivatsaḥ somakrayaṇaḥ*' ['The *Soma* is bought with a calf which is entire and three years old']; at the primary sacrifice however the *Soma* is bought with a heifer one year old; in connection with this heifer it is declared—'*Iyam gauḥ, tayā tē krīṇāmi, tasyai shṛtam, tasyai sharaḥ, tasyai dadhi, tasyai mastu, tasyā ātañchanam, tasyai navanītam, tasyai ghṛtam, tasyā āmikṣā, tasyai vājinam*' ['This is the cow, with her I buy thee; hers the Boiled Milk, hers the Cream, hers the Curd, hers the sour Cream, hers the Curdled Milk, hers the Butter, hers the Clarified Butter, hers the Curdled Pieces, hers the Whey'];—this same *mantra* comes into the *Sādyaska* in accordance with General Law (that 'the Ectype is to be performed like the Archetype').

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is 'modification' to be made only in place of the term '*go*' (changing '*iyam gauḥ*' into '*ayam vatsaḥ*'], and the rest of the words are to be remain as they are?—Or are they all to be 'modified'?

On this question, the view that presents itself as the most reasonable one (set forth under Sū. 42) is as follows:—The 'modification' in the form of the *Mantra* should appertain only to what is denoted by the term '*go*' ('Cow'); the rest of the words beginning with '*Tasyai shṛtam*' should be used in their unmodified form; *because there is no connection* between the things denoted by these latter—*boiled milk* and the rest—with the one-year-old heifer; for the simple reason that the heifer is only *one year old*, and the *one-year-old* heifer yields no milk; so that the words in question denote things that do not subsist in the *heifer* either; and hence in connection with the 'entire calf' also they should be used in the same unmodified form.

To this the following objection has been raised (in Sū. 43)—"You seem to think that the words '*Shṛtam*' ('boiled milk') and the rest denote things that do not subsist in the *one-year-old* heifer. That might have been so, if the qualities spoken of (as implied by the words in question) did not subsist in the one-year-old heifer at all; as a matter of fact, however, all that is spoken of is *likely to appear* in the heifer after some time; in the case of the *entire-calf* on the other hand, there is absolutely no possibility of its ever appearing at any time. Through referring to the qualities expected to appear at some future time, the words would be taken as serving the

purpose of commending (the heifer) by the assertion that 'she would yield the *Boiled Milk* and other things'.—Hence the words in question should *not* be used (at the *Sādyaska*) in their unmodified forms."

This objection is answered in Sū. 44, as follows :—What has been just urged cannot be right: The words in question must be used in their unmodified forms; all that is denoted by the words cannot subsist in the *one-year-old* heifer, simply because she is only *one year old*; it might be said that "they are going to appear in her after some time",—that might be said of the 'Entire Calf' also; as a milch cow might be born through that calf and this cow could yield the *Milk*, etc.—From all this it follows that the words in question should be used in their unmodified forms.

ADHIKARAṆA (18): *The 'Adhrigu-praiṣa-mantra',— 'Direction' to the Adhrigu Priest—is to be omitted in the case of the Ewe dedicated to Sarasvatī.*

SŪTRA (45).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—FROM AMONG THE ANIMALS TO WHICH THE SAME INJUNCTION IS APPLICABLE, THE 'EWE DEDICATED TO SARASVATĪ' SHOULD HAVE NO CONNECTION (WITH THE MANTRA),—BECAUSE THE MANTRA MENTIONS ONE PARTICULAR GENDER (MASCULINE) AND THE 'EWE' IS FEMININE.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, in connection with which certain animals have been spoken of (as to be killed)—'The animal dedicated to *Agni* should be killed at the *Agniṣṭoma*,—the animal dedicated to *Indra-Agni*, at the *Ukthya*,—the animal dedicated to *Indra-Vṛṣṇi*, at the *Ṣoḍashin*,—the Ewe dedicated to *Sarasvatī*, at the *Atirātra*'.—In connection with the *Agniṣomīya* (animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*), there is the following *mantra* known as the '*Adhrigu-praiṣa*' (Direction addressed to the *Adhrigu Priest*, who is also called the '*Shamayitṛ*', the Quarterer of the animal's body)—'*Upanayata mēdhyādura āshāsānā mēdhapatibhyām mēndha*' (Taitti. Brahmaṇa 3. 6. 6. 1).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Should the *Adhrigu praiṣa* be pronounced in connection with the *Ewe dedicated to Sarasvatī*?—Or not?

[An objection is raised against the question]—"The said *Mantra* has been enjoined in connection with *the animal dedicated to Agni-Soma* [which is the Archetype of all animal-sacrifices], and as such it is admissible in connection with all the animals, in accordance with the General Law relating to Archetypes and Ectypes; [so that the said question cannot arise at all]".

Answer—It is a hypothetical discussion that we have here, on the basis of the notion that the same injunction applies equally to all the animals.

The answer to the question which appears to be most reasonable is as follows:—*From among the animals to which the same Injunction is applicable, the 'Ewe dedicated to Sarasvatī' should have no connection* with the *Adhrigu-praiṣa*.—"Why?"—*Because the Mantra mentions one particular gender*; the *Adhrigu-praiṣa-mantra* has indicated the animal as belonging to a particular Gender (Masculine)—in the concluding words of the *Mantra*—'*Prāsmai agnim bharatā*', where the Masculine term ('*asmai*') has been

used; while the 'Ewe dedicated to *Sarasvatī*' is a female;—and the pronoun in the Masculine cannot stand for a female;—hence the conclusion is that the *Ewe dedicated to Sarasvatī* has no connection with the *Adhrigu-praiṣa-mantra.*

SŪTRA (46).

[*Opponent's view*]—"IN FACT, WHAT IS SPOKEN OF IS 'ANIMAL' IN GENERAL; AS THAT IS WHAT IS ENJOINED; AND IT IS THE CLASS 'ANIMAL' IN GENERAL TO WHICH THE MASCULINITY PERTAINS."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth in the foregoing *Sūtra.*

"It is not true that 'the Ewe dedicated to *Sarasvatī*' has no connection with the *Adhrigu-praiṣa*; because as a matter of fact, the *Adhrigu-praiṣa* is to be pronounced in connection with the said *Ewe* also.—'Why?'—Because of the Context; all the animals have been mentioned in the same Context; in fact, it is on the basis of this understanding that the whole of this hypothetical discussion has been started; consequently the *mantra* becomes connected also with the Ewe dedicated to *Sarasvatī*.—It has been argued that 'this would not be right, as the *mantra* makes use of a particular Gender'. But this is not right; because what is spoken of is *the animal in general*; what is in close proximity to the Masculine pronoun ('*asmai*') is the *class* 'animal'; and it is this which would be spoken of (referred to) in the words of the *mantra*—'*Prasmai agnim bharatā pashavē*';—and *it is this what is enjoined.* The masculinity too of the pronoun ('*asmai*') is what is denoted by the common term 'animal';—and this class-character of 'animal' is present in the *Ewe* also; so that when the pronoun would be used (in the *mantra* pronounced in connection with the *Ewe*) it would stand for the generic term 'animal' (which includes the *Ewe* also).—In this way, the indication of the Context would be duly honoured.—From all this it follows that the *Adhrigu-praiṣa* should be connected with the 'Ewe dedicated to *Sarasvatī*'."

SŪTRA (47).

[*Opponent's objection answered*]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT IS A PARTICULAR ANIMAL; AS THAT IS THE THING SIGNIFIED BY THE WORD.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' implies the rejection of the view just set forth.

It is not right to say that the 'Ewe dedicated to Sarasvatī' should be connected with the *Adhrigu-praiṣa*; what is right is the other view—that it should not be connected.—"Why?"—Because *it is a particular animal, as that is the thing signified by the word*; what the term ('*asmai*') is capable

of signifying is a *male*, while the thing in question—the Ewe—is *female*; and a word in the Masculine Gender cannot signify a female. So that the right view is what we explained at the very outset (under Sū. 45); all that remains to be done is to point out the incongruities in the view of the Opponent.

SŪTRA (48).

"BUT WHAT IS REALLY SIGNIFIED IS THE CLASS 'ANIMAL',—THE WORD BEING ONE AND THE SAME."

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 46) that—"the word would be taken as referring to the class 'animal'; *the word*, signifying the *class* 'animal' and the *individual* animal, *being one and the same*; hence the *Ewe* could be connected with the words of the *Mantra*—'*Prāsmai*, etc.'".

This argument has got to be refuted [and this is going to be done in the following *Sūtra*]—

SŪTRA (49).

IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE AS WE HAVE EXPLAINED ABOVE; BECAUSE OF PROXIMITY.

Bhāṣya.

It should be as we have explained above;—that is, the 'Ewe dedicated to *Sarasvatī*' should have no connection with the *Adhrigu-praiṣa*.—"Why"?—Because of the reason already explained,—that is, the other view is incompatible with the gender of the word used in the *mantra*.

It has been argued that—"[in the event of the *Mantra* being used in connection with the *Ewe*] the pronoun ('*asmai*') could be taken as correlated to the term 'animal' (which signifies *animal in general*)".—This however is not possible;—why?—*because of proximity*; i.e. the Pronoun always stands for what is in close proximity to it;—so that the *Mantra* should be connected with that thing which is *verbally* in close proximity to it; and it is only when there is no such thing there as is equipped with the same gender and other characteristics as the Pronoun itself—that it is taken as standing for what is in close proximity to it *materially*. By reason of this *proximity*, the pronoun can stand for an individual endowed with only one qualification (that of gender); hence on account of proximity, there is only one generic factor (that of *Masculinity*) that is accepted as signified, and not any other generic entity in the shape of the *class* 'animal' and the like. Hence when the term 'animal' is actually pronounced, the term would abstract the class 'animal' from the Individual, and we can have the construction '*asmai pashavē*'; when, on the other hand, the word 'animal' is *not* pronounced, the pronoun '*asmai*' comes to be expressive of the particular gender only.—Hence it follows that the *Mantra* in question has no connection with the 'Ewe dedicated to *Sarasvatī*'.

This is a purely hypothetical discussion; hence it is not necessary to explain the purpose served by it. In fact, this is a discussion which supplies the instance where use is made of the consideration of the question as to whether the accessory details relating to *animals* appertain to the *Agnīṣomīya* animal only, or they are common to all the animals. If the accessories belong to all in common (dealt with under 3. 6. 31)—then the 'Ewe dedicated to *Sarasvatī*' is not connected with the *Adhrigu-praiṣa*;—on the other hand, if the accessories appertain to the *Agnīṣomīya* animal only, then the *Adhrigu-praiṣa* becomes connected with the Ewe, but in the *modified form* (the Masculine Pronoun being changed into the Feminine one).—It is not necessary to explain the purpose of what is itself a purpose.

ADHIKARAṆA (19): *In the 'Yajñāyajñīya Sāman', the term 'irā' should be used in place of the term 'girā'.*

SŪTRA (50).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN A CASE WHERE THE VEDA ITSELF LAYS DOWN A FORM DIFFERENT FROM WHAT OCCURS IN THE VEDIC TEXT, THERE MUST BE MODIFICATION, BY REASON OF THAT DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, laid down in the text—'Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice';—at this sacrifice, the *Yajñayajñīya-sāman* [i.e. the verse '*Yajñāyajñāvo agnayē girā girā ha dakṣasē*', (*Vājasanēya-Saṁ.* 27. 42, *Sāma-Veda-saṁhitā* 1. 35) set to music] is sung;—in connection with this *Sāman*, it is laid down—'One should not pronounce the words *girā-girā*, if the *Udgātṛ* priest pronounces the words *girā girā*, he swallows himself,—hence the *Sāman* should be sung by changing *girā* into *irā*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is one to use the term '*irā*' *or* the term '*girā*' [the two forms being regarded as optional alternatives]?—Or should one use the term '*irā*' only?

The view that presents itself as the most reasonable is as follows:—*In a case where the Veda itself lays down a form different from what occurs in the Vedic text, there must be modification*; that is to say, the Veda lays down the use of the term '*irā*' which is different from the term '*girā*', which latter is what occurs in the Vedic text, dealing with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; and inasmuch as the form '*irā*' has been particularly specified, it should set aside the form '*girā*' which occurs only in a general way.

SŪTRA (51).

[*The Opponent's objection to the Siddhānta view*]—"IN REALITY, BOTH FORMS SHOULD BE USED, BECAUSE THE REASON IS THE SAME; HENCE AS SERVING THE SAME PURPOSE, THE TWO FORMS SHOULD BE TREATED AS OPTIONAL ALTERNATIVES."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

"The use should not be restricted to the word '*irā*',—*both forms should be used*; that is, both the forms may be used.—'Which two forms'?

—The form '*irā*' and the form '*girā*';—*because the reason is the same*; the word '*girā*' occurs in the Veda, and it is understood that the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice should be accomplished by means of the *Sāman* in which that word occurs;—and it is also understood that the sacrifice is to be accomplished by means of the word '*irā*' (as used in the *Sāman*);—so that both these words serve the same purpose;—i.e. the one, as well as the other, is used for the purpose of eulogising;—hence *the two words*—'*irā*' and '*girā*'—*should be treated as optional alternatives*."

SŪTRA (52).

[*Objection—concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE THE SĀMAN HAS BEEN ENJOINED."

"The *Siddhāntin* says—'The two words do not stand on the same footing: the word '*girā*' merely occurs in the Vedic text, while the word '*irā*' is *enjoined* as to be used'.—This is not right;—why?—*because the Sāman has been enjoined*; the use of the *Sāman* has been enjoined in the text 'They sing the *Yajñayajñiya*', and the *Yajñāyajñīya*-verse contains the word '*girā*'; so that when the verse has been enjoined, the word '*girā*' also becomes enjoined.—From all this it follows that the two words should be treated as optional alternatives."

SŪTRA (53).

[*Siddhāntin's answer to the Opponent's objection*]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE RESTRICTION; BECAUSE OF THE SPECIFIC VEDIC TEXT; THE OTHER WOULD BE TREATED LIKE THE 'NUMBER SEVENTEEN'.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the use should be restricted to the word '*irā*'. "Why?"—*Because of the specific Vedic text*; the use of the word '*irā*' has been laid down by the specific Vedic text—'It should be sung by changing into *irā*'; while the term '*girā*' is spoken of only in a general way; and as such how could it be related to the *Sāman* to be sung'? In fact, the word '*girā*' merely occurs in the text,—it is nowhere enjoined as to be used; that it is to be used can only be assumed on the basis of the Presumption that unless the word were uttered the *Sāman* could not be formed; in the case of the word '*irā*' on the other hand, that it should be used is directly enjoined in the Veda itself; and when the *Sāman* required would be accomplished with this enjoined word '*irā*', there would be no ground for the presumption of the use of the word '*girā*'.

Question—"In that case, where would there be room for the form '*girā*' which occurs in the text as the ordinary form?"

Answer—The other would be treated like the 'number seventeen'.—It is true that the form '*girā*' is laid down in the ordinary text; and it could be treated like the number 'seventeen'; that is, just as the number 'seventeen' (in connection with the *Sāmidhēnis*) finds room in the Ectypal sacrifices (as explained under Sū. 3. 6. 9), so could the form '*gīrā*' also find room in the Ectypal sacrifices.

ADHIKARAṆA (20): *The word 'irā' should be set to music.*

SŪTRA (54).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE WORD BEING DIFFERENT, AS IT DOES NOT APPEAR IN A FORM SET TO MUSIC, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS ENJOINED TO BE USED EXACTLY IN THE FORM IN WHICH IT IS MENTIONED."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Yajñayajñiya-Sāman* sung at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, we read—'One should not pronounce the words *girā girā*,—if the Udgatṛ-priest were to pronounce the words *girā girā*, he would swallow himself,—hence one should sing the *Sāman* by changing *girā* into *irā*';—and it has been settled that at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, one should use the word '*irā*' in place of the word '*girā*'.

The question that arises now is—When the word '*irā*' is used, should it be used as set to music? Or without being set to music?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"When we find that the word mentioned in the Veda (i.e. '*irā*') is different from the word '*girā*' (which is what is found in the original *Mantra*-text),—we assert that the word '*irā*' should be used without being set to music.—Why?—*Because it does not appear in a form set to music*; the form in which the word '*irā*' has been enjoined is not one set to music; and every word should be used exactly in the form in which it has been enjoined.—'It is not true that the word '*irā*' has been enjoined in a form *not* set to music; in fact, it has been enjoined by means of a nominal affix (the word used being *airam* which is derived from *irā* with the *aṇ* affix), by which a particular accent becomes indicated'.—It may be that there is a particular accent; but no such musical syllables as '*ā-ī*' and the like have been laid down (which would mean that the word is meant to be set to music); in fact, the nominal affix ('*aṇ*') has been added to the term '*irā*' in its simple (unmodified) form; whence it follows that the word should be used in that simple unmodified form (without being set to music).—It might be argued that—'the use of the simple form of the word as it stands is not what is meant to be enjoined'.—Our answer to this is that there is no reason in support of the idea that such use *is not meant*; while in support of the idea that such use *is meant* we have this fact itself that it is in that simple form that it is mentioned in the text.—From all this it follows that the word '*irā*' should be used without being set to music."

SŪTRA (55).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THAT SAME MUSIC SHOULD APPLY (TO 'IRĀ') WHICH IS FOUND IN THE WORD IN WHOSE PLACE THAT WORD IS USED; BECAUSE THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT THE WORD SHOULD BE DIFFERENT.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

That word ('*girā*') in whose place the word '*irā*' is used,—the music of that same word should be applied to the word '*irā*'.—"Why?"—*Because the important point is that the word should be different.* In the declaration that 'the word *irā* is to be used in place of the word *girā*', the important factor is that the word should be different,—not that that word should be used in a form *not set to music.* In fact, the form of verbal expression used in the enjoining of some peculiarity of the word '*irā*' would be entirely different from that used in the enjoining of the word '*irā*' itself. The form in which the injunction is actually found is—'One should sing the *Sāman* after having adopted a modification in the form of the word *irā*'; so that what is enjoined is simply the word '*irā*',—not the word *as apart from music*;—as all that is said is that 'one should pronounce the modification in the form of the word *irā*', not that of the word '*girā*'; and this idea has been expressed by means of the nominal affix (in the term '*airam*'); and the nominal affix does not provide the idea that 'the modification in the form of the word '*irā*' which is to be used should be one *not set to music*';—it is only subsequently that the nominal affix would express the idea that 'the modified form should be used', and this is what comes to be reiterated; the sense being that 'what is enjoined is what is denoted by the basic noun *irā*'. Thus what the injunction is meant to lay down is that a different word (from '*girā*') should be used,—and not that that word should not be set to music; in fact, *being set to music* is only a 'modification' of the word, and it is 'modification' in general that is laid down by the Injunction.

SŪTRA (56).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS ACTUALLY CONNECTED WITH SINGING.

Bhāṣya.

The connection of *singing* is there; the text '*Udgēyamā irā chā dākṣāsā*' clearly shows that there is singing of '*irā*'.

SŪTRA (57).

"IT MAY BE MERE ASSERTION",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer would be as given in the following *Sūtra*].

[Says the Opponent]—"If you think that the text quoted indicates *singing*,—then you are wrong; it is not so; in fact, the text '*Udgēya mā irā*, etc.' may mean mere *assertion*."

SŪTRA (58).

THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE THAT IS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

What has been urged is not possible; because in the text quoted, *that is the principal factor.*—"What is the principal factor?"—The word '*irā*' is the principal factor; as that is what is laid down; *music* is not the principal factor; as that is not what is laid down,—as we have already explained. So also the commendation that is found is that of the word '*irā*', not of the *music*—The text '*Irāmaham yajamānē dadāni*, etc.' contains a commendation of the word '*irā*', not of the *music*.—From all this it follows that the word '*irā*' should be used as *set to music*.

Question—"What is the use of all this discussion? We do not perceive any difference (between the two views)".

Answer—This discussion is of use in the case of another text—'One should not say *pra-pra*, one should say *pra-prī*'; in the case of this text, if the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is right, one might use either the phrase '*pra-pra*' or '*pra-prī*'; while, if the *Siddhānta* view is right, one must use the word '*pra-prī*'.

End of Pāda i of Adhyāya IX.

ADHYĀYA IX.

PĀDA II.

ADHIKARAṆA (1) : *It is the 'music' that is called 'Sāman'.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"SOME PEOPLE REGARD THE MANTRA AS 'SĀMAN',—ON THE GROUND OF 'SMṚTI' AND 'TEACHING'."

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Sāmans*—named (1) '*rathantara*', (2) '*bṛhat*'; (3) '*vairūpa*', (4) '*vairāja*', (5) '*shākvara*', and (6) '*raivata*',—in connection with the *mantras* '*Abhi tvā shūra nonumaḥ*, etc.' (Ṛgveda, 7. 32. 22) and others.

In regard to this, there arises the following question—Does the name '*Sāman*' apply to these *mantras as sung* ?—Or to the *music* (to which the *mantras* are set) ?

Objection against the question—"It has been already decided, under *Sūtra* 2. 1. 36, that 'the name *Sāman* is applied to the music'; [why then should the said question be raised again ?]".

Answer—Under Discourse II, the subject being considered was the injunctive potency of the verb contained in a *Mantra*,—and when the doubt arose as to the existence of *mantras* at all, it became necessary to prove their existence, and to that end the definition of '*mantra*' was provided in the form that 'The name *Mantra* is applied to those texts that are expressive of the said assertion of things connected with prescribed acts' (Sū. 2. 1. 32);—then, in view of the text '*Ahē budhniya mantram mē gopāya yamṛṣayastrayividā viduḥ ṛcho yajūṁṣi sāmāni*',—where the three kinds of *mantra*, *Ṛk* and the rest, have been mentioned,—it became necessary to make a distinction among *Mantras*,—and it was in that connection that the definition of '*Sāman*' was provided under Sū. 2. 1. 36—'The name *Sāman* is applied to the music'. [This has been done there only by the way, and the said definition was not meant to be a definite statement to the effect that it is the *music*, and not *the mantra as set to music*, that is called '*Sāman*'].—On that occasion no special consideration was given to the specific question as to whether the name '*Sāman*' applies to the *mantra set to music* or to the *music* itself,—because whether it applies to one or the other, it remains distinct from the other two kinds of *Mantra*, the *Ṛk* and the *Yajuṣ*; so that the threefold division remains intact; and

there was thus no need to investigate the further question regarding the more precise connotation of the term '*Sāman*'. On the present occasion, on the other hand, inasmuch as the operation in connection with the *mantra set to music* would be distinct from that in connection with the *music*, an attempt is made to find out the exact connotation of the term.

"But this also is well known that the term '*Sāman*' connotes the *act of singing*."

The answer to this is that the same fact is again reiterated, for the purpose of reminding people of it, with a view to introducing the further question—It being well known that the name '*Sāman*' applies to the *music*, the further question arises—In the *music*, are the verses (*mantras*) the *predominant* (primary), or the *subordinate* (secondary), factor ? [This is dealt with under Sū. 3 to 13.]

Says the Questioner—"For the purpose of reminding people of a well-ascertained fact, it is not necessary to bring forward the contrary view; for instance, there is no need for recalling the (*Pūrvapakṣa*) theory that 'the name *Sāman* applies to the *mantras*' [as has been done in the present *Sūtra*]".

The answer to this is as follows:—The contrary view (*Pūrvapakṣa*) also has been set forth here only for the purpose of reminding people of the *Siddhānta* view; so that what people are reminded of is the fact that (on the former occasion) having put forward the *Pūrvapakṣa* view, that 'it is the *mantra-text set to music* that is called *Sāman*', it has been finally settled that 'it is the *music* that is called *Sāman*'.—And this being already known, it becomes necessary to consider the further question—In the *music*, are the verses (*Mantras*) the predominant, or the subordinate, factor ? [If the *mantra set to music* is *Sāman*, then the *Mantra* is the *predominant* factor, while, if it is the *music* that is *Sāman*, then the *Mantra* is the *Subordinate* factor].

On this question then, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"Some people think it is the *mantra as sung* (set to music) that is *Sāman*.—On what grounds ?—*On the ground of 'Smṛti' and 'teaching'*;—there are *Smṛti-texts* to the effect that 'The *mantra* sung is *Sāman*', and the revered Vedic Teachers also impart the same teaching to their pupils.—[*Objection*]—'If what the *Smṛti-text* says is the same as what is *taught*, then the *teaching* cannot be regarded as a separate ground (reason)'.—[*Answer*]—True; then we shall explain the 'teaching' in a different manner: the 'teaching' (referred to in the *Sūtra*) is that contained in the text—'*Ahē budhniya mantram mē gopāya yamṛṣayastrayīvidā viduḥ ṛcho yajūṁṣi sāmāni*', where it is made clear that *Sāman* is a kind of *Mantra*; here thus we have the 'teaching' to the effect that the name '*Sāman*' applies to the *mantra* (not to the *music*); and from this 'Teaching' we conclude that it is the *Mantras* that are *Sāman*."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE INCONGRUITIES INVOLVED IN THIS VIEW HAVE BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED.

Bhāṣya.

The incongruity involved in the above view has already been explained under Discourse VII (Pāda ii), that in connection with the text '*Kavatīṣu rathantaram gāyati*', as there can be no *space* in the verse, it would be necessary to have recourse to the indirect indication of either *place* or *characteristic details* [*Bhāṣya* on Sū. 7. 2. 21].—From all this it follows that the name '*Sāman*' applies to the *music*, not to the *mantra-texts set to music.*

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The 'Ūha-texts' should be regarded as 'human' in their origin.*

Bhāṣya.

Sūtras (1) and (2) may be explained in the following manner as representing the following *Adhikaraṇa*:—

There is the '*Ūha-text*—'*Kayānashchitra ābhuvat,* etc.' (Sāmaveda, Saṁ. 1. 169 and 2. 32); in regard to this the question arises—Is this text *scriptural* and eternal? Or is it one that has been thought out and sung (by men)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* (set forth in *Sūtra* 1) is as follows:—"Some people think that the—'*Ūha-sāman*' texts are *mantras* and as such scriptural and eternal.—On what grounds?—*On the ground of* '*Smṛti*' *and* '*Teaching*'; there is the *Smṛti*—to the effect that the texts are *mantras* and hence scriptural and eternal, and they impart the same teaching to their pupils.—*Objection*: 'The *Smṛti* and the *Teaching* are the same (and hence the two should not have been mentioned as two reasons)'.—True; hence we are quoting another 'teaching'—in the shape of the Brāhmaṇa-declaration, '*Ūhashchikīrṣitaḥ*', the term '*chikīrṣitaḥ*' means *what is desired*,—the affix '*San*' (which is present in the term '*chikīrṣitaḥ*') having been laid down as having the desiderative force; and the *Ūha-text* could be 'desired' only if it were equal to the Veda, and not the conscious work of an author; on the other hand, if it were composed by an author, it could not be trustworthy, and hence not 'desired' as to be used at the sacrifice;—and yet we find the term '*chikīrṣitaḥ*' used in the *Brāhmaṇa-text* quoted (in reference to the *Ūha-text*); hence the *Ūha-text* should be regarded as eternal."

The *Siddhānta* (as set forth in Sū. 2) is as follows:—What has been just set forth declares its own incongruity; in explaining the grounds for your view, you have yourself declared its weak point—viz.: the statement '*Ūhashchikīrṣitaḥ*'; this means that 'the *Ūha-text* is *meant to be made*'; and this can be said only of what is *not eternal*.—It has been argued that

'the term *chikirṣita* means *desired*, the affix *San* having the desiderative force .—The answer to this is as follows—It is true that the term means *desired*,—but what it means is that, *that* which is made to bring about what is *desired* is itself *desired to be made* ; and for this reason the *Ūha-text* must be non-eternal,—As for the argument that—"it should be regarded as eternal, on the ground of *Smṛti*",—such a *Smṛti* has no authority, having, as it has, a visible source. There is the declaration that 'One should sing the Rathantara on the *Kavati*-verses'; and it is from this declaration of 'transference' that we derive the first notion that on the basis of reasoning, the singing of the *Sāman* should be done in this manner ; and it is on this first notion that the *Smṛti* (referred to by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) is based ; and as such, it cannot be regarded as authoritative ; and hence the *Ūha-text* must be regarded as the *work of man* (non-eternal).

"What is the purpose served by this discussion ?"

According to the *Pūrvapakṣa* what is contrary to reason would also be authoritative ; while according to the *Siddhānta*, what is contrary to reason cannot be authoritative.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *The 'Sāman' is an 'embellishment' of the Verse.*

SŪTRA (3).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"VERILY IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A PRIMARY ACT; BECAUSE THERE IS THE SIGN OF THE INJUNCTION."

Bhāṣya.

The same *Sāmans* are the subject-matter of this discussion also.—In regard to these it has been settled that it is the *music* that is called '*Sāman*'. The question that arises now is—In reference to the verses (set to music), is the *Music* the *Primary* or the *Secondary* factor?

Objection—"It has been already decided that what the term '*Sāman*' denotes is an *act of embellishment* (which must be the secondary factor)—under Sū. 7. 2. 13."

Answer—True; but here we start with objecting to that conclusion,—and here also the final conclusion will be the same.

In answer to the question raised, the view that presents itself as the most reasonable is that,—in accordance with the *Adhikaraṇa* referred to (i.e. Sū. 7. 2. 13), the *Music* must be regarded as an *act of embellishment* (and hence secondary).

Against that view, we have the following view [which is the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the present *Adhikaraṇa*]—"What is called '*Sāman*' should be regarded as a primary act.—'What is the reason for this?'—Herein is present the *sign of the Injunction of a primary act*,—in the shape of the Accusative Ending in '*Rathantaram gāyati*' [where '*rathantara*' is the name of a particular *Sāman*];—hence it should be regarded as a Primary act.—Then again, the singing (music) is done at the time of the performance of a sacrifice;—if then the *music* be held to be an 'embellishment' of the offering-material,—then, inasmuch as that material has been already 'embellished' (before the commencement of the sacrifice), it could not be 'embellished' by yet another invisible 'embellishment' during the time of the performance; for example, what is already smooth cannot be smoothed again, or what is already ground cannot be ground again. For this reason, the act (if it is to be an 'embellishment') would have to be regarded as to be done at a time when the sacrifice is not being performed,—just as in the case of the Fires; [and this would be incompatible with the fact that the *singing* of the *Sāman* is done *during* the performance of the sacrifice]. —In accordance with our view, on the other hand, being itself a Primary act, the *singing* would bring about its own result; and hence there would be no incongruity in the *singing* being done at a time other than that of the performance of the sacrifice.—Then again, it has been enjoined that—'Having taken up the observances on the Full Moon Day of the month of

Shrāvaṇa, one should carry on Vedic Study for four months and a half'; and the *singing* (of the *Sāman*) would be conducive to the result of these observances; under any other view, the Result, mentioned in connection with the men (taking up the observances), would have to be assumed as following from those observances themselves (which cannot be right).—For this reason also, the *singing* should be regarded as a Primary act".

SŪTRA (4).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"IT HAS THE VERSE FOR ITS SUBSTANCE,—SUCH BEING THE DIRECT DECLARATION;—AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'PĀKAYAJÑA'."

Bhāṣya.

"Our Opponent argues as follows:—'You say that the *singing* is a Primary act; but in reality, it cannot be a Primary act; because it brings no fruit; if a fruit were assumed, it would mean the assumption of something unheard of; hence the *singing* should be regarded as subordinate to the sacrifice. If it is not so subordinate (and if it is a primary act by itself), then (we ask) what is that *Substance*, in reference to which the singing would be a primary act?'—Our answer to this is as follows:—*It has the verse for its substance*; in regard to the *singing*, the *Verse* takes the place of the 'substance'; that is to say, just as the 'substance' helps in the accomplishment of an ordinary act, so does the verse help in the accomplishment of the *singing*; and hence in reference to the *verse*, the *singing* is a primary act; as *an accomplished entity* is always mentioned for the sake of *that which is to be accomplished*.—'But how do you know that the *singing* has the *verse* for *its substance*?'—We learn it from *direct declaration*; there are such declarations as '*Ṛchi sāma gāyati*' ('Sings the *Sāman in the verse*');—just as in the case of the *Pākayajñas*, such substances have been declared as '*Lājā*' (Fried grains), '*Dhānā*' (Parched grain), '*Taṇḍula*' (Rice), '*Ājya*' (Clarified Butter),—so, in the case of the *singing*, the substance is the '*Ṛk*' (Verse)."

SŪTRA (5).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"NOR IS THERE ANYTHING INCONGRUOUS IN ITS 'ABSENCE' IN, AND 'TRANSFERENCE' TO, ANOTHER SUBSTANCE."

Bhāṣya.

"Says the Opponent—'That particular verse which has been declared to be related to the *Singing* may be the *substance* of that *singing*; but when there is another substance, or when there is transference (of one *Sāman*) to another substance,—how can this other substance be regarded as the *substance* of that *Sāman*? [For instance, the verse '*Abhitvā shūra*,

etc.' is the declared *substance* of the *Rathantara Sāman*;—how then can that same *Rathantara*, when sung in connection with the verse '*Kayā nashchitra*, etc.'—be said to have this latter verse for its *substance*?]'.—Our answer to this is as follows:—There is no incongruity in this; *Sāman* is mere *music*, the *substance* is only what is declared to be the means of accomplishing that *music*; and this *substance* has been laid down in the most general form ('sings the *Sāman in a verse*', no special verse being specified); so that when any particular *substance* (verse) is specified (as pertaining to the *singing*), this special *substance* naturally sets aside the idea of *substance* (verse) *in general*. As a matter of fact, it is the mere *music*, apart from the *substance* (verse), which is called '*rathantara*' or '*bṛhat*'; so that there is no incongruity at all.—From all this it follows that the *Sāman* (Singing) is a primary act."

SŪTRA (6).

[SIDDHÂNTA]—BUT IT CANNOT BE SO; BECAUSE IT SUBSERVES THE PURPOSE OF THE WORDS.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('but') serves to reject the view set forth above. It cannot be true that the *Sāman* (singing) is a primary act; it should be regarded as a secondary act.—"Why so?"—*Because it subserves the purposes of the word*; the *Sāman* (Singing) is clearly perceived to be something helpful to the words; inasmuch as when the *Sāman* is uttered, the syllables of the verse become distinctly uttered: And this perceptible result being there, it is not necessary to assume an imperceptible (transcendental) result [which would be necessary if the *Sāman* (Singing) were a primary act].

SŪTRA (7).

ALSO BECAUSE THE WORDS SERVE A DIFFERENT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

The words too (of the verses) *serve a different purpose*; i.e.—they serve the purpose of *praising*; from such texts as '*Ājyaiḥ stuvatē*', '*Pṛṣṭhaiḥ stuvatē*' ['They praise with the *Ājya* (*Sāman*); they praise with the *Pṛṣṭha* (*Sāman*)'], it is clearly understood that what is enjoined here is *Praising* by means of the syllables of the verse which are pronounced distinctly (in the Singing). Thus then, though the *verse* clearly serves the purpose of *praising*, it would have to be assumed—under the *Pūrvapakṣa* view—to subserve the purposes of the *Sāman* (Singing); while there is no authority for any such assumption.—For this reason also, the *Sāman* (Singing) should be regarded as a secondary factor.

SŪTRA (8).

FURTHER, THERE WOULD BE NO CONNECTION WITH THE ACT, AS (ACCORDING TO THE PŪRVAPAKṢA) THE TWO TERMS WOULD HAVE DIFFERENT CONNOTATIONS.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also, the *Sāman* (Singing) should be regarded as a secondary factor.—" For what reason ? "—*There would be no connection* —of the *Sāman*, with the *Praise* (involved in the Hymn) ; because if (as held by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) the *Sāman* were the primary factor, then it would be the *Praise* that would have to be taken as laid down as appertaining to the *Sāman*,—and not the *Sāman* as appertaining to the Praise ;—and this would militate against the declaration—' *Bṛhat pṛṣṭham bhavati, Rathantaram pṛṣṭham bhavati* ' [where '*bṛhat*' and '*rathantara*' are the names of *Sāman*, and '*pṛṣṭha*' is the name of the Praise or Hymn] ;—what this declaration really lays down is that ' the *Pṛṣṭha*, Hymn, is one of which the *Rathantara* (*Sāman*) is the qualifying factor ' ;—and this could be possible only if the *Sāman* were taken as subserving the purposes of the verse ; as in that case the *Sāman* confers a perceptible benefit upon the *Pṛṣṭha* (Hymn-Praise) in that it clearly brings out its words. Now this would be possible only if the terms '*rathantara*' and '*pṛṣṭha*' were co-substrate and if they connoted the same thing ; if they had different connotations, then there would be no connection. [In the sentence '*Rathantaram pṛṣṭham bhavati*', according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the term '*rathantara*' connotes the *Music* (*Sāman*), and the term '*pṛṣṭha*' connotes the Praise-Hymn ; so that, both being primary factors, no co-substrateness or ' apposition ' between these two would be possible. According to the *Siddhānta*, on the other hand, the term '*rathantara*' indicates ' that of which the *Rathantara-Sāman* is a qualification ', and thereby it is easy to secure its ' apposition ' (co-substrateness) to the *Pṛṣṭha*, the Praise-Hymn].—From this it follows that the *Sāman* (Singing) is subordinate to (i.e. a qualification of) the verse.

SŪTRA (9).

[*Objection*]—" IF IT WERE AN ' EMBELLISHMENT ', IT WOULD BE DONE APART FROM THE SACRIFICIAL ACT,—LIKE THE FIRE-INSTALLATION ; AS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ALREADY DONE."

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 3) that—" If the *Singing* were an embellishment of the verse it would have to be regarded,—like the rite of *Fire-installation*—as to be done at a time other than (i.e. before) that of the performance of the sacrifice,—because it would have been already done [and hence need not be done again during the sacrificial performance] ".—

This has got to be refuted ; [and this refutation follows in the following *Sūtra*]—

SŪTRA (10).

THE USE OF THE WORDS (DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SACRIFICE) WOULD HAVE BEEN REGARDED AS NOT TO BE DONE, ONLY IF IT WERE IMPOSSIBLE TO DO IT.

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) If the *singing* done before the sacrificial performance could continue till the time of that performance, and did not cease,—then *it would have been regarded as not to be done* again (at the performance) [as happens in the case of the Fire-installation; the Fire having been installed before the sacrificial performance, continues to exist at the time of the performance, and hence the *installation* is not done again];—or (*b*) if it were impossible to do the *singing* again at the time of the performance,—then too *it would have been regarded as not to be done.*—As a matter of fact, however, it is quite possible for the words that have been sung (before the sacrificial performance) to be used (sung) again. Consequently the words could very well be used (sung) again at the time of the performance, on the ground that, as used at another time, they do not help in the performance at all; and hence there would be nothing wrong in it.

SŪTRA (11).

ALSO BECAUSE IT RESTS UPON IT.

Bhāṣya.

Then again, there is a text which clearly indicates that the *singing rests upon* (is to be done at) the time of the sacrificial performance: There is the declaration—'Having touched the Post made of *Udumbara* wood, the *Udgatṛ*-priest, without leaning upon it, sings',—which means that 'the Priest does the *singing* after touching the *Udumbara Post*, which is at the centre of the *Sadas*';—and this clearly shows that the *singing* is to be done in the *Sadas* (which can be done only during the sacrificial performance).—Thus there is no reason for assuming that the *singing* should be done, like Fire-installation, before the sacrificial performance.

SŪTRA (12).

"BUT IT IS ACTUALLY DONE",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 3) that—"Vedic study is carried on during four months and a half, and it brings about its own fruit [so that the *Sāma-singing* done apart from the sacrificial performance would bring its own fruit]".—This has got to be refuted (which we are going to do in the following *Sūtra*)—

SŪTRA (13).

IT IS DONE FOR THE PURPOSE OF BEING LEARNT.

Bhāṣya.

The *singing* (done apart from the sacrificial performance) cannot bring about its own fruit ; as this supposition would involve the assumption of a transcendental result ; while we actually perceive a distinct purpose (served by the *Sāma-singing*, or *Vedic Study*, done apart from sacrifices) ; it is this—the teacher recites the texts near the Pupil, with the view that the Pupil should learn them ;—the Pupil continues to recite them with a view to retain them in his memory ; and this *learning* and *retaining in memory* of the texts are for the purpose that these texts would be used at sacrificial performances. It is just like the case of (*a*) the man who draws the figures of the chariot on the ground, or (*b*) of the pupil who performs Sham-sacrifices. (*a*) The former draws the figures of the chariot on the ground and demonstrates the manner of using the chariot, with the view that he would be able to do it more efficiently in actual warfare ;—(*b*) similarly the Pupil engages himself in Sham-sacrifices, in order to attain efficiency in practice, which will make him efficient in the actual performance.—Similar should be the case with *Sāma-singing* [i.e. it is done apart from sacrificial performances for the purpose of acquiring efficiency which will be of service at the actual performance].—Thus then, when it is possible to explain it on the basis of a perceptible result, there can be no justification for regarding *Vedic Study* (or *Sāma-singing*) as bringing about invisible (transcendental) results.

From all this it follows that the *Sāma-singing* is an act of embellishment (of the Verse that is sung).

Adhikaraṇa (4): *In the triad of verses, the whole 'Sāman' should be sung with each verse.*

SŪTRA (14).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*continued*]—"It should be spread over the three verses,—because such is the declaration of the Veda."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, it is said—'*Tasmādēkam sāma trichē kriyatē stotrīyam*' ['One *Sāma-singing* is done with the Triad of verses, by way of Praise'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the singing (of the Sāman) to be spread over all the three verses? Or should the whole *Sāman* be sung with each verse?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows:—"The *Sāma-singing* should be spread over all the three verses.—'Why?'—*Because such is the declaration of the Veda*;—the Veda declares that '*One Sāman* is sung with the Triad of verses', where the number 'three' appears in connection with 'verse', as an accessory of the accomplishment of the *Sāma-singing*; such being the case, if people were to begin and finish the *Sāman* with one verse, then they would not make the number 'three' a factor in the means of accomplishing the *Sāman*; in fact, what would be accomplished would be what is qualified by the number 'one' only;—and this would be contrary to the said Vedic declaration.—For instance, when it is said 'Hang this Jar on the *three pegs*', the Jar is hung over all the three at one and the same time, and not on each of the pegs by turn. Similarly should it be done in the case in question.

"Says the Opponent—'But there are such assertions also as *Devadatta eats at three houses*, where *succession* is meant, not *simultaneity*; because the assertion is made even in cases where the man eats at the three houses one after the other;—the same should be the case with the *Sāma-singing* also'.

"The answer to this is as follows:—In the sentence cited, the number 'three' has not been mentioned in connection with the *act of eating*,—if it had been so, then alone it could be as suggested;—as a matter of fact, however, the number 'three' is connected with 'house'—i.e. 'at three houses', not at 'two houses' or at 'one house'. In a case where the number is mentioned in connection with the accomplishment of the *act of eating*, the man has to be fed simultaneously. In the case in question, however, the number 'three' is connected with the verb '*kriyatē*', ('sings'); so that the number comes to be predicated of the *act* (of *singing*);—in this way what the injunctive word enjoins is something which is spoken of by the same word [the Injunctive word '*kriyatē*', 'does', as taken along with 'three', enjoins this 'three' in reference to the 'singing'];

—otherwise, in any other construction, what the sentence would lay down would be the bringing about of the connection between the '*verse*' and of the *number* ('three'); and this would be a far-fetched construction. For these reasons we conclude that the number ('three') has been laid down in connection with the accomplishment of the *Sāman*.

"The Opponent rejoins—'In the case in question, the number *three* is related to the word *verse*; for if there were no such relation, there could be no compounding (between these two terms—as there is in the compound *tṛcha*)'.

"The answer to this is as follows:—We do not say that these two terms ('three' and 'verses') are not related; they are of course related, and there is (therefore) compounding also; but this compound word ('*tṛcha*') is employed in the accomplishment of the *Sāman*. Thus then, what is expressed by the term 'three' and what is expressed by the term 'verses' both come to be laid down for the 'accomplishment' ('doing'), not for the 'verse'; so that the meaning of the sentence is—'The *Sāma-singing* should be done, accomplished,—thus the verses become *three*, not less'. According to the other view, it would be the *repetition* (of the singing) that would be connected with the number 'three'; and in that case the expression '*Sāma kriyatē*' ('does the Sāma-singing') would have to be taken in a figurative sense; that is, the '*doing of Sāma-singing*' would have to be taken in the sense of '*does the repeating*'.

"From all this it follows that the singing of the *Sāman* is to be spread over all the three verses."

SŪTRA (15).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"BECAUSE WHAT THE WORD DENOTES IS 'MODIFICATION'."

Bhāṣya.

"For the following reason also we conclude that the *Sāman-singing* should be spread over all the three verses.—'Why?'—What is denoted by the name '*Sāman*' is a *modification*,—i.e. a quality of the verse. If then this 'modification' is spread over all the three verses, then many syllables remain *unmodified* (as only a few become subject to modification); and thus the injunction (of the use of the verse) becomes honoured (more than it would be if the *Sāman* were sung with every one of the verses).—Hence it follows that the *singing* should be spread over all the three verses."

SŪTRA (16).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"[A VEDIC TEXT] ALSO INDICATES THIS SAME CONCLUSION."

Bhāṣya.

"There is the following text—'*Ṛk* (Verse) said to *Sāman* (Music)—*let us pair off*; *Sāman* answered—*Thou art not fit to be my wife; dost thou know my*

greatness ?—Ṛk became two and they said the same ;—then *Sāman* answered—You two are not fit for being my wives ; do you know my greatness ?—Then Ṛk, became *three* and said—*let us pair off* ;—Sāman replied—*let us do it*'.—This shows that when it is said that 'One *Sāman* is to be sung, as Praise, with the triad of verses',—neither one verse nor two verses serve for the Sāma-singing in praise, they do so only when they are *three*. This clearly indicates that the *singing* is to be spread over the three verses".

SŪTRA (17).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, AS THE SENTENCES ARE DISTINCT, THERE SHOULD BE COMPLETION WITH EACH SENTENCE ; BECAUSE THE 'EMBELLISHMENT' IS FOR EACH.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('in fact') serves to set aside the view set forth above.

What are spoken of as 'three verses' are three distinct sentences ; every one of these three verses accomplishes the *praising* by means of the whole set of the words composing it ; and it is not along with any other verse that it praises anything ; and it is by becoming subordinated to the *Verse* that the *Sāman* helps it in doing the *praising*. Under the circumstances, if the singing of the *Sāman* were spread over all the three Verses, then the *Sāman* would be of no help to the *Verse* in doing the *praising* ; because the *Sāma-singing* is not made up of parts ;—nor is anything praised by a group of Verses,—where the said group could do the *praising* in connection with the *Sāman*. So that it comes to this, that the Verse does the *praising*, but it is not connected with the *Sāman* (according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*),—while the group of Verses is connected with the *Sāman*, but it does not do any *praising*. On the other hand, if the entire *Sāma-singing* is done with each of the three Verses, the *praising* comes to be done by words connected with the *Sāman* ; and thus the embellishment done by the *Sāma-singing* serving the purpose of bringing about the *praise*, the whole of the *singing* should be done with each of the three verses.

SŪTRA (18).

THERE IS AN INDICATIVE TEXT ALSO POINTING TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

There is a text which, though directly meaning something else, indicates the same conclusion—'One introduces the singing with eight syllables in the first verse and with two syllables in the next two verses' ; here the introducing of the *singing* in the various verses is spoken of as diverse (which can be possible only if the *singing* is separately complete in each verse by itself).—Then again, there is the text—' His last Hymn-verse

is one, he should take up that one and then sing',—which indicates a difference in regard to the *Udgītha*; and from this also it follows that the *singing* is to be done with each of the verses.

Even in cases where only half-verses are sung, the *singing* should be done to the verse;—in the half-verse, the sentence remains incomplete, while in the case of the whole *verse*, it becomes complete.—In cases where the singing is done to the quarter-verse, the *singing* is to be done to the quarters only; because in this case the sentence is complete in the quarter: e.g. the quarter—'*goṣthē vāshiṣṭhaḥ*'. The upshot of all this is that the *Sāma-singing* should be completed with that much of the verse as contains a complete sentence; in some cases the sentence is complete in the quarter-verse, sometimes in the whole verse, and sometimes in the half-verse also; so that the *singing* should be done according as the sentence is complete.

SŪTRA (19).

THE INJUNCTION OF SINGING 'IN ONE BREATH' ALSO POINTS TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

The injunction of singing 'in one breath' also is possible only under our view; the injunction is that 'One should *sing in one breath*',—this 'singing in one breath' is possible only if the *singing* is completed with each verse,—it could not be done if the singing were to be spread over the three verses.

Further, at the time of Vedic study, the *singing* has to be completed with each verse;—and the practice (of the singing) is to be done at the time of the Vedic study, with the view that there should be efficiency at the time of the performance. Under the circumstances, if, at the time of the performance also, the *singing* were done to each verse,—then alone would there be any justification for this being done in course of the Vedic Study.—From this also it follows that the *Sāman* should be sung with each verse.

SŪTRA (20).

THE OTHER DECLARATION (THAT THE PŪRVAPAKṢIN HAS QUOTED) WOULD BE FULFILLED BY REPETITION.

Bhāṣya.

In support of his view the *Pūrvapakṣin* has cited the declaration—'Therefore one *Sāma-singing* is done with the Triad of verses'.—But this should be understood as *fulfilled by repetition*—i.e. by being done to each verse by turn. Because this text does not speak of the verse as serving the purpose of accomplishing the *Sāman*. Consequently it cannot be said that 'the term *three* shall qualify the *verse* which is the means of accomplishing the *Sāman*'. In fact, the *Sāman* is spoken of clearly as sub-

ordinate to (qualification of) the Hymn-praise,—in such texts as—'*Rathantaram pṛṣṭham bhavati, bṛhat pṛṣṭham bhavati*'; and the most reasonable course to be adopted under the circumstances appears to be that the *singing* should be done to each verse. The number (*three*) is connected, not with the 'accomplishment of the *Sāman*', but with the verses; and as this could not be done in any other way, *repetition* becomes indicated,—the idea indicated being that 'the *Sāman* should be repeated over the three verses'. Just as, when it is said that 'Devadatta should be fed at three houses', the number 'three' is connected with 'houses', and repetition of the act becomes indicated,—so should it be in the case in question also.

From all this it follows that the whole *singing* should be done with each of the verses.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *The 'Sāman should be sung over verses belonging to the same metre.*

SŪTRA (21).

THE REPETITION OF THE SĀMA-SINGING SHOULD BE DONE OVER VERSES OF THE SAME METRE.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice laid down in the text—'Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice'; in connection with that sacrifice, it is declared—'Therefore one sings a *Sāman* over the triad of verses'.—In regard to this, it has been decided that the complete *Sāman* should be sung over each verse.

Now another question arising in this connection is—Should the *singing* be done over verses which may belong to the same metre or to different metres (at option)?—Or should it be done always over only those belonging to the same metre?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view presenting itself is that—"There being no hard and fast rule on the subject, there should be no restriction".

As against this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The *Sāman* should be sung over verses of the same metre,—not over those of diverse metres. —"What would be the advantage of this?"—The advantage would be that there would be no 'cutting off' and 'shortening'. That is to say, if we were to take up verses of metres shorter than the metre of the original verse (to which the Sāma-music has been set), then we would have to 'cut off' the music (as the number of syllables would be too small to take up all the music to which the longer-metred verse has been set);—on the other hand, if we were to take up verses of metres longer than that of the original verse, then the music would have to be 'shortened' (i.e. it would be too short for the large number of syllables in the verse). So that in either case, there would be going against authority.—If, however, we were to take up verses of the same metre as the original verse, then there would be no incongruity.—From this it follows that the *singing* should be done over verses of the same metre.—Then again, the application of the adjective 'three' would be right only if all verses belonged to the same metre; because it is only when some things of the same kind are spoken of that a numerical adjective is applied to them.

SŪTRA (22).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

We find a text also pointing to the same conclusion—'*Sthālyām saktu avadhīyatē, sambhavati ityāhuḥ, yadbṛhad gāyatrīṣu kriyatē ṛktvēnāntarujati*

iti na chāsyām sambhavati ' [' Flour is put in the dish ; they say *it is all right*' when the *Bṛhat-Sāman* is sung in connection with the *Gāyatrī-metre*, the verse suffers a clipping within it ; and thus it is not all right '] ;—this text speaks deprecatingly of the *singing* done to verses of diverse metres ; and thereby implies that it should be done to verses of the same metre.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *In the case of the injunction 'Uttarayorgāyati', the two verses taken should be such as occur in the 'Uttarā' section of the Veda.*

SŪTRA (23).

THE CHARACTER OF 'UTTARĀ', WHICH IS BASED ON A CERTAIN CONDITION, SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS SUBSISTING IN THE VERSES OCCURRING IN THE 'UTTARĀ' SECTION; BECAUSE OF IMMEDIATE SEQUENCE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Rathantaramuttarayorgāyati, bṛhaduttarayorgāyati, kavatīṣu rathantaram gāyati, yad yonyām gāyati taduttarayorgāyati*' ['One sings the *Rathantara* over the two *Uttarā* verses; one sings the *Bṛhat* over the two *Uttarā* verses; one sings the *Rathantara* over the *Kavatī* verses; what one sings over the original verse, that he sings over the *Uttarā* verses'].—Now, it has been understood (in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*) that a Sāman should be sung over verses belonging to the same metre as the 'original' verse.—The question arising next is—May the *Sāman* (*Rathantara*) which is laid down in this passage as to be sung over the '*Uttarā*' (Latter) verses be sung (optionally) either over the two verses that *follow* (and as such are '*Uttarā*', 'Latter', in relation to) the *basic* verse, or over those two verses that occur last (and as such are '*Uttarā*', 'Latter') among the three verses occurring in the '*Uttarā*' section of the *Veda*? Or should it be sung over the latter only (i.e. only over the two out of the three verses occurring in the *Uttarā* section of the Veda)?

[Of the verbal Vedic Text of the *Sāma-singers*, there are two sections called '*Chhandas*' and '*Uttarā*'; the '*Chhandas*' section contains only those verses that form the 'origin' or 'base' of the various *Sāmans*; while the '*Uttarā*' section contains hymns consisting of three verses each; of these three verses, the first one is one of those 'basic' verses that are contained in the *Chhandas* section, and the other two verses are distinct from those 'basic' verses.—Now, the passage quoted lays down the singing of the *Rathantara-Sāman* over the '*Uttarā* verses'—The term '*Uttarā*' means 'Latter'. Under the '*Chhandas*' section of the Veda, the 'basic' verse of the *Rathantara-Sāman* is '*Abhi tvā shūra nonumaḥ etc.*',—and this is followed by the 'basic' verses of the other *Sāmans*,—such verses, for instance, as '*Tvāmiddhi havāmahē etc.*'; so that the two basic verses that occur after the verse '*Abhitvā shūra etc.*' might be regarded as 'two *Uttarā* (Latter) verses' in relation to the said verse '*Abhi tvā etc.*'.—Under the '*Uttarā*' section of the *Veda*, however, the verse '*Abhi tvā shūra etc.*' is followed by verses ('*Na tvā vā anyē etc.*') which are entirely different from those that follow it under the '*Chhandas*' section; so that, in accordance with the '*Uttarā*' section, these other verses ('*Na tvā etc.*') would be regarded as '*Uttarā*' ('latter') in relation to the verse '*Abhi tvā etc.*'—The question to be considered thus is that, when it is laid down that 'The *Rathantara* is to be sung over the two *Uttarā*

verses', should it be sung over the verses '*Tvāmiddhi havāmahē etc.*', according to the text of the '*Chhandas*' section ? Or should it be sung over the verses '*Na tvā etc.*' according to the text of the '*Uttarā*' section ?]

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that, "since there is no scriptural injunction laying down any restriction, there should be no restriction [i.e. the *Sāman* may be optionally sung over two verses of either of the two sections]".

Against this, we have the following *Siddhānta* :—The character of being '*Uttarā*' *is based upon a certain condition*, and can belong to only those verses that are found in the '*Uttarā*' section.—"Why ?"—Because of the name ('*Uttarā*', which can apply to verses contained in the section of that name), and also because it is the verses contained in the '*Uttarā*' section that form the subject-matter of the Context.

Says the Opponent :—"*Syntactical Connection* is always more authoritative than both *Name* and *Context* ; for this reason it has to be concluded that there can be no restriction in the matter".

Answer—Relative terms do not denote anything at all, except in reference to another term (to which they are relative) ;—this other term therefore is always needed ;—and such a term can only be one that is in the same Context as, or one that is in close proximity to, the relative term ;—otherwise the sentence would be incomplete and as such meaningless.—On the other hand, when a term is the name of a certain thing, then it does not need another term,—its complete denotation being obtained from the term itself.—Consequently, in the case in question, the term '*Uttarā*' should not be taken as a relative term (meaning 'the latter'),—it should be taken as a *name* by itself ; and in the case of names, there is no need for the proximity of another term (as there *is* in the case of *relative* terms).

SŪTRA (24).

THERE IS REPETITION OF IT, AS IT DENOTES ONE SINGLE UNIT.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the *Sāma-singing* should be repeated over those same verses that occur in the *Uttarā* section ;—it is only thus that the term '*tṛcha*' (verse-triad) comes to be denotative of one unit ; people apply the term '*verse-triad*' to a single unit consisting of a genus and individuals (i.e. they use it as a 'Common' noun) ; it is in this sense that it has been declared that 'a number always refers to a particular set of individuals' ; if it were not so, then, all numbers would apply to all things, and there would be an end to all usage.

From all this it follows that the term '*tṛcha*' ('verse-triad') applies to those three verses that have the same metre and the same 'deity' ; so that in the case in question the verses taken up should be those that occur in the *Uttarā* section.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): (By another interpretation of *Sūtras* 21–24). *The singing of the 'Trishoka' is to be accomplished by the repetition of the 'Atijagatī' verse.*

SŪTRA (21).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE REPETITION OF THE SĀMA-SINGING SHOULD BE DONE OVER VERSES OF THE SAME METRE."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Dvādashāha*-sacrifice laid down in the text—'One should offer the *Dvādashāha* for one who desires offspring';—on the fourth day of this sacrifice there is singing of the *Trishoka-Sāman*, which has for its base a verse in the *Atijagatī* metre,—this verse being '*Vishvāḥ pṛtanā abhibhūtaram etc.*'; this verse forms part of the 'verse-triad' of which the two following verses are in the *Bṛhatī* metre—viz.: (1) '*Nēminnamanti chakṣasā etc.*' and (2) '*Samīm rēbhāso asvarannindram etc.*'.

The question that arises is—When the *Trishoka* is to be sung over the *Atijagatī-triad*—should it be sung over the first of the said verses, which is in the *Atijagatī* metre (i.e. the verse '*Vishvāḥ pṛtanā etc.*'), and the two other verses, which also should be of the same metre, should be brought in from elsewhere (as those occurring along with the said verse are *not* in that same metre)?—Or should these same verses in the *Bṛhatī* metre be taken up, and the *Sāman* should be sung over these same, even though they are not in the same metre as the basic verse?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"In order to avoid the contingencies of 'cutting off' and 'shortening', two other verses in the basic *Atijagatī* metre should be brought in and the *Sāma-singing* should be repeated over these same, which would be uniform with the first verse of the triad".

SŪTRA (22).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS."

Bhāṣya.

"People quote the following text also as indicative of the same conclusion: '*Atijagatiṣu stuvanti*'.—'What is there in this that indicates the said conclusion?'—It is the Plural number in '*atijagatiṣu*' [which can be justified only if there are *three* verses in the *Atijagatī* metre, and this is possible only in accordance with the *Pūrvapakṣa*, by which two additional verses in this metre are brought in from elsewhere].—From this it follows that the two additional verses in the *Atijagatī* metre are to be brought in from elsewhere."

SŪTRA (23).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE CHARACTER OF 'UTTARĀ', WHICH IS BASED ON A CERTAIN CONDITION, SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS SUBSISTING IN THE VERSES OCCURRING IN THE 'UTTARĀ' SECTION; BECAUSE OF IMMEDIATE SEQUENCE.

Bhāṣya.

The verses to be taken should be those indicated by the actual text of the *Uttarā-section* [where the *verse-triad* is found to contain the first verse in the *Atijagatī*-metre and the other two in the *Bṛhatī*-metre]; as it is these two verses that follow in *immediate sequence* to the *Atijagatī* verse; —specially because *Shruti* (the Vedic Text) is more authoritative than *Syntactical Connection*;—hence it follows that the two verses in the *Bṛhatī*-metre are to be taken up for the singing of the *Sāman*,—and none others are to be brought in from elsewhere.

SŪTRA (24).

THERE IS TO BE REPETITION OF IT AS IT DENOTES ONE SINGLE UNIT.

Bhāṣya.

It is only when the above is done that the term 'Verse-triad' becomes applicable to the *Trishoka*, which thus comes to have the same deity; for this reason also no other verses are to be brought in from elsewhere.

Says the Opponent:—"We have put forward the text '*Atijagatīṣu stuvanti*' as indicative of the *Pūrvapakṣa* view; since the plural number in the term '*atijagatīṣu*' indicates the presence of more than two *Atijagatī* verses [while in the verses as they stand there is only one *Atijagatī* verse]. —This argument has got to be refuted."

The answer to this argument is as follows:—*There should be repetition of it*,—i.e. repetition of the *Ṣoḍashin*; in view of the text '*Ēkavimshaḥ ṣoḍashī*', the *Ṣoḍashin* has to be repeated twenty-one times'; which means repetition of the *Trishoka*; so that there being *seven* repetitions of the *Atijagatī*, the plural number becomes quite explicable.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The 'Rathantara' is to be sung over verses obtained by interlinking the 'Bṛhatī' and the 'Paṅkti' verses.*

SŪTRA (25).

IN REALITY, WHAT IS OBTAINED BY INTERLINKING [SHOULD BE USED FOR THE SINGING].

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Bṛhat pṛṣṭham bhavati rathantaram pṛṣṭham bhavati*' [where the singing of the *Bṛhat-Sāman* and the *Rathantara-Sāman* is laid down];—the basic verse of the *Rathantara-Sāman* is the verse '*Abhi vā shūra etc.*', which is in the *Bṛhatī* metre;—and the verse which follows it (and is its '*Uttarā*') is—'*Na tvā vānanyo divyo etc.*', which is in the *Paṅkti* metre.—As for the *Bṛhat-Sāman*, its basic verse is—'*Tvāmiddhi havāmahē etc.*', which is in the *Bṛhatī* metre;—and its '*Uttarā*' verse is—'*Sa tvannashchitra etc.*', which is in the *Paṅkti* metre.—Now, in regard to these two *Sāmans*—*Rathantara* and *Bṛhat*,—it has been laid down that they are sung over *Divergent* metres,—as is clear from the declaration to the effect that—'Verily neither the *Bṛhat* nor the *Rathantara* is confined to one metre,—in the case of each of these, the first verse is of the *Bṛhatī* metre and the other two are of the *Kakup* metre'.

The question that arises here is—Should the singing be done after bringing in two verses of the *Kakup* metre from elsewhere [there being no such verses in the verses connected with the particular *Sāman*]?—Or should the first verse in the *Bṛhatī* metre and the second verse of the *Paṅkti* metre be so interlinked as to yield the third verse in the *Kakup* metre, and the singing thus made to be one in which the *Uttarā* verse is in the *Kakup* metre?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"Two original verses in the *Kakup* metre should be brought in from elsewhere.—Why?—Because in this manner, the presence of those other *Kakup*-verses would serve some useful purpose, by being so used for purposes for which the *Kakup* metre is needed.—An objection may be raised to this view—'Those other *Kakup*-verses might have their use in the *Vāchastoma*'.—The answer to this is that it is true that they would have their use there; but they are really meant to be used as *Kakup*; and this purpose should not be ignored."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*In reality, what is obtained by interlinking should be used for the singing.*—The term 'in reality' serves to set aside the *Pūrvapakṣa* view set forth above. In reality, the *Sāma-singing* should be done over the verse obtained by *interlinking*; that is, the first verse, which is in the *Bṛhatī* metre and the second verse which is in the *Paṅkti* metre, should be *interlinked*, specially because the *Smṛti-rule* is that 'the *Pragātha* should be *Kākubha*'.

Objection—"Thus *Kakup* (as Veda) being beginningless, the term '*Kākubha*' is impossible."

Answer—The term does not denote 'made of *Kakup*', but 'pertaining to *Kakup*' or 'born of *Kakup*'.

[The singing in question is to be done in the following manner:—(1) The *Rathantara-Sāman* should be sung over the verse '*Abhi tvā shūra* etc.', which is in the *Bṛhatī* metre;—(2) the last quarter of this verse should be linked up with the first half of the verse in *Paṅkti* metre which follows—i.e. of the verse '*Na vā vān* etc.';—this interlinking gives us a verse with 28 syllables divided into three 'feet' or 'quarters';—this becomes the first *Kakup*;—(3) the last foot or quarter of this *Kakup* is to be linked with the second half of the *Paṅkti*-verse;—this becomes the second *Kakup*.]

SŪTRA (26).

THUS IT IS OVER ITS OWN.

Bhāṣya.

In the manner above described, the singing is done over the verse in its own metre. By the *Uttarā-text* itself it is clearly indicated that in making up the *Verse-triad*, the *Paṅkti-metre* is to be used; so that in doing as above there is no abandoning of what is in the Context, nor an admission of what is not in the Context.—For these reasons also there should be *interlinking* of the two verses.

SŪTRA (27).

EVEN SO IS THE NAME 'PRAGĀTHA'.

Bhāṣya.

Thus too does the term '*pragātha*' become applicable; the prefix '*pra*' signifies *excellence*; so that the '*Pragātha*' is that where there is *excellent singing* (*pra-gātha*).—"What is the *excellence* in it?"—The *excellence* lies in the fact that a portion of the verse is sung over again.—For this reason also there should be an interlinking of the two verses concerned.

SŪTRA (28).

ALSO BECAUSE AN INDICATIVE TEXT MAKES NO TRANSGRESSION POSSIBLE.

Bhāṣya.

There is an indicative text which shows that of what has been said above there can be no transgression.—"What is the meaning of no *transgression* being possible?"—The meaning is that the 'interlinking' is to be done only between the two verses concerned,—not apart from those verses.—"What is the *indicative text*?"—It is as follows:—'*Ēṣā va pratiṣṭhitā bṛhatī yā punaḥpadā, tad yat pādam punarārabhatē tasmād vatso mātaramabhi hiṅkaroti*' ['This *Bṛhatī* is firmly established, because its quarter is repeated over again, etc. etc.'];—this 'repetition of the quarter' is possible only if there is 'interlinking' as described above, not otherwise.

From all this it follows that the singing should be done with *Kakup* as the *Uttarā* verse, by securing a 'verse-triad' by interlinking the first verse in the *Bṛhatī* metre and the second verse in the *Paṅkti* metre.

Or, the above four *Sūtras* may be taken as representing the following *Adhikaraṇa.*

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *The singing of the 'Raurava' and 'Yaudhājaya' Sāmans is to be done by interlinking the verses in 'Bṛhatī' and 'Viṣṭāra-Paṅkti' metres.*

[By another interpretation of *Sūtras* 25–28.]

SŪTRA (25).

IN REALITY, WHAT IS OBTAINED BY INTERLINKING [SHOULD BE USED FOR THE SINGING].

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice laid down in the text—'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice'.—In connection with this sacrifice, we read—'*Trichchhandā āvāpo mādhyandinaḥ pavamānaḥ pañcha-sāmā gāyatrāmahīyavē gāyatrē trichē bhavataḥ—raurava—yaudhājayē bārhatē trichē aushanasamantyam triṣṭupsu*'.—Here two *Sāmans* are spoken of—the '*Raurava*' and the '*Yaudhājaya*';—of these, the first verse is '*Punānaḥ soma dhārayā etc.*', which is in the *Bṛhatī* metre; and the *Uttarā* verse is '*Duhāna ūdhardiyam madhu priyam etc.*', which is in the *Viṣṭāra-paṅkti* metre.

In connection with the singing of these two *Sāmans*, the question that arises is—Is the singing to be done over the *Verse-triad*, all three verses of which should be in the *Bṛhatī* metre, one of them being the one just quoted ('*Punānaḥ etc.*') and the other two being brought in from elsewhere? Or should the singing over the Verse-triad in the *Bṛhatī* metre be accomplished by taking the one verse just quoted ('*Punānaḥ etc.*') and securing the other two by the interlinking of this verse in the *Bṛhatī* metre and the second verse in the *Viṣṭāra-Paṅkti* metre?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"The two additional verses in *Bṛhatī* metre should be brought in from elsewhere.—Why?—Because it is only thus that the presence of the verses would serve a useful purpose".

Against this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*In reality, what is obtained by interlinking should be used for the singing.* The term 'in reality' sets aside the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.—The singing of the *Sāman* should be done through the interlinking of the verses; and no additional basic verses in the *Bṛhatī metre* should be brought in from elsewhere; the interlinking should

be done between the two verses occurring in the Context itself. The Smṛti rule over the point is '*Bārhataḥ pragāthaḥ*' ('There is an interlinking of the *Bṛhatī*'); if original *Bṛhatī* verses were brought in, then there would be no 'interlinking'; and to that extent, the *Smṛti* rule would be infringed.—Hence the interlinking should be done between the two verses occurring in the Context itself.

SŪTRA (26).

THUS IT IS OVER ITS OWN.

Bhāṣya.

In this manner, the singing would be done over the Sāman's 'own' metre; and there would be no abandoning of the verse in the Context, and introducing of what is not in the Context. For this reason also additional *Bṛhatī* verses are not to be brought in.

SŪTRA (27).

EVEN SO IS THE NAME 'PRAGĀTHA'.

Bhāṣya.

In this way too the term '*pragātha*' becomes applicable; it is applied only in cases where there is *excellence of singing*; and in the case in question, this 'excellence' is secured by repeating the same quarter of the verse.—For this reason also additional *Bṛhatī* verses should not be brought in from elsewhere.

SŪTRA (28).

ALSO BECAUSE AN INDICATIVE TEXT MAKES NO TRANSGRESSION POSSIBLE.

Bhāṣya.

An indicative text also shows that such is invariably the case.—"What is that indicative text?"—It is this—'*Ṣaṣṭistriṣṭubho mādhyandinam savanam*'.—"How does this text indicate the said conclusion?"—It is only when the singing of the *Bṛhatī* is done by interlinking that the number of verses laid down as to be sung at all the *Savanas* becomes *sixty*; on the other hand, if two additional *Bṛhatī* verses were brought in from elsewhere, that number would become exceeded.—This is what is pointed out in the text—'*Gāyatramahīyavē gāyatrē trichē bhavataḥ*'; these two verse-triads are the six *Gāyatrī* verses;—then there are two verse-triads *Raurava* and *Yaudhājaya*, which make the six *Bṛhatī* verses;—'the last *Aushanasa* verses in the *Triṣṭup*' make the three *Triṣṭup* verses;—then, when the *Hotṛ* priest comes to sing either the *Bṛhat* or the *Rathantara Sāman* with its seventeen *Stomas*,—then in these seventeen we have five *Bṛhatis* and twelve *Kakups*.—"How so?"—The description is as follows:—'*Pañchabhyo hiṅkaroti, sa tisṛbhiḥ, sa ēkayā, sa ēkayā; pañchabhyo hiṅkaroti, sa ēkayā, sa tisṛbhiḥ, sa ēkayā; saptabhyo hiṅkaroti, sa ēkayā, sa tisṛbhiḥ, sa tisṛbhiḥ*'. The meaning of this is as follows:—(1) The three *Bṛhatī* verses with one *Kakup* verse;—(2) again the same three *Bṛhatī* with the one *Kakup* verse; (3)

one *Bṛhatī* with three *Kakups*; (4) one *Bṛhatī* with one *Kakup*; *thus there are four Bṛhatīs and six Kakups*;—then again, (1) with one *Bṛhatī* and three *Kakups*; (2) again with three *Kakups*;—*thus there are five Bṛhatīs and twelve Kakups*. Thus with the former ones, there are eleven *Bṛhatīs*.—Then from among the six *Gāyatrīs*, four, along with the twelve *Kakups*, make up twelve *Bṛhatīs*. Thus there are twenty-three *Bṛhatīs*.—Then in the *Vāmadēvya Sāman*, the seventeen *Gāyatrīs* along with the two *Pāvamānas* accompanied by the two remaining *Gāyatrīs*, make up the nineteen *Gāyatrīs*. Then in the *Nandhasa* and the *Kālēya*, there are seventeen *Bṛhatīs*; and these along with the fifty-seven quarters of the (nineteen) *Gāyatrīs*, make up fifty-seven *Bṛhatīs* and fifty-seven *Triṣṭups*; and these fifty-seven with the three *Triṣṭups* of the *Pāvamānī* make up the '*sixty Triṣṭups*' (spoken of in the indicative text quoted above).

On the other hand, if two original *Kakups* are brought into the *Bṛhat* and *Rathantara Sāmans*, then those verses become *sixty* which occur in the *Savana*. If the two *Kakups* not occurring in the text are introduced, then the number *sixty* is made up by using them twelve times. The term '*Savana*' in this case stands for those verses that have been laid down in connection with the particular *Savana*; and the term '*Savana*' does not stand for any *act*. In this way, at the three *Savanas* taken together, there would be many *Triṣṭups*.—And there would not be only *sixty Triṣṭups* at the *Mādhyandina Savana* (as mentioned in the indicative text quoted above).

From all this it follows that the singing should be done by interlinking the first verse in the *Bṛhatī* metre and the second verse in the *Viṣṭāra-Paṅkti* metre.

Or the four Sūtras 25–28 may be taken as embodying the following *Adhikaraṇa*.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *The singing of the 'Shyāvashvān-dīgava' should be done by interlinking the verses in the 'Anuṣṭup' and 'Gāyatrī' metres.*

[By the *third* interpretation of *Sūtras* 25–28.]

SŪTRA (25).

WHAT IS OBTAINED BY INTERLINKING [SHOULD BE USED FOR THE SINGING].

Bhāṣya.

At the third *Savana*, there is the *Pavamāna* named '*Ārbhava*'; and at this there are five *Sūktas* (hymns) and seven *Sāmans*. (1) The first *Sūkta* consists of the verse-triad '*Svādiṣṭhayā madiṣṭhayā etc.*'; where all the three verses are in the *Gāyatrī* metre;—in this connection, there are two *Sāmans*,

'*Gāyatra*' and '*Saṁhita*';—(2) the second *Sūkta* consists of the verse-triad '*Purojiti vo andhasaḥ etc.*', where the first verse is in *Anuṣṭup* and the other two in *Gāyatrī* metre;—in this connection, there are two *Sāmans*, '*Shyāvāshva*' and '*Āndhīgava*';—[(3) the third *Sūkta* consists of the verse-triad '*Indramachchhasutā imē etc.*', where all the three verses are in the *Uṣṇik* metre; and in this connection there is one *Sāman*, the '*Sapha*';—(4) the fourth *Sūkta* consists of the Pragātha '*Pavasva madhumattamaḥ etc.*', where the three verses are in the *Uṣṇik* metre; in this connection there is one *Sāman*, the '*Pauṣkala*';—(5) the last *Sūkta* consists of the verses '*Abhipriyāṇi pavatē etc.*', where the three verses are in the *Jagatī* metre; and in this connection there is one *Sāman*, the '*Kāva*'].

Now in connection with the two *Sāmans*, '*Shyāvāshva*' and '*Āndhīgava*' [see above, hymn No. 2], the first verse is in the *Anuṣṭup* metre—'*Purojiti vo andhasaḥ etc.*', and the other two verses are in the *Gāyatrī* metre—(*a*) '*Yo dhārayā pāvakayā etc.*', and (*b*) '*Tanduroṣamamī navaḥ etc.*'

In connection with this, there arises the question—Should two other *Anuṣṭup* verses be introduced from elsewhere and the singing done over all the three verses in the same (*Anuṣṭup*) metre? Or should the required verse-triad be secured by interlinking the first *Anuṣṭup* verse and the other two *Gāyatrī* verses, and thus the singing of the *Sāman* over the *Anuṣṭup* be secured?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"Other *Anuṣṭup* verses should be introduced.—Why so?—Because thus alone would the existence of those verses serve a useful purpose".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*What is obtained by interlinking should be used for the singing*; says the Smṛti—'*Ānuṣṭubhaḥ pragāthaḥ*' which speaks of the 'interlinking' (*pragathana*) of the *Anuṣṭup* metre; and this cannot be ignored.

SŪTRA (26).

THUS IT IS OVER ITS OWN.

Bhāṣya.

In this way the singing is done 'over its own';—and what occurs in the Context becomes admitted, and there is no need for bringing in what is not in the Context.

SŪTRA (27).

EVEN SO IS THE NAME 'PRAGĀTHA'.

Bhāṣya.

It is only when the quarter of the first verse is sung over again that the name '*Pragātha*' becomes applicable.

SŪTRA (28).

ALSO BECAUSE THE INDICATIVE TEXT MAKES NO TRANSGRESSION POSSIBLE.

Bhāṣya.

An indicative text shows that such is invariably the case—'*Chaturvimshatijagatyastṛtīyasavanam ēkā kakup*' ['The third *Savana* has 24 *Jagatīs* and one *Kakup*'].—It is thus explained—At the *Pavamāna* named '*Ārbhava*' there are five metres and seven *Sāmans* ;—there are two verse-triads in *Gāyatrī* metre ;—these six *Gāyatrīs* make three *Jagatīs* ;—the *Shyāvāshva* and the *Āndhīgava* pertain to the *Anuṣṭup* metre ; in these, the first verse is *Anuṣṭup* and the second *Gāyatrī* ;—when interlinking is done between these two verses, these two *Sāmans* have six *Anuṣṭups* ;—these make four *Jagatīs* ;—these, along with the aforesaid three, make *seven Jagatīs*.—The *Uṣṇik* metre makes the *Shapha-Sāman*, and the *Kakup* makes the *Pauṣkala Sāman* ;—there being one verse in each of these two ;—these two being in the *Uṣṇik* and *Kakup* metres ;—these make one *Jagatī* ;—this along with the aforesaid seven *Jagatīs* formed of the quarters of the *Gāyatrī*, make *eight Jagatīs*.—In the *Kāva Sāman*, there are three *Jagatīs* ;—with these, there are *eleven Jagatīs*.—The twenty-first *Sāman* is the *Yajñayajñīya* ; in this, the first verse is *Bṛhatī* and the second is *Viṣṭāra-Paṅkti* ; and two *Kakups* are made by interlinking.—When the twenty-first *Stoma* is made, there are seven *Bṛhatīs*, fourteen *Kakups* ; the seven *Bṛhatīs* make five *Jagatīs* ; these, along with the aforesaid ones, make sixteen *Jagatīs* ;—one quarter of the *Jagatī*, along with one quarter of the *Gāyatrī*, contains twenty syllables.—Of the fourteen *Kakups*, fourteen *Kakups* make seven *Jagatīs* ;—these, along with the former seventeen, make up 23 *Jagatīs* ;—the two remaining *Kakups* form one *Jagatī*, as also a quarter of the *Gāyatrī*. This, along with the former 23, makes up the 24 *Jagatīs* ;—and the quarter of the *Gāyatrī*, along with the aforesaid 20 syllables, makes a *Kakup*.—Thus if interlinking is done in this manner, there are 24 *Jagatīs* and one *Kakup*. If, on the other hand, the interlinking is not done, then in the *Shyāvāshva* and the *Āndhīgava Sāmans*, two extraneous *Anuṣṭups* have to be brought in ;—and in the *Yajñayajñīya Sāman*, original *Kakups* have to be brought in ;—and in neither of these two cases is the requisite number (mentioned in the indicative text) made up.—Hence we conclude that the singing should be done by interlinking the verses.

Or, the Sūtras (25-28) may be taken as representing the following *Adhikaraṇa*.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *The 'Brahmasāman' is to be sung by interlinking the quarters.*

[The fourth explanation of *Sūtras* 25–28.]

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Gavāmayana*, with reference to the *Brahmasāman*, there is the text—'*Chatuḥshatamaindrā bārhatāḥ pragāthāḥ, trayashtrimshatañcha sato barhatāstrikāḥ*' ['There are 104 *Pragāthas* in the *Bṛhatī* metre, with *Indra* as the deity; there are 33 triads in the *Bṛhatī* metre'].

The question that arises is—Should the singing of the *Sāman* be done over the verse-triad made up of two verses and the third obtained by the interlinking of those two verses?—Or should it be done over three distinct verses (viz. two from one *Pragātha*, and the third from the next *Pragātha*)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"The singing should be done over three (independent) verses.—Why so?—Because in connection with the Primary Sacrifice we read—'Therefore there is a single *Sāman* sung over a *Verse-triad*'; and this is applicable to the case in question under the General Law (relating to the Primary and its modifications); hence the singing should be done over three verses."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—

SŪTRAS (25–27).

IN REALITY, WHAT IS OBTAINED BY INTERLINKING [SHOULD BE USED FOR THE SINGING] (25);—THUS IT IS OVER ITS OWN, (26);—EVEN SO IS THE NAME 'PRAGĀTHA', (27).

Bhāṣya.

The singing should be done over the verses by twos; thus alone can the singing be said to be done *on its own*;—"*own*—what?"—own *Pragātha*.—"How would the *Pragātha* be *its own*?"—Because the *Pragātha* has been laid down in connection with the *Brahma-Sāman* sung at the *Gavāmayana*,—hence the *Pragātha* is the *Brahma-Sāman's* '*own*'; and the term '*pragātha*' always means the *Pragātha* of the particular *Sāman* itself.

SŪTRA (28).

ALSO BECAUSE THE INDICATIVE TEXT MAKES NO DEVIATION POSSIBLE.

Bhāṣya.

There is the following indicative text—'*Pañchasu māḥsu bārhatāḥ pragāthāḥ āpyantē*' [In five months are the *Bṛhatī-Pragāthas* obtained]; and this is possible only if there is *interlinking* (between two verses), not when the singing is done over three distinct verses.—'How so?"—There

are 104 *Pragāthas*;—of these there are two *Pragāthas* between *Bṛhat* and *Rathantara* at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*;—between the *Naudhasa* and *Kālēya* also, there are two *Pragāthas* at the same sacrifice;—then, there is the *Indra-kratu Pragātha* at the later *Yakṣas*;—the remaining 99 *Pragāthas* should have to be done over the *Abhiplavas*. In connection with the *Pṛṣṭhas*, *Sato-Bṛhatīs* have been laid down;—and the *Sato-Bṛhatīs* come on the third day of the *Abhiplavas*;—thus of the *Abhiplavas*, 100 Days remain; on the last day of these come the *Sato-Bṛhatīs*, and on the other 99 days, come the 99 *Pragāthas*. Even so the term '*āpyantē*' ('are obtained') occurring in the indicative text becomes applicable.—On the other hand, if the singing is done over three distinct verses, then, the 66 verse-triads would take three and seven months to be completed.—From this indicative text therefore it is clear that the singing should be done over the *Pragātha*.

Says the Opponent—"Why cannot the singing be done over the first verse-triad,—and then taking one verse out of these three, along with two other verses from elsewhere, the singing could be done over the verse-triad thus made up? In this way, the general law implying the singing of the verse-triad would become followed, and the indicative text—'*Pañchasu māḥsu* etc.' would become explicable".

Answer—The Indicative text shows that no deviation is possible; that is, there are other verses, but the *Sāman* is the same.

From all this it follows that the singing should be done over the *Pragātha* obtained by the interlinking of the verses by twos.

Adhikaraṇa (12): *There is Option in the use of the modifications of syllables and other musical modulations.*

SŪTRA (29).

Inasmuch as they serve the same purpose, there should be option among them.

Bhāṣya.

There are a thousand musical modulations in the *Sāma-veda.*

Question—" What are these 'musical modulations'?"

Answer—Music (singing) is an act; it gives expression to particular sound-notes produced by the internal (volitional) effort of Man; it is spoken of under the name of '*Sāman*'; it is sung over verses of fixed dimensions; hence for the purposes of securing the requisite music, it becomes necessary to have recourse to (*a*) Modification (*vikāra*) of the syllables contained in the verses,—(*b*) Disjunction (*Vishleṣa*), (*c*) Withdrawal (*Vikarṣaṇa*), (*d*) Repetition (*Abhyāsa*), (*e*) Pause (*Virāma*), (*f*) Break (*Stobha*) and so forth; and all these have been laid down in the scriptures.

The question that arises in regard to these is—Are all these to be used together?—Or optionally?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—" Inasmuch as all these have been laid down in the scriptures, and the injunction of an act takes in all the details of that act, all the said modulations should be used together."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*Inasmuch as they serve the same purpose, there should be option*; all the musical modulations are used with a view to serve the one purpose of accomplishing the required music; so that when the required music is secured on the basic verse by means of any one of the modulations, there can be no need for the use of others.—Hence there should be Option among them.

Adhikaraṇa (13): *Such injunctions as 'Ṛchā stuvatē—Sāmnā stuvatē'—mean that the 'Hymning' is to be done by means of Sāman.*

SŪTRA (30).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Inasmuch as both serve the same purpose, there should be option between 'Ṛk' and 'Sāman'; as both are meant to serve the purpose (of Hymning)."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with a particular sacrifice, we read—'*Ṛchā stuvatē, Sāmnā stuvatē; yadṛchā stuvatē tadasurā anvavāyan; yat sāmnā stuvatē tadasurā nānvavāyan; Sāmnā stuvīta*' ['One should hymn with the Verse; one should hymn with the *Sāman*; when they hymn with the Verse, the *Asuras* take it up; when they hymn with the *Sāman*, the *Asuras* do not take it up; one should hymn with the *Sāman*'].

In connection with this, there arises the question—How should the Hymning be done? May it be done either with the *Sāman* or with the Verse, optionally?—Or with the *Sāman* only?

On this, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"There should be Option; it may be done either with the *Verse* or with the *Sāman*; the sentence that 'when they hymn with the verse, the *Asuras* take it up' is distinct by itself; we find it making the statement that 'whenever the Hymning is done with the verse, the *Asuras* take it up', which is complete in itself;—and this statement is made in answer to the question—How is one to know that the Hymning is to be done with the *verse*?—'But for what purpose is this done?'—It is done with a view to see that the Hymning might form part of that particular sacrifice in connection with which it is mentioned; and this is gathered, by the force of actual usage, from the declaration of the entire procedure.—*Objection*—'But the mention of *Asuras* is deprecatory of the act'.—Not so, we reply. We do not recognise the *Asuras* as being either deprecated or appreciated; all that we gather from the statement is that the act mentioned is one that should be done.—Similarly the sentence 'One should hymn with the *Sāman*' is distinct, by itself.—From all this it follows that there should be Option. The *Verse* and the *Sāman* both being meant for *hymning*, their purpose is one and the same,—viz. that the *Hymning* should be done; and as this can be done by either one of the two, there should be Option."

SŪTRA (31).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—ON THE STRENGTH OF DIRECT DECLARATION, THERE SHOULD BE USE (OF ONE ONLY).

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that there should be *option*; as a matter of fact, there should be use of the *Sāman* only.—Why?—Because there is a sentence declaring the use of *Sāman*—'When they hymn with the verse, the *Asuras* take it up,—*one knowing this should hymn with the Sāman*'; here we find the *hymning with Sāman* eulogised by a direct eulogistic assertion; in the other case, the eulogy would have to be assumed,—to the effect that 'because the *Asuras* take it up therefore the hymning should be done with the verse'. On the other hand (as we take it) if the *Hymning with Sāman* is eulogised, then the statement that 'When the hymning is done with the verse, the *Asuras* take it up', comes to be taken in its direct sense of deprecating what is here mentioned (i.e. *Hymning with the verse*) and thereby eulogising the other course (i.e. *Hymning with the Sāman*); and in this case there is nothing to be assumed.—"But how do you know that the statement is deprecatory?"—We deduce it from the eulogy bestowed on the other course.—From all this it follows that the Hymning should be done with the *Sāman*.

Or, the *Sūtras* (30-31) may be interpreted as presenting the following *Adhikaraṇa*—

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *The 'Āhavanīya' should be worshipped with the verse 'Ayam sahasramānava, etc.' as duly set to music.*

[Obtained by a second interpretation of *Sūtras* 30-31.]

SŪTRA (30).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS BOTH SERVE THE SAME PURPOSE, THERE SHOULD BE OPTION BETWEEN THE VERSE AND THE SĀMAN; AS BOTH ARE MEANT TO SERVE THE PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with a certain sacrifice, we read—'*Ayam sahasramānava ityētayā āhavanīyamupatiṣṭhatē*' ['With the verse *Ayam sahasramānava*, etc. one worships the *Āhavanīya* Fire'].

In regard to this, there arises this question—Should the *worshipping* be done with the verse without setting it to music? Or should it be done with it as set to music?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The worshipping may be done with the verse, either sung or unsung.—Why?—Because there is no definite injunction one way or the other. Whether sung or unsung, the verse remains the same; in both cases, people regard it as the same verse; hence there should be no restriction in the matter; and when there is no restriction, then, inasmuch as both, the verse as well as the *Sāman* (sung), serve the purpose of *hymning*, there should be option."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—

SŪTRA (31).

ON THE STRENGTH OF DIRECT DECLARATION, THERE SHOULD BE USE OF ONE ONLY.

Bhāṣya.

It is the verse set to music (sung) that should be used, not that which is not set to music (unsung).—Why so?—Because of *Direct Declaration*;—the words '*Ayam sahasramānava ityētayā*' refer to what forms the subject-matter of the Context; and in the *Sāmavēda* what forms the subject-matter is the *verse as set to music*; hence it is such verse that should be taken as referred to by the pronoun '*ētayā*'.—"But in the *Sāmavēda* we also find verses that are *not* set to music".—True; but such verses are there only for the purpose of being connected with music; unless a verse is mentioned in its simple form, it is not possible to set it to music; hence it is for the purpose of being set to music that the unset verse occurs in the text of the *Sāmavēda*; i.e. the reading of the verses (not set to music) is always understood as being for the purpose of being connected with a *Sāman* (music); for the simple reason that there can be no setting of the *Sāman* (music) without the words of a verse; while it is possible to have a verse without *Sāman* (music); so that the *verse* does not always require the *music*.—Hence it follows that, in the *Sāmavēda*, whenever we find the *worshipping* or the *hymning* (as to be done with a verse), it is always understood as to be done with the verse *set to music* (and sung), and not with the verse not set to music (and unsung).

Says the Opponent—"If, on the basis of Context, the conclusion be that the verse used should be as *set to music*,—while on the basis of Direct Declaration it follows that it should be used as *not set to music*,—such direct declaration being found in *recensional* texts other than that of the *Sāmavēda*,—then the latter alternative should be adopted, as *Direct Declaration* would always set aside the implications of the *Context*."

Our answer to this is as follows:—The Direct Declaration—'*Ayam sahasramānava ityētayā*, etc.' does not lay down the words of the verse; it only mentions the opening words; and hence when it is taken as standing for the verse as occurring in the Context, the term 'verse' is taken in its direct

primary sense; on the other hand, in accordance with the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the mention of the opening words of the verse would be taken in its indirect secondary sense;—and when there is a conflict between Direct Denotation and Indirect Indication, it is more reasonable to accept the former. Hence it follows that the *worshipping* should be done with the verse *as set to music*.

Or, the *Sūtras* (30-31) may be taken as representing the following *Adhikaraṇa*.

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *The 'Yājyā' and 'Anuvākyā' Mantras like 'Agnirmūrdhā divaḥ, etc.' should be recited in the 'neutral' tone.*

[By the *third* interpretation of *Sūtras* 30-31.]

SŪTRA (30).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS BOTH SERVE THE SAME PURPOSE, THERE SHOULD BE OPTION, BETWEEN 'VERSE' AND 'SĀMAN'; AS BOTH ARE MEANT TO SERVE THE PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya.

In the case of the injunction of Vedic Mantras, some are found to be mentioned with three accents and some with four accents.—*Question*—"Those that are mentioned with *four* accents,—do they adopt an accent in addition to the three ordinary accents, the *Udātta* (High), *Anudātta* (Low), and *Svarita* (Mixed)?"—No; the accents in these also are those same that are found in those of the other class.—"Then what do they do with these?"—They read these *mantras* with a tone that passes beyond the limits of the three ordinary ones. [This fourth being what is called '*Tāra*' or '*Ēkashruti*', i.e. the 'Neutral Tone'.]

Now, there arises this question—Are all these accents to be used together, all at one time?—Or optionally?

"The view that appears to be reasonable is that 'Inasmuch as the Injunction of the performance takes in all the details, all the tones should be used together'.—But our (*Pūrvapakṣin's*) answer to this is that "inasmuch as the same purpose is served by all, there should be option. The purpose served by the use of all the tones is one and the same,—that of reciting the text of the *Mantra*; hence there should be option in their use."

SŪTRA (31).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—ON THE STRENGTH OF DIRECT DECLARATION, THERE SHOULD BE USE OF ONE ONLY.

Bhāṣya.

There is the following Direct Declaration inferred on the basis of *Smṛtis*—'At the sacrificial performance, the *neutral tone* should be adopted'; hence *mantras* should be recited in the *Neutral tone.*—*Question*—"Then why should there be any use of the *three* and *four* accents?"—

Answer—Their use will serve the purpose of indicating the precise meanings (of the words of the *Mantra*).

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *In the case of such injunctions as 'One sings the Rathantara over the Uttarā verses', the singing should be done in accordance with the syllables of the 'Uttarā' verses.*

SŪTRA (32).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE MODIFICATION IN A PART OF THE SĀMAN SHOULD BE DONE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BASIC VERSE, AS THIS IS WHAT IS LAID DOWN BY THE SCRIPTURAL INJUNCTION."

Bhāṣya.

We have such texts as—'*Rathantaramuttarayorgāyati, yadyonyām taduttarayorgāyati, Kavatīṣu rathantaram gāyati, Virātsu vāmadēvyam*' ['One sings the *Rathantara* over the *Uttarā* verses; one sings that in the *Uttarā* verses which is in the basic verse; one sings the *Rathantara* over the *Kavatī* verses; and the *Vāmadēvya* over the *Virāṭ* verses'].

The question that arises is—Should the singing be done in accordance with the syllables of the *Uttarā* verse? Or with those of the basic verse?

Question—"In what way is the singing done in accordance with the syllables of the *Uttarā* verses? And in what way is it done in accordance with the syllables of the basic verse?

Answer—We shall explain this by means of an example: In accordance with the rule '*Vṛddhantālavyamāī*' (?) ['the ā-ī comes after the augmented Palatal syllable'] 'ā-ī' when the modulation is introduced in one part of the basic verse,—if the same modulation is introduced in the same part of the *Uttarā* verse also,—then, the singing is said to be done in accordance with the syllables of the basic verse;—if, however, the Palatal syllable is found in the *Uttarā* verse in a different part, and the modulation 'ā-ī' is introduced in that part, then the singing is said to be done in accordance with the syllables of the *Uttarā* verse.—The question thus is that which of these two courses should be adopted.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"It should be done in accordance with the syllables of the basic verse.—'Why?'—Let us consider what is done in a case where in a certain part of the basic verse the syllable 'ē' is modified into the modulation 'ā-ī'. What is done is that the syllable 'ē' is not pronounced,—the syllables 'ā' and 'ī' are brought in in its place. Such being the case, here,—in the case of the *Uttarā* verse also, there should be no pronouncing of the syllable occurring in the corresponding part, and in its place, the syllables 'ā' and 'ī' should be brought in. In this way the singing over the *Uttarā* verses comes to be the same as that over the basic verse.—From this it follows that the singing should be done in accordance with the syllables of the basic verse—Further,

if it is done in this way, then the music is not spoilt; while in any other case, it might be spoilt in certain points; in fact, it would be clearly spoilt in a case where a long music is sung over a small number of syllables,—if the singing were done in accordance with the syllables of the *Uttarā* verses. For this reason also, the singing should be done in accordance with the syllables of the basic verse.—Then again, in some cases the order of syllables is followed,—where the syllable modified into 'ā-ī' does not occur in any particular order of sequence;—while in other cases the Vedic text is followed,—where there is no modification made. In any case the singing done at the time of the sacrificial performance should be in keeping with that done at the time of reading the Veda. For this reason also, the singing should be done in accordance with the syllables of the basic verse; so that *the modification*—into such modulations as 'ā-ī' and the like—*in a part of the Sāman should be in accordance with the basic verse*; it has been laid down in the scripture that 'that which is done in the basic verse should be done in the *Uttarā* verses'; from which it follows that in the *Uttarā* verses the modulation 'ā-ī' should be introduced at that same point at which it has been done in the basic verse."

SŪTRA (33).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT BĀDARI HOLDS THAT THE MODULATION IS TO BE DONE TO THE LETTER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LETTER; BECAUSE THE LETTERS ARE DIFFERENT.

Bhāṣya.

Bādari has held the opinion that the singing should be done in accordance with the syllables of the *Uttarā* verses,—and not in accordance with the part of the basic verse. The modification into 'ā-ī' that is done to the basic verse is not something new brought in, nor is the syllable 'ē' dropped there (in place of which something new could be brought in); because the syllable 'ē' actually contains the letter 'a' and the letter 'i'—the articulation of the former being 'contracted' and that of the latter 'expanded'; and both of these are elongated (into 'ā' and 'ī'); and though these elongated forms are incorrect, yet their coalescence brings about the conjunct vowel 'ē' which is quite correct;—and what is done (when the modulation 'ā-ī' is made) is that the constituent letters 'a' and 'i' are disjoined,—and not that any new letters are brought in; though a certain quality is produced in the letters which was not there before. In all these cases, Direct Perception is the only guide. In the case of the *Uttarā* verses, if in a certain part there is a new letter (different from 'ā-ī') and not a conjunct letter (like 'ē'),—as there is no *conjunction* (between the letters), there can be *disjoining*; on the other hand, in that part of the verse where there *is* a conjunct letter, the disjoining is done; and in this way what was done in the basic verse is also done in the *Uttarā* verses; that is, what was done in the basic verse was the disjoining of the conjunct letters, and the same disjoining of the conjunct letters is done in

the *Uttarā* verses also. In any other case, a different process would have to be assumed.

It has been argued that "the music would be spoilt".—But, as a matter of fact, it would *not* be spoilt; as it would be possible to do the '*vināma*' (?) and then do the singing without any letters. In any case, where there is no conjunction, there can be no disjoining, and it would not be necessary to follow the Vedic text and the order of sequence.

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *There is transference of 'Stobha' to the Uttarā verses.*

SŪTRA (34).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THERE IS NO TRANSFERENCE OF 'STOBHA' TO ANOTHER VERSE,—JUST AS THERE IS NONE OF THE VERSE ITSELF; SO SAY SOME."

Bhāṣya.

We have the declarations—'One sings the *Rathantara* over the *Kavatī* verses; one sings the *Rathantara* over the *Uttarā* verses; what one sings over the basic verse one sings over the *Uttarā* verses'.—We have understood that the singing is to be done in accordance with the syllables of the *Uttarā* verses.

The question that arises now is—Are *Stobhas* transferred or not?

[*Sūtra* 39 below provides a general definition of '*Stobha*'; Mādhava cites the following as an example: In the basic verse of the *Vāmadēvya Sāman*, between the two halves, we have the modulation 'ō-ō-hō-hoi'; this modulation is called '*Stobha*'].

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*Stobhas* are not to be transferred. —Why?—It is the *Music*, not the *Stobhas*, that constitutes *Sāman*; and it is the music that is transferred; for the declaration contains the term 'sings'—'What one *sings* over the basic verse, one sings over the *Uttarā* verses'.—Then again, the *Stobha*, having no connection with what is expressed by the words of the verse, would be useless; for this reason also it should not be transferred.—Further, somewhere there is the declaration—'One sings the *Avabhṛtha Sāman* over the *Aindrī* verse'; and in this case any applicability would be impossible; from the supplementary sentences, *Indra* is understood to be one who produces a *cooling* effect; as such, the term '*tapati*' ('warms') would be wholly inapplicable to him.—From all this it follows that the *Stobha* should be kept aloof from any verse other than the basic one;—just as there is no transference of the syllables of one verse to the other, because the syllables are not *music*, in the same manner and for the same reason, there should be no transference of the syllables of the *Stobha* also."

SŪTRA (35).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THERE SHOULD BE TRANSFERENCE OF ALL, AS THEY STAND ON THE SAME FOOTING; THE MODIFICATION WOULD COME IN AS IN ORDINARY SINGING.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the *Stobhas* should be excluded; in fact, *there should be transference of all*; the term '*Sāman*' stands for the whole of the *music*

along with all its details of *verse, stobha, accent, time*, and *repetition*.—" How do you know that ? "—We deduce it from the fact that it is used in this sense.—Such being the case, if the *Stobhas* were excluded, then the peculiarity of the music due to those *Stobhas* would not be included (in the second verse) ; and this would be contrary to the declaration (that 'What is sung over the basic verse should be sung over the *Uttarā* verses') ;—hence we conclude that *Stobhas* should be transferred.

It has been argued that—" the *Stobhas*, not being connected with what is expressed by the words of the verse, would be useless ".—Our answer to this is that *as in ordinary singing*, so here also, they would not be useless. For instance, in ordinary singing, musicians throw into the music many subsidiary factors,—and these serve the purpose of keeping the time of the music, and they are not uttered for being connected with the sense of the words (of the song),—and the very useful purpose is served by this, in that the time of the music is easily kept ;—in the same manner, in the case in question also, the *Stobha-syllables* would be carried on into the *Uttarā* verses for the purpose of keeping time.

SŪTRA (36).

THERE IS A TEXT ALSO THAT INDICATES THE CONNECTION.

Bhāṣya.

There is a text that indicates that the *Stobhas* are connected with the other verses also : It is declared that 'the *Stobhas* and the *Gēṣṇas* follow on' where the words of the text cease to come in ; '*Stobha*' here stands for the *Stobha-syllables*, and '*Gēṣṇa*' for the *accent*.—From this also it follows that the *Stobhas* are to be transferred.

SŪTRA (37).

[*Objection*]—" BUT, THEY SHOULD CEASE TO COME IN, IN CASES WHERE THE SENSE IS NOT APPLICABLE."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('but') sets up an objection to the view just set forth.

" Such *Stobhas* as '*agniṣṭapati*' must cease to come in ; because in the latter part of the sentence *Indra* is spoken of as producing a *cooling* effect ; so that *Stobhas* like the one cited (which speaks of *warming*) would not be applicable.—This sets aside what has been said under *Sūtras* 35 and 36 to the effect that the *Stobhas* would be applicable and connectible as in ordinary singing."

SŪTRA (38).

[*Answer*]—IN REALITY, THERE MUST BE TRANSFERENCE; THE PASSAGE (QUOTED) BEING MERELY DECLAMATORY.

Bhāṣya.

Even *Stobhas* of the kind referred to should be transferred. As regards *Indra*, we do not see his form (and do not know if he is *cool* or *hot*); as for the supplementary declaration referred to by the Opponent, it is only declamatory.

ADHIKARAṆA (18): *Definition of 'Stobha'*.

SŪTRA (39).

ACCORDING TO JAIMINI ['STOBHA' IS] THAT WHICH IS ADDITIONAL AND DISSIMILAR; SUCH BEING THE USE OF THE TERM 'STOBHA'.

Bhāṣya.

Question—"What is '*Stobha*'?—Its definition has to be provided."

The *answer* is as follows—That which is *in addition to* (in excess of) the syllables of the verse, and is *dissimilar* to them,—i.e. does not belong to the same 'class' of letters as those,—is what is called '*Stobha*'. It is to such letters that ordinary people apply the name '*Stobha*'; when, for instance, they say—'*Dēvadattēna sabhāyām param pralapatā bahustobham kathitam*',—they do so when they have found that much of what the man has spoken is more than what was necessary for conveying his meaning, and all this superfluity was totally dissimilar to what was necessary.

It is not necessary for us to explain the use of the present *Adhikaraṇa* which provides the definition of a certain thing; in fact, the use of providing a definition lies in the mere fact that the thing in question becomes defined.

Question—"Why should the *Sūtra* have mentioned both the adjectives? Either one of them—'in addition to' or 'dissimilar'—would have sufficed for defining the *Stobha*."

Answer—Not so; because it may be that a letter is 'excessive', but not 'dissimilar'; for instance, when there is repetition,—such as '*Shchādri-shchādriḥ*';—similarly a letter may be 'dissimilar' and not 'excessive'; as in the case of modifications—such as '*ognāi*'.—Thus it is necessary to have both qualifications in the *Sūtra*.

ADHIKARAṆA (19): *'Besprinkling', 'Threshing' and such details should be performed in the case of Nīvāra and other things.*

SŪTRA (40).

IN REGARD TO (*a*) SUBSTANCES, (*b*) SUBSIDIARY ACTS, (*c*) MODIFICATIONS, (*d*) CHANGES, AND (*e*) PROHIBITIONS,—THE INJUNCTIONS MUST BE FOLLOWED, BECAUSE THEY ARE APPLICABLE TO THEM AND BECAUSE WHAT IS LAID DOWN AS TO BE DONE SERVES A DISTINCT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) In connection with the *Vājapēya*, we read—'One offers the *Nīvāra* cooked on seventeen pans to *Bṛhaspati*'; at the Primary Sacrifice (*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*), the grain used is *Vrīhi*, which is *besprinkled* with water.—The question is—Should this *besprinkling* be done to the *Nīvāra* grain or not? —(*b*) Similarly, there is the text—'Speech gives out the *Udgītha*, when the *Ṣaḍaha-Pṛṣṭha* is completed; one should not speak much, nor ask any one else, nor say anything to anybody else; when the *Ṣaḍaha* is omitted, one should eat Honey or Clarified Butter'.—The question here is—are the details of the *Ṣaḍaha* applicable to the *Eating of Honey* or the *Eating of Clarified Butter*?—(*c*) Again, in connection with the *Rājasūya*, we read—'The cooked rice for *Nirṛti* is prepared of grains unhusked with nails'; at the Primary Original Sacrifice, there is *Besprinkling* of the Pestle and Mortar (used for the unhusking of the Rice by Threshing); so the question arises—Is the Besprinkling to be done to the *nails* or not?—(*d*) In connection with the *Chāturmāsya*, we read—'One should tie the animal to the *Paridhi*'; and the question arises—Are the details laid down in connection with the *Post* (to which the Animal is tied at the Primary Sacrifice) to be performed in connection with the *Paridhi* or not?—(*e*) There is the text—'One should not utter the term *girā-girā*; if the singer uttered these words, he would swallow himself; the singing should be done by pronouncing the term *irā*';—the question arises—Are the details laid down in connection with the term '*girā*' to be performed in connection with the term '*irā*', or not?

On all these questions, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"The details laid down in connection with the *Vrīhi-grain* and other things (mentioned above) cannot be applicable to the *Nīvāra-grain* and other things (that are laid down as to be used in place of the former), and hence they should not be performed in the case of these latter."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—In connection with the *Nīvāra-grain* and other things, *the Injunctions must be followed*; because the details laid down in connection with the respective Primary Sacrifices

are quite applicable to them. In connection with the Primary Sacrifice also, the particular details are laid down in reference to the transcendental result, not in reference to the *Vrīhi-grain* and other things; because what is laid down is a particular means of bringing about the transcendental result; so that the details laid down are in reference to that result, and not to the *Vrīhi-grain* and other things. This we have already seen above.—Then again, it is clearly understood that the *Nīvāra-grain* and other things serve the purposes served by the *Vrīhi-grain* and other things respectively.

(*a*) As for the *Nīvāra*, the injunction regarding it is that 'the Rice-offering should be prepared of *Nīvāra-grain*';—and the *Nīvāra-grain* cannot accord any help to the Sacrificial performance except through being made into *Rice*; and it is clearly perceptible that the *Nīvāra* serves the same purpose as the *Vrīhi*.

(*b*) Similarly in the case of the injunction, 'One should offer the *Ṣaḍaha*': it is understood that 'when the *Ṣaḍaha* is omitted'—i.e. when the offering is not done with the *Ṣaḍaha*,—then 'recourse should be had to Honey and Clarified Butter'; and as a rule, when it is found that one thing is dropped when another is present, it is understood that one is the substitute of the other; so that when the text says that there should be Eating of Honey when the *Ṣaḍaha* is not there, it follows that the Honey serves the same purpose as the *Ṣaḍaha*; and hence the observances and restrictions connected with the *Ṣaḍaha* become applicable to the *Eating of Honey* also. The Cups however do not come in in the case of the *Honey-Eating*, as there is no Sacrificial Offering; and so also there is no *Hymning*, as the Hymning has been laid down as to be done while holding the Cup or raising the Ladle [so that when there is no Cup or Ladle, there can be no *Hymning*]; and as there is no *Hymning*, there can be no *Shaṁsana* (Praying for gifts), which is laid down as to be done '*after* Hymning'. Similarly, there being no *Savana*, the *Savanīya* offerings do not come in. Thus, for one reason or the other, certain details do not come in in the case of *Honey-Eating*; but the Observances and Restrictions do come in; as also such other details are not absolutely useless.

(*c*) As regards *the unhusking of the rice with the nails*,—the Rice-grains do not become so 'unhusked' unless the husks are all removed with the nails; hence it follows that the nails have been laid down as to be used for the purpose of removing the husks; and as such, they become connected with the details laid down in connection with the Pestle and Mortar.

(*d*) Similarly, the *Paridhi* is used for the purpose for which the Sacrificial Post is used,—as is distinctly laid down in the text 'They tie the animal to the *Paridhi*'; hence it follows that the details laid down in connection with the Post should appertain to the *Paridhi*.

(*e*) In the sentence 'One should not utter the words *girā-girā*,—one should sing, pronouncing the words *irā*',—we do not have the injunction of both—of the prohibition of '*girā*' and of the use of '*irā*'; as, if it were so, then there would be a syntactical split. Nor can the word '*irā*' be taken as merely referred to, as it has not been enjoined before; to the Prohibition however, a *reference is* possible; because when the word '*irā*' is used, it is clear that the word '*girā*' cannot be used. The sentence is understood

as laying down only one form in which the word can be pronounced ;—the sense being that 'inasmuch as there is this danger in the use of the word *girā*, one should use the word *irā*.' If the sentence were taken as laying down several distinct forms of words to be used,—then there would be need of several assumptions of Transcendental Results.—The sentence cannot be taken as enjoining the dangerous thing that 'one should swallow himself' ; because as for the man's own body, it is impossible for him to swallow it ; if it refers to the Supreme Soul, then its 'swallowing' would not be anything undesirable ;—and the defect of syntactical split would remain all the same, in this case also.—Hence the mention of the word '*girā*' in the sentence in question should be taken as meant to show that the word '*irā*' serves the same purpose as '*girā*',—this being the meaning of the assertion that 'one should not sing, uttering the words *girā-girā*'.—From this it follows that the details laid down in connection with the word '*girā*' should appertain to the word '*irā*'.

Thus the same conclusion is arrived at in connection with all the five cases.

As regards the *Paridhi*, we are going to have a discussion in the following *Adhikaraṇa*.

Adhikaraṇa (20): *The details of the Sacrificial Post should be performed in connection with the Paridhi.*

SŪTRA (41).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"In view of the purpose for which the Paridhi is brought into existence, there should be exclusion from it (of the details of the Post),—because these details are based upon the functions of the Post."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifices, it is declared—'They tie the animal to the *Paridhi* at its middle point'.—It has been declared (in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*) that the details laid down in connection with the Post should be performed in connection with the *Paridhi*.—This view is now denied in the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"The details should *not* be performed,—*in view of the purpose for which the Paridhi is brought into existence*; that is to say, the *Paridhi* is brought into existence for the purpose of '*clothing*' (*paridhāna*, i.e. surrounding), the *Āhavanīya Fire*; consequently the details connected with the Post should be excluded from it;—specially *because these details are based upon the functions of the Post*; i.e. through the *tying of the animal*, which brings about the particular transcendental result, the details in question connect themselves with that transcendental result. Now the thing that has been declared to be part and parcel of the act of *tying the animal* must be regarded as having been brought into existence for the purpose of that *tying*; so that, when a thing has been brought into existence for the 'clothing' (surrounding) of the *Āhavanīya Fire*,—if it is used as part and parcel of something else, the *animal-tying* may be done to it; but that cannot justify the application to it of the details of the Post: because what may be done to that thing would not be done to the Animal, nor to anything connected with the Animal.—Further, the details of the Post would be excluded from the *Paridhi* for the very reason that it is *Paridhi* and as such is covered with bark (which the Post is not), and is not *vertical* (as the Post is); and further, it would be necessary to modify also the formula 'Bring Clarified Butter *for the Post*', which would be entirely objectionable.—From all this we conclude that the details connected with the *Post* are not to be adopted in the case of the *Paridhi*".

SŪTRA (42).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE DETAILS SHOULD COME IN, AS THEY WOULD BE USEFUL; AND THE EMBELLISHMENT IS FOR THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the details connected with the *Post* should find room in connection with the *Paridhi*; because those details have been laid down as helping in the work of *tying* the animal; and if any other thing brings about the *tying*, it does help in the work of the *tying*;—now the Embellishment in question (consisting in the detailed processes through which the *Post* is carried) brings about the *tying*; and it does not depend upon the fact of the thing concerned (*Post* or *Paridhi*) having, or not having, been brought into existence for that purpose;—hence the details connected with the Post must be performed in connection with the *Paridhi*.

It has been argued that the *Paridhi* has the bark on it and is not vertically placed [and as such does not ressemble the Post].—The answer to that is that such of the details would be performed as are not incompatible with the character of the *Paridhi*,—and not those that are incompatible with it.

SŪTRA (43).

THE NAME ALSO WOULD APPLY TO THE SUBSTITUTE BY REASON OF THE COMING IN OF THE DETAILS, SPECIALLY AS THEY ARE SOMETHING NEW.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that the formula 'Bring Clarified Butter *for the Post*' would (according to the *Siddhānta*) have to be modified (in the case of the *Paridhi*).—The answer to that is that there need be no modification; because, by reason of the coming in of the details (connected with the Post) the name 'Post' also would be applicable to the *Paridhi*; because the name is due to those details; and hence it should be just as applicable to the *Paridhi* as to the *Post*. Hence there need be no modification of the term 'Post' in the said formula.

Adhikaraṇa (21): *The details connected with the 'Praṇītā water' should be performed in connection with substances like the 'Shṛta' (Boiled Milk) and 'Dadhi' (Curd).*

SŪTRA (44).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The two substances are for different purposes; nor is there any similarity of purpose (between the two things); and the Embellishment is for that purpose."

Bhāṣya.

The subject-matter of the present *Adhikaraṇa* are the phrases '*Shṛtēcharum*' (Rice Cooked in boiled milk) and '*Dadhañshcharum*' (Rice Cooked in Curd), as occurring in the following passage—'*Vi vā ēnam prajayā pashubhirardhayati, vardhayatyasya bhrātṛvyam, yasya havīrniruptam purastāchchandramā abhyudēti; sa trēdhā taṇḍulān vibhajēt; yē madhyamāstānagnayē dātrē puroḍāshēnaṣṭākapālannirvapēt; yē sthaviṣṭhāstānindrāya pradātrē dadhañshcharum; yē kṣodiṣṭhāstān viṣṇavē shipiviṣṭāya shṛtē charum*'.

In regard to these two phrases, there arises the following question—Should, or should not, the details connected with the '*Praṇīta*' [Water sanctified for the purpose of Cooking Rice] be performed in connection with the '*Shṛta*' (Boiled Milk) and '*Dadhi*' (Curd)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows:—"The details in question should not be performed. The thing in question (*Boiled Milk* or *Curd*) is for the purpose of being offered, not for the purposes for which the *Praṇītā* water is used; as a matter of fact, the *Curd*, along with a portion of the Rice, is to be offered to *Indra-Pradātṛ*; and similarly the *Boiled Milk*, along with another portion of the Rice, is to be offered to *Viṣṇu-Shipiviṣṭa*; so that neither the Curd nor the Boiled Milk has been enjoined for the purpose of Cooking (the Rice). As for the presence of the Locative Ending (in '*Shṛtē*' and '*Dadhani*'), *that* is a mere reference; for, as a matter of fact, neither the Curd nor the Milk has been enjoined for the purpose for which the *Praṇītā* water is used. Consequently those two substances are not connected with the details connected with the *Praṇītā* water.—Nor is there any *similarity of purpose* between the *Praṇītā water* and the *Curd*;—and the Embellishment (due to the details in question) is for the accomplishment of that purpose, through the act of *Cooking*. From all this it follows that the details connected with the *Praṇītā-water* are not to be adopted in connection with the Milk or the Curd."

SŪTRA (45).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THEY SHOULD BE PERFORMED; BECAUSE THE PURPOSE IS FULFILLED.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the Details connected with the *Praṇītā-water* should not be performed in connection with Curd and Milk; as a matter of fact, these details have been enjoined as helping in the *Cooking* (of Rice),—and not in connection with any substance brought in for the purpose of cooking; only in the latter case could the need for the details be regarded as having ceased to exist in the case of substances other than the water. In fact, the details are performed with a view to definite transcendental results; and the act of *Cooking* (which is done with *water*) is done with *Curd* and *Milk* also; hence these also should be connected with the said details.

ADHIKARAṆA (22): *The characteristic details of the 'Bṛhat' and 'Rathantara' Sāmans are restricted in their application.*

SŪTRA (46).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THEY SERVE ONE AND THE SAME PURPOSE, THERE SHOULD BE NO DISTINCTION."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, it is declared—'*Bṛhat pṛṣṭham bhavati rathantaram pṛṣṭham bhavati*', [and in connection with these *Sāmans*, certain details have been prescribed. The question is—Are these details restricted to each *Sāman* ?—Or should all be performed in connection with both ?]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows—"It is clear that the two *Sāmans* are optional alternatives;—certain details have been laid down in connection with the accomplishment of the *Bṛhat-Sāman* with a view to the same purpose for which the *Rathantara-Sāman* is used;—hence it follows that the details connected with the *Bṛhat* and the details connected with the *Rathantara* should all be performed in connection with both. And the mention of the *Bṛhat* or the *Rathantara* would, in this case, be taken as meant for the purpose of indicating the particular *Sāman* to be used (in a particular case)".

SŪTRA (47).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THEY SHOULD BE RESTRICTED, BECAUSE OF THE SPECIFICATION.

Bhāṣya.

On account of the *specification*, the details connected with the *Rathantara* should be performed in connection with the *Rathantara* only; such details being specified as—'It should not be sung loudly, nor should it be sung with force; when the *Rathantara* is being sung, one should close his eyes, one should turn his eye towards Heaven', and so forth. The details connected with the *Bṛhat* are—'The *Bṛhat* should be sung loudly; when the *Bṛhat* is being sung, one should think in his mind of the ocean' and so forth.—This specification in this form can serve a useful purpose only when the two sets of details are respectively restricted. Otherwise, the mention of the '*Bṛhat*' and the '*Rathantara*' would have to be taken as merely illustrative; and in that case the words could be taken in a figurative sense; but so long as a word can be taken in its direct primary sense, it is not right to take it in an indirect figurative sense.

It has been argued that both the *Rathantara* and the *Bṛhat* serve the same purpose.—It is true that they serve the same purpose—of accomplishing the *Sāman* ; and yet it is also true that the *Sāman* is accomplished by the *Bṛhat* in one way and it is accomplished by the *Rathantara* in an entirely different way. For instance, when a piece (of stick or bamboo) is to be divided, there are two ways of doing it—(1) that two men should pull it at the two ends, and (2) it should be cut by a sharp-edged weapon ; now the process of sharpening the weapon to be used is connected with the second way of *cutting* the bamboo, and not with the way of *pulling* it at the two ends,—even though this latter way also serves the same purpose.—In the same manner, the question to be considered is—Are the details of the *Bṛhat* to be employed in connection with the *Rathantara* which serves the same purpose as the said *Bṛhat* ? And on the strength of the aforesaid specification, we conclude as follows : The *Bṛhat* accomplishes the purpose in one way and the *Rathantara* accomplishes it in an entirely different way. And we directly perceive another point of difference also : The *Rathantara* accomplishes the *Sāman* by setting forth the '*Shūrā*' and other hymns, while the *Bṛhat* accomplishes it by setting forth the '*Chitrā*' and other hymns. Thus the details of the *Rathantara* are restricted to the *Shūrā* and other hymns, and as such should come in when the *Rathantara* is proceeded with,—and not when the *Bṛhat* is proceeded with ; similarly the details connected with the *Bṛhat* also are restricted to the *Chitrā* and other hymns, and as such should come in only when the *Bṛhat* is proceeded with,—not when the *Rathantara* is proceeded with.—Thus there is restriction of the two sets of details.

Adhikaraṇa (23): *In connection with the 'Kaṇva-rathantara', the details of both the 'Bṛhat' and the 'Rathantara' are to be performed.*

SŪTRA (48).

IN CONNECTION WITH THE KAṆVA-RATHANTARA, THEY SHOULD BE RESTRICTED ONLY WHEN THERE IS INCOMPATIBILITY,—BECAUSE IT IS A MODIFICATION OF BOTH.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Vaishyastoma* sacrifice, laid down in the text—'*The Vaishya* should perform the *Vaishyastoma* sacrifice';—in connection with it, there is the following declaration—'The *Kaṇva-rathantara Sāman* is sung'.

In connection with this, there arises the question—In connection with the *Kaṇva-rathantara*, should the details of only one—either the *Bṛhat* or the *Rathantara*—be performed ?—Or of both ?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The details of only one of the two should be performed.—Why ?—Because of the specification contained in the following declaration—'To *Rathantara* belong the details of the *Rathantara*, and to the *Bṛhat*, the details of the *Bṛhat*'; and until any thing further is declared, only that much can be accepted which has been already declared. From this it follows that the details of only one of the two should be adopted."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*In connection* with the *Kaṇva-rathantara*,—*because it is a modification of both*,—i.e. because the *Kaṇva-rathantara* serves the functions of both, therefore,—it should take in the details of both. In connection with the modification (i.e. the *Kaṇva-rathantara*), there is no specification, as there is in connection with the original (*Rathantara* and *Bṛhat*); it is only through Presumption that the details come in; and in the case of the *Kaṇva-rathantara*, the Presumption applies equally to both; hence it should take in the details of both.—It is only those details that are incompatible,—such as 'it should be sung loudly, it should be sung with force' (which are not compatible with the *Rathantara*, which is to be sung '*not loudly, nor with force*')—that should be restricted (excluded);—those that are not incompatible should all come in.

[According to Kumarila, this *Siddhānta* is wrong, the right view being that the Details of the two should be treated as optional alternatives].

ADHIKARAṆA (24): *In a case where both Sāmans are sung, the details of each should be restricted to itself.*

SŪTRA (49).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—IN A CASE WHERE BOTH SĀMANS ARE SUNG, IT SHOULD BE AS IN THE FOREGOING CASE; BECAUSE THE PURPOSE SERVED IS ONE AND THE SAME.

Bhāṣya.

There are certain sacrifices where two *Sāmans* are sung; for instance, 'Both should be sung at the *Samsava*; both should be sung at the *Gosava*'. —In connection with the *Aprachiti* also, there is the declaration—'At the *Ekāha*, both the *Bṛhat* and the *Rathantara* should be sung'.—At the original Primary Sacrifice, there are details connected with the *Bṛhat*, as also details connected with the *Rathantara*. All these details become applicable to the *Gosava* and the rest, under the General Rule relating to the Primary and its modifications.

Now, there arises the question—At the sacrifice where two *Sāmans* are used, are the details of both to be brought in? Or here also they should be restricted?

On this the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"At the sacrifice with two *Sāmans* also it should be as in the foregoing case of the *Kaṇva-rathantara*. Because in this case both the *Sāmans* together make up the *Pṛṣṭha* (Hymn),—not singly. Hence it would not be right for it to take in the details of any one of them singly;—here both appear conjointly;—hence both would take in the details; both appear conjointly; i.e. they combine together for accomplishing the one purpose of making up the *Pṛṣṭha* (Hymn)".

SŪTRA (50).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, INASMUCH AS THE DETAILS OF EACH ARE FOR ITS OWN PURPOSES, THERE SHOULD BE RESTRICTION, AS IN THE CASE OF THE ORIGINAL PRIMARY SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') indicates the rejection of the *Pūrvapakṣa* view. It is not right that when the *Bṛhat* and the *Rathantara* appear together, they should take in the details of both; in fact, the details of the *Rathantara* should apply to the *Rathantara* only, and those of the *Bṛhat*, to the *Bṛhat* only.—"Why so?"—Because details are for the purpose of that to which they belong; i.e. the details of the *Rathantara* are for the *Rathantara* and those of the *Bṛhat* are for the *Bṛhat*. Then again, the details belong to the two *Sāmans*, not to the *Pṛṣṭha*;—and when the *Sāman* is

sung, it is either the *Rathantara* only or the *Bṛhat* only (at any one time); so that when the *Rathantara* is sung, the details of the *Rathantara* are to be brought in; and when the *Bṛhat* is sung, the details of the *Bṛhat* should be brought in. The details are in fact brought in by virtue of the particular *Sāman*;—and the *Sāman* produces visible as well as invisible (transcendental) effects; hence the *Sāman* also has the capacity of determining the details:—From all this it follows *that there should be restriction of the details, as in the case of the original Primary.* Just as, when the *Rathantara* is sung at the original sacrifice, the details of the *Rathantara* are brought in,—and when the *Bṛhat* is sung, the details of the *Bṛhat* are brought in;—similarly so should it be in the case in question also.

ADHIKARAṆA (25): *The 'Pārvaṇa-Homa' and such acts are not to be done at the 'Saurya' and other Sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (51).

THE TWO PĀRVAṆA-HOMAS DO NOT COME IN, BECAUSE THE TERM PERTAINS TO THE GROUP AND IT IS THE GROUP (OF ACTS) THAT IS PERFORMED.

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, in connection with which there is the declaration—'With the *Sruva* one offers the *Pārvaṇa-Homas*'.—In regard to the *Saurya* and other modifications of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, there arises the question—Are the two *Pārvaṇa-Homas* to be offered at them, or not ?

The first point to consider in this connection is this—Are the *Pārvaṇa-Homas* an offering to be made in connection with a certain point of time ? Or one to be made as part of a group (of offerings) ?—In the former case, they should come in at the *Saurya* and other modificatory sacrifices ; while, if they form part of a group, then they do not come in.

"Why should this second question arise at all ?"

It arises, because usage points both ways ; among ordinary people in the whole country—from the *Himālaya* down to the *Kumārī* (Cape Comorin ?), the term '*parva*' (from which '*pārvaṇa*' is derived) is known as denoting a *point of time* as also a *group*.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"The *Pārvaṇa-Homas* are an offering to be made in connection with a point of time ; we accept this usage, pertaining to the point of time [and hence the *Homas* should come in at the *Saurya* and other sacrifices]".

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta* :—At the modificatory or Ectypal Sacrifices, the two *Pārvaṇa-Homas do not come in.*—Why ?—*Because the term pertains to the group* ; that is, the offering is spoken of as '*Pārvaṇa*', on the basis of that usage of it which pertains to a group. The usage relating to the point of time we are going to refute below. Hence, inasmuch as the term '*Parvan*' denotes a *group*, what has to be performed is a group of offerings ; hence they cannot come into the modificatory sacrifices.

SŪTRA (52).

"BUT THE TERM IS CONNOTATIVE OF THE TIME",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

If you think that—"the term '*parvan*' denotes a point of time, and hence the offering in question should be made in connection with that point of time",—then we are going to refute it (in the following *Sūtra*).

This *Sūtra* merely states the objection; it is going to be developed later on.

SŪTRA (53).

THAT CANNOT BE; AS SUCH IS NOT THE CONTEXT.

Bhāṣya.

There is no reference in the Context to any *point of time*: while there is a distinct reference to the *group*. Hence, on the basis of the particular Context, the term is taken as denoting the *group*, not the *point of time*.

Says the Opponent—"The Context cannot set aside the fact of the term '*parvan*' denoting the *point of time*; because Context is weaker in its authority than the Indicative Power (of words)."

The answer to this is as follows—As a matter of fact, the term '*parvan*' is *not* really connotative of both; it really denotes only one; if it denotes the *point of time*, then it is through the connection of this *point of time* that it can be understood as pointing to the *group*; while, if it denotes the *group* then it is through its connection with this *group* that it can be understood as pointing to the *point of time*; so that the correct thing is to take it as actually denoting either one of the two, not both. Such being the case, the reason in favour of its being taken as denoting the *group* is that it is in keeping with the Context.

Further, the term '*parvan*' is derived from the root '*pṝ*'; and this root is known to be connotative of *giving, offering*; and it is the *groups* that are *offerings*; hence the term must be taken as standing for the *group of offerings*; as this would be in keeping with the derivative meaning of the term.

From all this it follows that the *Pārvaṇa-Homas* cannot come in into the *Saurya* and other modificatory sacrifices.

SŪTRA (54).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE WORDS OF THE MANTRA.

Bhāṣya.

It is only in accordance with this view that the reference contained in certain *Mantras* would be applicable; the two *mantras* being—(*a*) '*Ṛṣabham vājinam vayam pūrṇamāsam yajāmahē*', and (*b*) '*Amāvāsyā subhagā sushēvā*'.—[The former, used at the *Pārvaṇa-Homa* distinctly refers to the *group* of offerings that constitute the *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, and the latter *mantra*, also used at the *Homa*, distinctly refers to the group that constitutes the *Amāvāsyā* or *Darsha* sacrifice].

SŪTRA (55).

"EVEN THOUGH THE GROUP IS NOT THERE [AT THE MODIFICATORY SACRIFICES], YET LIKE 'AGNI' [IT WOULD COME IN]",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Opponent—"It is not right that the *Homas* should not find room in the Modificatory Sacrifices. Because *even though the group is not there*,—i.e. even though the term '*pārvaṇa*' denotes the *group*,—and the *group* is not there at the Modificatory Sacrifices,—yet the *Pārvaṇa-Homas* must come in at them.—How?—There may be some other deity indicated by the term ('*Pārvaṇa*'); or the *group* itself, though not actually present, may be offered, for the purpose of helping the *Saurya* and other Modificatory Sacrifices;—just as in the *mantra* '*Agnimagna āvaha*', *Agni* is invited for the purposes of the Sacrifice,—irrespective of its being present or not present there,—so would it be in the case in question also."

SŪTRA (56).

NOT SO; THE STATEMENT PERTAINS TO A PARTICULAR TOPIC.

Bhāṣya.

What has been urged is not possible, because the statement pertains to a particular topic; i.e. it lays down a detail in connection with that action to which the Context belongs;—and then it is the *Āgnēya* and other offerings (constituting the Primary Sacrifices) to which the Context belongs; hence those (i.e. *Agni*, etc.) are the deities connected with the *Homa* in question; it is the *Homa* offered to them that can be regarded as being for the sake of the deities. From this it follows that in a case where these deities are not present, the *Homa* for them cannot be offered; so that the *Pārvaṇa-Homas* must be excluded from the *Saurya* and other Modificatory Sacrifices.

ADHIKARAṆA (26): *The two 'Pārvaṇa-Homas' are restricted to the 'Darsha' and 'Pūrṇamāsa' Sacrifices, each to each.*

SŪTRA (57).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THEY SHOULD PERTAIN TO BOTH, AS THERE CAN BE NO DISTINCTION."

Bhāṣya.

The question that is raised now is—Are both the *Pārvaṇa-Homas* to be offered at the *Darsha* as well as at the *Pūrṇamāsa* ?—Or should the *Paurṇamāsī-Homa* be offered at the *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice and the *Darsha-Homa* at the *Darsha* sacrifice ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"both should be offered at both the sacrifices ;—why ?—because both the *Homas* have been spoken of in the Context of both the sacrifices ; and as such they should be offered at both".

SŪTRA (58).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, EACH OF THE TWO HOMAS SHOULD BE OFFERED AT THAT SACRIFICE WITH WHOSE NAME IT IS CONNECTED.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' (in reality) sets aside the *Pūrvapakṣa* view. It is not right that both should be offered at both ; *each of them should be offered at that sacrifice with whose name it is connected* ; as it can be helpful at that only ; and it would be useless at the other, and what is useless should not be done. It has been pointed out (in the last *Adhi.*) that the two *Homas* pertain primarily to the *group* of offerings ;—hence it follows that each of them should appertain to that sacrifice only with whose name it is connected.

ADHIKARAṆA (27): *Terms like 'Samid' and the rest, occurring in such texts as 'Samidho yajati' are names of Sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (59).

"IT MAY APPERTAIN TO THE PRAYĀJA",—IF THIS BE URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa, Prayājas* have been laid down in the following sentences—'*Samidho yajati, tanūnapātam yajati, iḍo yajati, barhiryajati, svāhākāram yajati*'.

In regard to this, the following question is raised—Do these sentences—'*Samidho yajati*' and the rest—enjoin particular deities in the form of *Samid* and the rest,—the meaning being that 'sacrifices are to be offered to *Samid* and the other deities'?—Or they do not assert any connection with the *Samid* and the rest that occur in the Context,—i.e. they do not enjoin any deities with such names, in connection with the main sacrifice (*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*)?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"What is enjoined in the sentences is the sacrifice to '*Samid*' and the rest; and from Syntactical Connection it is clear that '*Samid*' and the rest are *deities*. If we connect the sentence with the *Samid*, etc. mentioned in the context, the connection of the Context remains intact; and the result of this would be that at the *Prayāja* also there would be those same deities that are spoken of in the Context;—and it is the Deity that is the principal factor, as in the *Pārvaṇa-Homa*".

SŪTRA (60).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT SO; BECAUSE IT IS NOT ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be as asserted above; as in the sentences *Samid* and the rest are not enjoined *as deities*.—Why?—Because of the presence of the Accusative Ending (in the words '*samidhaḥ*', '*tanūnapātam*', etc.). As a rule, whenever the deity is enjoined, it is either by means of the appropriate nominal affix or by means of the Dative Ending; and it is only in these two cases that the idea of *being for the sake of* is connected; and it is only when there is this idea of *being for the sake of*, that the word is understood to denote the Deity. As a matter of fact, the *Deity* is not any distinct species of Being; so that the same may be the 'deity' of one thing and not the deity of another; one thing is the 'deity' of another thing, when the latter is *for the sake* of the former.—As for the Accusative Ending, it is used

in the sense of *the most desired*, so that it does not express the idea of anything being *for the sake of* another. It is for this reason that a word with the Accusative Ending cannot denote the Deity.

Says the Opponent—"We shall assume the idea of *being for the sake of*; as is done in the case of such sentences as '*Viṣṇum yajati*', '*Varuṇam yajati*'."

But here neither '*Viṣṇu*' nor '*Varuṇa*' is a sacrifice; nor is either of them anything else which could be *the most desired*; and yet we have the Accusative Ending; hence what is done in this case is that the idea of *being for the sake of* is assumed;—or it is taken as being expressed by some other word.—In the case in question however, the said idea is not expressed by any other word; nor can it be assumed;—nor can the thing spoken of be regarded as something conducive to the accomplishment of the action of *sacrifice*. On the other hand, the very nature of the terms '*Samid*' and the rest is such that they can be taken as signifying *sacrifices*; as for the Accusative Ending, it is also used in cases where an *action* is *the most desired* factor; as we find in such expressions as '*Pākam pachati*'.—From all this it follows that what the sentence '*Samidho yajati*' means is that 'the *Samid sacrifice* should be performed'.—Whenever an action tending to the performance of a *sacrifice* is enjoined, it is the *sacrifice* that is enjoined.—If the sentence were taken as enjoining a deity, —such enjoining of the deity could be done only if the act of *sacrifice* itself had been enjoined; and such injunction of what is enjoined would involve a syntactical split. Hence the sentence cannot be taken as the injunction of a deity. And when this sentence cannot be taken as enjoining the deity, the injunction of the deity will have to be sought after in the words of the *Mantras*; and in that case those Deities would be regarded as enjoined, through the words of the *Mantra*, for the simple reason that they are wanted and are compatible. Hence in the case of the sacrifices in question (*Samid*, *Tanūnapāt*, etc.), the Deities should be taken to be those that are indicated by the words of the *Mantras*.

End of Pāda ii of Adhyāya IX.

ADHYĀYA IX.

PĀDA III.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *Such terms as 'Vrīhi' occurring in Mantras should be changed when these Mantras come to be used at a modificatory sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (1).

IT IS TRUE THAT AT THE PRIMARY ORIGINAL SACRIFICE THE WORDS OF THE MANTRA SHOULD BE USED IN THEIR ORIGINAL FORMS,—AND SO ALSO AT THE SUBSEQUENT SACRIFICE, BECAUSE THIS LATTER HAS THE FORMER FOR ITS ORIGINAL;—BUT IT CANNOT BE SO, WHEN THOSE WORDS DO NOT SIGNIFY THE THING REQUIRED.

Bhāṣya.

Modificatory sacrifices form the subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa*,—such as (A) 'Desiring Brahmic glory, one should offer cooked rice to *Sūrya*',—'Desiring offspring, one should offer the cake baked upon eleven pans to *Indra-Agni*',—'Desiring cattle, one should perform the *Chitrā* sacrifice',—'Desiring a village, one should offer the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* to *Vishvēdēvas*'.—At the sacrifice which is the *original primary* of all these the *mantra* used in the offering is '*Agnayē juṣṭam nirvapāmi*' ['I offer this to *Agni*'].—(B) Then, there is another modificatory sacrifice laid down as—'One should offer the *Nīvāra* cake baked on eleven pans, to *Indra-Marutvat*';—and at the sacrifice which is the 'original primary' of this sacrifice, the *mantra* used contains the mention of *Vrīhi*—'*Syonantē sadanam kṛṇomi ghṛtasya dhārayā . . . . vrīhīṇām mēdha sumanasyamānaḥ*'.

In regard to both these sets of modificatory sacrifices (A and B), at which the use of the *mantras* quoted above would come in under the General Law (laying down that 'the Modificatory Sacrifice should be performed in the same manner as its original Primary')—there arises the question—Are the *mantras* to be used (at the modificatory sacrifice) in their unchanged original forms?—Or should there be a modification?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The *Mantras* should be used without any modification; it is only thus that the scriptural text would be preserved. The General Law is that what is done at the original Primary Sacrifice should be done also at the corresponding Modificatory Sacrifice;—and the terms '*agni*' and '*vrīhi*' have been used at the original Primary;—therefore those same terms should be used at the corresponding Modificatory Sacrifices also."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—*It is true that at the original Primary Sacrifice the words of the Mantra should be used in*

their original forms,—and that as it is used at the original Primary so should it be done at *the subsequent sacrifice*,—i.e. at the Modificatory Sacrifice, that same *Mantra* should be used; because *this latter sacrifice has the former for its original*. All this is quite true; and yet we assert as follows:—It cannot be as has been suggested, *because those words do not signify the things required*; that is, the terms '*agni*' and '*vrihi*' would not signify *Sūrya* and *Nīvāra* (which are the things required at the Modificatory Sacrifices).—The term '*cha*' in the *Sūtra* has the sense of '*tu*', ('but'); what should be done by *Mantras* is that they should speak of the things (connected with the sacrifice),—not that their mere form should be used; as in this latter case, a transcendental result would have to be assumed (as following from such use of the *Mantras*); while by signifying the things required, they serve a visible purpose.—From all this it follows that the two terms should be modified (at the Modificatory Sacrifices).

SŪTRA (2).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND AN INDICATIVE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

In support of the above conclusion there is the following indicative text—'*Na mātā vardhatē, na pitā, na bhrātā, na sakhā*' ['The mother grows not, nor father, nor brother, nor friend'];—as a matter of fact, we actually see the brother and the friend growing; hence the sentence cannot be taken as denying the growth of the persons denoted by the words; it must mean the denial of the growth of the *words* themselves;—the meaning being that 'the term *bhrātṛ* does not grow, nor the term *sakhi*'.—"What would be the 'growth' of these two *words*?"—'Growth' would consist in the appearance of other letters; e.g. when there is one person, the term is '*bhrātā*', but when there are two persons, the same term assumes the form '*bhrātarau*'. Thus then what is meant is that 'the term *bhrātṛ* and the term *sakhi* are not modified';—and from this it follows that words other than these do become modified; for when it is said 'You do not go to assemblies, you do not see the performance', what is implied is that other persons do go there;—in the same manner, in the case in question, when it is said that 'the term *bhratṛ* and the term *sakhi* are not modified', it indicates that other terms do become modified.

This discussion is left incomplete here; another discussion will now proceed [*and the thread of the main discussion will be taken up later, after the first explanation of Sūtra 3 below*].

Adhikaraṇa (2): *In a case where 'Lotus-grass' is used, there should be a corresponding 'modification' in the Mantra used in connection with the 'strewing' of the grass.*

SŪTRA (3).

There should be appropriate modification of the generic term as well as the contingent term.

Bhāṣya.

The scriptures declare that—'Desiring prosperity, one should offer cooked *Mudga-grains* to Shrī'.—In connection with this offering it is laid down that 'the grass used is of the Lotus' ['*Pauṇḍarīkāṇi barhiṣo bhavanti*'] —At the sacrifice which is the original Primary of this offering, the *mantra* used for the 'strewing of grass' is the following—'*Stṛṇīta barhiḥ pariḍhatta vēdim jayāmi mā himsīramupāshayānā darbhaiḥ stṛṇīta haritaiḥ suparṇaiḥ niṣkā hyētē yajmānasya bradhnaḥ*'; and under the General Law, this same *mantra* has to be used at the aforesaid *offering to Shrī*.—Now in this *mantra*, we have the word '*darbhaiḥ*', which is a 'generic' term (denoting the *Kusha-grass*), and '*haritaiḥ*' is a 'contingent' term, that is, a term denoting the quality (*green*)—[The two words thus meaning 'green Kusha-grass']—[At the *offering to Shrī*, in place of this *green Kusha-grass*, we have to use the *Lotus-grass*, which is *red*].

The question that arises is—[when the *mantra* comes to be used in connection with the 'strewing' of the *Lotus-grass*] should the generic term ('*darbhaiḥ*', 'Kusha-grass') alone be modified (into '*pauṇḍarikaiḥ*', 'Lotus-grass'), and the contingent term ('*haritaiḥ*', 'green') be used without change?—Or should both the terms be modified *in their appropriate place*,—i.e. the generic term being used in connection with the *strewing*, and the contingent term, in connection with the substance used for the *strewing*?

The question to be considered in the first instance is—In the *Mantra*, is the term '*harita*' ('green') used for denoting the *quality of green—colour?* —Or for denoting the quality of the substance used for *strewing*?—"What difference would that make?"—If what has to be spoken of is the *green colour* of the *Kusha-grass*, then it is clearly for some transcendental purpose; and then in that case, in connection with the *Lotus-grass* also, the same *green-colour* should be spoken of, for some transcendental purpose; so that the word '*haritaiḥ*' ('green') should have to be used in its unaltered form; —on the other hand, if the term '*haritaiḥ*' ('green') is meant to be used for speaking of the quality of the particular substance used for *strewing*, then it becomes necessary to speak of the quality of the *Lotus-grass*; [and

in that case the word 'green' should have to be modified into 'red', which is the colour of the *Lotus-grass*].—The term 'green' may have both the meanings mentioned above; the question is—in which sense is it used in the *Mantra* in question?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on these questions is as follows—"The term 'green' should be used in its unmodified form; hence we conclude also that the word is used in the *mantra* for the purpose of speaking of the *green colour*.—How so?—For the simple reason that the term '*harita*' ('green') is actually present in the *Mantra-text*. Nor is it necessary that the *Mantra* should speak of each and every one of the qualities that may be present in substances; that quality alone should be taken as spoken of which is expressed by some word present in the *Mantra*;—in the case in question, the word in the *mantra* denotes the quality of *green colour*;—hence it follows that this quality of *green colour* must be taken as spoken of [and hence the term denoting it must be used in its unmodified form].—*Objection*—'That same term (*green*) also expresses the *quality of the substance used for strewing*'.—*Answer*—We say—No; the green colour is spoken of by means of the term 'green', *not* because it happens to be the quality of a substance used for *strewing*,—but because it possesses *greenness*; so that the term 'green' ('*harita*') directly denotes this *greenness*, and only indirectly indicates *the quality of a strewing substance*; and *Direct Denotation* is more authoritative than *Indirect Indication*.—Thus then, inasmuch as the words '*haritaiḥ*' ('green') is used in the *Mantra* for the purpose of expressing the *green colour*, it should not be modified, even when the *mantra* is used at the Modificatory Sacrifice (of the *offering to Shrī*)."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The 'generic term' and the 'contingent term', both should be modified. In view of this, we offer the explanation that the term 'green' is used with a view to speak of the quality of a substance used for 'strewing'. Though it is true that the term '*harita*' ('green') directly denotes the *green colour*, yet, there would be no point in the *mantra* speaking of the *green colour*; so that it would be necessary to assume a transcendental purpose; but any such assumption would be unjustifiable so long as a visible purpose could be found. By indirect indication, the term '*harita*' expresses *the quality of a substance used for strewing*; and this indication serves the visible purpose of describing the particular *strewing-substance* (Kusha); and under the circumstances, it should be necessary to indicate the quality of the other substance (*Lotus-grass*) that is used for *strewing* (at the *offering to Shrī*); consequently it becomes necessary to modify the term '*harita*' ('green') into '*rakta*' ('red') [the Lotus-grass being red].

[*The broken thread of Adhikaraṇa* (1) *is now taken up*].

The *Adhikaraṇa* that we have just dealt with appears to be of the nature of something fallen within something else [i.e. an interloper]; hence we are explaining the *Sūtras* (2 and 3) somewhat differently—

SŪTRA (2) ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND AN INDICATIVE TEXT,—SŪTRA (3) THERE SHOULD BE APPROPRIATE MODIFICATION OF THE GENERIC AS WELL AS THE CONTINGENT TERM.

For the following reason also we conclude that there should be modification at the Modificatory Sacrifice—"For what reason?"—We find an indicative text.—"What is that indicative text?"—There is the following declaration—'*Vishvēṣāndēvānāmusrāṇām chhāgānām vapānām mēdasonubrūhi*';—here we find used several modified generic terms; which is possible only if *Mantras* are meant to express certain things (and not used only for the sake of the utterance leading to a transcendental result).—If no modification had been made,—and the *mantra* were not meant to express certain things, —then there should have been only the two terms '*agni*' and '*chhāga*'; and the presence of the other words, which do not signify any *action*, would be entirely meaningless. Nor could the presence of the words be explained as containing the injunction of these words themselves; because there is no injunctive term in the sentence—"They could be taken as enjoined by the declaration that lays down the entire procedure".—In that case, the objection remains that, they would be there only for a transcendental purpose.—From all this it follows that there must be modification at the Modificatory Sacrifices.

SŪTRA (4).

[*A Pūrvapakṣa view—continued*]—"SOME PEOPLE HOLD THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MODIFICATION; AS IT WOULD BE 'NON-SCRIPTURAL'."

Bhāṣya.

"Some teachers hold the view that there should be no modification."

In support of this view an indicative text is going to be cited (under the next *Sūtra*); and it is an introduction to that that the view has been stated here (in the present *Sūtra*).

The sense of this *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—

"If modifications were made in the *Mantra*, then the scriptural injunction [i.e. in General Law that the Modificatory Sacrifice should be performed in the same manner as the original Primary) would be disobeyed. Hence there should be no Modification."

SŪTRA (5).

[*Pūrvapakṣa view—concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS."

Bhāṣya.

"In support of this view (that there should be no modification) we find the following indicative.—In connection with the modificatory animal

at the *Āgnēya*, it is laid down—'*Agnayē chhāgasya vapāyā mēdasonubrūhi*'; if there were to be modification in the usual way, then there would be no need for the injunction direct;—as a matter of fact however, we do not find the injunction;—hence it follows that there should be no modification.—Further, there is yet another indicative.—In connection with the *Agnīṣomīya animal*, it has been declared—'*Yarhyēkam yūpamupasprshēt ēṣa tē vāyo iti brūyāt; yadi dvau, ētau tē vāyū iti; yadi bahūn, ētē tē vāyavaḥ*'; if modification were permitted, then all these varying injunctions would not be necessary; as every one of them would be secured by modification;—but there is the text actually enjoining the diverse forms;—from this also it follows that there should be no modification."

SŪTRA (6).

[*Pūrvapakṣa answered*]—IN REALITY, THERE MUST BE MODIFICATION, FOR REASONS ALREADY STATED.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') sets aside the view set forth above. It is not right that "there should be no modification",—as has been just asserted;—in fact, there must be modifications;—in support of this view we have the reason already explained before, at the end of *Sūtra* (1).—What the General Law (relating to the Primary Sacrifice and its Modifications) follows is the *sense*, not the mere *words*, of the *Mantras*; because in the main, *Mantras* are meant to be expressive of sense; they are not meant to be used merely in their verbal form. Hence for reasons explained before, there must be modifications in *Mantras*.

We have only got to answer the arguments based upon the indicative texts cited. [This we proceed to do.]

SŪTRA (7).

THE INDICATIVE TEXT CITED IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMPARTING THE CHARACTER OF 'MANTRA'.

Bhāṣya.

The indicative text that has been cited—'*Agnayē chhāgasya vapāyā mēdaso* '*nubrūhi*',—enjoins the altered form, with a view to impart to it the character of '*Mantra*'; otherwise, the *mantra*, in its modified form, would cease to be a real *Mantra*; it is for this reason that the text has reiterated it.

SŪTRA (8).

IT SERVES THE PURPOSES OF RESTRICTION; AS (OTHERWISE) BOTH MIGHT BE APPLICABLE.

Bhāṣya.

As regards the second indicative text cited—'*Yarhyēkam . . . ēṣa te-vāyo*, etc. etc.'—the answer to that is as follows:—If the declaration had not been made—that 'if two posts should be touched,—if several posts should be touched',—then all the *mantras* ('*esa tē vāyo—ētau tē vāyu,—ētē tē vāyavaḥ*') would come to be used in connection with the single Post; in order to avoid this contingency, the restriction has been made—'If *two* posts are touched, one should say *ētau tē vāyū*; if several posts are touched, one should say *ētē tē vāyavaḥ*'.—Thus this text also does not lend support to the view that there should be no modifications in *Mantras*.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *In connection with the 'Agnīṣomīya-Animal-offering', the Expiatory Rite is to be performed on account of the ordinary touching of the Post.*

SŪTRA (9).

IT SHOULD BE PERFORMED IN CONNECTION WITH THE ORDINARY TOUCHING, BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT IS CONNECTED WITH EVIL; SPECIALLY AS IT HAS BEEN ENJOINED AS CONTINGENT UPON SOMETHING COMING AFTER THE SACRIFICE HAS BEEN COMPLETED; HENCE IT COULD NOT BE PERFORMED IN CONNECTION WITH THE SACRIFICE, AS IT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO IT.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, at which there is the *Agnīṣomīya-Animal-offering*; in connection with that, it is declared—'If one touches one Post, he should say *ēṣa tē vāyo*; if he touches two, he should say *ētau tē vāyū*; if he touches several, he should say *ētē tē vāyavaḥ*'. [This lays down an *Expiation* to be performed for touching the Post].

In regard to this, there arises the following question:—Is this Expiation to be performed when one touches the Post during a sacrificial performance as well as when one touches it in ordinary life?—Or only when he touches it during a sacrificial performance? Or only if he touches it in ordinary life?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"(A) It may be performed when one touches it during a sacrifice, as well as in ordinary life; there is no restriction.—How so?—Because no restrictive condition has been laid down; there is no restriction as that the expiation should be performed only after touching it during a sacrifice,—or only after touching it in ordinary life. Hence there can be no restriction.—(B) Or the Expiation may be taken as to be performed only when one touches the Post during a sacrificial performance; as in that case the *Mantra* (laid down in the context dealing with the sacrifice) would be connected with a purpose near at hand (in the shape of the *touching* during the sacrifice),—while in the other case it would be connected with something quite apart from the context, and such connection could only be indirect.—Hence we conclude that the Expiation should be performed only on touching the Post during a sacrificial performance."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The Expiation can be performed only when one touches the Post in ordinary life,—not when one touches it during a sacrificial performance.—"Why so?"—Because the Expiation has been laid down in connection with an evil, in the following text—'The Post absorbs the evil consequences of the sacrifice,

—when one touches the Post, he absorbs the evil consequences of the sacrifice,—hence one should not touch the Post';—having made this declaration, the text goes on to say—'If one touches one Post, etc. etc.'—Hence it is clear that the Expiation is to be performed in cases where there is the *evil* referred to in the text. This evil can be present only in the ordinary touching,—not in the touching during a sacrificial performance. Because it has been laid down that in course of the sacrificial performance, the Post has to be 'raised' and 'anointed' (where *touching* is inevitable); and if the *touching of the Post* were something that *ought not to be done* (an evil), then it could not be what *should be done.* The prohibition of the *touching* has its scope in the *ordinary* touching; where there would be nothing incongruous (in its being regarded as an *evil* and hence to be expiated).

Further, the expiation *has been enjoined as contingent upon something coming after the completion of the sacrifice.* [Read '*nimittē*', the 'na' having to be taken with what follows].—"How so?"—The text says—'The Post absorbs the evil consequences of the sacrifice, etc. etc.', which means that 'if anything wrong has occurred during the sacrifice,' it is absorbed by the Post, and what has been good is absorbed by the sacrificer'; all this is purely valedictory, and is not connected with any other injunctive word. It is only the term '*iṣṭa*' that can be connected with an injunctive word; and that same word, being connected with the valedictory words, is near at hand; and being near at hand, it becomes connected with other words. Just as in the sentence—'*Daṇḍo manoharo ramaṇīyashcha prahara shīghram*', though the word '*daṇḍaḥ*' is connected with the intervening words '*manoharaḥ*' and '*ramaṇīyaḥ*', yet being close at hand, it becomes connected with the words '*prahara shīghram*'. In the same manner, in the case in question, the word '*iṣṭa*' becomes connected with the other words,—the sense of the passage thus being—'if on the sacrifice being performed—*iṣṭē*—one touches the Post, he should say *ēṣa tē vāyo*, etc. etc.'; thus the word '*iṣṭē*' comes to be expressive of the *completion* of the sacrifice. If then, the reciting of the *mantra* is contingent upon the *touching* that occurs *after the completion of the sacrifice*,—then clearly that *touching* cannot be one that is done *during* the *sacrifice*.—Hence the conclusion is that the expiation is to be performed when there is touching in ordinary life; as for the touching *during a sacrifice*, the expiation cannot be performed in connection with it, *because it is not applicable to it*; that is, it is not possible either for the prohibition (of touching) or the condition of 'completion' to apply to what occurs during the sacrificial performance.

[Kumārila does not agree with the *Bhāṣya*, and later writers present the *Siddhānta* in a simpler form:—The injunction of the Expiation follows upon the prohibition of touching;—this prohibition can apply to *ordinary* touching only—never to the touching during a sacrifice;—hence the Expiation should appertain to *ordinary* touching only.—Kumārila does not accept the *Bhāṣya* explanation of '*apavṛktē*' as 'completion'.]

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *At the Sacrifice where there are two animals the Singular and Plural forms of the words of the 'Pāsha-Mantras' are to be modified into the Dual form.*

SŪTRA (10).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"THAT WHICH IS INCOMPATIBLE (WITH THE PRIMARY) SHOULD BE USED IN ITS UNMODIFIED FORM; BECAUSE ITS OBSTRUCTION IS NOT VISIBLE; AND BECAUSE THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS AND THAT."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Agniṣomīya-Animal-sacrifice*, laid down in the text—'*Yo dīkṣito yadagniṣomīyam pashumālabhēta*' ['When one, being initiated, sacrifices the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*'].—In connection with this there is a *Mantra*-speaking of the singleness of the *Pāsha* (Noose)—'*Aditiḥ pāsham pramumoktu ētam*' ('May *Aditi* loosen this noose']; also there is another *Mantra* speaking of the *plurality* of the Noose—'*Aditiḥ pāshān pramumoktu ētān*'.—It is going to be explained (in the next *Adhikaraṇa*) that at the original Primary Sacrifice both these *Mantras* may be used.

[The text has the word '*Samuchchayam*' which ordinarily means that both the *Mantras* are to be used together; but in the next *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Siddhānta* is that *both the Mantras may be* used,—but as optional alternatives. The term '*Samuchchayam*' of the text therefore has to be taken in this sense. '*Vikalpam*' would be the right reading; but the MSS. also read '*Samuchchayam*'. The *Shāstradīpikā* speaks of '*Ubhayoḥ sannivēshaḥ*', 'both come in'; this also has to be taken in the sense that 'both come in—but as optional alternatives'.—The *Bhaṭṭadīpika* speaks clearly of '*vikalpam*', which is in keeping with the *Siddhānta* of the next *Adhikaraṇa*].

Then again, there is a modificatory sacrifice (Ectype) of the *Agniṣomīya*, at which *two* animals are killed, laid down in the text—'*Maitram shvētamālabhēta—vāruṇam kṛṣṇam*, etc.' ['The white goat should be sacrificed to *Mitra* and the black goat to *Varuṇa*'].—In accordance with the General Law, both the above-quoted *mantras* come to be regarded as to be used at this sacrifice of two animals.

In regard to the use of these two *mantras* at this last sacrifice of the two goats, there arise the following questions:—(*a*) Is the word in the Plural form to be used in its unmodified form and that in the Singular form should be excluded?—Or (*b*) Should the Plural form be excluded and the Singular form used as modified (into the Dual form)?—Or (*c*) should both (the Plural as well as the Singular) be used, there being a diversity of expression (i.e. option) regarding the one to be actually used in any particular case?—Or (*d*) should the Singular form be used in its modified form, the Plural form also (in its modified form) not being excluded?

(A) The first *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*That which is incompatible should be used in its unmodified form*; i.e. the Plural form, which is incompatible with the Primary Sacrifice (at which there is only one animal) should be used (at the sacrifice of two animals) in its unmodified form, and the Singular form should be excluded.—Why so?—Because we find no obstacle to its being used; so that just as it is used in the case of there being only (one animal and) one Noose so would it be used also in the case where there are (two animals and) two nooses; specially as the Plural form is expressive of neither *one* nor *two*.—In thus using the Plural form in its unmodified form, the scriptural injunction of the General Law becomes honoured; while in the other case, if the words were modified, then the *Mantra* would not be used in the form in which it is used at the Primary Sacrifice. Nor is there any difference between *one* noose and *two* nooses [so far as the applicability of the Plural form is concerned].—From all this it follows that, the Plural form should be used in its unmodified form and the Singular form should be excluded."

SŪTRA (11).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"IN FACT, THERE SHOULD BE MODIFICATION; BECAUSE IT SERVES THAT PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in fact') rejects the view set forth above.

"*In fact, there should be modification*; that is, the Singular form should be used in its modified form and the Plural form should be excluded.—"Why so?"—*Because it serves that purpose*; that is, the *two* nooses that have to be spoken of in the *Mantra* used at the Modificatory Sacrifice (with *two* animals) have to be spoken of simultaneously, in accordance with the injunction of the Procedure; so that, in the term '*pāsha*' (if the Singular form were used in its unmodified form) there would be nothing to differentiate which one of the two nooses is spoken of and which one is not spoken of; as there is nothing to discriminate between the two nooses. In fact, the connection of *both* the nooses with the performance can be spoken of only by means of the *Dual* Accusative form, and by no other means. Hence we conclude that the word should be modified into the Dual form, and the Plural as well as the Singular form should be excluded."

SŪTRA (12).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—"IN REALITY, AS IN THE PRIMARY SACRIFICE SO IN THE OTHERS (MODIFICATORY SACRIFICES) ALSO, THE ONE OR THE OTHER SHOULD BE USED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SENSE; BECAUSE OF THE CONNECTION OF THE 'INCOMPATIBLE' FORM."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*api vā*' ('in reality') sets aside the view just set forth.

"The Plural form should not be excluded. Just as at the Primary Sacrifice, the Plural and the Singular forms are both used,—the Plural form

being used by reason of its 'incompatible connection',—so at the Modificatory Sacrifice also, the Singular should be used in the modified Dual form; and the Plural form would also come in by reason of its 'incompatible connection'. Because, if the Plural form is permissible at the Primary Sacrifice—in cases where only one Noose is there,—on the ground that the word ('*pāshān*') is meant to express only what is denoted by the basic noun ('*pāsha*' independently of the signification of the case-ending), —then the same would be permissible, on the same ground, at the Modificatory Sacrifice,—where only two *nooses* are there. If it be held that at the Primary the Plural form expresses *singularity*, then at the Modificatory Sacrifice also, the Plural would express *duality*.—Hence there should be diversity of expression—(i.e. option) in regard to the use of the exact form."

SŪTRA (13).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT HOWEVER, WHAT IS USED SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATE OF THINGS; BECAUSE WHAT IS INCOMPATIBLE CANNOT BE ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('as a matter of fact however') rejects even the view that has been just set forth.

It is not right that there should be an option in the use of the *Mantras*; what should be used is that which *is in accordance with the state of things*; that is, the word should be modified into the Dual form, and the Plural as well as the Singular form should be excluded; because either the Plural or the Singular ending, appearing in the wake of the term '*pāsha*' as denoting *two nooses*, can never signify any connection with the sacrifice in question; and in the matter of the comprehension of the meanings of words, ordinary usage is the sole means of ascertaining it; and in ordinary usage we never find a term with the Plural or with the Singular ending applied to *two* things.—From all this it follows that in the case of there being *two* nooses, the *Mantra* should be used with the Singular *or* Plural forms—both duly modified (into the Dual form).

Question:—"How is it that at the Primary Sacrifice, where there is only *one* noose, the *Mantra* is used with the Plural form?"—[The answer is given in the next *Sūtra*].—

SŪTRA (14).

IN THE CASE OF THE VEDIC TEXT, WE MUST USE IT AS WE FIND IT.

Bhāṣya.

In the case of the Vedic text, all that is actually found there should be regarded as authoritative, and it should not be transgressed. If one were to transgress it and assume something else, he would not be doing things

according to the *Veda*; nor would it be an ordinary worldly act,—nor an act in accordance with any propriety.

It has been argued that "the General Law lays down 'diversity of expression' [i.e. option between the Plural and Singular forms]".—But that is not so; what is incompatible or unreasonable can never be enjoined; as a matter of fact, the General Law does not countenance recourse to any such unreasonable process.—"Why?"—Because at the Primary Sacrifice there is only *one* Noose, while the *mantra* with the Plural form also appears in the same Context; so that in this case the 'diversity of expression' (i.e. the use of the Plural form in relation to *one* Noose) is what is directly indicated (by the Veda). [This cannot be the case with the Modificatory Sacrifice, which is apart from the Context].—What does the term 'diversity of expression' really mean?—It means that the verbal expression is not in strict accordance with what is meant to be expressed by it. In the case of the Primary Sacrifice the Plural form is used in relation to the *one* Noose, not for the purpose of bringing about a 'diversity of expression', but for the purpose of doing exactly what it is capable of doing.—"What is it *capable of doing*?"—The fact of the matter is that, having found the Plural form actually present in the Vedic text, when we proceed to seek for its meaning, we take it as used for the purpose of expressing that meaning which is actually found to be signified by it. For instance, what is signified by the *Mantra* is the connection between the substance *Noose* and the act of *setting free* ('loosening'); and the words of the *mantra* are quite capable of conveying this idea, irrespective of *singularity* or *plurality*.—In the case of the Modificatory Sacrifice, on the other hand, what has got to be expressed is the connection of the act of 'setting free' with each of the two Nooses *simultaneously*;—the Plural form would be incompatible with the *two* nooses;—nor is the Plural form used (in the *Mantra*) as expressing *two nooses*;—and what we are considering is the actual use of the word—which word should be used? So that the actual using of the word (at the modificatory sacrifice) being dependent upon ourselves, why should we use a word (i.e. the Plural form) that is not expressive of the things in question,—while a word (in the Dual form) expressive of them is actually available?—In the Vedic text also, the Plural form is not found to be applied to *two* nooses; hence if the *Mantra* with the Plural form were used in connection with the *two* Nooses, it would be a *Corrupt* form, not the *Vedic* form. Nowhere,—in ordinary usage or in the Veda—is the Plural form found to be used for expressing *Duality*; and when what is meant to be spoken of is *Duality*, the Plural form is never used to signify the *two*. For instance, when it is said that '*Dēvadattayajñadattābhyām kartavyam*', the *Duality* is expressed by the two terms '*Devadatta*' and '*Yajñadatta*' themselves, and it is not meant to be expressed by the particular ending,—and yet it is the *Dual* form that is used, not the *Plural* form.

From all this it follows that at the Modificatory Sacrifice the *Singular* and the *Plural* forms should be modified (into the *Dual* form).

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *In connection with the 'Agnīṣomīya-Animal-sacrifice', the Mantras speaking of 'one' and of 'several' Nooses should be treated as optional alternatives.*

SŪTRA (15).

WHERE THERE IS AN ANOMALY, THERE SHOULD BE OPTION; AS BOTH STAND ON THE SAME FOOTING; AND IT IS ONLY THE SECONDARY FACTOR THAT MAY BE REGARDED AS INCOMPATIBLE, AS IT IS ONLY ONE PART OF IT.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Agnīṣomīya-Animal-sacrifice*, declared in the text—'On being initiated one sacrifices the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*';—in connection with this, two *mantras* have been laid down—one speaking of *one Noose*, and another speaking of *several Nooses* [*vide* preceding *Adhikaraṇa*].

In regard to these *mantras*, there arises the question—Should that which speaks of *one Noose* come into the performance and that speaking of *several* be taken out of the Context (and used elsewhere)? Or should both come into the performance?

On this, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The one speaking of *several* nooses should be taken out.—Why?—Because it is conducive to the loosening of *several* nooses, and there are not several nooses in the Context: hence not being able to be connected with anything in the Context, it has to be taken to some other performance where there may be *several* nooses. Just as in the case of the texts—(*a*) '*Yuvām hi sthaḥ svarpatī iti dvayoryajamānayoḥ pratipadam kuryāt*' ['*You two are Masters of heaven*—these words should be addressed to *two Sacrificers*'], and (*b*) *Ētā asṛgramindavaḥ iti bahubhyo yajamānēbhyaḥ pratipadam kuryāt*' ['*Ētā asṛgramindavaḥ*,—these words should be addressed to several Sacrificers'],—the latter is taken out of its Context and used elsewhere.—Similarly the words laid down as to be addressed to the offerings meant for *Pūṣan*, *Savitṛ*, *Sarasvatī*, *Dyavā-Pṛthivī*, and other deities are taken out of their Context and used elsewhere (where the offering to the particular deity is made).—Exactly in the same manner the *mantra* speaking of *several* nooses should be taken out of its Context and used elsewhere."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*When there is an anomaly*.—"What *anomaly*?"—The *anomaly* that at the Primary Sacrifice there is only *one Noose* while the *Mantra* is one that speaks of *several nooses*.—Such being the anomaly, the question is—Should the *mantra* be taken out of the Context or not?—The answer is that it should *not* be taken out.—"But in connection with the Primary Sacrifice there is another

Mantra."—Yes, along with that other *Mantra*, the *mantra* in question may be taken as an optional alternative.—" Why ? "—Because, since the *Noose*, which is the object denoted by the basic Noun 'noose' ('*pāsha*') is present at the Primary Sacrifice, it is not right to take out (i.e. exclude) any *mantra* (speaking of the Noose).—" But the *Mantra* in question speaks of *several* Nooses, while at the Primary Sacrifice, there is only *one* noose ; hence the *Mantra* cannot be used at it ".—The answer to this is that, even though the *Mantra* speaks of *several* nooses, yet it does express the object (*noose*) itself which is the substratum of the said plurality ; if it did not express that object, then the *Mantra* could not provide the notion of the *plurality* as qualified by the particular object, *Noose*. And if it does express that object, that suffices for our purpose ; as what is done with the *mantra* is the 'setting free' of that object (Noose), not of *plurality* or of the *genus* 'Noose'. Hence all that is necessary is that that object should be expressed ; and as this is done by the basic noun itself, there is no reason for excluding (the *mantra* containing the term with the plural ending).—" But there is the other *Mantra* which contains the required basic noun with the Singular ending, and this would do the signifying of the object ".—The answer to this is that the basic noun contained in this other *mantra* is not different from that contained in the *mantra* in question. So that, if it be held that the basic noun with the Singular ending is not excluded from the Context, then it follows that the basic noun with the Plural ending also should not be excluded ; as it is the same as the former.

Says the Opponent—" The Plural Ending can have its use in the case of a performance where there would be *several* nooses ; and it is on this ground that it should be excluded (from the performance where there is only *one* noose) ; now when it is excluded, it carries with it also the basic noun, which is a part of the word ['*pāshān*', 'nooses'] [so that there is nothing left which could be treated as an optional alternative]."

Answer—It is only the secondary factor that may be regarded as incompatible,—not the principal factor ; and in a word the secondary factor is what is signified by the case-ending, and the principal factor is what is signified by the basic noun ; as it is only a particular aspect of what is signified by the basic noun that is signified by the case-ending ; so that it is only when what is signified by the basic noun is there, that there can come in what is signified by the case-ending. As a matter of fact, in connection with the modificatory sacrifice, the basic noun is not there at all [the *mantra* containing the word '*pāshān*' being used at it only by virtue of the General Law transferring to it the details of the Primary Sacrifice] ; —as for the Primary Sacrifice, even what is spoken of in an isolated passage comes into it, what to say, then, of what has been spoken of in connection with the Primary itself ? Hence it follows that what is signified by the case-ending can come in only where what is signified by the basic noun is there.

Opponent—" The basic noun does come in into the Modificatory Sacrifice also by virtue of the General Law, so that what is signified by that noun would also be there."

True; but the General Law is a remote factor; hence that Law will not serve to exclude the Plural form. Hence it is the Basic noun which would drag away along with it the Plural Ending which is part of that noun. Nor is the Plural Ending absolutely meaningless in connection with the Primary Sacrifice; as it serves the purpose of connecting with the performance the genus 'Noose' through the act of being 'set free'.—It is for this reason that it is the secondary factor of the Plural Ending that is to be regarded as incompatible,—not the principal factor of what is signified by the basic noun.

"What is it that is *incompatible*?"

What is *incompatible* is this that *Plurality*, which is clearly comprehended, is regarded as *not meant*. This incompatibility may be assumed; but it should never be assumed that at the Primary Sacrifice it is 'incompatible' for the Basic Noun to signify what actually forms the denotation of that noun. In fact, in connection with the Modificatory Sacrifice, the secondary factor of the case-ending does not really signify *Plurality* at all, —because of want of proximity (which is an essential factor in every Verbal signification).

From all this it follows that the Plural form also finds place at the Primary Sacrifice.

SŪTRA (16).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE PECULIAR CONTEXT.

Bhāṣya.

From the peculiar Context it is ascertained that the Basic Noun carries with itself the Plural Ending, and not that the Basic Noun itself is carried away by the Plural Ending. What is signified by the basic noun is present at the Primary Sacrifice of the *Amīṣomīya-animal*; and what is signified by the Plural Ending is present at the Modificatory Sacrifice. For this reason also the Plural form of the noun finds place at the Primary Sacrifice.

It has been argued (under Sū. 15) that "there should be exclusion, as in the case of the Sacrifice with two Sacrificers".—This has got to be refuted [and this is done in the following *Sūtra*].

SŪTRA (17).

[IN THE CASE CITED] THE WORDS CANNOT BE USED, BECAUSE THE THING EXPRESSED IS NOT THERE AT ALL; IN THE OTHER CASE (THE ONE IN QUESTION) HOWEVER IT IS ONLY THE SECONDARY FACTOR (WHICH IS ABSENT).

Bhāṣya.

In the case cited by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, it is only right that the formula is taken out of the Context; because in that case there is neither *Duality* nor *Plurality* of *Sacrificer* at the Primary Sacrifice; so that there would

be nothing to which the two formulæ would apply. In the case in question, however, what is not there (at the Primary Sacrifice) is only the secondary factor of *Plurality*; while the Plural Ending serves another purpose of connecting with the act of 'setting free'; and when one thing serves several purposes, there is nothing to prevent its being used for only one of those purposes. For instance, a burning stick serves the purpose of giving light and also of producing ashes,—and if, in any case, it is *not* used for giving light, that does not prevent its being used for obtaining ashes.—Thus there is no analogy between the case in question and that of the formulæ cited by the *Pūrvapakṣin*.

SŪTRA (18).

"THERE IS SIMILAR EXCLUSION OF THE WORDS ADDRESSED TO 'DYĀVĀ-PṚTHIVĪ' ",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that the words addressed to *Dyāvā-Pṛthivī* and other deities are taken out of their Context; and similarly there should be exclusion in the case in question.—This has got to be refuted [which we proceed to do in the next *Sūtra*].—

SŪTRA (19).

NOT SO; BECAUSE (IN THE CASE IN QUESTION) THE ORIGINATIVE WORD IS THERE.

Bhāṣya.

The case in question is not similar to that of the words addressed to the deities; because the originative word of *Dyāvā-Pṛthivī* and the other deities named is not present in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices; while in the case in question, we have the originative word of the Noose.—Hence the case of the words addressed to the deities is not analogous to the case in question.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *In a case where the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa Sacrifices are performed by a person with two wives, there should be no modification in the mantra . 'Patnīm sannahya, etc.'*

SŪTRA (20).

AT A SACRIFICE WHICH HAS NO PRECEDENT, THERE SHOULD BE NO MODIFICATION; AS IN THIS CASE NO 'TRANSFERENCE' IS POSSIBLE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* there is the following text—'*Prokṣaṇīrāsādaya—Idhmam varhirupasādaya—Sruchaḥ samṛddhi—Patnīm sannahya—Ājyēnodēhi*' ['Get together the *Prokṣaṇī* water—Bring up the burning fuel—Clear up the *Sruks*—Dress up the wife—Come up with Clarified Butter'].—The sentence '*Patnīm sannahya*' ('Dress up the wife') is what is going to be considered. As a matter of fact, the Sacrificer may have one or several wives; and the term '*patnī*' ('wife') has to be taken as used here in reference to all cases of the performance (by a sacrificer with one wife as also by a sacrificer with several wives),—as has been already decided in the *Pāshādhikaraṇa* (preceding *Adhikaraṇa*).—The question however that arises is—In a performance where the sacrificer has two or more wives, has the word '*patnīm*' to be modified, or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is that "inasmuch as *mantras* are meant to serve the purpose of speaking of things as they exist, the word should be modified (into the Dual or the Plural form)".

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*At a sacrifice which has no precedent*,—i.e. at a sacrifice which has no other sacrifice for its original Archetype,—the word should be used in its unmodified form.—Why?—The term '*patnī*' ending in the long 'ī' is denotative of the *wife* only; hence at a performance where there are two or more *wives*, when the term 'wife' is uttered, the Dual or the Plural Ending comes in by mere implication, for the purpose of connecting the persons with the 'dressing up'; on the strength of the actual words of the scriptural declaration however, the word is actually used with the Singular Ending. As a matter of fact, it is not *Duality* or *Plurality* that is meant to be spoken of; because the term 'wife' is used only as an indicative (of the sacrificer's associate).—Nor is there any 'transference' of the *mantra* from the Sacrifice with one wife to the sacrifice with two wives; the fact of the matter is that the *number* (singular) is used at the latter in the same manner it is used at the former.—Hence the term 'wife' should be used without any modification.

Even if *singularity* were meant to be emphasised (in the sentence 'Dress up the *wife*'),—the Singular number would be used at the performance with two wives, as referring to *each* of the two wives, by reason of there being no understanding between them (as to which *one* should be 'dressed up');—and the same explanation would be applicable to the performance with *several* wives also. Hence we conclude that the word should be used without modification.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *At the performance of the Modificatory Sacrifice, with two wives, there should be no modification in the Mantra 'Patnīm sannahya'.*

SŪTRA (21).

SO ALSO AT THE MODIFICATORY SACRIFICE, BECAUSE OF THE DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

Now we proceed to consider the case of the term 'wife' as used at the Modificatory Sacrifice.—The question is—Should the term be modified at the performance with two wives—or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"When the term 'wife' is expressive of *two* or *several* wives, it must take the Dual or the Plural Ending; at the Primary Sacrifice however, these endings are precluded by the injunction of the *Mantra* (where we have the Singular Ending); in connection with the Modificatory Sacrifice however, there is no such injunction [and the *mantra* comes in only in view of the General Law]; and hence the term can take the Dual or the Plural Ending."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*At the Modificatory Sacrifice also*—the word should be used in its unmodified form.—"Why?—*Because of the declaration to that effect*;—i.e. the declaration that 'what is done at the Primary Sacrifice should be done at the Modificatory Sacrifice'. So that, if at the Primary Sacrifice, the *Singularity* (of the wife) is not meant to be emphasised, then at the Modificatory Sacrifice also, the *Singularity* or *Duality* or *Plurality* may be not meant to be emphasised; hence there should be no modification of the word.—Or, even if the *singularity* be taken as meant to be emphasised at the Primary Sacrifice,—the same would not be incompatible at a performance with several wives also. So that thus also the conclusion is that there should be no modification of the word.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The performance of the 'Savanīya-Animal-sacrifices' being similar to that of the 'Agnīṣomīya-Animal-sacrifice', there should be no modification of the Mantra 'Prāsmai agnim, etc.'*

SŪTRA (22).

IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'SAVANĪYA' ANIMALS THE 'ADHRIGU-MANTRA' SHOULD BE TREATED LIKE THE FOREGOING,—WHEN THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED AT THEM IS SIMILAR (TO THAT OF THE PRIMARY).

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Soma-sacrifice*, there is the *Agnīṣomīya-Animal-sacrifice*, spoken of in the text—'On being initiated, one sacrifices the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*';—at this a *mantra* is addressed to the *Adhrigu* (the man who kills the animal), which is called the '*Adhrigu-mantra*'; this *mantra* contains the words '*Prāsmā agnim bharatastṛṇīta barhiḥ, etc. etc.*'

In some cases the procedure adopted at the '*Savanīya-Animal-sacrifices*' is similar to that adopted at the '*Agnīṣomīya-Animal-sacrifices*'; in regard to such cases, the following question is to be considered—In the *Adhrigu-mantra*, are the words '*Prāsmai*, etc.' to be modified, or not ?

In answer to this question a 'transference' is suggested—*The Adhrigu-mantra should be treated like the foregoing*; that is, the view that was the *Pūrvapakṣa* in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* dealing with the term '*patnī*' should be the *Pūrvapakṣa* in the present *Adhikaraṇa*; and the view that was the *Siddhānta* there should be the *Siddhānta* here;—that is, the *Pūrvapkṣa* view is that the word should be modified; and the *Siddhānta* is that there should be no modification. [The singular form '*asmai*', which is compatible with the one animal of the *Agnīṣomīya*, should, according to the *Pūrvapakṣa* view, be modified into the plural form, in the case of the *Savanīya*, where there are several animals;—and according to the *Siddhānta*, there should be no modification.]

[According to the *Nyāyamalavistara*, there should be a modification of the number and gender of the pronoun '*asmai*', in accordance with the gender and number of the animals concerned.]

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *In a case where 'Nīvāra' is used as a substitute for 'Vrīhi', the term 'vrīhi' occurring in the Mantra should not be modified.*

SŪTRA (23).

IN THE CASE OF A SUBSTITUTE, THERE SHOULD BE NO MODIFICATION.

Bhāṣya.

In the event of the enjoined substance being spoilt, its substitute should be used (to complete the performance), as has been explained under *Sūtra* 6. 3. 15;—and this substitute should be similar to the original substance, as explained under *Sūtra* 6. 3. 27.—Thus it is that, when the (prescribed) *Vrīhi-grains* become spoilt, *Nīvāra-grains* are used as their substitute. Now, in connection with the *Vrīhi*, the following *mantra* has been laid down—'*Syonantē sadanam kṛṇomi . . . . . vrīhīṇām mēdha sumanasyamānaḥ*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—In the case mentioned, when *Nīvāra* is used as the substitute, should the term '*vrīhi*' occurring in the *Mantra* ('*vrīhīṇām mēdha, etc.*') be modified (into '*nīvāra*', '*nīvārāṇām mēdha, etc.*')?—Or should it be used without modification?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"If the term '*vrīhi*' were used in its unmodified form, it could not indicate the *Nīvāra* which is being used; hence for the purpose of indicating the *Nīvāra*, it becomes necessary to use the term '*nīvāra*'. Hence it follows that a modification should be made."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*In the case of a substitute, there should be no modification*; the words '*pratinidhau cha*' is to be construed along with the words '*ūho na kartavyaḥ*' ('no modification should be made').—"What would be the result of this?"—The result would be that there would be no modification and the scriptural text would be preserved.—From this we conclude that there should be no modification.

SŪTRA (24).

[*Objection*]—"THERE COULD BE NON-MODIFICATION ONLY IF THERE WERE NO MENTION (OF 'VRĪHI'), AND IF THE OTHER SUBSTANCE WERE NOT THERE."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not right that there should be no modification. There could be non-modification (of the *mantra*) only (*a*) if the term '*vrīhi*' were not

contained in the *mantra*, and (*b*) *if the other substance were not there*; i.e. if the substance used were not *Nīvāra*.—As a matter of fact, however, both these conditions are absent. Hence for the purpose of securing the indication of the thing actually used, the term '*nīvāra*' should be used in modification (of the term '*vrīhi*')."

SŪTRA (25).

[*Answer*]—IN REALITY, BY REASON OF THE NĪVĀRA SERVING THE SAME PURPOSE AS THE VRĪHI, IT MAY BE SPOKEN OF BY THE SAME NAME; SPECIALLY AS THE EMBELLISHMENTS ARE EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO BOTH.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') sets aside the above view.

It is not right that there should be modification; in fact, the *mantra* should be used without any modification.—"Why?"—*By reason of the Nīvāra serving the same purpose as the Vrīhi*; as a matter of fact, the *Nīvāra*-grains are used for the same purpose as the *Vrīhi-grains*. Further, the *Besprinkling* and other Embellishments that are done to the *Vrīhi-grains* are done to these as marked by certain characteristics;—some of these characteristics are present in the *Nīvāra-grains* also; so that it is in connection with these characteristics that the Besprinkling and other Embellishments are performed (to the *Nīvāra*). And just as the term '*vrīhi*', apart from the embellishments, is applicable to the grains as qualified by *vrīhi*, so is it applicable also to the *Nīvāra-grains* in question.—From this it follows that the *Mantra* should be used without modification.

SŪTRA (26).

FURTHER, THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED.

Bhāṣya.

Question—"How do you know that the characteristics of the *Vrīhi* are present in the *Nīvāra*?"

Answer—*The truth of the matter has been already explained*; i.e. in *Adhyāya* VI, under Sū. 6. 3. 27, it has been explained how the character of *Vrīhi* is present in *Nīvāra*.—From this also it follows that there should be no modification.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *At the Sacrifice where there are two animals, there should be no modification in the Mantras 'Sūryañchakṣurgamayatāt, etc. etc.'*

SŪTRA (27).

IN THE CASE OF RELATED THINGS, INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO FIXED LIMIT [THERE SHOULD BE NO MODIFICATION].

Bhāṣya.

In connection with *Adhrigu-Mantra*, there are certain 'related things', such as the 'Eye', the 'Life-breath' and so forth,—spoken of in the sentence—'*Sūryañchakṣurgamayatāt—vātam prāṇamanvavasṛjatāt*' ['May the *Eye* go to *the Sun*; may the Life-breath become absorbed in the Air'].

The question is, should these words be modified in the case of sacrifices with two or more animals,—or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* starts with a preliminary objection:—"The very fact that the words as they stand are incompatible (even at the *one-animal* sacrifice),—inasmuch as the *two Eyes* of the one animal are spoken of by means of a word in the singular form ('Eye')—shows that there should be no modification at sacrifices with two or more animals. [So that there can be no cause for raising the question that has been raised]".

"The answer to this preliminary objection (says the *Pūrvapakṣin*) is as follows—The 'going to the Sun' which is spoken of in the *Adhrigu-Mantra* is not that of the two physical Eye-balls; because as a matter of fact the two Eye-balls never go to the Sun; it is the *Light* (of the Eyes) that is spoken of as so *going to the Sun*; and this *Light* is only one; hence the *mantra* is not, in its very nature, 'incompatible'. On the other hand, in the case of the performance of the Modificatory Sacrifices with two or more animals—which have been enjoined in such texts as '*Maitram svētamālabhēta, vāruṇam kṛṣṇam, apāñchauṣadhīnām sandhāvannakāmaḥ*'—as these are different animals, it means that the Light (which constitutes the visual organ, *Eye*) also is diverse,—from which it would seem that there should be modification in this latter case (of the singular form into the Plural).—'In the case of the single animal also, as there are two distinct Eye-balls, the Light of the two Eyes is distinct.'—Not so, we reply; what is meant by the sentence 'May the Eye go to the Sun' is the animal's *Light* (which constitutes its Visual Organ as a whole), and not the distinct *Eye-balls*; while in the case of several animals, there is a diversity of this *Light* (constituting the visual organ of the several animals): and hence there should be modification in this latter case."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*In the case of related things, inasmuch as there is no fixed limit* [*there should be no modification*];—that is, in the case of related things, even though there is

diversity of animals, yet the *Light* constituting this visual organ is only a conglomeration (or aggregate or mass) of all their light-rays; just as in the case of water or oil or clarified butter, there are endless diverse drops in diverse places, yet when they come together in one place, they form a single mass; even the same manner, the Light-rays also (though diverse in the visual organs of the different animals, come to form a single mass when they come together); so that the singular form (of the term 'eye') being quite expressive of (and applicable to) this *mass*, there should be no modification.

SŪTRA (28).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND AN INDICATIVE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

There is an indicative text also, in support of the view that there is no modification in the case of 'related things'—'*Na māta vardhatē, na majjā, na nābhiḥ, prāṇohi saḥ*' ['There is no augmentation of the Mother, the Marrow, and the Navel, as all this is the Life-breath']; here the *non-modification of the Life-breath* is taken as a well-established fact and cited as a reason (for the non-augmentation of the Mother, etc.).—From this it follows that there is no modification in the case of 'related things'.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *At the Sacrifice with two animals, in the 'Adhrigu-Mantra' the term 'ēkadhā' should be repeated.*

SŪTRA (29).

THE TERM 'ĒKADHĀ' SHOULD BE PRONOUNCED REPEATEDLY; BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF 'ONE' ('ĒKA').

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, there is the *Agnīṣomīya-Animal-sacrifice*, spoken of in the text 'Being initiated, one sacrifices the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*'; at this latter the *Adhrigu-Mantra* is recited, wherein we read—'*Ēkadhā 'sya tvachamāchchhyātāt*' ['Cut out its skin once'].

When this *mantra* comes to be used at the Modificatory Sacrifice with *two* animals, there arises the question—Should it be repeated? Or should it be used as it stands, without any modification?

The only answer possible is that the term '*ēkadhā*' ('in one way') should be repeated.—"Why?"—*Because of the presence of* '*ēka*' ('*one*'). What the words in question mean is that 'when one is cutting out the skin, he should adopt *one* style'; when, therefore, the skin of two or more animals is being cut out, it is not possible to adopt absolutely the same style in connection with all; the skin is cut out of the animals by turns, hence in cutting out the skin of one they would adopt one style; and hence if the words were used as they stand, they could not apply to all the animals. Hence it follows that it should be repeated [and to that extent the *Mantra* should be modified].

SŪTRA (30).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA VIEW]—"IN FACT, THERE SHOULD BE NO MODIFICATION; JUST AS IN THE CASE OF ONE OPERATION PERFORMED OVER SEVERAL THINGS."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in fact') indicates the setting up of a different view.

"It is not right that the word should be repeated; in fact, it should be used as it stands, without any modification.—Why?—Because what the word means is 'unification'; the meaning of the sentence being 'make the skins of these animals into one'—The question is—what does this 'making one' mean? Does it mean that the skins of all should be cut out *at one and the same time*? Or *at one and the same place*?—The answer

to this is that—it is *just as in the case of one operation performed over several things*; i.e. just as several animals perform their actions at one and the same time; for instance, when one makes several cows drink water at one and the same time;—in the same manner in the case in question what is meant to be said is to 'bring about unification of the skin'; and there can be *unification* only when there are several skins concerned, not when there is a single skin. Hence it follows that when there are several skins, what the term '*Ēkadhā*' means is 'unification' [and hence being quite applicable, it need not be modified]."

SŪTRA (31).

[*Pūrvapakṣa answered*]—IN REALITY, WHAT 'ĒKADHA' SIGNIFIES IS 'ONCE'; AS THERE IS ONLY ONE SKIN (AT THE PRIMARY SACRIFICE), THE IDEA OF 'AT ONE TIME' COULD NOT BE MEANT; INASMUCH AS THE MODIFICATORY SACRIFICES HAVE THE SAID SACRIFICE FOR THEIR ORIGINAL, THE TERM COULD APPLY ONLY IF IT WERE AUGMENTED BY REPETITION.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') sets aside the view set forth above.

It is not right that there should be no modification; in fact, the word ('*Ēkadhā*') has to be repeated.—If the term stands for an act done *at one time*, then the words come to express the *combination of skins*; and this could not be really meant in connection with the Primary Sacrifice, at which there is only one skin [and hence a 'combination of skins' would be impossible].—Hence, inasmuch as the subsequent Modificatory Sacrifices with several animals have the said Primary Sacrifice for their original,—there being an increase in the number of animals, what is meant should be asserted by means of repetition.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *At the 'Two-animal-sacrifice' and other Modificatory Animal-sacrifices, the term 'Mēdhapati' should be modified according to the names of deities.*

SŪTRA (32).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"BECAUSE THE CHARACTER OF 'MĒDHAPATI' (MASTER OF SACRIFICE) SUBSISTS IN THE MASTER AND THE DEITIES,—BECAUSE IT IS SO USED EVERYWHERE, —AND BECAUSE (FOR THESE REASONS) THE MANTRA IS INCOMPATIBLE (AT THE PRIMARY SACRIFICE ALSO),—THERE SHOULD BE NO MODIFICATION IN ANY CASE."

Bhāṣya.

At the *Agnīṣomīya-animal-sacrifice* performed in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the *Adhrigu-mantra* is addressed to the 'Killers' ['*Daivyāḥ shamitāra uta cha manuṣyāḥ ārabhadhvam upanayata mēdhyāduraḥ āshāsānā mēdhapatibhyām mēdhaḥ*', which means—'O Killers, divine as well as human, start the work, bring up the weapons necessary for the sacrifice, hoping thereby to accomplish the sacrifice of the two Mēdhapatis']. In the text of this *mantra*, some rescensional texts read the word '*mēdhapatayē*' in the singular form, while others read it as '*mēdhapatibhyām*' in the Dual form. [The explanation of the *mantra* is according to *Mādhāva*; according to what the *Bhāṣya* says under Sū. 34 below, the meaning appears to be 'Bring up the *chest* out of the body of the sacrificial animal.']

In regard to this, there arises the question—In the case of those animal-sacrifices where two or more animals are sacrificed,—(*a*) should the word, in one form or the other, be used as it stands, without any modification? or (*b*) Should it be modified in accordance with the number of the Master of the sacrifice? or (*c*) in accordance with the number of Deities concerned?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"*As a matter of fact, the character of 'mēdhapati' belongs to the Master as well as the Deity*; because the animal has been offered—i.e. dedicated—to the two deities [so it belongs to the Deities]; and it belongs also to the Master, who also is '*mēdhapati*',—in the sense that it is going to accomplish his purpose;—and it is also going to be given away (offered) to the two deities;—so that the 'mastery' over the *Mēdha* (the animal) subsists in all these three (the Master of the sacrifice and the two deities, *Agni* and *Soma*).—The word '*pati*' also is used in the sense of 'mastery' everywhere, from the Himalaya down to Cape Comorin.—Thus at the Primary Sacrifice, the singular

form ('*mēdhapatayē*') as well as the Dual form ('*mēdhapatibhyām*') are used in the sense of these three (and to this extent it is 'incompatible'); hence, just as at the Primary Sacrifice, the word is not taken as denoting either *singularity* or *duality*, but is taken as merely denoting the relationship (between '*mēdha*' and '*pati*'),—similarly the same forms should be used at all the modificatory sacrifices (irrespectively of the number of Deities). Hence there should be no modification of the word."

SŪTRA (33).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"OR, THE DUAL FORM MAY BE TAKEN AS APPLYING ONLY IN CASES WHERE AN ENTITY OTHER THAN THE MASTER IS MEANT TO BE INCLUDED; HENCE THE WORD SHOULD BE USED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUMBER (OF ENTITIES AND MASTERS CONCERNED)."

Bhāṣya.

"*Or*, it is not as has been asserted above,—that the Singular form as well as the Dual form is used at the Primary Sacrifice; what really happens is that for persons whose Vedic text reads the word in the Singular form, it would apply to the Master alone, and for those whose Vedic text reads it in the Dual form, it would apply to the two deities. Consequently, at the Modificatory Sacrifices, where there are several deities, the Dual form shall be used in its modified form (i.e. in the Plural form), and in connection with the Masters, the Singular form would be used in its modified form; in this way the word would be used in accordance with the number of deities and masters; [so that, where there are several Deities and several Masters, we should have the plural forms, '*mēdhapatibhyaḥ—mēdhapatibhyaḥ*', the former referring to the Deities and the latter to the *Sacrificers*]."

SŪTRA (34).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—"OR, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS STANDING FOR THE MASTER ONLY; AS THERE IS A SINGLE TERM AND IF IT STOOD FOR THE DEITY, THERE WOULD BE WITHDRAWAL;—AS FOR THE DUAL FORM, THAT WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO THE WIFE (OF THE MASTER ALONG WITH THE MASTER HIMSELF).

Bhāṣya.

The term 'or' sets aside the view set forth above.

"It is not right that the word '*mēdhapati*' should be taken as standing for both the *Master* and the *Deity*; because the word '*mēdhapati*' is a single term; and simply because it is found in its dual form, and also in the singular form, it cannot become denotative of the Master as well as the Deities.—

Question—'It is true that there is one word *mēdhapati*, but another also is understood; how then is it said that it cannot denote both the Master and the Deity?'—*Answer*—When the word stands for the Master, then the words are to be construed as '*mēdhapatayē yo mēdhaḥ tam mēdhyā-duraḥ upanayata*'. ['Bring up the chest out of the animal belonging to the *Mēdhapati*, i.e. the Master']; while when it stands for the deity, the construction would have to be—'*mēdhapatayē upanayata mēdhyāduraḥ*' ['Bring up the chest of the sacrificial animal for the sake of the *Mēdhapati*, i.e. the Deity];—the word, being uttered once only, cannot be connected with the two different words (in the two different constructions shown above); in fact, such a dual construction would involve a syntactical split. From all this we conclude that the term '*mēdhapati*' stands for the Master only.—*Question*—'Why cannot it be assumed to stand for the Deity?'—*Answer*—If it were so assumed, then the *mantra* with the singular form would have to be transferred to the sacrifice at which there is a single deity; and this would go against the Context. On the other hand, if the word '*mēdhapati*' is taken as standing for the Master, there would be no transferring of the *mantra* with the Dual form; as at that same sacrifice (where there is a single Master), it would apply to the Master and his wife. Thus for the sake of preserving the Context, the word should be taken as standing for the Master; and hence it should be modified in accordance with the number of the Master."

SŪTRA (35).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE WORD SHOULD BE TAKEN AS STANDING FOR THE DEITY; AS IT IS FOR THE DEITY THAT THE THING IS SOUGHT FOR; AS THE SUBSTANCE ALREADY BELONGS TO THE MASTER, ANY SEEKING FOR IT ON HIS BEHALF WOULD BE MEANINGLESS.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('in reality') sets aside the view set forth above.

The term '*mēdhapati*' does not denote the Master: it must be taken as standing for the Deity.—"Why?"—Because *it is for the Deity that the thing is sought for*; when the words—'*āshāsanā mēdhapatayē mēdham*'—are pronounced, it means that the offering-material is sought for for the sake of the two deities, the meaning being—'seeking for the *mēdha* for the two *Mēdhapatis*, please bring it up for them'. Any such request with reference to the Master would be meaningless and should not be done; because the *Mēdha* already belongs to the Master; why then should it be sought for for him? Nor can there be any use in establishing a perpetual connection between the Master and the *Mēdha*; because, if the offering-material remained with the Master for all time, there would be no *sacrifice* at all.—From all this it follows that the term '*Mēdhapati*' denotes the deities.

SŪTRA (36).

BY REASON OF ITS HAVING BEEN GIVEN AWAY, THE MASTER'S OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBSTANCE COULD ONLY BE FIGURATIVE (SECONDARY).

Bhāṣya.

The substance having been given away, with the formula 'this is no longer mine', if one keeps it any longer, he keeps it only as belonging to some one else, with the view that it would become connected with the Deity.—"What is the connection between the substance and the Deity?" —It is this that it is in favour of the deity that the ownership over it has been surrendered; and this surrendering has been done before the sacrifice (is completed). Thus then on account of the sacrifice having been performed, the substance remains with the Master as something belonging to another person, and not as his own, after he has given it away. That alone is one's 'own' in regard to which one's own self is the predominant factor, and not that in regard to which one occupies only a subordinate position: in regard to such a thing as this latter, one's ownership ('mastership') is only figurative (secondary). So that in the case in question direct ownership —over the '*mēdha*',—hence the character of '*mēdhapati*',—belongs to the two deities; the ownership of the Master being only figurative (and indirect).

SŪTRA (37).

[*Objection*]—"THE MANTRA WITH THE SINGULAR FORM WOULD, IN THAT CASE, HAVE TO BE EXCLUDED (TRANSFERRED); AS IT WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE TWO DEITIES."

Bhāṣya.

This argument has been urged above (under *Pūrvapakṣa* (C), in *Sūtra* 34); and it has got to be refuted. [This is done in the following *Sūtra*].

SŪTRA (38).

BUT THE SINGULAR FORM IS APPLICABLE; BECAUSE IT CHARACTERISES IT.

Bhāṣya.

The answer to the said argument is as follows:—The term '*mēdhapati*' stands for the *group* consisting of the two deities *Agni* and *Soma*; and as such the singular form is quite applicable to the Deities thus grouped; the meaning of the words of the *mantra* used at the performance being— 'Bring up the *Mēdha* for this *one group*'. Thus the singular form of the term '*mēdhapati*', standing as it does for the *Group*, need not be transferred.

SŪTRA (39).

BECAUSE 'DEITY' IS A RELATIVE TERM, THEREFORE IT SHOULD FORM AN OPTION ALONG WITH THAT.

Bhāṣya.

This is another answer to the said objection—The entity known as 'deity' is something relative; that is, when one is said to be a 'deity', it means that two entities (an offering and a recipient of the offering) are related;—in some cases there is a single entity; but in cases where a substance has been offered to two entities, both of these become the 'deity',—the two entities having become one; and thus the singular form also fits in into the Context, and may be treated as an optional alternative to the previous (dual) form.

SŪTRA (40).

EVEN IF THERE IS A SINGLE DEITY, THE QUALITY DOES NOT CEASE.

Bhāṣya.

This is a bold assertion [*Vide* end of *Bhāṣya* or Sū. 43]. We grant that there is *Singularity* in the case of two deities; even so, the singular form would fit in with the Context. What is signified by the basic noun ('*mēdhapati*') is actually present in the case; as for the singular number, that is meant only for connecting it with the 'bringing up'; or we may even regard the *singularity* as not meant to be significant. For these reasons the singular form need not be transferred from the Context.

It might be argued that—"What the case-ending in '*mēdhapatayē*' signifies is the connection of that which is qualified by *singleness*".—But even so, our view would be all the more reasonable; because everything in the world is connected with *singleness*—"But what we mean is that the ending brings about the connection and also denotes *singleness*".—Even this makes no difference; for, inasmuch as no significance attaches to this *singleness*, the word would not be incompatible with the Context.—"But even when no significance attaches to the singleness, the singular case-ending is used only in reference to what is connected with *singleness*, not to anything else".—In that case the singleness that subsists in the term '*mēdhapati*' might be taken as actually belonging to it and, as such, referred to by the word in question.—So that this also does not affect our position.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *At the Animal-sacrifice where there are several deities, the Singular form 'mēdhapatayē' should be treated as an optional alternative.*

SŪTRA (41).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AT THE SACRIFICE TO SEVERAL DEITIES, THERE MUST BE MODIFICATION."

Bhāṣya.

There is an animal-sacrifice at which there are several deities, spoken of in the following text—'*Sa ētān pashūnādityēbhyaḥ kāmāya ālabhatē*' ['One should sacrifice these animals *to the Ādityas*, for the fulfilment of his desire']; again, '*Vaishvadēvam dhūmramālabhēta*' ['One should sacrifice the dusky animal *to the Vishvēdēvas*'].—The Primary Original of these sacrifices is the *Agnīṣomīya-animal-sacrifice*; at this latter, in the *Adhrigu-Mantra*, the term '*mēdhapati*' occurs in the singular and the plural forms; and under the General Law, this term is taken as to be used at the aforesaid modificatory sacrifices to the several deities.

In regard to this, there arises the following question—Should the Dual form of the word be modified, and the Singular form omitted?—Or should both of these be used as optional alternatives?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"Inasmuch as the Dual form expresses what forms part of the sacrifice, it should be used, but in the modified form; as for the singular form, it is incapable of expressing any such thing, and for that reason it has to be omitted;—such is the rule.—*Objection*—'Under this principle the Dual form would come to be used in its unmodified form, at the Primary Sacrifice; because the *duality* is not meant to be signified there'.—*Answer*—In this case the *Duality* does not specify anything; but that does not mean that it does not express what is contained in the sacrifice;—and what is expressed cannot be useless; so that the visible purpose that it serves is that it brings up the thing numbered (i.e. the animal) for the purpose of connecting it with another number; thus it is that there is modification into the Plural form."

SŪTRA (42).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE OPTION,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE ORIGINAL PRIMARY.

Bhāṣya.

It has been said that the Dual form should be modified;—this we accept; but we do not accept the view that the Singular form should be omitted; as a matter of fact, as at the Primary original sacrifice, so here

also, the Singular form can be treated as an Optional Alternative to the Dual form.—It has been already explained that at the Primary Sacrifice, the singular form is used on the understanding that the deities (*Agni* and *Soma*), form *one group*,—or on the ground that deities are 'relative' entities; similarly in the case in question also, the singular form may come in as an Optional Alternative, either on the understanding that the *several* deities form *one group*, or on the ground that deities are 'relative' entities.

Aḍhikaraṇa (14): *At the 'Ēkādashinī' Sacrifice, the singular form of the term 'mēdhapati' should be modified.*

SŪTRA (43).

In another case, there should be modification, because the Deities are distinct and self-contained.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Ēkādashinī* (where eleven animals are sacrificed to several deities)—spoken of in the following text—'*Praiṣāgnēyēna vāpayati, mithunam sārasvatyā karoti, rētaḥ saumyēna dadhāti, prajanayati pauṣṇēna, etc. etc.*'—At the Primary Original of this sacrifice (i.e. the *Agnīṣomīya*), there is the *Adhrigu-mantra*, wherein the term '*mēdhapati*' occurs in the Singular and the Dual forms:—under the General Law, this same *mantra* comes to be used at the *Ēkādashinī*.

In regard to this the following question is to be considered—Must the Dual form be modified, and as for the Singular form, should it be used in its unmodified form? Or should it be omitted?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"There should be option as at the Primary Original sacrifice" (as declared under Sū. 42, above)."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—At the *Ēkādashinī*, there should be *modification*, not *option*; hence the singular form should be omitted.—"Why?"—*Because the deities are distinct*; i.e. in this case the deities are distinct,—one deity appertaining to one animal, and another to another animal; so that in this case the deities cannot be treated as one 'group';—and such being the case, they cannot be treated as 'relative entities' either. At the Primary Sacrifice, both these conditions are present (*Agni* and *Soma* conjointly forming the deity of a *single* animal); whereby the singular form finds room. In the case in question, both these conditions are absent, hence there can be no room for the Singular form.

As for the assertion that—'Even if there is a single deity, the quality does not cease' (*Sūtra* 40),—this is only a bold assertion made after accepting (for the sake of argument) the view of the Opponent, and it is not the view of the *Siddhāntin* himself; hence that does not affect our position.

End of Pāda iii of Adhyāya IX.

ADHYĀYA IX.

PĀDA IV.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): In such *mantras* as '*Ṣaḍvimshatirasya vañkrayaḥ*', *the modification should be done by summation.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)—*continued*]—" AT THE ANIMAL-SACRIFICES, THE TERM 'ṢAḌVIṀSHATIḤ' SHOULD BE REPEATED; (*a*) BECAUSE THEY HAVE THE 'AGNĪSOMĪYA-ANIMAL-SACRIFICE' FOR THEIR ORIGINAL ;—(*b*) AND BECAUSE THE QUALIFICATION HAS BEEN SEPARATED. IF THERE WERE NO MODIFICATION, THE CONNECTION OF THE RIBS WOULD BE ONLY PARTIAL. THE MODIFICATION COULD NOT BE IN THE FORM OF SUMMATION, BECAUSE THERE IS NO CONNECTION WITH ALL (THE RIBS)."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the *Agniṣomīya*-animal-sacrifice is performed—as mentioned in the text—'On being initiated, one sacrifices the animal dedicated to *Agnī-Soma*' ;—in course of the *Adhrigu-Mantra* recited at it, there occur the following words—'*Ṣaḍvimshatirasya vañkrayaḥ*' ['He has twenty-six ribs'].—By virtue of the General Law, these words come to be used at those animal-sacrifices also where two or more animals are sacrificed.

Such sacrifices being those laid down in such texts as—'*Maitram shvētamālabhatē, vāruṇam kṛṣṇamapāñchauṣadhīnāñcha sandhāvannakāmaḥ*' ;—in regard to such sacrifices, there arises the following question—Should the term '*Ṣaḍvimshati*' ('twenty-six') be repeated (as many times as there may be the number of the animals)? Or should it be used as it stands, without any modification—Or should there be modification of the case-ending denoting number? Should the word be repeated?—or the words used should be determined by summation?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows :—"The term '*Ṣaḍvimsha*' ('twenty-six') should be repeated in the case of those animal-

sacrifices where there are two or more animals. In connection with the Primary sacrifice, the ribs of *one* animal have been spoken of as 'twenty-six';—in the case in question, *that qualification has been separated*; i.e. each of the several animals has got *twenty-six* ribs; under the circumstances, if the term 'twenty-six' were used in its unmodified form, all the ribs present would not be spoken of. If, on the other hand, all the ribs present were summed up, and the corresponding numeral used (i.e. the term 'fifty-two' in the case of *two* animals), then, the original term (of the Mantra) would become omitted; and this would militate against the scriptural text. —Further, all the ribs present are not connected with the 'sacrificial animal'; as they are connected with the 'animal-pair', and no 'animal-pair' is the 'sacrificial animal'.—*Objection*—'As a matter of fact, what has got to be connected with the *ribs* is that which is employed in place of the *sacrificial animal*, for the purpose for which this latter is employed;—the expression used (in the original Mantra) in this connection has been in accordance with this;—at the *two-animal*-sacrifice if the expression used were such as connected the *two animals* with *all the ribs*, then alone the connection would be established between each single animal and *twenty-six ribs*'.—The answer to this is as follows:—It is not so; at the Primary sacrifice the connection of the 'twenty-six' with the animal is *direct*; while in the case in question, if a connection were made with any other number, such connection would be only with an imperceptible number of limbs, and hence it would be only *inferential* (indirect); nor would the connection denoted necessarily be between 'twenty-six' and each of the animals; it might be understood that (of the 'fifty-two ribs'), *twenty-five* belong to one animal and *twenty-seven* to the other. As a matter of fact, however, no such idea has been expressed in connection with the Primary sacrifice.—From all this it follows that the term should be repeated."

SŪTRA (2).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)—*continued*]—"IF IT IS URGED THAT IN THE CASE OF REPETITION ALSO, THERE WOULD BE THE SAME CONTINGENCY—
[then the answer would be as in the following
Sūtra].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent to the Pūrvapakṣin—'If you think that the using of a term expressive of the total number of ribs (of the several animals concerned) would involve the introducing of a word not used at the Primary sacrifice,—then the same contingency would arise in the case of repetition also; as the term has not been repeated at the Primary sacrifice, its repetition at the sacrifice in question would mean the introducing of the *repeated term* which has not been used at the Primary sacrifice'.

SŪTRA (3).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)—*continued*—answer to objection]—" NOT SO; BECAUSE IT IS A SECONDARY FACTOR AND BECAUSE IT IS FOR A DEFINITE PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya.

" What has been urged does not affect our position. *Repetition* is only a secondary factor (a mere qualification) of the word; so that in our view, it would be this secondary factor which would be the one not used at the Primary sacrifice; while in your view it is the word itself that would be so. And it is declared (under Sū. 12. 2. 25) that—' when there is an incompatibility between the qualification of the Primary and that of the subsidiary, it is the latter that should be rejected '.—Further, it is for a definite purpose that we introduce a term not used at the Primary sacrifice,—for the purpose of securing the signification of the separate qualifications; and if something not declared (in the text) is done for a purpose that has been so declared, we welcome such a process. Hence what has been urged does not affect our position."

SŪTRA (4).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)—*continued*—Second objection to the Pūrvapakṣa]—" IF IT BE ARGUED THAT ' THE SAME MIGHT BE SAID IN CONNECTION WITH ' SUMMATION.' ALSO [then the answer is as below]."

Bhāṣya.

Says the Pūrvapakṣin's Opponent—' If your view is that by repeating the term, the General Law becomes honoured and yet all the ribs concerned become spoken of (without violating the original text),—then the same might be said in support of the view that we should use a term expressive of all the ribs *collectively*;—in this also the General Law would be honoured, as all the ribs would be spoken of. Further, in thus speaking of all the ribs collectively, they all become spoken of simultaneously and this is in keeping with the declaration of the entire procedure. Hence all the ribs should be summed up (and spoken of collectively.)'

SŪTRA (5).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)—*continued*—Pūrvapakṣin's answer to above objection]—" NOT SO; AS IT IS NOT POSSIBLE."

Bhāṣya.

" It is not so; in our case the General Law becomes honoured because we use only the term ' twenty-six ' (which is in the original *Mantra*); while

in your case what is honoured by the collective expression is the declaration of procedure. As a matter of fact, so long as the General Law can be followed, no heed should be paid to the declaration of procedure. For the General Law is more authoritative, as it serves to *originate* as well as *imply* the requisite details; while all that the declaration of procedure does is to bring together what has been already enjoined and implied; and this latter is weaker by reason of its later functioning. Hence the term should be repeated."

SŪTRA (6).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)—*concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE AT THE PRIMARY SACRIFICE THE ANIMAL IS SPOKEN OF AS ALONG WITH ITS OWN RIBS; AND IT SHOULD BE THE SAME IN THE CASE IN QUESTION ALSO."

Bhāṣya.

"At the Primary Sacrifice, the animal has been spoken of as along with its own (twenty-six) ribs; and in the case in question, the same should be done;—this is possible only if there is repetition;—in the case of a collective expression, the total number spoken of would appertain to a number of ribs present in other animals; so that none of the several animals (individually) would be spoken of as along with its *own* ribs. Hence what has been argued is not right."

SŪTRA (7).

[*Refutation of Pūrvapakṣa* (A)]—BUT, INASMUCH AS THE RIBS ARE THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR, THEY SHOULD BE SPOKEN OF COLLECTIVELY; THAT THEY ARE THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR FOLLOWS FROM THE FACT THAT THE ADHRIGU SUBSERVES THE PURPOSES OF THE RIBS.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('but') sets aside the view set forth above.

It is not right that the term '*Ṣaḍviṁshatiḥ*' ('twenty-six') should be repeated; in fact all the Ribs should be spoken of collectively, after *summation.*—Why?—*Because the Ribs are the principal factor*; they are the principal factor, as the statement meant to be made in the *Mantra* as used at the Primary Sacrifice is that 'these Ribs are twenty-six'; which shows that the animal's *Ribs* have been counted as *twenty-six*,—and not that the animal is characterised by Ribs which have been so counted.—"Why so?"—The counting of the Ribs serves the visible purpose that the whole flank of the animal is taken out; while there is no such purpose served by defining the animal as characterised by the counted Ribs. Thus it is not the relationship of the animal that is meant to be expressed; and predominance attaches to the Ribs.—Further, inasmuch as the *Adhrigu* is

meant to subserve the purposes of the Ribs, there can be no point in connecting it either with the number (twenty-six) or with the animal.—For these reasons, the term should be used by *summation*.—Then again, what has been spoken of at the Primary Sacrifice is the precise number of Ribs present; and hence at the Modificatory Sacrifice also, the exact number of Ribs present should be spoken of. For this reason also the term should be used by *summation*.

SŪTRA (8).

ALSO BECAUSE THE ENTIRETY OF RIBS IS SPOKEN OF.

Bhāṣya.

What is spoken of in the *Mantra* is the *entirety* of the Ribs,—not the entirety of the *animals*. When, for instance, it is said—'*Tā anuṣṭhya uchchāvayatāt*' ['Having counted the Ribs one should take them out'],—what is meant is that '*all the twenty-six ribs* should be carefully taken out'.—If such were not the sense, then the meaning (of the expression '*Ṣaḍvimshatirvaṅkrayaḥ*') would be that 'There are twenty-six Ribs in the animal and *something should be carefully done to them*'. For, when a thing is indicated, it is so indicated only for the purpose of connecting it with something to be done;—hence what is indicated by the expression 'the animal has twenty-six Ribs' must be taken as indicated for some purpose. Thus it is that predominance attaches to the Ribs.

SŪTRA (9).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"IN FACT, THE STATEMENT MADE SHOULD BE EXACTLY IN THE WORDS FOUND IN THE TEXT, AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'PATNĪVAT' SACRIFICE; BECAUSE IT IS NOT QUITE PROXIMATE.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*api tu*' ('in fact') indicates the rejection of the view set forth in the foregoing *Sūtra*.

"It is not right that all the *Ribs* should be summed up and spoken of collectively; the term '*twenty-six*' should be used in its unmodified form. —'Why so?'—*Because it is not quite proximate*, i.e. the *Adhrigu-Mantra* is not proximate; it is not indicated as the instrument of anything; if it had been indicated as an instrument, then what is expressed by it should have been regarded as *to be done* by its means, and not by means of *meditation*; and in that case the end of the *Mantra* would be proximate to the performance. In that case the requisite simultaneity could not be secured by means of the word in its unmodified form, and hence it might be either modified or repeated.—When, on the other hand, the *Mantra* is not an instrument, then the reciting of the *Adhrigu-Mantra* at the time of the fetching of the animal becomes merely descriptive of (reference to) what is being done,—

and it comes to be recognised, under the General Law, as to be recited in connection with the several animals. But it is found that the word (twenty-six) in question is incompatible inasmuch as it is incapable of denoting the number of Ribs in all these animals. Hence it follows that it is not necessary to state the exact number of the Ribs of all these animals; all that should be done is to assert the connection of the number 'twenty-six'.—Just as in the case of the performance where the sacrificer has two or more wives, the term 'wife' in the Singular number does not characterise the wives with the number 'one'; all that it does is that it connects them with the number 'one';—in the same manner, in the case in question also.—From all this it follows that the word should be used in its unmodified form; and when the word is used as it stands, the scriptural text becomes preserved."

SŪTRA (10).

[*Refutation of Pūrvapakṣa* (B)]—IN FACT, THERE MUST BE MODIFICATION; BECAUSE THERE IS TRANSFERENCE; AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'SACRIFICER'.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the view just set forth.

It is not right that there should be no modification; in fact the word should be modified. In cases where a particular number is used (in the Mantra) emphatically and directly in reference to a particular number of things,—on the strength of the direct injunction bearing upon the matter, if the number expressed by the term used is found to be incompatible with the actual state of things, the use is made on the basis of the understanding that a transcendental result follows from the use of such an inconsistent expression; as for instance, in connection with the term 'wife' used (in the Singular number) at the Primary Sacrifice (even where the number of wives is more than one, *Vide* Sū. 9. 3. 21).—In the case in question (i.e. at the Modificatory Sacrifice), however, the word 'twenty-six' (ribs), is not used (in the *Mantra*) emphatically in reference to *several* animals; all that is done is that the use of the *Mantra* laid down in connection with the Primary Sacrifice comes to be recognised (under the General Law) as to be used at the Modificatory Sacrifice; under the circumstances, the General Law can indicate the use of only that which is compatible (with the Modificatory Sacrifice),—and not emphatically and directly the term 'twenty-six' only.—"What is it that is so *compatible*?"—That which was meant to be spoken of at the Primary Sacrifice; at the Primary Sacrifice what was meant to be spoken of was the exact number of Ribs present; so that at the Modificatory Sacrifice what is indicated as to be spoken of is the exact number of ribs present [and this, in the case of two or more animals, must be more than 'twenty-six'].

Says the Opponent—"It has been already explained (by us) that the *Adhrigu-Mantra* is not indicated as an instrument; and when it is not an

instrument, how can it be expressive of the exact number of ribs? All that it can be directly expressive of is merely the number *twenty-six* [not the twenty-six-*ribs*]."

Answer—Even though it is not indicated by the Instrumental case-ending, yet, being included in the declaration of Procedure, it becomes a *means of accomplishment*; and what visible purpose would it accomplish, apart from the indicating of the act of *offering*?

Says the Opponent—"The word has no connection with *offerings*; it is the Declaration of the Procedure of the Primary Sacrifice that connects it with the *Sacrifice*; and at the Primary Sacrifice the purpose found to be served by it was the ordinary perceptible one of describing the offering-material; and the term 'twenty-six' also would only serve the purpose of eulogising that same material."

Our answer to this is that that cannot be so. All that the Context connects the word with is the *Sacrifice* only, and it is understood that the *Mantra* embodies a direction to the *Priests* (in general), and it is only on the basis of the indication of the words of the *Mantra* that we come to regard it as a direction to the *Shamitṛ Priests* (i.e. those whose duty it is to kill the animal); to this same effect are the words of the *Mantra*:—'*Daivyāḥ shamitāra upahūtā manuṣyā ārabhadhvam*' ['O divine Killers, the men have been incited, now begin your work'], and then '*Ṣaḍviṁshatirasya vaṅkrayaḥ tā anuṣṭhya uchchāvayatāt*' ['Of this animal, there are 26 ribs, count them and then take them out'].—From this it is clear that what the word expresses is *each num... of ribs*, not merely the number 'twenty-six'.—
—Just as in the case when the word 'Sacrificer' is used in the sense of one-Sacrificer, we take it that the word is expressive of the exact number of that Sacrificer alone, and hence in a performance where there are *two* Sacrificers, the word is modified into that form which is expressive of the exact number of Sacrificers.—Exactly the same should be done in the case in question also.

SŪTRA (11).

AS REGARDS THE TERM 'WIFE,' IT IS ON ACCOUNT OF ITS BEING SOMETHING NEW (THAT THERE IS NO MODIFICATION).

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 9) that the present case should be dealt with like the case of the term 'wife'.—But it was quite right in the case of the term 'wife'; in that case the term 'wife' was not one that had been laid down as to be used in connection with a performance by *a sacrificer with one wife*; and hence it was taken to be indicated as to be used at performances by sacrificers *with two or more wives*; because the term is expressive of the number pertaining to the *one wife*, just as much as to *two* or *more* wives. Hence there is no analogy between the present case and the case of the term 'wife'.

SŪTRA (12).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—"BUT, AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE (BASIC) TERM SHOULD BE USED JUST AS IT STANDS IN THE MANTRA, WITHOUT ANY MODIFICATION;—BECAUSE NUMBERS TAKE IN ALL."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('but') introduces another view.

"There should be modification of the Number,—but not by 'summation'; the basic noun used should remain 'twenty-six' ('*Ṣaḍvimsha*') as in the Vedic text; by retaining the basic noun in its unmodified form we preserve the scriptural text;—for the purpose of expressing the *separate qualifications* (i.e. the *twenty-six ribs* as belonging to each of the two animals separately), we shall modify the ending denoting Number—using the words '*Ṣaḍvimshatī*' *ētayorvaṅkrayaḥ*' ['The ribs of these two animals are two *twenty-sixes*'].

"*Objection*—'If the form used is '*Ṣaḍvimshatī*' in the dual, then the noun 'ribs' (*vaṅkrayaḥ*') should not have the Nominative ending [the Genitive being the proper ending in that case].

"*Answer*—When the substance qualified by *twenty-six* is what is meant to be emphasised, then alone is this particular number uttered for the purpose of qualifying (and characterising) it; and in that case even the Nominative case-ending can serve to specify the number by indirect indication; as we find in the case of the expression '*Indrāgnī dēvatā*' ['The two deities *Indra and Agni*']; in this latter expression, when what is meant to be emphasised is that quality which is denoted by the root '*div*' (to *lord over*; from which the term '*dēvatā*' is derived),—then in that case, the term '*indrāgnī*' qualifies the term in the singular form ('*dēvatā*'). It is on this ground that we have such expressions as—'*Pañchapañchāshataḥ trvṛtaḥ samvatsarāḥ, pañchapañchāshataḥ pañchadashāḥ, pañchapañchāshataḥ saptadashāḥ; pañchapañchāshataḥ ēkavimshāḥ*'; where the term expressive of number is qualified by the word '*trvṛtaḥ*' (Singular) through indirect indication. Just as we have in the sentence '*Dēvadatta-yajñadatta-viṣṇumitrāḥ parṣat*' [where the singular word '*parṣat*' qualifies the plural noun '*dēvadattayajñadattaviṣṇumitrāḥ*'];—in the same manner, we would have the form '*Ṣaḍvimshatī vaṅkrayaḥ*' ['Two-twenty-six ribs'].—In this way we shall avoid modification and yet have the term '*Ṣaḍvimsha*' ('twenty-six') applicable to the 'Ribs'."

SŪTRA (13).

[*Refutation of Pūrvapakṣa* (C)]—BUT IN THAT CASE, THE NUMBER WOULD BE THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR; WHILE IN REALITY IT IS THE RIBS THAT CONSTITUTE THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

It is true that the expression '*Ṣaḍvimshatī vaṅkrayaḥ*' would be possible; but such an assertion would make the Number (twenty-six) the

predominant factor;—what would be meant to be emphasised in this case would be the quality 'twenty-six', and the 'Ribs' would be taken as spoken of only for defining that quality. As a matter of fact, however, it is the *Ribs* that occupy the predominant place at the Primary Sacrifice,—not the number (twenty-six); as has been made clear in *Sūtras* 7 and 8 above.—Thus then, the suggested form of the words, if adopted, would not be in keeping with that used at the Primary Sacrifice; and this would militate against the General Law itself.—Hence the right course should be to modify the term by *summation*.

SŪTRA (14).

FURTHER, THE SUGGESTED FORM ALSO WOULD NOT BE EXACTLY WHAT OCCURS IN THE VEDIC TEXT; AND YET (IF THE CHANGE WERE NOT MADE) ALL THE RIBS CONCERNED WOULD NOT BE SPOKEN OF.

Bhāṣya.

In the view just suggested (*Pūrvapakṣa C*) the whole expression would not be precisely as found in the Vedic text; as it would involve the use of the words '*Ṣaḍviṁshatī*' (in the case of *two* animals) and '*Ṣaḍviṁshatayaḥ*' (in the case of more than two animals).—If, on the other hand, the Dual or the Plural forms were not used, on the ground that they are not scriptural,—then all the *Ribs* would not be spoken of in their entirety.

SŪTRA (15).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (D)]—"IN FACT, THERE SHOULD BE REPETITION, WITHOUT ANY MODIFICATION."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in fact') sets aside the view set forth in the foregoing *Sūtras*.

"The term should not be used in its collective form, by summation; there should be repetition of the term; this would involve no modification; so that both the scriptural text and the General Law would be duly honoured, and what would be done would be in strict accordance with the scriptures;—only the word would have to be repeated; and by this all the ribs concerned would come to be spoken of in their entirety."

SŪTRA (16).

[FINAL SIDDHĀNTA]—VERILY IN THAT CASE THE ANIMAL WOULD BECOME THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR, AS THE REPETITION WOULD BE DUE TO THAT.—FROM ALL THIS WE CONCLUDE THAT THERE SHOULD BE SUMMATION.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('Verily') introduces the final conclusion.

The view just set forth is not right; the term should be used after summation.

Under the view set forth (as *Pūrvapakṣa D*), it would be the Animal that would come to be spoken of as the predominant factor;—the form proposed is '*Ṣaḍviṁshatiḥ Ṣaḍviṁshatiḥ vaṅkrayaḥ*';—as there is no animal which has *not* got 'twenty-six ribs', the use of the expression could only imply that what is meant to be emphasised is the number (*Two*) connected with the animals;—and yet at the Primary Sacrifice, it is not this connection of the Number with the *Animal* that is meant to be emphasised;—it has been already explained that what is meant to be emphasised at the Primary Sacrifice is the exact number of the Ribs;—and it is the same that is indicated by the General Law as to be done at the Modificatory Sacrifice in question.—For this reason it is clear that there should be no repetition of the term, which would be due only to Animals.—From all this it follows that the Ribs should be spoken of collectively after summation [i.e. the term used should be one expressing the total number of Ribs concerned; viz. 'fifty-two' in the case of two animals, 'seventy-eight' in the case of three and so forth].

ADHIKARAṆA (2):

[In the exact interpretation of *Sūtras* 17–21, there is a difference of opinion between the *Bhāṣya* and *Maṇḍana-kārikā* on the one hand and the *Vārtika* and its followers on the other. Says the *Shāstradīpikā*—'The *Bhāṣyakāra* has explained the five *Sūtras* beginning with Sū. 17 as one *Adhikaraṇa*, while the *Vārtikakāra* has asserted that Sū. 17 should be separated as a distinct Adhikaraṇa, serving the purpose of introducing the next Adhikaraṇa'.—The *Bhāṭṭadīpika* has a similar remark. —The editor of the *Bhāṣya* has followed the interpretation of the *Nyāyamālā*, and has thus upset the whole purport of the *Bhāṣya* itself. The translation adopts an interpretation of the Sūtras on the basis of the *Maṇḍana-kārikā*, and it is at variance with the Vārtika and all the later commentators. There is not much difference in the net result, as will be clear later on, below.]

At the Ashvamēdha, in connection with the 'Savanīya Horse', there should be option in regard to the form of the Mantra.

SŪTRA (17).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"OF THE HORSE, THERE ARE THIRTY-FOUR SPOKEN OF ON THE BASIS OF THIS DECLARATION, THIS PECULIAR FORM SHOULD THEREFORE BE ADOPTED."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Ashvamēdha* sacrifice; at this there is the '*Savanīya*' animal, in the shape of the Horse, as also the Hornless Goat and the Ox-deer.—In connection with the Primary *Agnīṣomīya Animal-sacrifice*, there is the Mantra-declaration '*Ṣaḍviṁshatirasya vaṅkrayaḥ*' ['This has 26 Ribs'];—under the General Law this *Mantra* comes to be regarded as to be used at the aforesaid *Savanīya* (Horse, etc.);—but the Horse has 34 Ribs, while the Hornless Goat and the Ox-deer have 26 each.—Then there is the *Ṛk* verse—'*Chatustriṁshad vājino dēvabandhoḥ . . . . . vishasta*' [where the Horse is spoken of as having 34 Ribs].

In regard to all this, there arises the question.—In what form is the Mantra to be used at the *Savanīya* of the *Ashvamēdha*?—Should the peculiar trait (of having 34 Ribs) be separately emphasised in connection with the Horse, while of the Hornless Goat and the Ox-deer, the Ribs should be summed up and spoken of by the total number [i.e. *twenty-six* of the Hornless Goat *plus* the *twenty-six* of the Ox-deer'] ? Or should the Ribs of all the three animals be summed up and spoken of by the total number [i.e 'eighty-six'] ?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The Horse has 34 Ribs; therefore this peculiar trait should be separately mentioned in the *Mantra*. Why?—Because of the *declaration*; i.e. the statement made in the

Ṛk-verse—'*Chatuṣtrimśhad vājino dēvabandhoḥ*'—would serve a useful purpose only if this peculiar trait were emphasised; otherwise the statement would be entirely useless. Hence the conclusion is that in regard to the Horse, the peculiar trait must be mentioned separately."

SŪTRA (18).

[*Refutation of Pūrvapakṣa*]—WHAT IS ACTUALLY USED AT THE PRIMARY SACRIFICE REJECTS THE SAID PECULIAR TRAIT; BECAUSE IT IS EXPRESSED BY THE TERM 'THIRTY-FOUR'.

Bhāṣya.

What is actually used at the Primary Sacrifice rejects the said peculiar trait;—i.e. the statement to be made should be exactly that which has been made at the Primary Sacrifice.—How so?—Because there is the injunction that—'*One should not speak of thirty-four*, one should speak of twenty-six itself'; and this injunction clearly precludes the mention of the number 34, since it is expressed by the term 'thirty-four' the use of which is forbidden. Thus, inasmuch as it is forbidden, the separate mention of the peculiar trait (that it has 34 Ribs) cannot be made; and what can be mentioned is only the sum total of the ribs of all the three animals.

Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*—"Even though the injunction that 'one should speak of *twenty-six* itself' precludes the separate mention of the peculiar trait, yet this separate mention should be made."

We say—No. This declaration does not actually enjoin the use of the term 'twenty-six'; what it does is only to reiterate what is already known (through the General Law, which transfers the details of the Primary to the Modificatory Sacrifice).—"How do you know that?"—We gather it from the use of the term '*ēva*', 'itself'; this term '*ēva*' is used only in connection with what is already known.—And what is already known as to be done is not the use of the term 'twenty-six', but the mention of the number *twenty-six*; this is what has been done at the Primary Sacrifice; and this is what is indicated as to be done in the case in question;—and as this number was indicated at the Primary by means of the term 'twenty-six', in the present case also, the same term is used for indicating that same number.—If the declaration quoted were taken as *enjoining* the mention of the *number* twenty-six, then two things would come to be enjoined by it —(1) the prohibition of the number 34 and (2) the mention of the number 26;—and this would involve a syntactical split; which would mean that the declaration would cease to be one syntactical whole.—"What is this *syntactical whole*?"—It consists of mutual reliance (between the two clauses) —'One should not mention thirty-four,—he should mention twenty-six'; this sentence is one syntactical whole expressing the idea that 'as 34 is forbidden, 26 should be mentioned'; and as this is already known (that of two possible numbers, one being forbidden, the other should be mentioned), all that the statement can be taken to mean is that it eulogises the Prohibition;—thus it is that it becomes one syntactical whole. This would not be

possible if it were taken as actually enjoining the *number*. And so long as a sentence can be taken as expressing one single idea, it cannot be right to take it as expressing several ideas. As this always involves the assumption of many transcendental factors.—From all this it follows that the words should be used exactly as they are indicated (by the form used at the Primary Sacrifice).

SŪTRA (19).

[*Pūrvapakṣin's answer to Sūtra* 18]—"THERE IS THE ṚK-VERSE ACTUALLY FOUND IN THE VEDIC TEXT; AND THE ONLY REASONABLE COURSE IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO WAVERING."

Bhāṣya.

"The *Ṛk-verse*—'*Chatuṣtriṁshad vājino dēvabandhoḥ, etc.*'—is actually found in the Vedic text (where, in connection with the Horse, the number 34 is clearly spoken of);—at the same time, the mention of 34 has been forbidden (in the text '*Na chatuṣtriṁshaditi brūyāt*);—under the circumstances, the peculiar trait of the Horse must be separately mentioned. As it is only thus that a definite course would be adopted and there would be no wavering (between the two contending texts); and it is only right that there should be no wavering. If the two courses were treated as optional alternatives, then the two texts would become contradicted by one another: i.e. if the number is mentioned, then the Prohibition is not followed,—and if the number is not mentioned, the injunction of its mention is not followed.—From all this it follows that there should be a separate mention of the peculiar trait of the Horse."

SŪTRA (20).

[*Pūrvapakṣin's answer concluded*]—"ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXT, THERE WOULD BE A MODIFICATION OF THE WORD IN THE ṚK-VERSE; AS IN THE CASE OF THE WORD 'AIRA'."

Bhāṣya.

"It has been argued that the Ṛk-verse has been forbidden. But that is not so; all that is necessitated by the text is that there should be modification of the word in the verse. The text says—'One should not mention 34, he should mention 26'; here the word '34' is forbidden directly by the text, while it is only by indirect implication that the verse is forbidden;—and when there is conflict between Direct Assertion and Indirect Implication, the most reasonable course is to accept the former. Hence we conclude that there should be separate mention of the peculiar trait of the Horse [by means of the verse; only the word 'thirty-four' being changed into 'twenty-six']."

SŪTRA (21).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE IS PROHIBITION OF THE WHOLE VERSE; AS THERE WOULD BE NO CONNECTION WITH THE WORD.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, the prohibition is of the whole verse, not only of the word '34'.—"Why so?"—*As there would be no connection with the word,*—i.e. the verse would have no connection with the word 'thirty-four'; and in the absence of this word, the rest of the verse could not express the number of Ribs.—If the rest of the verse were connected with the word 'twenty-six',—even so it would not express the number of Ribs of the Horse (which has 34, not 26, Ribs); so that the statement would not serve any visible purpose. The sentence, thus being wanting in a necessary word, could not serve any useful purpose; specially as the uttering of a defective sentence has been declared to lead to evil consequences—'If a *Mantra* is defective, either in accent or in syllable, it is wrongly uttered and expresses not the intended meaning; it becomes a verbal thunderbolt and strikes the sacrificer; as happened in the case of the word '*indrashatru*', through wrong accentuation'.—Further in this case, the word 'thirty-four' would become absolutely useless.

From all this we conclude that—(*a*) the words used should be expressive of the sum total of the Ribs of all the three animals;—and (*b*) as the use of the *Ṛk-verse* has been enjoined by another injunction, there should be a separate mention of the peculiar trait of the Horse [i.e. the two forms of words should be treated as optional alternatives]. [The two options being —(*a*) 'Thirty-four Ribs (of the Horse) and Fifty-two (of the other two animals), —(*b*) 'Eighty-six Ribs of all the three animals together'.]

[The explanation of *Sūtras* 17-21, in accordance with the *Vārtika* and its followers has been clearly stated in the *Shāstradīpikā*; it may be thus summed up; —*Sūtra* 17 sets forth the *Siddhānta* view that there should be option in the present case. That *the text 'one should not mention 34, he should mention 26' prohibits the entire verse referring specifically to the Horse* is going to be established in the following *Adhikaraṇa* consisting of *Sūtras* 18-21;—what is considered under the present *Adhikaraṇa* (Sū. 17) is the question—should we always use the words exactly as they are used at the Primary Sacrifice—or should the specific verse speaking of the peculiar trait of the Horse be also treated as an optional alternative,—even though it has been prohibited?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that, "On the strength of the direct (prohibitive) declaration, the *Mantra* used should be exactly as used at the Primary Sacrifice".—The *Siddhānta* is that what is laid down in the sentence 'one should not mention 34' is the prohibition of the mention of 34; and this prohibition implies the possibility of using what is prohibited;—this possibility must be based upon scripture;—and on the basis of this assumed text indicating the possibility of the use of the words speaking of the peculiar trait of the Horse,—we take it that the use of these words also is

permissible, and hence should be regarded as an optional alternative. (This is the same as the final *Siddhānta* deduced by the *Bhāṣya* from all the five *Sūtras* 17–21.)—The next four *Sūtras* 18–21, according to the *Shāstradīpikā*, form a distinct *Adhikaraṇa* leading to the *Siddhānta* that there should be the following options—(*a*) 'Thirty-four Ribs (of the Horse) and 52 (of the other two), and (*b*) 'Eighty-six of all three' (34 of the Horse, 26 of each of the other two).]

Adhikaraṇa (3): *In connection with the 'Agnīṣomīya-Animal-Sacrifice', the term 'urūka' stands for the Fat.*

SŪTRA (22).

By reason of the proximity of the Vaniṣṭu (Rectum), it is the Fat that should be taken as denoted by the term 'Urūka'.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is the *Agniṣomīya-Animal-Sacrifice*; at which the following words are used in the *Adhrigu-Mantra*—'*Vaniṣṭumasya mā rāviṣṭa urūkam manyamānāḥ*' ['Do not cut out its rectum, thinking it to be *urūka*'].

In regard to the term '*urūka*' as used here, there arises the following question—Does the sentence mean 'Do not cut out the rectum, thinking it to be *ulūka*, i.e. an owl'? Or 'Do not cut out the rectum, thinking it to be Fat'?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The meaning is 'thinking the Rectum to be an owl'.—'But how can the term *urūka* signify the *ulūka* (owl)?'—It does so because the letters 'ra' and 'la' are similar; as we have such optional forms as '*paryaṅka—palyaṅka*', '*romāni—lomāni*', '*anguriḥ—aṅguliḥ*';—and also because the Rectum really resembles the owl. On the other hand, the term '*urūka*' is never found to be expressive of Fat."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—It is the *Fat* that should be taken as expressed by the term '*urūka*'; the idea expressed is 'Do not cut out the rectum, thinking it to be Fat'; this idea, as thus expressed, serves a distinctly useful purpose; as by reason of the proximity of the Rectum, it is quite possible for it to be mistaken for Fat and cut out;—and by preventing this possible contingency, the sentence serves a visible purpose. It does not mean that the Rectum is not to be cut out at all; what is meant is that at the time of the cutting out of the Fat, the Rectum should not be cut out under the misapprehension that it is *Fat*. Under the other view, the prohibition 'Do not cut out of the Rectum' would be meaningless, when as a matter of fact, the Rectum has got to be cut out; and the mention of the *similarity to the owl* would have to be taken as serving some transcendental purpose.—'But, as a matter of fact, the term *urūka* is never used in the sense of *Fat*,—how could it denote the Fat?'—*Answer*—Etymologically, the term '*urūka*' signifies *large*; as is found in such expressions as '*uru rājāṅgaṇam*' ['The royal courtyard is large'], '*Uru tailikāṅgaṇam*' ('The court of the *Tailika* is large']; as also in such Vedic sentences as—'*Uru hi rāja varuṇashchakāra*,

etc.',—' *Uru viṣṇo vikramasva* ' [in all of which cases '*uru*' stands for 'large']. —Similarly in the case in question it signifies 'large';—then again, the term '*Kasha*' is known to be denotative of *marrow*; as we find in such expressions as '*Kashavāhino rathāḥ*', which means that 'the chariots pass through marrow';—the term '*Ka*' is a part of the word '*Kasha*', and as such it brings about the notion of the whole of which it forms part; so that the term '*urūka*' is found to be a compound word (*urū-ka*) standing for 'large marrow', and denoting the *large lump of Fat full of marrow*; the meaning of the sentence in question thus comes to be—'Do not cut out the Rectum which is near the Fat, thinking it to be a large lump of Fat'. Thus it becomes established that the term '*urūka*' signifies *Fat*.

Question—"What is the use of this *Adhikaraṇa*?"

Answer—If what is meant is the Rectum itself which is spoken of as resembling the *owl* (*urūka*),—then, when the words come to be used at a sacrifice with two or more animals, there would be no modification in the word '*urūkam*', which comes in only as a standard of comparison;—if, on the other hand, the term '*urūka*' stands for *Fat-lump*, then both the terms '*uru*' and '*ka*' should have to be modified into '*urū-kē*' (in the case of *two* animals) and '*urūṇi-kāni*' (in the case of more than two animals); or into '*urūkē*' and '*urūkāṇi*', if the term '*urūka*' is taken as a compound.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *In the 'Adhrigu-Mantra', the term 'prashasā' occurring in the expression 'prashasā bāhū', stands for 'prashaṁsā' (Praise).*

SŪTRA (23).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE WORD 'PRASHASĀ' DENOTES THE SWORD."

Bhāṣya.

In the same *Adhrigu-Mantra* that we have been dealing with, we find the expression '*prashasā bāhū*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—In the sentence '*prashasā bāhū kṛṇutāt*', is '*prashasā*' a word with the Instrumental Ending, the meaning of the sentence being 'The two arms should be taken out by means of the *Prashas*'?—Or '*prashasā*' is a word with the Accusative Ending, the ending being turned into the form of '*ā*',—and the meaning of the sentence is 'The two *excellent* arms should be cut out'?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*The word 'prashasā' denotes the sword*; the term '*Shāsa*' is well known as denoting the *sword*; this is what has been referred to in the following Vedic-text—'*Dashaprayājāniṣṭvā āha shāsamāharēti asim vai shāsamāchakṣatē*' ['Having performed the ten *Prayāja* sacrifices, he says *Bring the Shāsa*; it is the *sword* that is called *Shāsa*'].—A mere praise of the arms (as 'excellent') would serve no useful purpose; as the only idea possible would be that 'the excellent arms bring about some transcendental result', and this would involve the assumption that the arms are *deities* indicated by the words of the *Mantra*;—and this would be highly improper; specially when another explanation is possible.—In support of this other explanation we have the following passage which occurs in the section dealing with the story of *Shunaḥshēpa*—'*Atastvāmagnim shāsahastam shāsēna vishasanatvāt na draṣṭumutsahē*'.—From all this it is clear that the '*prashasā*' stands for '*asinā*', 'by the sword'."

SŪTRA (24).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT SIGNIFIES THE PRAISE OF THE ARMS.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, the word in question signifies the praise of the arms; the sentence '*Prashasā bāhū kṛṇutāt*' meaning 'the two excellent arms should be cut out'; in this sense, the term '*prashasā*' serves a distinctly useful purpose; the 'excellence' of the arms consists in their *entirety*; hence the sentence means that 'one should take out the whole of the two arms';

i.e. 'the two arms should be wholly taken out'.—Under the *Pūrvapakṣa* view, the arms would be taken out by means of the *Svadhiti* (as they actually are), while the word uttered would be one signifying the *sword*; or the sentence would be laying down a deity indicated by the *Mantra*;—and lastly, the arms should have to be cut out with the *sword*;—all this would be highly improper, when the weapon actually enjoined for the purpose is the *Svadhiti*.—Nor can it be said that the *arms* (fore-legs) are not *excellent* or praiseworthy; as it is on those that the animal walks; and it is by bending and resting on them that it eats the *Shamī* and the *Karīra*.—From all this it follows that the term '*prashasā*' denotes the praise of the arms.

"What is the use of this *Adhikaraṇa*?"

At the *Ashvamēdha* there are a hundred silver swords with green scabbards; according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, in this case the form '*prashasā*' (Instrumental Singular) would have to be modified (into the Plural form, to be in keeping with the large number of swords);—while according to the *Siddhānta*, the modification (if any) would be in keeping with the number of *arms* concerned.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *In the expression 'Shyēnamasya vakṣaḥ', etc., the terms 'Shyēna' and the rest denote 'entirety'.*

SŪTRA (25).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"BY REASON OF THE PROXIMITY OF WHAT IS WELL KNOWN, THE TERMS 'SHYĒNA', 'SHALĀ', 'KASHYAPA', 'KAVAṢA', AND 'SRĒKAPARṆA' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS DENOTING THE SHAPE."

Bhāṣya.

In the same '*Adhrigu-Mantra*' that we have been discussing, there occur the following words—'*Shyēnamasya vakṣaḥ kṛṇutāt, Shalā doṣaṇī, Kashyapevāṁsau, Kavaṣorū, Srēkaparṇāṣṭhīvantaḥ*' ['One should make the chest of the animal a kite, etc. etc.'].

In regard to these words ('*Shyēna*', '*Shalā*', etc.), there arises the question—Do they signify the *shape* [the meaning being that 'the chest should be turned into the *shape* of the kite' and so forth]?—Or do they signify *entirety* [the meaning being that 'the chest should be kept *entire*' and so forth]?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*By reason of the proximity of what is well known, the term should be taken as denoting the shape*;—as a rule, in ordinary practice when something is asserted as to be made,—and this assertion is in proximity to what is well known, it is always understood as standing for the *shape* (of that well-known thing); e.g. in such expressions as—'Make lions of this lump of flour', 'Make girdles of the fibre of the *Arjuna*-plant',—it is understood that the term 'lion' stands for the *shape* of the Lion, and the term 'girdle' stands for the *shape* of the girdle. Similarly the sentences in question should mean—'The chest should be turned into the *shape* of the kite,—the arms should be turned into the *shape* of the porcupine,—the shoulders should be turned into the *shape* of the tortoise,—the thighs should be turned into the shape of a shield,—the knee-bones should be turned into the shape of the leaf of the *Karavīra*-plant'."

SŪTRA (26).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT IS 'ENTIRETY' THAT IS SIGNIFIED, AS IT IS ALREADY LIKE THAT.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

It is not true that the terms in question signify *shape*; what is meant to be expressed is the taking out of the *entire* limb; and as a matter of fact, when the limbs mentioned are taken out in their *entirety*, they actually have the shape of the things mentioned. So that when it is said 'Make these limbs such as to have the shape of the kite, etc.', what is understood to be meant is 'take out the limbs *in their entirety*'; such an injunction, even though got at by indirect indication, comes to serve a perceptible purpose; because the use to which the limbs are going to be put is such as can be fulfilled only when they are taken out *in their entirety*; that is to say, when each of these limbs is taken out as a whole, then alone is it possible to make an offering of that limb. Otherwise (according to the *Pūrvapakṣa* view) what would be offered would be the lump of flesh of that particular shape (not that particular limb).—From this it follows that the words should be taken as signifying *entirety*.

SŪTRA (27).

ALSO BECAUSE THE 'ADHRIGU-MANTRA' IS MEANT FOR THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

The *Adhrigu-mantra* also is for the purpose of the extracting of the limbs,—that is, it is meant to serve the purpose of accomplishing the extracting of the limbs *in their entirety*.—"How so?"—It contains the words—'*Gātram gātramasyānūnam kṛṇutāt*' ['See that each of its limbs remains intact'].—From this also it is clear that the terms '*Shyēna*' and the rest signify the extracting of the limbs in their entirety.

The purpose served by the discussion is as already explained; [i.e. according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the term '*Shyēnam*' in the singular form would have to be modified into the Dual or Plural forms in the case of there being two or more animals; while according to the *Siddhānta*, no such modification should be necessary, as the term 'entirety' is a generic term and as such is equally applicable to one or more animals].

ADHIKARAṆA (6) : *The expiatory sacrifice 'Jyotiṣmatī' is not to be performed on the extinguishing of the Fire taken out for the Darsha-sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (28).

THERE IS TO BE NO EXPIATION IN CONNECTION WITH WHAT IS ACCIDENTAL; BECAUSE IT IS FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE,—IT HAVING BEEN PRESCRIBED FOR THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Agnihotra* laid down in the text—'Knowing this, if one performs the *Agnihotra*, etc.'; in connection with this, it is declared—'If the Fire taken out should become extinguished before the *Agnihotra*-libation has been offered, one should offer the cake baked upon eight pans to *Agni-Jyotiṣmat*'.

[Every day, Fire is taken out of the *Gārhapatya-hearth* and placed in the *Āhavanīya* hearth, for the purpose of offering the Agnihotra-libations. If the Fire thus taken out goes out before these libations have been offered, then the man should make the said offering to *Agni-Jyotiṣmat*; this is an expiatory rite.]

In this connection the question that arises is—Should, or should not, this expiatory *Jyotiṣmatī* sacrifice be performed when the Fire that goes out *before the offering of the Agnihotra-libations* is the one that has been taken out for the offering of the *Darsha*, or the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice [and not the one that had been taken for the offering of the *Agnihotra*]?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The expiatory sacrifice must be performed in the said case.—Why?—Because when the *condition* is there, that which is *conditional* upon that condition must come in. The only condition laid down for the performance of the *Jyotiṣmatī* sacrifice is that *the Fire taken out should go out before the Agnihotra-libations have been offered*; hence [when this condition is there, as it is in the case in question] the sacrifice must be performed. Nor is there any word to the effect that 'the sacrifice should be performed only on the going out of the *Fire that has been taken out for the purpose of the Agnihotra*'. For this reason also, the sacrifice should be performed in the case in question."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*In connection with what is accidental*,—i.e. in connection with the going out of the Fire referred to above,—the expiation should not be performed;—because in that case the taking out of the Fire has been *for another purpose*,—i.e. for the purpose of the *Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices; —while the expiation has been laid down in connection with the going out of that Fire which has been taken out for the purpose of the *Agnihotra-offering*.—Hence it follows that the Expiation should not be performed in the case in question.

Says the Opponent—"We have already pointed out that there is no other word in the text to show that the expiation is to be performed on the

going out of only that Fire which has been taken out for the purpose of the Agnihotra-offering."

Answer—Though there is no such word in the text, yet it is understood that the expiation has been laid down only in connection with the going out of that Fire which has been taken out for the purposes of the *Agnihotra*.—"How so?"—It is so understood because the Expiation has been laid down under the context of the *Agnihotra*; from the fact of its having been laid down in the context of the *Agnihotra*, it follows that it is helpful at this latter.

"But the *taking out* of the Fire is not qualified by *Agnihotra*;—everything is done for its own sake, not for the sake of the qualification of something else."

Answer—The Expiation that is laid down is in relation to the *Fire*, not in relation to the *going out*.

Question—"What if it is so?"

Answer—If it were in relation to the *going out*, then, inasmuch as the *going out* is not a part of the sacrifice, the Expiation could not be held to be for the purpose of the *going out*; in fact, it is related to the *Agnihotra* as its purpose, which forms the subject-matter of the Context. When it is related to the Fire,—inasmuch as the Fire is a subsidiary detail of the sacrifice,—it is through that Fire that the Expiation becomes connected with its purpose. Such being the case, the Fire, thus taken out, is said to have 'gone out' ('extinguished') if it fails to accomplish that purpose. Thus the accomplishment of the *Agnihotra* is the purpose to be served by that Taking out of the Fire which is done for the sake of *Agnihotra*; and the accomplishment of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* is the purpose to be served by the Taking out of the Fire which is done for the sake of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*.—When the Fire that has been taken out goes out, it becomes incapable of accomplishing its purpose; and by means of the prescribed Expiation, it regains its capacity to accomplish that purpose. Thus it is that by making the Fire so capable, the Expiation helps the performance of the *Agnihotra*. On the other hand, when the Fire had been taken out for the sake of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*,—if the Expiation renders that fire capable, it does not in any way help the *Agnihotra*; it is only when the Fire had been taken out for the sake of the *Agnihotra* that by rendering that Fire capable, the Expiation helps the *Agnihotra*.—From all this it follows that the Expiation in question is to be performed only when the Fire had been taken out for the sake of the *Agnihotra*.

Question—"How do you know that the Expiation is related to the *Fire*, not to the *going out*? That it is related to the 'going out' as qualified by 'Fire' is *directly asserted* by the words of the text, while it is by *Syntactical Connection* that it is indicated that it is related to the 'Fire' as characterised by the 'going out';—and as Direct Assertion is more authoritative than Syntactical Connection, it follows that the Expiation is related to the 'going out'."

Answer—The connection of 'going out' is unavoidable; hence it follows that no emphasis is intended to be laid upon the phrase 'for whom it

should go out'; and there can be no connection with what is not required; as such connection could be accepted only as leading to some transcendental result. On the other hand, if the Expiation is related to the 'Fire' as characterised by 'going out',—the connection comes to be with what is actually required; as it comes to be recognised as to be performed only when there is extinguishing of the Fire, and in this case a visible purpose is served. Hence it follows that the Expiation is related to the Fire as characterised by the 'going out'.—If the Fire that goes out is one that had been taken out for the sake of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*,—then the Fire that has become extinguished is one that is not related to the *Agnihotra* itself; and as the *taking out* of the Fire was not for the *Agnihotra* itself,—the Expiation in question could not be applicable to this case.

Further, there is an indicative text also, in support of this view.—"What is that text?"—It is in the form of the reference in the words 'He whose Fire is taken out at the *Agnihotra*'. That this is a *reference* follows from the fact that if it were treated as an *injunction*, there would be a syntactical split.—If the *taking out* of the Fire is for the purpose of the *Agnihotra*, then with a view to express the idea that 'the said purpose has not been accomplished', it is only right that there should be a *reference* in the form of the said words to the fact of 'the Agnihotra-libations not having been offered'.—From this also it follows that the Expiation is to be performed only when the Fire going out has been one that had been taken out for the purpose of the *Agnihotra*.

Question—"What then should be done in the other case (where the Fire taken out for the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* has gone out)?"

Answer—In the case of that *going out* of the Fire, there should be some other Expiation which has not been prescribed with special reference to any particular sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The expiatory sacrifice 'Jyotiṣmatī' is not to be performed on the going out of the 'Dhārya' Fire.*

SŪTRA (29).

SO ALSO IS THE CASE OF THE 'MAINTAINING' (OF THE FIRE), BECAUSE IT IS FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been declared that 'The *Āhavanīya* should be maintained by *Gatashrī* persons' [i.e. (*a*) 'by persons who have attained prosperity', according to *Tantra-ratna*,—'by (1) the learned Brāhmaṇa, (2) the village-chief, and (3) the Kṣattriya', according to an old text].—There is the Expiation laid down in connection with the going out of the Fire in connection with the *Agnihotra*—'If the Fire taken out should go out before the Agnihotra-libations have been offered, one should offer a cake baked on eight pans to *Agni-Jyotiṣmat*'.

In regard to this there arises the following question—When this '*Dhārya-Agni*' (Fire to be Maintained) goes out, should the said Expiation be performed or not?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The Expiation must be performed, as the condition precedent is present; the only condition precedent is that the Fire taken out for the *Agnihotra* should go out; and this condition is wholly present in the case in question;—hence the Expiation must be performed. *Objection*—'The Fire that has gone out in this case is one that had been taken out for the purpose of all (sacrificial) acts, not *for the purpose of the Agnihotra* only.'—*Answer*—If it is for the purpose of all acts, then, as being for the purpose of the whole lot of acts, its being for the purpose of one of those acts (i.e. the *Agnihotra*) cannot be denied; it is only when a thing is for the purpose of every one individual of the lot, that it can be said to be for the sake of the whole lot of them; so that even though it might be used at all the acts, it would be used at the *Agnihotra* also.—As a matter of fact, however, the Fire in question is *not* for the purpose of the whole lot of acts; for the simple reason that no such *lot of acts* having been enjoined, there could be no need for the fulfilment of which such Fire and such other accessories would be required;—it is each individual act that needs the *taking out of the Fire*. Thus, even though the Fire might be used at all acts, it would be one that is used at the *Agnihotra* also;—from which it follows that the expiation due on the going out of the Fire should be performed. In fact, such rites as '*paryukṣaṇa*' (Besprinkling), '*Parisamūhana*' ('Encircling with water'), '*Triṇāpachaya*' ('Spreading out of the grass') are performed day by day, in connection with the *Dhārya* Fire;—and in the same manner, the Expiation in question should also be performed."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta* :—*In the case of the 'maintaining' of the Fire* by the '*Gatashrī*' persons, the Expiation due to the going out of the Fire should not be performed.—"Why ?"—*Because it is for another purpose* ; that is, at the time that the performer is '*Gatashrī*', the *taking out* of the Fire is not done for the purpose of *Agnihotra* ; in fact, the Fire is taken out for some one purpose and it is 'maintained' for all acts ; the 'taking out' of the Fire is always for the purpose of some one act ; it is only the 'maintaining' that is done for the purpose of all acts ;—and there can be no Expiation on the going out of the Fire which is only '*maintained*' for the purpose of the *Agnihotra* ; it is to be performed only on the going out of the Fire that has been '*taken out*' for the purpose of the *Agnihotra* itself ;—in the case in question, the 'taking out' is related to some other act,—it being done for the purpose of that act ; and it is only in the case of the Fire being actually taken out for the purpose of that act for the purpose whereof there is *taking out*,—that the Expiation can be performed.—From all this it follows that the Expiation should not be performed in the case in question.

SŪTRA (30).

IN THE CASE OF THE OTHER RITES, THERE WOULD BE PERFORMANCE OF THEM, BECAUSE THEY ARE FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE ACT.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that—"Just as the rites of *Paryukṣaṇa*, *Parisamūhana* and the like are performed in connection with the '*Dhārya*' Fire, so should the Expiation also be performed".—Our answer to this is as follows :—It is only right that *Parisamūhana* and the other rites are performed ; because they have been actually enjoined as 'embellishments' (of the Fire) ; and hence, they *can* be performed, and they have not yet fulfilled their purpose ;—as for the *Taking out* of the Fire, on the other hand, it has already fulfilled its purpose and, as such, ceased (past) ; nor *can* it be performed, as the place and time of its performance are restricted.—Hence there is no analogy between the Rites cited and the Expiation in question.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *In connection with the 'Darsha' sacrifice, the 'Taking out' of the Fire is to be done without Mantras.*

SŪTRA (31).

IN A CASE WHERE THE ACT IS PERFORMED IN A FIRE PRODUCED (FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE), IT IS NOT USED; BECAUSE THE OCCASION FOR IT HAS NOT ARRIVED.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the 'taking out' of the Fire at the *Agnihotra*, the following *Mantra* is used—'*Vāchā tvā hotrā—prāṇēna udgātrā, etc. etc.*'

In regard to this there arises the question—When the 'taking out' of the Fire is done for the purposes of the *Darsha* sacrifice,—should this *Mantra* be used or not?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"Even when the Fire is *taken out* for the *Darsha-sacrifice*, *Agnihotra*-libations are offered;—under the circumstances, if this 'taking out' were done without a *Mantra* the *Agnihotra* would be performed in a fire taken out without *Mantra*. Hence it follows that the 'taking out' at the *Darsha* also should be done with the prescribed *Mantra*.—If it be argued that—'As it would not be the occasion for the *Agnihotra*, the *Taking out* would be defective and hence cannot appertain to the *Agnihotra*',—the answer is that that cannot be right; as it is only the factor of *occasion* (or time) that will have ceased, and the 'Taking out', even though defective to that extent, would still be there and appertain to the *Agnihotra*. Such being the case, the 'Taking out' of the Fire at the *Darsha* should be done with the *Mantra*."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—When the Fire has been produced for another act,—if the *Agnihotra* is performed in that Fire,—in that case the *Mantra* should not be used. The term '*Chodanā*' (in the *Sūtra*) stands for *act*. That is to say, in such a case, the 'Taking out' will not have been done *for the Agnihotra*,—and when the 'Taking out' is related to some other act, naturally there should be no using of the *Mantra* (which has been laid down in connection with that 'Taking out' which is done *for the Agnihotra*.)

Says the Opponent—"It has been already explained that even though defective, the *Taking out* would be one pertaining to the *Agnihotra*; certainly the absence of the secondary factor (*of time*) cannot mean the absence of the primary factor."

Answer—*Time* is not a 'secondary factor'; it is the condition or occasion,—as has been already explained;—and if an act is done when the occasion is not there, it means that something has been done which has

not been enjoined in the Veda. For this reason the 'Taking out' cannot be regarded as appertaining to the *Agnihotra*;—and if the 'Taking out' does not appertain to the *Agnihotra*, then, for that very reason, the *Mantra* in question should not be used; even if it were used, it would be meaningless.

Adhikaraṇa (9): *In connection with the 'Prāyaṇīya-charu', the details laid down as appertaining to 'what is offered' should not be performed.*

SŪTRA (32).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*continued*]—"When there is 'cooking', it is found to be actually offered; hence it should take in the details relating to it; because there is mixture, as in the case of 'Honey and Water'; and because it is for eating."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Ādityaḥ prāyaṇīyaḥ payasi charuḥ*' ['The *Prāyaṇīya-charu* cooked in milk dedicated to *Āditya*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are the details laid down as to be performed in connection with *the Milk meant to be offered*,—to be performed in connection with the *Milk* in which the rice is to be cooked (according to the above text)?—Or not?—The fact is that if this Milk is *meant to be offered*, then the said details must be performed; while if it is meant only for the *cooking* of the Rice, then the details should not be performed.—"Why should there be any doubt on this point?"—The presence of the Locative Ending (in '*payasi*') indicates that the milk is meant only for the cooking of the Rice; on the other hand, if the said ending is taken as asserting the fact of the Milk being the receptacle of the *Rice* which is related to a Deity,—[and it would be so if the Milk were meant only for the *cooking*],—then there would be fear of syntactical split [the sentence meaning (*a*) that 'the Rice should be offered to the deity *Āditya*', and (*b*) that 'the Rice should be cooked in milk'. That is why there is a doubt.

On the said question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The milk is meant to be offered.—Why?—Because, if the sentence is taken to mean—(*a*) that 'the Rice is to be offered to *Āditya*' and (*b*) that 'it should be cooked in milk',—it would enjoin two things and hence there would be a syntactical split. As a matter of fact, both these ideas are derived from the text; if either one of them is taken as *enjoined*, the other, even though *not enjoined*, is comprehended all the same; and in this case there is no syntactical split, and it is necessary for us to adopt that interpretation which does not involve a syntactical split.—Now if the fact of the Milk being the receptacle of the Rice is taken as *enjoined*, then the idea of the connection with the deity *Āditya* cannot be understood to be implied by it; as this latter idea has not been expressed anywhere else;—on the other hand, if the connection with the deity is taken as enjoined,—then the very fact of the mention of

'Rice' and 'Milk' implies that the two things are mixed up and it is this mixture that is connected with the deity; and this naturally leads to the conclusion that the *Rice* has the *Milk* for its receptacle.—*Objection*—'What the sentence really speaks of are the *Rice and Milk*, not the mixture of the two'.—*Answer*—When the two things are expressed, the very declaration of the action implies that they are to be used together, and this implies their *being mixed*; and as the sentence is one only, the two are taken together. From this it is clear that all that is meant to be enjoined is the mere mention of the two things; as for the relation of container and contained between the two things, even though it is implied, it cannot be taken as being *enjoined*. The statement has been made in this special form, with a view to indicate the Rice and Milk as mixed together.—Now when the Rice mixed with the Milk is offered, the Milk also must become offered. This is what is meant by the term '*pradhānadarshanam*' ('found to be actually offered') (occurring in the *Sūtra*). The Locative Ending (in '*payasi*') has been used with a view to secure the *offering* of the Rice as cooked in the Milk. Thus it follows that this *Milk* is '*for Eating*',—i.e. for the purpose of being offered in sacrifice; the term '*bhojana*' ('Eating') here signifies the *sacrifice*, on account of similarity.—Thus the Milk, being meant for being offered, must take in the details that have been prescribed in connection with Milk (to be offered).—*Says the Opponent*—'Mere *offering* does not constitute *sacrifice*; it is only when the *offering* is made to a Deity that it becomes a *sacrifice*'. *Answer*—As a matter of fact, inasmuch as both the substances (Milk and Rice) have been mentioned (as to be offered to *Āditya*), both of them as mixed together are connected with the Deity,—*just as in the case of 'Honey and Water'*; that is, the present case is exactly like the case of the 'offering to Prajāpati' which has been laid down as consisting of 'Curds, Honey, Clarified Butter, Fried grains and Water'; even though in the case in question, the Locative Ending has been used to express the idea; that this is so follows from the fact that the sense of the Locative (i.e. *Location*) is not what is meant to be predicated, the mere mention (of the Milk) is what is intended. Just as in the case of the assertion '*odanē dadhi datvā abhyavahartavyam*' ['One should put curd *into the Rice* and then eat it'—where we have the Locative ending in '*odanē*'], all that is intended is the mention of the *Rice*, and not the fact of its being the *receptacle* or *container*,—so should it be taken to be in the case in question also.—From all this it follows that the Milk is for being offered, and hence in connection with it one should perform all those details that have been prescribed for such Milk as is meant to be offered."

SŪTRA (33).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"THE PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN EMBELLISHMENTS ALSO POINTS TO THE SAME CONCLUSION."

Bhāṣya.

"It is only in accordance with the above view that we can explain the prohibition (in regard to the offering in question) of some of those embellish-

ments that have been prescribed in connection with the Milk *to be offered*; for instance, there are such prohibitions as—(*a*) 'He removes the calves without using the *Yajuṣ-Mantra*', (*b*) 'He milks the cow in a vessel without the *Pavitra*-grass';—such prohibition would have some sense only if the embellishments were understood as to be carried out."

SŪTRA (34).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE, WHEN THERE IS PROHIBITION OF MILK, IT IS AVOIDED EVEN IN THAT (MIXED) FORM."

Bhāṣya.

"Wherever there is prohibition of milk, it is avoided, by people, *even in that form*; i.e. they avoid what has been wetted with milk, as also what has been cooked in milk;—this is not a property of the substance used for cooking;—for instance, *water* is used for cooking,—and when it is prohibited and *oil* is drunk, as there is the prohibition that 'water should not be drunk',—one does not drink *Rice-gruel* or *Barley-gruel* (because these contain *water*).—Then again, simply because the milk is avoided even in that mixed form, the mixture is not regarded as 'Milk' itself; because the mixture is for the purpose of eating;—and as *milk* is treated in ordinary life so should it be treated in the case in question; it is this argument from similarity that has been indicated here."

SŪTRA (35).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT CANNOT TAKE IN THE DETAILS; BECAUSE THERE IS NO 'OFFERING' OF IT; AS IT HAS BEEN ENJOINED FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE 'PRAṆĪTĀ' VESSEL, AND THERE CAN BE NO 'MIXTURE' OF THE TWO THINGS, ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR NOT BEING HOMOGENEOUS.

Bhāṣya.

The Milk in question cannot take in the details; that is to say, the details prescribed in connection with the *Milk to be offered* are not to be performed in connection with the Milk in question.—"Why?"—*Because there is no offering of it*; i.e. as a matter of fact, the Milk is not offered.—"But when the Rice cooked in Milk is offered, the Milk would certainly be offered; it is for this reason that it has been laid down that the Rice is to be cooked *in Milk*."—Not so, we reply; the Milk is mentioned only for the purpose of the cooking of the Rice; as what is required (for the offering) is *Cooked* Rice; as without the Cooking, it is not '*Charu*' (which is what is to be offered);—and it is not the Milk that is required for being offered; in fact nowhere is the Milk spoken of as *to be offered*.—"How so?"—Because, as a matter of fact, *it has been enjoined for the purposes of the Praṇītā vessel*.—"But this interpretation involves a syntactical split, on which ground, it has been already rejected above, and it has also been

pointed out that in the case in question, the substance that is offered is the mixed one (Milk and Rice)."—Our answer to this is that *there can be no mixture of the two things, on account of their not being homogeneous*; Milk and Rice are not homogeneous; and Milk is clearly spoken of as the receptacle of the Rice;—it is the *Cooked Rice* that is spoken of as the substance *to be offered*; —even though the fact of the Milk being something to be offered is *implied* (by the fact of its being the substance in which the Rice has been cooked), yet this implication is set aside by the direct assertion (through the Locative Ending) of the Milk being only the receptacle of the Rice.—As regards the syntactical split, there is no such split involved: because the sentence would not be construed as '*payasi charuḥ*' ('the rice in Milk'),—but as '*payasi ādityaḥ*' ('the offering to *Āditya* is in Milk'); so that both ('Rice' and 'Milk') would be connected with *Āditya*: the whole sentence being construed as—'*Ādityaḥ payasi-ādityaḥ charuḥ*'; so that both the words '*charu*' and '*payaḥ*' would be related to one and the same word '*Ādityaḥ*',—and thus there would be a single sentence, and there would be no chance of a syntactical split; the meaning of the whole being that 'the substance offered to *Āditya* has the Milk for its receptacle'.—From all this it follows that the details related to the *Milk to be offered* are not to be performed in connection with the Milk in question.

SŪTRA (36).

THE OTHER TEXT WOULD BE A MERE STATEMENT OF FACT.

Bhāṣya.

As regards the indicative text that has been cited (under Sū. 33) in support of the *Pūrvapakṣa* view—'*Ayajuṣā vatsānapākaroti apavitravati gāndohayati*',—this does not support the *Pūrvapakṣa* view; in fact *it is only a statement of fact*; it only describes the well-known fact that 'because the Milk is not going *to be offered*, the calves are not set aside with the *Yajuṣ-Mantra*, nor is the cow milked in a vessel covered with the *Pavitra-grass*'.—"But the mere statement of a fact serves no useful purpose".—The answer to this is that we are not considering whether or not it serves a useful purpose; all that we are discussing is the exact signification of the sentence; and what the sentence signifies is that 'the calves are set aside without the use of the *Yajuṣ-Mantra* and the cow is not milked in a vessel covered with the *Pavitra-grass*'; and both these—the *Yajuṣ-Mantra* and the *Pavitra*,—are precluded from the Milk in question simply on the ground of its not being meant *to be offered*.

SŪTRA (37).

OR, IT MAY BE THE PROHIBITION OF WHAT HAS BEEN ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

Or, the sentence cited may be taken as containing the prohibition of what has been enjoined; in connection with some cases, it has been enjoined

that 'the calves are to be set aside with the *Yajuṣ-Mantra*; the cow is to be milked in a vessel covered with the *Pavitra-grass*'; and the prohibition of these in connection with the case in question serves a distinctly useful purpose.

SŪTRA (38).

BY REASON OF THE SAID PROHIBITION, INASMUCH AS IT FORMS THE SUBORDINATE FACTOR IN THE AVOIDANCE,—THE DRINKING OF MILK BY ITSELF IS DUE TO A SPECIAL CAUSE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—"When milk is prohibited, things sprinkled with milk or mixed with milk are also avoided";—our answer to this is that in ordinary life such avoidance of things mixed with milk is only right; as it is the milk that has been prohibited; as a matter of fact, whenever milk is eaten, it comes in only as a subordinate factor in the food; and the prohibition of what comes in serves a distinctly useful purpose; what does not come in,—the prohibition of that can serve no useful purpose.—"But milk is often eaten by itself".—The answer to this is that when milk is eaten by itself, *it is due to a special cause*; i.e. milk is eaten by itself only by one who has taken a vow to do it, or by way of medicine; generally it is not so eaten. Hence, since milk is a subordinate factor, the sense of the prohibition of Milk can only be that 'one should not eat things mixed with milk'.

SŪTRA (39).

IT MAY ALSO BE TREATED AS AN OBSERVANCE,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'SMEARING'.

Bhāṣya.

Why is not the following explanation given of the Prohibition?—*It should be treated as an observance*; just as, when it is said that 'the Religious Student should not eat meat', they avoid even the smearings of meat in the Ladle,—so, in the case in question also, when it is said that 'Milk should not be drunk', they would avoid also those things that are sprinkled or mixed with milk.

SŪTRA (40).

BUT (IN THE CASE CITED) WHAT IS PROHIBITED IS THE TASTE; AS IT IS A PROPERTY APPERTAINING TO THE MAN.

Bhāṣya.

But the above explanation is not the right one.—The term '*vā*' ('but') implies the rejection of the explanation suggested above.

"Why (should not the explanation be accepted as right)?"

Because the observance *is a property appertaining to the Man*; that is, 'the avoidance of meat' by the Religious Student is meant to accomplish a transcendental result; hence if one eats ever so little of it as just gives the taste of meat, it constitutes a transgression; and its undesirable character does not depend upon the manifestation of any such visible effects as the catching of cold and the like.—It is not so in the case of Milk; hence the previous explanation given by us is the right one.

Adhikaraṇa (10): *At the 'Abhyudayēṣṭi' the details connected with 'what is to be offered' should be performed in connection with the 'curd' and the 'boiled milk'.*

SŪTRA (41).

At the rise of the Moon, the 'dissociation of the Milking' should take in its own details, because it is already in operation.

Bhāṣya.

There is the following text—'*Vi vā ēnam . . . . dadhamshcharum . . . shṛtē charum*' [wherein the performance of an *Iṣṭi* is laid down]; what form the subject-matter of the present *Adhikaraṇa* are the two phrases occurring herein—'*dadhamshcharum*' ('Rice cooked in curds') and '*shṛtē charum*' ('Rice cooked in boiled milk').

In regard to this, there arises the following question—In connection with the 'curds' and the 'boiled milk', are there to be performed all those details relating to the Milk offered at sacrifices—or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"They should not be performed;—why?—*because there is no offering of these,—as they have been enjoined for the purposes of the Praṇītā vessel,—and as they are not homogeneous, there can be no mixture of these with the Rice* (*Sūtra* 35, embodying the *Siddhānta* of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*)."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The 'milking' that has been 'dissociated' from the particular deity,—by reason of the occasion of the 'rise' (of the Moon),—*should take in all its details*; i.e. all the details related to the milk to be offered at sacrifices should be performed.—"Why?"—Because the Milk as well as the Curd has come in only for the purpose of being offered;—and because it is for being offered, therefore naturally the details related to the sacrificial offering also come in. There are reasons why these details should come in; while there are none why they should be excluded.—"But the Curd and the Milk in question have been enjoined for the purpose of the *Praṇītā* vessel".—Not so, we reply; for if it were so then there would be a syntactical split,—one part declaring the fact of the 'Cooked Rice' being for the sake of the Deity, and the other that of the Curd and Milk being for the purpose of the 'Cooked Rice'.—"In fact the Cooked Rice is related to the Deity, and so also are the Curd and Milk; and hence there is no syntactical split".—This is not possible; the previous sentence '*Trēdhā taṇḍulān vibhajēt*' has already gone before declaring that 'a division (of the Rice) should be made'; and then there comes the following sentence laying down the details of that 'division'—'*Yē sthaviṣṭhāḥ*, etc.' ['The coarser rice being cooked in curds for *Indra*-

Pradātṛ, and the finer rice cooked in boiled milk for *Viṣṇu-shipiviṣṭa* ']; so that the division of Curd and Milk also should be taken as asserted. Thus, if the Curd and the Milk which have to be divided were asserted to be for the purposes of the *Praṇītā* vessel also, then there would be syntactical split;—hence these two (Curd and Milk) cannot be taken as enjoined for the purposes of the *Praṇītā* vessel. And when what is expressed by the Locative ending is not enjoined (predicated), what becomes connected with the Deity is what is expressed by the basic noun, on the strength of syntactical connection. Thus both the Curd and the Milk, along with the Cooked Rice, become connected with the Deity;—one portion of the Cooked Rice, that cooked in Curd, being meant for *Indra-Pradātṛ*. When several kinds of things are divided, it is said—'Gems should be collected in the golden dish,—this will be one portion, the share of *Devadatta*; gold has been put into the silver dish,—this is another portion, the share of *Viṣṇu-mitra*',—it is understood that the two dishes together form two shares, on the ground that the sentence lays down a division, and the two dishes are distinct; in this case what is signified by the Locative ending is regarded to be a mere *reference*. In the same manner, in the case in question, on the ground of the sentence laying down a division,—and because the Curd and the Milk are mentioned as distinct from one another,—it is understood that there is one share (for *Indra-Pradātṛ*) (consisting of the *Rice cooked in Curd*); and inasmuch as what is signified by the Locative ending is already got at by implication, it can be regarded as a mere reference (or reiteration).—From all this it follows that the Curd and the Milk are meant to be offered; and hence in connection with the Curd and Milk all those details should be performed which are connected with offering.

SŪTRA (42).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE INJUNCTION OF THE 'BOILED MILK'.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the Details connected with *offering* should be performed in connection with the Curd and the Milk, both of which are meant to be offered.—"For what reason?"—There is injunction of the 'Boiled Milk' as an established entity, in the words 'rice cooked in curd, *rice cooked in boiled milk*';—this would be possible only in the event of the details having been performed; otherwise the 'boiling' would not be done and the 'Boiled Milk' could not be enjoined as an established entity.—For this reason also we conclude that the Details related to *offerings* should be performed in connection with the Curd and the Milk in question.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *At the 'Pashukāma-Iṣṭi', the 'details related to offerings' should not be performed.*

SŪTRA (43).

IN FACT, THERE SHOULD BE DISSOCIATION; BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN ENJOINED FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE,—LIKE THE COOKED RICE AND MILK.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Pashukāma-Iṣṭi* laid down in the following text—'*Yaḥ pashukāmaḥ syāt so'māvāsyāmiṣṭvā vatsānapākuryāt; . . . yē kṣodiṣṭhāstānagnayē sanimatē 'ṣṭākapālannirvapēt, yē madhyamāstān viṣṇavē shipiviṣṭāya shṛtē charum, yē sthaviṣṭhāstānindrāya pradātrē dadhamshcharum*' ['One who desires offspring should set aside the calves after having offered the *Darsha* sacrifice; . . . of the finer grains he should make a cake baked upon eight pans and offer it to *Agni-sanimat*; the middle-sized rice-grains he should cook *in boiled milk* and offer it to *Viṣṇu-shipiviṣṭa*; the coarser grains of rice he shall cook *in curd* and offer it to *Indra-Pradātṛ*']. The expressions '*dadhani charum*' ('rice cooked in curd') and '*shṛtē charum*' ('rice cooked in boiled milk') form the subject-matter of the present enquiry.

In regard to these, there arises the question—In connection with the *Curd* and the *Milk*,—should, or should not, one perform those details relating to Milk which have been prescribed in regard to Milk *to be offered*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"in accordance with the conclusion of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, the details in question should be performed; as the Vedic text is similar in both cases; and here also the 'boiled milk' has been mentioned as a well-established entity; all this can be explained only if there are details related to the offering".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—In fact, *there should be dissociation* of the details; because in the case in question, *the Milk has been enjoined for another purpose*, not for the purpose of being offered; as is clear from the use of the Locative Ending;—*as in the case of the 'Cooked Rice and Milk'*; just as in the case of the *Prāyaṇīya-charu* (dealt with under *Adhikaraṇa* 9), the details relating to *Milk to be offered* are not performed in connection with the Milk,—on the ground of the presence of the Locative Ending,—similarly should it be in the case in question also.

SŪTRA (44).

THE MENTION OF 'BOILED MILK' IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDICATION.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that "the *Boiled Milk* has been mentioned as a well-established entity".—That does not affect our position; the 'boiling'

spoken of will indicate the substance ; in fact the 'boiling' is already implied in the term 'Cooked Rice' itself ; hence the 'boiling' serves only to indicate the substance related to the *boiling* ;—the sense being 'the rice is cooked in a substance *which is boiling*'.—From all this it follows that in the case in question, the details relating to the *Milk to be offered* should not be performed.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *In connection with the 'mixings' at the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, the details relating to 'things to be offered' should not be performed.*

SŪTRA (45).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS IT IS SOMETHING NEW, THE 'MIXINGS' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS ENJOINED FOR THE PURPOSE OF BEING OFFERED."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Payasā maitrāvaruṇam shriṇāti, saktubhirmanthinam, dhānābhirhāriyojanam, hiraṇyēna shukram, ājyēna pātnīvatam*' ['He mixes with *Milk* the cup dedicated to *Mitravaruṇa*,—with flour, that dedicated to *Manthin*,—with fried grains, that dedicated to *Hariyojana*,—with gold, that dedicated to *Shukra*,—with clarified butter, that dedicated to *Patnīvat*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are the details relating *things to be offered* to be performed in connection with these 'mixings'—or not?

Question—"Why should there be any doubt in this matter?"

Answer—If these 'mixings' are meant to be offered, then the details should be performed; if they are not meant to be offered, then they should not be performed.

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The *mixings* are meant to be offered, and hence the details relating to things to be offered should be performed. As a matter of fact, the *mixing* brings about two results—(1) the *Soma-juice* becomes mixed with the *milk* (and other things), and (2) when the mixture is offered as a libation, the milk also becomes connected with the libation offered;—when the *Soma-juice* becomes mixed with milk, we do not perceive any benefit conferred on the *Soma-juice* by being mixed with the milk; while if the milk becomes connected with the *offering*, there is a benefit brought to the *offering*, in the form of its being accomplished. If the mixing is done with the view that the substance mixed should become connected with the *offering*,—then the Mixing is found to be of use through the visible benefit;—it being declared that 'when an offering is made with milk, it becomes highly efficacious'. On the other hand, in the other case (if the *mixing* were taken as meant only for mixing the *Soma* with the other substance), it would be necessary to assume a benefit conferred on the *Soma* by the mixing [and such a benefit could only be something imperceptible, transcendental]. Hence the conclusion is that when the *Soma-juice* is mixed with milk, it is done only with the view that the mixture may be connected with the injunction of the actual act of offering. At the original sacrifice itself, there is no mixing (of *Soma*) with

any other substance; therefore the milk in question cannot be taken as enjoined in place of that other substance,—because the *Soma is something new*.—From all this it follows that the Milk should be regarded as enjoined for the purpose of being offered; and hence the details connected with the Milk to be offered should be performed."

SŪTRA (46).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A SECONDARY FACTOR, SERVING THE PURPOSE OF 'MIXING'.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

In fact, the Milk should be taken as a secondary factor, subordinate to the *Soma*;—not as a substance to be offered; because it has not been mentioned as something to be offered; in fact, it has been spoken of merely as something subserving the purposes of the *Soma*.

SŪTRA (47).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS NOT MENTIONED.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the Milk is not connected with either the Libation or the Injunction of the Performance.—That it is *not mentioned* (as to be so connected) is clear from the fact, that it serves a different purpose altogether. Even though the Milk may be actually seen to be thrown into the fire (along with *Soma-juice*), yet, it is not by the *Milk* that the sacrificial offering is accomplished; it is only when the substance is directly connected with a Deity that the *giving* becomes an 'offering';—and in the case in question there is no direct connection between the Milk and the Deity;—the declaration is that 'one takes up the *cup* dedicated to *Mitra-Varuṇa*',—not 'the *Milk* dedicated to *Mitra-Varuṇa*'.—Thus there being no visible purpose served by the Milk, some imperceptible embellishment of the *Soma* is assumed as brought about by the *mixing* (of the Milk); consequently the Details related to *what is to be offered* are not to be performed in the case in question.

SŪTRA (48).

ALSO BECAUSE THE VEDIC TEXT ALSO MAKES THE SOMA THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the Milk should be regarded as subserving the purposes of the *Soma*:—"For what reason?"—*The Vedic text makes*

the Soma the predominant factor ; because of the use of the Accusative Ending (in the word that stands for *Soma*) ; which clearly shows that it is the *Soma* that is the most desired as to be accomplished by means of the 'mixing'.

SŪTRA (49).

THERE IS ALSO A DECLAMATORY ASSERTION TO THE SAME EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

There is a declamatory assertion also to the effect that the 'Mixing' is for the sake of the *Soma*—'*Sa mitro'bravīt payasaiva mē somam shrīṇan*' ['*Mitra* said *mix up the Soma* for me with *milk*'] ; and he did not say 'they should offer *milk* to me' ; all that he said means 'they should embellish the *Soma* with milk'.—From this also it follows that the 'mixing' is for the sake of the *Soma*.

SŪTRA (50).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS FOUND ALONG WITH EMBELLISHMENTS. FOR THESE REASONS THE SOMA SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

The text speaking of the 'mixings' occurs *along with Embellishments* ; that is, the assertions 'Mixes with milk the cup dedicated to *Mitra-Varuṇa*' and the rest occur where there are texts speaking of Embellishments ; and inasmuch as this 'mixing' is found spoken of in a context dealing mostly with Embellishments, it follows that it also is an Embellishment. Such a notion frequently follows the fact of a certain context dealing preponderatingly with one sort of thing ; for instance, when a certain writing is found along with a large number of fine writings, it also comes to be regarded as *fine*.

From all this it follows that the *Mixing* is not to be connected with the details relating to *what is to be offered*.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *At the Ashvamēdha Sacrifice, the text 'Īshānāya parasvataḥ, etc.' lays down a distinct 'sacrifice'.*

SŪTRA (51).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" THE INTENTION MUST BE THAT THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN 'SANCTIFIED' SHOULD BE LET LOOSE; AS IN THE CASE OF 'DEPOSITING'."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Ashvamēdha* it is declared—'*Īshānāya parasvata ālabhēta*' ['One should do the *ālambha* of wild animals for *Īshāna*']; and in reference to the same, it is added—'*Paryagnikṛtānāraṇyān utsṛjanti*' ['They give up the wild animals after they have been sanctified'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the *ālambha* of the wild animals to be done only for the purpose of giving them away ['*ālambha*' in this case meaning *touching*]?—Or does 'giving away' stand only for the omission of the rest of the Rites,—the meaning being that 'those that have been embellished with the rites ending with *sanctification* should be given (offered) (without the subsequent rites being performed) [in this case '*ālambha*' standing for actual *sacrificing*]?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—" What is enjoined here is the *giving up of the thing*, and the *ālambha*, i.e. 'touching', also is only for the purpose of *giving up*.—How so?—By this interpretation, the (second) sentence lays down the *giving up* which has not been enjoined elsewhere and thus speaks of it by Direct Assertion; otherwise (under the other interpretation) it would only be reiterating the *giving away*, which has been already enjoined (in the first sentence); and it would be only the affix which could speak of the 'prohibition' (omission of the remaining rites) as indicated by Syntactical Connection;—and Direct Assertion is more authoritative than Syntactical Connection. Under the circumstances, the connection of the animals with the Deity would rest only in their being *touched*; the sense of the two sentences being—'The wild animals should be touched with reference to *Īshāna*, and after the rite of sanctification has been performed, they should be given up (let go)'.—*As in the case of 'depositing'*; i.e. there is the text—'*Ētat khalu sākṣādannam ya ēṣa charuḥ—ya ēnam charumupadadhāti*' ['Cooked Rice is verily food itself;—he who deposits this cooked rice, etc.']; where the *Cooked Rice* is secured only for being *deposited*;—similarly in the case in question also, the *Touching* of the wild animals should be only for *being given up*."

SŪTRA (52).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT IS THE PROHIBITION OF THE REST; AS (OTHERWISE) THERE WOULD BE NO SENSE;—JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE EXPRESSION 'IḌĀNTA'.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, what is asserted in this sentence is the prohibition of the rest of the rites.—"How so?"—*As, otherwise, there would be no sense*; i.e. the sentence '*Īshānāya parasvata ālabhēta*' would have no sense at all, if the '*ālambha*' (here spoken of) were only for the purpose of 'giving up'. —"Why?"—Because in that case, at the time of the '*ālambha*' itself, the *Adhvaryu* priest would know that the animals are not going to be offered to *Īshāna*;—and knowing this, he would have no such determination as that 'these should be got hold of for being offered to *Īshāna*'; hence what the sentence expresses being impossible to do, it becomes useless; because the determination can only be in the form that 'these animals are to be offered to *Īshāna*'; hence it follows that what is enjoined by the term '*ālambha*' is the act of *offering* itself;—and when the act of *offering* is what is enjoined, the second sentence—'*Paryagnikṛtān utsṛjanti*'—can be taken only as laying down a particular detail in reference to the 'giving up',—the idea conveyed being that 'they give up (i.e. offer) the animals in this manner (i.e. after the performance of the "*Paryagni*" sanctification, without waiting for the performance of the other rites)'.

Question—"What is the *particular detail* that is laid down? Is it the time for the *Paryagni-sanctification*—the idea being that they give away the animal at such and such a time?"

Not so, we reply. There is no word in the text signifying *time*. And if *time* were enjoined, then it would mean the preclusion of another time, not of other details.

"Then, does the sentence enjoin that the thing should be given away after the *Paryagni*-sanctification has been done?"

Even this is not so; it is not the bringing about of the *Paryagni-sanctification* that is asserted here; if that were so, then, that would preclude all other details, those preceding as well as those following the *Paryagni-sanctification*.

"What then is it that is asserted?"

It is that 'it should be given away as soon as the *Paryagni-sanctification* has been done'.

"Does it mean that it should be given away in that condition?"

No, we reply; the idea is obtained from the General Law itself that the animal should be given away in that condition. The word too is not expressive of the preclusion of other conditions (of the animals). In fact, if the animal is given away at the time indicated by the General Law, then it is one which has passed through the *Paryagni-sanctification*. If it meant

a preclusion of other conditions, then what would be precluded would be those details that come *after* the *Paryagni* and *before* the *giving away*,—not those that come *after* the *giving away*.

"What then is the meaning of the sentence?"

That the animal should be given up exactly as it becomes, on the performance of the *Paryagni-sanctification*.

"But the animal as having the said sanctification performed over it is already indicated by the General Law itself."

The answer to this is that the fact of the said sanctification appertaining to the animal has been reiterated in this sentence, for the purpose of precluding the other details; the meaning being that the animal should be given up after only those details have been performed over it which end with the *Paryagni-sanctification*; so that the (other) details that would come in under the General Law become excluded—and no other details are performed.

"But how can the words of the sentence preclude these other details?"

They can do so, we reply.

"How?"

When all the needs of the Principal Act have been met by the details directly laid down by the sentence (i.e. those ending with *Paryagni*), its connection with the other details indicated by the General Law, which can only be indirect, remains no longer possible.

From all this it follows that the sentence in question precludes the subsequent rites.

SŪTRA (53).

INASMUCH AS THERE IS A WORD WITH AN ANTECEDENT, THE TERM 'SAṀSTHĀPAYATI' ('COMPLETES') WOULD BE INEXPLICABLE IF THE SACRIFICE HAD NOT COMMENCED.

Bhāṣya.

There is a word with an antecedent, i.e. preceded by the commencement of the sacrifice,—in the form of the text '*Ājyēna shēṣam saṁsthāpayati*' ('Completes the rest with clarified butter'); it is only if the sacrifice has been commenced that the term 'completes'—which connotes *finishing*—can have any sense; this sacrifice becoming similar to the other sacrifice, through its completion. If there had been no *sacrifice* commenced already,—and there were only the *giving up* of the animals,—then this would not be similar to any other sacrifice, through *completion*, and in that case, the term 'completes' would have no sense.—From this also it follows that there is preclusion of the rest of the rites.

SŪTRA (54).

AS THEY ARE PROMPTED BY THE SACRIFICE, IF THERE WERE NO SACRIFICE, THERE WOULD BE NO PERFORMANCE OF THE RITES OF EMBELLISHMENT; AS THESE ARE PERFORMED ONLY FOR THE SAKE OF SACRIFICES; —JUST AS WHEN THERE ARE NO PRAYĀJAS, THERE IS NO TAKING UP OF THE CLARIFIED BUTTER.

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* explains the purpose (of the present discussion).

If the mere *giving up of the thing* were taken as enjoined (and no sacrifice), then *there would be no performance of the rites of embellishment.*—"Why?"—Because the prompting of the embellishments is due to the sacrifice; so that if there were no sacrifice, why should the rites of embellishment be performed? Because they are always prompted by sacrifices. Just as when there are no *Prayājas*, the Clarified Butter to be used at them is not taken up,—i.e. *there is no taking up of the Clarified Butter.* That is to say, in those cases in regard to which it has been declared that 'they are without *Prayājas* and without *Anuyājas*',—as the *Prayājas* are not there, the Clarified Butter to be used at them is not taken up;—similarly in the case in question, the Rites of embellishment would not be performed.

SŪTRA (55).

THERE MUST BE PERFORMANCE (OF THE RITES)—WHEN THERE IS PRECLUSION; OTHERWISE NON-PERFORMANCE WOULD BE SUBVERSIVE OF THE WHOLE.

Bhāṣya.

Question—"Even if we accept the view that the sentence in question precludes the rest of the Rites,—even then, would the Rites of Embellishment be not performed?"

Not so; under the view of the preclusion of the rest, there would certainly be the performance of the Rites of Embellishment; because in that case, there is a *sacrifice*, and hence all the details of the sacrifice should be performed;—if there were no sacrifice, then alone would there be *non-performance* of the embellishments, and this would be *subversive of the whole*;—as a matter of fact, however, under the said view, the sacrifice *is* there;—hence all the embellishments have to be performed under the view that the sentence in question asserts the preclusion of the rest of the rites.

Adhikaraṇa (14): *The sentence 'Ājyēna shēṣam saṁsthāpayati' lays down a distinct sacrificial act.*

SŪTRA (56).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*continued*]—"The performance with Clarified Butter should be regarded as a substitute, because there is giving away of the thing."

Bhāṣya.

There is the text '*Paryagnikṛtam pātnīvatamutsṛjati*' ['Gives away the *Pātnīvata* which has had the *Paryagni-sanctification* performed']; and in connection with this, there is the further declaration—'*Ājyēna shēṣam saṁsthāpayati*' ['Completes the rest with Clarified Butter'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the Clarified Butter to be regarded as a substitute at the Rite that has gone before?—Or does the second sentence lay down a totally distinct Rite with Clarified Butter as the substance?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"It should be regarded as a substitute.—Why?—The term '*pātnīvata*' signifies a certain *thing*;—the term '*utsṛjati*' ('gives away') lays down the *giving away* of that *thing*;—the term '*shēṣam*' ('the rest') denotes what remains after certain things have been used; so that when it is declared that 'One completes the rest with Clarified Butter', what is done is that Clarified Butter becomes declared as to be used in place of the animal (which has been given away).—'But it has been said that the preceding Rite has been finished'.—The answer to that is that, there being the clear assertion of the *giving away* of the thing,—and the term 'rest' being still unexplained,—it is suspected that the preceding Rite has not been finished; and it is for this reason that the Clarified Butter has been laid down as a substitute;—such is our idea; specially as the term '*saṁsthāpayati*' ('completes') cannot be applicable to an absolutely fresh Rite."

SŪTRA (57).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*concluded*]—"Because the text speaks of 'Completion'."

Bhāṣya.

"The above idea of ours is supported by the following consideration also:—The term '*saṁsthāpayati*' speaks of *completion*; from which we conclude that 'the Rite that was originally commenced with the *animal*, is *completed* by means of *Clarified Butter*, after the animal has been given away'.—If the latter were a fresh rite, then it would be necessary to find

a previous declaration regarding its commencement; as a matter of fact, however, without making any mention of the *commencement*, the text goes on to speak of the *completion*; from this we conclude that the 'completion' spoken of is that of a previous rite, and it is not a fresh rite that is mentioned."

SŪTRA (58).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT MUST BE REGARDED AS THE INJUNCTION OF A FRESH RITE; BECAUSE THE PRECEDING RITE HAS BEEN FINISHED; SPECIALLY AS IT IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM OTHERS.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, it should be taken as the injunction of a distinct Rite.—Why?—*Because the preceding rite has been finished.*—"But it has been explained (under Sū. 56) that there being the clear assertion of *giving away*, and the term 'rest' being still unexplained, it is suspected that the preceding rite has not been finished".—The answer to that is as follows:—Both these (grounds of suspicion) are thus removed—(A) The verb '*saṁsthāpayati*' ('completes') is connected with the original term '*pātnīvata*'; the sense thus is that 'he completes the *Pātnīvata* offering'; so that it is a *sacrificial-offering* that is enjoined here. The word '*saṁsthāpayati*' is derived from the causal root '*sthāpa*' with the prefix '*sam*';—when it is necessary to use some such root with the prefix 'sam' as may be expressive of the '*bhāvanā*' (activity),—and when this *bhāvanā* comes to be expressive, the particular root used is '*saṁsthāpayati*' which is not incompatible with the context; just in the same way as the root '*ālabhati*' has been used in the previous sentence.—(B) As for the term '*shēṣa*' ('rest'), it has been used through similarity (between the two acts expressed by the two roots '*ālabhati*' and '*saṁsthāpayati*').—Lastly, as for the 'giving away of the thing', there is nothing in it that is incompatible with the *sacrificial-offering* that is spoken of. From all this we conclude that just as other verbs—like '*Nirvapati*' ('offers') and the like—are used for the enjoining of distinct rites, so also is the verb '*saṁsthāpayati*' in the present instance; *specially as it is not different from the others.*

SŪTRA (59).

IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE TEXT INDICATES THE WELL-KNOWN 'NON-SACRIFICIAL CHARACTER' OF THE VANASPATI-OFFERING.

Bhāṣya.

It is for this reason that there is a text speaking of the '*well-known non-sacrificial character*' *of the Vanaspati-offering.*—"How?"—The text is as follows—'*Yat tvaṣṭārañcha vanaspatimāvāhayasyatha vainau yakṣyasi tvāṣṭrī navamī prayājējyā vānaspatyā dashamyatraivaitāviṣṭau vidyāt*';

where it said that the *Vanaspati-offering* is helped in its completion by another subsidiary detail; and this indicates the absence of the *Vanaspati-offering*;—when the rest of it is finished, then alone we have the words 'offers the Vanaspati-libation'. If the previous offering had been finished, then it would have disappeared; and then alone would it be justifiable to indicate its absence. Hence the conclusion must be that the previous offering has been finished, and the second offering is an entirely distinct act.

SŪTRA (60).

IT HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF AS 'SAṀSTHĀPAYATI' BECAUSE OF THE DEITY BEING THE SAME.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that—"The use of the verb '*saṁsthāpayati*' would not be justifiable if it were a distinct act";—this has got to be refuted. Our answer is as follows:—The name '*saṁsthā*' ('completion') has been applied here to what is not really a '*saṁsthā*' (completion); and the rite has the semblance of being a completion (continuation) of the preceding rite of the *Pātnīvata*, on the ground of the deity being the same in both cases. Thus it is on the basis of this similarity that the term '*saṁsthā*' has been used.

End of Pāda iv of Adhyāya IX.

End of Adhyāya IX.

ADHYĀYA X.

PĀDA I.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *Those details of the Archetypal Sacrifice whose need is no longer there should not be performed at the Ectypal Sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" INASMUCH AS THE ENTIRE PROCEDURE IS TRANSFERRED TO THE OTHER CONTEXT, ALL THE DETAILS SHOULD BE PERFORMED."

Bhāṣya.

The subject of 'Modification' (*Ūhā*) has been dealt with in the preceding discourse; we are now going to deal with 'Exclusion' ('*Bādha*') and 'Inclusion' ('*Abhyuchchaya*'). When one idea that has been conceived as 'this is so' is, on other grounds, said to be 'wrong', it is a case of '*Bādha*' (Exclusion, Annulment);—and when the idea that 'this is here' is accompanied by the idea 'this other thing also is here', it is a case of '*Abhyuchchaya*' (Inclusion, Combination, Aggregation).

The question that is considered first of all is—[When the details of the Archetype are 'transferred' to the Ectype by virtue of the General Law that 'the Ectype is to be performed like the Archetype], are all the details of the Archetype to be performed at the Ectype? Or is there something that is to be excluded?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—" *Inasmuch as the entire procedure,*—of the Archetype—*is transferred to the other context*—i.e. to the Ectype,—without any distinction,—it follows that any and every detail that appertains to the Archetype is to be performed at the Ectype,—even those for whom the need may have disappeared.—Why so?—Because the direct assertion makes all the details applicable to the Ectype; and no burden is too heavy for Direct Assertion.—'How do you know that there is such a Direct Assertion?'—The entire body of details pertaining to the Archetype is required,—by way of a supplementary declaration,—by all the injunctions bearing upon the Ectype; so that all this becomes connected with the injunction bearing upon the Ectype in the same manner as it does with that of the Archetype; and there is no distinction between the two cases. Hence in the case of the *Kṛṣṇalas* (*gold pieces*, that are used as the offering substance at an Ectype, in the place of cakes), just as *cooking* is done (as is going to be established under Sū. 10. 2. 1-2),—even though it cannot serve the same purpose at the Ectype that it serves at the Archetype,—so also should the *threshing* and other details be done, even though all this also cannot serve the purpose at the Ectype that it serves at the Archetype."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT IS ONLY WHEN THE NEED IS THERE THAT THE 'MANTRA', THE 'EMBELLISHMENT' AND THE 'SUBSTANCE' ARE TO BE EMPLOYED; AS ALL THESE ARE FOR THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*' ('in reality') signifies the rejection of the above view.

It is not right that all the details of the Archetype should be performed at the Ectype; in fact, in some cases, 'the Mantra or the Embellishment or the Substance' become excluded, when its need has ceased.—"Why so?"—As a matter of fact, the Mantra or the Embellishment or the Substance is used only when there is need for it, not when there is no need; because everyone of those is enjoined as to be used for the purpose of something else, never for itself.

"It has been already explained that even when the need for an act has ceased, the act is done on the strength of Vedic texts; for instance, the *cooking* is done to gold-pieces (though there is no need for cooking in their case)."

There is no Vedic text laying down the use of what is not needed. As a matter of fact, the Ectype is not syntactically connected with those subsidiary details that appertain to the Archetype; the idea derived is not that 'the desired result should be obtained by the performance of the Ectypal sacrifice—how?—by means of the subsidiary details of the Archetype'; the idea really is that 'the result is to be obtained by the performance of the Ectype, just as it was obtained by that of the Archetype'.

"How so?"

What is needed for the Result is a particular functioning of the sacrifice, not merely Functioning in general. In reference to the Archetype, this 'functioning of the sacrifice' is found to be set forth and recapitulated in the declaration of the entire procedure; and it can therefore be sought after, and is capable of being sought after, to supply a real need. If the subsidiary details also were sought after, in connection with the Ectype, any particular functioning of the sacrifice could not be sought after. Otherwise there would be indirect indication. For instance, when it is said 'he fights with the stick', the words do not express the form of the *man with the stick*; if there were need for the indication of the man, then the words would be able to do that indicating. In the same manner, in the case in question, in the event of the subsidiary details being sought after (in relation to the Ectype), the words do not express that special character of the sacrifice which consists in its having those details,—though it *is* got at by indirect indication; and if there were such an indication, then the direct signification of the words would have to be rejected. If then, with a view to save the words from being rejected, the special functioning of the sacrifice were not sought after,—then the subsidiary

details themselves would be sought after. In that case, when there would be a seeking for the method of procedure of the Ectype,—the injunctive word would remain there with its needs unfulfilled;—the subsidiary details also would stand in need of another procedure;—the implied procedure of the Archetype would have to be abandoned,—and it would be necessary to admit the impossible syntactical connection between the Ectypal sacrifice and those details of the Archetype which serve some useful purpose at the performance of the Ectype. And all this is most unreasonable. For these reasons, the sentence is interpreted to mean that 'the result should be accomplished by means of the Ectype in the same way in which it is accomplished by means of the Archetype'.

"What if it is so?"

If it is so, then the effect of it is as follows:—Those details which are performed at the Archetype for the fulfilling of a certain need do not become enjoined in reference to the Ectype, if there is no need for them at this latter. Hence the conclusion is that the General Law does not lay down the performance at the Ectype of those details of the Archetype of which the need has ceased.

SŪTRA (3).

ALSO BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT DIRECTLY ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—"Just as in connection with the gold-pieces, though the original need for it has ceased, yet the *cooking* is done to them, on the strength of a Vedic text,—so would other similar details also be performed".—That cannot be; because the *cooking* done to the gold-pieces is not by virtue of the General Law (relating to the Archetype and Ectype); it is directly laid down by a Vedic text—'*Ghṛtē shrapayati*' ('Cooks the gold-pieces in Clarified Butter'). This text does not speak of the *cooking* as serving the purpose that it serves at the Archetype; in fact, on the strength of the text, the *cooking* is taken as serving some transcendental purpose. If the direct text were not there, then '*on the ground of their being not directly enjoined*', the *cooking* also would not have been done (to the gold-pieces).—Thus the citing of the analogy of the 'Cooking' is not right.

"What is the purpose served by this discussion? Which too is the Ectype that serves as the example?"

(*a*) Somewhere we read in the Veda (in connection with the Ectype)—'*Svayanditam varhirbhavati*' ['The grass used is that which has fallen down by itself']; by virtue of this the substance used at the Archetype (viz. Kusha-grass specially lopped for the purpose) becomes excluded (there being no need for it).—(*b*) Similarly, there is the text '*Svayamkṛtā vēdirbhavati*' ['The altar is self-made', i.e. in its natural state]; by virtue of which all the details of cleaning, digging and marking become excluded (as there is no need for them).—(*c*) Lastly, there is the text '*Svayamshīrṇā shākhā bhavati*' ['The branch to be used is that which has become torn off by itself'], by virtue of which the *sword* (for the cutting of the Branch)

becomes excluded [there being no need for it].—The *Mantras* too that are connected with these details become excluded from the Ectype.

Or, the *Sūtras* (1–3) may be taken as representing the following *Adhikaraṇa*.

ADHIKARAṆA (2) (the second interpretation of *Sūtras* 1–3): *Threshing is not to be done in connection with the gold-pieces.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THE ENTIRE PROCEDURE IS TRANSFERRED TO THE OTHER CONTEXT, ALL THE DETAILS SHOULD BE PERFORMED."

Bhāṣya.

There is the '*Charu-offering*' to *Prajāpati* laid down in the text—'*Prājāpatyam charum nirvapēt shatakṛṣṇalam āyuṣkāmaḥ*' ['One desiring longevity should offer *Charu* in the shape of a Hundred-gold-pieces to *Prajāpati*'].

Taking this as a special case falling under the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, we proceed to consider the question—Should 'Threshing' be done to the gold-pieces—or not ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"*Inasmuch as the entire procedure is transferred to the other Context, all the details should be performed*; hence 'Threshing' should be done to the gold-pieces, just as 'Cooking' is done to them".

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT IS ONLY WHEN THE NEED IS THERE THAT THE MANTRA, THE EMBELLISHMENT AND THE SUBSTANCE ARE TO BE EMPLOYED; AS ALL THESE ARE FOR THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

The *Siddhānta* view is that the 'threshing' should not be done to the gold-pieces.

SŪTRA (3).

ALSO BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT DIRECTLY ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

This refutes the argument that has been urged (by the other party).

Or, the *Sūtras* 1–3 may be taken as representing the following *Adhikaraṇa*:—

ADHIKARAṆA (3): [The *third interpretation of Sūtras* 1–3]—*At the 'Charu-offering' to Vishvēdēvas, the 'invocation' to Viṣṇu is to be excluded.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THE ENTIRE PROCEDURE IS TRANSFERRED TO THE OTHER CONTEXT, ALL THE DETAILS SHOULD BE PERFORMED."

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Vaishvadēvam charum nirvapēt bhrātṛvyavān; tam varhiṣadam kṛtvā shamyayā sphyēna vyūhēt idamahamamuñchāmuñcha vyūhāmīti yam dviṣyāt tam dhyāyēt, yadadho'vamṛdyēta yachcha sphya āshliṣyēt tad viṣṇava urukramāyāvadyēt*' ['A man who has enemies should offer Cooked Rice to the *Vishvēdēvas*; having deposited it on the Kusha-grass, he should collect it with the *Shamyā* or the *Sphya*, saying the words *idam ahamamuñcha vyūhāmi*; and he should think of the person whom he wishes to injure; what falls on the ground, or remains attached to the *Sphya*, that he should offer to *Viṣṇu-urukrama*']. [At the said offering to the *Vishvēdēvas*, a *Mantra* is recited invoking the Deity; the subsequent offering to *Viṣṇu-urukrama* has for its Archetype the said offering to *Vishvēdēvas*.]

In regard to this the question that arises is—Is the deity *Viṣṇu-urukrama* to be invoked—or not [in the manner in which the *Vishvēdēvas* are invoked at the original sacrifice]?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"*Inasmuch as the entire procedure is transferred to the other Context, all the details should be performed*;—hence the Deity should be invoked".

Objection—'It is just possible that no cooked rice may remain attached to the *Sphya*, or none of it may fall on the ground; and in that case, as there would be nothing to offer to *Viṣṇu-urukrama*, the invocation of that deity, if done, would be entirely purposeless.—Nor would it be right on the strength of the text quoted, to smear the rice to the *Sphya* or to

let it fall on the ground, intentionally; because either the *smeared* or the *fallen* Rice has not been enjoined as to be obtained or secured. Nor again is the offering to *Viṣṇu-urukrama* an act meant to serve a useful purpose; it is only a method of *disposing* of what may be smeared in the *Sphya* or dropped on the ground; there is also a visible purpose served by this, in the shape of the cleaning of the *Sphya* by the removal of the Rice smeared in it. In the other view, it would be necessary to assume a transcendental result following from the offering.—It may be urged that a transcendental result following from the offering will have to be assumed in any case.—True, it will have to be assumed as following from the sacrifice,—but only through the disposal of the substance in the said manner.'

"Our answer to the above is as follows:—Even when there is no need for it, the detail must be performed; just as *Cooking* is done to the gold-pieces.—Then again, it is quite possible that some rice may be smeared in the *Sphya*, or fall on the ground; and in that case, if there has been no invocation of the Deity, the offering would be defective. Hence people who are careful should always invoke the Deity; because (in case the invocation has not been done) if the rice should become smeared in the *Sphya* or drop on the ground,—it would not do to perform the invocation at that time, when its subsidiary condition (time) would be absent; as a matter of fact, it is only when the Deity is remembered at the right time that it takes its proper place,—not if it is remembered at a time subsequent to its right time; as at such a time the remembrance, if done, could be only for some special purpose, and would be without the proper *Mantra*.—If the *Sphya* does not become smeared with the rice,—or if no rice drops on the ground,—there would be nothing lost if the invocation has been done.—It would not be right to entertain the idea that—'Just as the King or the Minister or the Brāhmaṇa, having been invited for being honoured and served, if the honour or service is not rendered, he regards himself to have been ill-treated and it is feared that he would injure the inviter,—the same may be feared of the Deity also (if it is invoked and no offering is made to it).'—Because as a matter of fact, at the sacrifice, the Deity is not actually invited (called),—nor on being invited, will it take the offering to itself, or be satisfied with it, and on being satisfied, become pleased, and on being pleased will bestow the reward on the performer;—that all this is not so has been established under *Adhyāya* IX (9. 1. 6 *et seq.*).—Hence there would be no harm at all if the Deity were invoked and no offering made to it."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT IS ONLY WHEN THE NEED IS THERE THAT THE MANTRA, THE EMBELLISHMENT AND THE SUBSTANCE ARE TO BE EMPLOYED; AS ALL THESE ARE FOR THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*' ('in reality') signifies the rejection of the above view.

The Embellishment involved in the Invocation should be excluded.—Why ?—Because the 'Embellishment by Invocation', as also the Substance, is employed only when there is need for it; this has been explained already.

It has been argued that—"it is possible for the rice to become smeared or to drop on the ground, and it would not be desirable to do the Invocation in the middle of the performance".—This, however, does not affect the position; such *interrupted* invocation would be as good as *uninterrupted*; because at the time prescribed for the Invocation, the circumstances necessary for the offering to *Viṣṇu-urukrama* had not arrived; and as soon as those circumstances have arrived, its performance would come in.—What has not become smeared,—or what has not fallen on the ground,—need not be disposed of; and what is done after the performance has commenced does not help that performance.—From all this it follows that *Viṣṇu-urukrama* should not be invoked.

SŪTRA (3).

ALSO BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT DIRECTLY ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

This is the refutation of an argument against the *Siddhānta*; and has been already explained.

Adhikaraṇa (4): *At sacrifices like the 'Dīkṣaṇīyā', the 'Ārambhaṇīyā' sacrifice is excluded.*

SŪTRA (4).

The 'Iṣṭi connected with Ārambha' (commencement) is excluded from the Subsidiary Sacrifice; as the 'commencement' is related to the Primary Sacrifice.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice laid down in the text '*Jyotiṣṭomēna svargakāmo yajēta*' ['Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice'];—then there are the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and other rites which have the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* for their Archetype, which are laid down in the texts—'*Agnāvaiṣṇavamēkādashakapālam nirvapēt*' and so forth ['One should offer the cake baked upon eleven pans, dedicated to *Agni-Viṣṇu*'];—at the (commencement of the) Archetypal sacrifice of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, comes the *Ārambhaṇīyā Iṣṭi*, laid down in the text—'*Agnāvaiṣṇavamēkādashakapālam nirvapēt darshapūrṇamāsavārabhamāṇaḥ sarasvatyai charum sarasvatē dvādashakapālam, agnayē bhaginē aṣṭākapālam nirvapēt yaḥ kāmayēta bhagyannādaḥ syām*' ['Proceeding to commence the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, one should offer the cake baked on eleven pans, dedicated to *Agni-Viṣṇu*, cooked rice to *Sarasvatī*, a cake baked on twelve pans, to *Sarasvat*; a cake baked on eight pans, to *Agni-Bhagin*, if one is desirous to be prosperous and eater of food']; in some texts the last offering to *Bhagin* is laid down as essential (and not contingent upon the man desiring prosperity, etc.).

In regard to this, there arises the question—At the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and other sacrifices, should the *Ārambhaṇīyā Iṣṭi* be performed, or not?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "all the details related to the Archetype should be performed at the Ectype, *because the entire procedure being transferred to the other context, all the details should be performed* (Sū. 10. 1. 1). [Hence the *Ārambhaṇīyā* must be performed at the *Dīkṣaṇīya* and other sacrifices.]"

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The *Ārambhaṇīyā Iṣṭi* becomes excluded from all that set of rites named '*Dīkṣaṇīyā*' and the rest which have the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* for their Archetype, and which are subsidiary to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*.—"Why so?"—Because in this case, the '*ārambha*', *Commencement*, is of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, not of the *Dīkṣaṇīyā*, etc.—"How?"—The 'Commencement' of an act would always be either the first item in the procedure, or the first activity of the man;—if it means the *first item* in the procedure, then it would consist of such items as the *securing of the services of the Priests* or the *selection of the sacrificial ground*;—all this will have been done as part of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* for the purposes

of that sacrifice, and the same would serve the purposes of the *Dīkṣaṇiyā*, etc., also; and it should not have to be done over again for the sake of these latter rites;—so that, so far as these are concerned, the item of 'Commencement' will have disappeared;—and when the item of 'Commencement' itself has disappeared, the Rites of the *Ārambhaṇiyā* also, which are meant to accomplish that *Commencement*, would also disappear.—On the other hand, if 'Commencement' stands for the *first activity of the man* concerned, then,—since the 'activity' of man consists in being aroused from apathy,—the man who is going to perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* along with all its subsidiaries would have been aroused from his apathy by the performance of the first item in the performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; and from that point onwards, till the completion of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* along with its subsidiaries, he would be actively engaged, and there would be no *apathy* in him from which he could be aroused (at the 'Commencement' of the *Dīkṣaṇiyā*);—thus it is by virtue of the 'Commencement' of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself, that he becomes engaged in the *Dīkṣaṇiyā* and the other rites (which are only subsidiaries of that sacrifice);—so that there is no 'Commencement' for these;—and when there is no 'Commencement', the item of '*Ārambhaṇiyā Iṣṭi*', which is for the purpose of accomplishing that 'Commencement', also disappears.

Says the Opponent—"Surely there would be the 'Commencement' of the subsidiaries, *Dīkṣaṇiyā*, etc., themselves."

Reply—No; the 'Commencement' consists either of such acts as *securing the services of the Priests, selecting the sacrificial ground* and so forth, or *of the first activity of the man*;—in either case, the man has done this already for the sake of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. If it be said that "in connection with the *Dīkṣaṇiyā*, etc., there has come in another *first item*",—even so, that would not bring in the *Ārambhaṇiyā* connected with the Archetype (*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*);—thus the *Ārambhaṇiyā* would be excluded from all those items that are subsidiary to another act.—Further, as a matter of fact, at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the purpose of the 'Commencement' is served by the *Dīkṣaṇiyā*, etc., themselves;—as is clearly indicated by the following declaration: '*Agnāvaiṣṇavamēkādashakapālam nirvapēt dīkṣiṣyamāṇaḥ*, etc. etc.'.

Adhikaraṇa (5): *At the 'Anumati' and other sacrifices, the 'Ārambhaṇīyā Iṣṭi' becomes excluded.*

SŪTRA (5).

IT SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THAT PRINCIPAL ACT WHICH IS RELATED TO ANOTHER, BECAUSE IT IS THE COMMENCEMENT OF ALL, AND BECAUSE IT IS NOT A SUBSIDIARY.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Rājasūya* sacrifice, laid down in the text—'*Rājasūyēna svārājyakāmo yajēta*' ['Desiring self-sovereignty, one should perform the *Rājasūya* sacrifice']; in connection with this there have been laid down the *Iṣṭi*, the *Pashu*, the *Soma*, and the *Darvihoma*,—all of which are 'principal acts';—under '*Iṣṭi*' are included the *Anumati* and other sacrifices.

In regard to these, *Anumati*, etc., there arises the question—Should the *Ārambhaṇīyā Iṣṭi* be performed at these? Or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"It should be performed; because *inasmuch as the entire procedure is transferred to the other context, all the details should be performed* (Sū. 10. 1. 1)".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The *Ārambhaṇīyā* should be excluded from the Principal Act which is related to another Principal Act.—"Why?"—Because in regard to these acts, the *Jyotiṣṭoma* has been declared to serve the purposes of the 'Commencement', in the text—'*Agniṣṭomam prathamam āharati*' ('First of all one performs the *Agniṣṭoma*']; the single declaration of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* must be taken as applicable to each one of the *principal acts* pertaining to the Archetype; because the Context appertains in common to each one of the principal acts.—Consequently, the purposes of 'Commencement' of the *Anumati* and other principal acts having been accomplished (by means of the performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), the *Ārambhaṇīyā Iṣṭi* should not be performed.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *At the 'Ārambhaṇīyā' itself, the 'Ārambhaṇīyā' becomes excluded.*

SŪTRA (6).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" IT MUST SURELY BE PERFORMED AT THAT, LIKE THE PRAYĀJAS."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Ārambhaṇīyā Iṣṭi*, laid down in the text—'*Agnāvaiṣṇavamēkādashakapālam nirvapēt darshapūrṇamāsāvārabhamāṇaḥ*, etc.' [' Proceeding to perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, one should offer the cake baked upon eleven pans, dedicated to *Agni-Viṣṇu*, etc. etc.'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—At the *Ārambhaṇīyā Iṣṭi* itself, should another *Ārambhaṇīyā Iṣṭi* be performed or not ?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows :—" *It must surely be performed at that.*—The particle '*tu*' ('surely') is meant to set aside all doubts on the point ; the meaning being that there can be no doubt at all ; another *Ārambhaṇīyā* must be performed at the *Ārambhaṇīyā Iṣṭi.*—Why ?—Because, *inasmuch as the entire procedure has been transferred to the other Context, all the details should be performed* (Sū. 10. 1. 1). That is, just as the *Prayājas* are performed so should the *Ārambhaṇīyā* also be performed. —Says the Opponent—' If another *Ārambhaṇīyā* were to be performed at the *Ārambhaṇīyā*, then, at the former also a third *Ārambhaṇīyā* would have to be performed,—and yet another at this latter ; and so on and on there would be no end to the performance of the *Ārambhaṇīyā* ; and there must be some end to what is laid down in the scriptures '.—The answer to this is that in the cases of all infinite regress, there would be a limit imposed by the capacity (of the performer)."

SŪTRA (7).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—CERTAINLY NOT ; BECAUSE IT IS A SUBSIDIARY.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase 'certainly not' sets aside the view set forth above ; it means that another *Ārambhaṇīyā Iṣṭi* should not be performed at the *Ārambhaṇīyā.*—" Why ? "—Because it is subsidiary to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* ; and the 'commencement' of the Subsidiary is accomplished by the commencement of the Primary itself,—as has been explained above.

Says the Opponent—" When one undertakes the performance of the *Ārambhaṇīyā*, he has to perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* ; and hence like the Archetype, another *Ārambhaṇīyā* also should be performed by one who has

undertaken the performance of the *Ārambhaṇīyā*; consequently, another *Ārambhaṇīyā* must be performed at the *Ārambhaṇīyā*."

It is not so; even though he has not performed another *Ārambhaṇīyā*, if he performs the *Ārambhaṇīyā*, it is understood that he performs it as engaged in the *Ārambhaṇīyā*. Hence there should be no performance of the other *Ārambhaṇīyā* at the *Ārambhaṇīyā*.

Further, like water-bubbles, there would be no end to the series of *Ārambhaṇīyās*;—and this infinite regress indicated by the sentence would be set aside by the capacity of the performer! Under our view, on the other hand, there would not be either an infinite regress nor its rejection.

From all this it follows that there should be no performance of the second *Ārambhaṇīyā* at the *Ārambhaṇīyā* itself.

SŪTRA (8).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS A SINGLE SENTENCE.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also we conclude that it should be as explained above.—"For what reason?"—There is a single sentence laying down the *Ārambhaṇīyā*; if it enjoins it in connection with the *Ārambhaṇīyā*, then it does not become enjoined in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*; so that it could lay it down in connection with these latter only as if it were *not enjoined*; and it could be transferred to the *Ārambhaṇīyā* as if it were *enjoined*;—it cannot, however, do all this, when it is uttered only once.—For this reason also another *Ārambhaṇīyā* should not be performed at the *Ārambhaṇīyā*.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *At the 'Khalēbālī', the 'Yūpāhuti' becomes excluded.*

SŪTRA (9).

THE ACT IN QUESTION IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRINGING ABOUT AN OBJECT; IT SHOULD BE EXCLUDED, AS THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR IT; THAT IT IS FOR THAT PURPOSE IS CLEAR FROM THE VEDIC TEXT ITSELF.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the said *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is the *Agniṣomīya*-animal-sacrifice laid down in the text—'One who, being initiated, sacrifices the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*':—in connection with this latter, it has been declared—'*Yūpamachchheṣyatā hotavyam, na hi dīkṣitasyāgnau juhoti, ājyañchāraṇiñchādāya yūpasyāntikē'gnim mathitvā yūpāhutim juhoti*' [wherein the offering of the '*Yūpāhuti*', 'Oblation at the Sacrificial Post', has been laid down];—in connection with the *Sādyaskra* sacrifice it has been declared that 'The *Khalēbālī* (Stake in the Threshing Yard) is the Sacrificial Post' [i.e. the stake in the yard is to be used as the Sacrificial Post].

In regard to this, there arises the question—At the *Sādyaskra* sacrifice should, or should not, the *Yūpāhuti* be offered at the *Stake in the Threshing Yard*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "it should be offered; because, *inasmuch as the entire procedure has been transferred to the other context, all the details should be performed* (Sū. 10. 1. 1)".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*The act in question is for the purpose of bringing about an object*; that is, it is done with the view that through such-like embellishments, the Post becomes the 'Sacrificial Post'; this act has been laid down for the man who desires to secure a 'Sacrificial Post'; hence on the basis of the Vedic text, the embellishment (brought about by the *Yūpāhuti*) is for the purposes of the Sacrificial Post; the term '*achchha*' in the text has the sense of 'securing';—now at the *Sādyaskra*, there is no need for the 'Sacrificial Post', as the animal is tied to the *Stake in the Threshing Yard*, which is not the 'Sacrificial Post';—consequently all those embellishments which, like the *Yūpāhuti*, are for the purpose of bringing about the 'Sacrificial Post', become excluded, for the simple reason that there is no need for the Post.—From all this it follows that the *Yūpāhuti* at the *Stake in the Threshing Yard* is to be excluded.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *At the 'Sādyaskra', the 'Sthāṇvāhuti' is excluded.*

SŪTRA (10).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THE 'TREE-STUMP' IS MENTIONED ONLY AS INDICATING THE SPOT, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN TO BE NOT EXCLUDED."

Bhāṣya. *

In connection with aforesaid *Agniṣomiya animal-sacrifice*, we read—'*Sthāṇau sthāṇvāhutim juhoti*' ['Offers the *Sthāṇvāhuti* on the *Sthāṇu* (Tree-stump') [after the wood-piece has been cut off for making the Sacrificial Post, the stump of the tree that remains is called '*Sthāṇu*'].

Hence in connection with the *Sādyaskra*, there arises the following question—At the *Sādyaskra*, should the *Sthāṇvāhuti* be offered—or not? —In this connection, what has got to be considered is this—Is the *Sthāṇvāhuti* an act that helps the main sacrifice directly? Or is it only an embellishment for the Sacrificial Post? If it is an act that helps the main sacrifice directly, then it must be done (at the *Sādyaskra*);—while if it is only an embellishment of the Sacrificial Post, then it should be excluded.—"In what way would it be an act helping the main sacrifice directly? How, too, would it be an embellishment of the Sacrificial Post?"—If the sentence be construed to mean that 'one who desires to secure the Sacrificial Post should offer the *Sthāṇvāhūti*', then this *Āhuti* becomes an embellishment of the Sacrificial Post;—on the other hand, if the phrase '*Yūpamachchēṣyatā*' ('by one desiring to secure the Sacrificial Post') is not construed with the Context, then the *Āhuti* becomes an act helping the main sacrifice directly.

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The offering in question is an act helping the main sacrifice directly; it is a generally recognised principle regarding the use of actions that 'what is *accomplished* subserves the purpose what is *to be accomplished*'.—Further, if the offering in question were connected with the *Sthāṇu* (Tree-stump), the need for which has ceased,—in what way could it benefit the Sacrificial Post? When something is done to a thing related to another, then alone does it benefit the relative; in the case in question however, the *stump* has been detached from the Sacrificial Post [hence there can be no such benefit].—Then again, the *Yūpāhuti* would be applicable, in common with others, to the *Ēkādashinī*,—if it were an act helping the main sacrifice directly; and in that case, it would not be necessary to assume an unheard of *repetition* of the offering. —Lastly, it is an unqualified sentence that lays down the offering of the *Sthāṇvāhuti* on the Tree-stump, and the Context would indicate the fact of the said *Āhuti* being offered on that particular Tree-stump from which

the wood-piece for the Sacrificial Post has been cut off.—From all this it follows that the *Sthāṇavāhuti* is an act helping the main sacrifice directly, and as such it should be offered at the *Sādyaskra*, with a view to honour the General Law."

Such is the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.—In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—

SŪTRA (11).

IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN EMBELLISHMENT OF IT, BECAUSE IT IS SUBSIDIARY.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*' ('in reality') signifies the rejection of the view set forth above.

The offering in question should be regarded as an embellishment of the Sacrificial Post.—"Why?"—Because of the peculiarity of the Context. It is recognised that the *Sthāṇvāhuti* has been laid down for one who is desirous of securing the Sacrificial Post. If anyone holds the view that "what the unqualified sentence lays down is only the *Stump* as the place for the offering",—he will have to assume a result of this.—If one holds the view that "in view of the Context, the offering should be regarded as helping the main sacrifice directly",—for him the general (wider) Context would be rejected by the particular (narrower) Context.—As a matter of fact, the Sacrificial Post should be regarded as subsidiary to the Act (of Sacrifice), on the ground of its serving a useful purpose; if then the offering were connected with it,—it would serve only an unseen (transcendental) purpose, and then, if it were to help the main sacrifice directly,—it would necessitate the assumption of a purpose or use for it; and in that case a well-known fact would be set aside by reasoning; just as in the case of the term '*ashvakarṇa*'.—Then again, after the need for the *Stump* has ceased, and it has become dissociated from the Sacrificial Post, the idea remains that it is related to the Sacrificial Post,—and on the basis of this idea, if the *Yūpāhuti* is offered, this *Āhuti* becomes related to the Sacrificial Post; and hence it comes to be performed at the time of the *cutting* (of the wood-piece for the Sacrificial Post);—just as, when a garland has been worn on the head by *Devadatta*, and it is taken down, it is still regarded as related to *Devadatta*, and on the basis of that idea, it becomes desirable to endow it with such 'embellishment' as being kept in a clean place and so forth;—so should it be in the case of the *Sthāṇvāhuti* also.—As regards the *Ēkādashini*, as no emphasis is meant to be laid upon the place in close proximity, the *Yūpāhuti* would be applicable to it in common with others.—From all this it follows that the more reasonable view is that the offering in question is an embellishment of the Sacrificial Post [and as such it should not be performed at the *Sādyaskra*].

SŪTRA (12).

THE NAME ALSO POINTS TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

The name '*Sthāṇvāhuti*' also applies to that *āhuti* (offering) in which the *Sthāṇu* (Tree-stump) is the predominant factor.—How ?—Because the term is to be treated as a *Genitive Tatpuruṣa* ['*Sthānoḥ āhutiḥ*', 'the offering of the stump'],—the Genitive having the force of the Accusative; and what the Accusative denotes is that which is *the most desired.* As for the *Locative Tatpuruṣa* ['*Sthāṇau āhutiḥ*', the offering *on* the stump], this would involve an indirect indication and hence cannot be accepted.

SŪTRA (13).

THE WORDS OF THE MANTRA ALSO POINT TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason we conclude that the offering in question is an embellishment (of the Sacrificial Post): The reason is that *the words of the Mantra also point to the same conclusion*; the *Mantra* is—'*Atastvandēva vanaspatē viroha*'; this means—'Inasmuch as you have been lopped off by me, may you grow in manifold ways'; these *Mantra-words* appear to be honouring the Sacrificial Post.—From this also it follows that the offering is an act of embellishment (of the Sacrificial Post), and as such should not be performed in connection with the *Stake in the Threshing Yard* (at the *Sādyaskra* sacrifice).

Adhikaraṇa (9): *The 'Last Prayāja' is an act of embellishment.*

SŪTRA (14).

So also in the case of the Prayāja; as the same principle is applicable to it.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* it is said—'*Uttamaḥ prayājaḥ svāhākāram yajati*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this '*Uttama Prayāja*' (The Last Prayāja)—an act helping the main sacrifice directly? Or is it an act of embellishment?—Hence what we are going to consider is—At this *Prayāja*, are the deities the same to whom the '*Ājyabhāga*' and other offerings are to be made? Or are they other than those deities?

"In what way would they be other deities and in what way the same as those in the Context?"

If the words '*Svāhākāram yajati*' are taken as containing the injunction of the deity, then the deity at the *Prayāja* would be different from those in the Context; if, on the other hand, the deity of the *Prayāja* is taken to be those that are indicated by the words of the *Mantra* '*Yē yajāmahē svāhāgnim*, etc.' [and not by the words '*Svāhākāram yajati*'), then the deities at the *Prayāja* would be the same as those in the Context.

On the above question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The *Prayāja* in question is an act directly helping the main sacrifice. To explain —It is an entirely different deity that is enjoined by the words '*Svāhākāram yajati*'; in this way the deity of the offering would be got at directly from the Vedic text; while under the other view it would have to be assumed on the basis of indication of the words of a *Mantra*.

Objection—'This other deity (held to be enjoined by the words '*Svāhākāram yajati*') cannot be spoken of by means of any such terms as '*agni*' and the like; hence if that other deity were accepted, this would militate also against the use of the *Mantra* '*Yē yajāmahē svāhāgnim*'.

"*Answer*—There would be no militating against the use of this *Mantra*; a single term can denote more than one thing; for example, the term '*Mātā*' denotes the *Mother* as also the *measurer* (the person who does the *measuring*); when this term is used in such expressions as '*Mātā cha paramam daivatam samā cha putrēṣu*' ['The *Mātā* is the highest divinity, equally inclined towards sons'], it is taken as denoting the *Mother*; while when appearing in such expressions as '*Mātā samaḥ kṣiprashcha*' ['The *Mātā* is equable and quick'], it is taken as denoting the *measurer* of grains. —Similarly, when terms like '*agni*' are used in *Mantras* that are used at the sacrifice offered to the deity named '*Svāhākāra*', they would be understood to be denotative of that deity. In this way a well-known act

connected with the sacrifice would come to be accomplished, in the shape of what helps it directly.—From all this it follows that the *Uttama Prayāja* is an act that helps the main sacrifice directly."

In answer to the above we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*So also in the case of the Prayāja, as the same principle is applicable to it.* It has been said above that 'the *Sthāṇvāhuti* in an act of embellishment'; this same idea is applied to the present case by means of the particle '*cha*' ('also') in the *Sūtra*; the sense being that 'the *Uttama-Prayāja* is an act of embellishment'; it is for this reason that they declare that the deities of this *Prayāja* are the same as those to whom the '*Ājyabhāga*' and other sacrificial offerings are made.—"Why so?"—Because the deific character does not belong to *Svāhākāra*; the deific character is signified either by the Nominal affix or by the Dative ending;—in this case (in the sentence '*Svāhākāram yajati*') there is neither the Nominal affix nor the Dative ending;—hence this cannot be taken as an injunction of the deity. In fact, the Accusative ending (in '*Svāhākāram*') clearly signifies that the '*Svāhākāra*' is in apposition to 'sacrifice'; hence it follows that the term '*Svāhākāra*' denotes a *sacrifice*, just like '*Samid*' and other terms.

Says the Opponent—"If, on the strength of the Accusative ending you take the term '*Svāhākāra*' to be denotative of the *sacrifice*, then that *sacrifice* (which is denoted by the term '*Svāhākāra*') must be an act that helps the main sacrifice directly; because the Accusative ending signifies what is *the most desired*".

The answer to this is as follows:—In view of this objection, the *Sūtra* has added the term '*because the same principle is applicable* to it'; that is, that same principle is applicable to this case which has been applied to the case of the '*Sthāṇvāhuti*',—i.e. 'it should be regarded as an embellishment of it, because it is subsidiary' (Sū. 10. 1. 11). At the *Ājyabhāga* and other offerings, *Agni* and the other deities are subsidiaries,—and the sacrifice becomes useful only when it is offered to them. Under the other view, the sacrifice would be useless, and hence the mention of the Deity in connection with that sacrifice would also be useless. When there is a likelihood of the sacrifice being an 'embellishment' of the Deity, we cannot assume any other use for that sacrifice; and so long as it is possible for '*Agni*' and other terms to be taken in their own natural denotations, there can be no justification for assuming the entirely unknown fact that they denote a different Deity in the shape of *Svāhākāra*.

From all this it follows that the *Uttama-Prayāja* serves the purpose of 'embellishing' the Deity; and through the embellishment due to the remembrance of the Deity, that same sacrifice brings about a transcendental result also.

SŪTRA (15).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND AN INDICATIVE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

In support of the said conclusion we have an indicative text also.—"What text?"—In connection with the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifice, we find

the following *Mantra* speaking of certain common deities: '*Svāhāgnim—svāhā somam—svāhā savitāram—svāhā sarasvatīm—svāhā pūṣaṇam*'; and the use of this *Mantra* is explicable only on the basis of the sacrifice being an 'embellishment' of the Deity; under the other view, it would have to be regarded only as serving a transcendental purpose.—For this reason also, the *Uttama-Prayāja* should be regarded as an act of embellishment of the Deity.

The use of this *Adhikaraṇa* lies in the following—In the case of the *Saurya* and other sacrifices where there are diverse deities, the names of deities connected with the Archetype are not to be excluded,—according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*; while according to the *Siddhānta*, they become excluded.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *The 'Agni'-sacrifice is an act directly helping the main sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (16).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE SAME SHOULD BE THE CASE WITH THE 'ĀJYABHĀGA' OFFERING TO AGNI",—IF THIS IS URGED AS THE PŪRVAPAKṢA [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices laid down in the text—'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices';—in connection with these it is declared—'*Ājyabhāgau yajati*' ['offers the *Ājyabhāga* oblations'];—and the following is yet another declaration in the same connection—'*Tau hochatuḥ kimāvayostataḥ syāditi, yasyai kasyaichiddēvatāyai havirnirvapaṁstadvām purastādājyasya yajanniti tasmād yasyai kasyaichid dēvatāyai havirnirvapanti tē purastādajya-bhāgāvagnīṣomābhyām yajanti tau na saumyē'dhvarē na pashau*'; [where two '*Ājyabhāga* oblations' are spoken of as to be offered to *Agni* and *Soma*].

In regard to this there arises the question—In the case of the two '*Ājyabhāga* oblations' offered to *Agni* and *Soma*, is the oblation offered to *Agni*—the *Agni-sacrifice*—for the purpose of embellishing the Deity? Or for directly helping the main sacrifice?

On this question, if the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "*the same* should be the case with the *Ājyabhāga*-offering to *Agni*;—i.e. like the *Uttama-Prayāja*, *it should be regarded as an embellishment, because it is subsidiary* (Sū. 11)"—[then the *Siddhānta* in answer to that view is as follows]—

SŪTRA (17).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BECAUSE OF THE ACTUAL MENTION, IT MUST BE A DISTINCT DEITY.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right to hold that the *Ājyabhāga*-oblations are the embellishment of the Deity; in fact, they are acts directly helping the main sacrifice.—"Why?"—*Because of the actual mention*; it is understood that the Deity (*Agni*) to whom the oblation in question is offered is distinct from the *Agni* of the main sacrifice.—"What is that *mention*?"—It is the *Mantra*—'*Agnimagna āvaha, somamāvaha, agnimāvaha*'; which contains an invocation of the deities;—with a view to secure the offering of oblations to all these deities; and to avoid all mistakes, this invocation enumerates the deities;—in this enumeration, *Agni* is mentioned twice; this is explicable only if the two deities spoken of by the term '*agni*' are distinct; otherwise one

would be bewildered by the increase in the number. As for the enumeration, that is equally there for both views (the *Pūrvapakṣa* as well as the *Siddhānta*); in fact, under your view (that there is only one Deity of the name '*Agni*'), the intervention of '*Soma*' between the two '*Agnis*' would disturb the order of the enumeration. Further, when a word is used more than once, and is intervened by another word, it mentions the Deity as distinct. For instance, in the sentence—'*Brāhmaṇa āgataḥ, vṛṣala āgataḥ, brāhmaṇa āgataḥ*',—we have the enumeration of two distinct *Brāhmaṇas*; similarly in the case in question, there is mention of two *Agnis*.

Says the Opponent—"This *mention* is a mere indicative; you should state some reason."

This reason is stated in the following *Sūtra*—

SŪTRA (18).

Also because of equality.

Bhāṣya.

The following is the reason (in support of the *Siddhānta*)—In this case the Sacrifice is 'equal' to the Deity; that is, the *Deity* has been mentioned in connection with the main Sacrifice, and the *Sacrifice* also has been mentioned in another sentence '*Ājyabhāgau yajati*'; hence between these two—*Sacrifice* and *Deity*—both of which serve useful purposes,—the most reasonable course is to take the Deity as subserving the purposes of the Sacrifice; because it is well known that the Sacrifice is a subsidiary that helps directly.—Without a Deity, there can be no Sacrifice;—hence the Sacrifice always needs a Deity;—certainly the Deity of the main Sacrifice does not need another Sacrifice;—and when one thing is needed by another, the former is regarded as subserving the purposes of the latter;—hence it follows that the Deity subserves the purposes of the Sacrifice.

Further, there is 'equality' also between the Sacrifice in question and other such subsidiaries as help the main Sacrifice directly.—"How?"—It is described in the following text—'The two *Āghāra*-offerings are the two fingers of the Sacrifice,—the two *Ājyabhāga*-offerings are its eyes,—the *Prayāja*-sacrifices are its armour,—also the Sacrificer's armour, tending to the suppression of his enemy' [where the Sacrifice is likened to such directly helpful things as *fingers* and *eyes* and *armour*].

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *The 'Pashu-puroḍāsha' Sacrifice is an 'embellishment' of the Deity.*

SŪTRA (19).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"SO ALSO IN THE CASE OF THE ANIMAL-SACRIFICE",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is the *Agnīṣomīya-animal-sacrifice*, laid down in the text—'*Āsomam vahantyagninā pratitiṣṭhanti . . . . yo dīkṣito yadagnīṣomīyam pashumālabhatē varuṇapāshābhyām sa muchyatē*';—and in connection with this animal-sacrifice, there is the following declaration—'*Agnīṣomīyasya vapayā pracharya agnīṣomīyam pashu-puroḍāsha-manunirvapanti*' [where the offering of the *Meat-cake, Pashu-puroḍāsha*, is laid down].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this offering of the Meat-cake an act directly helping the main sacrifice? Or does it serve the purpose of 'embellishing' the Deity?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows;—and here the argument that had been put forward under the *Adhikaraṇa* on *Prayāja*,—even though refuted,—is yet again revived on the ground of some peculiarity—"*So also in the case of the Animal-sacrifice*; if you think that there is a doubt as to this being an act directly helping the main sacrifice or an embellishment of the Deity,—then our view is that in the case of the Animal-sacrifice also, the offering is an act that directly helps the main sacrifice; because this is the well-known function of actions.—Then again, the term '*agnīṣomīya*' is formed with a Nominal affix and the Deity enters into it as the subordinate factor;—in connection with the Animal-sacrifice also the same term with the Nominal affix is mentioned with great force, in the supplementary sentence, as signifying *Fire*; but this does not necessarily mean that it must signify the same in connection with the Meat-cake.—From all this it follows that, on the ground of usage, the sacrifice in question must be taken to be an act that directly helps the main sacrifice."

SŪTRA (20).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT SO; BECAUSE OF THE DECLARATION OF IDENTITY.

Bhāṣya.

'*Na*' is the term that denies what has been said above.

The sentence '*Āsomam vahanti agninā pratitiṣṭhanti*' is a declamatory declaration; so that, if it is on the basis of such a declamation that the

Deity of the Animal-sacrifice is to be regarded as distinct from the Deity of the Meat-cake-offering,—then, on the basis of a similar declamation, the Deity in both cases should be regarded to be the same; for we have the declaration to the effect that—'The Meat-cake has the same Deity as the Animal-sacrifice'.—Hence the support of a declamatory declaration being equal in both cases, the conclusion is that the Meat-cake-offering is an act of embellishment for the Deity.

SŪTRA (21).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND AN INDICATIVE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also we hold that the Meat-cake offering is an act of embellishment of the Deity.—"For what reason?"—The reason is that there is an indicative text also which supports this view: In connection with the series of Meat-cake-offerings, we find it laid down that 'a bull should be sacrificed to *Indra-Vājrin*'; and in this connection there is a couple of *Yājyānuvākyā* speaking of the common Deity—'*Indram snuhi vajriṇam stomapṛṣṭham snuhi shūram vajriṇam supratītam*'; this declaration is explicable only if the offering in question is an act of embellishment, not otherwise.

From all this it follows that the Meat-cake-offering serves the purpose of embellishing the Deity of the Animal-sacrifice.

SŪTRA (22).

[*Restatement of Pūrvapakṣa*]—"IN FACT (THE DEITY) SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A SUBSIDIARY DETAIL, LIKE THE PANS; ALSO BECAUSE IT IS A MODIFICATION OF WHAT IS A SUBSIDIARY DETAIL."

Bhāṣya.

The same argument is re-stated, with a view to add something new.—The term '*vā*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

"The Deity should be regarded as a subsidiary detail; as this would be in keeping with its well-known character of directly helping the main sacrifice. That it will be subsidiary to more than one act would be like the case of the Pan; the Pan is subsidiary to the *cooking* as also to the *removing of the chaff*; similarly the same *Agni-Soma* would be subsidiary to the *Animal-sacrifice* as well as to the *Meat-cake-offering*. Such being the case, the action, that has been laid down as subsidiary to the *Agni-Soma* connected with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* and as being the means of accomplishing the sacrifice, would, without any inconsistency, apply to the same deities as subsidiary to the offering in question; otherwise, it could not apply to the two deities when they form the predominant factor and serve an entirely different function. As a matter of fact however, we find the

Sviṣṭakṛt-offering which is left undefined.—From this also it follows that the offering in question directly helps the main sacrifice.—Then again, at the *Sautrāmaṇī* sacrifice, the cakes dedicated to *Indra*, *Varuṇa* and *Savitṛ* are *not* brought, from the context of the Animal-sacrifice, to those animal-sacrifices which have *Ashwin*, *Sarasvatī* and *Sudāman* for their deities;—while they would be so brought in if the offering were an act of embellishment; and it has been already explained that the mention of its serving the purpose of covering up the 'holes' is a purely commendatory declamation.—From this also it follows that the offering in question is an act directly helping the main sacrifice."

SŪTRA (23).

[*Pūrvapakṣa's argument answered*]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN ACT OF EMBELLISHMENT OF THE DEITY; BECAUSE IT IS A SUBSIDIARY,—LIKE THE 'SVĀHĀKĀRA'; SPECIALLY BECAUSE SUBSIDIARY DETAILS ARE CONNECTED WITH A PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*api vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

The offering in question is not an act that directly helps the main sacrifice; *it should be regarded as an embellishment of it*—i.e. of the Deity.—"Why?"—*Because it is a subsidiary*; i.e. because the Deity serves a useful purpose;—hence, just as the '*Svāhākāra*'-sacrifice is regarded as an act of embellishment of the Deity, on the ground that, otherwise, it would serve no useful purpose,—similarly should it be in the case in question also.—*Specially because subsidiary details are connected with a purpose*; i.e. in the sentence in question we find that there is connection with a purpose.—Hence it follows that the offering in question cannot be an act directly helping the main sacrifice. Because such details as enter into the very constitution of the sacrifice are far superior to those that help it directly.

It has been argued (under Sū. 19) that—"There is mention of the Deity by the word with the Nominal affix, where the Deity forms the subordinate factor"; but such mention is made also in those cases where the connection of the Deity is enjoined by means of a word of which the Deity forms the predominant factor.—Further, a perceptible purpose is always superior to the imperceptible (transcendental) one.—From all this it follows that the offering in question is an act of embellishment of the Deity.

SŪTRA (24).

THE MENTION OF 'DEFECT' ALSO AS DUE TO THE DIVERSITY (POINTS TO THE SAME CONCLUSION); AS IT IS FOR THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also, the offering in question is an act of embellishment.—In connection with the *Sautrāmaṇī* sacrifice, it is said that

there is a 'defect' due to the 'diversity' of deities; and this is explicable only if the offering is an embellishment of the Deity; the text being as follows:—'That which is a defect in the *Sautrāmaṇī* is a good point in this—viz. that the deities of the Meat-cakes are distinct from those of the Animals'.

SŪTRA (25).

"IT IS SO EVEN IN THE CASE OF THE SUBORDINATE FACTOR",—IF THIS BE URGED [then the answer will be as in the following *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"You think that the mention of 'defect' can be explicable only if the offering in question is an act of embellishment.—But that is not right; because the mention of 'defect' cannot be explained even under the view that the offering is an act of embellishment; because in reality there is no 'defect' there; as the sacrifice becomes more perfect by reason of the Cakes having diverse deities. The text says—'It is the good point in this that the Cakes have deities different from those of the Animals'.—Thus the objection being applicable to both views should not be urged against one only. In fact, just as the mention of 'defect' would be a declamatory assertion under the view that the offering is an act of embellishment,—so, under the other view also, it would be a declamatory assertion."

SŪTRA (26).

NOT SO; BECAUSE THERE IS NO HARM; JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE PANS.

Bhāṣya.

It is not so; because under your view there has been no *harm* (wrong);—*just as in the case of the Pans*, if the chaff is all removed by means of a single Pan, there is no harm done to the other Pans,—so in the case in question, if the Meat-cake-sacrifice is offered to another Deity, there is no harm done to the Deity of the Animal-sacrifice: and under the circumstances, there would be the mention of 'defect' when, in reality, there has been no defect at all.—Under our view, on the other hand, there is harm done to the subsidiary in the shape of the indication of the Deity.—As for the assertion—that 'the defect also becomes a perfection',—it is something entirely different. In fact, when the word 'defect' is used where there has been no harm or wrong done, it is clear that the signification of words has not been grasped.

SŪTRA (27).

THE DEITIES ARE COMMON WITH THOSE OF THE 'CUPS'; AND THE ASSERTION IS BASED UPON THAT; BECAUSE IT IS FOR THE SAKE OF THAT.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the offering should be taken as an act of embellishment:—The *assertion*—i.e. the assertion of the Cakes,—is based upon the fact that at the *Sautrāmaṇi*, the deities are *common with those of the Cups*;—this assertion being to the effect that 'There are no Cakes of these animals; these animals have the Cups for their Cakes'. It is not that the Cakes are not there; the assertion that 'the Cups are their Cakes', or 'they have the Cups for their Cakes', is based upon the observation that there is no embellishment by means of offerings to diverse deities.—"What is the similarity between the *Cups* and the *Cakes*?"—The similarity is that they serve the purpose of embellishment; and this would be possible only if the Cakes also served the purpose of embellishing the deities.—From all this it follows that the more reasonable view is that the offering is an act of embellishment.

SŪTRA (28).

IT IS IN THE ABSENCE OF THE CUPS THAT THERE IS THE ASSERTION.

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Naitasya pashorgraham gṛhṇanti, puroḍāshavānēṣa pashuḥ*' ['They do not take up the Cup of this Animal, it has only the Cake'].—Here 'the absence of the Cup' has been spoken of as being due to the presence of the Meat-cake,—which shows that the 'Cup' and the 'Cake' are meant to serve the same purpose.—Now it has been already found that the 'Cup' is for the purpose of 'embellishing' the deity; and hence the said assertion would be explicable only if the Cake also were taken as serving the same purpose (of embellishing the Deity).

SŪTRA (29).

FURTHER, IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THE DEITY IS THE OCCASIONER; HENCE IT INDICATES (THE SIDDHĀNTA VIEW).

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also we conclude that the offering is an act of embellishment: There is the text—'*Agnibhyaḥ kāmēbhyaḥ pashava ālabhyantē, kāmā vā agnayaḥ, āgnēyāḥ puroḍāshā bhavanti, āgnēyā hi pashavaḥ*',—where the Cakes are spoken of as 'occasioned' (due to) the deities; and this shows that the Meat-cakes are meant to serve the purpose of embellishing the Deity.

SŪTRA (30).

THE CONNECTION IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE, AS THE CONDITIONS ARE PRESENT; AS IN THE CASE OF THE TERM 'SHṚTA'; AND IT WOULD BE A 'MODIFICATION' OF THE SUBSIDIARY FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 22) that 'The detail pertaining to the subsidiaries could not appertain to the Principals'.—The answer to that is as follows: The *connection* of the details with the *Agnīṣomīya-offerings* would not be incompatible, even though these latter are principal offerings. —"Why?"—Because *the conditions are present*; i.e. even though these offerings are 'principals', yet, inasmuch as they bring about the accomplishment of the main sacrifice, they are 'means' to that accomplishment (and to that extent 'subsidiary'): and as such they could very well be connected with the details in question;—*just as in the case of the term 'Shṛta'*; i.e. in the case of the expression 'Rice cooked in boiled milk—rice cooked in curds', even though the *Boiled Milk* and the *Curds* are meant for being offered (and in that sense *principals*), yet they serve the purposes of the *Praṇītā* vessel, and as such become connected with the related details: and there is no *incompatibility* in that.

SŪTRA (31).

IT WOULD SERVE TWO PURPOSES; SUCH BEING THE DECLARATION OF THE VEDA; ITS MODIFICATORY CHARACTER HAS BEEN ASSERTED ON THE GROUND THAT IT SERVES THAT PURPOSE IN THE CASE OF DIVERSITY OF DEITIES.—IT HAS BEEN ASSERTED THAT "IT IS ONLY A DECLAMATORY STATEMENT" [and the answer to that is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the Opponent that—"the Cakes dedicated to *Indra, Varuṇa* and *Savitṛ* would become dissociated from the context of the *Sautrāmaṇī*".—The answer to this is as follows:—*It would serve two purposes*; i.e. the sacrifice would serve the purposes of 'embellishing the Deity' as well as that of 'covering the holes'; as both of these have been *declared in the Veda.* Consequently, by the mere fact of its serving the purpose of 'covering the holes' in the case of diverse deities, it would not become dissociated from the Context; in fact it would remain in the same Context, as a modificatory sacrifice.

It has been asserted that "*even this is a merely declamatory statement*";—the answer to that is as follows—

SŪTRA (32).

THERE BEING A DIVERSITY OF DEITIES, THERE IS A MODIFICATION OF NAMES.

Bhāṣya.

In that case (i.e. if it is purely declamatory) 'dissociation from the Context' would be avoided in the following manner: As for the 'embellishment of the Deity', it cannot be set aside by being dissociated from the Context;—at the *Sautrāmaṇī*, the Cakes that come in by virtue of the General Law are those with common deities; so that in that case the terms '*indra*' and the rest can be expressive only of those deities that are connected with the Animal-sacrifice.—"How so?"—It is understood that the names that have been mentioned are really those of these latter deities, but they appear only in their partial forms and accompanied by other letters; it is quite possible for component parts to signify the composite whole and thereby signify what is denoted by that whole; as is found in the case of '*gāvī*', and such other corrupt words [where the cow comes to be expressed by the letter '*ga*', which forms part of the term '*go*' which is what really denotes the *cow*];—also in the following *Mantra* related to the deity *Sarasvatī*—'*Nivarhaya prajām vishvasya bṛsayasya māyinaḥ*', the term '*bṛṣaya*' signifies what is really denoted by the term '*bṛhat*'.—"But why is all this assumption made?"—Because in connection with the sacrifices that are meant to serve the purpose of embellishing the deities, if other (foreign) deities were to be mentioned, they would be entirely useless.—Hence we conclude that the names of deities connected with *Cakes* are only modified forms of the names of those connected with the *Animal-sacrifice*.

SŪTRA (33).

OR, THERE MAY BE REPETITION; AS IN THE CASE OF THE PRAYĀJAS, ONE PORTION OF IT WOULD HAVE ANOTHER DEITY.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('or') here does not imply the rejection of the above view; it only introduces another argument in support of the view that the offering in question is an act of embellishment.

In fact, the names need not be taken as modified forms of other names; the names could be so taken, if there were no other means of establishing the view that the offering in question is an act of embellishment; as a matter of fact however, this view can be established even without taking the names as 'modifications'.—"How?"—There would be repetition of the Cake-offering; at this the *Deity of the Animal-sacrifice* as well as the *Cake* come in by virtue of the General Law; for the Deity of the Animal-sacrifice, there is another substance laid down in the form of the 'Cup', and a different Deity for the 'Cake'; the element of 'offering' ('sacrifice')

remains the same (unmodified) in both cases; and this sacrifice should have to be performed as connected with the *deities of the Animal-sacrifice*, as also with the *Cup*;—both these cannot be possible without the *sacrifice* being repeated;—so that naturally the sacrifice comes to be repeated;—and of this sacrifice *one portion would have another Deity,—as in the case of the Prayāja*; for instance, at the Animal-sacrifice, though all the five *Prayājas* are admissible by virtue of the General Law, it is the number of only 'one portion' that has been actually enjoined; and as this cannot be possible without repetition, the *Prayājas* come to be repeated; and when they are repeated, one portion of them has different deities in the shape of *Dura-Uṣāsā-Naktā* and so forth.—In the same manner, in the case in question also, there would be repetition of the Cake-offering;—so that there would be no dissociation from the Context, even under the view that the offering in question is an act of embellishment.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *In the sentence 'Sauryañcharum nirvapēt', the term 'charu' stands for 'odana', 'Cooked Rice'.*

SŪTRA (34).

THE 'CHARU' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A FORM OF THE OFFERING-MATERIAL, BECAUSE IT IS CONNECTED WITH THE ACT OF 'SACRIFICE'.

Bhāṣya.

The *Charu* is spoken of in the sentence—'*Sauryañcharum nirvapēt brahamvarchasakāmaḥ*' ['One desiring Brahmic glory should offer *Charu to Sūrya*']. The *Saurya, offering to Sūrya*, is a modification (an ectype) of the *Āgnēya, offering to Agni*, as has been established under the *Sūtra* 8. 1. 28—'It should be restricted to that of one act on the ground of there being a single thing (deity); specially because it is an ectype and is dependent upon what has gone before'. [The '*Āgnēya*' consists of 'the offering of *a cake baked on eight pans to Agni*; and the '*Saurya*' being an ectype of this *Āgnēya*, it takes the details that should be modifications of the details of the *Āgnēya*.]

The question that arises is—(A) Does the '*Charu*', laid down in connection with the *Saurya*, mean the modification of the *offering-material* (i.e. the *Cake* offered at the *Āgnēya*)?—Or the modification of the *Pan* (used at the *Āgnēya* for baking the Cake)?—(B) If it means a modification of the *offering-material*, then, is the offering-substance modified through the Pot or through the *Odana*?

On this question, the view that presents itself is that the '*Charu*' should be regarded as involving the modification of the offering-substance;—why?—*because it is connected with the act of sacrifice*; what is enjoined in regard to the '*Charu*' is expressed by the Nominal affix in the word '*Sauryam*', in the sentence '*Sauryam charum nirvapēt*'; which shows that the '*Charu*' is for the purpose of the sacrifice; and hence it must be regarded as the modification of the *offering-substance*.

SŪTRA (35).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"BECAUSE WHAT IS GENERALLY KNOWN SHOULD BE ACCEPTED."

Bhāṣya.

The conclusion arrived at in the preceding *Sūtra* being accepted (by both parties), the following view is stated (as *Pūrvapakṣa*) in regard to the further question (B) stated above:—"The *Charu* is a modification of the

offering-substance, and this modification is done *through the Pot, because what is generally known should be accepted*; the most reasonable course is to accept what is well recognised; the term '*Charu*' is generally known from the Himālaya to Cape Comorin as standing for the *Pot*; as a matter of fact, all over the country, from the Himālaya down to Cape Comorin, the term '*Charu*' is found to be used in the sense of the *Pot*. Hence it follows that it is through the Pot that the offering-substance is modified [i.e. at the *Saurya* sacrifice, the substance offered remains the Cake, the same as at the *Āgnēya*,—the only modification that that substance undergoes is that it is baked in the *Pot* instead of in the *Pan*]."

SŪTRA (36).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS THE 'COOKED RICE', BECAUSE OF THE CONNECTION WITH 'FOOD'.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*Charu*' is used in the sense of *Cooked Rice* also; in the present case, it is more reasonable to take the term as standing for the *Cooked Rice* than for the *Pot*.—"Why?"—*Because of the connection with food*; i.e. all cultured people offer sacrifices to deities with substances *that can be eaten*, not with what cannot be eaten;—from the *practice* of these cultured people we infer the *Smṛti*, and from the *Smṛti*, the basis of Vedic text.—Hence it follows that the offering-substance is modified through *Cooked Rice* [i.e. it is *Cooked Rice* that is offered in place of the *Cake*].

SŪTRA (37).

[*Objection continued*]—"IT CANNOT BE SO; BECAUSE IN THAT CASE THE TERM WOULD HAVE TWO MEANINGS.

Bhāṣya.

"The term '*Charu*' cannot be taken as denoting the *Cooked Rice*;—why?—because in that case, it would come to have two meanings; and as it is well known as denoting the Pot, its action in signifying the *Cooked Rice* would have to be regarded as *indirect indication*, based upon the connection (of the Rice) with the *Pot*.—Then again, in the case of such words, it is not right to attribute to them more than one meaning.—Hence it must be admitted that the offering-substance is modified through the Pot.—It has been urged that—'Cultured people offer sacrifices to deities with such things as can be eaten, and hence there must be a *Smṛti* in support of such practice'.—The answer to this is as follows:—This inference that has been put forward is refuted by the directly perceptible text to the contrary; from the directly perceptible text we learn that the sacrifice is to be performed *with the Pot*.—'How so?'—Because it is well known that the term '*Charu*' signifies the *Pot*; so that there can be no justification for taking the term '*Charu*' in its indirect figurative sense on the basis of mere usage;—even if such an assumption were made, it would mean the rejection of the direct signification of the word by usage; and this cannot be right; in

fact, it would be right to regard the usage itself as wrong, in view of the direct signification of the word; as we find in the case of the sentences—'*Shūlaishcha māsarēṇa chāvabhṛthamabhyavayanti*', '*Prājāpatyam charum nirvapēt shatakṛṣṇalamāyuṣkāmaḥ*' (?)."

SŪTRA (38).

[*Objection continued—second Pūrvapakṣa put forward*]—" IN REALITY, THE 'CHARU' MUST BE TAKEN AS INVOLVING THE MODIFICATION OF THE PAN; IN A CASE OF DOUBT, THE MATTER IS DETERMINED BY 'UTILITY' AND 'REASON'."

Bhāṣya.

"In fact, the very first proposition—that the '*Charu*' is a modification of the *offering-substance*—cannot be proved; In regarding it as a modification of the *Pot*, it would be necessary to assume, from *Practice*, the Vedic text as the basis of the *Smṛti* (on which the Practice would be based);—lastly, if the modification were through *Cooked Rice*, then it would necessitate the assumption of an indirect figurative meaning for the term, on the basis of its connection with the Pot;—but there is yet another way available: that the '*Charu*' be taken as the modification of the *Pan*.—For these reasons, the particle '*vā*' (in the *Sūtra*) should be taken as rejecting all the aforesaid views and we put forward the view that the '*Charu*' is a modification of the *Pan*.—The *modification of the Pan* also is of use to *Sūrya*; hence it can be spoken of as '*Saurya*'.—There is *reason* also in support of the view in the shape of the fact that cooking can be done in the Pot.—Thus there being some doubt regarding the view that '*Charu*' is a modification of the offering-substance, we should accept the view that it involves a modification of the *Pan*."

SŪTRA (39).

[*Objection and Pūrvapakṣa (B) continued*]—" ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SECONDARY AND THE PRIMARY."

Bhāṣya.

"There is a clear difference between the Secondary and the Primary; it may be right to set aside the Secondary; but it can never be right to set aside the Primary; this has been explained under Sū. 12. 2. 25."

SŪTRA (40).

[*Objection and Pūrvapakṣa (B) continued*]—" ALSO BECAUSE WHEN THE 'CHARU' IS SPOKEN OF, ANOTHER OFFERING-SUBSTANCE IS MENTIONED."

Bhāṣya.

"In a case where the *Charu* is spoken of, there is mention of another offering-substance—'*Prājapatyām ghṛtē charum nirvapēt shatakṛṣṇalamāyuṣkāmaḥ*', where the offering-material mentioned is '100 gold-pieces', and

the *Charu* is only something related to that substance. That gold-pieces can be used for offering is clearly shown by the text that says—'One makes offerings of four *Kṛṣṇalas* each."

SŪTRA (41).

[*Objection and Pūrvapakṣa (B) concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND A TEXT INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION."

Bhāṣya.

"There is the declaration—'*Mārutañcharunnirvapēt pṛṣṇinām dugdhē praiyaṅgavam grāmakāmaḥ*' where the offering-substance mentioned is the *Priyaṅgu*-corn cooked in milk;—as for the *Charu* it is a product of Clay (in the shape of the Pan), and not a product of *Priyaṅgu*-corns.—Hence the offering-substance is something entirely different, and the *Charu* involves only a modification of the Pan."

SŪTRA (42).

[*Answer to objection and Pūrvapakṣa (B)*]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS 'ODANA' (COOKED RICE); BECAUSE OF THE USE.

Bhāṣya.

From the use of the Nominal affix—in the expression '*Sauryashcharuḥ kartavyaḥ*'—it follows that the '*Charu*' is a modification of the *offering-substance*. According to the *Pūrvapakṣa* view, the action taken in accordance with the injunction '*Sauryaḥ charuḥ kartavyaḥ*' would be that the *Cake* would be offered (but cooked in a *pot*);—if this were done, then the idea derived from the injunction, that 'it is the *Charu* that should be offered and thereby connected with *Sūrya*', would become set aside;—so that in offering the *Cake*, the connection established with *Sūrya* would be of a thing that is incapable of such connection, and not of that which is capable.—If then, the original offering-substance (*Cake*) is modified (at the *Saurya* sacrifice),—then the modification should be by means of the *Cooked Rice*; because from the Himālaya down to Cape Comorin, the term '*Charu*' is recognised as denoting *Cooked Rice*; and in that case we secure the proper connection (with the Deity) of something *to be eaten*.

It has been argued (in Sū. 37) that—"it is not right to attribute two meanings to one word".—It is certainly not right to attribute two meanings to a word; but why should there be this impropriety in taking the term '*Charu*' as denoting *Cooked Rice*, by reason of its denoting the *Pot*,—and not in taking it as denoting *Pot*, by reason of its denoting *Cooked Rice*? In fact there are texts declaring that the term '*Charu*' denotes *Cooked Rice*,—such as '*Anavasrāvitāntaruṣmapakvo vishadasiddha odanashcharuḥ*' ['*Charu* is that *Cooked Rice* from which the water has not been strained,

which has been cooked by internal heat and which has become soft and yet the grains remain distinct ']. —This has been explained above under *Sūtra* 3. 3. 38. *Smṛti* is more authoritative than *Practice*; hence it follows that the term '*Charu*' denotes *Cooked Rice*; so that in the case in question it is through Cooked Rice that the offering-substance is modified;—this will also serve the purpose that the sacrifice shall be offered with *something to be eaten*. Further, there is no such substance appertaining to *Sūrya* as would be connected with the *Charu*.—It may be argued that "there is the Cake which would come in under the General Law".—But that cannot be; the General Law (applying the details of the archetype to the ectype) comes in after the injunction of the action (ectype) has been fully accomplished;—as a matter of fact, there is no injunction of the sacrifice (*Saurya*) before the word '*charuḥ*' has been pronounced; because what the term 'sacrifice' connotes is the connection of a Deity with a substance;—hence it is clear that the term '*Charu*' which comes in the wake of the injunction (of the act), can never qualify the *Cake*; for the simple reason that the General Law can come in only later on.

SŪTRA (43).

ALSO BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF AS SOMETHING NEW.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also we conclude that the offering-substance is modified through Cooked Rice.—"For what reason?"—For this reason that *it is spoken of as something new*: Says the text—'The deities prospered in this world through the Cake, and in the other world, through *Charu*'; where having spoken of the 'prosperity' through the *Cake*, it goes on to add 'through the *Charu* in the other world'; if the term '*Charu*' denoted only the *Pot* and the *Charu* were only a modified *Pot*,—then the *Charu* would come in in that same connection in which the *Cake* came in; so that the statement that 'through the *Cake* the deities prospered in this world' would mean the same as that 'they prospered in this world through the *Charu*';—if that were so then there would be no justification for the second clause 'through *Charu* in the other world', where the '*Charu*' is spoken of as something different (from the 'Cake').—From this also it follows that the offering-substance is modified through the *Cooked Rice*.

SŪTRA (44).

TO THE SAME EFFECT WE FIND AN INDICATIVE TEXT ALSO.

Bhāṣya.

If this view is accepted then it is possible to explain an indicative text that we find.—"How?"—There is the text—'*Ādityaḥ prāyanīyashcharuḥ aditya udayanīyaḥ*'; and in this connection there is the further text

—'*Ājyasyaiva charumabhipūrya chatura ājyabhāgān yajati, pathyām svastimiṣṭvāgnīṣomau yajati, agnīṣomāviṣṭvā savitāram yajati, aditimodanēna*';—here we have the injunction of the four '*Ājyabhāga*' offerings;—now as regards the (last) offering to 'Aditi', it is a reiteration of what has gone before in the former text '*Ādityashcharuḥ*';—so that the '*Charu*' (of the first text) is spoken of (in the second text) as '*Odana*' (Cooked Rice);—which shows that the offering-substance is modified through the Cooked Rice.

The following is yet another text indicative of the same conclusion—'*Yadi taṇḍulo vidyatē āmantad haviḥ syāt*' ('If the rice were there, it would be a raw offering-substance');—here the term '*haviḥ*' (offering-substance) has been applied to the *Rice*; which also shows that in the case in question, the offering-substance is modified through the *Cooked Rice*.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *The 'Cooked Rice' to be offered to Sūrya is to be cooked in a Pot.*

SŪTRA (45).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)—*continued*]—"IT SHOULD BE DONE IN THE PAN, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ARCHETYPE; SPECIALLY BECAUSE NO OTHER SUBSTANCE HAS BEEN MENTIONED."

Bhāṣya.

There is the 'Cooked Rice' spoken of in the text—'One desiring Brahmic glory should offer Cooked Rice to *Sūrya*'; we have learnt above that the offering-substance in the Ectype is the Cooked Rice; now the question arises—In what (vessel) is the rice to be cooked?

The likely view that presents itself first of all is as follows:—"There can be no restriction in the matter,—such as that 'the cooking must be done in *pans*'; in fact, it could be cooked in any vessel that might be obtained.—If the Pan be taken as coming in by virtue of the General Law, then, like the Pan, the number (*eight*) also of the Pan should come in. Then again, in connection with the Archetype also there is no such injunction as that 'the cooking should be done *in the pans*'; all that is said in the text is that 'it is one baked on *eight* pans';—and when this number (*eight*) comes in, what comes to be enjoined (in regard to the *Saurya*) is the *presence of eight pans*, not anything else;—as a matter of fact however, the number (*eight*) does not come in; for the simple reason that the 'Cooked Rice' cannot be cooked, like the cake, on several pans.—On the other hand, if the mere *Pan* came in, then 'the presence of *eight* pans', which had been enjoined, would not come in.—From all this it follows that the *Cooked Rice* should be cooked in any vessel that may be available."

"As against this view"—says the *Pūrvapakṣin*,—"we assert as follows: *It should be done in the Pan, in accordance with the Archetype; specially because no other substance has been mentioned*;—i.e. the 'Cooked Rice' should be Cooked in the Pan; as thus alone would the words 'like the Archetype' (in the General Law that 'the Ectype should be performed *like the Archetype*') be followed; nor is there any other substance mentioned;—and there must be restriction [that is, the vessel used must be the *Pan only*].

"It has been argued that 'like the Pan, the number (*eight*) also would come in.'—This has got to be refuted [and the refutation is as follows]—

SŪTRA (46).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)—*concluded*]—"IT SHOULD BE DONE IN ONE ONLY, BECAUSE OF IMPOSSIBILITY."

Bhāṣya.

"If it is not possible for the *Cooked Rice* to be cooked in several pans, then, by reason of this *impossibility*, it should be cooked in one pan only.

If it be argued that what the words '*aṣṭākapālo bhavati*' means is that 'it should be cooked in *eight pans*',—we deny this; if, by reason of impossibility, the number 'eight' cannot come in, then the *Pan* alone would come in."

SŪTRA (47).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"WHAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED ABOVE CANNOT BE DONE, BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF A DIFFERENT SUBSTANCE; THAT WHICH IS USED IN THE COOKING OF THE CAKE WOULD HAVE TO HOLD WATER, IN THE COOKING OF RICE; IN FACT THE VESSEL TO BE USED SHOULD BE ONE THAT WILL SERVE THE PURPOSE; CONSEQUENTLY THERE SHOULD BE NO RESTRICTION IN REGARD TO VESSELS THAT ARE EQUALLY CAPABLE OF SERVING THE PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya.

"The Rice should not be cooked in pans.—Why?—*Because of the presence of a different substance.*—The Pan is used in the cooking of Cakes, with a view that the heat of the Pan itself brings about the cooking of the Cake;—if, however, the Pan were used for the cooking of Rice, it would have to hold water, as in the case of the Rice, the cooking is brought about by the heat of the water; and in this case, the cooking is not brought about by the heat of the *Pan*. Thus then, if the Pan were used for the holding of water, it would not be used for the purpose for which it is used at the Archetype; and to that extent, the General Law would not be followed.—From all this it follows that *the vessel to be used should be one that will serve the purpose*; and hence, *in regard to vessels that are equally capable of serving the purpose* (of cooking the Rice), *there should be no restriction* as to which one of them should be used."

SŪTRA (48).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE DONE IN THE POT [IN THE CASE OF RICE], BECAUSE WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THAT VIEW.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, the cooking in question should be done in the Pot. There is the following text indicative of that view—'*Yāsu sthalīṣu somāḥsyuḥ tē charavaḥ syuḥ*' ['Those pots that contained the *Soma* should be used in the cooking of Rice']; this text speaks of the Rice as to be cooked in the Soma-pots, and hence specially indicates the *Pot* as the vessel to contain the Cooked Rice.

Says the Opponent—"What you bring forward is merely an indicative text; please state some reasons."

Answer—As a matter of fact, the cooking of what is known as 'cooked Rice' is found to be done in the pot, never in a frying-pan or a pan.—From all this it follows that the cooking of Rice shouid be done in the Pot.

Question—"What is the purpose served by all this discussion as to whether the 'Charu' involves a modification of the Pan or it is made an offering-substance in the form of *Cooked Rice*?"

Answer—(*a*) If the 'Charu' involves a modification of the Pan, the *grinding* would have to be done, as the need for it would not have disappeared; on the other hand if '*Charu*' were an offering-substance in the form of *Cooked Rice*, then there would be no *grinding*; as the grinding of the grains is needed only for the making of Cakes.—(*b*) Further, under the *Pūrvapakṣa* view, it is necessary to mix the flour with water for the purpose of obtaining the dough; while under the *Siddhānta*, this would not be necessary.—(*c*) So also with the placing of the flour in a vessel for mixing water.—(*d*) Heating also (of the Pan) for the purposes of cooking would have to be done from below, under the *Pūrvapakṣa* view; not so under the *Siddhānta*.—(*e*) Similarly with the placing of the Pan on the Fire.—(*f*) Under the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the dough would have to be spread out and smoothened; not so under the *Siddhānta*.—(*g*) Under the *Pūrvapakṣa*, it would be necessary to place live coals over the thing; not so under the *Siddhānta*; as it is only for the purpose of the cooking of the upper portion (of the Cake).—(*h*) So also with the applying of heat all round (with flaming grass).—(*i*) Under the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the thing has to be taken out of the Pan and kept aisde, because it is necessary to do it; under the *Siddhānta*, there would be no necessity for doing it; and hence it would not be done; because *the taking out and keeping aside* has to be done because there is need for it; and that which is done on this ground is not transferred to another act under the General Law.

Or, we may take each of these nine items separately—each being dealt with in a separate *Adhikaraṇa*, in the following nine *Adhikaraṇas*.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *There is to be no 'grinding' in connection with the 'Cooked Rice' to be offered at the 'Saurya' sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (49).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THIS CASE 'GRINDING' SHOULD BE DONE; AS THE NEED FOR IT HAS NOT DISAPPEARED."

Bhāṣya.

There is the offering of Cooked Rice laid down in the text—'*Sauryañcharunnirvapēt brahmavarchasakāmaḥ*' [' Desiring Brahmic glory, one should

offer Cooked Rice dedicated to *Sūrya*']; —we have understood that the offering-substance meant by '*Charu*' is *Cooked Rice*.—The question that arises now is—Should *grinding* be done in the case of *Cooked Rice* [as it is done in the case of the *Cake* at the *Āgnēya*]—or not?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"*Grinding should be done, as the need for it has not disappeared*,—and it is possible to do the *grinding* to the Rice".

SŪTRA (50).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THERE SHOULD BE NO PERFORMANCE OF THE GRINDING; AS IT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING THE CAKE.

Bhāṣya.

Even though it is possible to do the *grinding* to the Rice, yet it is not to be done. As for the Cake, it cannot be made without the grinding (of the corn); the *Cooked Rice*, on the other hand, is obtained without the grinding; in fact the grinding would actually destroy it; as in that case it would become either dough or gruel or something like oil-cake.—Hence we conclude that in the case of *Cooked Rice*, grinding is excluded.

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *The 'mixing of water' need not be done in the case of the 'Cooked Rice' to be offered to Sūrya.*

SŪTRA (51).

THE 'MIXING OF WATER' ALSO (NEED NOT BE DONE); AS IT IS MEANT FOR MAKING THE DOUGH.

Bhāṣya.

Here also the 'Cooked Rice' may be taken as the example.

In connection with the Archetype (i.e. the *Āgnēya*) we read—'*Praṇītābhirhavimṣi samyauti*' ['With water from the *Praṇītā*-vessel, one mixes water with the offering-substance'].—In regard to this there arises the question—In the case of the *Cooked Rice* (which is the substance offered at the Ectype, the *Saurya*)—should the 'mixing of water' be done or not? —The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "it should be done, as it can be done".—In answer to this, we have the *Siddhānta* that even though it can be done, it should not be done; because it is for the purpose of making the dough of the flour that water is mixed; and the dough is needed for making the *Cake*, not for obtaining the *Cooked Rice*.

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *There is to be no 'Throwing into the vessel', in connection with the 'Cooked Rice' to be offered to Sūrya.*

SŪTRA (52).

SO ALSO THE 'THROWING OF THE DOUGH INTO THE VESSEL', AS IT IS FOR THE SAME PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

The 'Cooked Rice' is again to be treated as the case in question.

In connection with the archetypal *Āgnēya* we read—'He throws the dough into the vessel', connecting it with the deities, reciting the *Mantra*, '*Savitrprasūta*, etc.'.—In regard to the *Cooked Rice*, there arises the question—Should, or should not, this 'Throwing into the vessel' be done?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"inasmuch as it can be done, and as it is necessary to follow the General Law, it should be done".—In answer to this, we have the *Siddhānta* that at the Archetype, this act is done for the purpose of 'mixing with water' (and making the dough); but in the case of the *Cooked Rice*, there is no need for the 'mixing with water' (or making the dough)—[Hence it need not be done].

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *The 'Heating of the Pan' need not be done in connection with the Cooked Rice to be offered to Sūrya.*

SŪTRA (53).

SO ALSO THE 'HEATING OF THE PAN', AS IT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF COOKING THE LOWER PORTION.

Bhāṣya.

Again there is a question regarding the *Cooked Rice*.—In connection with the Archetype (*Āgnēya*), the 'Heating of the Pans' has been laid down as to be done with the *Mantra*—'*Vasūnām rudrāṇām*, etc. etc. . . . . *tapyadhvam*'.—The question is—Is this 'Heating of the Pans' to be done in connection with the Cooked Rice, or not?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "it should be done, in accordance with the General Law that 'the Ectype should be performed *like the Archetype*'".—The answer to this is that the said 'Heating' is done for the purpose of cooking the lower part of the Cake; and hence the General Law does not apply this to the case of the *Cooked Rice* (where there is no *upper* or *lower* part).

ADHIKARAṆA (18): *There is to be no 'Placing of the Pan upon the Fire' in connection with the 'Cooked Rice' to be offered to Sūrya.*

SŪTRA (54).

SO ALSO THE 'PLACING OF THE PAN ON THE FIRE', AS THIS ALSO IS FOR THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the Cooked Rice again, there arises the question regarding the 'Placing of the Pan upon the Fire'—Should it be done or not ?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"it should be done, because of the General Law that the Ectype should be performed *like the Archetype*".—It has to be excluded however, because this also is for the purpose of cooking the lower part (of the Cake).

ADHIKARAṆA (19): *There is to be no 'spreading out and smoothening' in connection with the Cooked Rice to be offered to Sūrya.*

SŪTRA (55).

THE 'SPREADING AND SMOOTHENING' ALSO (SHOULD NOT BE DONE), AS THERE IS NO CAKE.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the 'Spreading out and Smoothening' there is the same question as to whether or not it should be done in connection with the *Cooked Rice*.—In connection with the Archetype (*Āgnēya*) we read—'Reciting the *Mantra*, *Uruprathā*, etc., he spreads out the Cake'.—'Reciting the *Mantra*, *Santē tanvā tanūḥ*, etc., he smoothens it'.—The question is—Should these two acts be done in the case of Cooked Rice ?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that, "in accordance with the General Law, they should be done".—But it has to be excluded by reason of the fact that the substance in this case is not a *Cake* (which alone needs to be *spread out*).

ADHIKARAṆA (20): *There is to be no 'Covering up with live coals' in the case of Cooked Rice to be offered to Sūrya.*

SŪTRA (56).

SO ALSO THE 'COVERING UP WITH LIVE COALS'; AS THIS IS MEANT FOR THE COOKING OF THE UPPER PORTION.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the Archetype (*Āgnēya*) we read—'Places live coals on the Cake with the ladle'.—The question is—Should this be done in the case of the Cooked Rice to be offered to *Sūrya* ?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that —"in view of the General Law that the Ectype should be performed *like the Archetype*, it should be done".—In answer to this we have the *Siddhānta* that the act in question is done in connection with the *Cake* for the purpose of the cooking of its upper portion; and as there is no upper part to be cooked in the case of Cooked Rice, the act becomes excluded.

ADHIKARAṆA (21): *There is to be no 'applying of Heat all round' in the case of Cooked Rice to be offered to Sūrya.*

SŪTRA (57).

SO ALSO THE 'APPLYING OF HEAT ALL ROUND'.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'He applies heat all round the Cake with tufts of Kusha-grass'.—In regard to the Cooked Rice to be offered to *Sūrya*, there arises the question—Should the act be done or not ?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"it should be done, in accordance with the General Law that the Ectype should be performed like the Archetype".—But it has to be excluded as this also is done in the case of the Cake for the purpose of the cooking of its upper portion.

ADHIKARAṆA (22): *There is to be no 'Taking out and keeping aside' in the case of the Cooked Rice to be offered to Sūrya.*

SŪTRA (58).

SO ALSO THE 'TAKING OUT AND KEEPING ASIDE'; AS IT HAS NOT BEEN SO MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH THE ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the Archetype (*Āgnēya*) we read—'Keeps the offering-materials within the altar'; this is done at the *Āgnēya* in this manner that the Cake is *taken out of the Pan and then kept.*—In connection with the Cooked Rice, there arises the question—Should it be taken out of the Pot and kept aside? Or the *taking out* is not to be done?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"inasmuch as it is done at the Archetype, it should be done in the case in question".—In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta:—The Taking out and keeping aside also (should not be done), as it is not so mentioned in connection with the Archetype*;—as a matter of fact, in connection with the Archetype also there is no such declaration as that 'the Cake should be kept after having been *taken out of the Pans*',—it is so taken out only because of the needs of the situation; and what is done only by reason of the exigencies of the situation is not transferred by the General Law (to the Ectype). Hence it follows that there is to be no 'Taking out'. In fact, if this 'Taking out' were to be done, it could be done only after it has been dried and become like the wood-apple; and in that case, the Pot would be broken. Hence we conclude that in connection with the Cooked Rice, there should be no 'Taking out and keeping aside'.

End of Pāda i of Adhyāya X.

ADHYĀYA X.

PĀDA II.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *'Cooking' has to be done also in the case where the 'Charu' consists of gold-pieces.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF GOLD-PIECES, THERE SHOULD BE NO 'COOKING', AS THERE IS NO NEED FOR IT."

Bhāṣya.

There is the injunction—'*Prājāpatyam charum nirvapēt ghṛtē shatakṛṣṇalamāyuskāmaḥ*' ['Desiring longevity, one should offer to *Prajāpati* the *Charu* in the shape of a Hundred gold-pieces in Clarified Butter'].

In connection with this, there arises the question—Does the General Law of 'Cooking' apply to the *gold-pieces* and hence it should be performed? Or does it not apply to it and hence it is not to be performed?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*Cooking* should not be done to the gold-pieces; at the Archetype, the cooking is done for the purpose of preparing the Cake; while in the case in question, even without the cooking, the gold-pieces remain 'gold-pieces' [and these are what are needed]. Hence the Cooking is not transferred to the gold-pieces, and it should, therefore, not be done."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE DONE, BECAUSE IT IS DIRECTLY ENJOINED, JUST LIKE THE ACT OF 'OFFERING'.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, Cooking should be done (to the gold-pieces); it does not come in by virtue of the General Law; there is a direct injunction of their Cooking, in the text—'Cooks them in Clarified Butter'; it is to be done, not for the purpose for which it is done at the Archetype; it is to be done by virtue of the direct injunction, for some transcendental purpose; just as, though the gold-pieces are not fit for eating, yet they are offered by virtue of the direct injunction, so should the Cooking of them also be done.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *In the case of the gold-piece, the 'Upastaraṇa' and the 'Abhighāraṇa' should not be done.*

SŪTRA (3).

THERE SHOULD BE NO 'UPASTARAṆA' AND 'ABHIGHĀRAṆA', BECAUSE THEY ARE FOR THE PURPOSE OF NECTARISATION.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the '*Charu*' in the shape of gold-pieces, there arises the question—The '*Upastaraṇa*' (Rubbing) and '*Abhighāraṇa*' (Pouring out) that are done at the Archetype, in accordance with the text 'When one *rubs* and *pours out*, he makes the libation nectarine',—are these two, *Rubbing* and *Pouring out*, to be done in connection with the *gold-pieces*—or not ?

On this question, the view that naturally presents itself (as the *Siddhānta*) is as follows:—There should be no performance of the 'rubbing' and the 'pouring out';—why ?—*because they are for the purpose of 'nectarisation'*; these two acts are done for the purpose of 'nectarising' (the oblation); says the text—'When one scatters and pours out, he nectarises the libation', where the citing of the likeness of 'nectar' shows that the acts serve the purpose of making the libation *tasty*; and as there can be no taste in the gold-pieces, the said acts should not be performed.

SŪTRA (4).

[*Pūrvapakṣa argument against Siddhānta*]—"IN FACT, THE ACTS IN QUESTION SHOULD BE DONE; AS THE TEXT IS ONLY A DECLAMATORY STATEMENT; AND THE ACTS SERVE THE PURPOSE OF MERE CONTACT."

Bhāṣya.

"The 'Rubbing' and the 'Pouring out' should be done,—in accordance with *Sūtra* 10. 1. 1—'Inasmuch as the Injunction has been transferred to the entire context, all the details should be performed'.—It has been argued that—'the acts are done for the purpose of making the libations *tasty*'; but as a matter of fact, in connection with the Archetype, they have not been laid down as being for the purpose of 'tastiness',—there being no such expressions as—'it should be made tasty'.—Hence the text—'makes the libations nectarine' must be regarded as a merely declamatory statement; in fact, what is done (by the two acts) is *mere smearing* of the Clarified Butter and of the offering-substance;—and this contact can be

done in the case of the *gold-pieces* also ; hence there should be no exclusion of the acts in question."

SŪTRA (5).

[*Answer*]—IN FACT, THE ACTS SHOULD NOT BE DONE ; BECAUSE THERE IS ASSERTION OF 'MAKING UP' BY MEANS OF FOUR ; AND WHAT IS MADE UP WITH IT WOULD BE THE 'QUADRUPLE OBLATION'.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in fact') rejects the view just set forth.

There should be no performance of the two acts.—"Why ?"—*Because there is assertion of 'making up' by means of four*,—in the text '*Chatvāri kṛṣṇalāni avadyati*' ['He offers four gold-pieces'].—"What do you mean ?" —There are four gold-pieces which make up four oblations,—one gold-piece taking the place of one oblation ; and for this reason the two acts of 'rubbing' and 'pouring out' should be excluded.—Similarly there is assertion of 'accomplishment' also, in the text—'He offers four gold-pieces for the making up of the Quadruple Oblation' ; and it is only when something is not there that it is 'made up' by means of another thing ;— for this reason also the 'Rubbing' and the 'Pouring out' should not be done.— If it were made up with it—and with the 'Rubbing' and 'Pouring',—then, it would be the full Quadruple Oblation by itself, and in that case the use of the term 'make up' would be incompatible with it. [The 'Rubbing' and 'Pouring' serve the purpose of accomplishing the *Quadruple Oblation*, hence if these were done in the case in question, the Quadruple Oblation would be already accomplished and there would be no need of its being 'made up' by means of 'four gold-pieces' as declared in the former text.]

SŪTRA (6).

[*Pūrvapakṣa view reiterated*]—"THERE SHOULD BE PERFORMANCE OF THE ACTS ; BECAUSE THE EXACT MEASURE OF THE PRINCIPAL OBLATION HAS BEEN LAID DOWN ; AND IT COMES IN AS A SUBSIDIARY BY VIRTUE OF SIMILARITY."

Bhāṣya.

"As a matter of fact, there should be performance of the acts in question,—for the purpose of obeying the General Law.—In connection with the Archetype, the exact measure of the principal oblation has been laid down in the text—'Offers to deities an oblation of the size of the thumb-joint' ;—in the text quoted by the *Siddhāntin* also the term 'gold-piece' denotes a certain measure ;—and it is connected with the number *four*, in the text—'he offers four gold-pieces' ;—this does not mean that the four original oblations (of Clarified Butter) are of the size of a gold-

piece; in fact the term '*Kṛṣṇala*' (gold-piece) denotes a definite measure of *gold*, and it cannot denote a measure of *Clarified Butter*.—The said *measure* (of gold) therefore cannot exclude the *substance*; as the purpose served by a substance (Butter) cannot be served by a quality (measure); the measure ('*Kṛṣṇala*', gold-piece) can only serve that purpose at the ectype, which is served by the measure ('thumb-joint') at the Archetype; and hence all that it can do is to exclude from the Ectype this latter measure. For instance, when it is said—'Here is curd, clarified butter, vegetables and here is rice,—feed *Devadatta*; feed, like Devadatta, *Yajñadatta* with oil',—we know that the use of the oil lies in lubricating the food, and hence in the food of *Yajñadatta*, it can exclude (from among the articles mentioned in the first part of the sentence) only the *Clarified Butter*, which also serves the same purpose of lubricating the food,—and not the vegetable or the curd or the rice. Similarly in the case in question, what the second measure ('*Kṛṣṇala*') does is to measure the principal oblation (the substance) itself, and as such it would exclude only the original measure ('thumb-joint') of the substance, not the substance (Clarified Butter) itself;—and from the Context, the second measure (*Kṛṣṇala*) would appertain to the principal oblation, not to the 'Rubbing' and 'Pouring'.—From all this it follows that these acts should not be excluded."

SŪTRA (7).

"ALSO BECAUSE THEY FORM A SINGLE OBLATION."

Bhāṣya.

"The following text shows that the four (gold-pieces) form a single oblation—'Four gold-pieces form one oblation': in the other case there would be *four* oblations, which would be contrary to the assertion that 'it is a single oblation'.—For this reason also the acts in question should not be excluded."

SŪTRA (8).

"AS FOR THE MENTION OF 'MAKING UP', THAT IS DUE TO THE SAMENESS OF NUMBER."

Bhāṣya.

[The *Pūrvapakṣin* continues]—"It has been argued (under Sū. 5) that there is mention of 'making up':—but this is only a commendation of the number 'four',—the sense being that 'the great virtue of the number *four* is such that the offering of a single oblation makes up four oblations'. For instance, when the *Vaishvadēva* is mentioned in connection with the morning-extraction—in the text '*Prātaḥsavanē vā ētad vaishvadēva-yajñam samsthāpayati*',—it means only a commendation of the *Vaishvadēva*, not the exclusion of other *extractions*; similarly in the case in question, we have the commendation of the number *Four*, not the exclusion of the acts of 'Rubbing' and 'Pouring'."

SŪTRA (9).

[*Objection to last Sūtra*]—BUT THE MENTION OF 'MAKING UP' WITH REFERENCE TO WHAT ARE ALREADY THERE IS USELESS.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('but') sets aside the view that the sentence is a commendation of the number *Four*. As a matter of fact, when the 'Rubbing' and the 'Pouring out' are already there, the mention of their 'making up' cannot be a commendation. It is only when something is spoken of as bringing about (or making up) what has not been there, that it is regarded as indicating its efficiency, and is commended as such;—if, on the other hand, it makes up what is already there, then it means that it is useless, and this means no commendation. Thus the mention of 'making up' in reference to the 'Rubbing' and 'Pouring out', which are already there, would be useless. Hence you should put forward another answer (to the *Siddhānta* argument of Sū. 5).

SŪTRA (10).

[*The Pūrvapakṣin suggests another answer to Sū.* 5]—"THERE SHOULD BE OPTION; AS 'ONE OBLATION' ALSO HAS BEEN MENTIONED."

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' implies the rejection of the view that the 'rubbing' and 'pouring out' are to be excluded because of the mention of 'making up'.

"You say that from the indicative premise in the shape of the mention of 'making up' we infer the exclusion of the two acts; similarly from the indicative premise in the shape of the mention of 'one oblation', it may be inferred that there is no exclusion of the acts.—Thus there being optional indicatives, the mention of 'making up' cannot prove the absolute exclusion of the acts."

SŪTRA (11).

[*The Pūrvapakṣin rejects the argument of the Siddhānta*]—"IF ALL WERE TRANSFORMED, THE REPETITION WOULD BE MEANINGLESS; WHILE (UNDER OUR VIEW), IT WOULD APPERTAIN TO THE OTHER OFFERING-SUBSTANCE;—IF IT WERE HELD TO BE FOR THE SAKE OF THE SVIṢṬAKṚT-OFFERING, THAT WOULD BE MOST UNREASONABLE.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' in the (*Sūtra*) implies the rejection of the argument (of Sū. 5) based upon the mention of 'making up'.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* continues—"When the argument based on the mention of 'making up' has been rejected,—if the 'four gold-pieces' were treated as the modification of all the oblations, the repetition (of the term '*chatvāri*') in the following text would be meaningless—'*Chatvāri chatvāri kṛṣṇalānyavadyati samṛddhyai*'. Under our view on the other hand, the repetition *would appertain to the other*—i.e. the second—offering-material.—It might be argued that—'Under our view also the repetition would appertain to the *Sviṣṭakṛt*-offering'.—But that cannot be; the reference to the *Sviṣṭakṛt would be most unreasonable.* It is the principal offering that is connected through the Context with the Assertion in question;—and in the case in question, the Context is not that of the *Sviṣṭakṛt*; it comes in only by virtue of the General Law.—Thus under your view, the repetition would be meaningless; hence the acts of 'Rubbing' and 'Pouring out' must be done."

SŪTRA (12).

[*Siddhāntin's Final Answer to the Pūrvapakṣa*]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE NO PERFORMANCE (OF THE SAID ACTS); BECAUSE THE NEED DUE TO CONTACT HAS CEASED; HENCE THE MENTION OF 'MAKING UP' IS FULLY JUSTIFIED.

Bhāṣya.

There should be no performance of the acts of 'rubbing' and 'pouring'. —"Why?"—As a matter of fact, the *Sruk* is smoothened with the rubbing of Clarified Butter with the view that the small particles of the Cake may not stick to it; similarly the 'pouring' of Clarified Butter over the *Sruk* is to make sure that all that is contained in it, and not sticking to it, may fall in the Fire.—In the case of the *gold-piece* however, as it is distinct by itself, there is no possibility of its sticking to the *Sruk*,—by reason of which possibility the lubricating of the gold would be done by means of the acts of 'rubbing' and 'pouring'.—Thus, the original need having ceased in connection with the *gold-pieces*, it is only right that the acts of 'rubbing' and 'pouring' should be excluded.—In this way the mention of the 'making up' also,—in the text '*Chatvāri kṛṣṇalānyavadyati chaturavattasyāptyai*'—becomes justified.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *There should be 'Eating' in the case of 'Golden Pieces'.*

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS 'EATINGS' ARE MEANT FOR SATISFACTION, THERE SHOULD BE NO EATING."

Bhāṣya.

Here also the subject-matter for consideration is the '*Charu*' in the shape of 'a hundred gold-pieces'.

At the Archetype, there are eatings (of the remnants of offerings) at the time of (1) '*Iḍā*', (2) '*Prāshitra*', (3) '*Chaturdhākaraṇa*', and (4) '*Shaṁyuvāka*'.

In regard to these 'eatings' there arises the question—Should these 'eatings' be done in cases where the '*Charu*' offered is in the shape of gold-pieces? Or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"It should not be done; at the Archetype it is done for the purpose of bringing satisfaction and thereby imparting strength; in the case of gold, it brings no satisfaction by being eaten;—hence there should be no *eating*."

SŪTRA (14).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE 'EATING'; BECAUSE WE FIND THE MENTION OF 'NIRDHĀNA' ('DRINKING OFF').

Bhāṣya.

In reality, there must be 'eating' of the gold; because we find the following text speaking of a particular form of eating it—'They eat it by drinking off, they eat it by sucking'; the text could lay down these special methods of *eating* only if the *eating* were already known as to be done; otherwise it would have to be taken as laying down the special method of *eating* as also the '*eating* itself; and in that case there would be syntactical split.—Hence we conclude that the eating comes in in the case of gold-pieces by virtue of the General Law itself.

SŪTRA (15).

[*Objection*]—"THE ASSERTION SHOULD BE TAKEN AS THAT OF THE EATING OF THE CLARIFIED BUTTER; AS THIS DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE ARCHETYPE."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not right that the *eatings* come in by virtue of the General Law; as a matter of fact, they become excluded on the ground of there being

no need for them.—It has been argued that there is an injunction of special methods of eating;—but from that injunction itself, it is clear that the sentence 'They eat it by *drinking off*, they eat it by *sucking*' enjoins the eating of the Clarified Butter;—the terms 'drinking off' and 'sucking' are only references to what happens when the Butter is being eaten; so that there is no syntactical split."

SŪTRA (16).

[*Answer*]—IN REALITY, THE ASSERTION MUST BE TAKEN AS RELATING TO THE GOLD; LIKE ITS OFFERING;—BECAUSE THE CLARIFIED BUTTER IS A SUBORDINATE FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, the assertion relates to the Gold, not to the Clarified Butter.—"Why?"—All that is found in the text is '*bhakṣayanti*' ('they eat'),—and nothing is said as to whether they eat *this* or *that*. Consequently the term ('they eat') must be related to that which has been spoken of in the Context; and what has been spoken of is the *Gold*, not the *Clarified Butter*. —"How so?"—In the text, '*Prājāpatyam charum nirvapet ghṛtē shatakṛṣṇalam*', the '*Charu*' in the shape of 'a hundred gold-pieces' has been mentioned for the purpose of being connected with some act,—and the *Clarified Butter* has been mentioned only as a qualification of that '*Charu*', and not by itself; hence what is connected with the other words of the sentence is the '*Charu*', not the *Clarified Butter*. Just as, when it is said 'The stick is there on the heap of bricks, strike with it', it is understood that the *striking* is to be done with the *stick*, not with the *brick-heap*,—in the same manner, in the case in question, what is connected with the mention of 'eating' is the *Charu*, not the *Clarified Butter*. From all this it follows that there should be *eating* of the *Charu*, just like its *being offered*; i.e. just as, though the gold-pieces are not fit for being eaten, yet they are *offered*, so though not fit to be eaten, they may be *eaten* also.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *In connection with the 'Charu' in the shape of Gold-pieces, the sentence 'Ekadhā charati' means that it should be offered collectively.*

SŪTRA (17).

WHEN IT IS SAID THAT 'THE PRESENTATION IS TO BE DONE ONCE', IT IS THE SIMULTANEOUSNESS OF THE 'BRAHMAN'S SHARES' THAT IS MEANT; AS THEY HAVE BEEN PRESENTED AT THE ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the same ('Eating of gold-pieces'), we read 'He presents it to the Brahman Priest *once*'.

In regard to this there arises the question—Is it *simultaneousness*, or only a *single* presentation, that is meant here (by the term 'once', '*ēkadhā*')?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"It may mean either *simultaneousness* or a *single presentation*; there is no restriction.—Why?—Because the word '*Ēkadhā*' ('once') signifies *in one way*;—and to make a single presentation is always *one way* of doing it, and to present simultaneously also is another *way*. For instance, if a man brings in the cows at one time only, he is said to have brought them '*Ekadhā*' ('once'); similarly if he brings a number of them together, simultaneously, then also he is said to have brought them '*Ekadhā*', 'once'.—Hence in making the presentation, one may either make a single presentation, or all the four presentations simultaneously."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The sentence '*Ekadhā brahmaṇē praharati*' is understood to mean that the presentations are done simultaneously; so that the presentation is done of the "Brahman's share' as also of the share of the non-Brahman.—Under the other view (if a single presentation is made) it is just possible that the presentation of some one 'share of the Brahman' may not be presented at all; and to that extent the injunction of the archetypal procedure would be transgressed.—All these shares are such as have been presented at the Archetype, and it is as thus presented that they are brought into the Ectype by the General Law; and under the circumstances, the term '*Ekadhā*' ('once') can denote only *simultaneousness*.—"But in connection with the gold-pieces, the *Eating* is one that is done in accordance with a distinct injunction, and it is not the same as that which is done at the Archetype; so that the archetypal eatings cannot find a place at the Ectype in question."—*Answer*—They may not come in as serving the purpose of embellishing the man, but they can certainly come in as embellishing the substance.—"If they come in by virtue of the General Law, why then should they be

laid down by a distinct text?"—They are so laid down for the purpose of laying down the method of the Eating.—"The method is already known to be either *drinking off* or *sucking*, according to circumstances, and it being so known, the sentence can be only a *reference* to it."—The answer to this is that it does not come in in a definite way; and it is for the purpose of restricting the method that Eating has been enjoined separately.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *In connection with the 'Gold-piece-Charu' all the eating-shares should be presented to the Brahman-priest.*

SŪTRA (18).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'ALL' SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY THEIR RIGHTS."

Bhāṣya.

The same 'gold-piece-*Charu*' continues to be the subject-matter of discussion.

In connection with the said *Charu*, we read—'Presents all to the Brahman-priest'. [At the Archetype each of the four Priests, *Brahman* and the rest, has his share kept in four pans, each *pan* being presented to him at the appointed time,—the first at the time of the '*Iḍā*-offering', the second at the time of the *Prāshitra*, the third at the time of the *Chaturdhākaraṇa*, and the fourth at the time of the *Shaṁyuvāka*.]

In regard to the said text, there arises the question—Does it mean that all the shares of Brahman himself are to be presented to him? Or that the shares of the other priests are taken away from them [so that all the shares of all the priests are to be presented to Brahman]?

Question—"Under what circumstances would it mean the presentation of the Brahman's own shares only? And under what conditions would the shares of other priests be taken away from them?

Answer—If the text means that the '*all*' is predicated in reference to the "presentation to *Brahman*',—or that the '*presentation*' is predicated in reference to 'Brahman's all',—then there would be presentation of the Brahman's own shares alone;—while, if in reference to the 'all', the presentation to Brahman' is predicated,—or in reference to the 'presentation', 'all to Brahman' is predicated,—then the shares of the other priests are to be taken away from them.

On the said question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"The 'all' should be taken as pertaining to the shares of Brahman himself.—Why?—Because the 'presentation to Brahman' is already known as to be done, and hence it cannot be taken as predicated (or enjoined); it is only the 'presentation of all (his shares)' that is not already known as to be done; hence there can be predication (or injunction) of that alone.—Or, all the shares of Brahman being already there, the presentation of some is known as to be done, while that of others is not so known; and it is the presentation of these latter that is enjoined in the text. The text therefore should be taken as speaking of only those shares of Brahman to which he is entitled."

SŪTRA (19).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE EXCLUSION OF (OTHER) MEN; BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT SPOKEN OF.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.—There should be exclusion of the other priests (from having any share).

(*a*) If the sentence were construed as '*Yat brahmaṇē pariharati tat sarvam*' ['What one presents to the *Brahman* is *all*'], then the whole injunction would be meaningless.—(*b*) If the construction were—'*Yat brahmaṇē tat sarvam pariharati*' ['What is for *Brahman*, that *all* one presents'], as it is not stated *what* is *for Brahman*, 'for Brahman' would be no qualification at all.—(*c*) If the construction be—'*Yat brahmaṇē sarvam tat pariharati*' ['What is for Brahman, *all* that he presents'], then also that thing would not be mentioned which is *for Brahman*.—(*d*) No such assertion is possible as '*Yat sarvam tat pariharati*' ['What is *all*, that one presents'], because *all* is *all*,—so that further qualification would be needed.—Thus the only construction possible is '*Sarvam brahmaṇē pariharati*' ['Presents all to the Brahman'],—whereby the connection of the *Charu* with the *Brahman-priest* is laid down; and there is nothing that remains meaningless or useless. Hence it follows that the shares of the other priests are taken away from them (and presented to Brahman).

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *The portions of the substance are to be eaten by the Brahman at their respective times.*

SŪTRA (20).

FROM THE EXCLUSION OF THE OTHER MEN, IT FOLLOWS THAT EACH EATING IS TO BE DONE AT ITS OWN TIME.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the same subject as before, there arises the question—It being understood that the other persons are to be excluded, are all the portions to be eaten at one and the same time?—Or is each portion to be eaten at its own time?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"The presentation of the portions is done for the purpose of eating, and hence when something has been presented for eating, it should be eaten immediately."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*From the exclusion of the other men, it follows that each Eating is to be done at its own time*;—the words of the sentence having served its purpose by having excluded the other men, it does not set aside the idea that the portions are to be eaten at their own time; hence they should be eaten at their own appointed time.

Adhikaraṇa (7): *In the 'Brahman's share' the operations of 'Chaturdhākaraṇa' and the rest are not to be performed.*

SŪTRA (21).

As it is for a single purpose, there should be no allocation of shares.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the same matter, we consider the following point:—In connection with the Archetype, we find the following allocation of shares laid down—'This for the *Brahman*,—this for the *Hotṛ*,—this for the *Adhvaryu*,—this for the *Agnīd*';—the question arises—Should this allocation be done in connection with the case in question (of the *gold-piece-Charu*)—or not?

There may be people who may entertain the notion that—"by virtue of the indication of the General Law, the allocation should be done";—it is in answer to these that we have the present *Sūtra*. At the Archetype, it is necessary to connect the 'Eating' with several priests,—and as this is not possible without the allocation of shares, this allocation is done at it;—in the case in question however, it is laid down that 'all is to be presented to the *Brahman*',—i.e. the whole of the *Charu* is to be given to a single individual; so that there is no need for any allocation of shares; if it were done, it could serve no useful purpose at the sacrifice; it would be done only for a transcendental purpose.—From all this it follows that there is to be no allocation of shares in connection with the *gold-piece-Charu*.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *At the Jyotiṣṭoma, the gift to the Priests is for the purpose of securing their services.*

SŪTRA (22).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE GIFT TO THE PRIESTS SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN ACT OF MERE DHARMA, BECAUSE OF THE FORCE OF THE ROOT 'TO GIVE'."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* laid down in the text—'Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice';—in connection with that there is the following declaration—'Cow, horse, mule, asses, goats, sheep, *Vrihi*-corn, barley-corn, sesamum, *Māṣa*, and Twelve-Hundred,—these constitute the Sacrificial Fee';—and again—'One gives the Sacrificial Fee to the priests'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this *giving* only an act of *Dharma* (fulfilment of duty)? Or is it ('wages') meant to secure the services of the priests?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*The gift to the Priests should be regarded as an act of mere Dharma*; it is an act which has been mentioned in the Veda as *to be done*; from the words of the text quoted we learn that the act of *giving* should be done; as for the necessity of securing the services of the priests, that is indicated only by Syntactical Connection; and Direct Vedic Assertion is more authoritative than Syntactical Connection. Among ordinary people also, the act of *giving* is understood as serving a transcendental purpose; and the *securing of services* and such other results come in by the force of the circumstances.

[The reading everywhere is '*nānamanādi*'; the sense is as translated; which requires the reading '*chānamanādi*'.]

Then again, in some cases we find that the Sacrificial Fee laid down is not in keeping with the duties performed; e.g. at the *Traidhātavī*, it is a thousand, and at the *Ṛtapēya*, a Soma-cup [which shows that the fee is not meant to be for services rendered].—Further, it is a case of 'purchase' (or hiring of services) where there is bargaining as to high or low prices payable, and what is to be given is not something fixed (as we find in the case of the Sacrificial Fees).—From this it follows that the gift in question is only an act of *Dharma*.—Further, this gift is made according to strict rules and with *Mantras*; and this could be explicable only if it were for a purely transcendental purpose.—In some cases we read—'Stick, shoes, and dry hide,—these constitute the Sacrificial Fee';—and what priest is there who would give his services for a *stick*?—From all this it follows that the gift is only an act of *Dharma*."

SŪTRA (23).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS SERVING THE PURPOSE OF 'HIRING' (THE SERVICES), BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF DUTIES,—AS AMONG ORDINARY PEOPLE.

Bhāṣya.

The gift must be regarded as serving the purpose of hiring the services of the men.—"Why?"—*Because of the mention of duties*; that is, the gift is spoken of as to be given to persons who have performed certain duties—'Gives the Sacrificial Fee *to the Priests*' (i.e. to those who have performed the priestly functions);—and when this perceptible purpose (the securing of services) is found to be served, it cannot be right to assume a transcendental result.—Even the transcendental result that would follow from the restriction (of the gift to certain things) would do so only through the said perceptible purpose,—the sense being—'When the Priests have their services secured by means of this particular gift of a particular character, they bring prosperity (to the performer)'.—"How so?"—When the *giving* is enjoined, it is enjoined as subservient to the *securing of services*, and not as the principal factor;—and the idea expressed by the sentence should be accepted;—otherwise the presence of the term '*ṛtvigbhyaḥ*' ('to the priests') would have no sense (it would be superfluous).—If the idea expressed by the sentence were not accepted, then the direct assertion of the Veda would be set aside.—As for the argument that 'the Sacrificial Fee is not always in keeping with the duties performed",—this could not justify the rejection of the visible purpose served by the gift;—and it has been already explained that the transcendental result that follows from the restriction (of the nature of the Fee) does so only through that visible purpose. As for the *stick*, it is regarded as a *gift*, on the strength of the direct assertion of the Veda; and some sort of service-securing is done by that simple gift also. Among ordinary people when something is given to the wood-carrier and other labourers,—that also serves the purpose of securing their services,—even though it may not be stated in so many words that it is a case of 'hiring' (of services).—From all this it follows that the Sacrificial Fee is given for the purpose of securing the services of the Priests.

SŪTRA (24).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE USE OF THE TERM 'EQUIPPED WITH THE SACRIFICIAL FEE'.

Bhāṣya.

The use of the term '*Dakṣiṇāyukta*' ('Equipped with the Sacrificial Fee')—in the text '*Dakṣiṇāyuktā vahanti ṛtvijaḥ*',—indicates that the gift is for the purpose of hiring their services.

SŪTRA (25).

THEY WOULD NOT AGREE TO SERVE EXCEPT THROUGH 'HIRING', AS THE ACT IS FOR THE PURPOSES OF ANOTHER PERSON.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the gift should be regarded as being for the purpose of 'hiring' the services.—"For what reason?"—Except through 'Hiring', no one would engage in working for another person.—"But there are other means of making a man to work,—such means, for instance, as conciliatory overtures and the like."—We do not say that there are no other means; what we mean is that 'Hiring' is what is directly laid down.—Hence the priests are to be 'hired' by the means laid down,—not by any other means.

SŪTRA (26).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE USE OF THE TERM 'PARIKRĪTA' (HIRED).

Bhāṣya.

There is the mention of the word 'hired', which also indicates the same conclusion; it is found in the following text—'*Dīkṣitamadīkṣitā dakṣiṇāparikrītā ṛtvijo yājayanti*' ['The uninitiated priests, *hired through the sacrificial fee*, perform the sacrifice for the initiated sacrificer'].—For this reason also, the gift should be regarded as serving the purpose of 'hiring' (services).

SŪTRA (27).

ALSO BECAUSE THE TERM 'BHṚTI' ('WAGES') IS APPLIED TO WHAT IS OBTAINED BY BEGGING.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*Sanivanya*' is to be explained as '*sanivani prāptam*', that is, *obtained by begging*;—it is to this that the term '*bhṛti*' ('wages') has been applied in the following passage—'*Yajño vai dēvatānām na samabhavat, tam bhṛtyā samabhāvayan, yat bhṛtim vanutē yajñasya bhṛtyai, dvādasharātrirdīkṣito bhṛtim vanvīta*' ['No sacrifice was possible for the deities,—they made it possible by means of wages; when one begs for wages, it is for the fulfilment of the sacrifice; the initiated sacrificer should beg for the wages for twelve nights'].—Here we find that the term '*bhṛti*' has been applied to what has been obtained by begging for the purpose of securing the services of the Priests, and for the purpose of obtaining the other accessories of the sacrifice; and 'wages' are that which is given to workers for securing their services.—For this reason also the gift to the Priests is to be taken as being for the hiring of their services.

SŪTRA (28).

ALSO BECAUSE THEY ARE DESCRIBED AS SIMILAR TO THE 'WOOD-CUTTER'.

Bhāṣya.

There is a description of the Priests as resembling the wood-cutter in the following text—'Just as the wood-carrier who cuts wood, on being hired for wood-cutting, takes up that work, so also the Priests of this sacrifice'; this text says that the Priests are like the wood-carrier cutting wood; and this clearly indicates that the gift is meant for the hiring of services.

Adhikaraṇa (9): *At the Jyotiṣṭoma, the 'Eating' is an act of Disposal.*

SŪTRA (29).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The 'Eatings of Remnants' also are like that."

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, there are *Eatings of Remnants*,—to which people are entitled by their having done the '*Vaṣaṭkāra*' or the 'Homa' or the 'Juice-extraction',—and which are done at the time of the '*Iḍā*', the '*Prāshitra*', the '*Chaturdhākaraṇa*' and the '*Shaṁyuvāka*'.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are these 'Eatings' for the purpose of hiring the services of the men—or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*The Eatings of Remnants* also should be treated *like that*; i.e. like the *giving of the Sacrificial Fee*. As *Eating* brings satisfaction and through satisfaction the men become agreeable to serve;—hence the *Eatings of Remnants* should be regarded as serving the purpose of hiring the services of men."

SŪTRA (30).

[Siddhānta]—In fact, it should be regarded as an Embellishment of the substance; as it is subservient to the purpose of something else.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

As a matter of fact, the *Eating* is not for the purpose of hiring the services, it is for the purpose of the embellishment of the substance.—"Why?"—Because the coming in of a substance is useful only when it serves a useful purpose at the sacrifice; so that when the *Eating* serves the purpose of embellishing the substance, that also serves a useful purpose.—Then again, there are several such statements as—'He slices off a piece from the right-hand portion and from the middle portion',—which speak of parts of the substance; these must refer to the Remnants of the substance used; and they cannot be taken as laying down the bringing in of a fresh substance. Hence what is laid down is the *Eating of the substance*, and not that the substance is to be brought in for the purpose of *Eating*; as the *Eating* is to be of that which has been used at the sacrifice concerned.—From all this it follows that the *Eating* serves the purpose of embellishing the substance.

SŪTRA (31).

ALSO BECAUSE IN REGARD TO THE REMNANT THEY ARE EQUAL.

Bhāṣya.

Further, that substance of which there is the Remnant is one that has been dedicated to a deity and as such cannot be used by the sacrificer himself; hence the Priests cannot make use of it, nor the sacrificer; because in this matter there is equality between the sacrificer and the Priests. If the sacrificer were to hire the services of the Priests with the Remnant, he would be making the Remnant his own, and in that case its dedication to the deity would be nullified.—From this also it follows that the *Eating* is not for the purpose of the hiring of services.

SŪTRA (32).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS FOUND TO BE DONE BY THE SACRIFICER ALSO; THE OTHERS ALSO BEING SIMILAR TO THE SACRIFICER, IT SHOULD BE THE SAME IN REGARD TO THEM ALSO.

Bhāṣya.

It is found that *Eating* is done by the *Sacrificer* also, as declared in the sentence—'The Priests with the Sacrificer as the fifth, on being invited, eat the Cake';—certainly there can be no 'hiring of services' of the Sacrificer himself;—and as the others (the Priests) also are in the same position as the Sacrificer, *it should be the same in regard to them*,—i.e. in their case also there can be no 'hiring of services'.—Such being the case, there can be no such idea as that 'the priests, with the Sacrificer as the fifth, have their services hired by the Eating of the Cake'.—"What is the similarity (between the Sacrificer and the Priests)?"—The presence of the Accusative ending (in the sentence '*Yajamānapañchamāḥ parikrīyantā*').—From this also it follows that the *Eating* is not meant for the 'hiring of services'.

SŪTRA (33).

SO ALSO IS THERE A TEXT INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

It is only under the above view that the following statement can be explained—'At the *Kuṇḍapāyinām ayana* they eat the *Soma* in cups without handles'; the special qualification 'without handles' would have some sense only if the *Eating* were already there.—Similarly we find *Eating* done at *Sattras*; and this would not be explicable if it were meant for the hiring of services.—For this reason also the *Eating* cannot be regarded as being meant for the hiring of services.

Adhikaraṇa (10): *At the 'Sattra', there is to be no 'appointment' of the Priests.*

SŪTRA (34).

The 'appointment' of the Priests is for the purpose of securing their services; hence it should not be done at the Sattra; as it is their own business.

Bhāṣya.

There are *Sattras,* in the shape of *Dvādashāha* and the rest, laid down in such texts as—'Desiring prosperity, they should have recourse to the *Dvādashāha*'.—The Archetype of these is the *Jyotiṣṭoma,* at which there is an 'appointment' of the Priests, laid down in such texts as—'*Agnirme hotā*, etc.'

In regard to the *Sattras,* there arises the question—Should this 'appointment' be done at the *Sattras*—or not?

In this connection, what we have to consider is—Is the 'appointment' done at the Archetype a mere act of *Dharma*? Or is it meant to serve the purpose of hiring the services of the Priests?—If it is only an act of *Dharma,* then it should be done at the Archetype as also at the Sattras. On the other hand, if it is meant for the purpose of securing the services of men, then it should not be done at the *Sattras.*

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"inasmuch as it is done with *Mantras* and in accordance with definite rules, it must be an act of *Dharma*; and hence it must be done at the *Sattras*".

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—At the *Sattras,* there should be no 'appointment' of the Priests,—i.e. it should not be done.—The performance of the *Sattra* is the Priests' *own business,* and certainly no one 'appoints' himself. At the Archetype (*Jyotiṣṭoma*) the 'appointment' is found to serve the visible purpose of securing the services of the Priests, and hence there can be no justification for the assuming of an invisible (transcendental) purpose.—Hence we conclude that there should be no 'appointment' at the *Sattras.*

Adhikaraṇa (11): *At the 'Sattra', there is to be no 'hiring' of the Priests.*

SŪTRA (35).

The 'Hiring' also [is not to be done], because the work is for their own sake.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the Archetype, *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the 'Hiring of Services' has been laid down in the text—'Cow, horse, mule . . . . constitute the Sacrificial Fee'; the giving of this Sacrificial Fee is indicated by the General Law as to be done at the *Sattra* also (this being an Ectype of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*). The question is—Should this be done at the *Sattra* or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"In obedience to the General Law, it should be done; also because we find that the giving of the cow and some other things enumerated above as 'Sacrificial Fee' has been forbidden in connection with the *Sattra* in the text—'At this sacrifice, the cow is not given; nor clothes, nor gold' [which implies that the other things are to be given]; and this is explicable only on the basis of the view that there is to be 'hiring'."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*The 'hiring' also is not to be done, because the work is for their own sake*; i.e. the 'hiring' should not be done. It has been explained above that no 'appointment' is to be done at *Sattras*; this same conclusion is applied to the case of 'hiring' by the particle '*cha*' in the *Sūtra* '*parikrayashcha*', the meaning being that the *hiring* also should not be done:—why?—because the work is *for their own sake*, and certainly no one 'hires' himself.

SŪTRA (36).

[*Objection*]—"But there is prohibition,—like that of an act."

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued above that "the Prohibition (of certain articles) can be explained only on the basis of the view that some Sacrificial Fee is to be given".—This has to be refuted (which, as suggested by some, is done in the following *Sūtra*).—

SŪTRA (37).

The said prohibition could be explained as pertaining to the gift that is made to the 'Prasarpakas'; as that is an act of mere Dharma.

Bhāṣya.

The meaning is that the said prohibition is explicable.—"As of what?" —As of the gift made to the *Prasarpakas*; as that is an act of mere *Dharma*,

and as the giving of that gift would be indicated by the General Law as to be done at the *Sattras*, it is only right that it has been prohibited; hence the prohibition is quite justified.

SŪTRA (38).

NOT SO; BECAUSE THE TERM 'SACRIFICIAL FEE' HAS BEEN USED; HENCE THE PROHIBITION IN QUESTION SHOULD BE REGARDED MERELY AS THE STATEMENT OF A FACT.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, the prohibition does not apply to the gift that is made to the *Prasarpakas*.—Why?—*Because the term 'Sacrificial Fee' has been used*; we find the term 'Sacrificial Fee' ('*dakṣiṇā*') in the following text—'*Adakṣiṇāni sattrāṇyāyuḥ, nahyatra gaurdīyatē, na vāso na hiraṇyam*' ['They say that the *Sattras* are without a *Sacrificial Fee*, as no cow is given at them, nor clothes nor gold'];—and the term 'Sacrificial Fee' is always used in the case of a gift made for the purpose of 'hiring'; as we have the following text bearing upon it—'Cow, horse, etc. etc. ... these constitute the Sacrificial Fee'; so that the *Sacrificial Fee* is what is given to the Priests, not to the *Prasarpakas*; hence the denial contained in the sentence is of what is given to the Priests, not of what is given to the *Prasarpakas*.—From all this it follows that the denial or prohibition in question is only *the statement of a settled fact*—that *there is no Sacrificial Fee at Sattras.*

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *The 'Udavasānīya Sacrifice' not forming part of the Sattra, the Fee given at the former is to be taken as meant for 'hiring'.*

SŪTRA (39).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'UDAVASĀNĪYA' SHOULD TAKE IN THE DETAILS OF THE 'SATTRA', BECAUSE IT IS PART OF IT; AND HENCE THE 'GIVING' AT IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A MERE ACT OF DHARMA."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Udavasānīya* sacrifice laid down in the text—'*Satrād udavasāya pṛṣthashamanīyēna jyotiṣṭomēna sahasradakṣiṇēna yajēran*' [Where the performance of a sacrifice is laid down as coming after the *Sattra*; and that sacrifice is called the '*Udavasānīya*'].

In regard to this sacrifice, there arises the question—Is the giving of the Sacrificial Fee at this sacrifice a mere act of *Dharma*? Or does it serve the purpose of 'hiring' (the priests)?—And in this connection there is the further question—Is the *Udavasānīya* a part of the *Sattra*—or not? —If it is a part of the *Sattra*, then the giving of the Fee must be an act of mere *Dharma*; while, if it is not part of the *Sattra*, then, it serves the purpose of 'hiring'.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows:—"The *Udavasānīya* is a part of the *Sattra*.—How?—Because it is laid down in the context of the *Sattra*: It is asserted in the text that 'it is to be performed *after completing the Sattra*'; and as the context is of the *Sattra*, it follows that it is to be performed as qualifying the *Sattra*; which means that the *Udavasānīya* is enjoined as part of the *Sattra*;—and as the *Sattra* is performed for the purpose of a definite result, it cannot be taken as performed for the purpose of accomplishing the *Udavasānīya*;—nor is it necessary that the *Udavasānīya* should be performed immediately after the completion of the *Sattra*; as such an idea could be got at only by means of indirect indication.—In case the *Udavasānīya* is not taken as part of the *Sattra*, it will be necessary to assume a distinct result as following from it.—From all this it follows that—(*a*) because it follows immediately after the *Sattra*, and (*b*) because of the Syntactical Connection of the sentence, the *Udavasānīya* must be regarded as part of the *Sattra*; the sense of the sentence being —'One should not rest content with having performed the *Sattra* as enjoined, —merely by that one should not think that he has done all that he had to do,—there is yet a part of the *Sattra* which should be performed, and this part is the *Udavasānīya*';—it is just as we find in the case of the sentence—'*Agnim chitvā sautrāmaṇyā yajēta*' ['Having established the Fire, one should perform the *Sautrāmaṇī* sacrifice'],—or in the sentence '*Vāja-*

pēyēna iṣṭvā bṛhaspatisavēna yajēta' ['After having performed the *Vājapēya* sacrifice, one should perform the *Bṛhaspatisava* sacrifice'].—From all this we conclude that the *Udavasānīya* is part of the *Sattra*.—Thus, inasmuch as the *Sattra* along with all its subsidiary parts is performed by men on their own behalf, the giving of the Sacrificial Fee at that sacrifice can be only an act of *Dharma*; and the *Udavasānīya* takes in all the details of the *Sattra*."

SŪTRA (40).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE IT HAS NOT THAT FOR ITS ARCHETYPE; AND ALSO BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN ENJOINED AS DISTINCT.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' rejects the above view.

It is not true that the giving of the Fee in this case is a mere act of *Dharma*; as a matter of fact, it is for the purpose of 'hiring'.—"Why?" —Because the *Udavasānīya* is not a part of the *Sattra*, as *it has been enjoined as distinct*; the case of this sacrifice is not similar to that of the *Bṛhaspatisava* or the *Sautrāmaṇī*; in the case of both these latter, it is declared that 'one should not rest content with having performed the mentioned details, as there is this yet to be done' [and then the *Bṛhaspatisava* and the *Sautrāmaṇī* are laid down]. In the case in question however, what is said is that 'after having given up the *Sattra*, one should perform the *Udavasānīya*',—the phrase '*Sattrāt udavasāya*' being equivalent to '*Sattrāt utthāya*', 'having risen from the *Sattra*';—in this case what is expressed by the affix '*ktvā*' (in '*Udavasāya*') is totally different; the meaning is 'having accomplished what has been laid down one should not abandon it'; the word '*Udavasāya*', derived from the root '*syati*' with the prefixes '*ut*' and '*ava*', means '*prahāya*';—thus here the affix '*ktvā*' denotes *abandoning*, while in the case of the *Bṛhaspatisava* and the *Sautrāmaṇī*, it signifies *immediate sequence*.—From all this we conclude that, because it has been enjoined as distinct, therefore the *Udavasānīya* is not a part of the *Sattra*, nor is the *Sattra* its Archetype;—and hence in the case in question, the giving of the Fee must be regarded as being done for the purpose of 'hiring'.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *The 'Udavasānīya' should be performed by each one of the Priests.*

SŪTRA (41).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THEY SHOULD BE PERFORMED COLLECTIVELY, AS SUCH IS THE DECLARATION;—AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'DVIYAJÑA'."

Bhāṣya.

The subject-matter is the same as before,—the text—'*Sattrāt udavasāya pṛṣṭhashamanīyēna jyotiṣṭomēna sahasradakṣiṇēna yajēran*'.—In connection with this we have seen that the *Pṛṣṭhashamanīya* (*Udavasānīya*) is not a part of the *Sattra*.—The question that arises now is—Is this sacrifice to be performed by the priests collectively? Or by each one of them, severally?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"It should be performed collectively by all.—Why?—Because the plurality enjoined (by means of the term '*yajēran*') is something to be adopted in connection with the sacrifice;—if then it were done by *anyone* of them, then the performance would not be accompanied by that plurality;—as *in the case of the* '*Dviyajña*' (sacrifice by two persons): In the text—'*Ētēna rājapurohitau sāyujyakāmau yajēyātām*' ['Desirous of absorption, the King and the Minister should perform this sacrifice'],—the King and the Minister have been mentioned as characterising the sacrifice, and the word '*yajēyātām*' signifies the sacrifice as something to be accomplished; and the same word also signifies that there are two performers [and there is a single performance];—similarly in the case in question we have the words '*pṛṣṭhashamanīyēna yajēran*'.—From all this it follows that the *Pṛṣṭhashamanīya* (*Udavasānīya*) should be performed by all, collectively."

This *Adhikaraṇa* is left here unfinished; we shall explain the *Sūtra* now which embodies an intermediate topic. [*The thread of Adhikaraṇa* (13) *is taken up under Sū.* 43, *which propounds the Siddhānta in answer to the Pūrvapakṣa set forth in Sū.* 41.]

Adhikaraṇa (14): *At the 'Udavasānīya' the Priests are to be other than those engaged in the 'Sattra'.*

SŪTRA (42).

AT THAT SACRIFICE, THEY SHOULD APPOINT OTHER PRIESTS.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the same text that has been dealt with under the preceding *Sūtra*, there arises the question—At the sacrifice in question are the same persons that are engaged in the *Sattra* to be the priests? Or should others be appointed?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"Those same should be employed;—why?—because the expression '*Udavasāya yajēran*' shows that the persons performing the *Udavasānīya sacrifice* are the same that have *given up* the *Sattra*; so that, even though the employment of other priests is indicated by the General Law, yet that indication is set aside by the Direct Assertion and the same persons are to be employed; just as, in the case of the *Sattra* itself, though the General Law indicates that it is to be performed by only one *sacrificer*, yet on the strength of Direct Assertion, it is performed by several (seventeen) sacrificers".

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*At that sacrifice they should appoint other priests*; it is not true that the performers of the *Pṛṣthashamanīya* (*Udavasānīya*) are enjoined to be the same as those of the *Sattra*; it has been already explained that these performers have not been enjoined as something to be actually adopted; and what has not been enjoined cannot form part of the sacrifice; and any defect in what is not a part of the sacrifice does not vitiate the sacrifice itself;—the General Law indicates the employment of other persons as priests.—Further, in so far as the result of the action accrues to the *doer*, the doers must be the same,—this is clearly indicated by the particular (*Ātmanēpada*) Conjugational ending; but the result of a sacrifice never accrues to the *doers*, in the shape of the *Priests*; hence so far as the *priestly* functions are concerned, the doers cannot be the same;—at the main sacrifice (of the *Sattra*) we do recognise them to be the *doers*, and they may be so recognised at the *Udavasānīya* also; yet for the priestly functions, other persons should be appointed.

[The thread of *Adhikaraṇa* (13) is now resumed, and the following *Sūtra* sets forth the *Siddhānta* of that *Adhikaraṇa*.]

SŪTRA (43).

[SIDDHĀNTA—*in answer to Pūrvapakṣa set forth in Sū.* 41]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE PERFORMED BY EACH ONE OF THEM SEVERALLY, AS THERE IS NO INCONGRUITY IN IT; SPECIALLY AS THERE IS ONLY ONE PERFORMER AT THE ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya.

This is the answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* which (under Sū. 41) was left unanswered.

The term '*tu*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.

As a matter of fact, the men are not to perform the *Udavasānīya* collectively,—they should perform it severally, one by one.—"Why?"—Because *there is no incongruity in it*; the mention of 'giving up' (of the *Sattra*) is meant to indicate the *men*—viz. 'those persons who give up the *Sattra*';—it is possible for only one man (from among the seventeen performers of the *Sattra*) to 'give up the *Sattra*'; and what the injunction means is that the particular sacrifice (*Udavasānīya*) is to be performed by those persons who have the said character of having 'given up the *Sattra*';—there is nothing to prohibit the performance of it by *one* man;—hence it follows that the men may perform the sacrifice one by one.—"But the performance has been declared as to be done by several persons; so that it cannot be done by the men singly."—That does not affect our position; there is nothing to prevent the performance of it by the men singly;—hence we conclude that on the strength of the General Law, the *Udavasānīya* should be performed by the men severally, one by one.

Says the Opponent—"When the performance is spoken of as to be done by several persons, it cannot be done by the men singly".

Even so the position remains unaffected. Because *plurality* is not what is enjoined here; the fact of the matter is that what is laid down is that 'those who give up the *Sattra* should perform the *Udavasānīya*',—and as there are several performers of the *Sattra*, it is this plurality that is only referred to in the text in question;—but each one of them singly also is 'a person who has given up the *Sattra*'; so that these would perform the *Udavasānīya* sacrifice also singly;—just as in regard to their 'giving up of the *Sattra*' the plural number refers to the persons not collectively (but severally), so in regard to the performance of the *Udavasānīya* also, it would refer to them not collectively (but severally).

Says the Opponent—"The plural number (in '*yajēran*') cannot be a mere *reference*, because the *plurality* in question has not been enjoined elsewhere; the plurality has not been already enjoined anywhere in regard to the sacrifice (*Udavasānīya*),—on the basis whereof it could be taken as merely *referred* to in the text in question.—It may be said that it has just been explained that the sacrifice has been laid down for those who have *given up the Sattra*, and these are *many* [so that the *reference* could be to this fact].—But that *plurality* is in regard to the *giving up* (of the *Sattra*), not in regard to the *sacrifice* (*Udavasānīya*).—It might be argued that, by the force of the sentence, it would pertain to the sacrifice also.—That however

is not possible; it is only when a complete word requires another word, that we have a *sentence*:—in the case in question however, the sacrifice became connected with *plurality* long beforehand, and at that time *the persons who give up the Sattra* have not been mentioned at all; and yet even at that time the Plural Number is used; hence being connected with the Plural Number, it requires the connection of 'the persons giving up the *Sattra*' who have been mentioned by another word;—from this it follows that the performance should be connected with *plurality*,—just as in the case of the *Dviyajña* and the *Sattra*."

Our answer to this is as follows—It is not so; in a case where there is the slightest ground for a sentence to be taken as a mere *reference*,—it is open to doubt as to whether it is a *reference* or an *injunction*; and though in other cases, where there is something new asserted, it may be more reasonable to take it as an injunction than a reference,—yet, in the case in question, it cannot but be a mere *reference* to Plurality; so that there is no connection established between the sacrifice and several persons,—and the purpose served is only a visible one; on the other hand, under the other view, if Plurality be connected with the sacrifice, it would be necessary to assume a transcendental purpose. From all this it follows that it should be taken as a mere *reference*.

Says the Opponent—"The same, then, may be the case with the *Dviyajña* and the *Sattra* (which also would not be performed by several persons)."

Answer—There is a difference between the injunction '*Udavasāya yajēran*' (which lays down the *Udavasānīya*) on the one hand, and the injunctions '*Rājapurohitau yajēyātām*' (laying down the *Dviyajña*) and '*Ṛddhikāmāḥ sattramāsīran*' (laying down the *Sattra*). Where there is a word with the participial ending '*Ktvā*', it is understood that there are two acts (one after the other),—and where the fact of their being several performers is learnt from direct assertion itself, in such a case, the second sentence speaking of the act is taken as enjoining only that much which is denoted by the verbal root (i.e. the factor of the *sacrifice* only),—and all the rest—the actual performance, the performers and their number—is only referred to as already known from other sources; the only thing enjoined being what is denoted by the verbal root (i.e. the act itself). In the case of the *Dviyajña* or of *Sattras*, all the factors—what is denoted by the verbal root, the performance, the performers and their number—are enjoined, not being already known from other sources.—The term '*rājapurohitau*' (in the sentence '*rājapurohitau yajēyātām*') cannot signify the performance, or the character of being the performer, or the number of performers. Similarly in the injunction of the *Sattra*, the term '*ṛddhikāmāḥ*' cannot signify any of these things. It is for this reason that in all such cases the *number* is taken to be predicated as something to be emphasised and secured; consequently in the case of the *Dviyajña* and other such sacrifices, the mention of the number is not taken to be mere *reference*, and hence in this case the act has to be done by a number of persons;—it cannot be so in the case in question; hence we conclude that the *Pṛṣṭhashamanīya* (*Udavasānīya*) should be performed by the persons *severally*.

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *At the 'Kāmēṣṭi' the Sacrificial Fee serves a transcendental purpose,—not that of securing the services of the Priests.*

SŪTRA (44).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"SO ALSO AT THE 'KĀMĒṢṬI'; AS THE TERM 'GIVING' IS THERE."

Bhāṣya.

At the *Sārasvata-Sattra*, there is the *Kāmēṣṭi*, laid down in the text—'*Plākṣam prasravaṇam prāpya agnayē kāmāya aṣṭākapālam purodāsham nirvapati—tasyām ashvām puruṣīñcha dhēnukē datvā prati yamunām avabhṛthamabhyavayanti*' [where the giving of two milch cows is laid down].

In regard to this there arises the question—Is this *gift* for the purpose of 'Hiring'? Or is it an act of mere *Dharma*? In connection with the *Pṛṣṭhashamanīya* (*Udavasānīya*) it has been explained that, inasmuch as it is not a part of the *Sattra*, the *gift* should be taken as serving the purpose of 'Hiring'; and we are now going to consider the same question in connection with the *Kāmēṣṭi* which is really part of the *Sattra*.

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"Just as at the *Pṛṣṭhashamanīya* (*Udavasānīya*), the giving is for 'Hiring', so it should be in the case in question also.—This is what is signified by the use of the particle '*cha*'.—'Why'?—*As the term 'giving' is there*; i.e. the term 'giving' is found in the text—'*Dhēnukē datvā*'; and the term 'giving' ('*dāna*') is always understood to be meant for 'Hiring', when it refers to workers.—Then again, the sacrifice in question is not a *Sattra*; it is only a subsidiary of the *Sattra*; what the Context indicates is that the *Sattra* is performed by the *Master* himself,—not so its subsidiaries; these latter being performed by the Priests who come into them by virtue of the General Law, and it is then alone that it is complete and helps the *Sattra* concerned; while if not performed by other priests, it would remain defective to that extent and hence not help the *Sattra*.—From all this it follows that in this case, the *giving* is for 'hiring'."

SŪTRA (45).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A MERE STATEMENT, BECAUSE IT IS A 'SATTRA'.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the above view.

In this case the *giving* is not for 'hiring'; it is a mere act of *Dharma*.—"Why?"—*Because it is a Sattra*; and it has been proved that at the *Sattra*, there is no *securing of services*.

Says the Opponent—"But the *Kāmēṣṭi* is not a *Sattra*; it is a subsidiary of the *Sattra*, as we have already explained above."

Answer—It is not a *Sattra*, it is a subsidiary of the *Sattra*, and as such it falls in the midst of the *Sattra*;—and the *Sattra* along with its subsidiaries has got to be performed by the sacrificers themselves (without the aid of hired priests);—so that when this self-performance is carried into practice, the performers of the *Iṣṭi* become known;—and in this case there is no need for the 'securing of services'; so that the *giving* that is laid down can only be regarded as an act of *Dharma*.

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *The gift made at the 'Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa' to the 'Enemy' is meant to serve a transcendental purpose.*

SŪTRA (46).

IN THE CASE OF THE 'ENEMY', INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO INJUNCTION, THE TERM 'SACRIFICIAL FEE' BECOMES EXCLUDED.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Yadi patnīḥ samyājayan kapālamabhijuhuyāt vaishvānaram dvādashakapālam nirvapēt, tasyaikahāyano gaurdakṣiṇā, tam sa dvēṣyāya dadyāt*' ['While preparing the wives, if one happens to throw into the fire the Pans, he should offer the cake baked on twelve pans to *Vaishvānara*; the sacrificial fee for this is an one-year-old calf; *this he should give to his enemy*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this *giving of the one-year-old calf* for the purpose of 'hiring'? Or is it a mere act of *Dharma*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"inasmuch as the text contains the term 'Sacrificial Fee' the giving must be taken to be for 'hiring'; as a gift is called 'Sacrificial Fee' only when it is made for the purpose of securing the services of the man."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—*In the case of the enemy*, the *giving* must be an act of mere *Dharma*,—this is what is indicated by the term 'Cha' in the Sūtra.—"Why so?"—*Because there is no injunction*,—of an *inimical* Priest; as a matter of fact, one's *enemy* can never be his Priest,—since it has been declared that 'the Priest and the Teacher should not be transgressed against'. In a case where there is no need for a *hired* performer, what will the mere use of the term 'Sacrificial Fee' do?—Further, if the gift in question were treated as meant for 'hiring', then this would mean the exclusion of the legitimate 'Sacrificial Fee'; under the General Law, the Sacrificial Fee payable at the Rite in question is the '*Anvāhārya*' (Cooked Rice),—and this would become excluded, and this would mean an infringement of the General Law.—From all this it follows that the giving of the one-year-old calf is a mere act of *Dharma* and that it should be given to a person who is not acting as a Priest.

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *The 'Bone-Sacrifice' has living persons for its performers.*

SŪTRA (47).

THE 'BONE-SACRIFICE' MUST BE TAKEN AS TO BE PERFORMED BY OTHERS, AS THERE IS NO INCONGRUITY IN THIS, WHILE THERE IS INCONGRUITY IN THE BONES (BEING REGARDED AS THE PERFORMERS).

Bhāṣya.

There is the following declaration—'*Yadi sandīkṣitānām pramīyēta tam dagdhvā kṛṣṇājinē asthīnyupanahya yo'sya nēdiṣṭhaḥ tam tasya sthānē dīkṣayitvā tēna saha yajēran, tataḥ saṁvatsarē asthīni yājayēran*' ['If after initiation one happens to die, they should cremate him and having tied up his bones in a black antelope-skin, they should initiate the person who happens to be his nearest relative and perform the sacrifice with him; at the end of the year, *they should make the Bones sacrifice*'].

In regard to this sacrifice at the end of the year, there arises the question —Is this to be performed by the living persons? Or by the Bones?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows:—"The sacrifice is to be performed by the Bones, on account of co-ordination.—'What *co-ordination*?'—The co-ordination consisting in the fact that the *Bones* are the object of the verb 'make to sacrifice'.—It might be objected that Bones are inanimate things and hence they cannot themselves perform any acts, —how then could they be the performers of any act?—The answer to this is that what the word expresses is the fact of the Bones being *made to do* the act, and those that make them do it are other than the Bones; those others will make the Bones do the act.—The Opponent may argue as follows: —'Unless one does an act, one is not spoken of as *made to do it*;—one is said to make another do an act only when the other does the act;—and the Bones can never perform the act in its entirety'.—The answer to this is as follows:—On the strength of the Direct Injunction the Bones would be *made to perform* as much of the sacrificer's functions as they can perform,— they would perform for instance such functions as the *measuring of the Udumbara Post* [the Post has to be as tall as the 'Sacrificer', and it will be possible to make it as tall as the *Bone*], the *Shukrānvārambhaṇa* and the like.—Says the Opponent—'The most important act they cannot do; nor can they perform all the subsidiary acts; and there are many acts that have got to be done by the Sacrificer'.—On the strength of the injunction what would be done is that the Priests would receive what belonged to the dead man, and having thus become 'hired' through that as the 'Sacrificial Fee, they would do the *offering of the sacrifice*; and this *offering* would be in strict accordance with the injunction.—Says the Opponent—'Under this explanation, the persons who officiate at the sacrifice,—and not the *Bones*—

become the *sacrificers*'.—The answer to that is that in reality, it is the actual *sacrificers* that become the *performers* in this case; because one who does do an act is not spoken of as *making to do*; the sacrifice being performed by the *Bones*, it is the fact of the Priests being the persons who *make them do it* which is referred in the text as something already known. Just as, when it is said '*Grāmakāman yājayēt*' ['One should make the man desiring a village to perform a sacrifice'], the injunction meant is that 'desiring a village one *should perform* a sacrifice'; and the causal factor (denoted by the causal affix in '*yājayēt*') is a mere reference to what is already known. This is what is clearly indicated by the text—'*Stotrē asthi kumbhamupadadhāti*' ['The hymn having been recited, the Bone sets up the jar']; where the *Bone* is found spoken of as the actual performer.—From all this it follows that the sacrifice in question is performed by the *Bones*, not by the living persons."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*The Bone-sacrifice must be taken as to be performed by others*,—i.e. by the living persons; because there would be no incongruity in those latter being regarded as offering the sacrifice; while it would be incongruous to refer to the *Bones* as offering the sacrifice. The act of *offering* is really done in the mind, and the Bones have no mind.—It has been asserted that—"the priests receiving what belonged to the dead man, as the Sacrificial Fee, would become *hired* and then make the *offering*, and this *offering* would be in strict accordance with the injunction".—But it is not so;—when the injunction is in the form '*Yajēta*' ('One should offer sacrifice'), the denotation of the root 'to sacrifice' does not become altered in view of certain persons being unable to offer the sacrifice,—simply on the strength of a certain assertion.—What the word '*Yajēta*' means is '*Yāgam kurvīta*', 'should perform sacrifice'; and the root 'to sacrifice' cannot have any other meaning. Further, merely on the strength of an assertion, it cannot be said that 'what is received by the Priests is the wealth of the dead man'; nor is the wealth (Fee) given by the *Bones*; and in the absence of *giving*, there can be no *hiring*. In the case of an injunctive word, it cannot be right to take it in an indirect (figurative) sense; in fact, it is only when a certain idea has been got at through other means of knowledge, that it is connected with a figurative expression; for instance, when it is said 'the ox should be sacrificed', what is sacrificed is the animal belonging to the genus 'ox', and not the plough-man; but when it is said 'this plough-man is an ox', the term 'ox', in its application to the ploughman, is taken in its figurative sense (of *foolish*).—Hence when the sacrifice is enjoined, the root 'to sacrifice' cannot have any other meaning (than *sacrificing*). Then again, there is no wealth that belongs to the Bones, on receiving which the Priests would regard themselves as hired by that skeleton.—Thus it follows that the Bones cannot in any way be the performers of a sacrifice; and hence the 'co-ordination' (urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) cannot be regarded as really meant to be expressed by the words of the text.

Says the Opponent—"Under the circumstances, as the sentence expresses an incompatible idea, it must be regarded as meaningless".

Not so, we reply. When a definite meaning is expressed, the sentence cannot be meaningless; in fact, from the sentence consisting of the words '*Samvatsarē yājayēt*' ['At the end of the year, one should make to sacrifice'], a certain sense is obtained, and that much alone is what is meant to be asserted here; and it is not meant to be asserted that '*the bones* should be made to sacrifice'.

"Is then the term '*asthīni*' a wrong reading?"

We do not say that it is a wrong reading; that alone cannot be regarded as the *right* reading which serves the purpose of enjoining things and which expresses its own direct meaning only; even such words become connected with a sentence as are mere *references* and express the sense by indirect (figurative) indication; and a word of this latter kind is not regarded as a *wrong* reading. Now while it is true that the word '*asthīni*' ('bones'), if taken as injunctive, or as expressing its direct meaning, cannot be construed with the sentence, it can be construed when taken either as a *reference*, or in an indirect (figurative) sense.—For these reasons the expression '*Samvatsarē yājayēt*' should be taken as pertaining to those *living* persons who are connected with the performance; the term '*asthi*' ('bone') would indicate these persons indirectly (figuratively)—in the sense of 'persons *with bones*';—so that the meaning of the sentence would be 'should make persons with bones to sacrifice'.—"Who are these *persons with bones*?"—Those who had started to perform the sacrifice along with the dead man:—it being quite reasonable for the man to whom the bones belonged to be indirectly indicated by the term 'bones'.—From all this we conclude that the sacrifice is to be performed by living persons.

SŪTRA (48).

ITS USE WOULD BE ONLY SO FAR AS IT IS ACTUALLY LAID DOWN.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that the text '*Stotre asthi kumbhamupadadhāti*' indicates certain functions of the *sacrificer* as to be performed by the *Bones*.—But the function spoken of here is not the Sacrificer's; because the Bones never perform a sacrifice,—as has been already explained. Hence on the strength of the sentence quoted all that can be admitted is that the function spoken of is similar to that of the sacrificer; only so far can be admitted as is actually asserted; it cannot indicate *all* the functions of the sacrificer.

From all this it follows that the sacrifice in question is to be performed by the living persons.

Adhikaraṇa (18): *At the 'Bone-sacrifice', the 'Japa' and such other details are not to be performed.* —(A Hypothetical Discussion.)

SŪTRA (49).

If, on the basis of the Text, it be taken for granted (that the Sacrifice is to be performed by Bones), (*a*) the 'Japa' and the 'Embellishments' become excluded :—(*b*) as also the Iṣṭi, because this is for that.

Bhāṣya.

We proceed to consider the 'Japa' (Repeating of Mantras), the 'embellishments' and the *Iṣṭi*; the first half of the *Sūtra* deals with the *Japa* and the 'embellishments', and the remaining part, with the *Iṣṭi*.—'*Japa*' stands for those Mantra-recitations in regard to which there are such injunctions as '*Japati*' ('recites');—'embellishments' stands for those acts that have been enjoined in such sentences as 'he shaves his head and beard'.

(A) The question that arises is—Should this '*Japa*' and the 'embellishments' be performed in the case of the *Bones* (performing the Sacrifice)?

Question—"But it has been settled that the Sacrifice is performed by the living persons, not by the Bones". [How then can there arise any such question?]"

Answer—This is a hypothetical discussion; we take it for granted (for the sake of argument) that the Sacrifice may be performed by the Bones and then proceed to consider the said question. In this manner, the purpose of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* also becomes considered.—If the sacrifice were performed by the Bones, are the 'Japa' and the 'embellishments' to be performed—or not?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"*In accordance with the principle laid down under* 10. 1. 1, *that—inasmuch as the procedure has been transferred to the other context, all the details should be performed.*—the 'Japa' and the 'embellishments' must be performed".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—*If, on the strength of the text quoted, the sacrifice were to be performed by the Bones*, then, in that case, the '*Japa*' and the 'embellishments' would become excluded, as the need for them will have ceased. As a matter of fact, the Bones cannot do the *Japa*, nor can there be any shaving of their 'head and beard'; and what is impossible to be done cannot be brought in by the General Law.

The latter half of the *Sūtra*, says—*as also the Iṣṭi, because this is for that.*—The question to be considered is—should, in this case, the *Dīkṣaṇīyā Iṣṭi* be performed, or not?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that, "in accordance with

the General Law, it must be performed ".—In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—Along with the *Iṣṭi*, the *Japa* and the *embellishments* should be omitted,—i.e. the *Iṣṭi* also should be excluded.—" Why ? "—*Because it is for the sake of that*, i.e. the *Iṣṭi* is to be performed in view of the fact that the sacrificer is going to take the Initiation ;—the 'Initiation' consists in the keeping of certain vows ;—these vows are mental operations ;—the Bones however have no *mind* [Hence they can have no mental operations].—That the *Iṣṭi* in question is for the sake of the Initiation to be taken by the sacrificer is clear from the assertion in the text laying down the *Iṣṭi*—' *When going to be initiated*, one should offer a cake baked upon eleven pans to *Agni-Viṣṇu*'.—From all this it follows that the *Iṣṭi* also becomes excluded.

Adhikaraṇa (19): *At the 'Bone-sacrifice' the 'measuring of the Udumbara Post' and the 'Touching of the Shukra' should be done*—(Hypothetical Discussion).

SŪTRA (50).

WHAT IS SUBSERVIENT TO THE PURPOSES OF THE SACRIFICE SHOULD BE DONE, BECAUSE IT IS A SUBORDINATE FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

[*The Hypothetical Inquiry continues*]—

In connection with the same 'Bone-sacrifice' the following question is going to be considered—At the Archetypal sacrifice 'the Udumbara Post is as tall as the sacrificer' and 'the sacrificer touches the *Shukra-vessel*'—at the Bone-sacrifice [assuming that it is performed by the *Bones*] should such acts as these be performed—or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"the Bones being inanimate things, they cannot, by themselves, do any act at all, and hence in the 'measuring of the Post' and 'the touching of the *Shukra*' they cannot be the *performers*."

In answer to this, we have the following—*Siddhānta*—*What is subservient to the purposes of the sacrifice should be done, because it is a subordinate factor*;—acts like those in question, which subserve the purposes of the sacrifice, should be done; because in this case the 'Sacrificer' is a subordinate factor; what is needed at the sacrifice is (*a*) the Udumbara-Post measured to be as tall as the sacrificer, and (*b*) the *Shukra* that has been touched by the Sacrificer;—and (*a*) the measuring can be done with the inanimate bones also, (*b*) so also can the touching of the *Shukra*. Hence it follows that acts like these should be done.

ADHIKARAṆA (20): *At the 'Bone-sacrifice', 'Prospective acts' shall not be performed*—(Hypothetical Discussion).

SŪTRA (51).

THE 'PROSPECTIVE ACTS' ARE NOT TO BE PERFORMED; BECAUSE THERE CAN BE NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE DESIRE (FOR RESULTS), JUST AS THERE IS NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE DESIRE OF OTHER PERFORMERS ALSO UNTIL THEY ARE MENTIONED.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice,—in connection with which, we read—'If one desire that the Rain-god should rain, he should measure out the assembly-room (*Sadas*) on a low level', etc., etc.

The question that arises is—At the Bone-sacrifice,—which has the *Jyotiṣṭoma* for its Archetype, and which therefore takes in the details of the latter, according to the General Law—should, or should not, such 'prospective acts' (acts performed with a definite result in view), be performed?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"In accordance with the General Law, it should be done.—*Objection*—'But the Bones cannot desire anything, while all such acts are performed by reason of the sacrificer entertaining the desire for definite results'.—*Answer*—In such cases, it is not necessary that the *Sacrificer* should have the desire for the results; the meaning of the text is—'If the assembly-room is measured out at a low level, there is rain'; so that whenever rain is needed (by anyone) the Assembly Room should be measured out at a low level, and the much-needed rain will follow."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—'Prospective' acts like those in question shall not be performed.—"Why?"—What is meant is that '*if the sacrificer desires rain*, rain comes if the Assembly Room is measured out at a low level'; on account of the Ātmanēpada ending (in '*kāmayēta*') the implication is that the main act along with all its subsidiary details is conducive to bringing rewards to the *Sacrificer*; and it cannot bring it to others desiring it.—In the case in question, it cannot be known that the *Sacrificer* (who has been assumed to be the *Skeleton*) desires the rain as his reward; even in the case of *living* sacrificers, when the desire is there, it is not known until he mentions it,—what to say of the *Bones* (which are inanimate)? And when the desire itself is absent in them, the acts prompted by that desire cannot be performed.

ADHIKARAṆA (21): *At the 'Bone-sacrifice', there shall be no 'invoking of blessings' along with the 'Sūktavāka'* —(Hypothetical Discussion).

SŪTRA (52).

THE INVOKING ALSO OF DESIRED BLESSINGS AS CONTAINED IN THE 'SŪKTAVĀKA' SHALL NOT BE DONE; BECAUSE OF ABSENCE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the 'Bone-sacrifice' there are certain acts performed, like the *Prāyaṇīya*, which have the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* for their Archetype, and which come into the Bone-sacrifice by the General Law. At these acts, the reciting of the *Sūktavāka* also comes in by virtue of the General Law; this *Sūktavāka* contains the following words—'*Ayam yajamāna āyurāshastē, suprajāstvamāshāstē, vishvam priyamāshāstē, yadanēna haviṣā āshāstē tadashyāt tad dadhyāt tadasmai dēvārāsattām*' ['This sacrificer desires longevity, he desires excellent progeny, etc., etc.'].

The question that arises is—Should, or should not, this 'invoking of blessings' be done at the 'Bone-sacrifice'?

The most reasonable answer that presents itself is as follows:—The blessings that are invoked in course of the *Sūktavāka* should not be invoked. "Why?"—*Because of absence,*—of the desiring person; the Bones do not desire anything, as has been already pointed out; hence the invokings should not be done.

Instead of reading '*Sūktāvakē*', the *Sūtra* has read '*Sūktavākavat*'. —"Why do you explain it like that?"—The answer is that the invoking of the blessings is that which finds place in the *Sūktavāka*; hence the affix '*vati*' is taken as signifying this 'finding place';—that such interpretation is permissible has been shown under Sū. 10. 5. 88 below; hence it means no attack on the *Sūtra*.

SŪTRA (53).

[*Pūrvapakṣin's objection*]—"THE INVOKINGS SHOULD BE DONE; BECAUSE THE STATEMENT IS PURELY DECLAMATORY."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not as you say—that in the case of the Bones (performing the sacrifice) the invoking of the blessings should not be done; as a matter of fact, *the invokings should be done, because the statement is purely declamatory*; that is, the invoking of the blessings must be done;—why?—*because the statement is purely declamatory*; the whole of the passage—'He desires longevity, etc.' is purely declamatory; there are no injunctions here, they

are only declamations; and because they are declamations, the fact of their coming in at the performance is indicated by the General Law. Hence if this invoking is done, the General Law becomes obeyed. Hence we conclude that the invoking of the blessings should be done."

SŪTRA (54).

[*Answer*]—NOT SO; BECAUSE THEY SIGNIFY DESIRE; AND THERE IS NO SUCH DESIRE (IN THE BONES) AS THERE IS IN OTHERS.

Bhāṣya.

It is not as you say—that 'the invoking of blessings should be done'. "Why?"—*Because they signify desire*; i.e. the invocations in question speak of *desire*;—the words 'the sacrificer *desires* longevity, etc., etc.'—are used only when the *desire* has actually appeared; in the case in question however, there is no such sacrificer as would entertain the desire for the blessings spoken of;—the Bones are inanimate things; and Bones can have no desire; this is what is meant by the phrase '*there is no such desire*',—i.e. there is no such desire in the Bones,—*as there is in others*; i.e. in living persons, these desires do appear; never in the Bones. Hence we conclude that in the case of the Bones (being the sacrificers), there should be no invoking of the blessings.

"But we have said that these assertions are declamatory."

The answer to that is that they are not declamatory, these are injunctive; hence the objection urged becomes refuted; so that what you have said—that for the Bones, the invoking of the blessings should be done,—is not right; as a matter of fact, it should not be done; this is what is meant by the *Sūtra*—*Not so, because they signify desire and there is no such desire in the Bones as there is in others.*

ADHIKARAṆA (22): *At the 'Bone-sacrifice', there should be no performance of the 'Hotṛ-Kāmas' (acts contingent upon the Hotṛ's desire)*— (Hypothetical Discussion).

SŪTRA (55).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'HOTṚ-KĀMA' ACTS SHOULD BE DONE."

Bhāṣya.

The '*Dvādashāha*' and other *Sattras* form the subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa*; in reference to these, we read—'*Tataḥ samvatsarē asthīni yājayēt*' ['Then at the end of the year, one should make the Bones perform the sacrifice'];—under the General Law, Initiation and other rites also become admissible at these *Sattras*;—and further, at the Archetype, there are certain '*Hotṛkāma*' *acts*, laid down in the text—'*Yam kāmayēta apashumān syāditi parāchīm tasyēḍāmupahvayēt, apashumānēva bhavati; yam kāmayeta pramāyukaḥ syāditi tasyochchaistarām vaṣaṭ kuryāt*, etc., etc.'. [Where certain acts are laid down as to be done by the *Hotṛ-priest*, in the event of his desiring certain results to befall the Sacrificer, hence these acts are called '*Hotṛ-Kāma*'].

In regard to these, there arises the question—Should these *Hotṛ-Kāma* acts be done or not in the case of Bones (performing the sacrifice)?

Objection—"It has been settled that the sacrifice can be performed only by the living persons (*Vide* above Sū. 47 et. seq.)".

Answer—We start this enquiry on the assumption (taking it for granted) that the sacrifice may be performed by the Bones.

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* starts with the *Sūtra*—"The *Hotṛ-Kāma acts should be done*—in the case of the Bones.—Why?—Because the General Law makes them admissible; hence their performance would mean obedience to the General Law; hence we conclude that the *Hotṛ-Kāma* acts should be done."

SŪTRA (56).

NOT SO; BECAUSE THEY INVOLVE THE INVOKING OF BLESSINGS UPON HIM.

Bhāṣya.

This is not right; you have said that the *Hotṛ-Kāma* acts should be done; as a matter of fact, they should *not* be done.—Why?—*Because they involve the invoking of blessings upon him*,—i.e. it is an invocation of blessings upon the *sacrificer*; as it has been declared that—'Whatever blessings the Priests invoke at a sacrifice, they all pertain to the sacrificer', which shows that the blessings in question also should pertain to the

Sacrificer. In the case in question however, there is no 'sacrificer'; the Bones (that are supposed to be the performers of the sacrifice) are inanimate things; and hence the Bones have not the capacity to desire anything;—it has been established under Sū. 6. 1. 5 that a person to be entitled to perform an act should be desirous of something and should be capable of performing that act.—From all these we conclude that in the case of the Bone-sacrifice the '*Hotṛ-Kāma*' *acts* should not be performed.

All the hypothetical discussions (*Adhikaraṇas* 18–22) have been finished. Their purpose need not be explained. All that is necessary to do is to reiterate that *the acts in question should not be performed, as it involves the invoking of blessings upon the sacrificer.*

ADHIKARAṆA (23): *The 'Sarvasvāra Sacrifice' should be completed, even after the death of the sacrificer.*

SŪTRA (57).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN THE SACRIFICER HAS DIED, THE 'SARVASVĀRA' SHOULD NOT BE COMPLETED; AS EVERY ACT IS RELATED TO A LIVING PERSON."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Sarvasvāra* sacrifice, known as the '*Shunaḥkarṇa Agniṣṭoma*', laid down in the text—'Desiring one's own death, one should perform this sacrifice, if he wishes that he should reach the Heavenly Region, without any disease'. [At the 'Third Extraction' of this sacrifice, the sacrificer throws himself into the Fire after having requested the priests to complete the performance of the sacrifice].

In regard to this, there arises the question—"When the Sacrificer has died, should the performance be left off at that point? Or should it be carried on to its completion?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"At the *Sarvasvāra*, after the sacrificer has died, the performance should be left off at that point, *because the act is related to a living person*; i.e. an act can be performed only by a living person, not by a dead one; and this implies that when one performs the *Sarvasvāra*, one should perform it only to the point of the sacrificer's death".

SŪTRA (58).

IN REALITY, THERE MUST BE [COMPLETION]; BECAUSE BOTH HAVE BEEN DIRECTLY ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

There must be—its completion,—*because both have been directly enjoined*—the *Sacrifice* as well as its *completion*,—in the following text—'Desiring death, one should perform this sacrifice'; where the verb clearly means that 'having begun the performance of the Sacrifice, one should complete it'; hence the *completion* also is denoted by the verb itself. Then again, there is the text—'*Ārbhavē prastūyamānē audumbarīm parito' dashēna vāsasā parivēṣṭya brāhmaṇāḥ parisamāpayata mē yajñamiti samprēṣyāgnim vishati*' ['When the *Ārbhava* has begun, the Sacrificer, having covered the *Udumbara* post with a borderless piece of cloth, says—*O Brāhmaṇas, please complete this Sacrifice for me*,—and enters the Fire'].—If this were meant to be a mere verbal direction (not meant to be acted upon), then it would have to be taken as serving only a transcendental purpose; hence on the basis of the indications of this Direction, it must be taken

as actually enjoining the completion of the Sacrifice;—just as, in the case of the text—'If they take away the *Soma*, one should say—*Run away and seek for it*'.

It has been argued that "it is the living, not the dead, man that can be the performer of a Sacrifice".—This does not affect the case in question: It is the *living* man that says 'Please complete what has been begun'; so that what is done (in obedience to this direction) is really done by *a living* man.

Says the Opponent—"At the time that the man addressed this direction, the completion was not done;—at the time that the completing is done, the man is not alive;—who then would be the *performer*?"

The answer to this is as follows—This is similar to that case where you, without any uncertainty, regard the performer to be a living man; when a man directs some one else to complete a piece of work and is alive at the time of completion,—the fact of his being so alive is immaterial so far as his being the *performer* is concerned,—he being regarded as the *performer* by virtue of the direction given by him; and so far as the giving of this previous direction is concerned, it is equally present in both cases,—that of the man alive at the time of completion as also the man that is not so alive. So that the man who has died after giving the direction is as much the *performer* as one who is alive at the time of completion.—It might be argued that—"Inasmuch as the living man is present at the time of the completion, it is possible for him to be regarded as the *performer* [not so the man who has died]".—This also is equally applicable to both cases: in the case of the living man also it is the *Personality*, not the *Body*, that is the *performer*; and the *Personality* is present also when the body has fallen off; so that the same *Personality* is the performer at the completion.—It might be urged that—"after the death of the Sacrificer, as it would not be possible for the *Sacrificer's* functions to be performed, the rest of the procedure cannot be carried out; and hence the General Law cannot indicate the admission of that part of the procedure".—That is not so; the General Law would certainly bring in all the rest of the details save those related directly to the Sacrificer; hence the argument does not affect the case at all.—Or, we may rely upon the direct assertion in the text itself—'O Brāhmaṇas, please *complete* this sacrifice of mine'; [which clearly indicates that the sacrifice has to be *completed*,] and on the strength of this, the details relating to the *Sacrificer* also may be performed.

Adhikaraṇa (24): *After the Sacrificer's death the 'Touching of the Shukra' and such other acts as are capable of being done by him shall be done.*

SŪTRA (59).

On his death, the performance shall proceed as in the case of the 'Bone-sacrifice'.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Sarvasvāra* sacrifice, also known as '*Shunaḥkarṇa Agniṣṭoma*', laid down in the text—'Desiring his own death, one should perform this sacrifice, if he wishes to go to the Heavenly regions, free from disease'.—After the Sacrificer has died, what is it that should be done?—That is the question.—We start off with the question itself, without setting forth the two views (*Pūrvapakṣa* and *Siddhānta*); even when the two views are set forth, the doubt remains there; as also when all the details bearing on the matter are not already known; as we find in the case of such questions as—what is the name of this hill? What is this river called? What fruit is this?

The answer to this question is as follows:—*On his death, the performance shall proceed as in the case of the Bone-Sacrifice*;—i.e. when the Sacrificer has gone the way of destiny, the performance shall proceed as it does in the case of the 'Bone-sacrifice'; that is, just as at the 'Bone-sacrifice' only those details are performed by the 'Bones' that are necessary for the accomplishment of the sacrifice, and the other details are omitted,—similarly in the case in question, when the Sacrificer has died, only that much shall be made to be done by the dead body as is necessary for the accomplishment of the Sacrificer; such, for instance, as 'the Sacrificer touches the *Shukra*', 'the Udumbara-post is of the same height as the Sacrificer'.

ADHIKARAṆA (25): *At the 'Sarvasvāra', before the Sacrificer's death, the 'invoking of the blessings of longevity' shall be done.*

SŪTRA (60).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" EVEN WHILE HE IS ALIVE, THE WORDS INVOKING THE BLESSINGS OF LONGEVITY SHALL NOT BE PRONOUNCED; AS IT IS FOR HIS SAKE ".

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Sarvasvāra*, while the Sacrificer is still alive, there arises the question—Should the words invoking the blessings of longevity—'*Āyurāshāstē yajamānaḥ*'—be pronounced ?—or not ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows :—" *Even while he is alive, the words invoking the blessings of longevity shall not be pronounced*;—why ?—because *it is for his sake.* When the Sacrificer invokes the blessings of longevity, it implies that he desires *longevity*,—just as when one says 'give me the bedding', it is implied that one desires to have the bedding; but in the case in question, how is the Sacrificer going to secure the longevity asked for ? In fact, here what the Sacrificer desires is something quite the contrary (of longevity); as he is going to immolate himself. From this it follows that the words invoking the blessings of longevity shall not be pronounced."

SŪTRA (61).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, THEY SHOULD BE PRONOUNCED; AS IT IS QUITE COMPATIBLE, PRIOR TO THE SAID OCCASION.

Bhāṣya.

The answer to the above is as follows :—The words invoking the blessings of longevity should be pronounced; because such invoking is quite compatible; it is after the *Ārbhava* has begun that the death of the Sacrificer comes to be sought for by him; while it is *prior* to the occasion of the *Ārbhava* that the Sacrificer invokes the blessings of longevity; and the meaning of this would be 'may I live till the time of the *Ārbhava*'; in this manner the General Law would be obeyed. Hence it follows that in this case also the words invoking the blessings of longevity should be pronounced.

ADHIKARAṆA (26): *At the 'Dvādashāha', details like the 'Ṛtuyājyā' should be performed.*

SŪTRA (62).

THERE SHOULD BE PERFORMANCE OF WHAT ARE SIMPLY MERITORIOUS ACTS.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Dvādashāha* sacrifice, laid down in the text—'Desiring prosperity, they should have recourse to the *Dvādashāha*'; there are certain purely meritorious acts (having no bearing on the Sacrificial Ritual) which are indicated by the General Law as admissible at it; such acts, for instance as, *Ṛtuyājyā*, *Varaṇa* and the 'giving of gold to *Ātrēya*'.

In regard to these there arises the question—Should the merely meritorious act be done, or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"It has been already established that inasmuch as the *Sattra* is performed by the Sacrificers themselves (without the aid of officiating Priests), the 'Varaṇa' and the 'Gift' become excluded (see *Adhikaraṇa* 11, above); there is no other injunctive sentence laying down that these should be done:—and there is as much wrong in doing what is not enjoined as there is in not doing what is enjoined. Hence the acts in question should not be done".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*There should be performance of what are simply meritorious acts*;—it is true that the 'appointment' (*Varaṇa*), or the 'gift', in this case is not for the purpose of securing the services (of the priests); but that does not make it incompatible with the performance at which the Sacrificers themselves are the performers. Consequently, in accordance with the General Law, the acts in question should be performed.

Adhikaraṇa (27) : *At the 'Pavamāna-Iṣṭi', the 'Nirvāpa' (Cooking) should be done.*

SŪTRA (63).

In the absence of the subordinate factor, the principal factor (should be carried out).

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the 'Fire-installation Rite', the *Pavamāna-Iṣṭis* are performed, as laid down in the text—'*Yo'gnayē pavamānāya puroḍāshamaṣṭākapālannirvapēt, agnayē pāvakāya, agnayē shuchayē*'; at these *Iṣṭis* the General Law renders admissible the act of 'Cooking with the *Agnihotrahavaṇī*'.—Now the time at which the *Pavamāna-Iṣṭis* are performed is not the time of the *Agnihotra*; so that at that time, the *Agnihotrahavaṇī* is not available. Thus then, there arises the question—As the *Agnihotrahavaṇī* is not there, should the said 'Cooking' be done (without it)? Or should it not be done?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"The *Cooking* cannot be done in the prescribed manner [as the *Agnihotrahavaṇī* is not there];—and no useful purpose can be served by doing an act in a manner not prescribed;—hence it follows that as the act would be defective, it should not be done at all."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*In the absence of the subordinate factor, the principal factor should be carried out*;—the *Agnihotrahavaṇī* is a subordinate factor, and the act of 'Cooking' is the principal factor. If the 'Cooking' were not possible, then there would be no need for the *Agnihotrahavaṇī*, which, therefore, would be excluded;—but even in the absence of the subordinate factor, the principal factor is not impossible;—hence it follows that the 'Cooking' (which is the principal factor) should be done; it is only the fact of its being done with the *Agnihotrahavaṇī* which, being impossible, becomes excluded.

ADHIKARAṆA (28): *At the 'Vājapēya', the 'Muṣṭi' (Handful) becomes excluded.*

SŪTRA (64).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE EXCLUSION OF THE NUMBER FOLLOWS FROM THE EXCLUSION OF THE 'HANDFUL'; BECAUSE IT IS SUBSERVIENT TO THAT."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Vājapēya* sacrifice, laid down in the text—'Desiring self-sovereignty, one should perform the *Vājapēya* sacrifice during the autumn':—in connection with that, we read—'*Naivārah saptadasha-sharāvaḥ kṣīrē charurbhavati*' ['The Nīvāra-corn cooked in milk in seventeen saucers constitutes the *Charu*'];—now in connection with the Archetypal Sacrifice, a definite number and the measure of 'handful' have been laid down, in the sentence—'*Chaturo muṣṭirnirvapati*' ['He cooks *four handfuls*'];—and both of these become admissible at the *Vājapēya*, according to the General Law.

There arises the following question in this connection—[At the *Vājapēya*] (*a*) Should the *number* be adimitted and the 'handful' excluded?—or (*b*) the 'Handful' admitted and the *number* excluded?—or (*c*) the *number* excluded?—or (*d*) the *number* and 'handful' both excluded?—or (*e*) either one excluded?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view (A) is as follows:—"(A) Either one of the two may be excluded,—i.e. either the *number* or the 'Handful' may be excluded.—Why so?—Because there being no word indicating the exclusion of any *one* in particular, there can be no restriction as to this or that alone being excluded."

In answer to this we have the following view, which is *Pūrvapakṣa* (B):—"There should be exclusion of the *Handful* and inclusion of the *number*.—Why?—Because the *number* is the predominant factor;—in the text quoted, the number comes first, and it, therefore, becomes apprehended first;—at the time of its comprehension there is nothing to obstruct the idea of the number;—it is only after this unobstructed idea of the *number* has appeared that the idea of the *Handful* comes in (as expressed by the second word in the sentence);—this latter therefore cannot get over the obstruction caused by the presence of the idea of the *number*;—hence, as coming later, the *Handful* becomes excluded, and the *number* becomes admitted, this latter

being the predominant factor; this is what is going to be explained under 12. 2. 23."

In answer to the above we have the following, [which is *Pūrvapakṣa* (C)]:—"The exclusion of the *Handful* should lead to the exclusion of the *Number*.—Why ?—*Because it is subservient to that*; in the phrase 'four handfuls', the *number* is spoken of as subordinate to (i.e. qualifying) the *Handful*;—the number 'four' being mentioned simply with the view that the *Handful* may be qualified by the number *Four*,—and it is not mentioned for its own sake. Hence, even though the number is mentioned first (in the phrase), it is as good as not so mentioned; it is mentioned only for qualifying the other factor (Handful); consequently, no special regard should be shown to it; and if the *Handful* becomes excluded, the *number* subsisting in that *Handful* also becomes excluded, by reason of its substratum having disappeared; if the *number* were admitted as subsisting in another substratum, then it would not be admitted in the form in which it has appeared at the Archetype. On the other hand, if the *number* were excluded (and not the *Handful*), then the Handfuls which subsist in the 'Cooking' would not become excluded, for the simple reason that their substratum (*Cooking*) will not have been excluded. Hence, inasmuch as the *number* is subservient to (quality of) the *Handful*, it is the *number* that becomes excluded, not the Handfuls; according to the principle going to be explained under *Sūtra* 12. 2. 25."

SŪTRA (65).

[*Argument against Pūrvapakṣa* (*C*)]—IT CANNOT BE SO; BECAUSE IT IS AUXILIARY TO THE 'COOKING'.

Bhāṣya.

It is not as has been explained above; as a matter of fact, the *number* is not mentioned as subsisting in the *Handfuls*; if it had been mentioned as subsisting in the *Handfuls*, then, being subservient, it could be excluded (on the exclusion of the *Handfuls*).—"What then is it mentioned as subsisting in ?"—In the 'Cooking'.—"How so ?"—The construction is, not as 'four handfuls' ('*Chaturo muṣṭiḥ*), but as 'he cooks four' ('*Chaturo nirvapati*'); in fact, it is the *Cooking* that is spoken of as qualified by the *handful*, as also by the *number*; it is only when a thing is connected with an action that the word expressing it takes the Accusative Ending (as we have in the words '*chaturaḥ*' and '*muṣṭiḥ*').—"Why ?"—Because it is a case-ending, an ending denoting a verbal relationship of something *brought about*; and what is *brought about* is an *action*, not a *substance* (which is an already accomplished entity). Hence *Direct Assertion* connects the number 'four' with the action of 'Cooking', while it is only *Syntactical Connection* that connects it with the 'handfuls';—and *Direct Assertion* is more authoritative than *Syntactical Connection*. Hence we conclude that in consideration of the principal factor, there should be exclusion of the Handful.

SŪTRA (66).

[*Final Pūrvapakṣa*]— "IN REALITY, ON ACCOUNT OF SIMILARITY IN REGARD TO THE INJUNCTION, THE NUMBER SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE MODIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL NUMBER; AND THE OTHER THING SHOULD BE TAKEN AS EXCLUDING THE 'HANDFUL', BECAUSE OF THE 'CONNECTION'."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

"It is not right that the *Number* is to be retained and the *Handful* excluded; what really happens is that the Number (*seventeen*) excludes the Number (*Four*), and the 'Saucers' exclude the 'Handfuls'.—How so?—Because of *similarity*;—At the Archetype the 'Handful' is the substance leading to the act of 'Cooking', and the Number 'four' is a qualification of these *Handfuls*;—in the case in question (of *Vājapēya*) what is asserted is that the '*Charu*' consists of the 'Saucers' as its substance and is qualified by the number 'seventeen';—now here the substance 'Handful' which serves the purpose of *measuring* (at the Archetype) becomes excluded (and replaced) by the substance '*Saucers*', which also serve the same purpose of *measuring*,—and the number 'four', which qualified the '*Handful*', is excluded (and replaced) by the number 'seventeen', which qualifies the 'Saucers';—just as in the case of the expression—'This is curd, this is clarified butter, this is the vegetable, these the paddy-grains,—*Dēvadatta* should be fed; like *Dēvadatta*, *Yajñadatta* also should be fed, with oil',—the purpose that is served in the food by the *Clarified Butter* is in the latter case understood to be served by *oil*; hence, even though it is not asserted in so many *words* that 'the food should be lubricated with oil', yet the *oil* serves to exclude the *Clarified Butter* (and no other substance),—and that for the only reason that both of these serve the same purpose (of lubricating the food). Similarly in the case in question, the number that qualifies a substance can exclude only the number that serves the same purpose of qualifying a substance. *The other thing*,—i.e. the substance, 'Saucers'—*should be taken as excluding* the *Handful*,—*because of the connection*.—From all this we conclude that the *Number* as well as the *Substance* connected with the Archetype becomes excluded (at the *Vājapēya*)."

SŪTRA (67).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT SO; BECAUSE OF THE CONNECTION OF THE SACRIFICER; SPECIALLY AS AT THE ARCHETYPE, THERE IS CONNECTION OF AN EMBELLISHMENT.

Bhāṣya.

It is not as set forth above. The term '*Chodanā*', (in the *Sūtra*) we explain as *sacrifice*; the number 'seventeen' as well as the substance

'saucers', is connected with a *sacrifice* ;—at the Archetype, the number 'Four' and the substance 'Handful' are connected with the embellishment of 'Cooking' ;—What is used at one place excludes a thing at another place, even though it may serve the same function as the former. When the purpose served by what is admissible under the General Law is found to be served by another thing directly mentioned, then this latter excludes the former; as a matter of fact, when the act of *sacrifice* is performed, the purpose served by the act of 'Cooking' does not become fulfilled; hence the *sacrifice* does not exclude anything that comes with the 'Cooking'; but the substance that is *Cooked* by 'four handfuls' does not become one 'Cooked in seventeen saucers',—because the two are incompatible; so one or the other must be excluded; and it is more reasonable that the *Handful* should be excluded, in favour of the *number* (seventeen).

ADHIKARAṆA (29): *In such Shruti-texts as 'Dhēnumālabhēta', terms like 'dhēnu' denote the 'cow'.*

SŪTRA (68).

IN THE CASE OF THE ORIGINAL WORD, THERE SHOULD BE MODIFICATION IN THE SUBSTANCE, AS THERE IS NO USE FOR IT.

Bhāṣya.

In a certain context, we read—'One should sacrifice a *dhēnu* to *Dyāvā-Pṛthivī*, a *Vatsa* to the *Maruts* and a *Ṛṣabha* to *Indra*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is it *goats* that are denoted by the words (*a*) '*Dhēnu*', (*b*) '*Vatsa*', and (*c*) '*Ṛṣabha*' [which literally stand for (*a*) 'Milch', (*b*) 'Young', and (*c*) 'Full-grown']? Or is it *cows*, [(*a*) the milch cow, (*b*) the calf, and (*c*) the bull]?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"In view of the General Law, the words should be taken as standing for *goats* [which are the animals that are used at the Archetypal Animal-sacrifice]. The connotation of all these words is based upon certain qualities [(*a*) *giving milk*, (*b*) *being about one-year-old*, and (*c*) *being full grown*]; and the quality must be connected with that animal which is indicated by the General Law.—'But the words signify those qualities as subsisting in the *cow*'.—True, they signify that; but the presence of the *cow* is not directly mentioned by any word, nor is it indicated by the General Law; so that, though the word signifying the quality denotes the quality as subsisting in the *cow*—and it indicates the *sacrificial animal* in general by Syntactical Connection,—yet inasmuch as the very substance *cow* is absent in the case in question, what is accepted is the Syntactical Connection indicating the *Sacrificial animal in general*, and not the Direct Denotation (of the *cow*).—Further, what the words really connote are (*a*) 'Giving milk' (in the case of '*dhēnu*'), and (*b*) a certain age (in the case of '*vatsa*' and '*ṛṣabha*'),—and qualities, being without a material body cannot become connected with an *action*,—it is only with *substances* that they are connected;—the substance is indicated by the General Law (as the *goat*);—and it is with this substance that these qualities become co-ordinated; —just as in the case of the expression '*avī dvē dhēnū dadāti, tasya puruṣī dhēnurdakṣiṇā*' [where the term '*dhēnu*' has been used in the sense of 'milch' and applied to the *sheep* and the *woman*];—similarly in the sentence '*Ajarṣabhasyājinamavastṛṇāti*' [where the term '*ṛṣabha*', in the sense of *full-grown*, is applied to the *goat*],—the term ('*dhēnu*' or '*ṛṣabha*') expressive of *giving milk* and *a certain age*, becomes connected with that substance (animal) which is spoken of in the same sentence;—similarly in the case in question, the terms shall be connected with the substance that

comes in by virtue of the General Law.—For all these reasons the terms '*dhēnu*', '*vatsa*' and '*ṛṣabha*', should be taken as standing for *goats*."

In answer to the above we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*In the case of the original word*,—i.e. the word in question, which, in its very origin is expressive of a quality as residing in a certain animal-species,—*there should be modification in the substance*; i.e. the substance also should be modified, not the quality only. That is, the terms in question,—which signify the quality of *giving milk*, or of *being of a certain age*, as subsisting in a certain animal-species,—cannot be applied to the animals of the species '*goats*'.—they must be applied to the animals of the species '*cows*'.

Objection—"In the case in question that much may be admitted which is capable of being admitted, while what is not capable of being admitted shall be excluded; as in the expression '*Ajā dhēnuvatsarṣabhāḥ* [where goats are spoken of as *dhēnu* (milch), *vatsa* (young), and *ṛṣabha* (full grown)".

Answer—In the expression quoted, the term 'goat' is clearly co-ordinated with the terms '*dhēnu*', '*vatsa*' and '*ṛṣabha*';—while in the case in question, the substance *goat* would come in by virtue of the General Law;—but the General Law cannot bring in the substance *goat* if it be found to be incompatible;—nor are the '*dhēnu*' and the rest connected with any substance;—because the particular case-ending connects them only with the *act of sacrificing*. That it applies to the *cow* is expressed by Direct Denotation, while the connection with the substance could be got at only through Syntactical Connection; which latter is weaker than Direct Denotation. Thus then, the particular quality subsisting in a certain animal-species which is connected with the act of sacrifice, cannot apply to the substance *goat*;—nor can the species (*cow*) which is directly expressed be abandoned on the strength of merely the General Law.—From all this it follows that the terms '*dhēnū*' and the rest must stand for *cows*.

ADHIKARAṆA (30): *In the case of the Injunction 'Vāyavyam shvētamālabhēta', it is the Goat that should be sacrificed.*

SŪTRA (69).

IN THE CASE OF THE CONTINGENT WORD, THE ORIGINAL THING SHOULD COME IN, BECAUSE THE CONNECTION IS CAPABLE OF BEING MADE, AND CONSEQUENTLY THE GENERAL LAW IS APPLICABLE.

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Vāyavyam shvētamālabhēta bhūtikāmaḥ*' ['Desiring prosperity, one should sacrifice the *Shvēta* dedicated to *Vāyu*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Should the animal used here be the *goat*? Or should the *goat* be excluded?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"In its very origin, the term '*Shvēta*' signifies only the presence of the quality of *whiteness*; hence any animal that may be possessed of the quality of *whiteness* may be sacrificed; and the term '*Shvēta*', directly applied, should not be excluded from application to any animal. Hence either the Goat or the Bullock or any other white animal may be sacrificed."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The term '*Shvēta*' being a contingent one,—having its application to a substance based upon the contingency of the presence of the quality of *whiteness*,—all that can be modified (at the ectype) is the *quality*; because in this case no substance belonging to any species is signified; that alone is to be taken as qualified which is found to help in the accomplishment of the act of *sacrifice*;—this is all that is understood from the sentence. That particular substance which is indicated by the General Law as to be used for sacrificing,—if found compatible,—should be taken as what is qualified by the term '*Shvēta*.'—"But the term can also qualify things other than the goat".—We do not say that it cannot qualify other things; all that we say is that there is no useful purpose to be served in the case in question by its qualifying other things. For these reasons we conclude that though the term '*Shvēta*' ('white') is all that is directly used, yet it should be taken, in the case in question, as qualifying the *goat* only, not any other animal.

Adhikaraṇa (31): *(A) At the 'Sādyaskra', the 'Stake in the Threshing yard' need not be of 'Khadira wood' only;—(B) At the 'Chitrā' the 'Rice' need not be of 'Vrīhi' only.*

SŪTRA (70).

There being incompatibility, there should be exclusion of the archetypal accessory; because of its assertion; and because it is with that that the action is connected.

Bhāṣya.

(A) In connection with the *Sādyaskra-sacrifice* we read—'*Khalēbāli yūpo bhavati*' ['The stake in the threshing-yard is the Sacrificial Post'].—In regard to this, there arises the question—Does the General Law make it necessary that this *stake in the threshing-yard* should be of *Khadira* wood (of which the Sacrificial Post is made)? Or does it not make this necessary and the stake may be made of *Khadira* or of any other wood?

(B) Similarly in connection with the *Chitrā* sacrifice, we read—'Curd, Honey, Clarified Butter, Water, Fried Grains, Rice,—these mixed together form the offering to *Prajāpati*'.—In regard to this also, there arises the question—Does the General Law make it necessary that *Vrīhi-grains* (which are used at the archetype) should be brought in, and the *Rice* must be of *Vrīhi*? Or does it not make it necessary and the *rice* may be of *Vrīhi* or of any other variety of grains?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"(A) The *Stake in the Threshing-yard* must be made of *Khadira-wood*, and (B) the *Rice* must be of *Vrīhi*; because the use of (A) the *Khadira* wood, and (B) of *Vrīhi-rice* is what is indicated by the General Law; and by adopting these, the General Law becomes obeyed. What is laid down in the text in question is that the *Khadira* and other wood are to be used as the *stake in the threshing-yard*,—the sense being that 'that which has been used as the *Sacrificial Post* should be made the *stake in the threshing-yard*'; it is quite possible for the *Sacrificial Post* to be made the *stake in the threshing-yard*; while it is not possible in any way for the *stake in the threshing-yard* to become the *Sacrificial Post*; as a matter of fact, the *Sacrificial Post* is made of the *Khadira* and other wood by such embellishments as 'Chopping' and the rest; it is not made of any other wood; so that when it is said of anything that 'it is the Sacrificial Post' (as it has been said in the text in regard to the *stake in the threshing-yard*), what is meant is that 'it serves the purposes of the Sacrificial Post'; and this would involve an indirect indication.—(B) As regards the *Vrīhi* also, the Rice is already known as to be used (from the fact of its having been used at the Archetype), and all that is done (at

the ectype, in accordance with the text in question) is that it is connected with the Deity (i.e. offered) in the shape of entire grains, and not in the form of the ground flour (in which it is used at the Archetype, where it is offered in the shape of *Cakes*).—From all this it follows that (A) it is the Khadira and other wood (that have been prescribed in connection with the Sacrificial Post) that should be made into the *stake in the threshing-yard*, and (B) the *Vrihi* is to be used as *Rice*."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*When there is incompatibility in the case, the archetypal accessory should be excluded*.—"What is the *incompatibility*?"—It is *because of the assertion*; that is, what is actually enjoined in the text is that the *stake in the threshing-yard* should be made the *Sacrificial Post*,—and not that the *Sacrificial Post* should be made the *stake in the threshing-yard*; this is the construction that makes the connection with the verb '*bhavati*' ('is') direct; as the term '*yūpaḥ*' precedes that verb immediately; under the other construction, which involves the construing of the verb with '*Khalēbāli*', which is removed from it, the connection would be a remote one. Then again, the term '*Khalēbāli*' ('stake in the threshing-yard') is applied to that piece of wood which is used for the protection of the threshing-yard; and it is this piece of wood which is laid down as to be used for that purpose for which the Sacrificial Post is used; this is the meaning of the assertion that 'that which is the *stake in the threshing-yard* is the Sacrificial Post'; and it is quite possible for that *stake* to be used for the purpose for which the Sacrificial Post is used.—As for the argument that "this involves recourse to *indirect indication*, by the words of the text, of the *purposes* of the Sacrificial Post",—even indirect indication is better than a remote construction; because in the case of indirect indication, the Syntactical Connection is quite perceptible, which it is not in the case of remote construction.—From all this it follows that, of whichsoever wood the *stake in the threshing-yard* might have been made, that same should be used for the purposes of the *Sacrificial Post*, and the General Law cannot restrict the *stake* to any particular wood; because if it did, the *direct Vedic text* would be set aside by the *General Law* (which functions only indirectly); hence there can be no such restriction as that the *stake in the threshing-yard* must be made of *Khadira* or such other wood (as have been prescribed in connection with the *Sacrificial Post*).

ADHIKARAṆA (32): '*Hewing*' *and the rest shall not be done to the* '*Stake in the Threshing-Yard*'.

SŪTRA (71).

THERE SHOULD BE EXCLUSION OF OTHERS.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the Stake in the Threshing Yard, there arises the question —Should, or should not, such operations as *Hewing, Sizing, Raising* and the rest be performed ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"They should be performed, in obedience to the General Law".

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*There should be exclusion of others*;—The stake as it stands has to be used as the Sacrificial Post; so that, if the stake as it stands is used as the Sacrificial Post, the requirements of the scriptures become obeyed; and when these requirements have been fulfilled, no effort need be made in regard to other details.—Further, *Hewing* and the rest are operations needed for the making of the *Sacrificial Post*;—while in the case in question, there is no need for the *Sacrificial Post* as such;—as the purpose for which the Sacrificial Post would be used is served by means something different (i.e. the stake in the threshing-yard);—hence it follows that *hewing* and other operations should not be performed in the case in question.

SŪTRA (72).

ALSO BECAUSE OF INCONGRUITY.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also, the operations in question should not be performed:—If these operations were performed on the Stake in the Threshing Yard, it would be something very incongruous. The 'Stake in the Threshing Yard' is that piece of wood which is already being used for the protection of the Threshing Yard; and it is to be used as it stands;—if *Hewing* were done to it, it would be destroyed; in fact, it would become a totally different thing, which could no longer be used for the protection of the Yard. As for the *sizing*, there would be no opportunity for it; as it has already been sized up for a totally different purpose; the *sizing* too is done to logs of wood, nor to articles made of wood.—Lastly, as for *Raising*, it is impossible to be done to the *Stake*, which is already raised (fixed vertically).—From all this it follows that *Hewing* and the other operations should not be performed.

Adhikaraṇa (33): *In the case of the 'Stake in the Threshing Yard', embellishments like 'ground-levelling', 'water-sprinkling', 'firm fixing' and 'anointing' should be performed.*

SŪTRA (73).

If there is no purpose served, it would serve as an 'embellishment'.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the 'Stake in the Threshing Yard', there arises the question —should, or should not, such operations be performed—as (*a*) the levelling of the ground with Maitrāvaruṇa's stick, (*b*) Sprinkling water over it, (*c*) firm Ramming in, (*d*) Anointing and so forth?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"They should not be performed; for reasons already explained under Sū. 71 above; it is exactly as it stands in the yard that the *stake*, which is not the *Sacrificial Post*, is to be used as the *Sacrificial Post*, and hence the embellishments laid down in connection with the 'Sacrificial Post', which might come in in connection with the *Stake*, should be excluded."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*When there is no purpose served*,—i.e. when there is no need for it—i.e. if the *Stake* does not need the embellishments in question,—then alone could it be said that for the performance of these operations, it is a necessary condition that the object concerned be the *Sacrificial Post*; and then in that case, they would not be performed in the case of the Stake in the Threshing Yard. In the case in question however we find that the *levelling of the ground, the sprinkling of water*, and the *firm ramming* do serve the useful purpose of securing the firmness of the stake; if it were left loose, it could not protect the Threshing Yard; and further, if these operations are performed, they do not deprive the 'Stake in the Threshing Yard' of its own character. Hence it follows that the operations should be performed.—As for the *Anointing*, that too does no harm to the stake, and if done, in obedience to the General Law, it would only improve it, and not spoil it in any way; hence the *Anointing* also should be done.

Adhikaraṇa (34): *At the 'Mahāpitṛyajña', 'Thumping' should be done to the Fried Grains.*

SŪTRA (74).

IF IT IS DONE AND THE SUBSTANCE IS NOT ALTERED, IT WOULD SERVE THE SAME PURPOSE, AND AS SUCH, WOULD REMAIN THE SAME.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Mahāpitṛyajña*, laid down in the text—'*Somāya pitṛmatē ṣaṭkapālam pitṛbhyo varhiṣadbhyo dhānāḥ pitṛbhyo'bhivānyāyai dugdhēmantham*'—[Where it is laid down that 'Fried grains' are to be offered to the *Varhiṣad Pitrs*].

In regard to the 'Fried grains', there arises the question—should *Thumping* be done to them, or not ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"It should not be done;—Why?—because of destruction; if the *Thumping* were done, the character of 'fried grains' would be destroyed, as the grains would be reduced to flour. Hence the *Thumping* should not be done."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—It has already been explained that if a certain operation does not actually destroy the thing, it should be done for the purpose of improving it, as in the case of the *Anointing* (see under Sū. 73).—Says the Opponent—"*Anointing* does not destroy the *Stake*, but the *Thumping* does destroy the *fried grains*".—*Answer*—The *Thumping* could be done in such a way as not to destroy the *Fried grains*; there might be a slight change in the order of the operations (the *Thumping* being done before the *frying*); by this change, it is only the order that would be transgressed, the substance would remain the same; so that there would be exclusion of the subordinate factor, but the inclusion of the principal factor (as explained above under Sū. 10. 2. 63). Hence the *Thumping* should be done first,—then the *frying*; so that the *Thumping* would be subservient to the *frying*, and the character of the 'fried grains' would not be lost.

End of Pāda ii of Adhyāya X.

ADHYĀYA X.

PĀDA III.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *At the 'Pashu' and other sacrifices, the 'Sāmidhēnī' and other archetypal operations should be adopted.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"IN THE CASE OF AN ECTYPE, WHAT IS DECLARED BY THE TEXT IS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR; HENCE ADDITIONAL SUBSIDIARIES SHOULD COME IN; BECAUSE OF THE PROXIMITY OF THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR."

Bhāṣya.

(A) In connection with the Soma-sacrifice, there is the Animal-sacrifice to *Agni-Soma*, laid down in the text—'On being initiated, one should sacrifice the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*';—in connection with this Animal-sacrifice, it is laid down that—'One should perform eleven *Prayājas* and eleven *Anuyājas*'.—(B) Similarly there is the injunction—'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Chaturmāsya* sacrifices';—and in connection with this *Chāturmāsya*, it is laid down that 'one should perform nine *Prayājas* and nine *Anuyājas*'.—(C) Similarly, there is the injunction—'Desiring prosperity, one should sacrifice the white goat'; and in connection with this it is laid down that—'One should pour out the oblation, reciting the *Mantra*, *Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ samavartatāgrē* etc.'—(D) Lastly, in connection with the *Avabhṛtha*, it is laid down that—'He should pour out the oblations'.

In regard to all these, there arises the question—Should the archetypal operations not come in at these ectypes,—and when they do not come in, are these entirely different acts that have been enjoined in these texts?—Or do the archetypal operations come in, and when they do come in, the texts in question only lay down accessory details?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"The archetypal operations do not come in; in fact, *in the case of every ectype*, what is declared by the words is the principal factor, not the accessory details; hence at the *Agnīṣomīya* and other sacrifices in question, *there is an appearance of additional subsidiary acts*; the 'Sacrifice' and 'Pouring out of oblations' that are enjoined should be regarded as distinct acts; in this way would the Vedic text be obeyed; it is through these acts that they become endowed with their subsidiary details.—For these reasons we conclude that the archetypal Procedure does not come in; as regards the archetype, that Procedure is in close proximity to it, and hence it cannot pass over that *archetype* which is in close proximity to it."

SŪTRA (2).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"THERE IS NO DEPENDENCE UPON THE FACT OF THERE BEING AN ARCHETYPE."

Bhāṣya.

"Under the above view there will be no dependence.—'What *dependence*?'—The assumption that it is to be performed 'like the Archetype'; in fact, that General Law, if applied, would require this Archetype, which is not far removed, though intervened by several sentences. —Hence it must be concluded that the distinct acts are enjoined—(*a*) 'Performs the *Prayāja* sacrifices', (*b*) 'Performs the *Āghāra*', (c) 'Makes the offering with the *Mantra, Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ samavartatāgrē etc.*'."

SŪTRA (3).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE OF THE CAPACITY OF THE INJUNCTION."

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* is meant to be the Pūrvapakṣin's answer to an objection against his view. This objection is as follows:—'The sentences in question do not possess the capacity to enjoin the performance of the acts in question.—How so?—The sentence does not afford the idea that *one performs the sacrifice*, all the idea derived from it is that *one brings about the number eleven in connection with the Prayāja*, which means that *he brings about a particular quality in the sacrifice*; that this is so is due to the presence of the word (eleven) denoting a quality; if what was meant were the bringing about of the *sacrifice* itself, then the word denoting the quality would be meaningless. Hence it follows that the sentences should be taken as laying down accessory details.'

The answer to this (as contained in the *Sūtra*) is as follows:—"The sentences in question do possess the capacity to enjoin; they are perfectly able to enjoin the performance.—How?—The sentences contain verbs, and verbs have been shown to be injunctive of action under *Sūtra* 2. 1. 1. These sentences therefore can enjoin the action along with its accessory details, the sense of the injunction being—'The sacrifice should be per formed, and the number *eleven* should be made up'. Similarly with the other sentences. From all this it follows that the words in question are injunctive of distinct actions; and hence the Procedure of the Archetype does not come into them."

SŪTRA (4).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE PRINCIPAL ACT ALONG WITH ITS SUBSIDIARIES, EVEN THOUGH SO CIRCUMSTANCED, SHOULD BE REGARDED AS 'ECTYPAL'; BECAUSE ITS PROCEDURE IS NOTICED; ALL THE ACTS MUST BE TAKEN TO BE SUCH AS HAVE AN ANTECEDENT AND ARE EQUALLY SET INTO OPERATION.

Bhāṣya.

It is not true that the Procedure (of the Archetype) does not come into the acts in question, and that these acts are distinct by themselves. In reality the *principal*,—i.e. the archetypal—*act along with its subsidiaries, even though so circumstanced, should be regarded as ectypal.* This has been explained under *Sūtra* 7. 4. 10.

The procedure of the archetypal act is duly noticed in some of the ectypal acts. Hence the whole procedure of the ectype should consist of *such acts as have an antecedent*,—i.e. have an archetype—*and are equally set into operation*,—i.e. as understood from the General Law.—For these reasons, in the case in question also, the archetypal procedure should come in.

As for the argument that—"Inasmuch as all needs will have been supplied by the *Prayājas*, the archetypal procedure cannot come in",—the answer to this is that this would be so if the *sacrifice* were enjoined; as a matter of fact, however, if the *sacrifice* were enjoined by the sentences, then all these words—'eleven', 'nine', '*Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ samavartatāgrē*'—would be meaningless. It cannot be said that the 'eleven' and the rest are only *referred* to;—because those are just the factors that are not already known, and as such they must be regarded as *enjoined* by the sentences in question; and the sentences show that they have been enjoined in relation to the sacrifice. If it were the *sacrifice* that is enjoined,—and the number 'eleven' is enjoined in relation to that sacrifice,—then there would be syntactical split.—From all this it follows that the archetypal procedure does come into the acts in question (by the General Law) and that the sentences in question contain injunctions of the accessory details of those acts.

SŪTRA (5).

THERE CAN BE NO INJUNCTION OF ACCESSORY DETAILS IN REGARD TO AN ACT WHICH HAS NO ACCESSORY DETAILS.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the sentences should be taken as injunctions of accessory details:—In relation to an act which has no accessory details, there can be no injunction of particular accessory details; particular injunctions of accessory details are in the form—'The Prastara, Bedding, is to be of reeds';—but there can be no injunction of a particular kind of *Bedding*

in a case where there is no *Bedding* at all. For instance, if a man has no son, no toys are made for the son ; similarly in the instance cited, there could be no injunction of 'the Bedding being made of reeds'.—Hence the sentences in question must be taken as injunctions of accessory details.

SŪTRA (6).

INASMUCH AS THE ACTION IS SPOKEN OF BY ONE AND THE SAME WORD, IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO IT, THE INJUNCTION BECOMES CONNECTED WITH THE NAME ; THROUGH THE PARTICULAR ACCESSORY, THE ACTION WOULD BECOME MODIFIED ; BECAUSE THE WORD APPERTAINS TO THE INJUNCTION AND THE ACCESSORY IS SOMETHING THAT IS TO BE ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

The following is another peculiarity (which points to the same conclusion):—The Principal Act and the Subsidiary Act are both *spoken of by one and the same word* :—i.e. a single 'word', consisting of the declaration of the entire procedure, speaks of the Primary Act as well as its subsidiaries ; hence in the declaration of the Primary Act, the subsidiaries are in close proximity to it ;—these being in close proximity, the injunction of the accessories becomes connected by mentioning the name, in this form—'That sacrifice which is named *Prayāja* has this accessory detail'.—In this manner, in the case of all sacrifices, *the action would become modified through the particular accessory* ; that is, the number modifies the number and the *Mantra* modifies the *Mantra*. As a matter of fact, *the word appertains to the injunction* of the *Prayāja* and other sacrifices ;—and *the accessory detail is something that is to be enjoined* ; consequently, the second mention of it is not meaningless.—From all this it follows that the archetypal procedure does come into the sacrifices in question and that the sentences are injunctions of accessory details.

SŪTRA (7).

ALSO BECAUSE THE NAME IS NOT SOMETHING TO BE DONE.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be said that "what is enjoined is the connection between the *Name* and the *Named*" ;—because when the relationship between a term and an object is enjoined, the form of the verbal construction would be different—in the form 'one should perform eleven sacrifices, and these sacrifices are named *Prayāja* and *Anuyāja*' ; and this construction involves a syntactical split.—On the other hand, if the mention of these sacrifices, whose names are already well known, is taken to be for the purpose of enjoining the accessory details, [then the said incongruity does not arise, and] on that account also the archetypal procedure should be taken as

coming in, and the sentences should be taken as injunctions of accessory details.

SŪTRA (8).

IN REGARD TO THE ACCESSORY DETAIL, THE 'CAPACITY' IS EQUALLY PRESENT.

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* is to be taken as preceded by certain words.—"What are those words?"—They are as follows:—It has been argued that "the *Prayājas* and the *Anuyājas* are not close by, and hence it is not for the sentences to be taken as enjoining the accessories of those sacrifices".—This has got to be refuted; and the refutation is as follows:—*In regard to the accessory details, the capacity* of the General Law *is equally present*; so that it will bring into the acts in question the accessory details related to the archetype; and being known to be so admissible, they are mentioned in the sentence in question, which serves the purpose of enjoining other accessory details.—The other alternative is that it will enjoin the accessories and then make them admissible at the acts in question; but in that case, these could have no connection with the sentence laying down the accessory details.—Of the two alternatives, it is much simpler to indicate the admission of those that have been already enjoined.—The word, having its purposes served by getting at the archetypal details, cannot enjoin fresh accessories.—"The sentence in question itself may serve to enjoin them".—That is not possible; because this sentence is only for the purpose of connecting the accessory details, as is clear from the presence of the word signifying the accessory detail.—For these reasons also we conclude that the procedure being already known to be admissible, the sentences in question are injunctions of accessory details.

It has been argued that—"the verbs are injunctions of *acts*—as proved under *Sūtra* 2. 1. 1."—The answer to that is that the *capacity* of these verbs *is equal*; the words which, being accompanied by words denoting the accessories, are capable of enjoining the accessory as well as the act, are all the more capable of enjoining the accessory only; for the man who eats stones, corn-cakes are easy to devour.—For this reason also the sentences in question should be taken as injunctions of accessories.

SŪTRA (9).

"IN THIS WAY, ALL ACTS WOULD BE 'PRIMARY'",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"If your view is that the *verb* will enjoin the accessory details,—then, in that case, as all acts are expressed by verbs, they would all be *primary*."

SŪTRA (10).

THE INJUNCTIONS BY SUCH A WORD (VERB) WOULD ALWAYS BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ACTUAL NATURE OF THE ACTS CONCERNED.

Bhāṣya.

It is not merely by being expressed by the verb that anything becomes *primary* or *secondary*; if an act is actually a *secondary* one, it does not become *primary* simply by reason of its being expressed by a verb; as a matter of fact, it is *in accordance with the actual nature of the* act concerned that there are injunctions by means of verbs; so that what is *primary* remains *primary*, and what is *secondary* remains *secondary*.

SŪTRA (11).

INASMUCH AS BOTH THE ARCHETYPAL AND THE ECTYPAL (ACCESSORIES) ARE EQUALLY RELATED TO THE DECLAMATORY STATEMENT, THE CHARACTER OF 'BEING ENJOINED' IS EQUALLY PRESENT IN BOTH; CONSEQUENTLY ALL IS SUBSERVIENT TO THE PRIMARY ACT.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason we conclude that the sentences in question are injunctions of accessory details.—"For what reason?"—*The character of 'being enjoined' is equally present in both the archetypal and the ectypal accessories*, as there is no difference in the connection between these and the Declamatory Statement; that is, the declamatory statement in connection with the Archetype is—'One offers the sacrifice to *Agni-Sviṣṭakṛt* for the stability of the sacrifice'; and in connection with the ectype also there is practically the same declaration—'When one offers the sacrifice to *Agni-Sviṣṭakṛt*, one renders the sacrifice stable'.—Similarly in connection with the Archetype there is the declamation—'The two *Ājyabhāga*-offerings are the two eyes of the sacrifice', and practically the same in connection with the ectype—'When one makes the two *Ājyabhāga*-offerings, they are the very eyes'.—From all this it follows that all acts of this nature subserve the purposes of the Primary Act,—and as such, in the case in question, they should be taken as subsidiary to the Ectypal Sacrifice.

SŪTRA (12).

THEIR APPEARANCE BEING SIMILAR, THEY SHOULD BE SIMILAR IN CONNECTION WITH THE EMBELLISHMENTS ALSO.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also we conclude that all the acts are not Primary Acts, there are some that are subservient to the Primary Act. The

order of sequence in the appearance of the *Prayājas* and the *Anuyājas* is similar; i.e. the order of sequence in the connection of the embellishments at the ectype is found to be similar to that at the Archetype.—"How so?"—The order of the *Prayājas* and *Anuyājas* is found to be thus described—'*Prajāpati* created the sacrifice,—first of all, He created Clarified Butter,—the animal in the middle,—and the *Pṛṣadājya*; it is for this reason that the *Prayājas* proceed first of all with Clarified Butter, with the animal in the middle, and with *Pṛṣadājya* in the end, then the *Anuyājas* proceed'; the mention of the order of sequence in regard to the *Prayājas* and the *Anuyājas* that we find here is explicable only if they be subservient to the Primary Sacrifice,—and not if they themselves were Primary Acts.—Hence it follows that all the acts are not *primary*, there are some that are subservient to the Primary.

Adhikaraṇa (2): *In connection with the Animal-offering to Vāyu, the mantra 'Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ samavartatāgrē etc.' is to be used with the second 'Pouring out of the offering'.*

SŪTRA (13).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*continued*]—"The 'Hiraṇyagarbha-mantra' should be used at the first offering,—as such is the indication of the Mantra-text."

Bhāṣya.

There is the animal sacrificed to *Vāyu*, in accordance with the text—'Desiring prosperity, one should sacrifice the white goat dedicated to *Vāyu*';—in connection with this sacrifice, we read—'With the mantra, *Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ samavartatāgrē* etc. one pours out the offering'.—We have seen in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* that this text enjoins an accessory in connection with the *Āghāra*-offering which is already known as enjoined elsewhere (and which comes in at the sacrifice in question by virtue of the General Law).—The question to be considered however is this—Is the accessory herein enjoined to be adopted at the *first* offering or at the *second*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*The Hiraṇyagarbha-mantra should be used at the first offering, as such is the indication of the Mantra-text*; i.e. the sentence in question should be taken as the injunction of an accessory for the first offering.—Why?—Because such is the indication of the words of the *Mantra* itself; the use of the *Mantra* is laid down as that 'with the Mantra, *Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ samavartatāgrē*, one pours out the offering';—in the *Mantra* itself, there are the words '*Bhūtasya jātaḥ patirēka āsīt*' ['He was the one *Lord of Creation*'], where the term 'one' stands for *Prajāpati*,—the idea expressed being that prior to the appearance of the Creation, He was the only *one* to appear; thus then the *Mantra* is found to be capable of speaking of *Prajāpati*;—and it is the *first* offering that is offered to *Prajāpati*; so that the *Mantra* can serve its purpose only at the first offering, not at the second one. Hence it follows that the sentence in question enjoins an accessory for the *first* offering."

SŪTRA (14).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*concluded*]—"Also because there would be no dependence upon the fact of there being an Archetype."

Bhāṣya.

"There would be no dependence upon the General Law that 'the Ectype is to be performed like the Archetype'; because the *Mantra* of the

second offering is not excluded; according to the other view (that the *Hiraṇyagarbha-mantra* is to be used at the *second* offering), there would have to be exclusion of the *Mantra* '*Urdho'dhvara* etc.' [which is the *Mantra* that is used with the second offering at the Archetype].—From this also it follows that the sentence enjoins an accessory for the *first* offering."

SŪTRA (15).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT APPERTAINS TO THE SECOND, AS IT IS THIS THAT NEEDS THE MANTRA.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the above view. As a matter of fact, the sentence does not enjoin an accessory for the *first* offering,—it is an accessory for the *second* offering that is enjoined; as it is this *second* offering—not the *first*—that needs the Mantra.—"How so?" —What is laid down is that 'with the Mantra *Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ samavartatāgrē*, one pours out the offering';—and what does this mean?—What it means is that 'one utters the said verse when pouring out the offering'; and what the verse does, on being uttered, is that it supplies a scriptural idea in connection with the offering, by means of the closing words of the Mantra '*Kasmai dēvāya haviṣā vidhēma*', which means that the offering shall be made to *one deity*; the fact of the matter is that the first word is '*ēkasmai*', from which the syllable 'ē' has been deleted,—that is how we deduce the idea that 'the offering-material is to be offered to the *one deity*'. Now, as a matter of fact, there is no such scriptural idea in connection with the *first* offering; hence (if the injunction were applied to that offering) it would be necessary to assume (1) that there is a scriptural idea in connection with that offering and (2) that that idea should be carried out with the Mantra '*Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ samavartatāgrē*'; there is, however, no authority for making any such assumption.—What the sentence enjoins is a particular use of the *Mantra*, and not restriction of its use in general;—the general use of the *Mantra* being subject to option.—It may be argued that "the use of the *Mantra* being subject to option, it is with reference to that that there is the injunction of the particular use".—But this argument is absolutely futile, as it practically accepts our view; and under this view the injunction serves a distinctly useful purpose, as it bears upon the *Pouring out* done with the *Juhū*.—From all this it follows that the sentence enjoins an accessory for the *second* offering.

It has been argued that—"The *Mantra* speaks of *Prajāpati* (the deity of the first offering), and it can never speak of *Indra* (the deity of the second offering)".—But it is not so. Just as *Prajāpati* is eulogised as *one*, on the basis of the name '*Prajāpati*',—the idea being that before the creation of the world, *Prajāpati* was the only one Being,—similarly on the basis of the fact that the name 'Indra' connotes *sovereignty*, *Indra* also is regarded as capable of creating all things and is consequently eulogised as *unborn*, in the following verse—'*Ka īmstavat kaḥ pṛṇāt ko yajātē yadugraminmaghavā*

vishvahāvē̄t pādaviva praharannanyamanyam kṛṇoti pūrvamaparam shachībhiḥ' (Ṛgveda 6. 47) ;—also in the following verse—'*Ka u nu tē mahimanaḥ samasyāsmat pūrvam ṛṣayo'ntamāyuḥ yanmātarañcha pitarañcha sākamayajanayathāḥ stanvā svāyāḥ*' (Ṛgveda 10. 54.)—The former verse—'*Ka imstavat* etc.' appears in the hymn addressed to *Indra*, and hence it is regarded as 'related to *Indra*', what it means is as follows—'Who can eulogise him ? Who can make an offering to him ? Who can offer a sacrifice to him ?'—All this expressing a certain amount of uncertainty—'He alone does all this ; just as a man in walking, puts one foot forward and another backward, so does he all this' ;—so that if he does all this, then by doing it before everybody else, he is *one*.—Similarly the second verse—'*Ka u nu tē etc.*'—means as follows—'Which sages, even among fore-runners, can get to the end of the majesty of this deity ? He is one who produced his own parents out of himself and is as such anterior even to his own parents,—what to say of other persons ?'—So it becomes established that he is *one* ; as he also was only one, before the creation of all other things. Thus the verse in question also speaks of *Indra*, and hence there is no incongruity (in its being used with the *second* offering)].

SŪTRA (16).

AS THERE IS TRANSFERENCE OF THE INJUNCTION, THERE WOULD BE MODIFICATION IN THE TEXT ; SPECIALLY AS IT IS THEIR ACCESSORIES THAT HAVE TO BE ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

It is the injunction of accessories that is laid down in the text speaking of the 'Pouring out' ; and there would be modification of that 'Pouring out' ; and it is in reference to the *second* 'Pouring out' that the *Mantra* has got to be enjoined ; the idea that we have derived from Vedic texts in regard to the Mantra to be used with this second offering (at the archetype) is that of the *Mantra* '*Ūrdhvodhvaro divispṛshamahūto yajño yajñapatēriudrāvān vṛhadbhabhāvī hi madhorghṛtasya svāhā*' ; and the idea that is derived from this is helpful in the sacrifice ; this idea being that 'the offering is to be made to *Indra*'. In the case in question, however, the idea that we derive from the Vedic texts is that the *Mantra* to be used is '*Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ savavartatāgrē etc.*' ; and this has the capacity to enjoin the *Mantra* to be used for the same purpose for which the former *Mantra* is used at the Archetype. For instance, in the case of the expression—'There is curd, clarified butter, vegetables, and rice,—feed Devadatta, as also Yajñadatta with oil',—the oil is mentioned as of use in the feeding, and it is to be used only in the place of Clarified Butter, the purpose of which alone can be served by oil ; the capacity to lubricate the food being common to the Oil and the Clarified Butter ;—similarly, in the case in question, when a fresh *Mantra* is mentioned, the notion that it produces is of some change in the idea that we had derived from the Vedic texts in connection with the Archetype ; and this is helpful only in connection with the *second*, not the

first offering.—Hence the sentence should be taken as enjoining an accessory for the *second* offering.

SŪTRA (17).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND THAT THERE IS A TEXT INDICATING THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO MANTRA IN CONNECTION WITH THE FIRST OFFERING.

Bhāṣya.

The following text shows that the *first* 'Pouring out' is to be done *without a Mantra*—'He pronounces the syllable *Svāhā*, he does not pronounce a *Mantra*'.—From this also it follows that the sentence enjoins an accessory for the *second* 'Pouring out'

Adhikaraṇa (3): *In connection with the 'Chāturmāsya Soma-sacrifices', the details laid down in regard to the 'Placing' and 'Tying' appertain to these acts as done at the Archetype.*

SŪTRA (18).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*continued*]—"There being an embellishment, it must be a distinct act,—it being injunctive of that."

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Chāturmāsya Soma-sacrifices*, in connection with which we read—(*a*) 'They place the Whey on the Dust-heap', (*b*) 'They tie the animal to the *Paridhi*'.

In regard to this there arises the question—Are these, the 'Placing', and the 'Tying', distinct from these same acts that are done at the Archetype—[to be done in addition to the 'Placing' and 'Tying' that are transferred to the sacrifice from its Archetype] ? Or do these sentences lay down only particular details (the 'Dust-heap' and the '*Paridhi*') relating to those same acts done at the Archetype [the meaning being that the acts done are the same that have come in from the Archetype, only instead of the spot where the Whey is kept at the Archetype, it is to be kept on the Dust-heap, and the Animal is to be *tied* to the *Paridhi*, instead of the Post] ?—What we have to consider in this connection is this—Are these, the *placing* and the *tying*, mere acts of *Dharma* (bringing transcendental results) ?—Or are they meant to serve only visible purposes ? If they are mere acts of *Dharma*, they must be distinct acts; if they are meant to serve a visible purpose, then the sentence must be an injunction of accessories.—Thus there is a two-fold doubt; hence both the questions are considered together; the combined question being—Is each of the acts one of mere *Dharma* and hence a distinct act ?—Or is it meant to serve a visible purpose and hence the injunction is one of an accessory detail ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"(*a*) Inasmuch as the Dust-heap (*Utkara*) is too high and is pointed at the top (conical), it cannot serve the useful purpose of supplying a suitable receptacle for the 'placing' (of the Whey);—similarly, (*b*) inasmuch as the *Paridhi* is a piece of wood lying flat on the ground, it cannot serve the visible purpose of supplying a suitable peg for the 'tying' of the animal;—hence both these are mere acts of *Dharma*. Just as, under the section of the *Sautrāmaṇi* sacrifice, the 'placing' laid down in the text 'place it on the *Brahmaṇa's* head' is a mere act of *Dharma*, so here also. And if it is a mere act of *Dharma*, then it must be a distinct act; such being the case, the 'placing' and the 'tying' should both be taken as enjoined; so that the injunction would be done by the Direct Assertion of the *Veda*; in the other case, it would be done by Syntactical

Connection. Further, under our view, the 'placing' and the 'tying' would not be mere indicatives of the injunction of accessories; while under your view, they would both have to be taken as indicating the injunction of accessories.—From all this it follows that each of the two acts is distinct (from the similar act done at the Archetype). Specially because *it is injunctive of that*; just as, in the case of the 'Pouring out', the verbal affix appearing at the end of the term cannot be injunctive of accessories, so also in the case of the two embellishments known as 'placing' and 'tying'."

SŪTRA (19).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE NO DEPENDENCE UPON THE FACT OF THERE BEING AN ARCHETYPE."

Bhāṣya.

"Under this view it would not be necessary to depend upon the General Law to transfer the archetypal accessories—laid down in the texts '*places* the offering-materials on the altar', and '*ties* the animal to the Sacrificial Post'.—For this reason also the acts in question should be regarded as distinct acts."

SŪTRA (20).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT, INASMUCH AS THE INJUNCTION IS THERE,—IF THERE IS A DOUBT, THE WORD SHOULD BE TAKEN AS USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF THAT OF WHICH IT IS INJUNCTIVE.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('but') implies the rejection of the above view.

The 'placing' and 'tying' in question are not distinct from those same acts done at the Archetype; what the texts in question do is to lay down an additional detail regarding the 'placing' and 'tying' done at the Archetype; hence the explanation is that the 'placing' and 'tying' serve only visible purposes.—"How so?"—Because we actually see the visible purpose served by them; 'placing' consists really in *having the thing within reach*, and this serves the visible purpose of helping the accomplishment of the *Homa*; the 'tying' of the animal also serves the visible purpose that it prevents the animal from running away.—Such being the case, each of the two texts must be taken as the injunction of an accessory.—"How so?"—*Inasmuch as the Injunction is there*;—i.e. the injunction of 'placing' and 'tying' is found to be rendered admissible by the General Law,—*if there is a doubt*,—as to whether what is enjoined is only an accessory detail or a distinct act,—it is not right to take it as the injunction of a distinct act; because 'injunction' consists in laying down what is not already known,—while 'placing' and 'tying' are both already known through the General Law;—hence the word should be taken as used for the purpose of that additional accessory which is enjoined by it. From all this it follows that the text in question contains the injunction of an accessory detail.

It has been argued that "in support of the *Pūrvapakṣa* view, there is *Direct Assertion*, while in support of the *Siddhānta*, there is only *Syntactical Connection* (which is weaker in authority)".—The reply to this is that though it is *Syntactical Connection* (that supports the *Siddhānta*), yet this view involves the assumption of a smaller amount of transcendental effect,—only in so far as it refers to the enjoined accessory, and not in so far as it would refer to the distinct act along with its accessory (which latter would be necessary in the case of the *Pūrvapakṣa*).

SŪTRA (21).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE MAY BE QUALITIES WHICH MAY MAKE THE EMBELLISHMENTS POSSIBLE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—"the Dust-heap being pointed at the top and the *Paridhi* lying flat on the ground, the *placing* and the *tying* in question cannot be done".—The answer to that is as follows:—We shall so make the *Dust-heap* and the *Paridhi* that the *placing* and the *tying* could be done; for instance, we can make the *Dust-heap* with a flattened top and have a thick *Paridhi*; so that on account of the presence of the *quality* of 'flattened top' and 'thickness', the articles in question would be enabled to accomplish the *embellishments* of 'placing' and 'tying'.

SŪTRA (22).

IT IS ONLY WHEN THERE IS AN INCONGRUITY THAT THE MERE ACTION WOULD BE DONE IN THAT PARTICULAR CONNECTION.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—"Just as in connection with the *Sautrāmaṇi*, the *placing* is regarded as a mere act of *Dharma*, so should it be in the case in question also".—This has to be refuted; the answer to it is as follows:—In connection with the *Sautrāmaṇī*, it is on account of the incongruity involved [in the actual *placing* of the offering-material *on the head of the Brāhmaṇa*] that the 'placing' for a visible purpose cannot be done, and as a necessary consequence, in connection with the *Sautrāmaṇī*, the 'placing' is taken as done merely as an act of *Dharma*. In the case in question, however, it is not impossible to do the act for a visible purpose; hence the text should be taken as the injunction of an accessory detail.

Adhikaraṇa (4): *At the 'Agnichayana', both the 'Archetypal' and the 'Ectypal' Initiatory oblations are to be offered.*

SŪTRA (23).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"In view of the injunction 'initiates with six', there should be modification of the mantras at those Initiations; because of the presence of the Direct Assertion."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Agnichayana* Rite, laid down in the text—'One who, knowing this, sets up the Fire-altar'; at this rite there are Initiatory oblations,—some that come in from the archetype, as also some that belong to the ectype itself; the Mantras used with these oblations at the Archetype are the following—(1) '*Ākutimagnim prayujam svāhā*', (2) '*Mano mēdhāmagnim prayujam svāha*', (3) '*Chittam vijñātamagnim prayujam svāhā*', (4) '*Vācho vidhṛtimagnim prayujam svāha*', (5) '*Prajāpatayē manavē svāhā*', (6) '*Agnayē vaishvānarāya svāhā*', (7) '*Vishvē dēvasya neturmatto vṛṇita sakhyam vishvē rāya iṣudhyasi dyumnam vṛṇita puṣyasē svāhā*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 4. 1. 9. 1);—while the *Mantras* laid down in connection with the Ectype (*Agnichayana*) itself are the following—(1) '*Ākūtyai prayujē agnayē svāha*', (2) '*Mēdhāyai manase'gnayē svāhā*', (3) '*Dīkṣāyai tapasē'agnayē svāhā*', (4) '*Sarasvatyai pūṣṇē'gnayē svāhā*', (5) '*Āpo dēvīrbṛhatīr vishvashambhuvo dyāvapṛthivī urvantarikṣam bṛhaspatirno haviṣā vidhātu svāhā*', (6) '*Vishvē dēvasya nēturmatto vṛṇita sakhyam vishvē rāya iṣudhyasi dyumnam vṛṇita puṣyasē svāhā*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 4. 1. 9. 1).

[There is something wrong in the quoting of these *Mantras*; in connection with the Archetype, the number of *Mantras* quoted is *seven*, whereas from the Context it is clear that it should be *six* only. Unfortunately, in no other work are all the twelve *Mantras* quoted. The manuscripts available read as in the printed text. The *Seventh Mantra* quoted in connection with the Archetype, it appears, should not be there. It is identical with the Sixth *Mantra* quoted in connection with the Ectype; this identity is repugnant to the Context.]

In connection with these, it has been declared—'Initiates with *Six Mantras*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—At the Ectype (*Agnichayana*), are the *Ectypal* Mantras alone to be used and the Archetypal ones should be excluded?—Or both the *Archetypal* and *Ectypal* sets should be used collectively?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*In view of the injunction 'initiates with six', there should be a modification* in the *Archetypal Mantras* used in connection with the oblations; i.e. the Archetypal *Mantras* should be excluded (and replaced) by the Ectypal ones;—*because of the presence of the*

Direct Assertion ; there is a direct assertion regarding the use of the Ectypal *Mantras*, and these Ectypal *Mantras* are six only, and these six are the Ectypal ones. From this it follows that there is exclusion of the Archetypal *Mantras*, and the two sets are not to be used collectively."

SŪTRA (24).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT THERE IS REPETITION OF THE PRIMARY SET.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('but') implies the rejection of the above view that "there is exclusion of the Archetypal Mantras";—in fact, there is no exclusion, there is inclusion.—"Why?"—Because it is quite possible. It is only in cases where it is impossible for the Ectypal and the Archetypal to be used together, that the *Archetypal* is excluded by the *Ectypal*. If both are used together, there would be repetition of the Primary;—and where such repetition has been directly declared, it should certainly be done; there can be no incongruity in such repetition. Because in this case the repetition of the Primary *Homa* is directly asserted in the text 'Offers twelve oblations' [and this number *twelve* is made up by offerings being made with both sets of *Mantras*].—Thus, as it is possible for both sets to be used collectively, they should be so used.

SŪTRA (25).

[*Objection*]—"EVEN ON REPETITION, THE ACTION WOULD BE WITH MANTRAS."

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"It is not right that the two sets of *Mantras* should be used collectively; because the Archetypal Mantras which could come in only by virtue of the General Law would be set aside by the Ectypal ones whose use is laid down by a direct injunction.—It has been argued that—so long as it is possible to use them, they should not be excluded.—The answer to that is that it is *not* possible to use them.—How so?—The six Ectypal *Mantras* are laid down by the direct injunction as to be used at the *Agnichayana* (Ectype) in connection with the oblations which come into the Ectype from the Archetype; if these oblations are to be offered, the *mantras* used must be the Ectypal ones;—even in the case of repetition, it is those same oblations that come in; and if they are those same oblations, then the *Mantras* used must be the Ectypal ones. Hence it is found that even when *there is repetition, the action would be with Mantras*—i.e. with those same Ectypal ones.—From all this we conclude that the Archetypal *Mantras* must be excluded."

SŪTRA (26).

[*Answer*]—IN REALITY, INASMUCH AS THERE IS AN OBLATION WITH EACH MANTRA, THERE SHOULD BE NO EXCLUSION OF THE ARCHETYPAL MANTRAS ; WHEN SOMETHING HAS BEEN DONE, ITS REPETITION WOULD BE UNREASONABLE.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the above view. *There are oblations with each Mantra* ;—the number 'twelve' is obtained by repetition ;—the Archetypal Mantras come in (at the *Agnichayana*) by virtue of the General Law, and the *Ectypal* ones come in by direct injunction ; —the injunction laying down the entire procedure takes in all the details of the sacrifice and hence includes within itself both sets of *Mantras*. It is only when *Inclusion* or *Combination* is entirely impossible that there is either Exclusion or Option,—not so long as Combination is possible ; because in case there is exclusion, what is indicated by the General Law would be entirely rejected.—Further, the Ectypal Mantras have not been singled out as those that alone are capable of accomplishing the oblation ; all that should be understood from the text is that 'if the oblation has to be offered, the Ectypal Mantras also are the means of accomplishing it'.— The Ectypal *Mantras* have been laid down in connection with the rite of Initiation, in the text—'He initiates with six' ;—but the text laying down the entire procedure of the oblation includes all those sentences ending with the syllable '*Svāhā*', which happen to be in close proximity to itself ;— now it is both the Archetypal and the Ectypal *Mantras* that are in such close proximity to it ;—hence there can be no ground for discriminating between these two sets of *Mantras*—such as 'it includes these and does not include those others'.—Nor in this case is there any incongruity in the repetition of the primary factor, as has been already explained.—From all this we conclude that there should be no exclusion of the Archetypal *Mantras*. —Further, *when a certain thing has been done, its repetition would be unreasonable* ; the Ectypal Mantras are read only once in the assertion that the man should be made an 'initiate' by means of these ; when, then, the initiation has been accomplished, and the purpose of these *Mantras* thus fulfilled, any repetition of these same *Mantras* (in order to make up the enjoined 'twelve' oblations) would be most unreasonable. For this reason also there should be no exclusion of the Archetypal *Mantras* [and the enjoined number 'twelve' should be made up by the combination of both sets].

SŪTRA (27).

THERE IS ALSO 'PRIORITY AND POSTERIORITY', WHICH WOULD NOT BE EXPLICABLE IF THERE WERE REPETITION ; BECAUSE THE TERMS ARE RELATIVE.

Bhāṣya.

Further, we find the terms 'prior' and 'posterior' in the following text—'He offers the six prior oblations ; he offers the six posterior

oblations';—if the Ectypal Mantras alone were used and there were repetition of these same (for making up the prescribed number 'twelve'), then there could be no 'priority and posteriority'; because these terms are *relative*; i.e. the term 'posterior' is relative to (and contingent upon) *something else* that has gone before, and similarly the term 'prior' also is relative to (and contingent upon) *something else* that is to come later.—For this reason also, there should be no exclusion of the Archetypal *Mantras*.

SŪTRA (28).

THERE IS ALSO A TEXT INDICATING THAT THEY ARE DISTINCT.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also we conclude that there should be no exclusion of the Archetypal *Mantras* and that there should be combination of the two sets of *Mantras*.—"For what reason?"—There is a text indicating that those oblations are *distinct*; that text being—'*Ubhayīrjuhoti āgnikīshchādhvarikīshcha*' ['Offers both sets of oblations, those appertaining to *Agni* and those appertaining to *Adhvara*'];—it is only when there is a combination of the two sets of *Mantras* that there can be a justification for these being spoken of as '*āgnikī*' and '*ādhvarikī* [The Ectypal Mantras laid down in connection with the *Agni-chayana* being called '*āgnikī*', and the Archetypal ones being called '*ādhvarikī*']; for, according to the other view (by which the set of Archetypal verses would be excluded), there would be only one set, called '*Āgnikī*' (those appertaining to *Agnichayana*); and in that case the separate mention of both would be inexplicable;—and yet we find that they are mentioned separately;—hence we conclude that there should be no exclusion of the Archetypal *Mantras*,—there should be a combination of both sets.

SŪTRA (29).

FURTHER, THERE IS AN ASSERTION, WHICH WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IF THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCE.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also there shall be no *exclusion*, there shall be *combination*.—"For what reason?"—Because there is an assertion; there is the following assertion—'*Adhvarasya pūrvam athāgnērupāgni hyētat karma yadagnikarma*'; here it is asserted that the '*adhvara*' (sacrifice, the Archetype) comes first, then the '*Agni*' (*Agni-chayana*, the Ectype); this is explicable only if there is combination of both,—not if there is no difference (in the two sets of *Mantras* used).

From all this it follows that there should be *combination* (of the Archetypal and Ectypal *Mantras*).

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *At the second 'Fire-installation', the Sacrificial Fee prescribed for the first 'Fire-installation' is excluded.*

SŪTRA (30).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"WHEN THE ACCESSORY DETAIL CONNECTED WITH 'FIRE-INSTALLATION' IS SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION ON ACCOUNT OF A CERTAIN CONTINGENCY, THERE SHOULD BE AN ADDITIONAL SACRIFICIAL FEE GIVEN; BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF A DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT."

Bhāṣya.

A second 'Fire-installation' has been laid down as to be performed when a certain contingency arises,—'*Bhāgya-yashaḥ-shrīkāmānām punarādadhīta;—yo'gnīnādhāya bhāgyajyānim putrajyānim vā jīyeta sa punarādadhīta*' ['Those who desire good-luck, fame and prosperity should install the Fires again; if, on having installed the Fires, one desires to overcome misfortune or ill-luck to sons, one should install the Fire again'];—in connection with this *second* Fire-installation, a special Fee has been prescribed—'Clothes resewn is the Fee, as also the rejuvenated bull';—for the ordinary Fire-installation, the Fee is as follows:—'One should be given, six should be given, twelve should be given, twenty-four should be given, a hundred should be given, a thousand should be given, an unmeasured number should be given'.

In regard to the *second* Fire-installation, there arises the question—Are the fees prescribed for the ordinary Fire-installation to be included and the two are to be combined?—Or are the Fees of the ordinary Fire-installation to be excluded?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"When there is a second Fire-installation due to a special contingency, there should be an additional Fee;—i.e. the Archetypal (original) Fee should be included, and there should be combination of both the Fees.—Why?—Because both are found to be mentioned in a single declaration—'He gives both, those relating to the Fire-installation and those relating to the second Fire-installation'.—From this it is clear that there is to be *combination*, not *exclusion*."

SŪTRA (31).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"INASMUCH AS THEY HAVE BEEN ENJOINED, THE OTHERS SHALL COME IN IN THE PROPER PLACE."

Bhāṣya.

"This *Sūtra* is in answer to a question—'How can there be a combination between what is directly enjoined and what comes in by virtue of the

General Law'?—The answer to this is—*Inasmuch as they have been enjoined, the others*—i.e. the Fees relating to the original Fire-installation,—shall be included in the proper place, on the strength of the declaration; there is the direct declaration—'Having given the Fee connected with the original Fire-installation, he gives the Fee connected with the second installation'. —From this it is clear that there is to be no exclusion of the Fee connected with the original Installation, there should be combination of both."

SŪTRA (32).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE MODIFICATION; AS THE PROSPECTIVE FACTORS COME IN ONLY WHEN THE ORIGINAL IS NOT THERE.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the above view.

In reality, there can be no combination, there must be modification.—"Why?"—Because the second Installation has been declared to be a 'prospective act' (to be done only when one desires a certain definite reward); this can be justified only when the archetypal context is not there, —not when this latter is there; so that if an ectypal accessory is laid down, it must exclude the archetypal one. Whenever a 'prospective' or 'contingent' act is to be performed, it comes in only in modification of the original essential act. For instance, when it is said that 'When there is consumption, the food should consist of rice and *mudga*, and one should sleep away from the wind',—it means a modification of the ordinary food and sleep.—Then again, the ectypal detail is laid down directly by a Vedic text, whereas the archetypal one comes in only by indirect inference, through the General Law; and hence the latter is set aside by the former.—It has been argued that—"On the strength of the declaration, the *Archetypal* details must come in".—The answer to that is that the declaration in question is in the form '*Ubhayīrdadāti*' ['*gives* both'], and there is no *injunctive* affix in this; the affix that is there signifies the statement of a *present* fact.—Taking this declaration along with the other sources of knowledge bearing upon the matter, we conclude that what the declaration in question—'gives both the fees,—those relating to the original Installation and those relating to the second Installation'—means is that 'the Fee relating to the original Installation is given at the original Installation and that relating to the second Installation is given at the second Installation'; so that this is a reiteration of a mere fact (and not an injunction).—From all this it follows that the Archetypal Fees are to be excluded.

SŪTRA (33).

THEN AGAIN, EXCLUSION IS INDICATED; BECAUSE 'BOTH' ARE MENTIONED.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the Archetypal Fees are to be excluded. —"For what reason?"—We understand that such *exclusion is indicated*.—

"How so?"—*Because 'both' are mentioned*; there is the declaration 'when one gives the Ectypal Fees, both the Fees become given' [which indicates that both are included in the one, hence the original one need not be given].—"But this may mean that both the Fees are to be given, since it is said that *both become given*".—We have already explained that when both are said to be given, what is meant is that the Fee connected with the original Installation is to be given at the Original Installation and that connected with the second Installation is to be given at the second Installation.—From all this it follows that the Archetypal Fees are to be excluded.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *At the 'Āgrayaṇa' sacrifice the 'Cloth' and the 'Calf' exclude the 'Anvāhārya Rice'.*

SŪTRA (34).

THE 'CLOTH' AND THE 'CALF' ALSO [EXCLUDE THE ORIGINAL FEE], —ON ACCOUNT OF THE SAMENESS (OF PURPOSE).

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Āgrayaṇa* sacrifice laid down in the following text— '*Hutādyāya yajamānasya . . . . ēkakapālaḥ*'.—In connection with this it is laid down that '*Cloth* is the Fee, the first-born *Calf* is the Fee'.—At the Archetypal sacrifice, however, the Fee consists of the *Anvāhārya Rice*; and the giving of this latter at the *Āgrayaṇa* is indicated by the General Law.—Hence there arises the following question—Do the *Cloth* and the *Calf* exclude the *Anvāhārya Rice*—or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"They should not exclude it, (1) because the General Law has to be obeyed and (2) because there is no incompatibility in giving both."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*The 'Cloth' and the 'Calf' also should exclude the original Fee, on account of the sameness of purpose*; it has been explained before that at the second Fire-installation, there is exclusion of the Fee connected with the original Fire-installation; that same 'exclusion' is connected with the present *Sūtra* by means of the particle '*cha*' ('also');—the meaning being that the *Anvāhārya Rice* is excluded.—"Why so?"—*Because of the sameness of the purpose* served by them; at the Archetype, the *Anvāhārya* Rice serves the purpose of the *Sacrificial Fee*,—in the Ectype in question, that same purpose is served by the *Cloth* and the *Calf*; because these also have been spoken of as 'Sacrificial Fee'. From this it follows there is to be exclusion, not combination.

Or, the present *Sūtra* may be taken simply as indicating the admissibility of the details of the *Anvāhārya* at the *Āgrayaṇa*,—for the purpose of introducing the next *Adhikaraṇa*.

———

Adhikaraṇa (7): *At the 'Āgrayaṇa', the details connected with the 'Anvāhārya' are to be performed in connection with the 'Cloth' and the 'Calf'.*

SŪTRA (35).

IT SHOULD TAKE IN THE DETAILS IN QUESTION, AS IT SERVES THE SAME PURPOSE; BECAUSE IT IS SPOKEN OF AS SUCH IN CONNECTION WITH A CERTAIN CONTINGENCY.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the same 'Cloth' and 'Calf' there arises the question—Should the details of the *Anvāhārya* be performed in connection with them —or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"As no reason is mentioned why they should be performed, we conclude that they should *not* be performed."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The *Calf should take in the details in question*,—the *Cloth* also should take in those details;—because they serve the same purpose. As a matter of fact, the details in question are meant to serve a certain purpose served by the *Anvāhārya*,—and their presence is not due to the mere presence of the *Anvāhārya* itself; hence they must be performed in connection with any other thing that serves the same purpose.—"But how can the *Cloth* and the *Calf* be regarded as serving the same purpose (as the *Anvāhārya*)?"—A certain contingency has been mentioned, and then they are spoken of in the following sentence as 'Fee' by reason of their securing the services of the priests—'The Cloth is the Fee, the first-born Calf is the Fee'.—From this it follows that the *Cloth* and the *Calf* should take in the details of the *Anvāhārya* Rice.

Adhikaraṇa (8): *At the 'Āgrayaṇa', there should be no 'Cooking' of the Calf.*

SŪTRA (36).

In the case of a gift, the Cooking is meant for a definite purpose.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the same *Āgrayaṇa*, it is said that 'a first-born Calf is the Fee';—it has been settled that the details of the *Anvāhārya* should be performed in connection with this *Calf*:—The question that arises now is—In the case of the *Calf*, should, or should not, the 'Cooking' also be done [as it is done in the case of the *Anvāhārya*]?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is—"It should be done—(1) because of the necessity of obeying the General Law, and (2) because it can be done."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—When the Calf is given as the Fee, there should be no 'Cooking'; even without being *Cooked*, the Calf remains a *Calf*;—what is laid down as to be given is the *Calf*, not the *meat* (of the Calf);—further, it has been laid down for the purpose of securing the services of the Priests, not as an embellishment of the man. For these reasons, the General Law cannot indicate the admissibility of the 'Cooking' to the case of the *Calf*. Under the circumstances, if the 'Cooking' were done, it would be an unauthorised animal-slaughter, and would mean the doing of an act entirely repugnant to established custom.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *At the 'Āgrayaṇa', there should be no 'Cooking' of the Cloth.*

SŪTRA (37).

THE COOKING IS DONE WHEN THERE IS AN ARTICLE OF FOOD.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the same *Āgrayaṇa*, we read—'The Cloth is a Sacrificial Fee'; and it has been found that the details of the *Anvāhārya* should be performed in connection with the *Cloth*.—The question that arises is—Should 'Cooking' be done to it, or not?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"It should be done, because the Cloth serves the same purpose as the *Anvāhārya*".—In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The 'Cooking' should not be done; because 'Cooking' is done when the thing concerned is *an article of food*,—and the Cloth is not an article of food; nor is it possible for 'Cooking' to be done to it;—hence we conclude that *Cooking* should not be done to the *Cloth*.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *At the 'Āgrayaṇa', no 'Pouring of Clarified Butter' is to be done over the Cloth and the Calf.*

SŪTRA (38).

SO ALSO OF THE 'POURING OF CLARIFIED BUTTER' [THERE SHOULD BE NO PERFORMANCE].

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Āgrayaṇa*, we read—'Cloth is a Fee, a first-born Calf is the Fee'; in connection with this it has been found that the details of the *Anvāhārya* should be performed;—The question that arises now is—Should, or should not, the Pouring of Clarified Butter be done? —The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"it should be done, because they serve the same purpose as the *Anvāhārya*".—In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*So also of the Pouring of Clarified Butter*,—"what?"—*non-performance*. As a matter of fact, the Pouring of Clarified Butter is done over the *Anvāhārya Rice* for the purpose of making it tasty;—the tastefulness of the Cooked Rice (*Anvāhārya*) is helpful in securing the services of the Priests;—in the case of the *Cloth* or the *Calf*, however, there is no purpose to be served by *tastefulness*;—hence there should be no Pouring of Clarified Butter over these two things.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *At the 'Jyotiṣṭoma', the number '112' mentioned in connection with the Fee, applies to one kind only.*

SŪTRA (39).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"THE NUMBER MENTIONED IN PROXIMITY TO THE INJUNCTION OF THINGS SHOULD BE THE QUALIFICATION OF ALL THOSE THINGS."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice laid down in the text—'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice';—in connection with this sacrifice it is said—'The cow, the horse, the mule, the ass, goats, sheep, corns, barley, sesamum, *māṣa*,—112 of that is its Fee'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—(*a*) Is the Fee to consist of 112 of each of the things mentioned?—Or of only one thing?—(*b*) If of only one thing, is it of any one thing, without restriction? or of *Māṣa* only?—(*c*) Or should the number 112 be made up of all the things collectively—or of only one kind of thing?—(*d*) If of a thing of one kind, is it of any kind, without restriction? Or of animals only?—(*e*) If of animals, then of any kind of animals, without any restriction? Or of *cows* only?—All these are the various alternatives that are possible.

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* (A) is as follows:—"In proximity to certain enjoined things;—'What things?'—The *cow* and the rest;—"Where have they been enjoined?"—In connection with the Fee, a number has been prescribed—'112 of it is the Fee';—and this number should pertain to each of the things mentioned, the cow and the rest.—Why?—Because the number has been mentioned as the subordinate factor, and the cow and other things as the principal factor.—How so?—The sentence is not construed as 'there should be 112', but as 'there should be 112 *of that*'; it is only thus that the presence of the term '*tasya*' in the sentence can have any sense; otherwise it would be either meaningless or a mere *reference*. As for the singular number (in '*tasya*') this also refers to the things spoken of in the context, and is a mere reference. Whenever a subordinate factor is laid down in proximity to certain principal factors, the former always varies with each of the principal factors. The mention of the number too serves the useful purpose of giving us the idea that 'the cow and other things have to be of such number'. And there is no ground for making any such discrimination as that of the several things mentioned—one has to be of this number and not the other; in fact, if any one of the things were not of the said number, it would involve the infringement of the Vedic text, in so far as it bears upon that thing. Hence we conclude

that each one of the things mentioned is to be connected with the said number."

SŪTRA (40).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—" BUT INASMUCH AS THE QUALITIES ARE EQUAL, THE NUMBER SHOULD PERTAIN TO ONE ONLY; BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF DIRECT DECLARATION."

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('but') implies the rejection of the above view.

"It is not that there should be 112 of each of the things; in fact, there should be 112 of any *one* of the things only.—Why?—Because *the qualities are equal*; i.e. the cow and other things are connected with the '*Fee*', and so also is the *number*;—the number is not enjoined (predicated) of the *Cow* and other things; what is enjoined is *the Fee as qualified by the number*,—not the Cow and other things.—How so?—If the number were not construed with the 'Fee',—and hence if what were connected with the 'Fee' were the Cow and other things without any fixed number,—then the mention of the number would be entirely useless; and as the term '*tasya*' would be in co-ordination with what is qualified by the number, it would have to take the Plural ending; and if '*tasya*' referred to the Cow and all other things, then the Singular number in '*tasya dvādasha-shatam*' would be inexplicable. For these reasons, the number has to be connected with any one of the things laid down as the means of securing the services of the Priests,—and then alone the fee given for the services can be of the prescribed number.—From all this we conclude that the number pertains to any one thing, not to every one of the things. It is even so that the Singular number (in '*tasya*') becomes justified. *Objection*—'As the number of a word is a mere sign, no significance can attach to the Singular number in the word *tasya*'.—*Answer*: Even though no significance attach to the Singular number, the ending must be one connotative of the same number that is referred to; for instance, when it is said '*brāhmaṇajātiyo na hantavyaḥ*' ('one belonging to the Brāhmaṇa-caste should not be killed'), even though the qualification mentioned is a mere indicative sign, yet it is not spoken of by means of a word with the dual ending—'*brāhmaṇau na hantavyau*' ('*Two Brāhmaṇas* should not be killed').—Says the Opponent—'But in the case of the names of castes or classes, the Plural ending may appear in connection with a single entity, or the Singular ending may appear with several things; but neither with one nor with several things does the Dual number ever appear; so in the case in question, either one thing might be spoken of by a word with the Plural ending, or many things might be spoken of (as they are in the sentence) by a word with the Singular-ending'.—*Answer*: It may be so in the case of the names of castes or classes; but the word '*tasya*' does not denote a caste or class, it denotes only the individual that is in close proximity to itself.—From all this it follows that the number in question (112) must appertain to *any one* of the things mentioned in the text [and there can be no restriction as to which *one* it should be]."

SŪTRA (41).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—" IN FACT, IT SHOULD APPERTAIN TO THAT THING IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO WHICH THE NUMBER HAPPENS TO BE MENTIONED ; BECAUSE SUCH IS THE CONSTRUCTION INDICATED BY SYNTACTICAL CONNECTION."

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* is in answer to the following:—' If the Number is related to one thing, then it will have to be taken as related to any one thing, without any restriction, as no specification is found in the text '.

In answer to this we have the following (which is *Pūrvapakṣa* C):—" It should appertain to that one thing in proximity to which it is mentioned; when the word signifying the number is found in close proximity to the word signifying a particular thing, it is that particular thing with which the number should be connected; because it is words uttered close upon one another that come to be syntactically connected.—How so ?—It is only when a qualifying word is connected with what is in close proximity to itself that it can qualify the idea expressed; it cannot do this when it is far removed from it. In the sentence in question the '*Māṣa*' comes in between the numerical word (112) and the 'Cow' and other things;—and Syntactical Connection is more authoritative than Context;—hence it is the *Māṣa* alone that should be connected with the number (112)."

SUTRA (42).

[PURVAPAKṢA (D)]—" BUT IT CANNOT BE SO CONNECTED; THEY (MĀṢAS) ARE ENJOINED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE OTHER THINGS; HENCE THE NUMBER SHOULD BE CONNECTED WITH ALL."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' (' but ') serves to set aside the above view.

" It is not right to say that it is the *Māṣa* alone that is connected with the number; in fact the number should be taken as pervading over all the things; i.e. the number (112) should be made up by all the things, *Cow* and the rest, taken together.—The number is not connected with the *Māṣa* only, because the *Māṣa* has *been enjoined by the texts enjoining the things in the same manner as those things.*—How so ?—The expression being ' *Tilāshcha māṣāshcha* ', the ' cha ' denotes ' *the Māṣa along with the Tila* ' ; so that the number is connected with the cow and all the other things taken together; as the particle '*cha*' signifies the connection of the things with one another; the nature of the particle '*cha*' is such that when it comes after a word it signifies the connection of the thing spoken of by that word with another thing, by direct denotation, not by Syntactical Connection;—if it were done by Syntactical Connection, it would be done by the particle even

appearing *before* a word (which however is not the case);—the Number however is connected through Syntactical Connection;—if the particle '*cha*' had not the aforesaid meaning, then it would be entirely meaningless; as it could not be construed later on,—after the connection of the Number has been established; in fact, if we construed it as '*tasya dvādashātañcha*', the meaning would be something entirely different,—it would mean '112 and something else also'; and yet no such 'something else' is spoken of in the sentence;—hence the particle '*cha*' must be construed first, and the connection of the number should come after that; the reason for this lying in the fact that words with the same case-ending are more powerful (and should be connected first) than the one that has a different case-ending.—Further, as words with the same case-ending are more powerful, their repetition is quicker, while that of words with different case-endings is more delayed;—words ending with the same First case-ending are more powerful in that they signify their meaning, while the word with the sixth case-ending qualifies something signified by another word.—Hence it follows that all the things (spoken of by the words with the first case-ending, '*gaushcha*' etc.) are connected with the number either as one aggregate whole, or as connected with one another; or it may be right to take all of them in combination with the number. From all this, we conclude that the number is connected with all the things.—'What would be the advantage of this?' The advantage would be that no one of the things would be deprived of its connection with the number. As there is no ground for discriminating among the things, if any one thing were deprived of the connection with the number, the sense of the whole would be rejected in reference to that thing.—The conclusion therefore is that the whole group of the things spoken of—cows and the rest—is connected with the number."

SŪTRA (43).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO MENTION IN THE INJUNCTIVE TEXT, THE CONNECTION SHOULD BE WITH ONE KIND ONLY; AS IN THAT CASE THERE WOULD BE NO INCOMPATIBILITY, IN THE SACRIFICE, WITH THE VEDIC TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the number should be made up by all the things taken together. *Inasmuch as there is no mention in the injunctive text,*—there can be no connection with the making up of the number by all the things mentioned; that is to say, there is no such declaration as—'The number appertains to the group consisting of the Cow and other things'; in fact, any group consisting of the Cow and other things is not even mentioned, which could be referred to by the Pronoun ('*tasya*') in the text;—the Cow and other things have been spoken of by name; hence it is they that are referred to by the Pronoun;—and it has been already explained that the Cow and the rest do not form the predominant factor in the sentence; it is with the 'Fee' that the number is connected;

hence the Pronoun, being a qualification of the number, is to be taken up only as qualifying that number; and in that case it is only right that due significance should be attached to the singular number (in '*tasya*'); thus it is that the particular number has been mentioned and referred to by the Pronoun, as qualifying one of the several kinds of things mentioned; hence from among the various kinds of things mentioned, it is only one that can be taken as qualified by that number, and that one thing must be of one kind only. It is in this sense that the *Sūtra* says '*Ekājātādhikāraḥ*' ['*the connection should be with one kind only*'].

"What would be the advantage of this interpretation?"

The advantage would be that under this explanation there would be no outrage against the Direct Assertion of 'oneness' (in the term '*tasya*'); while under the other view,* the number, connected, through Syntactical Connection, with the substance, would not be conducive to any activity, and, on account of being not conducive to any activity, it could not, through the Context, be connected with the sacrifice, in the sense that '112 is the Fee of that sacrifice'.

From all this we conclude that it is 112 of the thing of only one kind that constitutes the *Fee* in question.

SŪTRA (44).

THE MEANING OF WORDS ALSO SHOULD BE AS IN COMMON PARLANCE.

Bhāṣya.

Further, the matter should be treated in accordance with common parlance: In common parlance, whenever a numeral term is used without a qualification, the notion that arises is that of a thing of one kind only.—"How so?"—It is so because otherwise no usage would be possible; unless there is one particular kind, the number that enters into the conception of all things is the '*Parārdha*' (Highest conceivable Number) along with all the other numbers;—and the '*Parārdha*' is spoken of in terms of the intermediate numbers;—for those people who connect the number with any single thing, the Number comes in as pertaining to that one thing;—in this case, that one thing related to the number has to be pointed out, or the thing mentioned in the Context has to be taken (as related to the number), or some such other thing should be accepted as happens to serve some useful purpose.—In the case in question, there are things spoken of in the context that belong to several kinds (species); of these only one should be connected with the number; just as when it is said 'give a hundred to these two', what is meant is a hundred of only one kind of thing, not of several kinds of things, such as 'Substance', 'Quality', 'Action', 'Constituent Part', and so forth.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *In the text 'tasya dvādasha shatam dakṣiṇā' ['112 of that is the Fee'], the number pertains to the animal 'Cow'.*

SŪTRA (45).

[SIDDHĀNTA (a)]—THE NUMBER SHOULD PERTAIN TO ANIMALS; BECAUSE IT IS THESE THAT ARE, FROM THEIR ORIGIN, COUNTED SEPARATELY.

Bhāṣya.

It has been seen that the number pertains to a thing of one kind.—Now in regard to the question as to whether the number appertains to one of the *animals* or to one of the grains,—the *Pūrvapakṣa* (a) would be that there can be no restriction (it may be one or the other).—In answer to that we have the *Siddhānta* put forward in the *Sūtra*.

The number should pertain to one of the animals;—"why?"—*because, it is these that are, from their origin, counted separately.* In practice, animals are always counted on the basis of their separate existence from their very birth;—when, for instance, people speak of 'a thing purchased with *five horses*' or 'purchased with *five cows*';—there is no such natural counting in the case of corns, in whose case the number refers either to *nigada* (? mention) or to the measure; it is never said 'purchased with five *māṣa*-grains', what is said is 'purchased with five *Āḍhakas*, or *Droṇas* or *Kudavas* or *Khāris* of *Māṣa*'; hence so long as the measures (*āḍhaka* and the rest) are not mentioned, the sentence (mentioning the number) remains incomplete, and wanting in an essential part, and as such it cannot supply any right knowledge of any thing.

Question—"Why cannot the securing of the services of the Priests be regarded as being done with the *māṣa*-grains counted separately on the basis of the grains being separate from their very origin?"

Answer—When it is declared that 'the Fee consists of 112', what is laid down is the peculiar feature of what is already known as the price of services rendered; and as a matter of fact, 112 grains of *Vrīhi* or any other corn can never form the wages of the Priests; there are three forms in which wages are paid—(1) in the form of services rendered in return, (2) in the form of the produce of labour, and (3) in the form of words. (1) '112 *māṣa-grains*' cannot be the wages in the form of services rendered; when workers work at a sacrifice, they receive in return at least a 'quarter' per day;—(2) as for the produce of labour, no one ever recognizes the grains to be like the result that accrues from the work done by the priests;—(3) as for words, they only tend to lay down the exact measure of the wages that are already there.—In a case where even a 'quarter' per day is not

received, it is not a '*Dakṣiṇā* (Fee) at all; because it does not make the man '*Dakṣa*', 'alert' [and 'dakṣiṇā', etymologically, is that which makes one '*dakṣa*']. It is possible that a man may work for another throughout the day either through love or for some other reason,—but never through being tempted by the prospect of receiving 112 grains of *Vrihi-corn*.

"It is just possible that some one may do a work on being tempted by the prospect of receiving 112 grains of *Vrihi-corn*; would that be the 'Fee' in his case?"

No, we reply. A *dakṣiṇā* (Fee) is that which makes one '*dakṣa*', alert;—and *alertness* is a form of strength;—that which does not produce *satisfaction* (on being eaten) cannot be regarded as *imparting strength*;—hence that which does not produce satisfaction (on being eaten) cannot be regarded as '*Dakṣiṇā*' (Fee); while what is spoken of in the sentence in question (laying down the Fee) is the high degree of satisfaction produced (by what is laid down as the Fee).

"Even 112 grains of *Vrihi-corn* do bring about a certain degree of strength."

The answer to this is that the term 'strength' is a relative one; one and the same man may be 'strong' in relation to one man, and 'devoid of strength' (weak) in relation to another; hence in so far as there is no *satisfaction*, there is *absence of strength*;—it is by *eating* that a man gains in strength; and the strength is brought about after the satisfaction produced by eating. From all this it follows that that substance alone can be regarded as 'wages' which produces satisfaction, and that alone can be a '*dakṣiṇā*' (Fee);—and the character of 'Fee' being secured thus far, anything more than that can come in only on the strength of direct declarations (in the Veda).—At one of the ectypal sacrifices—the *Ṛtapēya*,—even the *Soma-cup* which can impart only a little strength, has been laid down in place of the 'Fee', and this is accepted on the strength of the direct declaration to that effect. As regards *Animals*, they are capable of imparting strength in the most important form; consequently when the animals are there, the number in question cannot be connected with the *Vrihi* and other grains.

SŪTRA (46).

[PURVAPAKṢA (*b*)]—"THERE SHOULD BE NO RESTRICTION; BECAUSE THERE IS NO GROUND FOR DISCRIMINATION."

Bhāṣya.

"If it is to be 112 *animals*, then there can be no restriction among the *cow* and other animals mentioned,—of any one of them, there may be 112. Things would be much simpler if there were no restriction; it would also facilitate the performance of the sacrifice; and the injunction of it therefore would have its scope very much widened."

SŪTRA (47).

[SIDDHĀNTA—(b)].—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE THE COWS; AS THEY ARE THE MOST USEFUL.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view that there should be no restriction.

It should, in fact, be 112 *cows*.—"Why?"—*Because they are the most useful*; as a matter of fact, cows are very useful; they are of the greatest use; i.e. they serve a most useful purpose;—hence if cows are given, it will confer a great benefit on the Priests; and it is essential that benefits should be conferred on them;—the Priests are rendering the greatest help to the Sacrificer, and it is the custom of all good men to render help to those who are rendering help to oneself. So that the custom of good men becomes followed if a large number of useful animals are given;—and *cows* are very useful;—hence it follows that it is 112 *cows* that should be given.—*Horses* would be more useful,—if the giving, receiving, and selling of them had not been forbidden; but there is the Vedic text—'One should not give animals with manes, one should not receive animals with two rows of teeth';—there is also the *Smṛti-text*—'One should not sell the horse'.—From all this it follows that it is 112 *cows* that should be given.

SŪTRA (48).

BECAUSE OF RECOGNITION.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the number should pertain to Cows:—"For what reason?"—*Because of recognition*; when one sets about making up the prescribed number by bringing together the things spoken of in the sentence, the first that are thought of are the *Cows*; and being thus the first to be *recognised*, they become connected with the number; and there is no incongruity in this;—and when the Cows have become so connected, the Horse and the other animals do not become connected with it; because it is only one kind of thing that should be connected (as explained above), and that has been already connected (in the shape of the Cows).—Hence we conclude that the number should pertain to the Cows.

SŪTRA (49).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE (OF THE SAME CONCLUSION).

Bhāṣya.

There is an indicative text pointing to the same conclusion:—"What is that indicative text?"—It is this—'*Sahasram dakṣiṇā, sahasram stotrīyā*

yāvadasya sāhasrasya uttarādharā gaurgavi pratiṣṭhitā tāvadasmāt lokādasau lokaḥ';—this clearly indicates *cows* as to be given.—Similarly there is the following text—'*Tām vā ētām shabalīm samāmananti idē rantē havyē kāmyē chandrē jyotiraditi sarasvati mahi vishruti ētā tē aghnyē nāmāni dēvēbhyo mā sukṛtam kṛtāt*'; here we have the names of the Cow;—and these two texts taken together indicate that—(1) what is spoken of as 'the thousand' is the *Fee*, and (2) then follow the names of the cow, which shows that it is the *Cow* that is meant to be the 'Fee' spoken of in the first text.

From this also it is clear that the number pertains to *Cows*.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *The cows as 'Fee' should be divided among the Priests.*

SŪTRA (50).

THE GIVING SHOULD BE BY APPORTIONMENT, AS THE GIFTS ARE DISTINCT.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the Cow and other things are to be given as the Fee: it has been established that the number prescribed as to be given relates to *Cows*.

The question that arises now is—Should the Sacrificer give the Fee to each of the Priests after apportioning the share prescribed for each? Or should the apportionment be made by the company (of priests) itself [and the Sacrificer should give it as a whole]?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"There should be no restriction; the Fee may be given either after apportionment, or without apportionment; because all that is enjoined is that 'the Fee *should be given*', and nothing is said as to whether it should be given after apportionment or without apportionment. Hence there should be no restriction."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The Fee should be given after apportionment; it is the very nature of the *gift* that one should renounce his own ownership over the thing given and should bring about the ownership of another person;—and in the very nature of things, this should be done by the Sacrificer himself, as explained under the Sūtra—'*Tasmāt svayamprayogē syāt*' (?)—When a definite share of the Fee has been assigned (by the Text) to a particular priest, it cannot become related to him until it is definitely apportioned to him; hence the person who does this apportionment is the person who does the *giving*;—and it is necessary that the *giving* should be done by the Sacrificer; hence it follows that it is after making the apportionment that the Sacrificer assigns the shares. That this should be done follows from the fact that *the gifts are distinct*. Unless there has been apportionment, the recipient cannot connect himself with his own share.—From all this it follows that the Fee should be given after apportionment.

SŪTRA (51).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS 'HIRING', AS IN THE ORDINARY WORLD.

Bhāṣya.

Then again, the gift is for the purpose of 'hiring', and not a mere act of *Dharma*; and what is meant for 'hiring' should be a matter of contract

between the employer and the employee. If, then, this contract were entered into with the group of Priests,—and this group were to do the apportionment,—then the contract would not have been with the employer (Master of the sacrifice); and hence it would not be a case of 'hiring' at all. Just as in the ordinary world, when something is given to wood-carriers and other labourers, it is the woodcarriers that enter into a contract with the employer, and the employer assigns to them the wages after due apportionment—'this is for you,—this is for you'; this should be understood to be the case in the present instance also.—From this it follows that the Fee should be given after apportionment.

SŪTRA (52).

THE VEDA ALSO INDICATES APPORTIONMENT.

Bhāṣya.

Then again, the Veda also indicates apportionment, inasmuch as there is a *mantra* that speaks of Apportionment—'*Tutho vo vishvavedā vibhajatu*'; also there is the text '*Kṛṣṇājinēna vitrāsya dakṣiṇām dadāti*', —and again, '*Agnīdhe'grē dadāti, agnimukhāneva pitṝn prīṇāti, brahmaṇē dadāti, prasṛtēbhyo dadāti, prasṛtyai hotrē dadāti nēṣṭrē dadāti havirdhāna āsīnēbhya adhvaryubhyo dadāti, udgātṛbhyo dadāti, antaḥsadasi āsīnēbhyo yathāshraddham prāsarpakebhyo dadāti*'.—In all this we find indications of apportionment.—Hence it follows that the Fee should be given after apportionment.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *At the Jyotiṣṭoma, the Fee is to be apportioned in accordance with the titles of the Priests.*

SŪTRA (53).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"IT SHOULD BE EQUAL; AS THERE IS NO DECLARATION."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the Fee has been laid down as 'The Cow, the Horse, the Mule, etc.';—and it has been established that the Fee is to be given after apportionment.—The question that arises now is—Is the apportionment to be equal? Or in accordance with the work done? Or in accordance with the word (title)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"*The apportionment should be equal, because there is no declaration*—of any discrimination. In a case where no discrimination is mentioned, the apportionment must be equal.—How so?—The whole can be given to one man, if nothing has to be given to any other person; therefore no one man should receive so much as to leave nothing to be assigned to another; no special share should be given; so to each one. Hence, inasmuch as no discrimination has been declared, the fee should be divided equally."

SŪTRA (54).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCE IN THE WORK [IT SHOULD NOT BE EQUAL]."

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*' ('but') signifies the rejection of the above view.

"The apportionment cannot be equal; there should be inequality due to the work done by each man; one who does more work always receives higher wages.—Hence there must be inequality based upon the nature of the work done."

SŪTRA (55).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN THE MATTER OF WAGES, THEY SHOULD BE UNEQUAL; THEIR TITLES ARE DIVERSE; INASMUCH AS THERE IS 'HIRING' OF ALL, THE INEQUALITY CANNOT BE BASED UPON WORK: SPECIALLY AS WE FIND A DISTINCTION MADE, AS IN THE CASE OF THE ABHYUDAYA'.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that there should be inequality due to work; it should be due to the help rendered; and the amount of help rendered is known

from the titles (of the priests); hence *the inequality should be due to the titles; so that in the matter of wages, they should be unequal; their titles are diverse;* some are called '*Halfists*', some 'Tertiarists', some 'Quarterists'; those having half are '*halfists*'.—"How do they have *half*?"—When a *half* is given to them. Similarly 'Tertiarists' and 'Quarterists'. It is with these titles that these priests are mentioned in the injunctive text laying down their Initiation. Inasmuch as there is 'hiring' (of all these priests), the said titles would be inexplicable if the difference in the shares were due to the work done by them.—"Where do you find such a distinction as the one described?"—We find it in the '*Abhyudaya*'; we take this term '*abhyudaga*' as standing for the *Dvādashāha* sacrifice which has '*abhyudaya*',—i.e. prosperity—for its result. The said distinction is found in the following passage—'The *Adhvaryu*, having initiated the Master of the House, initiates the *Brahman*; then the *Udgātṛ*, then the *Hotṛ*; then the *Pratiprasthātṛ*, having initiated the *Adhvaryu*, initiates the *Halfists*—viz.: the *Brahmāṇā-chchhamsin* related to the *Brahman*, the *Prastotṛ* related to the *Udgātṛ*, the *Maitravaruṇa* related to the *Hotṛ*;—then the *Nēṣṭṛ*, having initiated the *Pratiprasthātṛ*, initiates the *Tertiarists*—viz.: the *Agnīdhra* related to the *Brahman*, the *Pratihartṛ* related to the *Udgātṛ*, the *Achchhāvāka* related to the *Hotṛ*;—then the *Unnētṛ*, having initiated the *Nēṣṭṛ*, initiates the *Quarterists*—viz.: the *Potṛ* related to the *Brahman*, the *Subrahmaṇya* related to the *Udgātṛ*, the *Grāvastut* related to the *Hotṛ*;—thereupon the *Unnētṛ* is initiated by some one else, or by a religious student sent by his Teacher'. Here we find the priests referred to, in connection with the *Dvādashāha* sacrifice, as 'Halfists', 'Tertiarists', and 'Quarterists';—and this reference to them by these titles would be justifiable only if, at the original sacrifice (Archetype), the shares given to these men were actually in accordance with these titles.—We conclude therefore that, on account of their being named 'Halfists' and the rest, the diversity in the Fee received by them should be regarded as based upon these *titles*.

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *At the 'Ēkāha' sacrifice called 'Bhū', the text 'Tasya dhēnuḥ' excludes all the things laid down as constituting the 'Sacrificial Fee'.*

SŪTRA (56).

[PURVAPAKṢA]—"THE PHRASE 'TASYA DHĒNUḤ' SHOULD BE TAKEN TO MEAN THE EXCLUSION OF THE COWS; BECAUSE AT THE ARCHETYPE, THEY ARE ENJOINED SEPARATELY; ON THE GROUND OF SIMILARITY, THERE SHOULD BE MODIFICATION OF THAT ALONE; JUST AS THE 'IṢṬI' IS MODIFIED BY THE QUALITATIVE TERM."

Bhāṣya.

There is the following text—'*Athāiṣa bhūrvaishvadēvaḥ trivṛdēva sarvastasya vishvavatyastotrīyā dhēnur dakṣiṇā*'—[where the '*dhēnu*', milch cow, is prescribed as the Sacrificial Fee at the *Bhū-sacrifice*, which has the *Jyotiṣṭoma* for its Archetype].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does the 'Milch cow' (laid down here) exclude (from this *Bhū-sacrifice*) the 'cows' only—or the whole lot of things laid down as the 'fee' (in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*)?—In this connection, what is to be considered is—At the archetype, do the several things mentioned form so many distinct 'fees'? Or do they form one 'fee' collectively?—Hence we deal with the *Adhikaraṇa* by combining the two questions—At the archetype do the several things form so many distinct 'fees' severally,—and hence the 'milch cow' excludes the 'cows' only? Or do they collectively form a single 'Fee',—and hence the 'milch cow' excludes the whole lot?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"When we find the Veda asserting '*Tasya dhēnūḥ*' ['The milch cow is the Fee for it'], we conclude that the *Milch cow* excludes the 'cows'; with this view we think that the things laid down as 'Fee' in connection with the Archetype are to be taken severally.—'What do you mean by their *being taken severally*?'—It means that from among the 'cows' and other things, each one by itself forms the 'fee'.—'How so?'—In connection with the Archetype the text is '*Gauscha ashvashcha ashvatarashcha dakṣiṇā*' ['The Cow and the Horse and the Mule are the Fee']; where the mention of the 'Cow' and the rest shows that the term 'Fee' is wholly applicable to each of the animals mentioned; because what are

mentioned are the *cow and the rest*, not their *combination*. As for the term '*cha*' ('and'), it only *signifies* aggregation, it does not *enjoin* the aggregation;—and it takes in (signifies) the aggregation only for the purpose of qualifying another term; if the term 'cha' did the *enjoining* of *aggregation*, then such aggregation would be connected with the qualities of the action concerned; so that, just as we have the expression '*Samuchchayaḥ shobhanaḥ*' ['Aggregation is good'], '*Samuchchayo draṣṭavyaḥ*' ['Aggregation should be recognised'],—so would we also have such expressions as '*Cha shobhanaḥ*' '*Cha draṣṭavyaḥ*'! And just as the genitive ending is used in connection with the aggregating numbers,—in such expressions as '*dhavakhadirayoḥ samuchchayaḥ*' ['aggregation of the *Dhava* and *Khadira*'], so would there be also in such expressions as '*Dhavaḥ Khadirashcha*'!—Neither of these contingencies however takes place; hence it follows that the term '*cha*' does not lay down *aggregation*.—It is only when the Vedic text actually lays down a certain thing that there can be some reason for connecting it syntactically with the sentence. Further, Syntactical Connection is reasonably possible only with a factor that is laid down by Direct Assertion, and not with an *aggregate* which is only indirectly indicated by the *cow* and other things.—For these reasons, the sentence should be construed as '*gauḥ dakṣiṇā, ashvo dakṣiṇa*' ['The Cow is the Fee, the Horse is the Fee'], and so forth. What actually happens is that first of all the Cow and other things are indicated and *the character of being the Fee* is enjoined (predicated) in regard to them; so that this character being a subordinate factor must vary with each of the several principal factors mentioned. In this explanation, the presence of the term '*cha*' also becomes justified—'The cow is the fee, *and* the Horse is the Fee, etc., etc.'—and not in the form 'The *cow along with the Horse* is the Fee' or 'the *aggregate* of the Cow and other things is the Fee'.

"Now then, if *the character of being the Fee* belongs to each of the things *severally*, then the *Cow* comes to have *the character of being the Fee*; and then, it is for the purpose of qualifying it still further, that it has been asserted that 'the *milch* cow is the Sacrificial Fee', meaning that 'the *cow* that is to be given as the Fee should be *milch*'; this leaves unmodified all the other things that have been mentioned as the 'Fee', in whose case, the General Law would be obeyed if they were given exactly in the form in which they have been mentioned in connection with the Archetype. It is by means of a word that the further qualification—'being milch'—has been asserted in connection with the Cow; it is the *Cow* alone that can be '*dhēnu*' ('milch cow').—*Just as the 'Iṣṭi' is modified by the qualitative term*; i.e. in the expression '*Sauryam nirvapēt*' ('should offer to *Sūrya*') what is meant is that 'connection with *Sūrya*' should be established;—the idea meant being that this *connection* is to be of the *substance*; what the expression actually does is to lay down the connection as to be with the act of *offering* only; and what the term 'offering' does is to restrict the procedure of the *Iṣṭi*, on the basis of the *performance as accompanied by the offering*. Similarly in the case in question also, what the term '*dhēnu*' ('milch cow') as expressing a quality of the Cow does is to modify the Fee-character of the Cow only; so that no other Fee becomes modified."

SŪTRA (57).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, [THERE SHOULD BE EXCLUSION] OF ALL; ON ACCOUNT OF ITS CONNECTION WITH THE SACRIFICE, THE PURPOSE OF THE FEE IS ONE ONLY; THE SUBORDINATE FACTORS ALSO SERVE ONLY ONE PURPOSE; HENCE WHAT IS LAID DOWN WOULD SERVE THE SAME PURPOSE AT THE ECTYPE WHICH THE OTHER THINGS SERVE AT THE ARCHETYPE; AND IT IS THROUGH THEIR FUNCTIONS THAT THERE IS CONNECTION BETWEEN THE ACTIONS (AND THE PRIESTS).

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

What we assert is that the 'milch cow' excludes all the things that have been mentioned as constituting the 'Sacrificial Fee'; and hence we hold that all these things constitute the 'Fee' *collectively.*

"What is the meaning of *all the things constituting the Fee collectively*?"

The meaning is that the term 'Fee' is not to be construed with every one of the things mentioned;—it does not mean that 'The Cow is the Fee', 'the Horse is the Fee', 'the Mule is the Fee',—but that 'the cow and other things are the Fee';—the name 'Fee' is not predicated of the 'Cow' and also of the other things.—'The things known as *Cow, Horse,* and so forth are to be regarded as *Fee*';—because in that case, the term 'Fee' would have to be in the Plural number, as it would be denoting its relationship to all the things simultaneously; and the form of the sentence should have been 'the Cow and the rest are the Fees'—'*gavādayo dakṣiṇāḥ*';—just as in the expression '*Agnīṣomau dēvatē*' ['*Agni and Soma* are the deities'), or '*Prāṇāpānau abhisamabhavatām*' ['The *Prāṇa* and the *Apāna* came into existence']; because the gender and number of adjectives are determined by the gender and number of the substratum in which the qualities expressed by the adjectives subsist.

"What then is the right construction?"

The right construction is that 'the Cow and the rest' are predicated of the 'Fee': 'What is the *Fee*?—Cow and the rest'.—The term '*dakṣiṇā*' ('Fee') is derived from the root '*dakṣa*', to 'encourage'; so that the *Dakṣiṇā* is *that which encourages*; this quality (that of being an *encourager*) is one only:—it is this one quality that is meant to be emphasised as the principal factor,—and 'the Cow and the rest' come in as qualifying (and hence subordinate to) that one quality;—the principle is that the gender and number of words denoting qualities (i.e. adjectives) are determined by the gender and number of the substratum of those qualities;—and not that the gender and number of words denoting substances are determined by the gender and number of the qualities subsisting in those

substances; for instance, we have the form '*Vishvēdēvā dēvatā*' ['The *Vishvēdēvas* are the *deity*'].—Thus then, in the case in question, the question being—what is the 'Fee'?—the answer is '*gaushcha, ashvashcha, ashvatarashcha*' ['The Cow and the Horse and the Mule'].

Then again, it is the term 'Fee'—and not 'Cow' and the rest—that is connected with the *act of giving* to the Priests;—the purpose too of all Fees is one and the same—viz.: the securing of the services of the Priests;—and it is once for all that these Priests become amenable to render service; so that there would be no need of 'securing their services' over again;—the purpose served by *the Cow and other things* also is one and the same,—that of constituting the *Fee*.

Thus then, inasmuch as all the things mentioned constitute the Fee collectively, the 'Milch Cow' should be regarded as laid down in connection with the ectypal *Bhū-sacrifice*, for that same purpose which is served at the Archetypal Sacrifice by the prescribed Fee; so that the *Milch cow* serves the same purpose that is served at the Archetype by 'the cow and other things';—because it is in connection with the 'Sacrifice' that we find it laid down in the sentence '*Tasya dhēnurdakṣiṇā*', where '*tasya*' stands for the *sacrifice*;—so that, when this *milch cow* becomes connected with the sacrifice (by being given as the *Sacrificial Fee*), all those things which have been laid down in connection with the Archetype and which would therefore have come into the sacrifice by virtue of the implications of the General Law, become excluded; and what the Priests become connected with (presented with)—*by virtue of their connection with the Sacrificial acts*—is that same *Milch cow* which has been directly laid down in connection with the *Bhū-sacrifice* itself.

Then again, in the sentence '*Gaushcha ashvashcha . . . . dakṣiṇā*', the particle '*cha*' directly expresses the idea that the *cow is to be taken along with the other things*,—while the fact that the *cow* (alone by itself) is the 'Fee' is expressed by Syntactical Connection;—and *direct expression* is more authoritative than *Syntactical Connection*; hence it follows that the connection of the 'Cow' with the particle '*cha*' comes first, and it is only later on that its connection with the 'Fee' comes in; so that what become connected with the character of the 'Fee' are the Cow and other things taken together collectively.—From all this it follows that the *Milch cow* excludes the entire set of the Fee in the shape of *the Cow and other things*.

SŪTRA (58).

INASMUCH AS THE INJUNCTIONS ARE WITHOUT A SUBSTRATUM, THE MATTER SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY AN INDICATIVE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued above that—"Just as the Iṣṭi is modified by the qualitative term [so should it be in the case in question]".—The answer to that is as follows—In the case of the sacrifices, (*a*) *Āgnēya*, (*b*) *Upāṁshuyāja* and (*c*) *Agnīṣomiya* and of (*d*) *Saurya*, (*e*) *Āryamaṇa*, (*f*) *Prājā-*

patya and *Nairṛti*,—there is no one purpose to be served by the injunctions, on which the injunction of the Ectype could subsist; and in that case it may be said that the Ectype takes in the procedure of any one act.—And when the question arises—whose procedure it will take in?—it is only right that the matter should be determined by an indicative text. In the case in question however, no reason is given,—the purpose served by the Cow and other things is one only, that of *being the Fee*;—and in regard to this purpose the *Milch cow* has been directly laid down;—and hence it may certainly exclude those that can come in only by virtue of the General Law.

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *In the sentence 'Yasya somamapaharēyuḥ, etc.', the phrase 'ēkām gām' excludes only the original number pertaining to the Cow.*

SŪTRA (59).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE TERMS 'ONE' AND FIVE' ARE LIKE THE TERM 'MILCH COW'."

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'If they take away one's *Soma*, one should give *one cow* as the Sacrificial Fee; if it is burnt, *five cows*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—The 'one' and 'five,' *cows* that are spoken of here,—do they exclude the entire set of things prescribed as the Sacrificial Fee? Or the *cows* only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*The terms 'one' and 'five' are like the term 'Milch cow'*;—i.e. just as the term 'milch cow' excludes the entire set of things, so should the terms 'one cow' and 'five cows' also do; because the connection of these latter is laid down directly in the text; hence these serve all the purposes that would be served by the 'Fee' laid down in connection with the Archetype; hence these latter, being admissible only through implication, become excluded."

This *Adhikaraṇa* shall be left incomplete at this point [its *Siddhānta* being postponed till *Sūtra* 62]. In the meantime, we proceed with another *Adhikaraṇa*.

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *At the 'Sādyaskra', the 'three-year-old calf' excludes all the other things that have been laid down as the price to be paid for the Soma.*

SŪTRA (60).

THE 'THREE-YEAR-OLD CALF' ALSO.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Sādyaskra* we read—'The entire *three-year-old calf* is the price paid for the *Soma*, for those who vie with each other'. The things laid down (in connection with the archetype) as the price to be paid for the *Soma*,—which are admissible in the *Sādyaskra* also by virtue of the General Law,—are mentioned in the text—'He buys it with a

she-goat, buys it with *gold*, buys it with a *bull*, buys it with the *Horse's hoof*, buys it with *cloth* ', and so forth.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does the 'three-year-old calf' exclude the *Bull* only? Or all those things that have been laid down as the price of *Soma*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"It excludes the *Bull* only.—Why?—Because it is a male of the bovine species; on the basis of the similarity of being a male of the bovine species, one such male has been laid down (in place of another similar male).—' How do you know that the term *tri-vatsa* (three-year-old calf) lays down a *male member*?'—That it is so is clear from the term '*sāṇḍa*', 'with testicles', 'entire'.—Hence we conclude that it excludes the *Bull* only."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The '*three-year-old calf*' *also*;—'also' what?—*also excludes the entire set of things mentioned as the price to be paid for Soma*; because it is directly connected with the act of 'buying', and hence excludes all that comes in only by virtue of the General Law; hence it must be taken as setting aside the entire set of things mentioned as the price to be paid for *Soma*.

SŪTRA (61).

WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS ALSO POINTING TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

This same conclusion is pointed to by an indicative text?—"What is that text?"—In connection with another *Sādyaskra*, it is said—'*Strī gauḥ somakrayaṇī vyāvṛttā hyēṣāṃ spardhā*' ['The price to be paid for the *Soma* is a female member of the bovine species, because their rivalry has ceased']; when all the other things mentioned as the price of *Soma* have been excluded,—and the *Cow* alone is left as fulfilling the purpose of the *Buying of Soma*,—with what could this latter vie? [Hence it is in this sense that the 'Rivalry' is spoken of as having 'ceased']. Otherwise, if all the others had not been excluded by the *Cow*, the rivalry of the whole group would be there; and when the rivalry would be still there, it would not be right to say that 'their rivalry has ceased'.—From this it follows that the Cow does exclude all the rest.—The 'three-year-old- calf' also is laid down in the same manner as 'the female member of the bovine species' (Cow); hence this calf also should be taken as excluding all the other things.

Or, the indication of the text quoted may be explained in the following manner:—If the 'three-year-old Calf' excludes all other things, then alone could 'the female member of the bovine species' be left alone at the other *Sādyaskra*, because it will have set aside the said Calf; and then alone could it be right to say that 'the rivalry has ceased'. Otherwise, if the said *Calf* had excluded the *Bull* only, then by excluding that *Calf* alone the 'female member of the bovine species' would only become one of the group of things mentioned as the price of *Soma*, and hence the 'rivalry'

would still be there; and in that case it would not be right to say that 'the rivalry has ceased'.

From all this it follows that the 'three-year-old calf' must be taken as excluding the entire set of things (laid down as the price to be paid for the *Soma*).

The above explanation of *Sūtras* 60 and 61 as embodying Adhikaraṇa (17) brings in a separate topic right in the middle of *Adhikaraṇa* (16) [which is not quite right]; hence we are explaining the two Sūtras 60 and 61 in a different manner (as forming part of the *Pūrvapakṣa of Adhikaraṇa* 16 itself):—"For the following reasons also, the term 'one' and 'five' should exclude the entire set of things mentioned as the 'Sacrificial Fee'—(*a*) *The 'three-year-old-Calf' also* (Sū. 60) and (*b*) *we find indicative texts also pointing to the same conclusion* (Sū. 61); that is to say, (*a*) the 'three-year-old-calf', being mentioned in the same manner as the 'one cow' and the 'five cows', should be taken as excluding all the other things, and (*b*) it is only thus that the assertion that 'the rivalry has ceased' would be justifiable". *

[*In answer to the Pūrvapakṣa thus set forth in Sūtras* 59, 60, *and* 61, *we have the following Siddhānta*]—

SŪTRA (62).

[SIDDHĀNTA *of Adhikaraṇa* 16]—IN REALITY, ONLY ONE SET (BECOMES EXCLUDED), BECAUSE THE NUMBER IS CONNECTED WITH COWS ALONE, BY VIRTUE OF THE PARTICULAR GENDER.

Bhāṣya.

* This is the answer to the view (Pūrvapakṣa stated in Sū. 59) that was left unanswered.

It has been asserted that the 'one' and the 'five' exclude the entire set of things mentioned as the 'Fee'.—But that is not right; because *it is only one set* of things that becomes excluded,—i.e. the only one set of 'cows',—the 'Horse' and the rest are not excluded. As a matter of fact, the specific assertion that 'one should be given, five should be given' pertains to *cows*.—Why so?—Because the connection is with *the number as qualified by the cow*; the sentence 'gives one, gives five' is not to be construed as—'gives *one fee*, gives *five fees*', but as 'gives *one cow*, (five cows)'; because the connection between the cow and the number is the principal factor and hence more worthy of acceptance.

Further, the connection of the *number* with the term 'cow' is directly perceptible, while that with the term 'Fee' is remote and indirect, by reason of the intervention of the word 'cow'; so that the term 'cow' becomes taken

in its primary sense; in the other case, recourse would have to be had to indirect indication,—the word 'Cow' being taken as standing for 'one cow, and also Horse, etc.' Thus then, by reason of the particular gender (the Feminine in '*ēkām*') the number applies to the *cows* only; so that all the rest, Horse, etc., being not excluded, these are to be given as at the Archetype, whereby the General Law becomes honoured,—and the terms 'one' and 'five' exclude the cows only from among the things laid down as 'Fee' in connection with the Archetype. [That is, the text in question specifying the number of cows as *one* and *five*, sets aside that *number* which relates to the cows in connection with the archetype; so that at the *Sādyaskra*, only one or five cows are to be given, not the same number of them as are given at the Archetype].

Adhikaraṇa (18): *At the 'Ashvamēdha' the 'Two Lamp-posts' exclude the Adhvaryu's share of the regular Fee.*

SŪTRA (63).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"So also the 'two Lamp-posts"—if this be urged [then the answer is as in Sūtra 64].

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Ashvamēdha*, we read—'Gives two golden Lamp-posts to the *Adhvaryu*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Do the 'two Lamp-posts' exclude the entire set of things laid down as the Sacrificial Fee? Or of the Adhvaryu's share only?

"Why should this question arise?"

If the term 'two lamp-posts' is construed with the root 'to give', then it excludes the whole set of things laid down as the Sacrificial Fee;—while if it is construed with the '*Adhvaryu*', then it excludes only the *Adhvaryu's* portion.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"It excludes the whole set; hence we interpret the sentence by construing the term 'two lamp-posts' with the verb 'to give'.—'Why?'—By connecting the verb 'to give' thus, it is Direct Assertion that is honoured; while by connecting the lamp-posts with the '*Adhvaryu*', it is the Syntactical Connection that is honoured.—Then again, by its inherent force, the accusative ending in the word '*prākāshau*' ('lamp-posts') becomes connected with the verb, not with the noun; for this reason also it is connected, in the sentence, with the verb 'to give'. If it were connected with the *Adhvaryu*, the term '*Adhvaryu*' would have taken the Genitive Ending. For this reason the 'lamp-posts' are construed with the verb 'to give'. The two 'lamp-posts' are enjoined (predicated) as qualifying the verb 'to give'; so that the act of *giving* cannot be qualified by the *Adhvaryu*; for if it did, there would be a syntactical split.—Further, if, even in the presence of a qualification, the act of *giving* were regarded as unqualified and construed, as such, with another word, then, in actual action, it would come in that same unqualified form. In fact, a qualifying word, even though used, does not qualify its object, if it is incapable of doing so. Hence the term '*Adhvaryu*' here stands for the person who *sets up the sacrifice* ('*adhvaram yunakti*').—From all this it follows that the 'two lamp-posts' exclude the entire set of things mentioned as 'Sacrificial Fee'."

SŪTRA (64).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, INASMUCH AS IT SERVES THE PURPOSE OF A PART OF THE FEE,—AND AS AT THE ARCHETYPE, THEY APPEAR IN SEPARATE FORMS,—THE MODIFICATION OF THE ACCESSORY SHOULD BE ONLY TO THAT EXTENT.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*api tu*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

As a matter of fact, the *two Lamp-posts* serve the purpose that is served by only a part of the Fee', not that served by the entire Fee; the shares too of the *Adhvaryu* and others (at the Archetype) are separate—it being known that 'this is the portion of the *Adhvaryu*, these the portions of others'. —For this reason the *modification of the accessory should be only to that extent.*—"What is the meaning of '*guṇēdantāvikāra*?"—'*Guṇēdantā*' means the '*idantā*', *extent*, of the '*guṇa*', *accessory*;—'*idantā*' is the character of being '*idam*', '*this*';—'*guṇēdantavikāra*' thus is the '*vikāra*', *modification*, of the '*guṇēdantā*', *extent of the accessory.* This means that the *two Lamp-posts* exclude the *Adhvaryu's* share of the Fee.—"How so?"—'*Hiraṇmayau prākāshau*' ('two golden lamp-posts') is one sentence; here we have not got the Nominative ending, nor is there any connection with the term 'Fee', by reason of which the lamp-posts could serve the purposes of the 'Fee'.—"What then is it?"—It is the Accusative ending and is connected with the verb 'to give';—hence there is the one sentence in the form—'*Hiraṇmayau prākāshau adhvaryavē dadāti*' ['Gives two golden Lamp-posts to the *Adhvaryu*']; so that the two Lamp-posts are connected with the act of *giving*, in which the *Adhvaryu* is the recipient, and hence what they exclude is the Adhvaryu's share in the gift.—Or, we may take the sentence as laying down a new act of giving as qualified by all the qualifications; and as it serves a visible purpose (of securing the Priest's services), it would set aside the other means of securing the services of the *Adhvaryu.*

It has been argued that—"What is enjoined is the connection of the *two Lamp-posts* with the act of *giving*;—by accepting this construction we honour the Direct Assertion".—But this Direct Assertion is not independent of Syntactical Connection; so that it would not be possible when there is no immediate sequence between the verb 'to give' (and the 'two lamp-posts').

As for the argument that—"Every case-ending is capable of being connected with the verb",—our answer is that this *capability* is set aside by what we actually see. The immediate sequence also that we find is between the 'two lamp-posts' and the *Adhvaryu.*

As for the argument that "if the connection were as suggested, the genitive ending would be there",—it is true that the genitive ending would be there; but it is not that in the absence of the genitive ending, there is

no connection with the *Adhvaryu*; because such connection is actually recognised through Syntactical Connection.

Says the Opponent—" The Dative Ending that is present in the sentence would set aside the Syntactical Connection ".

That which is not itself enjoined (or predicated) cannot set aside anything.

" How then is it that the Dative ending is there even when the Recipient is not meant to be enjoined ? "

It occurs only by way of reference to what is indicated by the force of circumstances. Hence what has been urged does not affect our position. —Or, we may take the answer to be what has been explained above, to the effect that what is enjoined is the act of giving qualified by all the qualifications (mentioned in the sentence).

Thus then, if the other items of the Fee are not excluded, the General Law becomes obeyed; hence we conclude that it is only the *Adhvaryu's* share that is excluded by the ' two lamp-posts '.

ADHIKARAṆA (19): *At the 'Upahavya' sacrifice, the 'Horse' excludes all the rest of the things mentioned as the 'Fee'.*

SŪTRA (65).

THE CASE OF THE 'HORSE' GIVEN AS FEE IS LIKE THE 'MILCH COW': AND THE PHRASE 'SA BRAHMAṆAH' ('IT IS TO BE GIVEN TO THE BRAHMAN PRIEST') IMPLIES THE EXCLUSION OF THE OTHER PRIESTS, AS IN THE CASE OF 'GOLD'.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Upahavya* sacrifice laid down in the following passage—'*Upahavyo aniruktaḥ, tēnābhishasyamānam yājayēt . . . . ashvaḥ shvēto dakṣiṇā; upahavyo niruktaḥ . . . ashvaḥ shyāvo rukmalalāṭo dakṣiṇā*' [wherein 'the bay horse with a golden forehead' is laid down as the Sacrificial Fee]; in connection with this we read—'*Sahyaniruktaḥ sa brahmaṇē dēyaḥ*' [where the said Fee is laid down as to be given to the *Brahman* Priest].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does the *Horse* here laid down exclude only the Brahman's share (in the Fee laid down in connection with the Archetype, as consisting of 'the cow, the horse, etc.')? or the whole set of things laid down as the Sacrificial Fee?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"It excludes the Brahman's share (in the original sacrifice).—Why?—(*a*) Because it is connected with the performer; (*b*) because it serves the purpose that is served by a part of the original Fee, and (*c*) because at the Archetype it appears separately,—therefore there shall be modification of the accessory to that extent (as explained under *Sūtra* 64),—as in the case of the 'Garland'; i.e. just as in the case of the text 'Gives the garland to the *Udgātṛ*', the *garland* excludes only the *Udgātṛ's* share (in the original Fee), and not the entire set of things laid down as the 'Fee',—so also it should be in the case in question."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*The Horse given as Fee is like the milch cow*; i.e. it should exclude the entire set of things laid down as the 'Fee'.—"Why?"—Because the connection is with the term 'Fee', in the sentence 'The bay horse with the golden forehead is the Fee'; the sense is that by means of the *Horse* here directly laid down (in connection with the *Upahavya*), the 'securing of services' should be done; and such being the case, all the Fee that would come in by implication through the General Law should naturally be set aside.

Objection—"But we find the Horse spoken as related to the performer—in the sentence that lays down that 'it should be given to the *Brahman*'."

Answer—The first sentence (where the Bay Horse has been laid down as the Fee) serves to exclude all those things which would come in as the Fee, in accordance with the General Law,—and the second sentence (where the

Horse is mentioned as to be given to the *Brahman*) serves to exclude the other priests; just as in the case of the sentence 'Of the gold, all is given to the *Brahman*'.

From all this it follows that the Horse excludes the entire set of things.

SŪTRA (66).

"BUT IN REALITY, ONLY ONE THING SHOULD BE EXCLUDED, BECAUSE OF THE CONNECTION OF THE PERFORMER, BY VIRTUE OF THE PARTICULAR GENDER,—LIKE THE GARLAND."

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (in this *Sūtra*) that—"only one thing is excluded, because of the connection of the performer, by virtue of the gender,—like the garland".—And this has to be refuted—[We are doing that in the next *Sūtra*].

SŪTRA (67).

IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE MODIFICATION, AS IN THE CASE OF THE GOLD, BECAUSE OF THE REFERENCE BEING TO THAT.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase 'in reality' implies the rejection of the above view (expressed in Sū. 66).

Because of the reference being to that,—i.e. because the reference is to the *Fee*,—what the sentence has done is that by means of the term 'Fee' it has brought about the relationship of the Horse to the sacrifice; hence the Horse should be regarded as being the modification of the entire set of things.—Hence it has to be treated like 'gold', not like 'garland'.

———

ADHIKARAṆA (20): *At the 'Ṛtapēya' sacrifice, the 'Soma-cup' excludes the entire set of Sacrificial Fees.*

SŪTRA (68).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"SO ALSO THE SOMA-CUP."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Ṛtapēya* sacrifice, we read—"'*A Soma-cup* made of *Udumbara* wood is the Fee; it should be given to the Brahman-priest who is dear and belongs to one's own *gotra*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does the *Soma-cup* exclude only the Brahman's share in the regular Fee (prescribed in connection with the Archetype)? Or does it exclude the entire Sacrificial Fee?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*So also should be the Soma-cup*; just as the 'garland' prescribed for the *Udgātṛ* excludes only his share in the regular Fee,—because of the connection of both with the *Udgātṛ*-priest,—so also in the case in question, on account of the connection of both with the Brahman-priest, the *Soma-cup* should set aside only the Brahman's share in the regular Fee."

SŪTRA (69).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, THERE SHOULD BE A MODIFICATION OF THE WHOLE LOT; BECAUSE FOR PURPOSES OF THE SACRIFICE, ANIMALS HAVE BEEN FORBIDDEN.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the above view.

The *Soma-cup* sets aside, not only the Brahman's share, but the whole of the regular Sacrificial Fee.—How do you know that?—Because the text in question is in reference to the prohibition of animals; the passage runs thus—'*Soma* is right, animals are wrong; if one gives animals, one does wrong; the *Soma-cup* made of *Udumbara-wood* is the Fee'; here we find that the *Soma-cup* has been enjoined after having rejected the giving of *animals*; the sense of the passage being 'One who gives animals incurs this sin, *hence animals should not be given*'; instead of saying this in so many words, the text says that 'the *Soma-cup* should be the Fee', which means the same thing; as the implication is that if the *Soma-Cup* is given, animals are not given; thus the *Soma-cup* comes to set aside the whole of the regular Fee; if it were to set aside only the *Brahman's* share, it would mean that animals would be given to the other priests [and this would go against the prohibition just referred to]. Hence, we conclude that it sets aside the whole of the regular Fee.

SŪTRA (70).

[*The following objection may be urged*]—" IT WOULD BE THE SAME IN REGARD TO THE GIFT TO THE BRAHMAN."

Bhāṣya.

It might be argued as follows—" If your view is that 'by reason of the prohibition of animals, the *Soma-cup* should set aside the whole of the regular Fee',—then, the same would be applicable to the case of the gift to *Brahman*; the assertion that 'the *Soma-cup* should be given to the *Brahman*' may refer to the animals that are given to the same *Brahman* (out of the regular Fee). Hence it does not necessarily follow that the reference to the prohibition of animals can be explained only on the basis of the exclusion of the whole of the regular Fee (payable to all the priests); because it can also be explained as referring to what is given to the *Brahman* only."

SŪTRA (71).

[*Answer*]—AS THE GIFT IS FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE SACRIFICE, A PROHIBITED ACT WOULD BE DONE; AND IN THAT CASE THE PURPOSE OF THE FEES WOULD BE AN INDIRECT SECONDARY ONE.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the *Soma-cup* should exclude only the *Brahman's* share; in fact, it should set aside the whole set of the regular Fee. The gift of the *Soma-cup* is subservient to the purposes of the sacrifice; as it is connected with the term 'Sacrificial Fee', in the text 'the *Soma-cup* is the *Sacrificial Fee*'. At the Archetype, the various things, Cow and the rest, do not constitute the *Fee* severally; in fact, it has been already explained (under Sū. 57) that the term 'Fee' is applied to the whole lot of the things, Cow and the rest, taken together. Thus then, the animals having been forbidden by the gift of the Soma-cup, if it were regarded as equally applicable to the Brahman's gift also, and animals were given to the other priests, then something would be done which is prohibited;—what forms the share of the Brahman alone is not the 'Fee', it is only part of the *Fee*; and if the term 'Fee' could be applied to what is only a part of the Fee, such application would be only indirect (figurative);—but so long as the direct meaning of a term is applicable, the indirect one cannot be admitted. The purpose of giving the *Soma-cup* is the exclusion of the regular 'Fee';—and the purpose served by the 'Fee' is the securing of the services of *all the priests*, not merely the gift to *Brahman*.—From all this it follows that the *Soma-cup* sets aside the entire set of the regular Fee.

SŪTRAS (72-73).

IF IT IS THE BRAHMAN'S SHARE ALONE THAT IS EXCLUDED, THEN THE MODIFICATION WOULD APPERTAIN TO THAT EXCLUSION ALONE; BUT IN REALITY, THE WHOLE LOT IS EXCLUDED, AND THERE IS ONLY THE EXCLUSION OF THE OTHER MEN; ALL THE FEES BEING SUBSERVIENT TO THE SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

These two *Sūtras* explain the purpose of the *Adhikaraṇa.*

If the *Soma-cup* excludes the Brahman's share only, then the regular Fee would be the smaller to that extent; and by reason of this modification, the other portions of the Fee would be given to the other priests;—this would be so if the *Pūrvapakṣa* view were correct. On the other hand, if the *Siddhānta* view were correct, then the whole lot of the regular Fee would become excluded; that being excluded, it is the exclusion of the other priests (from receiving the Soma-cup at the *Ṛtapēya*) that is done by the sentence 'it should be given to the Brahman'. The Fees are always subservient to the sacrifice;—the sacrifice is accomplished by the securing of the services of all the Priests, not by securing those of the *Brahman* alone. It is by the giving of the *Soma-cup* that the services of all the priests are secured; so that nothing else need be given.—This is the purpose served by this *Adhikaraṇa.*

Or these two *Sūtras* may be explained otherwise, as embodying a distinct *Adhikaraṇa,* as follows:—

ADHIKARAṆA (21): *The Soma-cup excludes the entire regular Fee as also the other Priests.*

[By another interpretation of *Sūtras* 72-73.]

SŪTRA (72).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IF THE BRAHMAN'S SHARE ALONE IS EXCLUDED, THEN THE MODIFICATION WOULD BE LESSENED TO THAT EXTENT."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Ṛtapēya,* we read—'The Soma-cup made of Udumbara-wood is the Fee, it should be given to the Brahman priest who is dear and belongs to one's own *Gotra*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Should the Regular Fee be given reduced by the Brahman's share? Or should the *Soma-cup* alone be given?

Objection—"It has already been explained that the construction is that the *Soma-cup is the Fee* [and hence there can be no room for the question]".

Answer—We are raising the question on the supposition that the construction is that *the Soma-cup is for the Brahman*.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"If that is so, and the construction adopted connects the *Soma-cup* with the *Brahman*, then the Brahman's share of the regular Fee is to be excluded, and all the rest is to be given; the modification of it being only to the extent that the Brahman's share would be excluded from it."

SŪTRA (73).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE WHOLE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED; AS THE SENTENCE EXCLUDES THE OTHER MEN, AND THE FEES ARE SUBSERVIENT TO THE SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

The whole lot of the regular Fee should be excluded.—"Why?"—Because it is quite clear that the *Soma-cup* is to be construed with the *Fee*; so that the entire set of the regular Fee having been excluded by this construction, all that is done (by the mention of the *Brahman*) is that the other priests are excluded. Specially because *the Fees are subservient to the sacrifice*; so that, when the *Soma-cup* becomes the 'Sacrificial Fee' (and the needs of the sacrifice are served thereby), it excludes all the rest of the things that have been mentioned as forming the 'Sacrificial Fee'.

ADHIKARAṆA (22): *At the 'Vājapēya', the mention of the 'Chariot' is meant to restrict that gift to one particular Priest.*

SŪTRA (74).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AS REGARDS THE CHARIOT CONSECRATED WITH THE YAJUṢ VERSE, IT VERILY CONSTITUTES A MODIFICATION OF THE REGULAR FEE PAYABLE TO THE ADHVARYU."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Vājapēya* sacrifice; in connection with which it is declared—'The *chariot consecrated with the Yajuṣ-verse* one gives to the *Adhvaryu*'.

[In place of the cow and other things prescribed as the 'Fee' at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there are laid down, in connection with the *Vājapēya*, other seventeen articles, such as the *Chariot*, the *Cart* and so forth; among these there is one chariot which is consecrated with the *Yajuṣ-mantra*, '*Indrasya*, etc.'; this is the chariot which is called '*Yajuryukta-ratha*', or, briefly '*Yajūratha*.']

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does this *chariot* exclude the *Adhvaryu's* share in the Regular Fee? Or, is the *Adhvaryu's* share restricted to this chariot?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*As regards the chariot consecrated with the Yajuṣ-verse, it is verily a modification of the Fee payable to the Adhvaryu.* The particle '*tu*' implies absence of all doubt; the sense being that 'there can be no doubt on the point'; what is clearly meant by the text is that 'To the *Adhvaryu* one gives the *chariot consecrated with Yajuṣ*, nothing else'; so that the *chariot* sets aside the *Adhvaryu's* share and thereby having its purpose fulfilled, it cannot exclude the other articles of the Fee whose admission at the *Vājapēya* is indicated by the General Law. The sentence is not to be construed as 'The *chariot consecrated with Yajuṣ* one gives at the *Vājapēya* sacrifice', in which case the *chariot* would be connected with the sacrifice.—Why so?—Because the *Vājapēya* is the sacrifice with which the *Context* deals, while the *Adhvaryu* is mentioned in the *sentence*; and *Syntactical Connection* is more authoritative than *Context*.—From all this we conclude that the *Chariot* excludes the *Adhvaryu's* share in the regular Fee."

SŪTRA (75).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, ON THE BASIS OF THE DIRECT DECLARATION, IT IS HIS SHARE OF THE FEES THAT IS RESTRICTED.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the above view.

As a matter of fact, all the chariots have been directly spoken of in the general statement—'One gives seven *seventeens*';—these '*seven seventeens*' are—'(1) Seventeen chariots, (2) Seventeen coins, (3) Seventeen slave-girls, (4) Seventeen pairs of bullocks, (5) Seventeen hundred cows, (6) Seventeen kinds of fodder and (7) Seventeen *Vayasīs* (?)'.—Here 'seventeen chariots' have been mentioned without any specification, and they are to be distributed among all the priests; it is not known which *chariot* should go to whom;—the *Yajūratha* in question which might possibly fall to the share of the *Adhvaryu*, is restricted as such—'the chariot consecrated with the *Yajus*, one gives to the *Adhvaryu*, no other is to be given to him,—and the said chariot is not to be given to any one else'. The presence of the qualifying term 'consecrated with *Yajuṣ*' is for the purpose of enjoining the chariot as to be given in one alternative scheme, and hence it cannot serve the other purpose of excluding the *Adhvaryu's* share in the Regular Fee; and the non-exclusion of this makes the General Law duly honoured.—Hence the conclusion is that the *chariot* is restricted as the *Adhvaryu's* share; and his share in the regular Fee is not excluded.

End of Pāda iii of Adhyāya X.

ADHYĀYA X.

PĀDA IV.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *At the 'Agni-chayana' and other similar rites, there is combination of the 'Nāriṣṭa-homa' and the 'Nakṣatrēṣṭi'.*

SŪTRA (1).

INASMUCH AS SIGNS OF THE ARCHETYPE ARE NOT PRESENT, THE ACT IN QUESTION SHOULD BE AN ADDITIONAL EMBELLISHMENT AT THE ECTYPE.

Bhāṣya.

(A) There is the *Agni-chayana* Rite, laid down in the text 'One who knowing thus sets up the Fire-altar'; in connection with that Rite, comes the *Nakṣatrēṣṭi* sacrifice, (at which there are *Upahomas*) described as follows —'*Agnayē kṛttikābhyaḥ puroḍāshamaṣṭākapālam nirvapēt, so 'nujuhoti, agnayē svāhā—Kṛttikābhyaḥ svāhā—Ambāyai svāhā—Niyatayē svāhā—Āmrapattyai svāhā—Nirvargapattyai svāhā—Nipurnikāyai svāhā*';—at the Primary sacrifice which is the Archetype of the *Agnichayana*, there are *Nāriṣṭa-homas* offered, as laid down in the text—'*Nāriṣṭahomān juhoti*'.—In regard to this, there arises the question—[At the *Agni-chayana*] are the *Nāriṣṭā-homas* excluded (by the *Nakṣatrēṣṭi*)? Or, are they not excluded, and there is a combination of both?

(B) Similarly in connection with the *Shyēna*, we read—'Red-turbaned priests with red clothes worn in the *Nivīta*-mode carry on';—in connection with the Archetype (of the *Shyēna*) we read—'The *Nivīta* is the mode for men, the *Prāchīnāvīta* is for *Pitṛs*, and the *Upavīta* is for *deities*; when one wears the cloth in the *Upavīta*-mode one bears the mark of Deities';—and the *Upavīta*-mode recommended in this latter text is indicated by the General Law as applicable to the *Shyēna*.—There arises the question—Is the *Upavīta*-mode excluded (by the *Nivīta* laid down in the former text)? Or is it not excluded, and there is combination of both?

(C) Similarly again, in connection with the *Pṛṣṭhya Ṣaḍaha*, we read—'He should make him eat *honey* or *Clarified Butter*';—in connection with the Archetype, however, it has been laid down that—'The *Brāhmaṇa* should live upon *milk*, the *Kṣattriya* upon *barley-gruel* and the *Vaishya* upon *whey*';—all this latter is indicated by the General Law as applicable to the *Pṛṣṭhya-Ṣaḍaha*.—There arises the question—Is all this laid down in the latter text set aside (by the Honey and Clarified Butter laid down in the former text)? Or is it not set aside, and there is combination of both?

On these questions, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"There should be exclusion of what is indicated by the General Law; i.e. the *Upahoma* and other details which are themselves directly laid down by the texts should set aside those that come in only by the implications of the General Law. Further, all the details (directly laid down) bear the mark of being themselves 'Archetypes',—such marks, for instance, as are indicated by the injunctive terms (A) '*juhoti*', (B) '*nivītāḥ pracharanti*' and (C) '*āshayēt*'. Just as, in accordance with the injunction 'The Reed is the grass used', sets aside the *Kusha* [so should it be in the cases in question]."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—There is to be no *exclusion*, there should be *combination*.—"Why so?"—*Because the signs of the Archetype are not present*;—i.e. the *Upahoma* and the rest have no connection with any such effect as marks the Archetype. This connection is indicated in the following ways—(*a*) by direct declaration,—e.g. 'The *Charu* is of *Nīvāra* corn';—Or (*b*) by enjoining a thing in the absence of something else,—e.g. '*Juhūṣā vā . . . . na bahu vadēt . . . . . madhvāshayēt ghṛtam vā*';—(*c*) Or by modification,—e.g. '*Nairṛtashcharurnakhāvapūtānām*' ['*Charu* of rice unhusked by nails is fit for the *Nirṛtis*'];—(*d*) Or by words directly expressive of the thing itself,—e.g. 'Should tie the animal to the *Paridhi*';—(*e*) Or by prohibition,—e.g. 'One should not say *gīrā girā*, if one says *girā girā*, the *Udgātṛ* will swallow him, therefore one should sing it by changing it into *irā irā*';—(*f*) Or by means of something else whereby one may feel that the purpose served by the Archetypal detail would be served.—Not one of these signs is present in the cases in question. But that does not lead to the exclusion of the details in question—on the ground that they come in only through the General Law while the others are enjoined directly; because there is exclusion only when there are signs of the Archetype present, not otherwise.

Says the Opponent—"It has just been pointed out that signs of the Archetype are actually present, in the form of the terms—(*a*) '*Juhoti*', (*b*) '*Nivītāḥ pracharanti*' and (*c*) '*Āshayēt*'."

The answer to this is as follows:—(A) The *Homas* enjoined in the texts are other than the *Homas* of the Archetype; and as the *Homa* is always for the purpose of a transcendental result, how could it be known that this other *Homa* serves the same purpose as the Archetypal *Homa*?—(B) Similarly the *Upavīta-mode* serves a transcendental purpose; how then could it be known that the *Nivīta* serves the same purpose?—(C) Similarly, the taking of food is for the purpose of sustaining life,—and it is known that this purpose is served by the eating of Honey and Clarified Butter.—Thus it is found that the signs of the Archetype are *not* present.

The following argument may be brought forward—"The *Upahomas* are not distinct from the Archetypal Homas; all that the text in question does is to lay down new *Mantras* for use at the same Archetypal *Homas*."

This however is not true; as there is no injunctive word in the text. The text contains the words '*So'nujuhoti*' ('he offers the later oblations'), and after the sentence has been completed, there follows the declaration of a *Mantra*, and there is no such expression as that 'one should offer

the oblations *with this Mantra*'; in fact, the sentences are distinct: '*So'nujuhoti*' is a distinct sentence enjoining the *Upahomas*, and then come the totally different sentences—'*Agnayē svāhā, Kṛttikābhyaḥ svāha etc.*', which are *Mantra-texts*; hence it is clear that the re-mention of the *Homas* is not for the purpose of enjoining the new *Mantras* to be used at them. For the enjoining of the *Homa*, there would be Direct Assertion (in the sentence '*So'nujuhoti*'), and for the enjoining of the *Mantra*, there would be only *Syntactical Connection*;—for this reason also the passage in question cannot be taken as enjoining the *Mantras* (to be used at the Archetypal *Homas*). Consequently, there should be combination (of both sets of *Homas*). As a matter of fact, both sets come in through valid means of knowledge—Direct Declaration is a trustworthy means of knowledge, and so also is the General Law; and as the purposes served by them are totally different, there is no conflict between them (whereby one would set aside the other). Hence—just as the *Prayāja* and other details are not set aside (by the (*Upahomas*), so the *Nāriṣṭahomas* also should not be set aside.—For these reasons we conclude that in all such cases *the act in question should be an additional embellishment at the Ectype.*

SŪTRA (2).

WHERE THE SIGNS OF THE ARCHETYPE ARE PRESENT, THERE SHOULD BE A MODIFICATION, BECAUSE OF THE PROXIMITY OF THE ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—"Just as in the case of the assertion 'the grass used consists of reeds', the *Reeds* set aside the *Kusha*, so should there be exclusion in the case in question also".—The answer to this is as follows: —In the case of the *Reeds*, it is only right that there should be *exclusion*, because in that case the signs of the Archetype are present, through the term '*barhiḥ*' ('grass'),—the sense being that the *grass* used may be such as is used at the Archetype (i.e. *Kusha*), or Reeds should be used in place of *Grass*. In the case in question, however, signs of the *Archetype* are *not* present; hence there is no analogy between the case in question and the case of *grass*.

Or *Sūtra* (2) may be taken as a distinct *Adhikaraṇa* as follows—

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The 'Kusha-grass' is set aside by the 'Reed-grass'.*

[By second interpretation of *Sūtra* (2).]

There is the following declaration—'*Somāraudram charum nirvapēt kṛṣṇānām vrīhiṇām abhicharan*' [wherein the performance of a malevolent

Rite is laid down); in connection with this, we read—'The grass consists of Reeds'.—In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the *Kusha-grass* excluded—or not?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "there should be combination of both, as both are cognised by trustworthy means of knowledge".—In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*Where the signs of the Archetype are present, there should be modification* (*Sūtra* 2). The sign of the Archetype is actually present here, in the shape of the term '*barhiḥ*' ('grass'); hence the Archetypal accessory must be excluded.

Or *Sūtra* (2) may be explained as embodying the following *Adhikaraṇa*—

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *At the 'Vājapēya' the rumblings of the 'Chariot' and of the 'Drum' set aside both the 'Darbha' and the 'Mantra'.*

[By third interpretation of *Sūtra* (2).]

There is the *Vājapēya* sacrifice, laid down in the text—'Desiring self-sovereignty, one should perform the *Vājapēya* sacrifice in the autumn';—in connection with this sacrifice, we read—'*Rathaghoṣēṇa māhēndrasya stotramupākaroti, dundubhighoṣēṇa māhendrasya stotramupākaroti*' ['Starts the *Māhendra* hymn with the *rumbling of the chariot*, starts the *Māhendra* hymn with the *rumbling of the drum*'].—At the Archetype, this starting of the Hymn is done 'with two blades of *Kusha-grass*, with the *Mantra*, *Upāvartadhvam*'.—This latter is indicated by the General Law as coming into the *Vājapēya*.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the *sound* of the *Chariot-rumbling* or *drum-rumbling* meant to exclude the *Mantra* ('*Upāvartadhvam*'), and the substance (*Chariot*) is to set aside the *Kuṣha-blades*? Or are both together meant to set aside both together?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* on this question is as follows:—"Inasmuch as both are *sound*, the *rumblings* exclude the *Mantra*,—and as both are *substance*, the *substance* (Chariot) excludes the *Kusha-blades*.—*Objection*—'In the term *rathaghoṣa* we have the *Tatpuruṣa* compound, from which it follows that the *ratha* (Chariot) is mentioned only as qualifying the *ghoṣa* (rumbling), so that it is for the purpose of something else, and not for the purpose of any function of its own'.—*Answer*—Words like those in question may also be taken as *Dvandva*; in favour of which there is the following reason also: The Chariot will not have been mentioned for the purpose of something else;—as in that case, the Direct Significance of the word would be abandoned, and recourse would be had to indirect indication,—and the presence of the signs of the Archetype would be militated against;—hence we conclude that the *Rumbling* excludes the *Mantra* and the *substance* excludes the *Kusha-blades*."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*Where the signs of the Archetype are present, there should be modification* (*Sūtra* 2). As a

matter of fact, the signs of the Archetype are present in both together, not one by one; what is spoken of is the '*rathaghoṣēṇa*' ('by the rumbling of the Chariot'), not '*rathēna ghoṣēṇa cha*' ('by the *Chariot* and by the *rumbling*');—what marks the *starting of the Hymn* is the *Rumbling qualified by the Chariot*; while at the Archetype, what marks it are the Kusha-blades *as also* the Mantra.

Objection—"It has just been pointed out that '*rathaghoṣa*' may be a *Dvandva* compound."

That cannot be; as in that case there should be the Dual ending ('*rathaghoṣābhyām*'); while what we actually find is the Singular ending ('*rathaghoṣēṇa*'); hence the mark must be one only; and that is the *rumbling*; and it is with that term that the Instrumental ending appears.

Objection—"The Instrumental ending may be taken as appearing with the composite (made up of the *ratha* and the *ghoṣa*)."

That is not possible; as no such composite is denoted by the word. Then again, if such a composite were spoken of,—then you would have admitted the fact of the exclusion being done by *both* together.

"Certainly the Mantra '*Upāvartadhvam*' (which is not in the singular number) does actually point to a composite."

No, we reply; because what the *Mantra* denotes is mere *Upāvartana* (revolution); and certainly mere *revolution* is not the *starting of* the Hymn. Even if the said denotation were there, it would do the excluding.—Then again, that the *starting* should be done with the specified mark has been declared by *Direct Assertion*, while that it should be done with a *Mantra* is only indicated by the General Law; and Direct Assertion is more authoritative than the implication of the General Law.

From all this it follows that the Rumbling of the Chariot and the Rumbling of the Drum exclude both (the *Mantra* and the *Kusha-grass*).

"What will be the use of this discussion?"

If the *Chariot* does not qualify the *rumbling*, then *any rumbling*, even apart from the *Chariot*, would mark the starting of the Hymn.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *At the 'Bṛhaspatisava' etc. the Cups dedicated to Indra-Vāyu etc. are to be combined with those dedicated to Bṛhaspati.*

SŪTRA (3).

IN ALL CASES, THERE SHOULD BE DECLARATION OF ADDITIONAL CUPS, AS AT THE ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) In connection with the *Bṛhaspatisava*, we read—'*Bārhaspatyam graham gṛhṇāti, viṣuvatyarkam graham gṛhṇāti*' ['He takes up the cup dedicated to *Bṛhaspati*, at the equinox he takes up the *Arka cup*'].—(*b*) In connection with the *Mahāvrata*, it is said '*Shukragraham gṛhṇati*' ['Takes up the cup dedicated to *Shukra*'].—(*c*) In connection with the *Ashvamēdha*, it is said '*Sauvarṇarājatābhyām mahimānau grahau gṛhṇati*' ['Takes up two *Mahiman cups* of gold and silver'].—At the Archetypal sacrifice of which all these are ectypes, there are *cups dedicated to Indra-Vāyu and other deities*; these latter are indicated by the general Law as coming in at the said Ectypes (*Bṛhaspatisava*, etc.).

There arises the question—Are these Archetypal Cups set aside by the Ectypal ones? Or, they are not excluded,—there is combination of both sets?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"The Ectypal Cups are laid down directly by Vedic texts, while the Archetypal ones come in only under the General Law; the former therefore should set aside the latter; specially as the sign of the Archetype is present in them, in the shape of the term 'cup'."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—In every one of the cases cited, there should be additional cups; i.e. the Archetypal Cups should not be excluded.—"Why so?"—Because both the sets are made known by trustworthy means of knowledge; the General Law being a trustworthy means of knowledge, and so also the Direct Assertion.—It might be argued that—"the term 'cup' is the sign of the Archetype".—That is not so; if the term 'cup' were uttered and then an accessory detail were laid down, then, it would be the Archetypal Cups alone that would be modified by that accessory. If a non-Cup were enjoined (predicated) in connection with the *Cup*, then that *non-Cup* would serve the purposes of the *Cup*, and hence set aside the Archetypal Cup; as in the case of the assertion—'The stake in the Threshing Yard is the Sacrificial Post' [where the purposes of the Post are served by the Stake, which therefore sets aside the Post].—In the case in question, however, the term '*graha*' is totally different, signifying the *act of holding*,—in such sentences as 'Holds the *graha* (Cup) named *Arka*', 'Holds the Cups named *Mahiman*'. Here the act of *Holding* enjoined is one that has not been previously known;—consequently the term '*graha*',

'cup', is not a sign of the Archetype. It is only when a number of things serve the same purpose that there is *option* or *exclusion*; in the case in question, however, the Archetypal Cups do not serve the same purpose as the Ectypal ones.

"But all the Cups serve the purpose of accomplishing the sacrifices, and in that sense they serve the same purpose."

The answer to this is as follows:—Towards the fulfilment of the sacrifices, all the Cups help collectively; singly, each of them cannot accomplish the sacrifices; they are not related to the sacrifice severally—in the sense that 'one should sacrifice with the *Arka* Cup', or 'one should sacrifice with the *Shukra* Cup'; what happens is that the passage declaring the entire sacrificial procedure includes all these Cups,—and of these, those alone that are in close proximity; —and in regard to proximity, there is no difference among the Cups; hence the declaration of procedure includes all the Cups, Archetypal as well as Ectypal;—*as in the case of the Archetype*; i.e. in regard to the Archetype, the holding of the Cups dedicated to *Indra-Vāyu* has been enjoined,—and yet again the holding of the Cup dedicated to *Mitra-Varuṇa* is enjoined,—and the distinction between these lies in the transcendental embellishment, and in the dedication to different deities; that this is so is due to the fact that the effect produced by them is not perceptible; for which reason it cannot be perceived that the former serves the same purposes as the latter. Then again, inasmuch as all the Cups are included under the declaration of the entire sacrificial procedure, it follows that there should be a combination of all,—not only with those dedicated to *Mitra-Varuṇa* and other deities, but also with the *Amshu* and the *Adābhya*, which latter are not mentioned in the same context.—In the same manner there should be combination of all at the Ectype also.

Says the Opponent—"What we find is that the Cup is mentioned and then its qualification is laid down—e.g. 'at the *Ashvamēdha*, the Cups are of gold and silver'."

The answer to this is as follows:—The two Cups herein mentioned (as being of gold and silver) are not those relating to the Archetype; in fact, the Cup and the Action are distinct, in accordance with the *Sūtra* 2. 2. 22.

Says the Opponent—"In that case, in the present instance, the sentence 'Hold the *Bārhaspatya* Cup' would come to serve the purpose of laying down the deity (*Bṛhaspati*)."

Answer—By taking the *Cup* as the thing enjoined, we accept *Direct Assertion*, while if we take the *Deity* as the thing enjoined, we accept *Syntactical Connection*; and *Direct Assertion* is always more authoritative than *Syntactical Connection*.

Says the *Opponent*—"It would be as in the case of '*Āgnēya*'; just as in the case of the sentence 'At the Agniṣṭuṭ there are *Āgnēya* Cups', it is the Deity that is taken to be the thing enjoined,—in the same manner, there would be injunction of the deity by the term '*bārhaspatyam*', even though it is in the Singular number,—as no significance attaches to the Number in such cases; for instance, in accordance with the sentence '*graham sammārṣṭi*' ('Washes the *Cup*', where 'Cup', '*Graham*,' is in the Singular

number), what is taken as laid down is the *washing* of *all the Cups*; in the same manner, in the case in question, what is laid down is the Deity of all the Cups."

The answer to this is that it has already been explained by its being pointed out that Direct Assertion is more authoritative (than Syntactical Connection). As for the sentence '*Āgnēyā grahā bhavanti*' ('The Cups are *Āgnēya*'),—in this case Syntactical Connection is not inconsistent with Direct Assertion; as in this case there is no such expression as '*Āgnēyam graham gṛhṇāti*' ('Holds the *Āgnēya* Cup'); so that in this case it is only right that mere existence of the *Āgnēya* be asserted through Syntactical Connection, which is not inconsistent with Direct Assertion.

From all this it follows that the '*Bārhaspatya* Cup' (the Cup dedicated to *Bṛhaspati*) is distinct from the Archetypal Cups, and is combined with them. Just as at the Archetype, in accordance with the sentence 'Holds the *Amshu*,—Holds the *Adābhya*'—these two things (*Amshu* and *Adābhya*), though not appearing in the Context, are combined with those that do appear in the Context,—so in the case in question, the Ectypal Cups should be combined (with the Archetypal ones).

SŪTRA (4).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE ARE INSTANCES OF SYNTACTICAL UNIFICATION WITH ADDITIONAL FACTORS.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also we conclude that there should be combination.—"For what reason?"—There is the case of the 'Wine-cups' where there is syntactical unification with the *Wine-cups* which are, beyond doubt, additional factors.—"How so?"—The passage is—'*Saptadasha ētē grahā gṛhyantē, dvayē prajāpatyāḥ, Somagrahāḥ surāgrahāshcha*' ['Seventeen cups are held up, two sets are dedicated to *Prajāpati*, the Soma-cups and the Wine-cups']; here the 'Wine-cups' are clearly *additional*, and in regard to these the 'holding' is *enjoined* (in this passage), not merely *referred to*; the word '*Gṛhyantē*' ('are held'), even though mentioned once, is connected with the *Soma-cups* also; hence there is no doubt that here we have a distinct injunction of the Cups: and it may be the same in other cases also.

SŪTRA (5).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

An indicative text also points to the same conclusion—"What is that text?"—'*Viraṇyo vā ēṣa yajñakratuḥ yad vājapēya ativa hyagniṣṭomam*

krāmatyukthyamatiṣoḍashinam nātirātramāpnoti'; the term '*viraṇya*' stands for 'extensive'; for when it is said '*viraṇyāni araṇyāni*', it is understood that 'the forests are extensive'.—It is only when there is combination that there can be this 'extensiveness'; it would not be possible if there were exclusion of anything. From this also it follows that there should be combination (of the two sets of Cups).

Adhikaraṇa (5): *At the 'Vājapēya', the 'animals dedicated to Prajāpati' are to be combined with the 'sacrificial animals'.*

SŪTRA (6).

In the case of the 'animals dedicated to Prajāpati' also; because of the declaration.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Vājapēya* sacrifice, laid down in the text—'Desiring self-sovereignty, one should perform the *Vājapēya* sacrifice'; at this sacrifice there are 'animals dedicated to *Prajāpati*', as declared in the text—'One should sacrifice seventeen animals dedicated to *Prajāpati*'.—At the Archetypal sacrifice, there are certain 'Sacrificial animals' (the *Āgnēya* and the rest); and these are indicated by the General Law as coming into the *Vājapeya*.—Hence there arises the question—Are the *Sacrificial animals* excluded by the 'animals dedicated to *Prajāpati*'? Or are they combined with them?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "the *animals dedicated to Prajāpati* have been directly enjoined (as to be sacrificed at the *Vājapēya*), and as such should exclude the *Sacrificial animals* which are only indicated by the General Law."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*In the case of the 'animals dedicated to Prajāpati' also*, there should be combination;—the particle 'cha' signifies the connection of the present *Sūtra* with the conclusion of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*.—The 'Sacrificial animals' are spoken of in the following text—'*Brahmavādino vadanti nāgniṣṭomo nokthyo na ṣoḍashī nātiratra iti; atha kasmād vājapēyēna sarvē yajñakratavo'varudhyante,—pashubhiritī brūyāt, yadāgnēyam pashumālabhatē agniṣṭomē tēnāvarundhē, aindragnēnokthyam, aindrēṇa ṣoḍashinam, sārasvatyā atirātram mārutyā bṛhatstotram, ētāvanto vai yajñakratavaḥ, tān pashubhiravarundhē*, ['Teachers of Brahman teach as follows—[At the *Vājapēya*] there is neither *Agniṣṭoma*, nor *Ukthya*, nor *Ṣoḍashin*, nor *Atirātra*;—if it is asked how all sacrificial performances are included under the *Vājapēya*, the answer should be—*Through the animals*: when one sacrifices the animal dedicated to Agni, thereby he takes in the *Agniṣṭoma*; by the animal dedicated to *Indra-Agni*, he takes in the *Ukthya*; by the animal dedicated to *Indra*, he takes in the *Ṣoḍashin*; by the animal dedicated to *Sarasvatī*, he takes in the *Atirātra*; by the animal dedicated to the *Maruts*, he takes in the *Bṛhatstotra*;—only so many are the *sacrificial performances*, these become taken in by the *Vājapēya*, through the animals'].—This clearly shows that there should be combination.

"What you have put forward is only an *indicative text*; what is the reason?"

The reason lies in *the absence of the signs of the Archetype.*

"But the term 'animal' is a sign of the Archetype."

Not so, we reply. In the text in question it is not the *Deity* that is enjoined (predicated) with reference to the *animal*; because what is declared is the number; hence from the declaration of the Number and the Deity, it follows that it is a distinct act that is spoken of here, in accordance with the principle laid down under *Sūtra* 2. 2. 21.

From all this it follows that as in the case of the *Cups*, so in that of the *animals* also, there should be combination of both sets.

Adhikaraṇa (6): *At the 'Sāṅgrahaṇī-Iṣṭi', the 'Anuyājas' should be combined with the 'Āmanahomas'.*

SŪTRA (7).

In the case of 'Āmana' also; because we find indicative texts.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Sāṅgrahaṇī-Iṣṭi*, laid down in the text—'Desiring a village, one should offer the *Sāṅgrahaṇī* to the *Vishvēdēvas*'. In connection with this, we read—'He pours three oblations with the *Mantra, Āmanamasyā dēvāḥ*'.—At the Archetype, there are three *Anuyājas*; and these are admissible at the *Sāṅgrahaṇī*, under the General Law.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are the *Ānuyājas* to be set aside by the *Āmana-homas*? Or are the two sets to be combined?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"The *Āmana-homas*, being directly enjoined, should set aside the *Anuyājas*, which can come in only by implication (through the General Law); also because there is present the number 'three' which is a sign of the Archetype."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—In the case of the *Āmana*, there should be combination.—"Why?"—Because a text clearly indicates this: The text is—'*Bahirātmā vai prayājānuyāja ātmā dēvatā yat prayājānuyājānām purastadvā upariṣṭādvā juhuyāt bahirātmānam sajātānāmādadhita, atha yam madhyato juhoti madhyata ēva sajātānāmātmānam dhattē*';—this clearly shows that the *Anuyājas* are not to be excluded.—"But the number 'three' is there as the sign of the Archetype".—Not so, we reply; it is not possible for any accessory to be enjoined with reference to a mere number; because there is nothing to which some sort of number does not belong. Hence the mere number cannot be regarded as a sign of the Archetype.

"You have pointed out an indicative text; please point out some direct authority for it."

Answer—The presence of the oblation is stated by Direct Assertion in the text 'Pours the oblations'; the *Mantra* to be used is indicated by Syntactical Connection; and the mention of the number 'three' comes in as a mere *reference*; so that what are enjoined by the text in question are distinct sacrifices with a definite number and a definite *Mantra*; and as all these are vouched for by trustworthy means of knowledge, it is only right that these should be combined.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *At the 'Mahāvrata' there should be combination of the 'Upagāna (Music) of the Ladies' with the 'Music of the Priests'.*

SŪTRA (8).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF 'UPAGĀNA', IT SHOULD BE AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'REED', BECAUSE THE SIGN OF THE ARCHETYPE IS PRESENT."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Mahāvrata*, we read—'*Patnya upagāyanti, pichchholābhirupagāyanti, Kāṇḍaviṇādibhirupagāyanti, āpāṭalikābhirupagāyanti*' ['The Ladies set up the music, etc. etc.];—at the Archetype, 'the Priests set up the music';—and this music of the Priests' becomes admissible in the *Mahāvrata* by virtue of the General Law.

Now there arises the question—When the Ladies set up the music, do they set aside the Priests setting up the music ?—Or not ?

The first point to be considered is—Does this '*upagāna*' ('Music') here stand for the *song-music* (vocal music) or for the *instruments-music* (instrumental music) ?—Then also there is a further question—Does 'song-music' stand for the *music of the song*, or for the *song itself constituting the music* ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on the main question is as follows:—"What comes from the Archetype is set aside; hence we explain the term 'song-music' as the *music of the song*; when the Ladies sing, they swell the music of the singers; the singing is already known as coming from the Archetype, it is only the *swelling of the music* that is laid down by the text in question (in connection with the Ectype) as denoted by the prefix ('*upa*' in the verb '*Upagāyanti*'), hence the term 'song-music' stands for the *music of the song*.—Or the song itself may be taken as the 'music'; the term 'singing' is well known as meaning the singing *by the mouth*; hence the song itself is meant to be the 'music' here; or, as shown before, it may mean the *music of the song*. Whichever of these two views be accepted, in either case, the *Ladies* do the work of the *Priests*; hence, *on account of the presence of the sign of the Archetype*, what is laid down directly sets aside what comes in through the General Law;—*as in the case of the Reed*; just as in the case of the text 'the grass consists of Reeds', the Reeds, being directly laid down, set aside the *Kusha-grass*, which can come in only through the General Law;—so should it be in the case in question also."

SŪTRA (9).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, ON ACCOUNT OF SUPERFLUOUSNESS, IT SHOULD BE ADDITIONAL.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

There is to be no exclusion; there should be combination. Hence we offer the following explanation—the *music* meant is that of the *instruments*; at the sacrifice in question there are several musical instruments, as described in the texts 'Drums are rumbling on all sides, etc. etc.'; and the music of these instruments is the 'music of the instruments'.—How so?—The conjugational ending directly connotes the presence of what is denoted by the verbal root;—and what is denoted by the prefix is farther off, and hence weaker in its application. Hence the injunction of the presence of what is denoted by the prefix is set aside by the injunction of the presence of what is denoted by the verbal root.—Or, the *instrument* itself may be regarded as meant by 'music' here; what the text says is—'The Ladies set up the music, they set up the music with the *Kāṇḍa-viṇā* and other instruments': so that the music (*Upagāna*) that is set up is that of the *Kāṇḍa-viṇā* and other instruments. As a matter of fact, the term '*gāna*' (lit. *singing*) is often applied to the music of the stringed instruments; hence the music meant here by '*Upagāna*' is that of the instruments. This term 'music of the instruments' may mean the *music produced by the instruments* or the *music in the form of the instruments themselves*; in either case, this *Upagāna* is something different from what is done at the Archetype. Hence there should be combination of both.—"Why?"—*Because of superfluousness*; i.e. in this way the General Law does not become superfluous,—i.e. it becomes honoured.

From all this we conclude that there should be combination in the case in question.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *At the 'Añjanābhyañjana' sacrifice, the 'anointing with Butter' should be combined with the 'anointing with Gum-resin'.*

SŪTRA (10).

AT THE EMBELLISHMENT ALSO [THERE SHOULD BE COMBINATION]; BECAUSE OF THE CONNECTION OF ANOTHER.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Añjanābhyañjana-sacrifice* lasting for forty-nine days; in that connection, we read—'At the morning-extraction, they anoint and re-anoint with gum-resin, at the midday-extraction, with the resin of the *Pīlu*-tree, at the third extraction, with perfumes'.—At the Archetype, the *anointing* is done with *Butter*; and this becomes admissible at the sacrifice in question, under the General Law.

There then arises this question—Is this latter 're-anointing with Butter' set aside by the anointing with substances laid down in connection with the Ectype?—Or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"Inasmuch as in connection with the Ectype, the anointing and re-anointing with the substances there mentioned have been laid down directly by the text,—and as the sign of the Archetype is present,—there must be *exclusion*.—*Objection*—'At the *Sattra*, the anointing and re-anointing are done at the time of the extraction,—at the Archetype, the re-anointing with Butter is done at the time of the Initiation;—thus the two appearing at different times, and serving two distinct purposes, there can be no exclusion'.—*Answer*—As in the case of the *Prayāja*, so here also, though appearing at different times, the two must be regarded as serving the same purpose; the time alone is different, the act remains the same; for instance, when it is said '*Tiṣṭhantam pashum prayajanti*', the *Prayājas* that are performed while the animal is standing are found to serve the same purpose as at the Archetype; similarly should it be in the case in question also."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—At the embellishment, of anointing and re-anointing, there should be combination with the Archetypal detail.—"Why?"—*Because of the connection of another*: it appears at a different time, and serves another purpose. By so doing, we shall be honouring the General Law.—From all this we conclude that there should be combination.

SŪTRA (11).

"IT SHOULD BE LIKE THE PRAYĀJA", IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

This argument has been put forward by the *Pūrvapakṣin*; it has got to be refuted [and this is done in the following *Sūtra*]—

SŪTRA (12).

NOT SO; BECAUSE THE PURPOSE SERVED IS DIFFERENT.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be as in the case of the *Prayāja*.—"Why?"—*Because the purpose served is different*; at first the Butter is used for the anointing for the purpose of securing easy movement; after the proceedings have begun, later on, at the time of extraction, there is re-anointing with gum-resin; and this is clearly seen to serve the purpose of removing roughness; and thus, as serving an entirely distinct purpose, it cannot set aside the former Archetypal anointment with Butter.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *At the 'Mahāvrata', there is combination of the 'New cloth' with the 'Tārya' (Butter-besprinkled Blanket).*

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS BOTH SERVE THE SAME PURPOSE,—AS REGARDS THE DRESS, THERE SHOULD BE MODIFICATION OF WHAT IS LAID DOWN IN CONNECTION WITH THE ARCHETYPE."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Mahāvrata* we read—'The Sacrificer puts on the Butter-besprinkled Blanket, and the Lady puts on the Kusha-cloth'; —at the Archetype 'he puts on unworn (new) cloth'; and this latter becomes admissible at the *Mahāvrata* under the General Law.

Thus there arises the question—Is the 'new cloth' to be excluded or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*In regard to the dress there should be modification of what has been laid down in connection with the Archetype.*—Why?—Because they *serve the same purpose*; there is the same purpose of covering the *loin-slip* that is meant to be served by what has been laid down in connection with the Archetype, as also by what has been laid down in connection with the Ectype;—and at the Archetype, as well as at the Ectype, it is this *covering* that is done. Hence what comes in by virtue of the General Law should be set aside by what has been laid down directly by a text."

SŪTRA (14).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE AN ADDITION; BECAUSE THE PURPOSES SERVED ARE DIFFERENT.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

It should be an addition; what is laid down in connection with the Ectype should be in addition to the Cloth laid down in connection with the Archetype.—"Why?"—Because one thing sets aside the other when, without setting aside this latter, it cannot come in; that which can come in without setting aside the other, does not set aside this latter; if that were to set it aside, then it would be rejecting what is indicated by the General Law, even when this latter is not inconsistent or incompatible.

Objection—"But the word 'puts on' is used in the sense of covering the loin-slip; so that the purpose served in both cases cannot be different."

Answer—It is not so; the word 'puts on' is used in connection with the upper garment also; for instance, it is said 'he puts on the blanket', 'he puts on the skin of the *Ruru-deer*'; in fact the etymological meaning of the word '*paridhattē*' (puts on) is 'wears all round'. From this it follows that there should be no exclusion of the 'new cloth',—there should be combination of both ('new cloth' and 'butter-besprinkled blanket').

SŪTRA (15).

THERE IS A TEXT ALSO THAT INDICATES THE SAID COMBINATION.

Bhāṣya.

By using the term 'cloth' ('*vāsas*') in the plural in the following texts, it is indicated that there should be combination of both—(a) '*Vāsāmsi vārahi chopānahau vimuñchati*',—(b) '*Kṛṣṇaviṣāṇayā vāsāmsi vibhramsayati, tato'dhvaryuḥ paridhattē*'.—From this also we conclude that there is to be no *exclusion*, there should be *combination*.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *At the 'Mahāvrata' the 'Shloka' and other Sāmans are to be combined with the 'Rathantara' and other Sāmans.*

SŪTRA (16).

IN THE CASE OF SĀMANS, IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE IS TO BE NO MODIFICATION, BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF ENTIRELY DIFFERENT THINGS.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Mahāvrata*, we read—'*Shlokēna purastāt sadasaḥ stuvatē, anushlokēna pashchāt sadasaḥ, krauñchēna chātvālamavēkṣamāṇaḥ*' ['He sings the *Shloka-sāman* before the Assembly,—the *Anushloka-sāman* behind the Assembly,—and with the *Krauñcha-sāman*, while looking at the hole in the ground'].—At the Archetype, there are other *Sāmans*, which also are admissible at the *Mahāvrata* by virtue of the General Law.

Thus there arises the question—Is there to be exclusion of the Archetypal *Sāmans*? Or is there to be no exclusion, there is to be combination?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"Inasmuch as the sign of the Archetype is present, in the shape of the word '*stuvatē*' ('sings'), and it has been directly declared,—the Archetypal *Sāmans* should be excluded. Just as in the case of the assertion—'*Kautsam bhavati, Kāṇvam bhavati, Vashiṣthasya janitrē bhavataḥ, Shuddhāshuddhīyē bhavataḥ, Bhargayashasī bhavataḥ, Krauñchāni bhavanti*', when all these are directly laid down, those that could have come in by virtue of the General Law become excluded,—so should it be in the case in question also."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*In the case of Sāmans*,—such as are prescribed in such texts as 'They sing the *Shloka-sāman* before the Assembly',—being directly laid down, *it should be understood that there should be no modification*—of the Archetypal *Sāmans*.—"Why?"—*Because of the mention of entirely different things*;—i.e. in the sentences 'They sing *before the Assembly*' and the like, we find the *Sāman* mentioned as connected with an entirely different thing. When one word is connected with another as its qualification, it cannot become connected with any other word, so long as it remains mentioned only once;—e.g. in the expression '*Bhāryā rājñaḥ puruṣo dēvadattasya*', if '*rājñaḥ*' is taken as uttered to qualify '*bhāryā*', then it cannot be connected again with the term '*puruṣaḥ*'. Similarly, when a thing has been connected with the sentence '*purastāt sadasaḥ stuvatē*', it cannot be connected again with the sentence '*Shlokēna stuvatē*'.—If it is the presence of the place of the *Stuti* that is taken to be enjoined (by the sentence),—and the mention of '*Shloka*' is only by way of *reference*,—then, in that case, the whole could be taken as *one sentence* (syntactically connected). But if the presence of the

place has been enjoined, then the sentence is already complete: and in that case '*Shlokēna cha*' ('With the *shloka-sāman*') has got to be enjoined; and for this purpose the injunctive affix has to be brought into the mind;—and for bringing it into the mind, it should be pronounced;—but as a matter of fact, we do not find it so pronounced; hence either it should be assumed, even though not pronounced,—or the *pronouncing* also should be assumed; and if this were assumed, it would be contrary to the actual words of the text.—Hence we conclude that the above explanation is not possible.—What then?—What is enjoined by Direct Assertion is the *Stuti* as qualified by the place (*before the Assembly*) and the *Sāman* ('*shloka*'); and when one connection of the things has been enjoined and the sentence completed,—it cannot be necessary to assume another Syntactical Connection; so that when the *Stuti* qualified by two qualifications has been enjoined by Direct Assertion, then the Syntactical Connection has become complete,—and it is not necessary to assume any other Syntactical Connection,—for which purpose it could be pronounced twice.—From all this we conclude that the sentence in question lays down an additional *Stuti* and the Archetypal *Stuti* does not become excluded.

SŪTRA (17).

WHEN ANY OTHER THING IS NOT SPOKEN OF, THERE IS MODIFICATION OF THE ARCHETYPAL DETAIL, BECAUSE IT IS SUBSIDIARY.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that the Archetypal detail is excluded in the case of such sentences as '*Kautsam bhavati*, etc. etc.'.—This has to be refuted; this refutation is as follows:—In the instance cited, it is only right that the Archetypal detail is excluded; because in this any other thing is not found mentioned,—what is found mentioned is subsidiary to the Archetypal detail,—hence it is only natu that the Archetypal detail should be set aside by the Ectypal detail which is directly laid down.—In the case in question however, another thing is found mentioned; hence in order to avoid syntactical split, there should be no exclusion of the Archetypal detail, as has been explained above.

Or, *Sūtra* (17) may be explained as embodying the following separate *Adhikaraṇa*—

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *In some Ectypes, the Archetypal Sāmans are excluded by 'Kautsa' and other Sāmans.*

Bhāṣya.

Somewhere we read—'*Kautsam bhavati* . . . . . *Krauñchāni bhavanti*', where so many distinct *Sāmans* are mentioned as coming in; in connection with the Archetype however, there are other *Sāmans*, which are admissible

at the Ectype also, in accordance with the General Law.—The question then arises—Are these latter excluded or not?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—"There is no exclusion, there is combination.—Why?—Because all that is enjoined in the sentence in question is mere *Sāman*, and there is no sign of the Archetype in the form of the word '*stuvatē*'; hence there should be combination."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta* :—

SŪTRA (17).

IN REALITY, WHEN ANY OTHER THING IS NOT SPOKEN OF, THERE IS MODIFICATION OF THE ARCHETYPAL DETAIL, BECAUSE IT IS A SUBSIDIARY.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the above view.—Even when another thing is not mentioned, there should be modification the Archetypal detail; because at the Archetype the *Sāman* is a subsidiar —and the text in question also mentions a *Sāman* ;—hence by virtue of th common character of '*Sāman*', the latter can very well be used for the purposes for which the *Sāman* is used (at the Archetype). For instance, when it is said—'Here are Curds, Clarified Butter, Vegetables, and Rice,—feed Devadatta,—and like *Devadatta*, feed *Yajñadatta* also, with oils',—though it is not said in so many words that the oil is to be used for lubricating the food, yet it is for that purpose alone that the oil is used, because it is capable of doing that only ;—in the same manner, even though it has not been said in so many words that the Ṛk-verse is to be embellished by the *Sāma-music*, yet the only purpose that the *Sāman* is capable of serving, and for serving which it is used, is the embellishing of the *Ṛk-verse*.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *The 'Kautsa' and other Sāmans exclude the Archetypal Sāmans in a restricted manner.*

SŪTRA (18).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"(THERE SHOULD BE EXCLUSION) OF ALL; BECAUSE THERE IS NO DISTINCTION."

Bhāṣya.

Somewhere we read—'*Kautsam bhavati—Kāṇvam bhavati—Vashiṣṭhasya janitrē bhavataḥ—Shuddhāshuddhīye bhavataḥ.—Bhārgayashasī bhavataḥ—Krauñchāni bhavanti*'.—In connection with the Archetype, there are other *Sāmans*, which are indicated by the General Law as finding place in the Ectype also.—We have understood that the former set of '*Kautsa*, etc.' set aside the *Archetypal Sāmans*.

Now there arises the question—Do all the Ectypal details set aside all the Archetypal ones? Or is it that one out of the Ectypal *Sāmans* sets aside one Archetypal *Sāman* and two Ectypal *Sāmans* shall exclude two of the Archetypal ones and more than three (several) Ectypal ones shall exclude more than two Archetypal ones?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"All exclude all.—Why?—*Because there is no distinction*; there is no peculiarity whereby it could be understood that 'this excludes that, nothing else'. Hence we conclude that all exclude all."

SŪTRA (19).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE IS EXCLUSION OF ONE ONLY (BY ONE); BECAUSE OF THE FORCE OF THE VEDIC TEXT; AND THERE IS NO MODIFICATION OF THE (REST OF THE) ARCHETYPAL ONES.

Bhāṣya.

It is not true that all Ectypal *Sāmans* exclude all Archetypal ones; in fact, one excludes one, two exclude two, and several (more than two) exclude several.—Why?—*Because of the force of the Vedic text*: In the case of the clauses '*Kautsam bhavati*', '*Kāṇvam bhavati*' (in each of which only one *Sāman* is mentioned), each of these texts, having brought about each of the Archetypal ones, has its purpose fulfilled and thereby it proves its utility;—in the case of the clauses '*Vashiṣṭhasya janitrē bhavataḥ*', '*Shuddhāshuddhīyē bhavataḥ*', and '*Bhārgayashasī bhavataḥ*' (each of which speaks of two *Sāmans*), when each of these couples has excluded two of the Archetypal *Sāmans*, its force has been duly fulfilled;—and lastly, in the case of the clause '*Krauñchāni bhavanti*' (where a plurality of *Sāmans* is

spoken of), this text has its force duly fulfilled by the exclusion of three Archetypal *Sāmans* by three of those spoken of.—If on the mention of one, only one is excluded, then the number of the Ectypal *Sāmans* becomes equal in number to the number that has been admitted at the Archetype.

"What would be the effect of this ?"

The effect would be this that there would be no modification of the rest of the Archetypal ones;—i.e. the rest of the Archetypal *Sāmaṇs* would be admitted (at the Ectype), and to that extent, the General Law would be obeyed.—From all this it follows that one excludes one, two exclude two, and many exclude many.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): (*a*) *At sacrifices where the 'Stomas' are augmented, the Archetypal Sāman is not excluded ; (b) At those where the 'Stomas' are not augmented the Archetypal Sāman is excluded.*

SŪTRA (20).

WHERE THERE IS AUGMENTATION OF 'STOMA', THERE SHOULD BE ACCRETION (COMBINATION); WHERE THERE IS NO INCREASE (OF 'STOMA') THERE SHOULD BE MODIFICATION OF THE THING; SPECIALLY BECAUSE THE OTHER HAS NOT BEEN ASSERTED.

Bhāṣya.

There are certain sacrifices at which the *Stomas* are augmented, and there are some at which the *Stomas* are not augmented ;—these have been mentioned in the following text—'With twenty-one *Atirātras* one should sacrifice for one desiring offspring; with twenty-seven, for one who desires energy; with thirty-three, for one who desires a good standing'; and again, 'There are thirty-two *Pavamānas* at the *Abhiṣēchanīya*' ;—'There are nine *Rājasāmans*, eleven *Rājasāmans*, two *Balaughashravas*, two *Vashiṣṭha's Janitras*,—these they call *Sākampravēdanas*, the *Shuddhāshuddhi*, and both the *Samshravopapada*'; again, 'In the *Rathahavirdhāna*, of the *Punaḥstoma* sacrifice', also 'the *Apachitivatis* of the *Punaḥstoma* sacrifice'; 'the middle *Savana* of the *Punaḥstoma* has been declared to be twelve; at the other two *Savanas*, the number of *Stomas* should be nineteen'.—In all this, in some cases we find the Archetypal number of *Stomas* augmented, while in others it is reduced.

Now, there arises the question—When there is augmentation or reduction at the Ectype, do the Archetypal *Sāmans* become excluded? Or are they excluded where there is reduction, and not excluded where there is augmentation?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—"In both cases there is to be exclusion (of the Archetypal *Sāmans*); because what is admissible only by virtue of the General Law is always set aside by what has been directly laid down; and it is only when the new *Sāmans* would come in that their existence would be justified."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta* :—*Where there is augmentation of Stoma*, there should be no exclusion, but accretion (combination).—"Why?"—It is going to be explained under *Sūtra* 10. 5. 23, that the number of *Sāmans* is made up by introducing additional *Sāmans* ;—in this way the General Law would be followed.—Where, on the other hand,

there is no augmentation, the Archetypal *Sāmans* should be excluded; that much of the Archetypal *Sāmans* should be excluded whose exclusion would make up the requisite number, and the rest should be those same that are connected with the Archetype.—"Why?"—*Because the other has not been asserted*; the other is not found to be laid down; i.e. it is not laid down that 'there must be introduction of new *Sāmans*', all that is laid down is the number (of the *Sāmans* to be used).—From all this it follows that in cases where there is augmentation of *Stomas*, there is no exclusion of the Archetypal *Sāman*, while in cases where there is reduction of *Stomas*, just so many may be excluded as may be necessary.—As for the argument that "the existence of the *Sāmans* would be justified",—we may let the *ārṣa* (the *Smṛti*-rule) be set aside by the General Law; what is laid down in the *Smṛti* is a mere subsidiary in general, while what comes in by the General Law is a particular subsidiary. [Read—'*Guṇamātramārṣam, vishiṣṭaguṇashchodakaḥ*', as in manuscript C.]

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *The 'āvāpa' (Inclusion) and 'udvāpa' (Exclusion) of the Sāmans pertaining to the sacrifices with augmented and reduced 'Stomas' is to be done in the Pavamāna-hymn.*

SŪTRA (21).

THEY MUST BE IN THE 'PAVAMĀNA', AS IT IS THEREIN THAT 'INCLUSION' AND 'EXCLUSION' ARE FOUND (MENTIONED).

Bhāṣya.

The subject-matter of enquiry here are those sacrifices in which there is an augmentation of *Stomas*, as also those in which there is a reduction of them,—those same that have been dealt with in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*. In connection with them we have understood that there is non-exclusion (of the Archetypal *Sāmans*) in those sacrifices in which there is an augmentation of *Stomas*, and there is exclusion of them in those in which there is reduction of *Stomas*.

Now there arises the question—Are the said 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' to be done to any hymn one chooses? Or should they be done in the *Pavamāna* hymn only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"Inasmuch as there is no ground for making a discrimination, they may be done anywhere one chooses."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' should be done in the *Pavamāna*.—Why?—Because it is in this that they are found mentioned, in the following text—'There are three bellies of the Sacrifice—the *Gāyatrī*, the *Bṛhatī* and the *Anuṣṭup*, it is in these that they *include* and *exclude*' [and these metres are found in the *Pavamāna* hymn only].

Objection—"This is a mere indication, point to some direct reason."

The *answer* is as follows—

SŪTRA (22).

THERE ARE TEXTS ALONE (PUT FORWARD), BECAUSE THE SUBJECT IS SOMETHING NEW.

Bhāṣya.

It is because there is no reason (or argument) that we are putting forward texts only.

For these reasons we conclude that the 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' are to be done in the *Pavamāna* hymn only.

Adhikaraṇa (15): *In connection with sacrifices, the Deity must be indicated by means of that name which occurs in the Injunction of the Sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (23).

In the matter of the Mantra (indicating the Deity), it should be done by means of the term that is contained in the Injunction; as it is by that term that there has been injunction.

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, laid down in the text—'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices'; in connection therewith, we read—'On the Moonless and Full-moon days, one may not fail in offering a cake baked upon eight pans, dedicated to *Agni*'.—Of this deity *Agni*, there are several names—'*Agni*', '*Shuchi*', '*Pāvaka*', '*Dhūmakētu*' '*Kṛshānu*', '*Vaishvānara*', '*Shāṇḍilya*' and so forth.

There arises the following question—In the Mantra-texts indicating the deity (*Agni*), should the Deity be mentioned by *any* one of its several names? Or only by that one name '*Agni*' which occurs in the injunction of the offering?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"It may be mentioned by any one of the names.—Why?—Because all that is meant to be conveyed is the idea of the deity *Agni*; i.e. the Cake has to be connected with the deity *Agni*;—the Deity is to be one that is *Agni*;—it is *Agni* who is to be referred to at the time of making the offering;—now this Deity should be mentioned by a word that may be capable of signifying it;—any one of the several names is capable of signifying the Deity;—hence we conclude that in the Mantra-texts speaking of the Deity, it may be mentioned by any one of the names."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The Deity must be referred to by the name '*Agni*' alone, which is what occurs in the Injunction,—and not by any other of the names, '*Shuchi*' and the rest.—"Why?"—*Because the injunction is by that name*; i.e. the connection between the Deity with the offering has been declared by means of that name.—"How so?"—When the Injunction speaks of the Cake being made '*Āgnēya*' ('dedicated to *Agni*') what is meant is that *Agni* should be made its 'Deity'.

"What do you mean by 'Deity'?"

There is one opinion that by the term 'deity' we understand those beings, Agni and the rest, who are described in *Itihāsas* and *Pūraṇas* as living in Heaven.

Against this opinion there is this that, under that view *Ahaḥ*, *Shārdūla* and the like could not be included under the term—[and yet these have been declared to be *Deities* of certain offerings].—And terms denoting time are found to be spoken of as 'Deity', in such texts as—'This is an offering to *Kāla* (Time)', 'the *Māsa* (Month) is the Deity', '*Saṁvatsara* (Year) is the Deity'.

The other opinion is that—"by the term '*dēvatā*' ('Deity') are meant just those to whom the name 'Deity' has been applied in the *Mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa* texts, such as—'*Agni* is the Deity—*Vāta* is the Deity,—*Sūrya* is the Deity,—*Chandramā* is the Deity."

Under this view also, *Ahaḥ* and the rest do not become included under the term. Further, inasmuch as the generic name 'Deity' being scarcely used in common parlance, the meaning of the term would always remain unknown (if its denotation were to rest entirely upon *Mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa* texts).

For these reasons we conclude that *Deities* are those who are *Sūktabhāk* (to whom Hymns are addressed) and *Havirbhāk* (Recipients of offerings).

"Who are '*Sūktabhāk*'?"

Those to whom hymns like the following are addressed—'*Imam stomamarhatē, etc. . . . . . vayantava*' (Ṛg-Veda)—and '*Havirbhāk*' are those who are mentioned as *the recipients of offerings*, in texts like—'*Āgneyamaṣṭākapālam nirvapēt*' ('One should offer the cake baked on eight pans, to *Agni*'); '*Agniṣomiyamēkādashakapālam*' ('One should offer the cake baked upon eleven pans, to *Agni-Soma*').

Says the Opponent—"If *recipients of offerings* are 'Deities', then, even Pans are 'Deities'; as these also (containing the offerings) are 'recipients of offerings'."

To meet this, that 'recipient of offerings' should be the 'Deity' for whose sake the offering is made.—Similarly with '*Sūktabhāk*', [it being that to whom Hymns are meant to be addressed]. In this sense we find the term '*Dēvatā*' ('Deity') used, in such expressions as—'*Agnidēvatyam sūktam*' ['Hymn addressed to *Agni*']; in the same way we have the expression '*Agnidēvatyam haviḥ*' ['the offering to *Agni*']. Similarly with such expressions as '*Atithidēvatyam*' ('offered to the guest'), '*Pitṛdēvatyam*' ['offered to *Pitṛs*'].—Thus the character of 'Deity' becomes applicable to all those beings that are spoken of as those to whom anything is offered,—be they corporeal or incorporeal, sentient or insentient;—and in this way the use of the generic term 'deity' would also become explicable.

"What if it is so?"

If it is so, then that being becomes the 'Deity' of an offering, by whose name the Sacrificer makes the determination 'I shall present the offering to so and so'.

"If that be so, then naturally, the Deity *Agni* may be mentioned by any one of its several names."

The answer to this is as follows:—This would be so if the term '*agni*' were meant to be uttered for the purpose of bringing about the notion of *agni*, *Fire*,—and this thing, *Fire*, also were meant to be connected with the offering. As a matter of fact, however, in the case in question, the term '*agni*' is not pronounced for the purpose of bringing about the notion of the thing, *Fire*; it is only when the purpose in view is meant to be served by the *thing*, that the word is used for bringing about the notion of that thing; in a case however, where there is no need for the *thing*,—and where the purpose is meant to be served by the *word* only, it is the *word* alone whose idea should be brought about for that purpose.—Then again, it is not in its material form that the Deity helps the accomplishment of the sacrifice,—it does so in its verbal form; just as the *Adhvaryu* helps it with his hands, so the Deity helps it with the name. Just as when, in accordance with the injunction—'*Hotuḥ pānam dvirlēpēnopastṛṇāti*',—though the action bears directly upon his *hands*, yet it is the *Hotṛ priest* himself that is regarded as helping the sacrifice,—in the same manner, even though help is rendered by the Deity through the name connected with itself, yet it is the Deity itself that is regarded as helping the sacrifice. So that, even though what is enjoined is the Deity as helping the sacrifice, yet what enters into the constitution of the sacrifice is the *word* (name, connected with the Deity).—Thus then, the word ('*agni*') is not pronounced for the purpose of bringing about the notion of the thing denoted by it, *Fire*. Nor would it be right to take the word as denoting the thing and then, through that denotation, to supply the *name* itself. As that would involve an *indication per indication* (a very complicated process). What happens really is that it is the *word* (name) that is connected with the *offering*, and through its connection with the name, the thing (Fire) also comes to be recognised as the Deity. So that the Deity is that being whose name is connected with the offering in the sense that the offering is intended for it; and the act is recognised as being done in reference to the *thing* denoted (Fire), only when it is found that it is not possible for the offering to reach the *word*. In the case in question, however, it is possible for the action to take place in reference to the *Word* itself. Hence we conclude that the word is not pronounced for the purpose of bringing about the notion of the thing denoted (Fire). This is what has been thus explained by the *Vṛttikāra*—'The notion of the thing denoted is not preceded by the word; hence the existence of the thing is established (as apart from the word)'.—Thus then, the connection of the *offering* being with the word '*agni*', there can be no possibility of the use of '*Shuchi*' and the other names of Fire. Hence when the *Mantra* comes to indicate the Deity, it must make use of that word which occurs in the Injunction.

Says the Opponent—"In that case it is the *word* that becomes the Deity."

Answer—This is an idea that it is not for us to refute; because such an idea, if expressed, does not militate against our view; on the contrary it lends all the more strength to the view that '*Shuchi*' and the other names of Fire should not be used.

SŪTRA (24).

In all other Mantras the same term is used; hence that is the name that is found everywhere.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also, when the Deity comes to be spoken of, the term used should be the same as that occurring in the Injunction:—"For what reason?"—In the *Mantras*, there is the same one word, which is the word occurring in the Injunction; that same word is found to be used everywhere in connection with all such (dative) syllables as (*a*) '*Apāt*', (*b*) '*Ujjiti*' and (*c*) '*Svāhā*'.—For instance, (*a*) in connection with '*apāt*', we find the text—'*Apāt agnēḥ priyā priyā dhāmāni*, etc.';—(*b*) in connection with '*ujjiti*', we have the text—'*Agnērujjitimanūjjēṣam*, etc.';—and (*c*) in connection with '*svāhā*', we have the text—'*Svāhā agnim svāhā somam*'.—Thus then, inasmuch as in every case the term used is the same '*agni*' (or '*Soma*' or '*Indra*'), there is no room for the use of any alternative names;—this is just as we have argued above.

From all this it follows that *in the matter of the Mantra indicating the Deity, it should be done by means of the term that is contained in the Injunction.*

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *Even in the case of 'Transference' the deity should be spoken of by the term occurring in the Injunction.*

SŪTRA (25).

SIMILARLY IN THE SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS; BECAUSE IT HAS THE SAME FOR ITS ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Charu-offering* laid down in the text—'Desiring Brahmic glory one should offer cooked rice to *Sūrya*'. Of *Sūrya*, there are many names—'*Sūrya*', '*Āditya*', '*Bhāskara*', '*Savitṛ*', '*Divākara*'.

The question therefore that arises is—In the *Mantras* indicating *Sūrya* as the deity, may the deity be mentioned by any one of the several names? Or by the name '*Sūrya*' only, which occurs in the Injunction of the offering?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"At the *Archetype*, the *Mantras* that were used contained the term '*Agni*';—these same *Mantras* are admissible at the *Saurya*, according to the General Law, and they contained the name '*Agni*', not '*Sūrya*';—further, the term '*Sūrya*' is found in connection with the '*Charu*', not in connection with '*Ujjiti*' ('*apāṭ*', '*svāhā*' and the like);—hence the *Mantras* should be modified in accordance with the real state of things,—and it is the object *Sun* (*Sūrya*) that should be spoken of in them;—this can be done by any one of the several words denoting the *Sūrya* (Sun). Hence there can be no restriction as to any one name being used.—It has to be borne in mind that what form the subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa* are those Archetypal *Mantras* which contain the term '*Agni*', not those that do not contain that word."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*Similarly in the subsequent proceedings*,—i.e. at the Ectype,—*because it has that for its Archetype.* .Just as, at the Archetype, so at the subsequent proceedings of the Ectype also—the *Mantras* are to be used in obedience to the General Law,—*because it has that for its Archetype.* At the Archetype, the term "*Agni*' was used in the sense of the term as used in the injunction,—not in the sense of the object, *Fire*; so in the case in question also, because it has that for its Archetype, the *Mantras* that are used should be used in the sense of the terms occurring in the injunction.—The connection too of the term '*Sūrya*' is not with the '*Charu*' but with the *performance*; the *sense* is that 'the thing should be dedicated to *Sūrya*', and this is connected with the performance; the sense is not that the '*Charu*' is what is dedicated to *Sūrya*: because the case-ending used is the Accusative, which is related to the verb.—From all this it follows that at the Ectype also, the *Mantras* used should contain the term '*Sūrya*' only.

Adhikaraṇa (17): *At the 'Fire-installation', 'Agni' should be spoken of along with the qualifications.*

SŪTRA (26).

WHEN THE ARCHETYPAL DEITY IS SPOKEN OF WITH QUALIFICATIONS, IT SHOULD BE SPOKEN OF ALONG WITH THOSE QUALIFICATIONS.

Bhāṣya.

There is the 'Fire-installation', laid down in the text—'One who knowing thus installs the Fire'. In connection with this, certain '*Pavamāna*-offerings' have been laid down in the text—'One should offer the cake baked on eight pans to *Agni-Pavamāna*, to *Agni-Pāvaka* and to *Agni-Shuchi*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Should the deity *Agni* be spoken of along with the qualifications ('*Pavamāna*', 'purifying', '*Pāvaka*', 'purifier', '*Shuchi*', 'pure')? Or without the qualifications? —[At the Archetype the Deity mentioned is simply '*Agni*', without any qualifications.]

The most reasonable view that presents itself (as the *Siddhānta*) is that the Deity that has been spoken of at the Archetype, without any qualifications, should (at the Ectype) be spoken of as with the mentioned qualifications.

SŪTRA (27).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA VIEW]—"REALLY THERE SHOULD BE NO MODIFICATION; AS ONLY THUS WOULD THERE BE NO DISAPPEARANCE OF THE OBJECT AND THE WORD, AS IN THE CASE OF THE SUBSTANCE."

Bhāṣya.

"Verily, *there should be no modification*;—i.e. *Agni* should be spoken of without any qualifications.—Why?—*Because only thus would there be no disappearance of the object and the word*; i.e. in this way, the object (Fire) and the word ('*Agni*') both remain undisturbed; *Agni* is the same as *Pavamāna*, the same as *Pāvaka*, the same as *Shuchi*. So that the deity that has to be mentioned, becomes mentioned even without adding the qualifications ('*pavamāna*', '*pāvaka*', and '*shuchi*');—*as in the case of the substance*; i.e. in the text 'The barren she-goat is sacred to all deities; desiring prosperity, one should sacrifice it to Vāyu', the offering is spoken of in connection with the '*barren* she-goat', and yet in the Ectype, the *Mantra* used contains the simple word '*Chhāgā*' ('she-goat', without the qualification 'barren'),

on the ground that the object (animal) and the word both remain intact. The same should be done in the case in question.—From all this it follows that the Deity should be spoken of without qualifications."

SŪTRA (28).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *answered*]—THE DEITY SHOULD BE SPOKEN OF AS ENJOINED; BECAUSE IT DOES NOT ENTER INTO THE BODY OF THE SACRIFICE, IN ITS MATERIAL FORM; IT ENTERS INTO IT ONLY IN THE VERBAL FORM; IF IT WERE NOT MENTIONED ALONG WITH THE QUALIFICATIONS, THEN THE TEXTS SPEAKING OF THE QUALIFICATIONS WOULD BE MEANINGLESS.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, *the deity should be spoken of as enjoined*,—i.e. along with qualifications.—"Why?"—*Because the deity does not enter into the body of the sacrifice, in its material form*; i.e. the deity does not enter into the material constitution of the sacrifice; it has been already explained that it is not in its material form that the Deity helps the sacrifice. If it had entered into the sacrifice in its material form, then, *Pavamāna* also would have been denoted by the term '*agni*', and in that case the qualification ('*pavamāna*') need not have been mentioned.—"In what way then does the Deity help in the sacrifice?"—*The deity enters into the sacrifice in its verbal form*; it is the connection between the word denoting the deity and the offering that is directly asserted by the text; that word has to be mentioned with which the offering is connected; and it has to be pointed out that 'in this manner is this connection brought about'.—If the qualification were not mentioned at all, then the mention of these qualifications in the text would be meaningless. The word is mentioned in the text only with a view to point out how it should be uttered; under the circumstances, if the qualification were not connected,—the mention of the qualification would be absolutely futile.—From all this it follows that the deity should be mentioned along with the qualifications.

SŪTRA (29).

IN THE CASE OF SUBSTANCES,—INASMUCH AS THEY ENTER INTO THE BODY OF THE SACRIFICE IN THEIR MATERIAL FORM, THERE WOULD BE NO MODIFICATION IN THE SUBSTANCE, BECAUSE OF THE STRENGTH.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued above that—"as in the case of substances,—in the text 'The barren she-goat is sacred to all deities,—desiring prosperity, one should sacrifice it to *Vāyu*', the original sacrifice having been enjoined with the term 'barren she-goat', when the *Mantra* comes to be used at the

Ectype the word used is simply 'she-goat' (without the qualification of 'barren')."—This has got to be refuted. Our answer to this is as follows—In the case of substances, it is only right that it should be so, as they enter into the body of the sacrifice; that is, the substance becomes a constituent part of the sacrifice; so that if the substance (animal) is sacrificed—be it *barren* or *not barren*,—it is understood to be spoken of by the word 'she-goat'; hence the thing being a means of accomplishing the sacrifice, even when there is no modification (in the way of the mention of qualifications), the denotative force of the sentence is quite explicable; hence in that case, the animal could be mentioned without qualifications, for the purpose of obeying the General Law.—In the case in question, on the other hand, as the Deity enters into the sacrifice in its verbal form, a modification should be made of what comes in under the General Law.

ADHIKARAṆA (18): *At the 'Ājyabhāga-offering', in connection with 'Fire-installation', the Deity is to be spoken of without the qualification.*

SŪTRA (30).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE TERM 'BUDHANVĀN' SHOULD BE TREATED LIKE THE TERM 'PAVAMĀNA', BECAUSE IT DENOTES A PECULIAR QUALITY."

Bhāṣya.

There is the Fire-installation, laid down in the text—'One who knowing this installs the Fire'; at this rite there are the *Pavamāna* offerings laid down in the text—'One should offer the cake baked on eight pans to *Agni-Pavamāna, to Agni-Pāvaka,* to *Agni-Shuchi*';—at this there are the two 'Ājyabhāga-offerings', in regard to which we read—'The *Āgnēya* should be made *budhanvān*, and the *Saumya* should be made *Pāvakavān*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Should *Agni* be mentioned with the qualification ('*budhanvān*')? Or without the qualification?

In this connection the point to be considered first is—Does the term '*budhanvān*' indicate the deity or the *Mantra*?—If it indicates the deity, then *Agni* should be mentioned with the qualification; while if it indicates the *Mantra*, then *Agni* should be mentioned without the qualification.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—"*Agni* should be mentioned with the qualification; hence we explain the term ('*budhanvān*') as indicating the deity.—Why?—Because *Mantras* appear in the texts in their own form (and are recognisable as such), hence any injunction of them would be superfluous; the Deity however is not so recognisable, and hence the injunction of the deity serves a useful purpose. When it is said that '*Agni* should be made *budhanvān*', the '*Āgnēya* can become '*budhanvān*' only if the Deity has the qualification of being '*budhanvat*'.—From this it follows that the Deity should be mentioned along with the qualification;—just as in the case of the *Pavamāna Iṣṭis, Agni* is spoken of as '*pavamāna*' (see foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*),—so in the present case also, the specification of the peculiar qualification that we find in the expression '*agnirbudhanvān*' serves a useful purpose only if the said qualification is mentioned.—From all this we conclude that *Agni* should be mentioned with the qualification."

SŪTRA (31).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—INASMUCH AS THE TERM INDICATES A PARTICULAR MANTRA, THERE SHOULD BE NO MODIFICATION IN THE NAME OF THE DEITY.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the Deity should be mentioned with the qualification; it should, as a matter of fact, be mentioned without the qualification. In this connection, they offer the explanation that the term ('*budhanvān*') indicates a particular *Mantra*.—"How?"—In reality, the term clearly indicates the form of a particular *Mantra*; what the sentence 'the *Āgnēya* should be made *budhanvān*' means is that 'that thing which is related to a particular *Agni* should be made *budhanvān*',—it does not mean that '*Agni* should be made "*budhanvān*". If *Agni* were made "*budhanvān*", then *Budhanvān-Agni* would be the deity, and in that case we could not have the term "*Āgnēya*" with the nominal affix', as it would be incomplete (containing only half the name of the deity *Budhanvān-Agni*). Nor would it be possible to have the nominal affix to this conjunct name, as Nominal Affixes are not added to terms with qualifications;—nor would it be right to bring in the qualification after the Nominal Affix had come in;—from all this it follows that '*budhanvān*' cannot be a qualification of *Agni*.—"What then is it that is specified as '*budhanvān*'?"—The *Āgnēya*;—its *mantra* is '*budha*', hence it is the *Āgnēya-sacrifice* that is '*budhanvān*' (using the *mantra* '*budha*'); this '*budha-mantra*' being the following—'*Agnim stomēna bodhaya samidhāno amartyam*' [where the word '*bodhaya*' occurs, and it is this that gives the name '*budha*' to the *mantra*].—Or the *mantra* itself may be taken to be construed in the sentence '*Āgnēya* is *budhanvān*'.

It has been argued that "the *mantra* is recognised in its own form and hence does not need to be enjoined".—The answer to this is as follows:—If that were so, then any *mantra* that contains the word speaking of *Agni* might be recognised as to be used; and hence it is with a view to negative this possibility that the text says 'the *budhanvān* should be used'—i.e. the *mantra* '*Agnim stomēna bodhaya*'. Such being the case, the term ('*budhanvān*') is not a qualification of the deity; and hence the deity should be mentioned without the qualification; this would also be in keeping with the General Law [as at the archetype, the deity is spoken of without qualifications].

ADHIKARAṆA (19): *(a) In the 'cow-sacrifice', the cow should be spoken of by means of the term 'Usrā', which is contained in the Injunction—(b) In the 'Pṛṣadājya homa', the tree should be spoken of by means of the term 'Vanaspati', which is contained in the Injunction.*

SŪTRA (32).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS AT THE ARCHETYPE, THERE IS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE INJUNCTION AND THE MANTRA, THERE SHOULD BE DIFFERENCE AT THE ECTYPE ALSO; AS THIS HAS THAT FOR ITS ARCHETYPE."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice; in connection with which we read—(A) 'The Cow should be sacrificed, and the Goat, dedicated to *Agni-Soma*'.—Of the Cow, 'go', there are several names—'*usrā*', '*usriyā*', '*ahī*', '*mahī*', '*aditi*', '*ilā*'. Hence there arises the following question—In the *mantras* at the cow-sacrifice, is the cow to be mentioned by any one of these several terms? Or must it be mentioned by that term alone which has appeared in the Injunction?—(B) Similarly we read 'With *Pṛṣadājya* one sacrifices to *Vanaspati*'; of the *Vanaspati*, 'tree', there are several names—'*vṛkṣa*' '*pādapa*', '*druma*', '*naga*'; hence there arises the question—In the *mantras* at the *Vanaspati-sacrifice*, is the tree to be mentioned by any one of the several terms? Or must it be mentioned only by that term which appears in the Injunction?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—(A) "The *Cow* may be spoken of by any one of the several terms.—Why?—*Because at the Archetype there is difference between the Injunction and the Mantra*;—as a matter of fact, we find a difference in the terms used in the Injunction and in the *Mantra*: For instance, the Injunction is in the form—'*Yo dīkṣito yadganiṣomiyam pashumālabhēta*' (where the word used for the animal is '*pashu*'),—while the *Mantra* used is in the form—'*Chhāgasya vapāyā mēdaso'nubrūhi*' (where the term used for the animal is '*Chhāga*').—In the case in question also (i.e. of the Cow-sacrifice, which is an Ectype of the *Agniṣomiya*) what has appeared at the Archetype is rendered admissible by the General Law;—and at the Archetype what has appeared is a difference in the terms used in the Injunction and in the *Mantra*;—strictly in accordance with the General Law, then, the term to be used at the Ectype also should be '*chhāga*' (as at the Archetype);—but it is impossible to apply that term to the *Cow*;—it is quite possible, however, to admit the general principle that there may be difference between the term used in the Injunction and that

used in the *Mantra*;—hence we conclude that in the case of the Cow-sacrifice, the Cow may be spoken of in the *Mantras* by any one of the synonyms, '*usrā*' and the rest.—(B) Similarly (in regard to the *Vanaspati-sacrifice*), we find that at (the *Sviṣṭakṛt-sacrifice*, which is) the Archetype, the Injunction is '*Agnim sviṣṭakṛtam yajati*' (where the Deity is spoken of by the conjunct term '*Agni-Sviṣṭakṛt*').—while the *Mantra* reads as—'*Prīhi dēvamushato yaviṣṭha . . . . yē daivya ṛtvijastēbhiragnē tvam hotṛṇāmasyā yajiṣṭha*' (where the Deity is spoken of by the simple term '*agni*'); so that a difference has been made between the Injunction and the *Mantra*;—the *Vanaspati-sacrifice* is an Ectype of the *Sviṣṭakṛt-sacrifice*, as is going to be explained under the *Saṅkarṣa*;—hence (according to the General Law) at the *Vanaspati-sacrifice*, there should be a difference between the Injunction and the *Mantra*. From this we conclude that *Tree* may be spoken of by any one of the several names of the Tree;—because it has the *Sviṣṭakṛt-sacrifice* for its Archetype."

SŪTRA (33).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, THE TERM USED SHOULD BE THE ONE USED BEFORE; BECAUSE THERE CAN BE NO TRANSFERRED INJUNCTION OF ANYTHING DIFFERENT.

Bhāṣya.

The thing must be mentioned by the same term that has been used before;—i.e. the *Cow* should be spoken of by the term '*usrā*'; as it is this term that has been used in the Injunction—'*Usrāyai vapāyai mēdaso'nubrūhi*'.

Says the Opponent—"This is only a Mantra-text; there is no such declaration as that 'the Cow should be spoken of by the term *usrā*'; on the other hand, the General Law is a declaration to the effect that 'the animal should be spoken by a term different from that used in the Injunction'."

Answer—It is not so; because the General Law does not declare the admissibility of the said *difference*; there is no General Law to the effect that 'whatever is there at the Archetype should be there at the Ectype also'; what the General Law does is to indicate the admissibility, at the Ectype, of that which has been declared *by the Injunctive Word* as to be done at the Archetype, and which does not come in there *by implication*. It is nowhere declared that 'at the Archetype there should be difference between the Injunction and the *Mantra*';—what happens is that it is laid down that the *Mantra* used should be '*Chhāgasya vapāyai mēdasonubrūhi*', and the difference (between the term '*chhāga*' used here and the term '*pashu*' as in the Injunction) comes in by mere implication. Thus, the use of the term '*chhāga*' is laid down by Direct Assertion, while the difference between the Injunction and the *Mantra* comes through indirect indication;—and whenever there is a doubt as between Direct Assertion and Indirect Indication, the former is more acceptable than the latter.—(A) From all this we conclude that the Cow should be spoken of, not by any one of the

several synonyms, but by the term '*usrā*' alone, on the strength of the Mantra-text.—(B) Similarly in connection with the *Pṛṣadājya*, the Deity should be spoken of by that same term which has been used in the Injunction as mentioning the Deity. Nowhere has it been laid down that 'there should be a difference made between the Injunction and the Mantra';—hence the Tree should be spoken of by the term '*Vanaspati*' only.

Adhikaraṇa (20): *At the 'Avabhṛtha', Agni and Varuṇa should be spoken of along with the qualifying term 'sviṣṭakṛt'.*

SŪTRA (34).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The deity 'Sviṣṭakṛt' being different, that term should be excluded from the name of the deity."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Avabhṛtha-sacrifice*, laid down in the sentence—'They perform the *Avabhṛtha* by offering the cake baked on one pan to *Varuṇa*'; in connection with this, it is laid down—'Offers the sacrifice to *Agni-Varuṇa sviṣṭakṛt*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—In the *Mantra*, is the term used for the Deity to be accompanied by the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*'? Or to be not accompanied by the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*'?—The point to be considered is this:—Is '*sviṣṭakṛt*' a conventional term (having its denotation independent of its etymology)? Or, it is not conventional, but figurative, having its denotation determined by its etymology, as '*sviṣṭam kṛtavan*', 'one who has done good'?—If it is *conventional*, the Deity should be spoken of without the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*'; if it is etymological, then it is to be spoken of with that term '*sviṣṭakṛt*'.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"The term is *conventional*, not *etymological*.—Why?—Because till the time of the sacrifice the Deity has *not done any good*, and yet it is at the time of the sacrifice that it is called '*sviṣṭakṛt*', as declared in the text 'Offers the sacrifice to *Sviṣṭakṛt*'.—Neither the accent nor any embellishment becomes affected by any partial qualification. In fact it is *Agni* itself that is spoken of as '*sviṣṭakṛt*'; as between the two, *Agni* and *Varuṇa*, it is *Agni* that has *done good*. Thus then, when the word is purely conventional, the Deity should be mentioned without the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*'.—Why?—Because the term (conventionally, not etymologically) denotes *Agni*, and not *Agni-Varuṇa*; and hence at the Ectype, as the Deity is not *Agni* (but *Agni-Varuṇa*), the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*' must be excluded from the name of the Deity.—From all this it follows that the Deity should be spoken of without the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*'."

SŪTRA (35).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, the term should be present; because the meaning is applicable, and the name is based upon action.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the Deity should be spoken of without the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*'; in fact, the Deity should be spoken of with the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*';

with this view we offer the following explanation: The name is secondary, etymological;—one is called '*sviṣṭakṛt*' on account of his ***having done good*** (*sviṣṭakaraṇāt*); and when a meaning is actually understood from a term, it cannot be right to deny its denotation by it; in fact, from the constituent factors of the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*' it is clear that its application is based upon the performance of some act. Then again, the term as a whole is never used in the sense of Fire (*Agni*), it is not recognised, in ordinary parlance, as being denotative of Fire;—hence it cannot be regarded as a *conventional* term.—Such being the case, the Deity should be spoken of along with the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*';—specially *because the meaning is applicable*; i.e. the deities '*Agni-Varuṇa*' have been spoken of in the sense of '*Agni*', in the sentence '*Agnī-varuṇau sviṣṭakṛtau yajati*'; and on account of the presence of the action (signified by the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*') this term '*sviṣṭakṛt*' is capable of signifying *Agni-Varuṇa*.—From all this it follows that the Deity should be spoken of along with the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*'.

It has been argued that—"the term means 'one who *has done* good', while *Agni* has not actually done any good at the time of the sacrifice."

Our answer to this is that under our view, it is only the *past* character of the act that would be wanting; while under your view, the past character as well as what is signified by the verbal root and its prefix would all be wanting. Further, *Agni* may be regarded as *having already done good*, in view of what has been done at previous sacrifices (at all of which *Agni* has been helpful).

ADHIKARAṆA (21): *In connection with the 'Agnīṣomīya-animal-sacrifice', throughout the performances, Agni should be spoken of by the term 'agni' without any qualifications.*

SŪTRA (36).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN OF AN OBJECT WITH QUALIFICATIONS, THE QUALIFICATION IS DROPPED, IT SHOULD BE SPOKEN OF IN THE MANTRAS AS BEFORE."

Bhāṣya.

At the Soma-sacrifice, there is the *Agniṣomiya*-animal-sacrifice, as laid down in the text—'*Agniṣomiyasya vapayā pracharyāgniṣomīyam pashu-puroḍāshamanunirvapati*'; in connection with the *Sviṣṭakṛt-offering* at this sacrifice, the qualifying term ('*sviṣṭakṛt*') is dropped, and the injunction reads simply as '*Agnim yajati*' ('sacrifices to *Agni*').

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is it at the *Sviṣṭakṛt-sacrifice* alone that the qualifying term is to be dropped, and in the other *Mantras* it is to be used as at the Archetype (i.e. along with the qualifying term '*sviṣṭakṛt*')?—Or is the qualifying term to be omitted throughout the animal-sacrifice?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"When we find that, of Agni, who has the qualification of being '*sviṣṭakṛt*', this qualification has been dropped,—we assert that there should be omission of the qualifying term only at that action in connection with which it has been dropped in the texts; that is, as a matter of fact, it is only in connection with the sacrifice (*sviṣṭakṛt*) that the text says '*Agnim yajati*' (omitting the qualifying term '*sviṣṭakṛt*'); so that the omission of the qualifying term being found in connection with that sacrifice,—if it were to be omitted in all the *Mantras*, then something would be done for which there is no authority in the scriptures; and there is as much wrong involved in doing what has not been laid down in the scriptures as there is in omitting to do what is laid down in them.—Hence we conclude that there should be omission of the qualifying term only at the one sacrifice, not in all the *Mantra*-texts."

SŪTRA (37).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE THROUGHOUT; AS THE WHOLE FORMS ONE ACT.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, it should be throughout; i.e. in the *Mantras*, whenever *Agni* happens to be spoken of along with the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*', this qualifying

term should be omitted.—Why ?—*Because the whole forms one act*; the qualifying term cannot be omitted at the *Sviṣṭakṛt-sacrifice* only, but throughout the entire sacrificial performance.—How so ?—The text '*Agnim yajati*' speaks of the performance; which means that the qualifying term should be omitted *at the performance of the Sviṣṭakṛt-sacrifice*; and as a matter of fact, all those other *Mantras* which contain the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*' may be regarded as so many '*Sviṣṭakṛt-sacrifices*'. Hence there should be omission of the qualifying term throughout the performance.

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ADHIKARAṆA (22): *At the 'Anuyājas', the 'Sviṣṭakṛt-sacrifice' is an 'act of Embellishment'.*

SŪTRA (38).

AT THE 'ANUYĀJA', THE SVIṢṬAKṚT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN INTEGRAL FACTOR, BECAUSE IT IS CONNECTED WITH THE PURPOSE SERVED BY USEFUL ACCESSORY DETAILS.

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* sacrifices;—at these, is performed the *Sviṣṭakṛt-sacrifice*, laid down in the text—'At the *Anuyājas*, one sacrifices to *Agni-Sviṣṭakṛt*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does the *Sviṣṭakṛt-sacrifice* help the *Anuyājas directly*? Or is it only an 'embellishment' (helping indirectly)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"It helps the *Anuyājas* directly.—Why?—It is a well-known fact that the function of actions is to help things directly; as it is only thus that the well-established entity serves the purpose of something still to be accomplished;—and the injunction also of the sacrifice in question is by Direct Assertion. Under the other view, something yet to be accomplished would serve the purpose of a well-established entity (which is absurd), and the injunction would be through Syntactical Connection.—From this we conclude that the *Sviṣṭakṛt-sacrifice* helps the *Anuyājas* directly."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—The *Sviṣṭakṛt should be regarded as an integral factor*, not something external.—"What is the meaning of '*āvāpika*' (integral)?"—The space between the *Ājya-bhāga* and *Sviṣṭakṛt* is '*āvāpa*', and that which comes in during that interval is '*āvāpika*'; in contrast to '*āvāpika*' is '*tāntrika*', which latter name applies to the *Anuyāja*. That which is the Deity of the *Sviṣṭakṛt*, that same is the principal Deity, and that also is the integral factor; it is for this reason that the *Sviṣṭakṛt* has been called '*āvāpika*', 'integral'.—Such being the case, the sacrifice must be an act of embellishment; thus alone does it become useful, helping the *Agni* which serves a useful purpose.—Then again, subsidiaries are of two kinds—*āradupakāraka*, *External*, those that help *from a distance* [i.e. from outside, and are exterior to, not the integral part of, the main sacrifice], and *sāmavāyika*, *Internal*, those that form integral parts of the sacrifice; and the Internal subsidiaries are more important than the External ones; because in their case the injunction is direct, while in that of the other, the Syntactical Connection would have to be with a sentence not before the eyes (remote).—Hence we conclude that the *Sviṣṭakṛt-sacrifice* is an act of embellishment.

Adhikaraṇa (23): *At the 'Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa', the 'Yājyā' and 'Puronuvākyā' are acts of Embellishment.*

SŪTRA (39).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"THE ACTION SPOKEN OF AS 'ANVĀHA' ('RECITES') MUST BE REGARDED AS A 'PRINCIPAL ACT',—LIKE THE RECITING OF THE 'SHASTRA',—BECAUSE THERE IS A DISTINCT INJUNCTION."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'Recites the *Yājyā*; recites the *Puronuvākyā*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this reciting of the *Yājyā* and *Puronuvākyā* a 'principal act'? Or 'an act of embellishment'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*The action spoken of as 'recites' must be regarded as a principal act.*—Why?—*Because there is a distinct injunction.* If it were an act of embellishment, then, inasmuch as from the very form of the verses (known as '*Yājyā*' and '*Puronuvākyā*') it would be clear that they are to be *recited*, the addition of the word 'recites' would be superfluous. On the other hand, if the *reciting* is a principal act, then it is necessary to add the word 'recites'; as otherwise, it would not be understood that it is an act that should be done; hence, inasmuch as the idea that it should be done is obtained from Direct Assertion, it must be regarded as a Principal Act;—*like the reciting of the 'Shastra'*; just as the reciting of the *Shastra* and *Stotra* hymns, being laid down by means of the words '*shaṁsati*' and '*stauti*' respectively, has been regarded as a principal act,—so should the act in question also be regarded."

SŪTRA (40).

[Siddhānta]—IN REALITY, IT IS AN ACT OF EMBELLISHMENT, BECAUSE THE ENJOINED WORD IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF BEING RECITED.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the reciting in question should be regarded as an act of embellishment (of the Deity).—"Why?"—Because the word that enjoins the act is for the purpose of being recited; that being the visible purpose served by it; and so long as that is there, there can be no reason for assuming an invisible (transcendental) result.—Hence the *reciting* must be an act of embellishment.

It has been argued that "the term 'recites' would be meaningless".—This has got to be refuted.

SŪTRA (41).

IT WOULD BE QUITE EXPLICABLE, AS SERVING THE PURPOSE OF ADDING OTHER ACCESSORY DETAILS.

Bhāṣya.

The expression '*anvāha*' ('recites') would be *quite explicable*,—justifiable;—how?—*as serving the purpose of adding other accessory details*;—such as—'He recites the *Yājyā* standing, he recites the *Puronuvākyā* sitting'; for the purpose of adding these details of *standing* and *sitting*, it is only right that the 'reciting' should be reiterated.

From all this it follows that the reciting of the *Yājyā* and of the *Puronuvākyā* are acts of embellishment.

ADHIKARAṆA (24): *In the 'Manotā', there is to be no 'Ūha' (Modification).*

SŪTRA (42).

IN THE 'MANOTĀ', THERE SHOULD BE NO MODIFICATION, BECAUSE OF THE DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

There is the offering of the animal dedicated to *Vāyu*, laid down in the text—'Desiring prosperity one should kill the white animal dedicated to *Vāyu*'.—At the *Agniṣomīya-animal-sacrifice*, which is the Archetype of all animal-sacrifices, there is used the *Manotā-mantra*—'*Tvam hyagnē prathamo manotā asyādhiyo abhavodasma hotā*' (Taitti. Brā. 3. 6. 10); this *Mantra* is indicated by the General Law as to be used at the ectypal animal-sacrifice to *Vāyu*.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the *Manotā-mantra* to be modified in accordance with the Deity (e.g. '*agnē*' being changed into '*vāyo*')? Or should it be used in its original form, without any modification?

The answer is as follows:—So far as the Archetype is concerned, the question that has been raised is not reasonable; at the Archetype *Agni-Soma* are the Deity;—the *Mantra* also is '*āgnēya*' ('recited to Agni', inasmuch as it is addressed to *Agni* and contains the term '*agni*'); and as it does not speak of anything that forms the constituent part of the sacrifice, it must be used in its unmodified form; [so that the raising of the question has no justification].

Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*, in answer to the above—"It is true that *Agni-Soma* are the Deity at the Archetype; but they are *Agni* and *Soma*; so that *Agni* alone is not the Deity there; nor is it true that *Agni* does not form a constituent part of the sacrifice; in fact, that Deity is recognised here which is indicated by the conception of *Agni*.—Now in the case in question, it is *Vāyu* that is mentioned as serving the purposes of the 'Deity'; and being mentioned as serving the purposes of the Deity, it also serves that purpose of *Agni* which consists in bringing about the conception of the Deity; hence, as serving the purpose of *Agni*, it must take in all the characteristic accessories of *Agni*, in accordance with *Sūtra* 10. 3. 35.—From all this it follows that the *Manotā-mantra* should be used (at the *Vāyu*-sacrifice) with such modifications as may be called for by the particular Deity concerned."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*In the case of the Manotā-mantra, there should be no modification, because of the declaration.*

There is the declaration to the effect that 'even when the animal has been dedicated to another Deity, the *Manotā-mantra* used must be that *related to Agni*'. And what is there that cannot be done by a declaration? There is nothing too much for a declaration.—From all this we conclude that the *Manotā-mantra* should be used without modification.

ADHIKARAṆA (25): *The 'Kaṇvarathantara'-Sāman should be sung over its own basic verse.*

SŪTRA (43).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE SĀMAN OTHER THAN RATHANTARA WHICH IS SPOKEN OF IN CONNECTION WITH THE PṚṢṬHA SHOULD BE SUNG OVER THE BASIC VERSE OF THE RATHANTARA, BECAUSE IT IS PRECEDED BY THAT AND BECAUSE THE VERSES HAVE BEEN DIFFERENTIATED."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Vaishyastoma* sacrifice, laid down in the text—'*Vaishyo vaishyastomēna yajēta*' ['The *Vaishya* should perform the *Vaishyastoma* sacrifice'];—in connection with that sacrifice, we read—'The *Kaṇvarathantara* is the *Pṛṣṭha* (*Sāman*)'.—It has been settled under 9. 2. 48, that the '*Kaṇvarathantara*' is a modification of the two *Sāmans* (*Bṛhat* and *Rathantara*).

In regard to this, there arises the question—May the '*Kaṇvarathantara*' be sung (*a*) over the basic verse of either the *Bṛhat* or the *Rathantara*, without any restriction? Or (*b*) over the basic verse of the *Rathantara* only? Or (*c*) over its own basic verse?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* (*a*) is that—"The General Law does not indicate any restriction; the matter becomes simplified also if there is no restriction, as that expedites the performance."

In answer to this, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa* (*b*):—"*The Sāman other than Rathantara*—i.e. *Kaṇvarathantara*,—*which is spoken of in connection with the Pṛṣṭha—should be sung over the basic verse of the Rathantara*;—because the *Vaishyastoma* is preceded by (and has for its Archetype) the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, and at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the *Sāman* has been sung over the basic verse of the *Rathantara*.—'But at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the *Sāman* has been sung over the basic verse of the *Bṛhat* also'.—Not so; *because the verses have been discriminated*; i.e. it is found that there is a discrimination among the verses, such as 'the basic verse of the *Rathantara* is adopted' and so forth.—Further, the term '*rathantara*' is found to be used in the sense of *Kaṇvarathantara*; from which it follows that the *Kaṇvarathantara* is only a particular form of the *Rathantara*. The *Kaṇvarathantara* might be taken as something different from the *Rathantara*, if it did not have the characteristics of this latter;—but when it does have these characteristics, it would be like the 'Sacrificial Post'; just as in the case of the sentence 'the Sacrificial Post is of *Udumbara* wood', it is found that the *Udumbara-wood* has not been mentioned in connection with the Archetype, and yet the adjective 'made of *Udumbara* wood' has been regarded as explicable on the basis of the presence of certain characteristics;—so also in the case in question, the

name '*rathantara*' may be applied to the *Kaṇvarathantara* on the basis of the presence in the latter of certain characteristics of the former."

SŪTRA (44).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE SUNG OVER ITS OWN BASIC VERSE; BECAUSE IT IS THE NAME APPLICABLE TO ALL.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the *Kaṇvarathantara* should be sung over the basic verse of the *Rathantara*; *it should, in fact, be sung over its own basic verse.*—"Why?"—*Because it is the name applicable to all*;—i.e. the term '*rathantara*' denotes the *Sāman* marked by all qualifications; while the name '*Kaṇvarathantara*' is applied to all those *Sāmans* only that are equipped with a particular *prastāva*, *udgītha*, *pratihāra*, *upadrava* and *nidhana*, and accompanied by a particular *Stobha*, *Svara*, *Kāla* and *Abhyāsa*; consequently, the basic verse also must be a characteristic mark.—Then again, if the *Kaṇvarathantara* were treated as *Rathantara*, it would mean the assumed application of the name '*Rathantara*' to the *Kaṇvarathantara*, which is something entirely different.—From all this it follows that the *Kaṇvarathantara* should be sung over its own basic verse.

SŪTRA (45).

"IT MAY BE AS IN THE CASE OF THE SACRIFICIAL POST",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

If you hold the view that—"the *Sāman* in question should be sung over the basic verse of the *Rathantara* itself,—as it is only thus that the presence (in the name '*Kaṇvarathantara*') of the name '*Rathantara*' could be justified; because this could be explained only on the basis of the presence of the characteristics of the *Rathantara*,—just as in the case of the 'Sacrificial Post' (vide under Sū. 43)",—then the answer is as follows:—

SŪTRA (46).

THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE IT IS DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF FUNCTIONS.

Bhāṣya.

What has been suggested *cannot be right*; *because it is due to the presence of functions* that a piece of wood comes to be called the 'Sacrificial Post'; there is no tree in the world that is called '*Yūpa*' ('Sacrificial Post'); that piece of wood is called 'Sacrificial Post' which has undergone certain embellishments; hence the name, as found in the sentence 'the Sacrificial

Post is made of *Udumbara* wood', is one based upon certain embellishments. In the case in question however, the term '*Kaṇvarathantara*' as marked by certain well-defined characteristics is a name well known in the world; it is so called, not in the sense of being the '*Rathantara of the Kaṇvas*'; because if the term were taken as laying down the connection of the *Sāman* either with *the character of Rathantara* or with *Kaṇva*, there would be a Syntactical Split.—Hence we conclude that the term '*kaṇvarathantara*' is a conventional whole (and is not to be treated etymologically); and therefore the *Sāman* of that name has to be sung over its own basic verse (not over that of the *Rathantara*).

Adhikaraṇa (26): *The 'Kaṇvarathantara' is to be sung over the two 'Uttarā' verses of its own basic verse.*

SŪTRA (47).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"In view of the nature of what is to be done, the singing over the 'Uttarā' verses should be as at the Archetype."

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the *Kaṇvarathantara* again, there arises the following question—When it is said that 'it should be sung over the *Uttarā* verses', is the singing to be done over the '*Uttarā*' verses of the basic verse of the *Rathantara*? Or over the '*Uttarā*' verses of the basic verse of the *Bṛhat*? Or over the '*Uttarā*' verses of the basic verse of the *Kaṇvarathantara* itself?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"It should be sung over the '*Uttāra*' verses of the basic verses of either the *Bṛhat* or the *Rathantara*.—Why?—Because only thus does the General Law become obeyed. In this case there will be no room for the objection that 'the *Kaṇvarathantara* has its own particular basic verse'; because when what is to be done appertains to the *Uttarā* verses, the basic verse (of the *Kaṇvarathantara*) has to be abandoned in any case; hence it is only right that the indications of the Context should be followed (and the singing done as suggested above)."

SŪTRA (48).

[Siddhānta]—In fact, it should be sung over verses connected with the same deity; as the 'Verse-triad' cannot be separated.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the *Kaṇvarathantara* should be sung over the *Uttarā* verses of the basic verse of either the *Rathantara* or the *Bṛhat*;—in fact, it should be sung over those of its own basic verse.—"Why?"—Because of the term 'verse-triad'; it has been already explained that the term 'verse-triad' is applied, without reservation, to a set of verses in the same metre and related to the same deity:—hence this Direct Assertion sets aside the General Law; so that the *Kaṇvarathantara* should be sung over the *Uttarā* verses of its own basic verse.

Adhikaraṇa (27): *At the 'Agniṣṭut sacrifice', the 'Stotra' and 'Shastra' hymns are not modified.*

SŪTRA (49).

THE CUPS BEING RELATED TO ANOTHER DEITY,—THE 'STOTRA' AND THE 'SHASTRA' SHOULD NOT BE MODIFIED; BECAUSE THEY ARE ACTS.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Ēkāha* sacrifice, *Agniṣṭut*, in connection with which we read—'*Āgneyā grahā bhavanti*' ('Cups are dedicated to *Agni*').

In regard to this, there arises the question—When the Archetypal *Stotra* and *Shastra* hymns come to be used at this *Agniṣṭut*, are the names of deities occurring therein to be modified in accordance with the deities of the *Agniṣṭut* itself? Or are the original names to remain unmodified?

In order to preclude all idea of modification in the case, the *Sūtra* says—*The Cups being related to another deity, the 'Stotra' and the 'Shastra' should not be modified, because they are acts,*—i.e. *principal* acts.

Question: "Who is the person who could entertain the notion of there being a modification, whose notion the *Sūtra* should have sought to set aside?"

It is that person of dull intelligence who may think that by modification, the mention of the relevant deity would be secured. Teaching imparted to persons of dull intelligence also is sometimes fruitful. Further, in comparison with some one or the other, all persons may be 'of dull intelligence'.

If this does not satisfy (the questioner), we offer another explanation. There is an *Adhikaraṇa* that has gone before in *Adhyāya* II (*Pāda* ii, *Sūtras* 13–29) which has established the fact that the *Stotra* and other hymns are 'principal acts';—it is the useful purpose served by that *Adhikaraṇa* that is explained by the present *Sūtra*—*The Cups being related, etc. etc.* This being the reply to the question—"if the *Stotra* and *Shastra* are (subsidiary) acts of embellishment, what is the purpose of the *Adhikaraṇa*?",—the sense of the answer is that in that case, at the *Agniṣṭut* sacrifice there would be modification in accordance with the name of the relevant deity;—while if they are 'principal acts', then—*the Cups being related to another deity, the 'Stotra' and the 'Shastra' should not be modified, because they are (principal) acts.*

Adhikaraṇa (28): *At the 'Chāturmāsya' sacrifices, the invocation is to be done without modifying the term 'ājya'.*

SŪTRA (50).

[Pūrvapakṣa (A)]—"In the case of 'Pṛṣadājya', as there is drinking of both, there should be mention of 'Curd'; because in the Mantras there is mention of what is to be drunk."

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifices laid down in the text—'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifices'; at these the *Anuyājas* are offered, in connection with which it is declared—'Offers the *Anuyāja* sacrifices with *Pṛṣadājya* (Mixed Clarified Butter,—Clarified Butter mixed with Curdled Milk)';—at the Archetype there is an invocation with the *Mantra* '*Dēvān ājyapān āvaha*' ('Invite the Deities who drink Clarified Butter');—this same invocation is indicated by the General Law as to be done at the sacrifices in question.

In regard to this, there arises the question—At the Ectype (the *Chāturmāsya*) is the invocation to be done without modifying the *Mantra* in any way? Or should there be modification?—If there is to be modification, should the word '*ājyapān*' be changed into '*ājyapān dadhipān*' ('drinkers of Clarified Butter, drinkers of Curd')—or into '*dadhipān*' ('drinkers of Curd)—or into '*pṛṣtadājyapān*' ('drinkers of *Pṛṣadājya*, mixed Clarified Butter')?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* (A) is as follows:—"*There should be mention of the Curd*, also—i.e. of the Curd and also of the Clarified Butter.—Why?—*Because there is drinking of both*; i.e. both the substances are offered to the deity, and the *Mantra* says that what is offered is *drunk*; and what is to be drunk has been mentioned, at the Archetype, by the word '*ājyapān*' (in the invoking *Mantra*);—in the case in question, in place of 'Clarified Butter', we find laid down 'Curd and Clarified Butter', in the text—'Then he takes up the *Pṛṣadājya*, which consists of both, *Clarified Butter* and *Curd*,—it is the couple that, on pairing, becomes productive,—it is this couple therefore that becomes productive'; where we find *Curd* mentioned on the same footing as *Clarified Butter*. Hence both, the *Curd* as well as *Clarified Butter* should be mentioned in the invoking *Mantra*."

SŪTRA (51).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A) refuted]—IN FACT, THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE IT IS FOR THE SAKE OF ANOTHER, LIKE THE 'MASTER OF THE SACRIFICE.'

Bhāṣya.

It should not be, as suggested above, that *Curd* should be mentioned —Why ?—*Because it is for the sake of another*; the substance to be drunk is for the purpose of another; i.e. the substance is mentioned as indicating the *drinkers*; under the circumstances, if the drinkers have been indicated by the mention of the *Clarified Butter*, the purpose is duly served, and there is no need of indicating them further by the mention of the *Curd.*—*As in the case of the 'master of the sacrifice'*; in the text '*Imam yajñamavānyēva yajñapatim vardhān*', the term '*yajñapati*' ('master of the sacrifice') has been used for the purpose of those men who offer libations, and it is not mentioned for its own sake, and hence is always used in its unmodified form (in the singular), and no regard is paid to all the many sacrificers that may be there (in any particular case). Similarly in the case in question, the *substance to be drunk* is mentioned for the sake of indicating the *drinker*, and not for its own sake; and hence, inasmuch as the *drinkers* would be duly indicated by any one of the substances, there would be no need for making a mention of any other.

SŪTRA (52).

[Says the *Pūrvapakṣin* (*A*)]—"BUT THERE MUST BE MENTION OF IT, BECAUSE THE INVOCATION IS FOR THAT PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya.

"There should be mention of the Curd; and it could not be like the 'master of the sacrifice'. The term 'master of the sacrifice' is not used for its own sake, it is used for eulogising the *Iḍā*-cake;—the invocation in question, on the other hand, is to serve as a *reminder*; and it is necessary to remember the *drinker* as well as the *substance drunk*. Hence with a view to obeying the General Law, the other *substance to be drunk* should also be mentioned."

SŪTRA (53).

[*Pūrvapakṣin* (*A*)'s *argument answered*]—IN FACT, IT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE THERE IS A TERM DENOTING AN EMBELLISHMENT.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, the *Curd* should not be mentioned; *there is a term denoting an embellishment*—of the Clarified Butter—in the text '*Pṛṣadājyēna anuyājān yajati*',—where '*pṛṣadājya*' means *mixed ājya*; and the *Clarified*

Butter becomes 'mixed' when it undergoes an embellishment in the process of *mixing*;—and this *mixed character* is clearly brought about in it by the *Curd*.—Hence it is clear that the *Curd* is meant to serve the totally different purpose of bringing about the *mixed character*, and *not* for being *drunk*; consequently it should not be mentioned.

SŪTRA (54).

[*The Pūrvapakṣin argues again*]—"THERE SHOULD BE MENTION OF IT; BECAUSE THE WORD SIGNIFIES A SUBSTANCE."

Bhāṣya.

"There should be mention of the *Curd*; the *Curd* is as much a *substance* as the *Clarified Butter*;—we have already explained that it is the principal factor that is enjoined in the text—'Then he takes up the *Pṛṣadājya*, etc. etc.' (See under Sū. 50, above),—where the *Curd* as well as the *Clarified Butter* have been enjoined; the sense being that 'the sacrifice is to be offered with Curd and with Clarified Butter'; in fact, the term '*pṛṣadājya*' does not denote any different substance [it denotes only *Curd and Clarified Butter*];—hence it follows that the Curd must be mentioned."

SŪTRA (55).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS THE CURD IS THE SUBORDINATE FACTOR, THE MANTRAS SHOULD SPEAK OF 'DRINKER OF CLARIFIED BUTTER' (ONLY); THE SUBORDINATE CHARACTER OF THE CURD BEING DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE TEXT SPEAKS OF THE CLARIFIED BUTTER AS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

It is not true that the *Curd* stands on the same footing as the *Clarified Butter*, as regards predominance. Because, in the *Taking up*, it may be equal to the *Clarified Butter*, but not in the *offering* (at the sacrifice); the offering has been laid down as to be done *with Clarified Butter, which is mixed*;—thus, inasmuch as *the Text speaks of the Clarified Butter as the predominant factor*, the Curd should be a subordinate factor, in connection with the *offering*. It is not necessary that what has been asserted in connection with *Taking up* should become asserted in connection with *offering*. In fact, in connection with the *offering*, the *Clarified Butter* is indicated by Direct Assertion, as the instrument,—while the *Curd* would be so indicated only by Syntactical Connection.—"Why then should the Curd be taken up at all?"—It is taken up so that when the Curd is taken up, the *mixed* character of the Clarified Butter becomes apparent.

From all this it follows that the Mantras should speak of '*ājyapāḥ*' ('drinkers of Clarified Butter') alone, and there should be no mention of the *Curd*.

SŪTRA (56).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"VERILY THE CURD MUST BE MENTIONED, IT BEING THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR ; SPECIALLY BECAUSE THE CLARIFIED BUTTER IS CONNECTED WITH THE FIRST AND LAST OPERATIONS."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not right that the *Mantras* should speak of 'drinkers of Clarified Butter' and there should be no mention of the *Curd*. As a matter of fact, the term to be used in the *Mantra* should be '*dadhipān*' ('drinkers of Curd'); as it is the Curd that is the predominant factor here.—Why ?—*Because the Clarified Butter is connected with the first and last operations* ; i.e. the 'first' operation is *spreading* and the 'last' is *Pouring out* ; as described in the following text—'*Yadi cha sattre yajēta dvirupastṛṇīyāt, sakṛdabhighārayēt, etc. etc.*' ['If one is performing the *Sattra* he should *spread* twice and *pour out* once, etc.'] ; and again '*Yadi prāvṛṣi yajēta, etc.*' ['If one performs the sacrifice during the rains, he should spread once, and pour out twice'].—This *spreading* is done for the purpose of keeping something else upon it, and hence for the sake of that something else. This is what is expressed by the term '*upastṛṇāti*' ('spreads') and not the mere *holding* ; because as a matter of fact, the term '*upaspṛṇāti*' is used when one thing is rendered fit for being the substratum of some other thing. Similarly the *pouring out* that the term '*abhighārayati*' ('pours out') expresses is not the mere *holding* ; what it is understood to mean is that the *pouring out* is done in the presence of (in regard to) some other thing,—in order to secure the connection of that thing with the *Clarified Butter* (that is poured out).—By reason of these two operations—of *spreading* and *pouring out* (with which the Clarified Butter is connected), it follows that the *Curd* is the predominant factor, and the Clarified Butter also is subordinate to it.—From this it follows that it is the *Curd* alone that should be mentioned, not the *Clarified Butter*."

SŪTRA (57).

[*Refutation of Pūrvapakṣa (B)*]—IN FACT, INASMUCH AS THE CLARIFIED BUTTER IS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR, THE MENTION WOULD BE FOR THE SAKE OF QUALIFICATION, AND THE TERM COULD BE TAKEN, FIGURATIVELY, AS INDICATING EMBELLISHMENT.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, it is not right that the *Curd* is the predominant factor and hence it should be mentioned : as a matter of fact, it is the Clarified Butter that is the predominant factor; as it is the Clarified Butter that serves a useful purpose through its connection with the '*sacrifice*', as laid down in the text 'One offers the *Anuyāja* sacrifices with mixed Clarified Butter'.

—When it is *spread out*, two things are accomplished—(1) it becomes carved out (for being offered), and (2) the *Curd* also becomes spread out; under the circumstances what the word expresses is that, when the embellishment comes to the Curd it is the embellishment of the *container* for purposes of the *contained*, and there is no need for the embellished curd itself. As for the 'mixed' character of the Clarified Butter, it is clearly perceived when it is brought about (by the mixing of the Curd), and it is this *mixed character* that is needed; as the Clarified Butter laid down in the text is found to be qualified by the qualifying term '*pṛṣat*' ('mixed').—In the sacrifice itself, the *Curd*, which is indicated by Syntactical Connection, cannot be regarded as the instrument, so long as it is faced by the *Clarified Butter* which is directly asserted by the text. Hence the *spreading out* must be taken as being for the purpose of the holding of the Clarified Butter; and then inevitably the Curd also would be held; so that the relation of the container and contained being thus implied, it becomes *like spreading* (*as if it were spreading*); and thus it is in this figurative (indirect, secondary) sense that the term 'spreads' has been used.—Similarly with the term 'pours out' also.—Thus then the terms 'once' and 'twice' being found to be used for the purposes of qualification, the term 'spreads' or 'pours out' is to be taken figuratively as signifying *embellishment*. So also with the words '*oṣadhiṣvēva pashūn pratiṣṭhāpayati*', '*Vṛṣṭyaiva pashūnabhijigharti*' [which are found at the end of the two texts quoted—(1) '*Yadi sattrē yajēta, etc.*', and (2) '*Yadi prāvṛṣi yajēta, etc.*'].

From all this we conclude that the *Mantras* should contain the term '*ājyapāḥ*' ('drinkers of *Clarified Butter*').

SŪTRA (58).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—"IN FACT, AS THERE IS CHANGE IN THE NAME, THE INDICATION SHOULD BE BY THAT."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*api vā*' implies the rejection of the views set forth above.

"As a matter of fact, the *Mantras* should not contain the term '*ājyapāḥ*' ('drinkers of Clarified Butter'), the term used should be '*pṛṣadājyapān*' ('drinkers of mixed Clarified Butter').—Why?—Because the change is made in the name only. As a matter of fact, there is *mixing* of Clarified Butter and Curd; and the particular name '*pṛṣadājyā*' applies to that substance which is equipped with the quality produced by the said mixing. —Just as there is in the case of such names as '*rāgaḥ*' (Musical Melody) '*Khādavaḥ*' (Sugar-Candy) and '*Surā*' (Wine).—In all these cases we find a term applied figuratively (to a mixture); and *the relation of expressed and expresser* also is understood to be based upon the same figurative application. It is by means of this mixture (named '*pṛṣadājya*') that the sacrifice is declared as to be accomplished—in the text '*Pṛṣadājyēnānuyājān yajati*'.— From all this it follows that the word used should be '*pṛṣadājyapān*'."

SŪTRA (59).

[*Refutation of Pūrvapakṣa (C)*]—THAT CANNOT BE ; BECAUSE THE TEXT LAYS DOWN A QUALITY.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be that the term '*pṛṣadājya*' is figuratively expressive of the mixed substance,—just like the term '*rāga*' ('musical melody', which also is a mixture). It is true that in the case of the term 'musical melody', there is *figurative application*, which application has been learnt from common parlance. In the case in question, however, it is understood that a quality is actually produced in the Clarified Butter.—"How so?"—The term '*ājya*' denotes *Clarified Butter*,—the term '*pṛṣat*' denotes *mixed character*, as is found in several such instances as '*pṛṣadrajjuḥ*', '*pṛṣanmaṇiḥ*', '*pṛṣanmṛgaḥ*'. So that when these two terms—'*pṛṣat*' and '*ājya*'—are uttered together, the idea obtained is that of the *mixed Clarified Butter*; and hence the term can be reasonably applied to that alone.

Hence we conclude that in the *Mantra*, there should be mention of '*ājya*' alone,—as, *mixed* or *unmixed*, it will always be *ājya*.

End of Pāda iv of Adhyāya X.

ADHYĀYA X.

PĀDA V.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *When out of a number of things, only a few are to be selected, it is the first ones that should be selected.*

SŪTRA (1).

WHEN A NUMBER OF THINGS ARE MENTIONED IN A DEFINITE ORDER, AND ONLY A FEW HAVE TO BE SELECTED, WHAT COMES LATER SHOULD BE LEFT OUT,—AS IN THE CASE OF ARRIVALS.

Bhāṣya.

There are certain declarations regarding *parts* of things—(*a*) 'What is dedicated to *Dyavā-Pṛthivi* is baked on one pan', (*b*) 'What is dedicated to the *Ashvins* is baked on two pans', (*c*) 'What is dedicated to *Viṣṇu* is baked on three pans';—and the whole lot of pans also are mentioned in the declaration—'One should offer the cake baked on *eight* pans to *Agni*'. [The total number of pans is *eight*; of these, under (*a*) *one* is to be taken,—under (*b*), *two*—and under (*c*), *three*].—Similarly, there are the declarations—(*a*) 'One should perform the *Two-day* sacrifice', (*b*) 'One should perform the *Three-day* sacrifice', (*c*) 'One should perform the *Four-day* sacrifice', (*d*) 'One should perform the *Five-day* sacrifice', (*e*) 'One should perform the *Six-day* sacrifice', (*f*) 'One should perform the *Seven-day* sacrifice', (*g*) 'One should perform the *Eight-day* sacrifice', (*h*) 'One should perform the *Nine-day* sacrifice', (*i*) 'One should perform the *Ten-day* sacrifice', 'One should perform the *Eleven-day* sacrifice'; in all these, parts of the whole have been mentioned; the whole lot is mentioned in the declaration—'If a man is desirous of offspring, one should make him perform the *Twelve-day* sacrifice'.—Similarly, in the declarations—(*a*) 'He recites *one Sāmidhēnī* verse', (*b*) 'He recites *three Sāmidhenī* verses',—where parts of the whole are mentioned,—the whole lot being mentioned in the declaration 'He recites *fifteen Sāmidhēnī* verses'.

In regard to all these cases, there arises the question—When a few out of the whole lot have to be selected, should those that come first be taken up and those that come later abandoned? Or should there be option (one selecting any that he likes)?

The apparently right view is as follows:—*When a number of things are mentioned in a definite order*—of sequence,—*and only a few have to be selected*,—what we assert is that *what comes later should be left out*, and those that come first should be taken in.—"What is the reason for this?"—What

comes first is most important, while what comes later is unimportant,—and between the important and the unimportant, if one has to be left out, it is the unimportant that should be left out, and the important taken in. This is what is made clear under *Sūtra* 12. 2. 23.—*As in the case of arrivals*;—in the case of assemblies and groups, when fresh arrivals come in, they do so without displacing those already seated there, similarly in the case in question it should be the same [i.e. those that come later should not displace those that have come before].

SŪTRA (2).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also, the earlier ones should be taken in and the later ones rejected.—"For what reason?"—There is the following text indicating the said conclusion—'*Lupyēta vā ētat ṣaṣṭhamaho yat pañchāhānupayanti, lupyēta vā ētat ṣaṣṭham kapālam yat pañchakapālam nirvapanti*', where what is declared is the omission of the *sixth*, not of the *first*.

SŪTRA (3).

[*Pūrvapakṣa argument against Siddhānta—continued*]—"IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE OPTION, BECAUSE OF EQUALITY."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not right that the earlier ones should be taken in; as a matter of fact, there should be option; one may take in either the earlier or the later one.—Why?—*Because of equality*; the rejection of the later stands on the same footing as the rejection of the earlier; there is no Direct Assertion of the rejection of the earlier, or of the rejection of the later. Either the important or the unimportant factor may be taken up,—in either case what would be taken up would be something connected with the Archetype, and it makes no difference if what is taken up is important or unimportant: for there is no special text to the effect that 'it is the important one that should be taken in'.—Hence there should be no restriction (as to the taking up of the later or the earlier ones)."

SŪTRA (4).

[*Pūrvapakṣa-argument—continued*]—"WHEN THERE IS A FIXED ORDER OF SEQUENCE, THEN ALONE SHOULD THE IMPORTANT COME AT THE END."

Bhāṣya.

"It has been argued (by the *Siddhāntin*)—'In assemblies and groups, the later arrival comes in without displacing those already sitting there,

and the same should be done in the case in question also '.—In the case cited, it is only right that it should be so, because when a place is already occupied by persons already arrived, the new arrival does not occupy that place, and comes in at the end, for the simple reason that it is not possible for him to do otherwise. In the case in question, however, we are considering a case where there is no position already occupied; what we are considering is, which *one* or *two* of the pans out of the eight should come in; so that there is no position already occupied by any pan of which there would be displacement."

SŪTRA (5).

[*Pūrvapakṣa-argument—concluded*]—" AS FOR THE INDICATIVE TEXT, THAT IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO BOTH VIEWS; AS WHAT IT SPEAKS OF IS THE NUMBER."

Bhāṣya.

"The *Siddhāntin* has quoted the indicative text—' *Lupyēta vā ētat ṣaṣṭhamahaḥ*, etc. ', and has argued that this shows that it is the *sixth*, not the first, that should be omitted.—But *this is equally applicable to both views*, i.e. also to the view that there should be option. Because what the term ' *ṣaṣṭha* ' speaks of (denotes) is the completion of a certain number; anyone of the lot being omitted, that one would be the *sixth* which would complete the number ' six ',—be it the first or the middlemost or the last; just as it is said ' the sixth brother is not seen ', when either the youngest or the eldest or the middlemost of the brothers is not seen. So should it be in the case in question also."

SŪTRA (6).

[*Pūrvapakṣa-arguments answered*]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE OPERATION SHOULD ALWAYS PROCEED FROM THE BEGINNING; AS THE COMMENCEMENT IS ALWAYS FROM THE BEGINNING; AND THE LATER ONE SHOULD BE TAKEN UP ONLY WHEN THERE IS A DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

The term ' *vā* ' (' as a matter of fact ') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

The operation should always proceed from the beginning.—" Why ? "—*Because the commencement is always from the beginning*; whenever a number of things appear in a definite order of sequence, any operation that is done over them should always commence from the beginning; that is, the operation should start with the first, then it should go on to the second; when it would be done to the first, it would be done without having started with anything else;—when the first thing has been operated upon, then it passes it on to the next thing; but the first thing has to be operated upon without the

operation having been done to anything else. And so long as the operation begins with the first thing, the objection of wrong beginning cannot apply to it. Hence it follows that in all cases, whenever an operation has to be done in a certain order of sequence, it should commence with the first thing.

Then again, the occasion for the operation to be done over the first thing is already there,—nor is there anything wrong in the operations having commenced with that. As regards the later things, on the other hand, even though the occasion of the operation may have arrived, yet, inasmuch as the requisite number will have been already made up, there would be nothing wrong in their being omitted.

From all this it follows that the earlier ones should be taken in and the later ones given up.

Such being the course dictated by reason,—if in any case, there is a declaration to the effect, the operation may be done to the later ones by skipping over the middle ones. As we find in the case of the declarations—'*Apavarhiṣaḥ prayājān yajati*' '*apavarhiṣau anuyājau yajati*'.—Whenever there is no declaration to the contrary, the only reasonable course is to omit the later ones.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *At the 'Ēkatrika' sacrifice the singing should be done over the first Verse-triad.*

SŪTRA (7).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" AT THE ĒKATRIKA SACRIFICE, DURING THE MIDDAY PAVAMĀNA, THE SINGING SHOULD BE DONE OVER THE FIRST VERSE OF EACH OF THE THREE VERSE-TRIADS; BECAUSE THE THREE METRES HAVE BEEN SPOKEN OF IN THE SHRUTI."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Ēkatrika* sacrifice thus described—'*Athaiṣa ēkatrikaḥ tasyaikasyām bahiṣpavamānam, tisṛṣu hoturājyam: ēkasyām maitrāvaruṇasya, tisṛṣu brāhmaṇāchchhamsinaḥ,—ēkasyāmachchhāvākasya, tisṛṣu mādhyandinaḥ pavamānaḥ*'.

In regard to this last *Madhyandina* (*Midday*) *Pavamāna*, there arises the question—Should the singing be done over the first verse of each of the verse-triads? Or over the first verse-triad itself?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*At the Ēkatrika sacrifice, during the Midday Pavamāna*, the singing should be done over the first verse of each of the verse-triads constituting the hymns.—Why?—*Because the three metres have been spoken of in the Shruti*; in connection with the Archetype, three metres have been spoken of in the Veda, in the text—'*Trichchhandā āvāpaḥ, mādhyandinaḥ pavamānaḥ pañchasāmā*'; and these metres become admissible into the sacrifice in question, under the General Law; and these can be so brought together only if the singing is done to the first verse of each of the 'verse-triads'.—Hence the singing should be done to the first verse of each of the 'verse-triads'."

SŪTRA (8).

IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE FROM THE BEGINNING; AS THIS IS THE REASONABLE COURSE; THE OTHER COURSE BEING MERELY INFERENTIAL.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

In fact, the singing should be done to the first *verse-triad*; such would be the reasonable course; as only thus would the order of sequence be preserved;—as for the other view, in which the implications of the metres would be followed, it would be only *inferential*, as based upon the implications

of the General Law.—Says the Opponent—" The *order of sequence* also is something pertaining to the Archetype, and hence the following of that also would be *inferential* ".—Our answer to that is that, between the two 'inferential' courses, the adopting of the *order of sequence* is better.—" Why ? "—Because in that case, the Gāyatrī-metre having been dealt with in the first verse, the second hymn-verse is begun ; and when an operation has been begun with the first factor, then alone it goes on to the subsequent factors ;—so long as no factor has been operated upon, the whole matter can be optional,—not when a factor has been actually operated upon ; and when one has been operated upon, no other can take its place ; what has to be done in this case is the completion of what has been begun ;—so that, there being no possibility of both coming in, there can be no option, as to whether what has been begun should be completed or something new should be begun. In fact, when one goes on to complete what has been begun he does what has been enjoined ; while if he omits it, he fails to do what has been enjoined ; hence it follows that what has been begun should be completed ;—and when that has been completed, the purpose for which any other optional alternative could come in having been already served by it, there can be no occasion for that alternative. Thus then, the right course is to adopt the order of sequence, not the exigencies of the metre.

Says the Opponent—" If the operation is done over the *Gāyatrī*-metre, it means that it has been started over the later *Triṣṭup*-metre also."

Answer—True, it becomes started ; but not without having done the second and the third. When the verse-triad will have thus been completed through these, there would be no further need for any metres.—Thus the order of sequence of the first hymn to the subsequent hymns being apparent, it is better to adopt that order than the metres.

SŪTRA (9).

IT SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SAME POSITION AS IN THE ARCHETYPE, AS THE MODIFICATION IS IN THE NUMBER ONLY.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the singing should be done over the verse-triad.—Why ?—*It should be in accordance with the same position as in the Archetype* ; when the three hymns come in by virtue of the declaration, there is modification only of the number, at the 'midday' function.

" Just as there is no modification of the order of sequence, so there should be no modification of the metres also."

Answer—True, that is so ; but the adopting of the order of sequence is of greater importance than that of the metres.

For these reasons also the singing should be done over the *verse-triad.*

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *The 'Dhūḥ-Sāman' should be sung over one Verse.*

SŪTRA (10).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—IN THE CASE OF THE 'DHŪḤ'—THE SINGING SHOULD BE DONE OVER THE 'VERSE-TRIAD'.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Ēkatrika-sacrifice*, described in the following passage:—'*Athaiṣa ēkatrikaḥ, tasya ēkasyām bahiṣpavamānam, tisṛṣu hoturājyam ēkasyām maitrāvaruṇasya, tisṛṣu brāhmaṇāchchhaṁsinaḥ, ēkasyāmachchhāvākasya, tisṛṣu mādhyandinaḥ pavamānaḥ*'.—There are certain *Sāman-chants* styled '*Dhūḥ-sāman*'.

In regard to these latter, there arises the question—Are these *Sāmans* to be sung over the Verse-triad? Or over only one verse?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*In the case of the 'Dhūḥ-Sāmans' the singing should be done over the 'Verse-triad'.* By so doing the General Law indicating the coming in of the Verse-triad would be duly followed. Hence the singing should be done over the Verse-triad."

SŪTRA (11).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE DONE OVER ONE (VERSE) ONLY; BECAUSE THE SINGING HAS THE CHARACTER OF BEING REPEATED.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, it should be sung over one verse only; because the singing has to be repeated, on the authority of the Direct Declaration, which is to the effect that—'They chant over the *Dhūḥ* repeatedly; they worship with repeated chanting';—and what is there that Direct Declaration cannot do? —Hence we conclude that in the case of the *Dhūḥ-Sāman*, the chanting should be done over a single verse.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *At the 'Dvirātra' and other sacrifices, the procedure of the 'Dasharātra' has to be adopted.*

SŪTRA (12).

FROM AMONG THE INJUNCTIONS, INASMUCH AS (TWO) ARE ORIGINAL, THE ACCESSORY DETAILS SHOULD BE RESTRICTED THROUGH INDICATIVE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Dvirātra* and other *Ahargaṇa* sacrifices, laid down in the texts—'One should perform the *Dvirātra* sacrifice' and so forth.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Is the procedure of the entire *Dvādashāha* sacrifice admitted into these? Or that of the *Dasharātra* only, leaving aside the *Prāyaṇīya* and the *Udayanīya*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"inasmuch as there is no ground for discrimination, the procedure of the entire *Dvādashāha* should come in."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*From among the injunctions, as the two*—those relating to the *Prāyaṇīya* and the *Udayanīya* —*are original*,—i.e. they cannot be regarded as preceded by another,—the procedure that should be admitted into the *Dvirātra* and the rest is that of the *Dasharātra*.—"For what reason?"—Because the Procedure should be restricted by the indicative text.—"What is the indicative text?"— It is said—'That which is the first is the second, that which is the second is the third and it takes in the *Jagatī*';—what this means is this—'That which is the first at the *Dvirātra* is the second at the *Dvādashāha*, i.e. the *Gāyatra*; that which is the second at the *Dvirātra* is the third (at the *Dvādashāha*), i.e. the *Traiṣṭubha*, which takes in the *Jagatī*'; this shows clearly that at the third *Ahan* of the *Ṣaḍaha*, the *Jāgata* becomes included in something else; and this indicates the coming in of the *Dasharātra*.—The phrase 'that which is the first' must be taken as referring to the *Dvirātra*, on the basis of the Context;—the phrase 'is the third' should be taken as referring to the *Dvādashāha*, as there can be no 'third' at the *Dvirātra*.—There is yet another indicative text—'*Gāyatra* is the first *Ahan*, *Traiṣṭubha* is the second, which takes in the *Jagatī*', which also shows that the third *Ahan* of the *Ṣaḍaha* is included in another.—From all this it follows that it is the Procedure of the *Dasharātra* that should find place in the *Dvirātra*.

SŪTRA (13).

THE ADMISSIBILITY IS ALSO SHOWN BY THE CONNECTION OF THE TERM 'RĀTRI'.

Bhāṣya.

In the sentence '*Dvirātrēṇa yajēta*' we have the term '*rātra*'; so also we have the same term in the name '*Dasharātra*'; from this indicative of the Archetype, it follows that the Procedure of the *Dasharātra* is to be admitted into the *Dvirātra*; and this is what is shown by the various indicatives.

Adhikaraṇa (5): *From among the Mantras laid down as to be used for the 'Fanning' of the Fire, any seven may be used, without any restriction.*

SŪTRA (14).

In the case of numbers not dealt with beforehand, there should be option, as all serve the same purpose.

Bhāṣya.

(A) In connection with Fire-laying, certain *Mantras* are laid down as to be used for the Fanning of the Fire—'*Vēshīnām tvāpatmannādhūnomi, etc. etc.*';—in reference to these it is said—'One fans the Fire *with seven*'.—(B) Similarly, there are certain *Mantras* laid down as to be used for the 'Scattering' of the Fire—'*Yā oṣadhīḥ etc.*';—in reference to these, it is said—'Scatters the Fire with fourteen'.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Should the first ones (*seven* or *fourteen*) alone be used? Or should there be no restriction at all?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that, "in accordance with the conclusion arrived at under *Sūtra* 8 above, the first ones alone should be used".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*In the case of numbers not dealt with beforehand*,—i.e. those that have no connection with an original Archetype—we assert that wherever we find them, *there should be option*; as it is only thus that all the numbers come to have their use; if only the first ones were taken up, the mention of some of the *Mantras* (later ones) would be entirely useless. And yet, from the Context we understand that these also are connected with 'scattering'.—Those that are connected with an original Archetype become utilised in connection with the performance of that Archetype.—Hence on the ground that some *Mantras* would become useless, the abandoning of the principal numbers (earlier ones) becomes justifiable.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *At the 'Vivṛddhastoma' sacrifice, 'Sāmans' may be brought in even from outside the Context.*

SŪTRA (15).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN CASES WHERE THERE IS AUGMENTATION OF 'STOMAS', THE REQUISITE NUMBER SHOULD BE MADE UP BY THE REPETITION OF THOSE OCCURRING IN THE SAME CONTEXT, WITHOUT ANY MODIFICATION; AS THE NUMBER IS A SUBORDINATE FACTOR AND NONE OTHER HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF."

Bhāṣya.

Those sacrifices form the subject-matter of consideration here wherein there is augmentation of '*Stomas*',—such, for instance, as—'*Ēkavimshēna atirātreṇa prajākaman yājayēt, triṇavēna ojaskāmam, trayastrimshēna pratiṣṭhākāmam*' [where there is an increase in the numbers, 21, 27, 33].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the increased number to be made up by the repeating of the original *Sāmans* occurring in the Context itself? Or by bringing in new ones from outside the Context?

The view that presents itself is that there should be no restriction, as there is no ground for discrimination.

Against this, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"*In cases where there is augmentation of Stomas, the requisite number should be made up by repetition*; as thus only those would be admitted that occur in the Context otherwise those would be brought in which have no connection with the Context. As a matter of fact, the particular number is laid down as a factor subordinate to the *Sāmans* occurring in the Context, which are the principal factor; it is not laid down as the principal factor. Nor is there any other *Sāman* spoken of—directly enjoined by a text. And there is as much wrong in assuming what has *not* been enjoined as there is in omitting to do what *is* enjoined.—From all this we conclude that the *Sāmans* occurring in the Context should be repeated, just as in the case of the *Dhūḥ-Sāman* (Vide *Adhikaraṇa* 3, above)."

SŪTRA (16).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT SHOULD BE DONE BY IMPORTATION; BECAUSE REPETITION HAS NOT BEEN ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('as a matter of fact') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

The requisite number should be made up by importing *Sāmans* not occurring in the Context.—" Why ? "—*Because repetition has not been enjoined.* All that is laid down is that '*Ēkaviṁshēna atirātrēṇa prajākāman yājayēt*'. And there is as much wrong in doing what is *not* enjoined as there is in omitting what *is* enjoined.

Objection—" But *importation* also has not been enjoined."

Answer—When both (*importation* and *repetition*) are such as have not been enjoined, importation is the more reasonable of the two ; because the number made up by the importation of fresh *Sāmans* would be appropriate, while that made up by repetition would be inappropriate.—Hence we conclude that the number should be made up by importing fresh *Sāmans* from outside the Context.

SŪTRA (17).

ALSO BECAUSE NUMBER RESTS ON SEPARATENESS.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the number should be made up by importation.—" For what reason ? "—*Number rests on separateness* ; for instance, when we speak of 'eight jars' (it means that there are eight *separate* jars). If there were mere repetition, there would no separateness. Hence it follows that the number should be made up by importation.

SŪTRA (18).

BECAUSE OF THE TERM 'PARĀK'.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the number should be made up by importation.—" For what reason ? "—Because the term '*parāk*' has been used in the text—'*Parāk bahiṣpavamānēna stuvanti*' ('They hymn with the later *Bahiṣpavamāna*') ;—and the term '*parāk*' denotes non-repetition ; as we find in the text '*Parāchīḥ sāmidhēnīranvāha*' ('Recites the later *Sāmidhēnī* verses'), where it is understood that the *Sāmidhēnis* meant are those that have not been repeated.—From this also it follows that there should be importation.

SŪTRA (19).

ALSO BECAUSE IN THIS WAY THERE IS NO MODIFICATION OF WHAT HAS BEEN DECLARED.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also there should be importation.—Because in this way *there is no modification of what has been declared.*—" What is this *non-modification* ? "—It means *non-repetition* ; there would be this 'modi-

fication' if the *Sāmans* were repeated; and it has been declared that—'It becomes a flaw in the sacrifice if any one thing is done over again'.

SŪTRA (20).

[*Objection*]—"INASMUCH AS IT HAS NOT BEEN LAID DOWN [THERE CANNOT BE IMPORTATION]",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

If it be urged, as has been urged before, that "Importation also has not been laid down",—this has to be refuted (which is done in the following *Sūtra*).

SŪTRA (21).

THE INJUNCTION LAYS DOWN THE MEASURE OF THOSE THAT ARE IMPLIED BY THE REQUIREMENTS.

Bhāṣya.

Sāmans are enjoined by the requirements.—"By what requirements?"—By the requirements of such sentences as '*Ēkaviṁshēna atirātrēṇa prajākāmam yājayēt*'. Unless *Sāmans* are brought in from outside, the numbers mentioned in these sentences cannot be appropriately made up. Hence what the sentence does is that it lays down the measure of the things that are implied by the requirements, and having served this purpose in this manner, it cannot stop the importation of fresh *Sāmans* necessitated by the sentence '*Ēkaviṁshēna atirātrēṇa prajākāmam yājayēt*'.—Hence it follows that the number in question should be made up by importation.

SŪTRA (22).

THE MENTION OF 'ĀVĀPA' ALSO CANNOT BE EXPLAINED IF THERE IS REPETITION.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also we conclude that there should be importation:—There is mention of '*āvāpa*' (insertion), in the text—'Three are the bellies of the sacrifice—*Gāyatrī*, *Bṛhatī* and *Anuṣṭup*; herein they insert and herefrom do they exclude'. This cannot be explained if there is repetition of the *Sāmans*.

SŪTRA (23).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE FORCE OF THE LAYING DOWN OF THE SĀMANS.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also, there should be importation.—"For what reason?"—Thus alone would the laying down of the *Sāmans* serve a useful purpose,—the *Sāmans* being laid down in the following passage. 'There are 10,114 *Sāmans* along with their subsidiaries and esoteric details;—all these the *Sāma-singers* chant; there are 180 dedicated to *Agni*, 400 *Pavamānas*, 27 dedicated to *Indra*, which the *Sāma-singers* chant'.—If it were not so, then the laying down of the *Sāmans* would be entirely useless.—For this reason also we conclude that there should be importation of *Sāmans* from outside the sacrifice.

SŪTRA (24).

"IN THE CASE OF THE 'DHŪḤ-SĀMAN' ALSO"—IF THIS BE URGED [then the answer will be as contained in Sū. 25].

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that "just as it is in the case of the *Dhūḥ-Sāman*, so in the present case also".—This has got to be refuted (which is going to be done in the next *Sūtra*).

SŪTRA (25).

NOT SO; BECAUSE THEY ARE ACTUALLY CHARACTERISED BY REPETITION.

Bhāṣya.

What is asserted here cannot apply to the *Dhūḥ-Sāmans*; because these are characterised by repetition; as is clearly shown by the following passage bearing upon them—'They hymn repeatedly over the *Dhūḥ-Sāmans*; and with the *Pṛṣṭhas* they worship repeatedly again'. So that in their case the repetition is made on the strength of this declaration. There is no such declaration bearing upon the case in question. Hence the two cases are not similar. Consequently it is only right that in the case in question, the number should be made up by importation.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *In the case of the 'Bahiṣpavamāna', there should be importation of the verse (not of the Sāman).*

SŪTRA (26).

IN THE CASE OF THE 'BAHIṢPAVAMĀNA' HOWEVER, THERE SHOULD BE IMPORTATION OF THE VERSE; AS THERE IS TO BE ONLY ONE SĀMAN.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to those sacrifices at which there is an augmentation of *Stomas*,—there arises the question—In the case of the *Bahiṣpavamāna*, should there be *importation* or *repetition* of the *Sāmans* ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"In accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, there should be importation".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta* :—*In the case of the Bahiṣpavamāna however*, it is not so (i.e. there is no importation of *Sāman*); because in that case there is importation of the verse.—"Why ?" —*Because, there is to be only one Sāman*.—"How so ?"—When in connection with the later two *Pavamānas*, one pronounces the syllable '*hiṅ*' with each verse-triad, why, at the *Bahiṣpavamāna*, does one pronounce the syllable '*hiṅ*' only once ?—This is due to the declaration that—'One should say that there is only one *Sāman*—the *Gāyatra*, which is *Svāra*';—when therefore it is known that there is to be only one *Sāman*, the requisite number should be made up by the importation of a verse; and the same *Sāman* should be repeated.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *In the case of the Sāmidhēnī verses, the remaining number is to be made up by Importation.*

SŪTRA (27).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"BUT IN THE CASE OF THE SĀMIDHĒNĪ VERSES, THE NUMBER IS TO BE MADE UP BY REPETITION; BECAUSE THERE IS REPETITION AT THE ARCHETYPE."

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, in connection with which there are several numbers of *Sāmidhēnī* verses laid down as to be recited with a view to various rewards:—(*a*) 'For one desiring a good standing, he should recite 21'; (*b*) 'For one desiring Brahmic glory, he should recite 24'; (*c*) 'For one desiring food, he should recite 21';—(*d*) 'For one desiring a good standing, he should recite 22'; (*e*) 'For one desiring cattle, he should recite 26'.

In regard to all this there arises the question—In the case of the *Sāmidhēnī* verses, should the requisite number be made up by *importation*? Or by repetition? Or by *repetition* to the declared extent and the rest by *importation*?—[There are really only *eleven* verses that have been called '*Sāmidhēnī*'; and there is a text declaring that 'the first should be recited *thrice*, and the last should be recited *thrice*'. Thus the sense of the last alternative put forward in the question, is that up to *fifteen*, the number may be made up by *repetition*, in the manner laid down in this text, the declared repetitions of the first and the last verses giving us the *fifteen* verses,—and all the rest of the numbers are to be made up by bringing in fresh verses from elsewhere.]

The view that presents itself as the apparently correct one is that—"in accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, there should be *importation* (in every case); further, as in the case of repetition, the idea conveyed would be the same, the number made up thereby would not be appropriately made up; hence there should be *importation* [in the making up of all numbers beyond the original *eleven*]".

In answer to this we have the following view [*Pūrvapakṣa*]—"But the number should be made up by *repetition*;—the term 'but' sets aside the above view,—the sense being that there should be no importation, there should be *repetition*.—Why?—*Because there is repetition at the Archetype.* At the Archetypal sacrifice, the (increased) number has been (declared to be) made up by repetition—'He recites the first thrice, he recites the last thrice'.—How so?—The Vedic text has declared that 'there are *fifteen* *Sāmidhēnī* verses'; of these, eleven have been mentioned in the Vedic text;—and the question arising as to whether the additional four verses required to make up the number *fifteen* are to be obtained by *repetition* or

by *importation*,—it has been definitely laid down that 'he should recite the first *thrice*, he should recite the last *thrice*',—which means that it must be these two first and last verses alone that should be *repeated*, and they should be repeated as many times as would yield the required number *fifteen*;—this is the idea conveyed by the specification of 'thrice'; and in this way it serves a visible purpose; if the declaration were taken as laying down the *number* 'three', then it would be necessary to assume an invisible transcendental result.—From all this it follows that in the case in question also (where the numbers 21, 22, 24 and 26 have to be made up),—which is based upon the said Archetype,—there should be as many *repetitions* of the first and the last verses as would yield the required number."

SŪTRA (28).

[*Objection against the Pūrvapakṣa*]—"'IT CANNOT BE SO, AS THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFERENCE',—IF THIS IS URGED [then we answer as follows]."

Bhāṣya.

"This argument has been put forward above; and it has got to be refuted [this refutation follows in the next *Sūtra*]."

SŪTRA (29).

[*Objection answered by Pūrvapakṣin*]—"THERE SHOULD BE (REPETITION), BECAUSE IT TAKES AFTER THE ARCHETYPE; HENCE, AS AT THE ARCHETYPE SO HERE ALSO, THE VERSE SHOULD BE REPEATED TILL THE REQUIRED NUMBER IS MADE UP."

Bhāṣya.

"*There should be* repetition;—why?—because the Ectype should take after the Archetype; hence *till the required number is made up, the verse should be repeated*; as it is only thus that it would be done as at the Archetype; and the repetition may be regarded as appropriate on the strength of the General Law. From all this it follows that there should be repetition."

SŪTRA (30).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT SHOULD BE AS DECLARED; BECAUSE THE EXACT EXTENT HAS BEEN PRESCRIBED.

Bhāṣya.

The term 'वा' ('as a matter of fact') implies the rejection of the views set forth above.

It is not right that the first and last verses should be repeated as many times as would yield the required number; in fact, there should be *repetition* in accordance with the declaration and the remaining number should be made up by *importation.*—Why so?—*Because the extent*—of the repetition——*has been prescribed*; the exact extent of the repetition has been laid down in the declaration—'He recites the first thrice, and he recites the last thrice'; here the number *three* is meant to stand for three repetitions, not for repetitions *completing any required number*; hence in the manner suggested, the *direct declaration* would be followed; in the other case recourse would have to be had to *indirect indication.*—It has been argued that—"in the manner of the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the method serves a visible purpose".—This however is not right; because what has got to be followed is the declaration regarding the 'three'; as for the visible purpose of making up the number, that could be done also by *two* repetitions of the first and *four* of the last verse;—and yet it is necessary that there should be *three* repetitions each of the first and last verses, and it is by this means that the requisite number should be made up.—In the case in question also, the number is made up by the same repetition; hence also it is the repetition that makes up the requisite number. At the Archetypal sacrifice the first and last verses have been repeated thrice and the requisite number (fifteen) has been thus made up;—the same should be done in the case in question also; the first and last verses should be repeated thrice and the requisite number should be made up;—but in connection with the Archetype, there is nothing to tell us that *the requisite number is to be made up by the repetition*; all that we learn from the declaration is that *there should be repetition* (of the first and last verses), that the requisite number *should be made up* is got at only by implication; hence it is by implication that the requisite number has been made up by means of the declared repetition. What, however, is done at the Archetype by mere implication is not included under the General Law; hence the General Law (as applied to the case in question) cannot be taken to mean that *the requisite number* (21, 22, *etc.*) *should always be made up by the repetition* (*of the first and last verses*). Under the circumstances, there should be *repetition* only to the extent laid down (i.e. the first and last verses should each be repeated thrice) and the remaining number should be made up by *importation.*

SŪTRA (31).

ALSO BECAUSE WE SEE ADDITIONAL ONES.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also there should be importation: As a matter of fact, we find additional verses also spoken of; for instance, in the text—'*Na jagatyā paridadhyāt, yajjagatyā paridadhyāt tacchchhandāṁsi gamayēt, triṣṭubhā paridadhāti*'; here we find the introduction of the *Jagatī* mentioned; there would be no possibility of the *Jagatī* coming in if there were to be only repetition (of the first and last verses, neither of which is in the *Jagatī* metre). From this also it follows that there should be *importation.*

SŪTRA (32).

[*Objection*]—"IN THE CASE OF ACTIONS ALSO IT WOULD BE THE SAME", —IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"If you think that having repeated the verses to the declared extent, the rest of the numbers should be made up by importation,—then the same might be done in the case of the actions of the singing of the *Dhūḥ-Sāman*."

SŪTRA (33).

NOT SO; BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

It is not true that the same might be done in the case of the singing of the *Dhūḥ-Sāman*; because in that case, *repetition* has been actually laid down—'In the case of the *Dhūḥ*,—they hymn *by repetition*, etc. etc.': in the case in question however, there is no such declaration.—From all this it follows that having repeated the verses to the extent declared, the rest of the number should be made up by *importation*.

Adhikaraṇa (9): *The 'Ṣoḍashin' appertains to the Archetype.*

SŪTRA (34).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*continued*]—"The Ṣoḍashin should be taken as appertaining to the Ectype, because it has been enjoined, in its entirety, in relation to that."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Ṣoḍashin* laid down in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*—'One who takes up the *Ṣoḍashin* becomes himself, etc.'

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does this *Ṣoḍashin* appertain to the Archetype? Or to the Ectype?

"Why should there be any such question?"

Because, from the fact of its having been laid down in connection with the Archetypal sacrifice of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, it would appear to be appurtenant to the Archetype,—while from the fact of its being mentioned in connection with the Ectype,—in the text '*Madhyame'han trirātrasya gṛhyatē*'—it would appear to be appurtenant to the Ectype. Then again, it appears to be mentioned in connection with the Archetype also, in the text—'*Agniṣṭomē rājanyasya gṛhṇiyāt atirātrē brāhmaṇasya*'; and on the strength of the said declaration it might be thought that it would be taken up at the Ectype; on the other hand, it has been declared in connection with the Archetype, and it is at the Archetype that the *Atirātra* occurs,—hence there is the idea that it may appertain to the Archetype.—It is for these reasons that the aforesaid question arises.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*The Ṣoḍashin should be taken as appertaining to the Ectype.*—Why?—*Because it has been enjoined, in its entirety, in relation to that*; as a matter of fact, it is in connection with the Ectype that the *Ṣoḍashin* has been enjoined in its entirety.—How so?—Having declared that—'one who knowing this, takes up the *Ṣoḍashin*, etc.',—the injunction goes on—'on the middlemost day, it is taken up at the *Atirātra*';—and Syntactical Connection is more authoritative than Context. So that the Context having been set aside by Syntactical Connection, it follows that the declaration 'At the *Atirātra*, for the *Brāhmaṇa*' pertains to the *Atirātra* at the Ectype. Thus then, even though, having been enjoined in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, it has not been mentioned in its entirety in connection with the Ectype, yet it comes to be enjoined in its entirety, in relation to the Ectype. From this it follows that the *Ṣoḍashin* should be taken up among the Ectypes already enumerated,—not at the Archetype."

SŪTRA (35).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND ITS ABSENCE AT THE ARCHETYPE."

Bhāṣya.

"For the following reason also the *Ṣoḍashin* should be taken as appertaining to the Ectype.—'For what reason?'—At the Archetype we find its absence.—'How so?'—The assertion '*Dvē samstutānām virājamatirichyētē*' is possible only if there is no *Ṣoḍashin*; it having been shown above under 2. 4. 26 that 'two *Stotriya* hymns exceed the *Virāṭ*'.—From this also it follows that the *Ṣoḍashin* appertains to the Ectype."

SŪTRA (36).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE IT IS SPOKEN OF AS 'NOT A SACRIFICE'."

Bhāṣya.

"For the following reason also, it should be regarded as appertaining to the Ectype: There is the assertion that 'They say that there is no sacrifice of the name of *Ṣoḍashin*'. As a matter of fact, it is not that there is no *Ṣoḍashin* at the Archetypal *Jyotiṣṭoma*; and yet there is this assertion;—this can be explained only if it is present, not at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, but at the Ectype. From this also it follows that the *Ṣoḍashin* appertains to the Ectype."

SŪTRA (37).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD APPERTAIN TO THE ARCHETYPE, BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN SO LAID DOWN.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

It is not right that the *Ṣoḍashin* should be regarded as appertaining to the Ectype; in fact, it appertains to the Archetype.—Why?—Because it has been mentioned in connection with the Archetype, *Jyotiṣṭoma*; and hence through Context, it should be construed along with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; and this relationship would not cease even when it is spoken of in connection with the Ectype. The declaration quoted does not deny the *Ṣoḍashin* in relation to the Archetype; all that it does is that it asserts it in relation to the Ectype. Hence, inasmuch as it has been declared, and not denied, in reference to the Archetype, the *Ṣoḍashin* can certainly find room at the Archetype.

Further, it is not only the Context that proves this; there is Syntactical Connection also; as we read—'For the *Rājanya* one should take it up at the

Agniṣṭoma, and for the *Brāhmaṇa*, at the *Atirātra*'; so long as it is possible for it to be admitted at the Archetype, there can be no justification for relegating it to the *Atirātra connected with the Ectype*.—From all this it follows that the *Ṣoḍashin* appertains to the Archetype.

SŪTRA (38).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS SEEN AT THE ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, this *Ṣoḍashin* is found spoken of as occurring at the Archetype, in the text—'*Tisraḥ samstutānām virājamatirichyētē*'; and it has been already explained that it is only when the *Ṣoḍashin* has been taken up that there is a possibility of *three Stotriyas* being found.—From this it follows that the *Ṣoḍashin* appertains to the Archetype.

SŪTRA (39).

THE MENTION IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF SPECIFICATION.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that "it should be taken as appertaining to the Ectype, because it is in relation to that that it has been enjoined in its entirety".—This has been already answered by the assertion that the injunction referred to does not deny its presence at the Archetype.—"In that case it would come into the Ectype under the General Law itself; why should it have been enjoined over again?"—In connection with the Archetype, the presence of the *Ṣoḍashin* has been declared in a general way—in the text 'For the *Rājanya*, at the *Agniṣṭoma*,—for the *Brāhmaṇa*, at the *Atirātra*'; and it is for the purpose specifying this same, in order to secure the presence of the *Ṣoḍashin* at the *Agniṣṭoma* also, which is not an *Atirātra*,—that there is the further declaration that 'It is taken up on the middlemost day of the *Trirātra*'.

SŪTRA (40).

THE FINDING OF 'ABSENCE' HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—"The *Ṣoḍashin* is not found at the Archetype, as is clear from the text '*Dvē samstutānām virājamatirichyētē*'."—It has been already explained that on account of this finding of absence, the *Ṣoḍashin* should be taken as optional; and the fact of its being enjoined and prohibited should not be taken to mean that it is to be always omitted in one case.

SŪTRA (41).

AS FOR ITS BEING SPOKEN OF AS 'NOT A SACRIFICE', THAT IS A FIGURATIVE ASSERTION.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—"inasmuch as it has been spoken of as 'not a sacrifice', the *Ṣoḍashin* cannot find place at the Archetype."—This has been answered already; being so enjoined, it is certainly taken up at the Archetype.—"How is it then that it is spoken of as 'not a sacrifice'?"—Inasmuch as it is optional, in one case that sacrifice would not be there; it is in view of this fact that it is figuratively spoken of as being 'not a sacrifice'.

From all this it follows that the *Ṣoḍashin* appertains to the Archetype.

The use of this *Adhikaraṇa* lies in this that, according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the *Ṣoḍashin* would not be taken up at the Archetype, while, according to the *Siddhānta*, it should be taken up at it.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *The 'Ṣoḍashin' should be taken out of the 'Āgrayaṇa' vessel.*

SŪTRA (42).

IT SHOULD BE TAKEN OUT OF THE ĀGRAYAṆA.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Ṣoḍashin*, laid down in the text—'If, knowing this, one takes up the *Ṣoḍashin*, etc. etc.'—In connection with this we have learnt that this *Ṣoḍashin* appertains to the Archetype.

Now there arises the question—Should this be taken out of the *Āgrayaṇa* as well as the *Ukthya*? Or out of the *Āgrayaṇa* only?

The apparently correct view is that *it should be taken out of the Āgrayaṇa.* —Why?—Because of the declaration—'One takes the *Ṣoḍashin out of the Āgrayaṇa*'.—[This is the *Siddhānta.*]

SŪTRA (43).

[*Pūrvapakṣa's argument against Siddhānta—continued in Sūtras 45 and 46*]

—"IT SHOULD BE TAKEN OUT OF THE UKTHYA ALSO—ON ACCOUNT OF THE DECLARATION."

Bhāṣya.

"We accept the statement that the *Ṣoḍashin* should be taken out of the *Āgrayaṇa*; but it should be taken out of the *Ukthya* also.—Why?—*Because of the declaration*; there is this declaration—'One takes the *Ṣoḍashin* out of the *Ukthya*'. What is there that this declaration cannot do?—Hence the conclusion is that the *Ṣoḍashin* should be taken out of the *Āgrayaṇa* as also out of the *Ukthya.*"

We shall let this *Adhikaraṇa* remain unfinished at this point and shall proceed with the following *Adhikaraṇa* [the thread of the *Tenth Adhikaraṇa* being resumed in *Sūtra* 45, and carried on to *Sūtra* 48].

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *The 'Ṣoḍashin' should be taken up at the Third 'Savana'.*

SŪTRA (44).

IT SHOULD BE AT THE THIRD 'SAVANA', AS THERE IS A DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice; in connection with that, we read—'When the *Ṣoḍashin* is taken up, one installs within oneself virile sense-organs'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Should the *Ṣoḍashin* be taken up at each '*Savana*'? Or at the third '*Savana*' only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"It should be taken up at each *Savana*.—Why?—Because it is found to be spoken of in connection with each *Savana*, in the text 'One takes up the *Ṣoḍashin*'. In the matter of an act which is amenable to only verbal means of cognition, the verbal text is our only source of knowledge. Hence we conclude that the *Ṣoḍashin* should be taken up at each *Savana*."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—The taking up of the *Ṣoḍashin* should be done *at the third Savana*.—Why?—Because *there is a declaration to that effect*; there is the declaration—'*At the third Savana*, one takes up the *Ṣoḍashin* out of the *Āgrayaṇa*'; such declaration is authoritative for us; hence the *Ṣoḍashin* should be taken up at the third *Savana*.

As for the assertion that the *Ṣoḍashin* should be taken up at each *Savana*,—the declaration to that effect is only for the purpose of eulogising the taking up of the *Ṣoḍashin* at the third *Savana*.—How so?—The eulogy is contained in the following passage—'*Prātaḥsavanē gṛhyaḥ, ... ārtim nītaḥ*'.

SŪTRA (45).

[*Pūrvapakṣa's argument of Adhi.* 10—*continued, from Sū.* 43]—

"BECAUSE THE TERM 'PARĀK' DENOTES NON-REPETITION, AS IT HAS THAT MEANING."

Bhāṣya.

"For the following reason also we conclude that the *Ṣoḍashin* should be taken out of the *Ukthya* also:—For what reason?—On account of the text—'*Parāñchamukthyān nigṛhṇāti ṣoḍashinam*' ['Out of the *Ukthya*, one takes up the later *Ṣoḍashin*']; where the construction is '*Ukthyāt nigṛhṇāti*' ('takes out of the *Ukthya*').—Why so?—Because the term '*parāk*' denotes *non-repetition*.—Why?—*As it has that meaning*; i.e. it is found that it has that meaning,—in such expressions as '*parāchiḥ sāmidhēnīranvāha*', which means that 'he recites the *unrepeated Sāmidhēnī* verses'. Thus then, denoting non-repetition, it cannot be construed with '*Ukthya*';

as there can be no sense in the construction '*Ukthyāt anabhyastam*'; the right construction is '*Ukthyāt nigrhṇāti tam anabhyastam*'.—From all this it is clear that the *Ṣoḍashin* should be taken up out of the *Ukthya* and the *Āgrayaṇa*."

SŪTRA (46).

[*Pūrvapakṣa's argument of Adhi.* (10)—*concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS DECLARATION OF 'SEPARATION' OF THE UKTHYA."

Bhāṣya.

"For the following reason also the *Ṣoḍashin* should be taken up out of the *Ukthya* also:—'For what reason?'—*There is declaration of the 'separation' from the Ukthya*—viz.:—'When they fetch the *Ukthyas* and the *Ṣoḍashin* out of it, they separate the *Ukthya*': the mention of 'fetching' clearly shows that the *Ukthya* is the thing from which the *Ṣoḍashin* is separated (taken out). For this reason also this *Ṣoḍashin* should be taken up out of both (the *Āgrayaṇa* and the *Ukthya*)."

SŪTRA (47).

[SIDDHĀNTA—*of Adhi.* (10)]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE OUT OF THE ĀGRAYAṆA; BECAUSE THE TERM 'PARĀK' DENOTES PLACE,—LIKE THE TERM 'PUNARĀDHĒYA'.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the *Ṣoḍashin* should be taken out of the *Āgrayaṇa* only, not out of the *Ukthya*.—Why?—Because there is the declaration that 'one takes up the *Ṣoḍashin* out of the *Āgrayaṇa*'; and when the whole of it is taken out of the *Āgrayaṇa*, it cannot be taken out of the *Ukthya*. In cases where the whole of a thing is concerned, *option* and *combination* can be admitted only when there is no other way out of it; so long as there is another way out of it, option and combination cannot be admitted;—and in the case in question, there is a way out of it.—"How?"—The term '*parāk*' denotes *place*; as a matter of fact the term '*parāk*' denotes *place* and *direction*; so that '*Ukthyāt parāñchaḥ*' becomes quite reasonable construction [meaning 'behind the *Ukthya*']; and this construction will not be inconsistent with the presence of the whole thing;—just as in the case of the sentence '*Parāñchamagnyādhēyāt punarādadhāti*', the Ablative Ending is in connection with *time* [meaning *after*], not in the sense of something from which a thing is separated;—similarly should it be in the case in question also.—From all this it follows that the *Ṣoḍashin* should be taken up out of the *Āgrayaṇa* only.

SŪTRA (48).

AS FOR THE 'SEPARATION', THAT IS BASED UPON THE SIMILARITY OF 'STOMA'.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that "the mention of *separation* indicates the *Ukthya* as something from which there is separation".—But it is not so; as a matter of fact, *the 'separation' is based upon the similarity of Stoma*; when it is said that 'when they fetch the *Ukthya* and the *Ṣoḍashin*, they separate the *Ukthya*',—what is meant is that, on account of its containing *twenty-one Stomas*, the *Ṣoḍashin* forms, as it were, the body of the *Ukthya*; hence it is spoken of as 'separated' from the previous two—when it is said that 'they fetch it from there'. The Ablative Ending here also denotes *time*, not in the sense of something from which there is separation.—From all this it follows that the *Ṣoḍashin* should be taken up out of the *Āgrayaṇa* only.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *The 'Ṣodashin' is accompanied by 'Stotra' and 'Shastra' hymns.*

SŪTRA (49).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"ON ACCOUNT OF ITS CONNECTION WITH 'UKTHYA' AND 'AGNIṢṬOMA', IT SHOULD BE WITHOUT 'STOTRA' AND 'SHASTRA'; IF THESE WERE THERE, IT WOULD FORM ANOTHER 'TERMINUS'."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the subject of the *Ṣoḍashin*, it is declared that—'At the *Agniṣṭoma*, it should be taken up for the *Rājanya*; it should be taken up in the *Ukthya*'.

In regard to this there arises the question—Is the *Ṣoḍashin* to be accompanied by *Stotra* and *Shastra*? Or is it to be without *Stotra and Shastra*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"The *Ṣoḍashin* should be without *Stotra* and *Shastra*.—Why?—*On account of its connection with Ukthya and Agniṣṭoma*; there is connection with *Ukthya* and *Agniṣṭoma* in the text—'At the *Agniṣṭoma*, one should take it up for the *Rājanya*; it should be taken up at the *Ukthya*', this means that the *Ṣoḍashin* should be taken up during the *Agniṣṭoma-Terminus* and the *Ukthya-Terminus*. Now, this sacrifice of the *Ṣoḍashin* can belong to the *Agniṣṭoma-Terminus* only if the *Cup* (*Ṣoḍashin*) is taken up during that Terminus, and if no *Stotra* or *Shastra* used therein; if the *Stotra* or *Shastra* is used there, then the process would end with the *Ṣoḍashi-Stoma*; and in that case it would not belong to the *Agniṣṭoma-Terminus*, nor to the *Ukthya-Terminus*; and this would be contrary to the following declaration that 'At the *Agniṣṭoma* one should take it for the *Rājanya*; it should be taken up at the *Ukthya*'. As a matter of fact, the *Ṣoḍashin* has been laid down in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* as accompanied by the *Agniṣṭoma*, and it is a subsidiary of the *Agniṣṭoma* tself;—and no sacrifice is ever subsidiary to the *Stotra* and *Shastra*; as the sacrifice brings forward a definite reward; while the *Stotra* and *Shastra* lead to no results. It is only thus, not otherwise, that the *Agniṣṭoma* becomes a Terminus of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*.—From all this it follows that the *Ṣoḍashin* should be without *Stotra* and *Shastra*."

SŪTRA (50).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY 'STOTRA' AND 'SHASTRA', BECAUSE THESE ARE ITS SUBSIDIARIES.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, the *Ṣoḍashin should be accompanied by Stotra and Shastra*,—why?—*Because these are its subsidiaries*; *Stotra and Shastra* are subsidiaries

of the sacrifice, consequent upon the taking up of the Cup.—How so?—There is the declaration that—'Taking up the Cup, or raising the Ladle, one recites the *Stotra*',—which shows that when the *contingency* (cause, in the shape of the *Taking up of the Cup*) is there, the *Contingent* (reciting of the *Stotra*) must be there. Hence it follows that the *Ṣoḍashin* should be accompanied by *Stotra* and *Shastra*.

SŪTRA (51).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND AN INDICATIVE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

There is an indicative text which points to the conclusion that the *Ṣoḍashin* is accompanied by *Stotra* and *Shastra*.—How so?—The text is as follows:—'*Ūrdhvā vā anyē yajñakratavaḥ santiṣṭhantē, tiryañcho'nyē yē hotāramabhisantiṣṭhantē tē tērdhvāḥ, yē vā achchhāvākam te tiryañchaḥ*'.—"How does this passage indicate the said conclusion?"—What the passage means is as follows—'There are two kinds of Sacrificial Performance—those that rest with the Hotṛ and those that rest with the *Achchhāvāka*'; this could be so only if the *Ṣoḍashin*, were accompanied by *Stotra* and *Shastra*; otherwise, this *Ṣoḍashin* would rest with the *Adhvaryu*.—From this also it follows that the *Ṣoḍashin* should be accompanied by *Stotra* and *Shastra*.

SŪTRA (52).

IF IT IS ANOTHER 'TERMINUS', THAT IS DUE TO A DIRECT DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that if there are *Stotra* and *Shastra* in the *Ṣoḍashin*, it becomes a distinct 'Terminus'.—If it becomes so, it does so on the strength of a direct declaration. The declaration relating to that which has been spoken of as ending with the *Agniṣṭoma* clearly lays down that the *Ṣoḍashin* is another 'Terminus';—and what is there that a direct declaration cannot do?—From this also it follows that the *Ṣoḍashin* is accompanied by *Stotra* and *Shastra*.

Adhikaraṇa (13): *At the 'Aṅgirasām Dvirātra', there is 'preclusion' of the 'Ṣoḍashin'.*

SŪTRA (53).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"On account of absence, it is taken up at the Atirātras."

Bhāṣya.

There is the '*Aṅgirasām Dvirātra*', in connection with which it is declared—'On the previous day there is the *Vaikhānasa Sāman*, on the next day, the *Ṣoḍashin*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this an injunction of the *Ṣoḍashin*? Or a preclusion of it from cases where it is already admissible?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"Here we have the injunction of the *Ṣoḍashin* which is not otherwise admissible. As for the General Law, it is purely inferential, and it cannot render anything admissible which is already directly enjoined as to be used elsewhere; as for instance, in the case in question, the *Ṣoḍashin* has been enjoined as coming in 'on the second day, at the *Dvirātra*'; hence in so far as the '*Aṅgirāsām dvirātra*' is concerned, the admissibility of the *Ṣoḍashin* cannot be taken to be indicated by the General Law; and hence it follows that the sentence in question should be taken as enjoining the *Ṣoḍashin*, which is not already admissible."

SŪTRA (54).

[Siddhānta]—In fact, there should be connection; as the injunction is an isolated one.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, there should be connection; i.e. the declaration in question—'On the previous day, the *Vaikhānasa* etc. etc.' is for the purpose of precluding the *Ṣoḍashin* from another sacrifice.—"How can there be such 'connection'?"—*Because the injunction is an isolated one*;—"Which is the *isolated injunction*?"—The injunction that 'the *Soḍashin* is taken up at the second day of the *Dvirātra*'; it is the *Ṣoḍashin* rendered admissible by this injunction that is spoken of in the text in question, which, thus, means that—'The *Ṣoḍashin*, which has been enjoined (in the said isolated injunction) as to be taken up at the *Dvirātra*, should be taken up at the *Aṅgirasām-Dvirātra, not at other Dvirātras*'.

Or, the *Adhikaraṇa* may be presented as follows :—

The *Pūrvapakṣa*—" ON ACCOUNT OF ABSENCE, IT IS TAKEN UP AT THE ATIRĀTRAS (Sū. 53). The taking up of the *Ṣoḍashin* at the *Atirātras*, in accordance with the Archetype, is optional; and having recognised it as an optional factor admissible at all *Dvirātras*, there is a restriction laid down by the text that 'it is taken up on the second day of the *Dvirātra*'; and it is in reference to this that we have the text in question, which means that there is 'absence' of the *Ṣoḍashin* at the other *Dvirātras ;* and by reason of this 'absence', it becomes restricted to the second day of the *Aṅgirasām Dvirātra* ".—*Siddhānta*—THERE SHOULD BE CONNECTION, AS THE INJUNCTION IS AN ISOLATED ONE (Sū. 54). As a matter of fact, the 'later' days of *all Dvirātras* are connected with the *Ṣoḍashin* ; as is clear from the 'isolated' injunction that 'it is taken up on the second day of the *Dvirātra* '.—" This text should be taken as the reiteration or preclusion of the *Ṣoḍashin* in regard to the 'later' day ".—The answer to that is that a Direct Assertion cannot be precluded by any specificatory text, as there would be three objections (to this preclusion): viz. (1) non-acceptance of what is expressed by the text, (2) assumption of a different meaning, and (3) the exclusion of what is known to be admissible.—Nor can it be taken as a *reiteration* (of what has been said in the other text), because the two sentences are entirely distinct.—" What then is the meaning of the expression '*Ṣoḍashyuttarē*' ? " —This is an *injunction*, not of the *Ṣoḍashin* ; but of the *Vaikhānasa-Sāman* ; —what is enjoined is that—' there is the *Vaikhānasa-Sāman* on the previous day'; what follows in the expression '*Ṣoḍashyuttarē*' is a mere reiterative reference, the injunction of admissibility being contained in the previous 'isolated' injunction. Hence what is to be taken up (at the *Aṅgirasām Dvirātra*) is the *Ṣoḍashin* already enjoined elsewhere.

[The *Nyāyamālā* remarks that the former presentation of the *Adhikaraṇa* is according to the *Vṛttikāra's* interpretation, and the latter is in accordance with the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya-kāra* himself.]

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *The 'Ṣoḍashin' is to be taken up at the several 'Ahīna' sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (55).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE SENTENCE 'CHATURTHĒ CHATURTHE'HANI AHĪNASYA GṚHYATĒ' SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN THAT THERE SHOULD BE REPETITION; AS IN THE CASE OF 'EATING'."

Bhāṣya.

In reference to the *Ṣoḍashin*, it has been declared—'*Chaturthē chaturthē ahani ahīnasya gṛhyate*' ['The *Ṣoḍashin* is taken up on the fourth day and the fourth day'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does this mean that *at one and the same Ahīna* sacrifice, the *Ṣoḍashin* should be repeated (on the fourth day)? Or, that it should be repeated in the sense that it should be taken up at the fourth day of each of the *several Ahīna-sacrifices*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"It should be repeated at one and the same *Ahīna*.—Why?—Because the text contains the word '*ahīnasya*' which means 'of *one Ahīna*'; if it were taken as standing for several *Ahīnas*, this could be only by *Indirect Indication*, while under our view it is *Direct Denotation*. Further, if several *Ahīnas* had been meant, then the repetition (of the word 'Chaturthē') would have been entirely superfluous; and the required idea would have been obtained by the simple expression '*Chaturthē ahani ahīnasya*' ('on the fourth day of the *Ahīna*'). If, on the other hand, it refers to a single *Ahīna*, then the repetition serves a useful purpose. Hence the *Ṣoḍashin* should be repeated at one and the same *Ahīna*;—*like eating*; just as in the case of the expression '*Chaturthē chaturthē ahani dēvadatto bhuṅktē*', it is understood to mean that 'having eaten on the *fourth day*, he eats again on another *fourth day* during the same fortnight',—similarly should it be in the case in question also.—From all this it follows that there should be repetition at the same *Ahīna*."

SŪTRA (56).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN UP AT SEVERAL AHĪNAS; BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF THE NUMBER; AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'FORTNIGHT'; AS IT IS ONLY THUS THAT THE NUMBER SERVES A USEFUL PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, the *Ṣoḍashin* is taken up on the fourth day of several *Ahīna* sacrifices; as it is only in this way that there would be a number of 'taking

up'. In one *Ahīna*, there can be only one 'fourth day', the other would be the 'eighth day'.—It has been argued that—"under the *Pūrvapakṣa* view, the term '*ahīna*' would be taken in its direct denotation".—It is true that there would be direct denotation; but mere direct denotation cannot do anything; as the character of 'fourth' would not be there. In our view, there is Indirect Indication, and this does serve a useful purpose.—Further, under our view, there need be no indirect indication either; as the singular number (in '*ahani*') may be taken as standing for the generic entity.—It has been argued that "repetition would be superfluous";—but that is not right; merely because a certain term would be superfluous, there can be no justification for assuming a meaning of words which the words do not express at all.—From all this it follows that the *Ṣoḍashin* is to be taken up at the several *Ahīnas*;—*as in the case of the* '*fortnight*'; in the case of the expression '*pañchamyām pañchamyām bhuṅktē*', it is understood to mean the *fifth day* of two distinct *fortnights*; the same should be the case in the present instance also.—We conclude therefore that the *Ṣoḍashin* should be taken up at several *Ahīnas*.

SŪTRA (57).

IN THE CASE OF 'EATING', THE NUMBER CAN BE APPLICABLE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that "it should be as in the case of *Eating*";—but in the case of *Eating*, it is by implication that the other day also is regarded as the 'fourth'; that is, the second occasion of eating would be the 'fourth' day only when it is counted from the first occasion of Eating, which alone is really the 'fourth day';—in the case of the *Ahīna*, that occasion would be the *eighth day*. In the case of an act (like sacrifice) which is governed entirely by Verbal authority, we can understand only that much as is actually expressed by the word; and not on the basis of secular practice. Thus then, it is only right that in the case of *Eating* (which is a secular act), the ordinary secular practice should be followed; in the case of the *Ahīna* however (which is a *Vedic* act), that alone can be admitted which is expressed by the word.

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *It is at the Ectype that the 'Grahas' should be led by 'Āgrayaṇa'.*

SŪTRA (58).

IN THE CASE OF THE TERM 'JAGATSĀMAN',—INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO SUCH SĀMAN,—THE SĀMAN WOULD TAKE THAT NAME THROUGH THE VERSE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Yadi rathantarasāmā . . . . Yadi jagatsāmā āgrayaṇāgrān*' ['If the Soma-sacrifice should be one at which the *Rathantara-Sāman* is chanted, then the *grahas* should be led by those dedicated to *Indra-Vāyu* . . . . . . If it is one at which the *Jagat-Sāman* is sung, the *grahas* should be led by the *Āgrayaṇa*'.] This second sentence is the subject-matter for consideration.

In regard to this, the question that arises is—Does this character of *being led by the Āgrayaṇa* find place in the Archetype? Or in the Ectype?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"In accordance with the Context, it should find place in the Archetype. As a matter of fact, the sacrifice referred to in the expression 'if the Soma-sacrifice be one at which the *Jagat-Sāman* is chanted' is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself (which is the Archetype),—the name '*Jagat-sāmā*' being applied to it by some sort of relationship—of quality or of action."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—Even though we find the term '*Jagatsāman*' actually used, yet *it is through the verse alone that the Sāman could take that name.*—Why so?—*Because there is no such Sāman*; in the whole of the *Sāmavēda*, there is no such *Sāman* as '*Jagat-sāma*'; hence that sacrifice alone can be called '*Jayatsāmā*' at which the *Sāman* is chanted over a verse in the *Jagatī metre* (as the basic verse);—and such a sacrifice is the *Viṣuvat* (an Ectypal sacrifice).—"But the *Viṣuvat* has been spoken of as being one at which the *grahas* are led by *Shukra*".—That does not affect the case; this latter may be taken as pertaining to cases where the *Viṣuvat* is performed with a view to a particular reward.—From all this it follows that the character in question is to find place in the Ectypal Sacrifice, *Viṣuvat*.

This same *Sūtra* (58) may be explained differently as embodying the following *Adhikaraṇa*.

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *The name 'Jagatsāmā' applies to the 'Viṣuvat' sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (58).

IN THE CASE OF THE TERM 'JAGATSĀMAN',—INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO SUCH SĀMAN,—THE SAMA WOULD TAKE THAT NAME THROUGH THE VERSE.

Bhāṣya.

The text for consideration is the same as above—'*Yadi jagatsāmā āgrayaṇāgrān grahān gṛhṇāti*'.

In regard to this there arises the question—What is it that is meant by '*Jagatsāmā*'? (*a*) Is it one that has either of the two *Sāmans*—*Rathantara* or *Bṛhat*? (*b*) Or that which has both these *Sāmans*? (*c*) Or is it that which has the *Rathantara* only? (*d*) Or is it that wherein the *Sāman* is chanted over a basic verse in the *Jagatī-metre*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"(*a*) It is that at which the *Sāman* is either *Rathantara* or *Bṛhat*.—Why?—Because there is no reason for discriminating between the two. That it is so is indicated by the fact that the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is the sacrifice dealt with in the Context, and at this sacrifice either of the two *Sāmans* may be chanted.—(*b*) Or, that sacrifice may be regarded as '*Jagatsāmā*' at which both the said *Sāmans* are chanted; the term '*jagat*' denotes *whole*; and the *Jyotiṣṭoma* could be spoken of as having the '*whole Sāman*' only if it had both the *Sāmans*; if only one of the two alone were used, then the term '*jagat*' could not be taken as a qualifying term, and it would have to be regarded as being of no significance at all. Hence it follows that it must be a sacrifice having both the *Sāmans*.—(c) Or, that may be regarded as '*Jagatsāmā*' which has the *Rathantara* only; as the basic verse of the *Rathantara*—'*Īshānamasya jagataḥ svardṛsham*'—contains the term '*jagat*'. If the '*Jagatsāmā*' were that at which both (*Rathantara* and *Bṛhat*) are chanted, then the Injunction in question would be doing what is already done, and as such it would be superfluous. Hence there can be no combination of those two at the Archetype; so that that alone can be regarded as '*Jagatsāmā*' at which the *Rathantara* alone is chanted."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—That is called '*Jagatsāmā*' at which the *Sāman* is chanted over a basic verse in the *Jagatī* metre. This is the view that is supported by the direct denotation of the term. Otherwise, if the term were taken as standing for the *Rathantara-Sāman*, the verse would indicate the word and the word would indicate the *Sāman*; so that there would be *indicative indication*. For this reason the name '*Jagatsāmā*' should be taken as standing for that at which this *Sāman* is chanted over a basic verse in the *Jagatī-metre*. Thus then, it is through the verse (in the *Jagatī* metre) that the *Sāman* named '*Jagat*' would be taken as occurring at the *Viṣuvat* sacrifice.—"But the *Viṣuvat* has been

declared to be *Shukrāgra* (whereas the *Jagatsāmā* is spoken of as '*Āgrayaṇāgra*') ".—That does not affect our position; as that would be taken as referring to that case of *Viṣuvat* where it is performed with a view to a definite reward.—From all this it follows that the character in question should find place at the *Viṣuvat*; which is an ectypal sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *At the 'Samsava' sacrifice, neither the 'Agriyavatī' nor the 'Upavatī' verse is to be used.*

SŪTRA (59).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"AT A SACRIFICE WHERE BOTH SĀMANS ARE CHANTED, THAT WHICH IS CONTINGENT SHOULD BE USED OPTIONALLY, BECAUSE BOTH ARE EQUAL."

Bhāṣya.

There are certain sacrifices called '*Ubhayasāman*' ('where both Sāmans are chanted'),—such as 'Both should be chanted at the *Samsava*';—again in connection with *Ēkāha* sacrifice called *Apachiti*, we read—'Both, the *Rathantara* and the *Bṛhat*, should be chanted';—now contingent upon the adoption of the *Rathantara* or of the *Bṛhat*, we have the rule that 'in connection with the *Rathantara*, one should adopt the verse containing the term '*upa*', and in connection with the *Bṛhat*, one should adopt the verse containing the term '*agriya*'.

Now there arises the following question:—(*a*) Should the verse adopted be *either* the one contingent upon the *Rathantara-Sāman* (i.e. the verse with '*Upa*'), *or* that contingent upon the *Bṛhat-Sāman* (i.e. the verse with '*agriya*'), and there should be option?—Or (*b*) Should that alone be adopted which is contingent upon the *Rathantara-Sāman*? Or (*c*) Should that be adopted which is contingent upon something totally different (from both *Rathantara* and *Bṛhat*)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"One should adopt that contingent upon either the one or the other,—there being *option*.—Why?—Because the admissibility of both is equal, and combination of both is impossible;—nor is there any reason for selecting either one of the two to the exclusion of the other,—justifying the adopting of that contingent upon one, and not that contingent upon the other; nor is it possible to adopt both the verses. Hence there must be *option*."

SŪTRA (60).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"OR, PREDOMINANCE SHOULD BE THE DETERMINING FACTOR."

Bhāṣya.

"It has been argued that the admissibility of both is equal and there is no reason for selecting either one of the two;—but we say that there is such a reason, in the shape of '*predominance*', which, as applying to the *Rathantara*, consists in its being mentioned first; as is going to be explained under *Sūtra* 12. 2. 23."

SŪTRA (61).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF THE CONTINGENCIES, THE ACTION SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE SACRIFICE ITSELF.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the views set forth above.

There should be exclusion of both the contingencies (*Bṛhat* as well as *Rathantara*), and the *sacrifice* alone should be regarded as the determining factor; such being the case, it would be a case neither of *Rathantara-Sāman* nor of *Bṛhat-Sāman*; in fact, the *Sāman* would be made up of both; consequently the verse adopted should be neither the one with '*Upa*' nor the one with '*Agriya*'; that alone may be adopted which is related to the *sacrifice* itself.

Adhikaraṇa (18): *The Cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu is not to be brought up before all Cups.*

SŪTRA (62).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Inasmuch as the Cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu is spoken of as the 'foremost', it should be brought up at the beginning."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we read—'*Vāg vā aindravāyavo yadaīndravāyavāgrā grahā gṛhyantē vāchamēvāvarundhē*' [where the '*aindravāyava*' cup is spoken as the '*agra*', 'first', 'foremost', of all *cups*;—while in the *Mantra-kāṇḍa* and the *Brāhmaṇa-kāṇḍa*, the order of the Cups is as follows:—(1) *Upāmshu-graha*, (2) *Antaryāma-graha*, (3) *Aindravāyava-graha*, (4) *Maitrāvaruṇa-graha* and so forth, where the *Aindravāyava* has the *third* place].

In regard to this there arises the question—In accordance with the text quoted—Should the '*aindravāyavagraha*' (Cup dedicated to *Indra-Vāyu*) be brought (from the third place) to the beginning, before all the rest, even before the *Upāmshu* and the *Antaryāma* Cups? Or is it to be taken up only before the *Shukrāmanthi*-Cups?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*The Cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu should be brought up before all the rest.*—Why?—*Because it is spoken of as the 'agra' ('foremost', 'first')*: the text quoted above clearly lays down the 'first' place for the *Cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu*—'*Aindravāyavāgram gṛhṇāti*',—which clearly means that the *Cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu* should be dealt with *before all the other Cups*: so that, without any distinction, all the Cups should be treated so that the *Cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu* comes before them. If the Cup in question were not brought up before all the others, then the *Upāmshu* and *Antaryāma* Cups would not be such as have the *Cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu* before them. On the other hand, when the Cup is brought up before *all*, then all the Cups become such as have *the Cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu* before them.—Then, as a matter of fact, the text in question does not *enjoin* merely the 'first' place for the *Cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu*; if that had been enjoined, then that would have been fulfilled by making that Cup 'first' in relation to any few Cups;—what is actually enjoined is that character of *all the Cups* which consists in *having the Cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu* before them; hence (according to this Injunction) that character has to be brought about in *all the Cups*; consequently the Cup has got to be brought up before all the Cups.—'How do you know that what is enjoined is the character of all the Cups?'—That it is so is clear from the assertion itself 'One should make the Cups *such as have the Aindra-Vāyava Cup before them*'; what this sentence lays down is not that the

Cup should be 'made'; what is asserted is that *the Cups* should be made such as have that particular Cup before them; so that the character of being 'first' (as belonging to the *Aindravāyava-Cup*) is, not for its own sake, but only for imparting the aforesaid character to the other Cups.—From all this it follows that the *Cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu* should be brought up before all the Cups."

SŪTRA (63).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, THE CUPS HAVING THE PARTICULAR CHARACTER ARE EQUALLY ENDOWED WITH THAT CHARACTER; AND WHAT IS MEANT BY 'AGRA' SHOULD, ON THE BASIS OF THE CONTEXT, BE TAKEN TO BE THAT THE CUP IN QUESTION SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN ITS OWN PLACE.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*api vā*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

The Cup in question should not be brought up before all the rest: it should be taken up *in its own place.*—"Why?"—Because what is enjoined in the text is not the fact of the Cup in question being the 'first',—which would be the indication of Syntactical Connection; what is enjoined is the taking up of the Cups of which the Cup in question is the '*agra*' (first), as is *directly expressed* by the words of that text which lays down that 'in the case of the *Soma-sacrifice* being one at which the *Rathantara-Sāman* is chanted, those Cups which have been declared to have the *Aindra-Vāyava* Cup as their first should, by reason of that character, be taken up in that particular order'; so that the 'taking up' enjoined is only of those Cups that, in their own normal position, have the *Aindravāyava* Cup before them [and not of those that are made so by the transference of the *Aindra-Vāyava* Cup]. Hence we conclude that the *Aindra-Vāyava* Cup is not to be brought up before *all the rest.*

SŪTRA (64).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE TERM 'DHĀRĀ'.

Bhāṣya.

Further, in the text speaking of the *Aindra-Vāyava* Cup, we find the term '*dhārā*' ('stream')—'*Aṇvā avyavachchhinnayā dhārayā gṛhṇāti*'; from which it is clear that what is laid down is the taking up of those *dhārā-grahas* only which have the *Aindra-Vāyava* Cup before them [and not of *all Cups*].

ADHIKARAṆA (19): *Even when the desire for a reward is there, the Aindravāyava Cup is not to be brought up before all.*

SŪTRA (65).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN THERE IS DESIRE FOR REWARD MENTIONED, THE CUP MUST BE BROUGHT TO THE BEGINNING, BECAUSE OF THE DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT."

Bhāṣya.

In some cases we have a declaration of the *Cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu* in reference to the presence of a desire for rewards; e.g. 'One who desires that there should be offsprings as before should take up the Cups in such a way as to make the *Aindravāyava Cup* the first'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Should the Cup in question be brought up before all the rest? Or should here also the Cup be taken in its own place?

The apparent answer to the question is that, in accordance with the principle arrived at in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, the Cup in question should be taken up in its own place.

As against this, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"In a case *where there is desire for reward mentioned, the Cup must be brought up* before all the rest.—Why?—*Because of the declaration to that effect*; there is the direct declaration to the effect that 'one who desires that there should be offsprings as before should take up the Cups in such a way as to make the *Aindravāyava* Cup the first'; this declaration would serve a useful purpose only if it were taken as laying down the fact of the *Aindravāyava* Cup coming before all others, and if, in accordance with this the said Cups were actually brought up before all the rest. If it were taken (as suggested by the *Siddhāntin* in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*) that what is laid down is only the taking up of the Cups of which the *Aindravāyava* is the first,—then the declaration would not lead to any particular form of activity (and as such, would be futile). Hence it follows that the Cup in question must be brought up before all the rest."

SŪTRA (66).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—INASMUCH AS THE TERM 'AGRA' IS RELATED TO THOSE OCCUPYING A CERTAIN POSITION, THE DECLARATION SPEAKING OF THE DESIRE FOR REWARD SHOULD REFER TO THOSE; SPECIALLY ON ACCOUNT OF THE PRESENCE OF WHAT IS ESSENTIAL.

Bhāṣya.

What has been said regarding the Cup in question having to be brought up before all the rest is not right; the order of sequence can be

duly followed only when the Cup is taken up in its own place in the series; hence it must be taken up in its own place.—It has been argued that "on account of the text laying down the *first* place for the Cup, it must be brought up before all the rest";—but that is not so; in fact, what the text lays down is in relation to those Cups which in their own normal position in the 'stream', have the *Aindravāyava* Cup before them;—the reward in question would be brought about only if there were the 'taking up' of just those Cups which have that character of having the *Aindravāyava* before it; thus alone would the Direct signification of the words be followed; while your view would have the support of *Syntactical Connection*; and Direct Assertion is more authoritative than Syntactical Connection.—It has been argued that—"if the declaration were taken as the injunction of the taking up (of just these Cups), then it would not lead to any particular form of activity".—The answer to this is that there are two distinct connections—by one connection, the essential (compulsory) act (of *Taking up*) is related to the *desire for reward*, the meaning being that 'the particular reward should be obtained by means of the *Taking up*',—and by the other connection, there is the essential act by itself (without reference to any reward),—in the sense that 'one should take up those Cups which have the *Aindravāyava* Cup before them';—so that the particular form of activity is duly secured. Hence the declaration in question should be taken as laying down, as a means of securing the reward, the taking up of the Cup in its own place; so that the Cup in question has to be taken up in its own place in the series.

ADHIKARAṆA (20): *The Cups which have the Āshvina Cup as their foremost have to be brought forward.*

SŪTRA (67).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN OTHER CASES ALSO, THE TERM 'AGRA' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS BEFORE."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice; in connection with which there are mentioned Cups other than that dedicated to *Indra-Vāyu*, in connection with a desire for particular results:—(*a*) 'For one who is ill, one should take up the Cups with the *Āshvina*-Cup as the *foremost* ("*agra*")', (*b*) 'For one who is performing a malevolent rite, one should take up the Cups with the *Shukra-Cup* as the foremost', (*c*) 'For one against whom a malevolent rite is being performed, one should take up the Cups with the *Manthin Cup* as the foremost'.

In regard to all this, there arises the question,—should, in all these cases also, the Cups specified as 'foremost' be taken up in their own places? Or should they be brought up before all the other Cups?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*In other cases*,—i.e. in the taking up of Cups other than the *Aindravāyava*,—also the term '*agra*' ('foremost') *should be taken as before*; i.e. the Cups should be taken up in their own places; and the result desired would be connected with those Cups of which certain Cups have been mentioned as the 'foremost'."

SŪTRA (68).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE BROUGHT UP; BECAUSE THE 'AGRA', WHICH IS CONNECTED WITH THE ESSENTIAL FACTOR, HAS NO CONNECTION (WITH THE RESULT).

Bhāṣya.

The Cups in question should be brought back before the *Aindravāyava* Cup.—"Why?"—Because in this case the desire for results has no connection with the essential factor.—If the desire were present in the case of the essential act also, the term '*agra*'—as appearing in the words '*āshvinā-grān*' and '*manthyagrān*'—could not be applicable to it; because the presence of that declaration is not found to give rise to any particular form of activity; while if it were withdrawn to before the *Aindravāyava* Cup, then the said declaration would serve a useful purpose.—Then again, the Cups in question are those that are used at the Archetype, and in reference to these the sentence in question lays down the character of *having the Āshvina*

for their first and of *having the Shukra for their first.* Hence it follows that the Cups in question should be brought up to the beginning.

SŪTRA (69).

THERE IS A TEXT INDICATING THE SAID 'BRINGING UP'.

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Dhārayēyustam yam kāmāya gṛhṇīyuḥ, aindra-vāyavam gṛhītvā sādayēt yam kāmāya gṛhṇīyuḥ*'. ['They should hold that which they have taken up with the desire for a certain result; having taken up the *Aindravāyava* Cup, they should deposit that which they have taken up with the desire for a result'];—here it is said that that is to be held which has been taken up with the desire for a certain result, which shows that the *Aindravayava* Cup is to be taken up.—For this reason also the Cups in question should be brought up before all the rest.

ADHIKARAṆA (21): *The 'Āshvina' and other Cups are to be brought forward just before the 'Aindravāyava' Cup.*

SŪTRA (70).

IT SHOULD BE PRIOR TO THE 'AINDRAVĀYAVA'; BECAUSE THAT IS THE POSITION ASSIGNED TO THE 'AGRA'.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice; in connection with that certain Cups are spoken of as coming after the *Aindravāyava* Cup, and as to be taken up for the fulfilment of certain desires;—e.g. '*Ashvināgrān grahān gṛhṇāti āmayavinaḥ*', 'For one who is ill, one should take up the Cups with the *Āshvina* Cup as the first';—'*Shukrāgrānabhicharataḥ*', 'For one who is performing a malevolent rite, the Cups with the *Shukra* Cup as the first';—'*Manthyagrānabhicharyamāṇasya*', 'For one against whom a malevolent rite is being performed, the Cups with the *Manthin* Cup as the first'.—It has been settled (in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*) that these Cups are not to be taken up in their places, but are to be brought forward.

Now there arises the question—Are these to be brought forward prior to all the Cups? Or prior to some Cups (without any restriction)?—Or prior definitely to the *Aindravāyava* Cup?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"as there is no rule laying down the exact place whereto the Cups in question are to be brought forward, there can be no restriction [and they may be brought forward anywhere one likes]."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*They should be brought forward prior to the Aindradāyava Cup*;—why?—*because that is the position assigned to the 'agra'*; it has been recognised that the place meant by the term '*agra*', 'first' (as occurring in '*āshvināgrān*' and other words), is that *after* the *Upāmshu* and *Antaryāma* Cups, and *before* the *Aindravāyava* Cup.—"How so?"—In accordance with the previous text—'If the *Soma*-sacrifice should be one at which the *Rathantara-Sāman* is chanted, one takes up the Cups with the *Aindravāyava* as the first'—the *Cups* have been taken up at the Archetype as with the *Aindravāyava* as the first;—and in this text the taking up of these Cups has been laid down as in relation to the *Aindravāyava* Cup;—and having been laid down there, it cannot be taken as laid down again in connection with 'those having the *Āshvina* for their first', or 'those having the *Shukra* for their first', or 'those having the *Manthin* for their first';—hence all that the text in question can be taken as laying down is the fact of these being the 'first';—now here the *Cups* that have been spoken of in the context are 'those having the *Aindravāyava* for their first'; so that when the question arises as to what one should do, in the case of one performing a malevolent rite, to 'the Cups with the

Shukra as the first',—the answer is that he should 'take these up'; and this naturally has to be taken along with the Context; we cannot connect the '*Shukrāgrān*' with simply '*grahān*'; as there would be no term expressing the 'taking up'.—With what then is it to be connected?—It has to be connected with the term '*aindravāyavāgra*' which appears in the context, —the full sentence being '*Shukrāgrān gṛhṇīyāt aindravāyavāgrān*' (in the sense that 'one should take up the Cups with the *Shukra* as the first, *which are prior to the Aindravāyava*'); and what these Cups are has been described there.—Thus the conclusion is that the Cups in question are to be brought forward prior to the *Aindravāyava* Cup.

SŪTRA (71).

ALSO BECAUSE THEIR PROPERTIES ARE SIMILAR.

Bhāṣya.

The Cups in question have properties similar to those of the *Aindravāyava*; in the latter we find the presence of the 'stream'; hence we conclude that when the text speaks of the 'first', it is in relation to those Cups that are connected with the 'stream'.

SŪTRA (72).

TO THE SAME END WE FIND AN INDICATIVE TEXT ALSO.

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Dhārayēyustam yam kāmāya gṛhṇīyuḥ, aindravāyavam gṛhītvā sādayēt, atha tam sādayēt yam kāmāya gṛhṇīyuḥ*'—where the holding of the *Aindravāyava* is spoken of as coming after the holding of the Cup that has been taken up with the desire for a certain reward.—This also shows that the Cups in question should be brought forward prior to the *Aindravāyava* Cup.

ADHIKARAṆA (22): *The 'depositing' also is to be brought forward.*

SŪTRA (73).

THE 'DEPOSITING' ALSO; AS IT IS SUBSIDIARY.

Bhāṣya.

There is the declaration—'*Āshvināgrān gṛhṇīyāt āmavayāvinaḥ, shukrāgrān gṛhṇīyāt abhicarataḥ, manthyagrān gṛhṇīyāt abhicaryamāṇasya*';—it has been explained that the Cups spoken of here are to be brought up prior to the *Aindravāyava Cup.*

Now there arises the question—Is the 'depositing' also (of these Cups) to be brought up?—Or not?

We assert (says the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that "there being no declaration to that effect, the *Depositing* should not be brought forward; our sole authority is the Vedic word; and what the Vedic word lays down is the *bringing forward* of the 'Taking up' of the Cups, not of the 'depositing': hence the *Depositing* is not to be brought forward."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*The 'depositing' also*—should be brought forward;—why?—because the 'depositing' is only subsidiary to the 'taking up';—the *taking up* of the Cups is for the purposes of *offering*; and this *offering* has got to be done of several substances at one and the same time; they could not be used for being offered as libations unless they were *deposited*, kept in proper places; in fact, it is by *depositing* that the *taking up* becomes fit for the act of *offering*;—hence it follows that the *depositing* is subsidiary to the *Taking up*; and hence when the *Taking up* is brought forward, the *Depositing* must also be brought forward.

SŪTRA (74).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

A text is also found to be indicative of the same conclusion.—"Which text?"—'*Dhārayēyustam yam kāmāya gṛhṇīyuḥ, aindravāyavam gṛhītvā sādayēt, atha tam sādayēt yam kāmāya gṛhṇīyuḥ*'; this clearly shows that the *depositing* also has to be brought forward.

ADHIKARAṆA (23): *The 'offering' is not to be brought forward.*

SŪTRA (75).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'OFFERING' ALSO SHOULD BE TREATED LIKE THE 'DEPOSITING'."

Bhāṣya.

There is the following declaration—'*Āshvināgrān gṛhṇāti āmayāvinaḥ, shukrāgrānabhicharataḥ, manthyagrānabhicharyamāṇasya*';—it has been established that when the 'taking up' of these Cups is brought forward, their 'depositing' is also brought forward.

Now there arises the question—When the 'taking up' has been brought forward, is the 'offering' also brought forward? Or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"The *offering* is brought forward.—Why?—Because of the relationship; the *taking up* and the *offering* are mutually connected; as the Cup is *taken up* only for being *offered*; it is only thus that it serves a visible purpose; otherwise, all that is done after the 'depositing' would be for an unseen purpose;—the *Taking up* however is not for an unseen purpose; hence whenever, at any other time, the *offering* is to be made, the *taking up* has to be done. Such being the case, whenever there is *Taking up, Offering* must be there; such being the connection (between the *Taking up* and the *Offering*), the *Offering* has to be treated like the *Depositing*; that is, just as on the bringing forward of the *Taking up*, the *Depositing* is brought forward, similarly the *Offering* also should be brought forward."

SŪTRA (76).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE IT IS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR; AS FOR THE 'DEPOSITING', IT IS TREATED AS ABOVE BECAUSE IT IS A SUBSIDIARY FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

It is not true that the *offering* is brought forward. Because the *offering* is the principal factor; it is not a mere auxiliary to the *Taking up*;—hence it is not brought forward (along with the *Taking up*). It has been argued that it should be treated like the *Depositing*;—but *Depositing* is a subsidiary factor; that is why it is brought forward.

ADHIKARAṆA (24): *The mention of 'Aindravāyavāgra' in connection with the 'Tryanīkā' is for the purpose of pointing out the similarity of procedure.*

SŪTRA (77).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRYANĪKĀ, THE MENTION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY INDICATED BY THE GENERAL LAW CAN BE ONLY FOR THE PURPOSES OF EULOGISING."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Dvādashāha* sacrifice, there is the *Tryanīkā*, described in the following text—'*Aindravāyavāgrau prāyaṇīyodayanīyau, dashamañchāhaḥ, athētarēṣām navānāmahnām aindravāyavāgram prathaman ahaḥ*, etc. etc.'

['*Tryanīkā*' is that which has three *anīkas*, facets, in the shape of the *Aindravāyava*, the *Shukra* and the *Āgrayaṇa*—says the *Nyāyamālā*.—According to the *Subodhinī*, '*Tryanīkā*' is the name given to nine 'days' of the *Dvādashāha*, excluding the *first*, *last*, and *tenth* 'days'.]

In the above passage it is declared that the first 'day' has the *Aindravāyava* Cup as the first, and the second 'day' has the *Shukra* Cup as the first;—inasmuch as the *Rathantara-Sāman* is chanted on the First Day, and the *Bṛhat-Sāman* on the second Day,—the presence of both the said Cups as the first is already indicated by the General Law.

Now there arises the question—When the same fact (of the two Cups being the first on the First Day and the Second Day respectively, which is already indicated by the General Law) is mentioned again in the passage quoted above,—(*a*) is it for the purpose of reiterating the same? (*b*) Or for precluding others? (*c*) Or as a mere commendatory declaration? Or (*d*) for the purpose of pointing out that the same procedure is to be adopted?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"It should be taken as meant to be only a commendatory declaration.—Why?—When a text merely reiterates what has been already asserted before, it does not lead to any particular form of activity [hence alternative (*a*) cannot be accepted]. As for the second alternative (*b*), Preclusion is always open to a three-fold objection. Hence the passage should be taken as a *commendatory declaration*.—'What is the quality that is commended here?'—It is the quality of *propriety*—it being regarded as right and proper that on the Third Day the *Āgrayaṇa* Cup should be the first.—How so?—Because it has been declared that on the First Day, the *Aindravāyava* Cup is to be the first, and on the Second Day, the *Shukra* Cup is to be the first; and nothing has been said in regard to the *Third* Day; hence it is only right and proper that on the Third Day, the *Āgrayaṇa* should be the first."

SŪTRA (78).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY (WHAT IS MEANT IS THAT) AMONG THE 'AHARGAṆAS', THERE SHOULD BE SIMILARITY OF PROCEDURE; AS IN THE CASE OF 'AGNI'.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

The declaration is not for the purpose of eulogising a quality; it is for pointing out that the procedure should be similar.—It is not right to say that—"what is declared being already implied by the General Law, its reiteration is useless, hence it must be taken as serving some other purpose".—"What is the view then that can be held?"—What has been done at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* in connection with the *Rathantara-Sāman* in accordance with Syntactical Connection is rendered admissible in the case in question by the General Law; and it is reiterated with the intention that 'I shall adopt the same procedure here also'.—*As in the case of 'Agni'*;—just as the sameness of procedure has been asserted in connection with the *Agniṣṭoma*, in the following passage—'*Athāto'gniṣṭomēnaivānuyajati, tam-ukthyēna, tamatirātrēṇa, tam chatūrātrēṇa, tam pañcharātrēṇa, tam ṣaḍrātrēṇa, tam saptarātrēṇa, tamaṣṭarātrēṇa, tam navarātrēṇa, tam dasharātrēṇa, tamekādasharātrēṇa*'.

The purpose served by this discussion is that, as explained above, there will be no *Preclusion*.

Adhikaraṇa (25): *The 'Analytic' Dvādashāha is the Ectype of the 'Synthetic' Dvādashāha.*

SŪTRA (79).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Of the Dvādashāha, the 'Analytic' and 'Synthetic' forms stand on the same footing; like the 'Pṛṣṭha'."

Bhāṣya.

Of the *Dvādashāha*, there are two forms—the 'Analytic' and the 'Synthetic'. The 'Synthetic' form is described in the following passage—'*Aindrāvāyavagrau . . . athāgrayaṇāgram*';—and the 'Analytic' form is described in the passage—'*Aindravāyavāgrau prayaṇīyodayanīyau . . . . dvē aindravāyavāgrē*'.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are the details laid down for the *Dvādashāha* in reference to both forms of it? Or are they laid down in reference to the 'Synthetic' form of it, and the 'Analytic' form is only a modification (or Ectype) of the former?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*Of the Dvādashāha, both the Synthetic and Analytic forms stand on the same footing*;—why?—because both the forms form the subject-matter of the Context, and hence it cannot be differentiated to whom the details belong and to whom they do not belong. Hence both should be regarded as standing on the same footing.—*Like the 'Pṛṣṭha'*; i.e. in regard to the two *Pṛṣṭhas, Bṛhat* and *Rathantara*, it being found that the Context appertains equally to both,—they are taken as having the same details; so should be the case with the 'Synthetic' and 'Analytic' forms of the *Dvādashāha* also."

SŪTRA (80).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, the 'Analytic' form is the modification of the 'Synthetic' form, because we find indicative texts to that effect.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

The *Synthetic* and *Analytic* forms do not stand on the same footing; in fact, the *Analytic* one should be regarded as the modification of the *Synthetic* form.—Why?—*Because we find indicative texts to that effect*; the following is the indicative text—'*Aindravāyavasya vā ētadāyatanam yachchaturthamahaḥ*';—this text occurs in connection with the 'Analytic' *Dvādashāha*; at the analytic *Dvādashāha*, however, the *Aindravāyava* does not

form the first on the Fourth 'Day'; in fact, it is the *Āgrayaṇa* that forms the first on that day;—such being the case, the assertion '*Aindravayavasya vā ētādāyatanam*' cannot be applicable. If however, the Analytic is the modification of the Synthetic form, then the said assertion becomes applicable as referring to the Synthetic form; the sense being that the '*āyatanam*' which should belong to the *Aindravāyava* (in accordance with the General Law) is asserted in reference to the *Āgrayaṇa*. Hence from this indicative text, it follows that the Analytic is the modification of the Synthetic form.

SŪTRA (81).

BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF 'DESIRE'.

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Yaḥ kāmayēta bahu syam prajāyēya*, etc.'; and whenever a 'prospective act' or 'contingent act' is done, it comes in only as a modification of an 'essential act'; for instance, the eating of *Mudga and Rice* and sleeping away from the wind—in cases of eye-disease.

SŪTRA (82).

IT OPERATES BOTH WAYS,—BEING ONE AND THE SAME ACT.

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* explains the purpose of the discussion. The *Dvādashāha* operates equally both ways, among the *Ahargaṇas*; because both are one and the same act.—This in accordance with the *Pūrvapakṣa*. According to the *Siddhānta*, on the other hand, the *Analytic* form is operative only when there is a direct declaration or an indicative text to that effect;—in all other cases it is the *Synthetic* form that is operative.

Adhikaraṇa (26): *At the 'Samvatsara-Sattra', there is an augmentation of the 'anīkas'.*

SŪTRA (83).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"There should be repetition of the Tryanīkā, as there is in the case of the Ēkādashina."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Dvādashāha*, we read—'*Aindravāyavāgrau prāyaṇīyodayanīyau, dashamañchāhaḥ . . . . atha āgrayaṇāgram.*' [The meaning of this is that there is a '*Tryanika*', consisting of the *Aindravāyava*, *Shukra*, and *Āgrayaṇa*; by repeating this *Tryanikā* thrice we get the nine 'days' of the *Dvādashāha* (excluding the first day, the last day, and the tenth day); these nine are thus arranged—(1) *Aindravāyava*, (2) *Shukra*, (3) *Āgrayaṇa*; again, (4) *Aindravāyava*, (5) *Shukra*, (6) *Āgrayaṇa*;—and again for the third time, (7) *Aindravāyava*, (8) *Shukra*, and (9) *Āgrayaṇa*].—All this becomes admissible, under the General Law, into the *Gavāmayana* (*Samvatsara-Sattra*); and as there are several *Tryanikās* to be brought about, a repetition becomes implied as a matter of course.

Now with regard to this repetition, there arises the question—Should the repetition be in the manner of the 'Measuring Rod' [where the whole Rod is let fall on the ground, several times, so that the entire nine days are to be repeated as one composite whole in the manner described above]? Or is each part of it to be augmented in its own place [The *Aindravāyava* being repeated three times, then the *Shukra* being repeated three times, then the *Āgrayaṇa* being repeated three times]?

Question—"In what way would it be 'like the measuring Rod' and in what way would there be 'augmentation in its own place'?"

Answer—If the occasion consists of the 'Days', then after the first nine 'days' have been completed, the General Law points to the admissibility of the *Tryanikā* into the other remaining (three) 'days' also; and hence what presents itself is the order 'The *Aindravāyavāgra* is the first *day* and then the *Shukrāgra*';—after these nine also have been completed, the same again presents itself as 'the *Aindravāyavāgra* being the First Day'.—This would be repetition 'like the measuring rod'.—On the other hand, if the occasion is not of the 'Days', then the interval between the *Prāyaṇīya* and the *Udayanīya* is filled up by the *nine anīkās*; so that at the *Gavāmayana* also, it would have to be filled up by the nine *anikas*; and on the completion of this, there would be no further repetition; so that this would not be 'in the manner of the Measuring Rod';—and yet without augmentation, the said interval could not be filled up; hence it comes to this that each *anikā* should be augmented (by repetition) in its own place.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* on this question is as follows:—"The repetition is to be in the manner of the Measuring Rod. With this view, we hold that

the occasion *is* that of the 'Days'. It is declared that 'The *Aindravāyavāgra* is the First Day, then comes the *Shukrāgra*'—this *Shukrāgra* also is understood to be the *Day*, as that is what forms the subject-matter of the Context; hence the occasion must be regarded as that of the 'Days'. Therefore we conclude that the repetition is in the manner of the Measuring Rod. Of the various methods of Repetition, that in the manner of the Measuring Rod is the most reasonable; as in this case the order of sequence remains preserved. For instance, when one says 'Repeat the section three times', it is read in the manner of the Measuring Rod (that is, the section as one composite whole is read three times), with a view to preserving the order (of its component parts). In the same manner it should be done in the case in question. Just as at this same *Gavāmayana*, when the *Ēkādashinī* comes to be repeated, it is repeated (as a whole) in the manner of the Measuring Rod, and there is no augmentation of the several component parts in their own respective places."

SŪTRA (84).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, THERE SHOULD BE AUGMENTATION (OF THE COMPONENTS) IN THEIR OWN PLACES; AS THE NUMBER OF THE 'DAYS' IS NOT PERCEPTIBLE.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, there should be augmentation of the components in their own places,—and the repetition shall not be in the manner of the Measuring Rod; with this view we hold that the occasion is not of the *Days.*—Why? —*Because the number of the Days is not perceptible*; as a matter of fact, the number of the *nine Days* is not perceptible, as also the fact of the *Aindravāyava* Cup being the first that has been enjoined.—"Why should not the *Day* be regarded as enjoined?"— Because there would be syntactical split: The meaning would be that 'The first is that in which the *Aindravāyava* is the first,—and this is a *Day*, not a group of days'; this would involve a syntactical split. Hence it follows that the mention of the *Ahargaṇa* is only a reiteration. Such being the case, with a view to preserving the order of sequence, recourse must be had to the alternative of having an augmentation of the component parts in their own places; that is, having augmented those of which the *Āgrayaṇa* is the first, augmentation should be done to those at which the *Aindravāyava* is the first.

SŪTRA (85).

FURTHER, IN THE REPETITION OF THE 'PṚṢṬHYĀ', WE FIND THE 'ĀGRAYAṆA' MENTIONED ON THE THIRTY-THIRD 'DAY'; WHILE UNDER THE OTHER VIEW, IT WOULD BE THE 'AINDRA-VĀYAVA' THAT WOULD OCCUPY THAT POSITION.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also we conclude that there should be augmentation of the components in their own places.—"Why so?"—

Under the later half of the sacrifice, on the repetition of the *Pṛṣṭhyā*, we find that 'the character of having the *Āgrayaṇa* for the first' is what appears on the thirty-third 'day'.—"How so?"—There is the following passage—'*Jagatīm vai chhandāmsi pratyavarohanti, āgrayaṇam vai grahāḥ, bṛhat pṛṣṭhāni, trayastrimsham stomāḥ*';—all this is possible only if the components are augmented in their own places, not if there is repetition 'in the manner of the measuring rod'.—"Why?"—During the first half, the *Tryanikā* is repeated thrice; so that, without being repeated, it ends with the *Āgrayaṇas*; and the second half also begins with the *Āgrayaṇas* under the impression that the revolution has been complete. Thus then, in the first ninth part comes the *thirty-third day*; hence it becomes one of which the *Āgrayaṇa* is the first;—and in this way this declaration becomes explicable. On the other hand, if the repetition were 'in the manner of the measuring rod', in that position we would have the *Aindravāyava* (not the *Āgrayaṇa*).—"How?"—Beginning with the *Trivṛt*, when we arrange the 'days' in groups of nine, there remain *seven* in the first half; therein the *Aindravāyava* is the first, the *Shukra* is the first in the *Viṣuvat*, and the *Āgrayaṇa* is the first of the first *Svarasāman*;—hence the *Tryanikā* becomes completed in the *Vishvajit*; and the thirty-third day comes to be one of which *Aindravāyava* is the first; which is incompatible with the statement quoted above. Hence we conclude that there should be augmentation of the components in their own places.

[The *Subodhinī* supplies the following account of the 'days' of the *Gavāmayana*.—There are 361 days in all.—180 days form the First wing or Half and 180 the Second wing or Half;—in between these two halves, like the central pillar, is the one day called '*Viṣuvat*';—in the *First Half*, the first day is called the (1) '*Prāyaṇīya*',—(2) the second day is called the '*Chaturvimshat*';—these two days have been directly declared as having the *Aindravāyava* as the first;—after this comes the *Tryanikā*;—herein are four *Abhiplavas*, each made up of one *Ṣaḍaha* or 'Six-Day',—thus giving the total of 24 days;—then comes the *Pṛṣṭhya*, which is made up of another *Ṣaḍaha*, which means another 6 days;—24+6 make up 30;—similarly during the second, third, fourth, and fifth months;—this makes the total number of days 30×5=150;—during the sixth month there are three *Abhiplavas*, each made up of a *Ṣaḍaha*; which makes 18 days;—one *Pṛṣṭhya*, also made up of a *Ṣaḍaha*;—this is 6 days;—then there is the *Abhijit* which takes only *one* day;—then 3 more *Ekāhas*, called '*Svarasāman*',—these make 3 days; 28 in all during the sixth month;—thus the total comes to be 2 (the first two days)+150 (first 5 months)+28 (sixth month)=180.—Then comes the Central Day called '*Viṣuvat*', 181.—Then comes the *Second Half*; first of all there are 3 *Svarasāmans*;—then the '*Ekāha*' named '*Vishvajit*',—then the *Pṛṣṭhya* which is a *Ṣaḍaha* (Six Days),—*total 10*;—then 3 *Abhiplavas* each of which is one *Ṣaḍaha*, thus making a *total of 18*;—again the *Pṛṣṭhya*, which is a *Ṣaḍaha*,—then, 4 *Abhiplavas*, each consisting of a *Ṣaḍaha*; this gives 24; these 24 and 6 make 30;—thus we have 30+18+10=58;—then the last 30 days are repeated thrice over,—90; thus we have 58+90=148;—then again there are 3 *Abhiplavas*, each consisting of a *Ṣaḍaha*, thus making 18 days;—then 2 more consisting of the Mantra '*Āyuṣgauḥ*',—then the *10* Central Days of the *Dvādashāha*,—and 2 days of the *Mahāvrata* and the *Atirātra*;—thus we have 148+32=180 days.—The two halves with the one Central Day, make up 361 days of the *Gavāmayana*, also called the *Samvatsara-yāga*.]

SŪTRA (86).

AT THE 'ĒKĀDASHINA' THERE IS REPETITION BECAUSE OF THE DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 83) that it should be as in the case of the *Ēkādashina*.—It is right that in the case of the *Ēkādashinas*, there should be repetition 'in the manner of the Measuring Rod'; because there is a declaration to that effect—'*Vāruṇamantataḥ punaḥ paryāvṛttēṣvāgnēyamēva prathamēhani ālabhēta*':—in accordance with this declaration, there is repetition 'in the manner of the Measuring Rod' of those that are repeated over again;—this, being found to be impossible at the *Dvādashāha*, finds room in the *Gavāmayana*. What is there that a Direct Declaration cannot do? There is no burden too heavy for Direct Declaration.

SŪTRA (87).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

There is an indicative text also which points to the same conclusion, as to how the *Ēkādashinas* are repeated 'in the manner of the Measuring Rod':—'*Prāṇā vā ēkādashināḥ yadēkādashinībhirīyurahānyatirichyantē pashavo vā*'.—If the components are augmented in their own places, there is no excess: it is only in the case of 'repetition in the manner of the measuring rod' that there is always either *excess* or *shortage*. From this also we consider it only right that in the *Ēkādashina*, there should be 'repetition in the manner of the Measuring Rod'.

ADHIKARAṆA (27): *At the 'Analytic' Dvādashāha, there should be change of the Metres of Mantras only.*

SŪTRA (88).

INASMUCH AS THE 'CHANGE OF METRE' HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'ANALYTIC' DVĀDASHĀHA, IT IS THE TEXT OF THE MANTRAS RELATING TO 'BHAKṢA', 'PAVAMĀNA', 'PARIDHI', AND 'KAPĀLA' THAT SHOULD UNDERGO MODIFICATION.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Dvādashāha* sacrifice in its 'analytic' and 'synthetic' forms; of these the Analytic form is thus described—'*Aindravāyavāgrau . . . . . atha dvē aindravāyavāgrē*'.—In connection with this Analytic form of *Dvādashāha* there is the following declaration—'The metres ponder over the regions of one another—the *Gāyatrī* over that of the *Triṣṭup*, the *Triṣṭup* over that of the *Jagatī*, the *Jagatī* over that of the *Gāyatrī*'. [Here we have an interchange of metres laid down.]—At the same sacrifice, there are (1) the *Bhakṣa*, (2) the *Pavamāna*, (3) the *Paridhi*, and (4) the *Kapāla*.—(1) Related to the *Bhakṣa*, there is the *mantra*—'*Bhakṣē hi mā visha . . . . . gāyatrachhandasaḥ triṣṭupchhandasaḥ jagatīchhandasaḥ . . . . bhakṣayāmi*';—(2) related to the *Pavamāna*, there is the *mantra*—'*Shyēnosi gāyatrīchhandāḥ suparṇosi triṣṭupchhandāḥ sakhāsi jagatīchhandāḥ . . . . . pāraya*';—(3) in relation to the *Paridhi*, there is the *mantra*—'*Gāyatro madhyamaḥ paridhiḥ, traiṣṭubho dakṣiṇo, jāgata uttaraḥ*';—(4) in relation to the *Kapālas*, there is the *mantra*—'*Aṣṭākapālaḥ . . . . . tārtīyasavanikaḥ*'.

In regard to this, there arises the following question:—When there is 'change of metre' (as prescribed), is there to be change (1) of the *Bhakṣa-mantras* as well as of the *Bhakṣa*,—(2) of the *Pavamāna-mantras* as well as of the *Pavamāna*,—(3) of the *Paridhi-mantras* as well as of the *Paridhis*,—(4) of the *Kapāla-mantras* as well as of the *Kapālas*? Or is there to be 'change of metre' in the *mantras* only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"There should be change of the *Mantras* as also of the subject-matter of the *mantras*.—Why?—Because the declaration is without distinction; the declaration that there is makes no distinction at all; it says—'The metres ponder over each other's regions—the *Gāyatrī* over the *Triṣṭup's*, the *Triṣṭup* over the *Jagatī's*, the *Jagatī* over the *Gāyatrī's*'; there is nothing in this to show that the change is to be of the *mantras* only (not of their subject-matter). Hence there should be change of *mantras* as well as of their *subject-matter*. As a result of this, (A) the Central *Paridhi* should be placed in the position of the Right one,—the Right one in the position of the Left one,—and the Left one in the position of the Central one;—(B) the *Aṣṭakapāla* should be con-

nected with *Midday*,—the *Ēkādashakapāla* with the *Third Savana*,—the *Dvādashakapāla* with the *Morning Savana*;—(C) the Drink connected with the *Morning Savana* should be drunk in place of the Midday Drink,—the Midday Drink should be drunk in place of that related to the *Third Savana*, —and that related with the *Third Savana* should be drunk in place of that related to the *Morning Savana*;—and (D) the *Bahiṣpavamāna* should be used in place of the Midday *Pavamāna*,—the Midday one in place of the *Ārbhava*,—and the *Ārbhava* in place of the *Bahiṣpavamāna*."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—It is not right that there should be 'change of metres' all through, without distinction; the change should be in the *mantras* only; it is the metres in the *mantras* alone that should be changed.—Why so ?—Because it is only the *metres* of the *mantras* that are capable of being really changed; as for the *Bhakṣa* and other things, even on being changed, they remain what they were, —the *Bhakṣa* still remains *Bhakṣa*, and so on. For instance, if the *Bhakṣa* (Drink) related to the Morning *Savana* is drunk at the time of the Midday one, it would not become 'related to the *Triṣṭup*-metre'; so on, in all cases.—How so ?—Because even at its own time, the Drink is not 'related to the *Gāyatrī-metre*; it is only the *Gāyatrī*,—not what is *not-Gāyatrī*,—that can take the place of the *Triṣṭup*; and certainly the *Drink* and other things are *not Gāyatrī*. Thus there is no possibility of any change of the *Drink* and other things. On the other hand, the metres of the *Mantras* can very well exchange their places.—Hence the change should be made only in the metres of the *Mantras*.

End of Pāda v of Adhyāya X.

ADHYĀYA X.

PĀDA VI.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *The Rathantara and other Sāmans are sung over a Verse-triad.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AT THE SACRIFICE, THEY SHOULD BE (SUNG) OVER A SINGLE VERSE, JUST AS IN THE READING OF THE TEXT."

Bhāṣya.

The *Sāmans* form the subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa*—such as *Rathantara, Bṛhat, Vairūpa, Vairāja, Shākvara, and Raivata.*

In regard to these, there arises the question—Should the singing of these be done over a single verse? Or over a Verse-triad?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*At the sacrifice they should be sung over a single verse*; they are so sung at the time of reading the text; and as they have been sung at the time of reading the text so should they be sung at the sacrificial performance;—it is only right that there should be no difference between what is done during the reading of the text and what is done during the performance of a sacrifice; as it is only for the purpose of sacrificial performances that the text is read;—hence at the sacrifice the *Sāman* should be used just as it has been used during the reading of the text.—From this it follows that the *Sāmans* should be sung over a single verse.

The *Sāmans* that form the subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa* are those which have their origin in single verses, not those that are based in their very origin upon Verse-triads. As has been said—'*Simāsantaniya ēvāpatyashākvaravarṇam*' (?)—[This is the reading of MS. D. MS. C. reads '*Yathāhimasataniyatashvāpatyashākvaravantum*'; in any case the words are not intelligible]."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, THEY SHOULD BE SUNG OVER A VERSE-TRIAD; AS WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that they should be sung over a single verse.—Why?—*Because we find indicative texts*; there is the following indicative text—'*Aṣṭākṣarēṇa prathamāyā ṛchaḥ prastouti dvyakṣarēṇa uttarayoḥ*' [where the details of the singing are spoken of as bearing upon the 'first verse' and the 'two later verses']; if the singing were done over a single verse, there

would be no sense in the use of the terms 'first' and 'later two'.—Hence it follows that they should be sung over a Verse-triad.—The following is another indicative text pointing to the same conclusion—'The *Ṛk* said to the *Sāman*—*Let us pair together*; *Sāman* said—*Thou art not fit to be my wife, the Veda is my majesty*; then becoming two, the *Ṛks* said the same thing; the *Sāman* said—*You are not fit for being my wives, the Veda is my majesty*; then becoming *three*, the *Ṛks* said the same thing; whereupon the *Sāman* said—*Let us be together*'.—From this also it follows that when a hymn is sung, one *Sāman* is chanted over three verses.

Says the Opponent—"This that you have put forward is only an indicative text; state some direct reasons."

Answer—In the whole of the *Ṛgveda*, there is no verse that is named '*Prathamā*' (First), nor are there any named '*Uttarā*'; in fact, both these names are relative; hence in the text quoted, when it is said that the hymning should be done with *eight syllables of the Prathamā* (*first*) *verse*, and *with two syllables of the Uttara* (*two later*) *verses*, it is clear that *three* verses are being referred to.—Similarly, though the text '*Ēkam sāma tṛchē kriyatē stotrīyam*' appears to be only reiterative, yet on the basis of the commendatory passage describing the conversation between *Ṛk* and *Sāman*, it is clear that the said text is *injunctive* (not merely *reiterative*). This is what has been explained under *Sūtra* 3. 5. 21.

Adhikaraṇa (2): *The term 'Svardṛk' serves the purpose of indicating the time for the 'Vīkṣaṇa'.*

SŪTRA (3).

'Looking at Svardṛk' should be taken only as indicative of time; because it is for the sake of something else.

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Īshvaram vai rathantaramudgātushchakṣuḥ, pramathitā rathantarē prastūyamānē sammilēt svardṛsham prati vīkṣēta*' ['The *Rathantara* is the all-powerful eye of the *Udgātṛ*; when the *Rathantara* is begun, the *Pramathitṛ* should close his eyes and look towards the *Svardṛk*'.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—The 'looking at the Fire' that is here laid down—is it meant to be an accessory of the sacrifice? Or is it mentioned only as indicating a particular point of time?—What we have to consider in this connection is—Is 'looking towards the *Svardṛk* (Fire)' meant to be subsidiary to the 'closing of the eyes on the starting of the *Rathantara*'? Or is the sentence 'he should look towards the *Svardṛk*', a separate sentence by itself?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"The 'looking towards the *Svardṛk*' is meant to be an accessory and the sentence laying it down is separate by itself.—Why?—Because it is clearly understood to be different; the sentence 'he should look at the Fire' is found to be clearly distinct from the preceding sentence.—'But the sentence is actually found to be non-separate also from the preceding one: Having laid down that *on the starting of the Rathantara one should close his eyes*, it goes on to reiterate that '*he should look towards the Svardṛk.*'—The answer to this is that, in both these constructions, we have to regard the two sentences as distinct; this *difference* would be inconsistent with the *non-difference* urged by the objector; and when there is a conflict between Injunction and Reiteration (and the question is whether the sentence 'he should look towards the *Svardṛk*' is an *injunction* or a *reiteration*), the right course is to take it as an Injunction; *firstly* because in that case it says something new,—and 'a mere declaration serves no useful purpose', as declared under *Sūtra* 1. 2. 19;—secondly because we find a clear injunction; a clear injunction is perceived in the word '*vīkṣēta*' ('should look');—*thirdly*, the Direct Denotation of the words becomes accepted; for instance, the words 'should look at the fire' clearly lay down the act of 'looking' towards what is denoted by the term '*svardṛk*'; so that there is direct connection between what is denoted by the term '*svardṛk*' and the act of 'looking'. If the words were not taken to mean this, then the term '*svardṛk*' could only *indirectly indicate* a particular time. And when there is conflict between Direct Denotation and Indirect Indication, the most reasonable course is to accept the former. From all this it follows

that the 'Looking' is meant to be an accessory.—Or, the text '*Svardṛsham prati vikṣēta*' may be construed in the following manner, to show that the 'Looking' is meant to be an accessory:—What is denoted by the term '*svardṛk*' is the means of accomplishing the 'looking'; this would be in keeping with the Indicative text, as also with Syntactical Connection,—inasmuch as the term '*svardṛk*' is actually present in the sentence.—From all this it follows that the act of 'looking' is meant to be an accessory."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—'*Looking at Svardṛk' should be taken only as indicative of time, because it is for the sake of something else.*—It is not that the 'Looking' is meant to be an accessory; in fact, the connection between what is denoted by the word '*svardṛk*' and 'look' is for the purpose of indicating time.—"Why?"—Because the *Sāman is for the sake of something else*; in the text '*Rathantaram pṛṣṭham bhavati*', the *Sāman* is declared as to be used in the *Pṛṣṭha-hymn*; which means that when the words of the verses are making up the Hymn, the said *Sāman* helps in this making up by showing forth the words of the hymn to an advantage by means of note-combinations and other details. Such being the case, when the *Sāman* is employed in the *Hymning*, those words of the verse which are inter-related also come to be employed in the same: consequently, inasmuch as the term '*svardṛk*' also occurs in the text of the verse, it follows that that term also is employed in the Hymning;—hence we conclude that, inasmuch as it is for the sake of something else, its presence must be indicative of *time*.

Says the Opponent—"The term '*svardṛk*' is only contained in the verse; the actual injunction is of the *Rathantara*; which must set aside what might be merely inferred from the presence of a particular term; hence the sentence could directly point to the *looking* being an accessory."

Answer—As a matter of fact, one thing can be taken as setting aside something else only when it is found that, if it did not set aside this latter, it would serve no useful purpose;—in the case in question, the injunction in question does not become useless by not setting aside the implication of the term '*svardṛk*', as even so it serves the very useful purpose of indicating the time during performances.

It might be argued that—"on account of the presence of the term in the *Mantra*, and by reason of the injunction of the *Sāman*, the connection of the term with the act of Hymning is direct; while the relationship of an *act* and its *means* is expressed by Syntactical Connection; and as both facts are cognised by valid means of knowledge, there can be no incompatibility in the case."

But it is not so; if one accepts the relationship of an act and its means, in the case of the term as taken apart from the Mantra-text,—he cannot at the same time, recognise the connection of that word, uttered only once, with the *Hymning*;—in fact, if he did recognise this connection, he should utter it again, not otherwise. Hence the relationship of the *act* and *means* also should rest in the Hymn itself. What is recognised is the connection of the *means* with the connection of the *act* in the *Hymn* itself,—not in the *connection* of the Hymn; as no particular *means* are present.—Thus then, it

being proved that there is no inconsistency between the text of the Mantra and the injunction of the *Sāman* and the sentence 'one should look at the *Svardṛk*',—the presence of the word should be taken as serving the purpose of indicating the time. That is why we say that the presence of the term serves to indicate the time.

It has been argued that—"Where both difference and non-difference are possible, it is difference that should be accepted,—and where both Injunction and Reiteration are possible, it is better to accept the Injunction; and as we find the Injunctive affix, we should conclude that it is an Injunction."

Our answer to this is as follows:—True: between Injunction and Reiteration, Injunction is superior, on the ground that it puts forward something new; but this can be so only if there is no other means of knowledge bearing upon the matter in question. In a case, however, where the admissibility of what forms the subject-matter of the Injunction happens to be already expressed by some other word, or already implied by something that has gone before,—in such cases, the subject-matter being one that is already known, the text (though with the Injunctive affix) has to be taken as only *reiterative*.—Now in the case in question, the act of '*looking*' is already indicated by the man's own needs, because unless the man *looks* at things, he cannot take part in the activities involved in the performance; and thus the act of *looking* being already thus implied, the injunctive affix (in '*vīkṣēta*') must be taken to be merely reiterative.

"But the direct assertion that 'on the starting of the *Rathantara*, one should close his eyes' would set aside the *looking* if it were only implied; just as the *Prajāpati-vratas* (observances laid down for the Religious Student) set aside, by Direct Assertion, all those activities which would be prompted by the desires of the man."

It is not so understood.—"Why?"—Because it is prefaced by the beginning of a particular action—'when the *Rathantara* is started'; so that when this *starting* has been done, this sentence has fulfilled its purpose, and hence it cannot set aside the *looking* that is implied by the needs of the man.

It has been argued that—"the connection of what is denoted by the term '*svardṛk*' and the 'looking' is got at by Syntactical Connection; while the *act* of *looking* is already indicated by the meaning of the sentence and the indicative term in the shape of the root '*drshi*' ('to see', in the term '*svardṛk*')."

Our answer to this is as follows:—The term '*prati*' (in the sentence '*Svardṛsham prati vīkṣēta*') is a preposition; and hence it signifies, by Direct Denotation, the fact that what is denoted by the term '*svardṛk*' is an indicative sign. And it has been already understood that Direct Assertion sets aside the Indicative word, as also Syntactical Connection.—Or, there need be no setting aside of Syntactical Connection in this case; what Syntactical Connection signifies is mere *relationship*,—sometimes the relationship between an act and its means, sometimes the relationship between the qualification and the qualified, sometimes the relationship between the indicator and the indicated and so forth, several other forms of relation-

ship;—in the case in question, it is the relationship of indicator and indicated which is found necessary and hence accepted as the particular relationship; so that Syntactical Connection is not set aside. As for instance, in common parlance, when it is said 'it is flashing at the tree', the relationship between the *Tree* and the *Flashing* is not that of cause and effect; all that is understood is that the *Tree* is mentioned as the mark, the indicator of the *flashing* that has proceeded from somewhere else. In the same manner, in the case in question the term '*svardṛk*' is mentioned as the indicator of the *looking*, which has been already prompted by the needs of the man; and hence the sentence is not useless; because, unless the indicative and the indicator are spoken of in a sentence, their relationship cannot be recognised.

It has been argued that "on account of the presence of the root '*dṛshi*' ('to see', in '*svardṛk*'), the indication of this is honoured (under the *Pūrvapakṣa* view)."

But as a matter of fact, we do not find even this (reason) yielding the conclusion desired (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*). The root '*dṛshi*' can denote the act of *looking* only when it is used for its own sake, not when it is used for the sake of something else:—in the term '*svardṛk*', the root '*dṛshi*' appears with a prefix, and hence it is understood to be a subordinate factor in the character of the Nominative Agent, which agent is the predominant factor. When the Nominative Agent is expressed, he is not recognised as an indicative of the act of *looking*, because the root '*dṛshi*' is an entirely subservient factor;—and the word that denotes the Nominative Agent cannot be construed with the root '*vīkṣa*', to 'look'. If what is enjoined were that 'one should look at *Svardṛk*',—and the question arose who '*Svardṛk*' was, the only answer available would be that it is one *looking at* whom has been enjoined;—so that being in ignorance, we could not determine what should be done.—On the other hand, if the meaning of the sentence is that 'One should accomplish the *looking by means of the Svardṛk*', there also, as it is not known who or what '*Svardṛk*' is, the same difficulty remains.—Thus we find that if we hurriedly accept any of these constructions (possible under the *Pūrvapakṣa*), we follow neither the Indicative Word nor the Syntactical Connection. On the other hand, if we connect the *Looking* with the *Svardṛk* as the indicative (of time), then at the time of the utterance of the word '*vīkṣēta*', the said connection does, somehow or other, become recognised;—then, as for the connection with the *Hymning*, it is not inconsistent even with the denotation of the Nominative Agent; as the necessary co-ordination is there, it being connected with '*Īshāna*' as a qualification of this latter,—in the Mantra—'*Īshānam svardṛsham tasthuṣaḥ*'.—It is for these reasons that we assert that the sentence '*Svardṛsham prati vīkṣēta*' is connected with the act of *Hymning*, as indicating the time.

"What is the use of all this discussion?"

If the 'looking' were taken as an accessory,—then, in the case of the transference laid down in the text '*Rathantaramuttarayorgāyati*', the injunction, that 'when the *Rathantara* starts one should close his eyes', would present itself;—and as the term '*svardṛk*' is not present in the *Uttarā*

verses, there would be no restriction regarding the 'looking',—in accordance with the *Pūrvapakṣa*; while according to the *Siddhānta*, the '*Svardṛk*' being an indication, the time for *looking* would not be past till the time indicated (i.e. at the time that the word '*svardṛsham*' is uttered during the singing); and hence the restriction becomes secured (that the Looking should be done at that time).

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *At the 'Gavāmayana' sacrifice, during the 'Pṛṣṭhya-Ṣaḍaha', the 'Bṛhat', and the 'Rathantara' should be separated.*

SŪTRA (4).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF THE 'PṚṢṬHYA', AS THERE IS SIMULTANEOUS INJUNCTION, BOTH THE SĀMANS SHOULD BE CHANTED; AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'ĒKĀHA'."

Bhāṣya.

There is the following text—'*Pṛṣṭhyaḥ ṣaḍaho bṛhadrathantarasāmā*' ['The *Pṛṣṭhya-ṣaḍaha* should have the *Bṛhat* and *Rathantara Sāman*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Should, on each of the six days, both the *Sāmans* be chanted? Or, on some days, the *Bṛhat* and on some, the *Rathantara*?

"Why should such a question arise at all?"

The compound '*bṛhadrathantarasāmā*' becomes applicable to the '*Ṣaḍaha*' in both cases;—i.e. when the term '*bṛhadrathantara*' is taken as standing for the *Bṛhat and Rathantara* conjointly, as also when it is taken as standing for them severally. Hence what is to be considered is, whether the compound '*bṛhadrathantarasāmā*' is a *Bahuvrīhi* containing within itself a *Dvandva*,—it being expounded as '*bṛhadrathantarē sāmanī yasya*' ('at which the *Bṛhad—Rathantara* are the *Sāman*'),—or it is a multi-membered *Bahuvrīhi*,—being expounded as '*bṛhat yasya—rathantaram yasya—sāma*' ['that which has *Bṛhat*—that which has *Rathantara*—*for its Sāman*'].—If it is the former *Bahuvrīhi*, then both the *Sāman* should be chanted conjointly on each of the six days; if, on the other hand, it is the latter kind of *Bahuvrīhi*, then they should be chanted separately (on different days).

The *Pūrvapakṣa* on this question is as follows:—"Both the *Sāmans* should be chanted conjointly; hence we explain the compound as a *Bahuvrīhi with a Dvandva compound within itself*.—Why?—Because the terms '*bṛhat*' and '*rathantara*' are in close proximity to one another, and we therefore regard the term '*bṛhadrathantara*' as a complex formation; and when there is a complex formation, compounding is essential; further, in the case of a *Dvandva* compound, if it is taken as denoting its own meaning, then alone is Direct Denotation followed, as well as the intimate relationship between the terms preserved; otherwise, both these would be militated against. For this reason, we conclude that the compound '*bṛhadrathantarasāmā*' is a *Bahuvrīhi with a Dvandva within itself*;—and such being the case, on each of the six days, both the *Sāmans* should be chanted jointly.—Why so?—Because the *Dvandva* compound, in this case, is of that kind which denotes mutual companionship between the two numbers; so that the meaning is that 'wherever there is *Rathantara*, it should be accompanied

by the *Bṛhat*'. It is this *mutual companionship* that is meant by the term 'simultaneous injunction' (in the *Sūtra*). From this it follows that on each of the six days the two *Sāmans* are to be chanted together.

"*As in the case of the Ēkāha* (*Sū.*);—just as in accordance with the text '*Jyogāmayāvinaḥ ubhē kuryāt, samsavē ubhē kuryāt apachitāvapyēkāhē bṛhadrathantarē kuryāt*' [both the *Bṛhat* and *Rathantara* are chanted together at the *Ēkāha*]."

SŪTRA (5).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, THE COMPOUND HAS BEEN FORMED WITH THE TWO MEMBERS TAKEN SEPARATELY; HENCE THERE IS NOTHING WRONG IN THEIR BEING SEPARATED.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that both the *Sāmans* should be chanted on each of the six days; in fact, on some days, the *Rathantara*, and on some days the *Bṛhat* is to be chanted; and it is not true that the two *Sāmans* are enjoined conjointly.—Why?—Because, even if the term '*bṛhadrathantarasāmā*' be explicable according to both views (the *Pūrvapakṣa* as well as the *Siddhānta*), —even so the right course would be to chant the two *Sāmans* separately.— —Why?—Because at the Archetypal Sacrifice, the *Pṛṣṭha* has been made up of only one *Sāman*; hence, in accordance with the General Law, it should be made up of only one *Sāman* at the Ectypal Sacrifice also. Such being the case, everything due to the *Bṛhat* as well as everything due to the *Rathantara* would be done.

If it be held that—"what makes up the *Pṛṣṭha* is the combination of *Bṛhat* and *Rathantara*, neither the *Bṛhat* alone, nor the *Rathantara* alone",— then, in that case, the conditions of neither one would be adopted; as that would go against the General Law. It is not only that the conditions of neither would be adopted; in fact, neither the *Bṛhat-Pṛṣṭha* nor the *Rathantara-Pṛṣṭha* would be secured. And by reason of this discrepancy, it would become an entirely different performance.

Then again, that the *Pṛṣṭha* is to consist of the two *Sāmans* combined can be only indirectly implied. While such assertions as '*Bṛhat pṛṣṭham bhavati*', '*Rathantaram pṛṣṭham bhavati*' are indicative of the fact that the two are *not* to be combined.

Further, the term '*bṛhat*', standing in need of connection with the term '*sāman*', cannot be connected with the term '*rathantara*':—and as for *close proximity*, this is equally present between the terms '*rathantara*' and '*sāman*'.—Then again, if the view is adopted that the term '*bṛhadrathantara*' is a complex formation, the chances of its being taken as a *Dvandva* compound becomes very much lessened. Nor is it necessary that whenever there is complex formation, there must be compounding; because the revered *Pāṇini* has made it a matter of option.—Further, the mention of the term '*sāman*' clearly shows that the *Bṛhat* and the *Rathantara* are the characteristic marks of the *Sāman*.—From all this it follows that the two *Sāmans* are not to be chanted together.

It has been explained already that even when the *Sāmans* are separated, there is no incongruity in the term '*bṛhadrathantarasāmā*'; for instance, when it is said that 'for a month Devadatta is to feed on clarified butter and oil', what is meant is that he is to be fed, for half a month, with clarified butter, and for the other half, on oil,—similarly the term '*bṛhadrathantarasāmā*' also may be explained.

As for the *Ēkāha*, as it is to be done only on one day, there is no possibility of 'separation', hence it has been said that '*Samastā jyogāmayavinaḥ ubhē kuryāt*'.

Adhikaraṇa (4): *At the 'Prāyaṇīya' and 'Udayanīya', the 'Ēkādashina' should be dealt with severally.*

SŪTRA (6).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*continued*]—"Among the 'Ēkādashinas', there verily should be combination, as that is what is done at the Archetype."

Bhāṣya.

There is the following text—'*Ēkādashinān prāyaṇīyodayanīyayorati-ratrayorālabhēta*' ['One should sacrifice the eleven animals on the *Prāyaṇīya* and *Udayanīya Atiratras*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Should all the eleven animals be sacrificed on the *Prāyaṇīya* day, and again another eleven on the *Udayanīya* day? Or, out of the eleven animals, some are to be sacrificed on the *Prāyaṇīya* day and some on the *Udayanīya* day?—This question arises because the form of expression is the same in both cases.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"The term '*tu*' ('verily') implies the absence of all doubt. *Among the eleven animals there must be combination*; i.e. all the eleven are to be dealt with together on the *Prāyaṇīya* day, and again all the eleven, on the *Udayanīya* day.—Why?—*Because this is what is done at the Archetype*; at the Archetypal Sacrifice of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* all the animals are sacrificed together; and the same combination is rendered admissible in the case in question also, by the General Law.—Further, the *Prāyaṇīya* or the *Udayanīya* day is spoken of only as a distinctive qualification; and when all the eleven are found to be enjoined in connection with the *Prāyaṇīya* day, there is nothing to differentiate which ones from among the eleven are so enjoined. Similarly in connection with the *Udayanīya* also.—From all this it follows that there should be combination."

SŪTRA (7).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*concluded*]—"Also because distributive treatment has been prohibited."

Bhāṣya.

"There is prohibition of distributive treatment in the text—'On the *Prāyaṇīya* and the *Udayanīya*, one should sacrifice the eleven animals'. In the ordinary way, there is distributive treatment, as asserted in the text 'one animal should be sacrificed on each day'; and in accordance

with this, one animal would be sacrificed on the *Prāyaṇīya* day and the other animals on other days.—Under the circumstances, what the text in question does is to prohibit those to be dealt with on the other days; and all of them come to be dealt with at the *Prāyaṇīya*, and so again at the *Udayanīya*. Hence it follows that all the animals concerned may be sacrificed on the *Prāyaṇīya day*."

SŪTRA (8).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, THERE SHOULD BE SEPARATE TREATMENT, ON THE BASIS OF DIRECT ASSERTION,—AS IN COMMON PRACTICE.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the view set forth above. It is not right that they should all be dealt with together,—*there should be separate treatment.*—Why?—Because of the Direct Assertion of *Duality*; we have the assertion of Duality in the word '*prāyaṇīyodayanīyayoḥ*';—and this duality is asserted as something to be made up,—and not as a distinctive feature.—Why?—The injunction of the *Ēkādashinī* being close by, what is done is that after having enjoined the *Ēkādashinī* by direct declaration,—again having indicated it by Direct Assertion,—for the purpose of laying down the purpose, it is again added—'*Prāyaṇīyodayanīyayoḥ*'; the compounding found here becomes possible because members of the *Dvandva* compound are predominant factors, and hence there is need for the compounding. The compound being there, it denotes mutual companionship; so that the *Ēkādashinī* appertains to the *Prāyaṇīya*, not alone, by itself, but as accompanied by the *Udayanīya*;—similarly it appertains to the *Udayanīya* also (as accompanied by the *Prāyaṇīya*). Hence the significance of the sentence is complete with the whole lot (of the eleven animals). If, on the other hand, the two (*Prāyaṇīya* and *Udayanīya*) were not regarded as something to be secured, then the members of the *Dvandva* compound would become subordinate factors,—and hence there being no need,—the compound itself would become impossible; and in that case the signification of the sentence would be complete with each one of the eleven animals.—As a matter of fact, we find it spoken of as something to be secured.—Hence there must be distributive (separate) treatment.

As in common practice;—as in common practice, when it is said 'give a hundred to *Devadatta* and *Yajñadatta*', what is signified by the compound ('*devattayajñadattayoḥ*') is what is enjoined (predicated), and what the sentence means is that 'the hundred that is to be given should be given to *Devadatta and Yajñadatta*'; and on the strength of the predication of the *Dvandva* compound, the 'hundred' is divided (between the two persons). Similarly in the case in question, the 'Eleven animals' have to be divided (between the *Prāyaṇīya* and the *Udayanīya*).

SŪTRA (9).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS DISTRIBUTIVE TREATMENT AT THE ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also there should be separate treatment.—"For what reason?"—There is distributive treatment at the Archetype; as we read in the text—'At the *Ēkādashinī* one should sacrifice one every day'. It is a modification of this *Ēkādashinī* that is laid down in the text in question—'One should sacrifice the *Ēkādashinas* at the *Prāyaṇīya* and *Udayanīya Atirātras*'.—Hence we should, as far as possible, preserve the *distributive treatment.*

SŪTRA (10).

IN CASE OF UNCERTAINTY, THE COURSE IS DETERMINED BY THE PROXIMITY OF THE ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* anticipates the following objection—Says the Opponent—"If distributive treatment is desired, then five will have to be sacrificed on one day and six on the other; and it cannot be decided which number shall be sacrificed at which of the two—the *Prāyaṇīya* and the *Udayanīya*;—and as it cannot be ascertained, there will be uncertainty; and when there is uncertainty, there can be no activity; so that the injunction would become futile".

In answer to this, we have the *Sūtra*—*In the case of uncertainty*,—i.e. the doubt raised in the objection,—proximity to the Archetype is what is principally followed; hence we decide that five of the animals would be sacrificed on the *Prāyaṇīya* and six on the *Udayanīya* day.

SŪTRA (11).

"IN THAT CASE THERE SHOULD BE ONLY THREE",—*if this is urged* [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*.]

Bhāṣya.

"If you think that proximity to the Archetype is to be principally followed, then, in that case, only *three* should be sacrificed at the *Prāyaṇīya*,—just that number which would be in keeping with the *plural* number."

This objection has been urged against the *Siddhānta.*

SŪTRA (12).

NOT SO ; BECAUSE OF EQUALITY ; AS IN THE CASE OF THE PRAYĀJAS.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be as has been urged.—Why ?—*Because of equality*; when, as a matter of fact, the *Ēkādashinas* have been laid down in connection with the *Prāyaṇiya* and the *Udayanīya*, which are dependent upon one another,—and at neither of the two are all the animals to be sacrificed,—with reference to that one at which they are not sacrificed, their *entirety* becomes set aside; and you will therefore have to admit of this rejection at least to the extent of that number which is not sacrificed at one or the other of the two days.—Hence the distribution should be equal ;—*just as in the case of the Prayājas*; for instance, the six additional *Prayājas*, being the modifications of the first and the last, are equally distributed between both ; similarly in the case in question, the animals shall be so distributed over the two days as to make the distribution as equal as possible, and if there is an odd animal left over, it shall be sacrificed at the *Udayanīya* ; as that would be in accordance with the proximity to the Archetype. Thus we find that there is no force in the objection.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *When it is declared that 'the Vishvajit is Sarvapṛṣṭha', it is only one 'Sāman' that is to be brought in at the point that has been enjoined as the 'place of Pṛṣṭha'.*

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF THE 'SARVAPṚṢṬHA', INASMUCH AS THE TERM 'PṚṢṬHA' IS THERE, ALL THE PṚṢṬHAS SHOULD BE BROUGHT IN AT ONE AND THE SAME PLACE,—THE PLACE OF THE PṚṢṬHAS HAVING BEEN ALREADY DETERMINED."

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Vishvajit sarvapṛṣṭhaḥ*' ['The *Vishvajit* sacrifice is one at which *all Pṛṣṭhas* are introduced', these *Pṛṣṭhas* being the six *Sāmans*, (1) *Rathantara*, (2) *Bṛhat*, (3) *Vairūpa*, (4) *Vairāja*, (5) *Shākvara*, and (6) *Raivata*].

In regard to this, there arises the following question—Are all these *Pṛṣṭhas* to be introduced at *the place that has been assigned to the Pṛṣṭha?* Or only one *Pṛṣṭha* is to be introduced at that place and the rest are to be brought in elsewhere?

"Which is 'the place assigned to the *Pṛṣṭha*'?"

The interval that comes after the *Mādhyandina-Pavamāna* and before the *Maitrāvaruṇa-Sāman* is the 'place assigned to the *Pṛṣṭha*'.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"this same place would be the place wherein all the *Pṛṣṭhas* (*Sāman*) have to be brought in.—Why?—Because of the use of the term '*pṛṣṭha*'. The place in question is one that has been assigned to all that is used as the *Pṛṣṭha*; hence all the *Sāmans* must be introduced at that same place".

SŪTRA (14).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, THERE SHOULD BE DISPERSAL, ON ACCOUNT OF THE INJUNCTION.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the view set forth above. What has been urged above on the basis of reasoning should be set aside on the strength of Direct Injunction; and the Direct Injunction is that one *Sāman* only is to be used as '*Pṛṣṭha*' and the others are to be used as '*Parisāma*'.—"How so?"—There is the (injunctive) text—'*Pavamāne rathantaram karoti, ārbhave bṛhat, madhya itarāṇi, vairūpam hotuḥ pṛṣṭham,*

vairājam brahmasāma, shākvaram maitrāvaruṇasāma'. [Where the use of the single *Sāman* is laid down]. Thus then, by adopting this method, the said Injunction is made useful, if the other *Sāmans* are used as '*Parisāman*'. Otherwise, there would be no justification for the injunction of *one Sāman* to be used as '*Pṛṣṭha*'. In order to avoid this contingency, we conclude that one *Sāman* only is to be used as '*Pṛṣṭha*' and the others are to be used as '*Parisāman*'.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *The 'Vairūpa-Sāman' and the 'Vairāja-Sāman' are to be used as 'Pṛṣṭha'.*

SŪTRA (15).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE VAIRŪPA-SĀMAN SHOULD FIND PLACE IN THE ENTIRE SACRIFICE, BECAUSE OF ITS CONNECTION WITH THE (ENTIRE) SACRIFICE; JUST LIKE THE 'TRIVṚT', IT SHOULD HAVE ONLY ONE SĀMAN."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma*-sacrifice, at which there are two particular terminuses'—*Ukthya* and *Ṣoḍashin*; in connection with these, we read—'*Ukthyo vairūpa-sāmā . . . Ṣoḍashī vairājasāmā*' ['The *Ukthya* is *that which has the Vairūpa-Sāman*; the *Ṣodashin* is *that which has the Vairāja-Sāman*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does the *Vairūpa-Sāman* enter into the whole of the *Ukthya-sacrifice*, and the *Vairāja-Sāman*, into the whole of the *Ṣoḍashin-sacrifice*? Or are they to be used only in place of the '*Pṛṣṭha*'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"Throughout the whole sacrifice, there should be the one *Sāman*, the *Vairūpa* only (at the *Ukthya*), and the *Vairāja* only (at the *Ṣoḍashin*).—Why?—*Because of its connection with the entire sacrifice*; without any specification, the *Vairūpa-Sāman* has been enjoined in connection with the whole sacrifice (*Ukthya*),—so also the *Vairāja* (with the *Ṣoḍashin*); consequently neither of them can be used in place of the *Pṛṣṭha* only.—*Just as in the case of the 'Trivṛt'*;—in the case of the text—'The *Agniṣṭoma* is *trivṛt*',—the *Trivṛt-stoma* enters into the whole sacrifice (of the *Agniṣṭoma*),—in the same manner, the two *Sāmans* in question should extend respectively into the whole of the sacrifices.—Or, as in the case of the text—'*Dhēnurathaiṣa bhūrvaishvadēvaḥ trivṛdēva sarvastasya vishvavatyaḥ stotriyā dhēnurdakṣiṇā*,'—the *milch cow* (*Dhēnu*) is used in place of the entire Sacrificial Fee, so also should the two *Sāmans* in question enter respectively into the whole of the *two* sacrifices (*Ukthya* and *Ṣoḍashin*)."

SŪTRA (16).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY SHOULD BE USED ONLY IN PLACE OF THE 'PṚṢṬHA', BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE INDICATIVE OF THE ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the two *Sāmans* should be taken as to be used in place of the *Pṛṣṭha*.—How?—In the two compound words '*Vairūpa-sāmā*' and

'*Vairāja-sāmā*', there is the term '*Sāman*' which is indicative of the Archetype; and it indicates that compounds are to be taken as *Bahuvrīhi*; so that what is enjoined is, not the *Vairūpa-Sāman* or the *Vairāja-Sāman*, but the fact of the sacrifice having *the character of having the Vairūpa Sāman* and *the character of having the Vairāja Sāman*. The connection too is with the *Sacrifice*, not with the *Hymn*; in fact, even in a single *Hymn*—if the *Vairūpa* and the *Vairāja Sāman* are chanted,—the sacrifice can have *the character of having the Vairūpa Sāman* and *the character of having the Vairāja Sāman*.—How?—If the *Sāman* is laid down in connection with a Hymn, then it would be chanted over *all* Hymns; because all equally are *Hymns*;—such however is not the case; hence, when over a single Hymn, the *Vairūpa* and the *Vairāja Sāman* are chanted, there comes about *the character of having the Vairūpa Sāman* and *the character of having the Vairāja Sāman*.—And when this is done in connection with a single Hymn, they should be used in the place of '*Pṛṣṭha*'; because *the character of having the Vairūpa Sāman* that is enjoined is a quality,—and so also is *the character of having the Vairāja Sāman*;—and as such they could be used only in place of a quality of the same kind;—at the Archetype, the qualities of this kind are *the character of having the Bṛhat Sāman* and *the character of having the Rathantara Sāman*;—so that the presence of these indicatives of the Archetype shows that *the character of having the Vairūpa Sāman* and *the character of having the Vairāja Sāman* are to be used in the place of '*Pṛṣṭha*';—in accordance with the principle arrived at in *Sūtra* 8. 1. 2.—From all this it follows that the two *Sāmans* in question are to be used in the place of '*Pṛṣṭha*'.

SŪTRA (17).

"IT WOULD BE LIKE THE 'TRIVṚT'",—IF THIS IS URGED, [then the answer would be as in the following *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

If it be urged, as has been argued before, that—"Just as in the case of the text '*Trivṛt agniṣṭomaḥ*', the character of '*Trivṛt*' enters into the whole sacrifice,—so should it be in the case in question also",—then this has to be refuted [and we proceed to refute it in the following *Sūtra*].

SŪTRA (18).

THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE AT THE ARCHETYPE THE CONNECTION IS NOT WITH THE WHOLE SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be as suggested. In the case in question, we find that by reason of the signs of the Archetype, the *Vairūpa* and *Vairāja* cannot be connected with the whole sacrifice. In the case of the '*Trivṛt*', there is no such connection with any marks of the Archetype which could lead us to take it as not connected with the whole sacrifice. Hence the case of the '*Trivṛt*' is different from that of the two *Sāmans* in question.

SŪTRA (19).

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE INJUNCTION, IT CANNOT BE SO",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the following *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

If it be urged, as has been argued before, that—"just as the Injunction of the *Milch Cow* is used in place of the entire Sacrificial Fee on Earth, so should the two *Sāmans* also be used at the whole sacrifice",—(then the answer is as follows)—

SŪTRA (20).

IN THE CASE OF UNCERTAINTY, IT COULD BE SO, AS IN THAT CASE IT WOULD BE QUITE REASONABLE; SPECIALLY BECAUSE THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN THE ACT.

Bhāṣya.

It is quite possible that the *Milch Cow* should set aside the entire Sacrificial Fee on Earth. Because when there is an uncertainty as to whether the said cow should, or should not, set aside the entire Sacrificial Fee, it is only right that it should set aside the entire Sacrificial Fee.—Why?—*Because there is no difference in the act*; i.e. the purpose of the Sacrificial Fee remains undisturbed, whether it is done by means of the entire Fee or by means of the *Milch Cow*. Because the *Milch Cow* is found to be laid down as serving the same purpose as the Sacrificial Fee,—in the text—"The Milch Cow is the Sacrificial Fee'; hence in that case it is only right. In the case in question however, the presence of the sign of the Archetype has set aside the grounds that were present in the other case.—Hence this case also is not analogous to that of the *Sāmans* in question.

SŪTRA (21).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS NO MODIFICATION OF THE ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the *Sāmans* cannot be connected with the whole sacrifice.—"For what reason?"—*Because there is no modification of the Archetype*; that is, in this way, there is much of the Archetype that would remain unmodified; and to that extent, the General Law would be obeyed.—From this also we conclude that the two *Sāmans* in question are not connected with the whole sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *In the case of the text 'Trivṛdagniṣṭomaḥ', the change of number is in the 'Stoma'.*

SŪTRA (22).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF THE 'TRIVṚT', AS IT IS A NUMBER, THERE SHOULD BE A MODIFICATION OF THE NUMBER OF ALL THINGS."

Bhāṣya.

We have the text '*Trivṛdagniṣṭomaḥ*' ['The *Agniṣṭoma* is *threefold*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does this number '*threefoldness*' pertain to all accessories of the *Agniṣṭoma*? Or is it restricted to the *Stoma* only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"When it is declared that 'it should be *threefold*', there should be a modification of every number.—Why?—Because in common parlance, the term 'threefold' ('*trivṛt*') is used in the sense of 'connected with the number *Three*', as we find in the case of such expressions as 'the *threefold* rope', 'the *threefold* gem'; in the case in question also, when it is said that 'the *Agniṣṭoma* should be *trvṛt*, threefold', what is meant is that the *Agniṣṭoma* should be 'connected with the number *Three*'; and this connection of the *Agniṣṭoma* with the number *Three* can be brought about only through the number characterising the accessories of the *Agniṣṭoma*,—not directly by itself;—because Number is a quality. Further, here no particular thing is predicated which could be measured by the number in question; so that in the absence of any specification, whatever accessory of the *Agniṣṭoma* there may be fit for being characterised by a number should be taken to be characterised by the said number *Three*; which would, by reason of its belonging to the genus 'number', modify the original number of those accessories. Just as, when it is said that '*Dēvadatta* should be fed with Curds, Clarified Butter, and Rice, and *Yajñadatta* should be fed like *Devadatta*, with oil',—the oil is used for the purpose of lubricating the food, on the ground of its belonging to the genus of 'lubricants',—and it is not used for the purpose for which Rice is used;—in the same manner, in the case in question, the number should be used for the purpose of numbering only."

SŪTRA (23).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT IS OF THE 'STOMA' ONLY, BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVES OF IT.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the number of everything should be changed; in fact, it is the number of '*Stoma*' only that should be changed.—How so?

—Because in another text, the term '*trivṛt*' ('threefold') is found to be used in connection with the *Stoma*;—e.g. in the text '*Trivṛt-bahiṣpavamānaḥ*', it is clearly perceived that the term '*trivṛt*' pertains to the *Stoma*; similarly in the text '*Trivṛdagniṣṭomaḥ*', there is the same word '*tṛvṛt*' pronounced; and it would bring to the mind its same relative; thus the text, being indicative of the *Stoma*, should modify the number of the *Stoma* itself.

The following objection is here put forward:—"This is not possible; because as a rule numeral terms are not restricted in their application; they specify anything to be numbered with which they are connected; as is clearly shown in such expressions as 'threefold rope', 'threefold gem'. Consequently when it is co-ordinated with the *Bahiṣpavamāna*, it specifies the Hymn; and in other cases also whatever may be there to be numbered, the numeral shall qualify that; so that the presence of the indicative of the *Stoma* also cannot be a ground for restricting the application of the numeral term in question."

The answer to this is as follows:—The term '*trivṛt*' in the present connection, transcends its ordinary connotation, and is used in the sense of a peculiar relationship of number and numbered; for instance, in the sentence '*Trivṛt-bahiṣpavamānaḥ*', what is expressed is the number *nine* as pertaining to *Stomas*; so that what are spoken of are the *nine Stotriyas*;—from this it follows that the number in question subsists in these.—Similarly in another case also we find the declaration—'*Trayastrikapalāstrivṛtā stomēna sammitā nava prakṛtiraprakṛtiragniṣṭomasya*', where the *nine Kapālas* are spoken of as measured by the '*trivṛt stoma*'; and this shows that the term '*trivṛt*' has that well-known sense. Hence from the said well-known usage, and from the co-ordination that has been found, it is recognised that such is the meaning (of the term '*trivṛt*').—In common parlance also, the meaning of words is ascertained either through co-ordination or through usage; as in the case of such expressions as '*Ayam dēvadattaḥ*' ('This is *Devadatta*).—From all this it follows that the term '*trivṛt*', having been found elsewhere to be used in the sense of the peculiar relationship of number and numbered, brings that same relationship to the mind, through the presence of an indicative; that is how, in the case in question, it comes to be taken as restricted to the *Stoma*.—It has been argued that—"numeral terms are not restricted in their application, and are connected with all things".—But this has been already refuted by showing that the term is to be taken, not in its etymological sense, but in its conventional sense.—Thus then, the numbers of other accessories (except the *Stoma*) not being set aside by the sentence '*trivṛt agniṣṭomaḥ*', the indication of the General Law becomes duly respected.

Adhikaraṇa (8): *In cases of 'Ubhayasāma', there is combination of the Bṛhat and the Rathantara.*

SŪTRA (24).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"In the 'Ubhayasāma' there should be distribution, as in the 'Vishvajit'."

Bhāṣya.

There are certain sacrifices (such as the *Samsava* and the *Apachiti*) called '*Ubhayasāman*' (Lit. 'That at which *both Sāmans* are chanted'), laid down in the text—'*Samsava ubhē kuryāt, apachitavapyēkāhē ubhē kuryāt*' ['At the *Samsava*, one should use *both Sāmans*, at the *Ēkāha Apachiti* also one should use both *Sāmans*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—At these sacrifices, should the two *Sāmans, Bṛhat* and *Rathantara*, be chanted separately, or together?

Question—"What is there to show that they should be chanted together?—And what is there to show that they should be chanted separately?"

Answer—The same text that has been just quoted would seem to indicate both these courses.

"How?"

What the text means is that the sacrifice has to be connected with both the *Sāmans*; whether these *Sāmans* are chanted separately or collectively, in both cases the sacrifice becomes connected with them. Thus both the courses appear to be indicated in the text.—What then is the right course?

Pūrvapakṣa:—"They should be chanted *separately*.—Why?—At the original Primary (Archetypal) sacrifice, the *Pṛṣṭha* has been made up by *either* the *Bṛhat or* the *Rathantara*; hence it follows that in the present case also, in accordance with the General Law that 'the Ectype should be performed in the manner of the Archetype', the *Pṛṣṭha* should be made up by either the one or the other of the two *Sāmans*. It is only thus that in the working of all the rites connected with the *Pṛṣṭha*, the details of the Archetype become entirely followed. On the other hand, if both the *Sāmans* together were to make up the *Pṛṣṭha*, inasmuch as they would nullify one another, it would become an entirely different operation, as the *Pṛṣṭha* would be neither '*Bṛhat*' nor '*Rathantara*'.—Such being the case, so long as it is possible to obtain both the meanings from the text, there is no reason why the General Law should not be followed.—From this it follows that, just as, at the *Vishvajit* sacrifice, the *Bṛhat* and the other *Sāmans* are not all chanted at one and the same place [*vide*—Sū. 10. 8. 13-14, above], so in the present instance also, the two *Sāmans* are not to be chanted together."

SŪTRA (25).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, BOTH SHOULD BE TAKEN AS SERVING THE PURPOSES OF THE 'PṚṢṬHA'; AS THEY ARE NOT FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the two *Sāmans* should be chanted separately; in fact, they should be chanted together.—Why?—At the Archetype, the *Pṛṣṭha* has been made up, either by *Bṛhat* or by *Rathantara*, optionally; at the Ectype, in the case in question, under the General Law, they are understood to be used, optionally, at the same place (as at the Archetype),—and it is in modification of that idea that the present text lays down the *associating of both*—'Both'—the *Bṛhat* and the *Rathantara*—'should be chanted';—this *association* of both is secured only if the two *Sāmans* do not renounce one another;—both of them being laid down as to be secured, the assertion of *Duality* and the assertion of *association* (both by the word '*ubhē*') has to be taken as duly significant;—hence it follows that wherever (at the sacrifices in question) the *Bṛhat-Sāman* is chanted, it is always accompanied by the *Rathantara-Sāman*, never alone by itself.

The following argument might be put forward here—"What is meant by the 'association' of the two *Sāmans* is that they should both be used at the same *main act* (sacrifice);—this 'association' is maintained even when they are chanted separately (so long as they are chanted at the same sacrifice). For instance, when *Dēvadatta* and *Yajñadatta* are said to be associated in the act of *cooking*,—if one does one part of the cooking and another does another part,—and one does not do exactly the same work that is done by the other;—similarly in the case in question, one *Sāman* will make up one Hymn, and the other will make up another Hymn; and they would be *associated* in the sense that they would be helping the main performance conjointly."

The answer to the above is as follows:—What has been put forward is the right course in a case where there is association of two such things as are dependent upon one another. In a case, however, where the association is in any one part of the action concerned,—beginning, middle or end,—there the two have to go together, not separately.—"Why?"—Because the idea is that the one *Sāman* will help the sacrifice in the same manner in which it would when accompanied by the other *Sāman*.

As for the argument that—"in ordinary life, even when several agencies are spoken of as operating in a certain case conjointly, each of these functions separately",—the answer is that it is so in that case because conjoint functioning is impossible; for instance, when a pot is boiling on the oven, it is not possible for anything else to be boiling there at the same time; and hence by reason of this impossibility, no one does it; and not because it has not been laid down by the texts as to be done by the two *conjointly*, not otherwise. In the case in question however, there is no such impossibility; because the use to which the *Bṛhat* and the *Rathantara* are put is

the embellishing of the verse; and this embellishment of the *Pṛṣṭha* they can do conjointly; and hence the only right course is that they should be used together.

It has been argued that—"when both courses are possible, it is better to follow the General Law, so that, if all the accessory details of the Archetype are adopted at the Ectype, there would be no harm done";—the answer to this is that, inasmuch as their conjoint use has been laid down directly by an injunctive text, there can be nothing wrong in rejecting the implications of the General Law.

SŪTRA (26).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

There is an indicative text also which shows that the *Sāmans* in question are to be used together, not separately.—"What text?"—The text says—'*Mahāvṛkṣau hi bṛhadrathantarē nidhanēna samāpyētē, yanmahāvṛkṣau samṛchchhyētē na hyatra vibhagnam prabhagnam*'; here a difference of '*nidhanas*' (the musical finale) is spoken of, which shows that the two *Sāmans* are used at the same place. If they came at different places, there would naturally be a difference in the 'musical finale' (and there would be no need to mention it); when however they come together (at the same place), then alone, it becomes necessary to speak of the difference in the 'finale'.—For this reason also they should appear at the same place.

There is another indicative text also: '*Pūrvāhno vai rathantaram, aparāhno bṛhat*'; here the two *Sāmans* are spoken of as parts of the same day; which shows that they should appear at the same place.

From all this it follows that the two *Sāmans* come in together in place of the *Pṛṣṭha.*

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *The 'Eating of Honey' and the 'Eating of Clarified Butter' should come in at the end of the 'Ṣaḍaha' (Six-Day-Session).*

SŪTRA (27).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" THE EATING OF POTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'PṚṢṬHA' SHOULD BE DONE AT THE REVERSED ACT AT THE END OF THE THIRTY-THIRD (STOMA); BECAUSE OF ITS IMMEDIATE SEQUENCE; AS AT THE ARCHETYPE."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with a certain sacrifice, we read—'The *Ṣaḍaha* connected with the *Pṛṣṭha* begins with the *Thirty-third* (*Stoma*)';—in connection with the *Dvādashāha*, there is the following declaration—'When the *Ṣaḍaha* connected with the *Pṛṣṭha* is finished, one should be made to eat Honey or Clarified Butter'.—This *Eating of Honey* and the *Eating of Clarified Butter* become admissible at the former sacrifice, under the General Law.—And in regard to this there arises the question—Should the *Eating* be done at the end of the *Thirty-third Stoma* (which is the *first* Stoma at the *Ṣaḍaha*)? —Or at the end of the (whole) *Ṣaḍaha*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* starting with the *Sūtra* is as follows:—"*In connection with the Pṛṣṭha, the Eating of potions should be done at the reversed act—Ṣaḍaha—at the end of the Thirty-third* (*Stoma*)—[At the normal *Ṣaḍaha* the order of *Stomas* is as follows—(1) *Trivṛt*, (2) Fifteenth, (3) Seventeenth, (4) Twenty-first, (5) Twenty-seventh and (6) Thirty-third;—at some modified ectypes, this order of *Stomas* is reversed and (1) the *Thirty-third* comes first, (2) then the twenty-seventh, (3) Twenty-first, (4) Seventeenth, (5) Fifteenth and (6) Trivṛt.—It is this latter that is spoken of in the *Sūtra* as the '*reversed Ṣaḍaha*'.]—'Why?'—*Because of immediate sequence*; i.e. at the Archetype (i.e. the Normal *Ṣaḍaha*), the 'Eating of the Potions' has been done after the *Thirty-third Stoma* (this being the last *Stoma* in the case);—hence if one were to act as at the Archetype and do the Eating at the end of the *Thirty-third Stoma*, he would honour the General Law;—and if he were to do it at the end of another 'Day', he would be ignoring the General Law.—*Immediate sequence* is an 'order of sequence', and it has been found to be a basis of particular relationships;—in the present case, the 'immediate sequence' of the *Eating of Potions* has been found to be in relation to the *Thirty-third Stoma*; and hence it is to be done after the *Thirty-third Stoma*."

SŪTRA (28).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE DONE AT THE END; AS THE TIME HAS BEEN FIXED.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the 'Eating of Potions' should be done at the end of the *Thirty-third Stoma*; in fact, it should be done at the end of the (whole) *Ṣaḍaha*.—Why?—Because what has been declared is that it should be done '*when the Ṣaḍaha is finished*',—not '*when the Thirty-third is finished*'; that is, at that *end* which is marked by the completion of the *Ṣaḍaha*, not that marked by the *Thirty-third* or any other *Stoma*;—the *Ṣaḍaha* is finished in six days, not on the one day, the *Thirty-third*.

It has been argued that—"By reason of the immediate sequence to the Thirty-third at the Archetype, the Eating should be done, in the case in question also, in immediate sequence of the same".—This however is not right; because at the Archetype it was as a matter of course that the immediate sequence of the Thirty-third came about.—How?—Because at the Archetypal *Dvādashāha* (where we have the normal *Ṣaḍaha* at which the Thirty-third is the last *Stoma*) it is on the Thirty-third 'Day' that the *Ṣaḍaha* is completed;—so that in the present case also there would be eating when the *Ṣaḍaha* is completed.—Thus then, the 'Eating' is connected with that day which is marked by the completion of the *Ṣaḍaha*;—this is what is meant by the declaration that it is to be done 'when the *Ṣaḍaha* is completed';—it is not to be done on what is marked by the completion of the *Thirty-third*.

It has been argued that "the 'order of sequence' is a basis for determining particular relationships".—True, it is a basis for it; but not in cases where it runs counter to a more powerful authority; in the present case it has been laid down through *Syntactical Connection* that the eating should be done *at the end of the Ṣaḍaha*; so that, when a particular relationship has been established on the basis of Syntactical Connection, mere Immediate Sequence (Order) cannot serve as the basis for any other relationship.

From all this it follows that the Eating should be done at the end of the *Ṣaḍaha*.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *Even when the 'Ṣaḍaha' is repeated, the Eating of Honey and Clarified Butter is to be done only once.*

SŪTRA (29).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN THERE IS REPETITION, THERE SHOULD BE REPETITION OF THE EATING, AS THE WHOLE SACRIFICE IS PERFORMED OVER AGAIN."

Bhāṣya.

There is the text '*Āvṛttam pṛṣṭhyam ṣaḍahamupayanti*' ['They have recourse to the repeated *Ṣaḍaha* pertaining to the *Pṛṣṭha*']; at that repeated *Saḍaha*, the act laid down in the text—'On the completion of the *Ṣaḍaha* pertaining to the *Pṛṣṭha* one should eat Honey or Clarified Butter'—becomes admissible under the General Law.

In this connection, there arises the question—With the repetition of the *Ṣaḍaha*, should the *Eating* also be repeated? Or, should it be done once only, at the end of the *Ṣaḍaha*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"When there is repetition of the *Ṣaḍaha*, the *Eating* must be repeated.—Why?—*Because the whole sacrifice is performed over again*; the performance of the sacrifice is repeated; and when that is repeated, everything connected with it should be repeated;—just as the *Stotra* and *Shastra* hymns connected with the *Ṣaḍaha* are repeated, so should the Eating also, which is connected with the *Ṣaḍaha*, be repeated."

SŪTRA (30).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE DONE AT THE END, AS THAT IS THE TIME FIXED FOR IT.

Bhāṣya.

What has been said—that "When the *Ṣaḍaha* is repeated, the *Eating* also should be repeated"—is not right; in reality, what should be done is that the *Eating* should be done once only at the end of the *Ṣaḍaha*—why?—*Because that is the time fixed for it*; the time for the *Eating* has been fixed as 'after the completion of the *Ṣaḍaha*', '*Samsthitē ṣaḍahē*',—and '*Samsthāna*' means *end*,—i.e. the cessation of operations relating to the *Ṣaḍaha*;—when one takes up the repeated performance of the *Saḍaha*, he is not regarded as having desisted from the operations relating to the *Ṣaḍaha*;—and so long as the Performer does not desist from the operations, the *Ṣaḍaha* is not completed; because the 'Completion' of an act means that the actor turns his back upon it or takes up another act. When a man

is repeating the *Ṣaḍaha*, he is not turning his back upon it, nor is he taking up another act, he is repeating that same act ;—so that the *Ṣaḍaha* cannot be regarded as *finished* at that stage ; and when it is not finished, and there is no completion, the *Eating* does not come in at the time ; if it were done, it would be something not sanctioned by the scriptures.

It has been argued that—" just as the *Stotra*, *Shastra* and other details of the *Ṣaḍaha* are repeated (when the *Ṣaḍaha* is repeated), so the *Eating* also would be repeated ".—But this is not right ; those details are all connected with the 'Day' ; so that when the 'Days' are repeated, it is only right that the *Stotra* and the rest should be repeated ; in fact, they have not been enjoined in connection with the 'end' of the sacrifice. In the case in question however, the *Eating* has been enjoined in connection with the 'end' of the sacrifice, which fact has been already put forward as the reason (in support of the *Siddhānta*).—From all this it follows that it is not right that there should be a repetition of the *Eating*.

Further, if the *Eating* in question were a (part and parcel) of the *Ṣaḍaha*, then it would naturally be repeated with the repetition of its Primary; as a matter of fact however, it is not a part.—Why ?—Because there is no ground for its being regarded as a part ;—it could be regarded as a part either by reason of the *Context*, or through *Syntactical Connection*, or through noticing that it helped the main act effectively. Not one of these conditions we find present in the present case. As for the *Context*, that belongs to the *Dvādashāha*, not to the *Ṣaḍaha*. As for *Syntactical Connection*, what the expression '*Samsthitē ṣaḍahē*' ('on the completion of the *Ṣaḍaha*) predicates *is the Eating on the completion of the Ṣaḍaha* ; and the *Ṣaḍaha* is 'completed' only when none of its parts remains to be done.—Lastly, the Eatings of Honey and Clarified Butter do not accord any help to the *Ṣaḍaha*.—" Why ? "—Because the *Eating* is done after the *Ṣaḍaha* has ceased. It could have accorded a help only to the extent to which it would, by bringing about his satisfaction (of hunger), produce in the performer the strength requisite for carrying out the details preceding the completion of the sacrifice ; certainly this could not be done after the *Ṣaḍaha* had been finished. As for *Order* and other evidences of subsidiary character, these also can be evidenced for particular relationships only through the help of other evidences, never by themselves alone.—From all this it is clear that the act of *Eating* is enjoined for men at the time marked by the 'completion of the *Ṣaḍaha*', and hence it should not be repeated in the case in question.

Adhikaraṇa (11): *At the 'Gavāmayana', the 'Eating of Honey' and the 'Eating of Clarified Butter' are to be repeated every month.*

SŪTRA (31).

When there is interruption, there should be repetition, because there is difference of time.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the '*Gavāmayana*' sacrifice, we read—'*Chatvaro'-bhiplavāḥ ṣaḍahāḥ, pṛṣṭhyaḥ ṣaḍahaḥ sa māsaḥ sa dvitīyaḥ sa tṛtīyaḥ sa chaturthaḥ sa pañchamaḥ*' [where the repeated performance of the *Ṣaḍaha* for several months is laid down];—in this connection, the General Law makes admissible what is laid down in the text—'At the completion of the *Ṣaḍaha* related to the *Pṛṣṭhya*, one should eat Honey or Clarified Butter'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this 'Eating of the Potions' to be repeated every month? Or is it to be done only once, at the end of all? Which is the correct course?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"In accordance with the principle evolved in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Eating* should be done once only; it is only at the end of all,—not before that,—that the man desists from the operations relating to the *Ṣaḍaha*; before that, even after he has performed the *Ṣaḍaha*, he proceeds again with the same;—nor is the *Ṣaḍaha* 'completed' if the man takes up its performance again;—at the end of all however, he does not take it up again;—hence it follows that the *Eating* should be done at the end of all."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*When there is interruption, there should be repetition, as there is difference of time*;—there should be repetition of the 'Eating of Potions', and it should not be done only once.—"Why?"—Because the occasion is repeated; the 'Completion of the *Ṣaḍaha*' is the occasion for the *Eating*; so that whenever the *Ṣaḍaha* is repeated, the occasion for *Eating* is repeated; hence the *Eating* should be repeated.

It has been argued that—"it is only at the end of all,—not before,—that the man desists from the operations relating to the *Ṣaḍaha*; even after having performed it, he again proceeds to take up the same".—The answer to this is as follows:—Even when he takes up the same act again, yet it is only after *completing* one performance that he begins the other performance, and he completes this again;—this is not what is done in the case of the mere repetition of the *Ṣaḍaha* (dealt with in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*); in that case there was repetition of the *Pṛṣṭhya* before it was quite finished; in the present case on the other hand, the four *Abhiplavas* intervene between one *Ṣaḍaha* and the other; and hence by reason of the

intervention of a different subsequent act, the operations relating to the *Pṛṣṭhya* must be taken to have been completed. This is the difference (between the present case and the one dealt with in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*).—That this is so is clear from the fact that until one action is completed, the other action cannot be taken up. The 'End' (or 'Completion') of an action is of two kinds—(1) having done it, one turns his back upon it, and (2) he takes up another action,—as has been already explained above.—From all this it is clear that every month the *Pṛṣṭhya* (*Ṣaḍaha*) is repeated, along with an intervening factor (in the shape of the *Abhiplavas*); and when it is thus repeated, the Eating due to its completion has to be repeated; hence the *Eating* should be repeated every month.

Adhikaraṇa (12): *At the Dvādashāha, the Sattra-performers also are to eat the Honey.*

SŪTRA (32).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—" Being initiated, they should not eat Honey, because they have the character of the ' Religious Student '."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Dvādashāha*, we read—' On the completion of the *Ṣaḍaha* related to the *Pṛṣṭha*, one should eat Honey or Clarified Butter '.

In regard to this there arises the question—Should Honey be eaten by the Sattra-performers or not ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—" It should not be eaten ;—why ?—because being ' initiated ', they have the character of the ' Religious Student ' ;—and Honey-eating has been forbidden for the Religious Student—' He should avoid Honey and Meat ' ;—hence it follows that they should not eat the Honey.—It may be argued that ' the injunction of Honey-eating is a special one, and hence it sets aside the said prohibition which is a general rule '.—We say, it cannot set it aside.—Why ?—There are two forms of *Dvādashāha*, according as Honey or Clarified Butter is eaten,—and the Sattra-performers would eat Clarified Butter (not Honey) ; at the *Ahīna*, the eating of Honey is done by the Priests ; so that there would be these two kinds of *Dvādashāha*, with two different substances ; and there would be done nothing that is incongruous.—From all this it follows that the Sattra-performers should not eat Honey."

SŪTRA (33).

[Siddhānta]—In fact, it should be eaten, as it is for purposes of the sacrifice.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that Honey should not be eaten by Sattra-performers ; in fact, it must be eaten. It has been laid down for all performers, without any distinction. When two forms of *Dvādashāha* are spoken of, in the text ' On the completion of the *Ṣaḍaha* related to the *Pṛṣṭha* one should eat *Honey* or *Clarified Butter* ', it is with a view to the two substances (*Honey* and *Clarified Butter*) being used as optional alternatives,—and not with a view to different performers. Hence we conclude that the Sattra-performers also should eat Honey.

It has been argued that—" inasmuch as it is possible to take the two rules as pertaining to two distinct spheres, it is not right to reject any of

them; specially as the course suggested would not be incompatible with the Eating being an auxiliary to the *Dvādashāha*".—The answer to this is as follows:—On the completion of the *Ṣaḍaha*—pertaining to the *Sattra*, or to the *Ahīna*,—it is laid down, without any distinction that Honey or Clarified Butter is to be eaten;—under the circumstances on what grounds can we restrict the *Eating* in any way?—If it be urged that "it could be done on the ground of inconsistency",—that cannot be, because the Injunction and the Prohibition have been asserted in reference to different matters;—the Prohibition relating to the *purposes of the man*, and the Injunction relating to the *purposes of the sacrifice*.—If the Prohibition were regarded as more authoritative than the Injunction, then in that case, the Injunctive sentence would be entirely superfluous.—It might be argued that "it would have its use in the other alternative course".—But that is not possible, as the subjects are different; it is only when there are two alternatives relating to the same subject and with the same purpose that we have *Option*,—not when the two relate to different purposes. In the case in question, we find that the two relate to two different purposes.—How so?—The Injunction is for the purpose of making the sacrifice complete in all its details, and the Prohibition is related to the purposes of the man being fulfilled by the due keeping of an observance (of not eating Honey).

From all this it follows that the Sattra-performers should eat Honey.

Adhikaraṇa (13): *The 'Mānasa' is part of the Tenth 'Day'.*

SŪTRA (34).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*continued*]—"The 'Mānasa' should be a different 'day'; as difference has been declared."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Dvādashāha*, we read—'*Anayā tvā pātrēṇa samudrarasayā, prajāpatayē juṣṭam gṛhṇāmīti prājāpatyam manograham gṛhṇāti*' [by which the 'Mānasa'-offering is described as consisting in the 'Cup', wherein the Earth is the 'vessel', the Ocean is the '*Soma*', and *Prajāpati* is the 'deity'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this *Mānasa*-'Day' a 'day' distinct from the *Dvādashāha*? Or a part of this same?

On this point there are found certain reasons pointing to the *Mānasa* being distinct; with a view to refute these reasons, the Teacher puts forward the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"*The Mānasa' should be a different 'day'*;—why?—because it has been spoken of as different.—How so?—There is the text—'Speech verily is *Dvādashāha*, Mind is the *Mānasa*',—which speaks of the *Mānasa* as not included in the *Dvādashāha*; the expression 'Speech verily is *Dvādashāha*' eulogising *Speech*, and the expression '*Mind is Mānasa*' eulogising *Mind*; so that, just as Speech and Mind are recognised to be really different from one another, so also should be the *Dvādashāha* and the *Mānasa*; because it is only when two things are really separate that they are spoken of as different, not otherwise. Hence from the declaration quoted, it follows that the particular 'Day' in question (the *Mānasa*) is distinct (from the *Dvādashāha*)."

SŪTRA (35).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*continued*]—"Also because it is eulogised through that."

Bhāṣya.

"For the following reason also the *Mānasa* should be regarded as a distinct 'Day'.—'For what reason?'—Because the *Dvādashāha* has been eulogised through the *Mānasa* 'day'.—'How?'—There is the text—'*Vidhūtāni ha vai dvādashāhasya gatarasāni chhandāmsi, tāni mānasēnaiva āpyāyanti*', which means that 'The metres of the *Dvādashāha*, with their essence gone, are shaken off; they are made up by the *Mānasa* itself'; and this clearly shows that the *Mānasa* is different from the *Dvādashāha*.—'How?'—Because of the eulogy; any one thing is not eulogised through itself, because the *eulogising* and the *eulogised* factors must be entirely

distinct; *Devadatta*, for instance, is never eulogised through *Devadatta* himself, he is eulogised through his head, hands and other limbs. Similarly in the case in question, inasmuch as the *Dvādashāha* has been eulogised through the *Mānasa*,—from this eulogy it follows that the two are distinct."

SŪTRA (36).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE IT IS ENJOINED AS COMING AFTER THE LAST 'DAY' (OF THE DVĀDASHĀHA)."

Bhāṣya.

"For the following reason also it appears that the *Mānasa* is a distinct 'day'.—'For what reason?'—The *Mānasa* has been enjoined as coming after the last day of the *Dvādashāha*, in the following text—'*Patnīḥ samyājya, prañcha udētya, mānasāya prasarpanti*' ['Having prepared the wives and moving forward, he proceeds to the *Mānasa*']. If this text were the injunction of an accessory detail of the *Dvādashāha* itself,—then in that case, it would have ended with the 'Preparation of the wife' in connection with the *Dvādashāha*; [but it is laid down as coming *after* it]; on the other hand, if it is a distinct 'Day', then there can be no room for the objection that it is an accessory of the *Dvādashāha*, of nothing else. From this it follows that the *Mānasa* is a distinct 'Day'."

SŪTRA (37).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"IN THIS CASE THE NUMBERS WOULD BE APPLICABLE LIKE THE NUMBER 'THOUSAND'."

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* contains the *Pūrvapakṣin's* answer to an objection.—"What is that objection?"—It is this—If the *Mānasa* is distinct from the *Dvādashāha*, then there are thirteen 'Days'; and hence the name '*Dvādashāha*' ('Twelve-Days') would not be applicable.

The *Pūrvapakṣin's* answer to this is as follows—"When, on the strength of other authorities, it is found that the name '*Dvādashāha*' stands for so many 'days', then, on the basis of its being the nearest number, the term '*dvādasha*' ('Twelve' in the name '*Dvādashāha*') may be explained as standing figuratively for *thirteen*; just as in the case of the declaration—'The *Atirātra* consists of a *thousand Days*, one should perform the *Atirātra* sacrifice which is made up of a thousand',—the term 'thousand' is used in the sense of what is actually more than a thousand; similarly in the case in question, the term 'twelve' may be taken in the sense of what is more than twelve (i.e. *Thirteen*). Or (there may be another explanation)—The name '*Dvadashāha*' is the name of a *group of acts*, and we take it as standing for all those acts in reference to which it has been used; as a matter of fact, it has been used in reference to all the acts spoken of in the context; and as

such would stand for all these (be their number *twelve* or *thirteen*); hence the objection has no force."

SŪTRA (38).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN ACCESSORY (PART) OF ONE OF THE 'DAYS' (OF THE DVĀDASHĀHA); BECAUSE AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'AMSHU', THERE IS NO (SEPARATE) INJUNCTION.

Bhāṣya.

The *Mānasa* should be taken as an accessory of the Tenth 'Day' (of the *Dvādashāha*),—and not as a distinct 'Day'.—"Why?"—Because there is no text that would justify its being regarded as a distinct 'Day'.—"How so?"—The text laying down the *Mānasa* is—'*Anayā tvā pātrēṇa samudarasayā prajapatayē juṣṭam gṛhṇāmīti prājāpatyam graham gṛhṇāti*';—and this is an injunction of the particular 'cup' in reference to the *Tenth* 'Day' (of the *Dvādashāha*); as is clear from the fact that the verb '*gṛhṇāti*' ('takes up') lays down what is an *Embellishment*; and a difference of 'Embellishments' does not lead to a difference of 'acts; it having been explained under *Sūtra* 2. 1. 3, that Embellishments are not-injunctive (of *Acts*); as in that case, the act is the secondary, not the principal, factor.—For instance, in the case of the *Amshu* and the *Adābhya*, though they have been enjoined, yet they do not make distinct acts (*vide* Sū. 3. 6. 33-34); in fact, they are as two other 'cups' used at the same act at which they appear,—and not as distinct acts.—If the *Mānasa* is treated as an accessory of the Tenth 'Day', and not a distinct act,—(*a*) it involves the assumption of very little of the 'unseen (transcendental) factor',—(*b*) the connection of the context is maintained,—(*c*) there would be no performance of any other act, not connected with the Context.—For these reasons, the *Mānāsa* cannot be a distinct 'Day', it must be an accessory of the Tenth 'Day'.

SŪTRA (39).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS SPOKEN OF AS THE 'DISMISSAL OF THE TENTH'.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the *Mānasa* should be regarded, not as a distinct 'Day', but as an accessory.—"For what reason?"—Because it is spoken of as 'the dismissal of the Tenth'; there is a text speaking of the *Mānasa* as the 'dismissal of the Tenth':—'What is known as the *Mānasa* is *the dismissal of the Tenth Day*'; this text speaks of the *Mānasa* as the 'dismissal'— i.e. the end—of the Tenth 'Day'. This shows that it is the *end* of the Tenth 'Day',—and it is not an independent act by itself.—From this also it follows that it is an accessory of the Tenth 'Day', not a distinct act.

SŪTRA (40).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE EXPRESSION 'ON THE TENTH DAY', WHICH SPEAKS OF IT AS AN ACCESSORY.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the *Mānasa* should be regarded as an Accessory.—"How ?"—It is only in that case that the following texts which speak of accessories, would be explicable—(*a*) '*Dashamē' hani mānasāya prasarpanti*' [' On the Tenth Day, they proceed to the *Mānasa* '] ; —(*b*) '*Dashamē' hani sarparājñībhir ṛgbhiḥ stuvanti*' [' They hymn with the *Sarparājñī* verses, on the Tenth Day '] : in these texts, the Tenth ' Day ' is spoken of as the principal factor, and the *Cup* is spoken of as something forming part of that factor. It must therefore be taken as an accessory of the Tenth ' Hymn ', —not as a distinct act.

SŪTRA (41).

BECAUSE THE NUMBER IS CONSISTENT (ONLY UNDER THIS VIEW).

Bhāṣya.

The number denoted by the name '*Dvādashāha*' (' Twelve Days ') too becomes consistent only if the *Mānasa* is an accessory ; otherwise the name '*Dvādashāha*' would be applied to *Thirteen Days*, and as such would be *inconsistent* ; as ' twelve ' is not expressive of *Thirteen*.

It has been argued that " the number would apply figuratively, as in the case of the number *thousand* ".—That however is not possible ; as in the case of the number *thousand*, the things numbered have been cognised by other authoritative means of knowledge ; and as the numbered things have been actually found to be *more than a thousand*, the term ' thousand ' is taken as applied to them figuratively. In the case in question however there is no authoritative evidence to show that the number of things is actually larger (than *twelve*), on the basis whereof the figurative application could be assumed.—As for the declaration—' *Anayā tvā pātrēṇa*, etc.', it only lays down an embellishment of the Cup, and hence what it enjoins is a repetition of the sacrifice on the tenth day,—and it does not enjoin a distinct act ; this we have already explained before.

Such being the case, the direct declaration in question cannot justify the assumption of another ' Day ' ;—nor is there any other means of knowledge pointing to such another action, on the basis whereof we could take the term as applicable to a larger number of things.—Consequently the term ' twelve ' cannot be taken as used figuratively.

Then again, it has been asserted that—" the term '*Dvādashāha*' being the name of a *group of acts*, as many would be taken as included in it as there would be in the context,—and the repetition would be in the form of the name ".—This also is not right. It is true that the term is the name

of a *group of acts*, but not in such a way as would be inconsistent with actual facts ; the fact of the matter is that there are *twelve acts* measured by 'days' which have been grouped together and given the name '*Dvādashāha*' ; it is in this sense that the name applies to the group of acts,—not merely in its verbal form. In the case of the names of all acts, the name is applicable on the basis of the actual facts, which is in a way referred to by the name ; it is never applied irrespectively of the real state of things, as a mere technicality, like such terms as '*vṛddhi*', '*guṇa*' and the like. This is what is found to be the case with all such names as '*Agnihotra*', '*Shyēna*', '*Jyotiṣṭoma*'. Thus we conclude that the term '*dvādashāha*' is a name applied on the basis of facts, not without basis in facts. Hence the argument of the Opponent has no force at all.

SŪTRA (42).

IN CONNECTION WITH THE EXCESS OF ANIMALS, THERE IS ONLY ONE THAT IS MENTIONED.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the *Mānasa* is an accessory of the *Dvādashāha*.—" For what reason ? "—*With the excess of animals*,—the excess that is indicated by the texts is of *one* only, not of *two* :—The text—'*Yaḥ pashuratirichyēta sa aindrāgnaḥ kāryaḥ*' ['The animal that is in excess should be dedicated to *Indra-Agni*']—having laid down the *Ēkādashinī* in connection with the *Dvādashāha*, indicates that after the *Ēkādashinī* has been dealt with, there is *one more animal* that is required. [According to the *Pūrvapakṣa*] either there would be no more animals required, or it would not be one only.—" How so ? "—There are *eleven* animals (of the *Ēkādashinī*), and there are twelve 'Days' (of the *Dvādashāha*) ; that there are *twelve* 'Days' is shown by the text speaking of only *one more* being required ; if there had been *thirteen* 'days' (as in the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the *Mānasa* being the additional thirteenth 'day'), then there would have been *two more* required, not only *one*.—From this also it follows that the *Mānasa* is an accessory of the *Dvādashāha*, not a distinct act by itself.

SŪTRA (43).

THE 'EULOGY', OR THE 'DECLARATION', IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH ITS BEING AN ACCESSORY ; AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'VRATAS'.

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* supplies the answer to two *Sūtras* (34 and 35).

It has been argued (*a*) that "the *Mānasa* should be regarded as a distinct 'day' because it has been declared to be different (under Sū. 34), —and (*b*) that there must be difference, as the *Dvādashāha* has been eulogised

through the *Mānasa*; no one thing is ever eulogised through itself".—The answer to this is as follows:—There is no inconsistency in this; because the *Composite* has often been found to be eulogised through its component part; for instance, the *Samvatsara-sattra* has been eulogised through the details of the *Mahāvrata* (which is one of the components of the *Samvatsara-sattra*). For instance, the text—'*Yanti vā ētē mithunād yē samvatsaramupayanti, antarvēdī mithunau sambhavataḥ, tēnaiva mithunā na yanti*'—describes the defect of the whole Composite (*Samvatsara-sattra*), and then palliates it by pointing out the redeeming feature of the *Mahāvrata*, which is a component of that *Sattra*,—the *whole* thus being eulogised through its *part*. In ordinary experience also, the whole is often eulogised through the part; when, for instance, Devadatta is said to be 'beautiful' on account of his long hair;—similarly in the case in question also, the *Dvādashāha* would be eulogised through the *Mānasa* (one of its accessories), and there would be no incongruity in this.

SŪTRA (44).

IT IS ON ACCOUNT OF THE DECLARATION THAT IT IS NOT TAKEN AS ENDING WITH THAT.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 36) that—"there is a text speaking of the *Dvādashāha* as *ending with the Mānasa*,—this would be applicable only if the *Mānasa* were a distinct 'Day' by itself, not if it were only an accessory of the *Dvādashāha*; in the latter case it would be *ending with the 'Preparation of the Wife'*".—Our answer to this is as follows:—*It is on account of the declaration that it is not taken as ending with that*; as a rule, the 'Days' of the *Dvādashāha* end with the 'Preparation of the Wife'; but it is a peculiar feature of the Tenth 'Day' that it ends with the *Mānasa*, in accordance with the declaration—'Having prepared the wives, they proceed to the *Mānasa*';—and for a declaration there is no burden too heavy. For this reason also there is no incongruity in our view.

From all this we conclude that the *Mānasa* is an accessory of the *Tenth* 'Day', not a distinct act by itself.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *The 'Sattra' is to be performed by several 'Sacrificers'.*

SŪTRA (45).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"ONLY ONE MAN SHOULD PERFORM THE SATTRA, LIKE ITS ARCHETYPE."

Bhāṣya.

The *Dvādashāha* and other *Sattras* form the subject-matter of the present *Adhikaraṇa*.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Should only one man perform the *Sattra*? Or several?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*Only one*;—why?—it is *like its Archetype*; at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* (which is the Archetype of the *Sattras*), there is only one *Sacrificer*; and as the *Sattra* has that for its Archetype, it should have only one Sacrificer, in accordance with the General Law.—'But we find several sacrificers spoken of—in such texts as—*Those who, knowing this, have recourse to the Sattra*'; '*knowing thus they have recourse to the Sattra*'.—The answer to that is that the *Sattra* has been enjoined for persons desiring certain rewards; and these must be many, independent of one another; so that, even when each of them performs the *Sattra* singly by himself, it is possible to speak of the *performance of the Sattra* as done by *several men*; as in ordinary life, even when men do an act separately, the plural number is used—'If the Heaven were to rain *many people would cultivate the fields*', or, 'if there is a good harvest, many *Brāhmaṇas* would perform sacrifices'. Similarly in the *Veda* also, we find such expressions as—'Having risen from the *Sattra*, they should perform the *Pṛṣṭhashamanīya* sacrifice'.—In the case in question also the plural number in '*āsīran*' and '*yajēran*', may be similarly explained."

SŪTRA (46).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—ON ACCOUNT OF DIRECT DECLARATION, IT SHOULD BE PERFORMED BY SEVERAL MEN.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that there should be only one Sacrificer, not several. In fact several persons should perform the *Sattra*-sacrifice.—"Why?"—Because there is a *Direct Declaration*; there is the declaration containing the verbs '*āsīran*' and '*upēyuḥ*', all in the plural form, which shows that what is enjoined is connected with *plurality* (of men); and this fact, thus directly declared, sets aside the notion of there being only one Sacrificer, which is based only upon the implications of the General Law.

SŪTRA (47).

IF IT IS ARGUED THAT—"IT IS A MERE ASSERTION" [then the answer is as follows].

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 45) that—"the plural number may be taken as based upon the similarity of action, as in ordinary experience we meet with such expressions as '*they* would perform sacrifices',—and in the *Veda* also, such expressions as '*they* should perform the *Pṛṣṭhashamanīya*-sacrifice'; the same would be the case in the present instance also".—This has got to be refuted, [and the refutation is as follows].

SŪTRA (48).

THAT CANNOT BE, AS 'ONE' IS MENTIONED (IN CONNECTION WITH ANOTHER).

Bhāṣya.

That it should have only one Sacrificer is not possible for the *Sattra.*—Why?—*Because 'one' is mentioned in connection with another.*—How so?—There is the following declaration—'One who receives a gift at the *Sattra* eats a dead corpse; only one should perform the sacrifice'; where having (in the first clause) disposed of the *Sattra*, the second clause lays down, in regard to another sacrifice, the fact of there being only one performer; and this implies that at the *Sattra* there should be several sacrificers.

As for the analogy cited of 'ordinary experience', that is not right; because in ordinary life, the word is only a reiteration of what has been known from elsewhere, and hence when it is used it is understood to be based upon the presence of similar activities.

The instance that has been cited (under Sū. 45) of the *Udavasānīya*—it is all right in regard to the *Udavasānīya*, as there mere *performance* has been laid down in connection with various *Udavasānīyas*; and it is this plurality, thus indicated, that is reiterated in the text cited;—this has been already explained. In the case in question however, the activity is one prompted entirely by the verbal injunction,—and the verbal injunction connects the performance of the *Sattra* with performers, as qualified by *plurality*; so that when the action comes to be undertaken on the authority of the verbal Text, due significance has to be attached to the *pluraity*; hence it follows that the *Sattra* should be performed by several persons.

SŪTRA (49).

THERE IS ALSO A TEXT SHOWING 'COMMINGLING'.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also there should be several sacrifices at the *Sattra.*—"For what reason?"—Because we find 'commingling'; there is a

text which declares the 'commingling' of several 'Fires' in one place—'*Pañchabhiḥ pashubhiryakṣyamāṇaḥ sannivapēran*', '*Sāvitrāṇi hoṣyantaḥ sannivapēran*' [' When going to sacrifice five animals they should commingle the Fires', ' When going to offer the *Sāvitra* libations, they should commingle the Fires ']. It is only when several persons perform the act conjointly that such ' commingling ' of the Fires is possible ; if each man did it separately on his own account, the mention of ' commingling ' could not be explained. From this also it follows that there should be several Sacrificers at the *Sattra*.

SŪTRA (50).

IF THERE WERE ONLY ONE PERFORMER, THEN THE SPECIFIC MENTION OF 'SEVERAL' WOULD BE MEANINGLESS.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also we conclude that the performance is done by several persons conjointly.—" For what reason ? "—We read —' *Yo vai bahūnām yajamānānām gṛhapatiḥ sa sattrasya pratyētā sa hi bhūyiṣṭhām ṛddhimārdhnoti*' [' Among the *several sacrificers* one who is the master of the house is the propounder of the *Sattra*, and he obtains the highest prosperity ']; this text speaks of a particular result accruing to one Master of the House operating with *several sacrificers*, and hence shows that the performance is by several persons jointly. Otherwise, if there were only one Sacrificer,—as there would be only one *Agent* and only one result,—any distinction between general and special results would be incongruous, and hence any mention of a particular result accruing to the Master of the House would be meaningless ;—and yet, we do find such a particular result mentioned ;—from this also we conclude that several persons should perform the *Sattra*-sacrifice.

Adhikaraṇa (15): *At the Sattra, the 'Sacrificers' themselves act as 'Priests'.*

SŪTRA (51).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Others should be the Priests, as at the Archetype."

Bhāṣya.

Sattras are the subject-matter of consideration here also.—It has been explained that it is performed by several Sacrificers.

The question that arises is.—Are the sacrificers of the *Sattra* themselves to act as 'Priests'? Or are others to be secured?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"Other persons should be secured as *Priests*.—Why?—At the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, which is the Archetype of *Sattras*, it has been declared that other persons should be secured as performers (priests); similarly in the case in question also, when the Sacrificers are performing the sacrifice, they should, in accordance with the General Law, secure other persons; it is only thus that the performance would be 'like the Archetype'".

SŪTRA (52).

[Siddhānta]—In fact, the sacrificers themselves should be the 'Priests'; because of the connection of the Priests' names; hence the character of 'Sacrificer' belongs to the priests.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that other persons should be secured as 'priests'; *in fact, the Sacrificers themselves should be the Priests.*—"Why?"—*Because of the connection of the Priests' names*; the embellishment of Initiation, which is done for the Sacrificer only, has been laid down in connection with the names of the priests, *Adhvaryu* and the rest, which are all based upon the performance of certain functions; which shows that the Sacrificers are connected with the functions of the *Adhvarya* and other priests.—"How so?"—It is only when they perform these functions that they can be referred to by names based upon those functions,—not otherwise; from this we conclude that they are actually connected with those functions.

"What is that text where the Initiation is spoken of?"

It is thus—'*Adhvaryurgṛhapatim dīkṣayitvā brahmāṇam dīkṣayati, tato hotāram, tata udgātāram*', and so on all the priests become connected with *Initiation*.—From this it follows that the Sacrificers themselves—and none others—should perform the Priestly Functions.

SŪTRA (53).

"THE EMBELLISHMENT WILL BE OF THE PERFORMER, ON THE STRENGTH OF THE DECLARATION,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE INSTALLER",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

The Opponent may argue as follows:—"It is not right that the *Sacrificers* should be the *Priests*; because at the Archetype, the *Priests* are declared to be other than the *Sacrificer*; hence, as at the Archetype, so in the case in question also, the *Priests* should be other than the Sacrificers. It is the same *Pūrvapakṣa* view that is reiterated. Only it is necessary to refute the *Siddhānta* view. It is this refutation that is set forth in the *Sūtra*—*The Embellishment will be of the Performer, on the strength of the Declaration, as in the case of the Installer*;—How so?—All that we read in the Text is—'The *Adhvaryu*, having initiated the Master of the House, initiates the Brahman-priest';—even if the *Performers* (of the priestly functions) are other than the Master, the text may be taken as laying down the embellishment of Initiation for those Performers, mentioning these latter by their names ('*brahman*' and the rest); and there would be nothing incongruous in this;—as it would be *as in the case of the Installer*;—i.e. it would be like the case of Fire-installation, in connection with which the Embellishment of the Performers has been laid down, in the following text—'One who is going to instal the Fire on the following day should keep an observance during the night,—he should not eat meat, nor approach his wife',—here the declaration enjoins an observance for the *Adhvaryu*;—or again, in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read 'all the Priests keep a fast',—where *fasting* has been laid down for the *Priests*;—in the same manner, in the case in question also, the Embellishment spoken of should be taken to be that of the *Priests*."

SŪTRA (54).

WHEN THERE IS A DOUBT, IT SHOULD BE AS DETERMINED BY REASON; AS AT THE ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the *Priests* should be other than the *Sacrificers*; in fact, the *Sacrificers* themselves should be the *Priests*.—"Why?"—When there is a doubt as to whether the same persons who are the *Sacrificers* should be the *Priests*, or these should be different from them,—the reasonable course is that those same should be the *Priests*; the reason for this has been explained already above, under Sū. 52; from what has been said under that *Sūtra*, we conclude that those same should be the *Priests*.

It has been argued that "the Embellishment shall be of the *Priests*, as at the Installation".—But that is not right. "Why?"—When the Embellishment (Initiation) has been laid down in connection with the *Sattra*,

it may be taken, either as enjoined for the Priests and serving no useful purpose in connection with the Archetype,—or as serving the same purposes as at the Archetype, but mentioned in the text as laying down the order of the Initiation, in view of the fact that there are several *Sacrificers*. Between these two alternatives, it is much simpler to take it as describing what is already known to be admissible (under the General Law; i.e. the latter alternative), because in that case the text lays down only the *order* (of the Initiation); while if the Embellishment were for the *Priests*, it would be necessary to assume an unseen (transcendental) factor, and to take the text as laying down several factors. Hence the right course is to take it as describing what is already admissible under the General Law, and not as laying down anything not already known.

It has been argued that—" Just as there is the injunction for the *Priests* to keep fast, or for the *Fire-installer* to keep an observance,—so in the case in question also, (it should be an injunction of the Initiation of the *Priest*) ".—But in those cases it is only right that it should be so, as there are the distinct declarations—' The *Priests* keep fast ', ' He should keep an observance during that night ';—in these cases what is laid down is something new, and hence there can be no suspicion of its being already known; hence the texts are taken as *Injunctions*.

SŪTRA (55).

" THE NAMES MAY BE TAKEN AS THOSE OF THE MASTER, LIKE THE NAME ' GṚHAPATI ' ",—IF THIS IS URGED, [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* embodies an objection (against the *Siddhānta*)—" Why cannot the term ' *Adhvaryu* ' and the rest be taken as names of the Master, like the term ' *gṛhapati* ' ?—' What would be the effect of this ? '—The effect of this would be that the fact of the priestly functions being performed by persons other than the *Sacrificer*,—which is what is admissible under the General Law—would not have to be set aside, and at the same time, the names ' *Adhvaryu* ' and the rest would come useful as standing for the *Sacrificer*,—just like the name ' *Gṛhapati* ' ".

The objection thus set forth is answered in the following *Sūtra*.—

SŪTRA (56).

THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE THAT ALONE SHOULD BE ACCEPTED WHICH IS WELL-KNOWN; THE OTHER NAME IS APPLICABLE TO ONE WHO IS NOT ENDOWED WITH THAT CHARACTER.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the names ' *Adhvaryu* ' and the rest should be taken as standing for the *Sacrificer*,—like the name ' *Gṛhapati* '.—" Why ? "—

Because that alone should be accepted which is well-known; as a matter of fact, these names are well-known as applicable, on the basis of the functions performed, to persons performing the functions of the *Adhvaryu* and other Priests,—not to those performing the functions of the *Sacrificer*; hence it is not right or possible that they would be applicable to the *Sacrificers* who have no connection with the priestly functions.—" But how about the name '*Gṛhapati*'?"—The answer to that is that the name '*Gṛhapati*' (Master of the House) applies to the Master who has no connection with the priestly functions. Further, even etymologically the term '*gṛhapati*' is expressive of the *Pati* (Master); and hence it would be only right that it should be a name of the *Sacrificer*. In fact, even in connection with the Archetype, this term has been used in that sense, in the text '*gṛhapatiryajēta*' ('The Master of the House should sacrifice'). As for the terms '*Adhvaryu*' and the rest, on the other hand, which are related to the functions of the Priests, they cannot, in any way, be applicable to the Master; hence, on account of their being connected with other functions, they are taken as different.

Further, if they were equal, then the specific mention of 'several' would be meaningless.

For the following reason also, the *Sacrificers* themselves should perform the priestly functions.—" For what reason?"—Says the text—'*Yo vai bahūnām yajamānānām gṛhapatiḥ sattrasya pratyētā sa hi bhūyiṣṭhām ṛddhimārdhnoti*' ['Among the several Sacrificers, the one Master of the House who is the propounder of the *Sattra* secures the highest prosperity'];—the very specific mention of one *Sacrificer*, by the term '*gṛhapati*', can be explained only if all the *Sacrificers* do not stand on the same footing,—not otherwise; if all of them were to perform the functions of the Sacrificer, and did no other work, then, in that case, there would be no distinction among them; so that there would be no justification for the specific mention of one of them. If, however, the other *Sacrificers* perform both functions—those of the *Sacrificer* as well as those of the *Priests*—while the Master of the House performs those of the *Sacrificer* only,—then, in that case, the specific mention (of the latter) is right and proper. From the said specific mention, therefore, it follows that the *Sacrificers* themselves are Priests.

SŪTRA (57).

THE MENTION OF THE 'INITIATED' AND THE 'UNINITIATED' ALSO IS NOT EXPLICABLE; AS THE FACTS ARE ALWAYS THERE.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also *Sattras* are performed by the *Sacrificers* themselves.—" For what reason?"—Because there is mention of the 'initiated' and the 'uninitiated'; the text says—'The *initiated* perform the *Sattra*-sacrifice, the *uninitiated* perform the *Ahīna*-sacrifice';—the two facts are always there—that those who are *initiated* perform sacrifices for their own sake alone, while those who are *uninitiated* perform sacrifices also for the sake of another sacrificer'; if, as regards these two facts, there were

no difference between the *Sattra* and the *Ahīna*,—then there would be no sense in the assertion made in the text quoted ; on the other hand, if there is this distinction between the two that at the *Sattra* all the acts are done by the *initiated* (sacrificer) only, while at the *Ahīna* they are done by the *uninitiated* (priests), then the said assertion becomes explicable, not otherwise. Hence from the said assertion we conclude that at the *Sattra* all the functions are performed by the *Sacrificers* themselves.

SŪTRA (58).

Also because there is no Sacrificial Fee.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the *Sattra* should be performed by the *Sacrificers* themselves.—"For what reason ?"—*Because there is no Sacrificial Fee* ; they say that at *Sattras*, there is no Sacrificial Fee ; 'there is no *cow*, or *cloth* or *gold* given at it', says the text ; this declaration of the absence of the Sacrificial Fee is possible only if the priestly functions are performed by the Sacrificers themselves ; not otherwise ; if they were performed by others, then it would be impossible that there should be no Sacrificial Fee ; no one ever takes up any activity for the sake of another person, unless there is some purpose of his own.—From this also it follows that *Sattras* are performed by the *Sacrificers* themselves.

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *Difference between 'Sattra' and 'Ahīna'.*

SŪTRA (59).

TO THE DVĀDASHĀHA BELONGS THE CHARACTER OF 'SATTRA', (*a*) WHEN THE INJUNCTION IS OF 'SITTING' AND 'PROCEEDING', AND (*b*) WHEN THERE IS A PLURALITY OF SACRIFICERS;—THESE BEING ASSOCIATED WITH THE NAME 'SATTRA'.

Bhāṣya.

The *Dvādashāha* is the subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa.*

It has been explained above that the *Dvādashāha* is a *Sattra* and also an *Ahīna*; of these two forms of the *Dvādashāha*, the definition is provided now—'when the *Dvādashāha* has such and such characteristics, it is *Sattra*,—and when it has such other characteristics it is *Ahīna*'.—In order to understand this distinction, it is explained that—(*a*) when there is injunction of 'sitting' and 'proceeding', and (*b*) when there is plurality of Sacrificers, it should be regarded as *Sattra*; as a matter of fact, the two injunctions in the form of '*āsatē*' ('they sit at') and '*upayanti*' ('they proceed') are always found to be associated with the name '*Sattra*', in such texts as—(*a*) 'Those who knowing thus *sit at the Sattra*', and (*b*) 'Those who knowing thus, *proceed to the Sattra*';—the name is also associated with *the plurality of sacrificers*, in such texts as—"The number of persons *sitting at the Sattra* should not be more than *twenty-four*, nor less than *seventeen*'; so that of two things thus associated, when one is found, it brings the other to the mind.

SŪTRA (60).

TO IT BELONGS THE CHARACTER OF 'AHĪNA', (*a*) WHEN THE INJUNCTION IS OF 'SACRIFICING', AND (*b*) WHEN THERE IS NO RESTRICTION REGARDING THE NUMBER OF 'MASTERS'.

Bhāṣya.

Question—"When is the *Dvādashāha* an '*Ahīna*'?"

Answer—(*a*) When there is injunction of 'sacrificing', and (*b*) when the number of Sacrificers is not restricted,—then it is understood to be *Ahīna*. As a matter of fact, *Ahīnas* are invariably enjoined by means of the root '*yaja*' ('to sacrifice'), as in the text—'*Dvirātrēṇa yajēta*'. The number of Sacrificers, also at these is not restricted; while that of the Sacrificers at the *Sattra* is restricted—that they must be *many*.

The purpose served by the definition of things defined lies in itself, and no other purpose need be sought for.

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *At the 'Pauṇḍarīka' sacrifice, the Sacrificial Fee should be given only once.*

SŪTRA (61).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AT THE 'AHĪNA', THE RULE REGARDING THE SACRIFICIAL FEE SHOULD VARY DAY BY DAY, BECAUSE IT IS AN ACCESSORY DETAIL, AND EACH DAILY PERFORMANCE IS DISTINCT BY ITSELF.

Bhāṣya.

There is the Pauṇḍarīka sacrifice lasting for eleven days, laid down in the text—'*Pauṇḍarīkēṇa ēkādasharātrēṇa svārājyakāmo yajēta*' ['Desiring sovereignty of heaven, one should perform the *Pauṇḍarīka* sacrifice lasting for eleven days']; in connection with that sacrifice, we read—'At the *Pauṇḍarīka* one should give ten thousand,—a thousand horses on the eleventh'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are the 'Ten Thousand' and the 'Thousand Horses' to be given every day (of the eleven days)? Or are they to be given only once?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*At the Ahīna, the rule regarding the Sacrificial Fee should vary day by day.*—Why?—Because the Sacrificial Fee is an accessory detail, and the 'days' (constituting the *Pauṇḍarīka* sacrifice) are the principal factor; and when the Fee has been laid down through the name of the *Composite* whole ('*Pauṇḍarīka*), it is with reference to the 'Days' composing that sacrifice; and when a subordinate detail is thus laid down, it must differ with each one of the 'principal factors' in the shape of the components of that composite;—just as, when *Bathing* or *Smearing of Sandal-paste* is laid down for a group of men, it is done by each member of the group;—so should it be in the case in question. In this way, the General Law also becomes followed, as it applies to each individual Rite; and the excess of the Fee would tend to the excess of the Reward (obtained by means of the Sacrifice).—From all this it follows that there should be a distinct fee given on each day."

SŪTRA (62).

[*Objection against Pūrvapakṣa*]—BUT THE WHOLE IS ONE RITE [HENCE THERE SHOULD BE ONLY ONE FEE].

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that there should be a distinct fee for each day; as a matter of fact, the 'Ten Thousand (Cows)' and the 'Thousand (Horses)' should be given only once.—Why?—*Because the whole is a single Rite*; there is one purpose to be served by the Fees,—viz. the securing of the

services of the Priests; these services having been secured for the accomplishment of the entire sacrifice with all its subsidiaries and details,—there can be no need for the same in course of the performance of that sacrifice; and hence it is not done over again.—The argument that "an excess in the accessory detail (Fee) will be conducive to excess in the reward",—this is so only when the fact of a certain thing being an accessory detail has been duly recognised, not otherwise;—and the Fee is an accessory of the entire composite sacrifice, not of each of its components;—as has been explained already.—It has been argued that—"The General Law appertains to each individual rite and hence indicates the admissibility of the details at each".—But the General Law becomes set aside when it is found that on the basis of the direct declaration the Sacrificial Fee is taken as enjoined with reference to the entire sacrifice regarded as one composite whole. Hence there is no incongruity at all.

SŪTRA (63).

[*The Pūrvapakṣin's answer to the above objection*]—"THE INJUNCTION OF THE ACCESSORY DETAIL SHOULD PERTAIN TO EACH OF THE 'DAYS', LIKE THE 'PṚṢADĀJYA'."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not right that the Fee should be given only once; in fact, it has to be given several times.—Why?—What is laid down in the text in question is a peculiar feature of the Fees that are already known as to be given day by day; and as such, that feature has also to be adopted day by day;—*like the Pṛṣadājya* (Mixed Clarified Butter); just as in the case of the text, 'Offers the *Anuyājas* with Mixed Clarified Butter', the 'mixed' character of the Butter, which is a peculiar feature laid down in connection with the *Anuyājas*, is taken as referring to each one of the *Anuyājas* separately; so should it be in the case in question also."

SŪTRA (64).

[*Another objection against the Pūrvapakṣa*]—THE FEES CONNECTED WITH THE JYOTIṢṬOMA APPERTAIN TO ALL, AS ALL CONSTITUTE A SINGLE ACT; HENCE, AS AT THE ARCHETYPE, THERE SHOULD BE NO MODIFICATION IN THE MATTER OF THE FEES.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that there should be a separate Fee on each day; in fact, it should be given once only as common to all 'days'.—"How so?"—As a matter of fact, *the Fees connected with the Jyotiṣṭoma* are given as appertaining to the whole set of acts (that go to make up that sacrifice); and all these Fees, which are for the purpose of securing the services of the Priests at the Composite Sacrifice, are admissible (according to the General

Law) at the *Pauṇḍarīka*; it is in reference to the Fees thus admissible that the text in question lays down the peculiar feature that the Fee should be 'ten thousand (Cows) and one thousand (horses)';—when this peculiar feature is thus laid down, it leads us to the conclusion that it is in modification of all those Fees that are given at the sacrifice (under the General Law); but it does not set aside the notion that the *securing of services* is done once only. From this it follows that it is to be given only once.—As for the instance of the *Anuyājas* that has been cited,—it is only right in the case of the *Anuyājas*, as it is a distinct substance (*Mixed Clarified Butter* in place of *Clarified Butter*) that is laid down; a substance is always laid down as an accessory of the sacrifice; so that when the Sacrifices are different, the substance used at one sacrifice does not help the other; hence it has to be used separately with each. In the case in question however there is only one *securing of services* (for the entire sacrifice, which is one composite whole), as already explained; hence there can be no analogy between the two cases.

SŪTRA (65).

[*Pūrvapakṣin's answer to the second objection*]—"AT THE DVĀDASHĀHA THERE IS A SEPARATE FEE GIVEN ON EACH DAY, ON THE STRENGTH OF A DIRECT DECLARATION; AT OTHER SACRIFICES ALSO, WHICH HAVE THAT FOR THEIR ARCHETYPE, THERE SHOULD BE A MODIFICATION IN THE NUMBER OF FEES."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not right that the Fee should be given once: in fact, the particular Fee that is laid down should be given separately day by day.—Why?—Because in connection with the *Dvādashāha*, there is the direct Declaration to the effect that 'one gives 1200 every day';—the *Pauṇḍarīka* sacrifice has the *Dvādashāha* for its archetype;—hence under the General Law the Fees become payable every day; and in regard to these the text in question lays down the peculiar feature (that it should be 'ten thousand (cows) and one thousand (horses)';—so that it follows that this feature is in modification of those same Fees that are connected with each part of the sacrifice;—consequently this peculiar feature of the Fees has to be adopted separately (on each day)."

SŪTRA (66).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO SEPARATE 'SECURING OF SERVICES', THE MODIFICATION SHOULD BE THAT OF THE WHOLE.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that there should be separate Fees on each day; in fact, the Fee is given only once.—"Why?"—Because *there is no separate*

'*securing of services*', therefore, it is the whole Fee that should be modified. It is in reference to the Sacrifice as a whole that Fees are prescribed.—"How so ?"—Because that is what is needed by the man ; the man wishes to do that alone which is fruitful ;—when the man proceeds to do any such act and is on the look out for assistance,—it is for that occasion that the text lays down the 'hiring' (of priests) ;—now, as a matter of fact, no single component part of a sacrifice is fruitful,—the fruit following from the sacrifice as a whole ;—so that, when the 'hiring' has been done with reference to the whole sacrifice, it should continue till the accomplishment of the whole ; so that there can be no 'hiring' during the intervals of the sacrifice.

Further, when the peculiar feature of the Fee has been enjoined in connection with the name '*Pauṇḍarīka*', it follows that it appertains to that sacrifice which is denoted by that term ;—it is the whole sacrifice, and not any part of it, that is denoted by the term '*Pauṇḍarīka*' ; the part is only indirectly indicated by the whole. Thus the *Pūrvapakṣa* view involves the incongruity of recourse to *indirect indication* ; such indirect interpretation is accepted only when there is no other way possible ;—in the case in question however, it is not that no other way is possible ;—hence the only right course is that the Priests should be appointed only once, with reference to the whole sacrifice ; thus the 'securing of services' being done only once.

Lastly, if the Fee is given only once,—(*a*) the declaration of the entire procedure becomes duly followed,—(*b*) and the entire performance becomes expedited, and the scripture comes to embrace a vast sphere of activity Hence this is the most reasonable course.

SŪTRA (67).

THERE CAN BE DIFFERENCE ONLY WHEN THERE IS A (DIFFERENT) ACCESSORY.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—"Inasmuch as the *Pauṇḍarīka* has the *Dvādashāha* for its archetype,—and at the *Dvādashāha* there are distinct Fees given on each day,—the peculiar feature laid down in connection with the *Pauṇḍarīka* should be taken as pertaining to the said distinct Fees given on each day".—This has to be refuted. Our answer to this is as follows :— At the *Dvādashāha* also, the whole sacrifice being one, there is only one 'hiring of services' ; as for the difference (in the Fees), that is based upon direct Declaration to that effect,—being due to the connection of the *Sūtyā* and also to the idea of 'embellishing' the Fee : this diversity therefore does not make a diversity in the 'hiring of services'.

ADHIKARAṆA (18): *At the Pauṇḍarīka all the 'Fees' should be 'carried' in instalments.*

SŪTRA (68).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"EACH DAY THERE SHOULD BE EMBELLISHMENT OF ALL, AS AT THE ARCHETYPE; BECAUSE THE FEE IS AUXILIARY TO ALL."

Bhāṣya.

The same *Pauṇḍarīka* is the subject-matter for discussion again.—It has been understood that the 'hiring of services' is to be done only once. In connection with the Archetype, it has been laid down that 'At the Mid-day Extraction, the Fees are carried up'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—(*a*) Should the entire Fee be *carried up* each day?—(or) should it all be *carried up* only once?—or (*c*) should it be carried up (each day) in instalments?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* (A) is as follows:—"*Each day there should be embellishment of all*;—why?—*as at the Archetype*; at the Archetype, the entire Fee is embellished at the stated time; hence here also the whole of it should be embellished.—How so?—The 'Days' are the predominant factor, and the Fees are subordinate to them; hence the entire 'Fee' is auxiliary to all the 'Days';—and the embellishment of the auxiliary therefore becomes necessary on each of the 'days'; hence it follows that the whole Fee should be embellished each day."

SŪTRA (69).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"INASMUCH AS THERE IS ONLY ONE PURPOSE TO BE SERVED, IT CANNOT BE AS STATED."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not right that each day there should be embellishment of the entire Fee; in fact, there should be embellishment only once;—why?—because there is only one purpose to be served by the Fees,—that purpose being the 'securing of services';—these Fees are to be given after they have been duly 'embellished' by having passed through all such embellishments as 'carrying up' and the like;—and when, after being thus embellished, they have been given away on one day, the injunction has been duly fulfilled and there would be no need for any further embellishment. Hence it follows that the Fees should be embellished (by being 'carried up') only once."

SŪTRA (70).

[*Pūrvapakṣa (B)—refuted*]—IT SHOULD BE (EVERY DAY); BECAUSE IN THEIR VERY ORIGIN, THERE IS DIFFERENCE OF TIME.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the embellishment should be done only once; in fact, it should be done every day.—Why?—*Because in their very origin, there is difference of time*; in their originative injunction the Fees are found to be connected with particular points of time.—For instance, it is declared that—'The Fees are carried out during the Mid-day extraction, in the regions of the *Triṣṭup*'. As a matter of fact, all the Fees are auxiliary to all the 'days';—the 'Mid-day Extractions' of the several 'days' are different from one another; and inasmuch as no further distinction is recognised,—if the Fees were not embellished during the Mid-day Extraction of any 'day', then, so far as that 'day' is concerned, the Fees would have had no embellishment at all; as the actions on the different 'days' are different, and hence those that have been embellished on one 'day' could not be regarded as embellished in connection with another. Hence it follows that they have to be embellished separately.

SŪTRA (71).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT SHOULD BE DONE IN INSTALMENTS, BECAUSE THERE IS A DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT;—AS AT THE DVĀDASHĀHA.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that all the Fees should be embellished together on every day; in fact, they should be embellished *in instalments*.—Why?—Because there is a declaration to that effect; at the *Dvādashāha*, the 'carrying out' and other embellishments are done every day, on account of a declaration to the effect that 'Each day one gives 1200';—the *Pauṇḍarīka* has the *Dvādashāha* for its archetype,—not the *Jyotiṣṭoma*;—hence even though the 'hiring of services' is one only, yet the embellishment should be done separately.

ADHIKARAṆA (19): *By the term 'Manu's Verses' only as many of those verses may be used as may be necessary for the purpose in view.*

SŪTRA (72).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN A THING IS SPOKEN OF BY ITS INDICATIVE MARK, THE IDEA SHOULD BE OF ALL THAT HAS THAT MARK, BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE INDICATIVE MARK IN ALL,—AS IN THE CASE OF 'ĀGNĒYA'."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with a certain Rite, we read—'*Manorṛchaḥ sāmidhēnyo bhavanti*' ['*Manu's Verses* are to be the *Sāmidhēnis*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are all those verses contained in the Tenth *Maṇḍala* which are marked by the presence of the term '*Manu*' to be brought together and used as *Sāmidhēni-verses*, in the kindling of Fire?—Or only a few of them are to be so used, not all?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"All the verses marked by the presence of the term '*Manu*' are to be used.—Why?—*Because the indicative mark is present in all*; all that we find in the text is that '*Manu's verses* are to be the *Sāmidhēnis*'; hence the presence of the term '*Manu*' is the only indicative feature of the verses that have to be brought together; and when the text indicates the verses with the presence of the term '*Manu*', it must be taken as indicating without distinction as many verses as might contain that term;—and all that the injunctive text lays down is the use of certain verses solely on the basis of that indicative mark, and it does not mean to mark off only a few selected ones. Hence all the verses containing the said indicative mark should be brought together;—*as in the case of* '*āgnēya*';—in connection with the annual placing of the *Ṛjīṣas* with the '*āgnēya*',—where we have the declaration '*āsūta sūktēna sūktasya avichchhēdāya*' ['It should be so done that there may be no disjunction of one hymn from another'], and the hymn meant is the '*āgnēya*',—and the bricks are laid with *all* those hymns of the Tenth *Maṇḍala* that contain the term '*agnī*'; similarly, in the case in question also, the purpose of *Sāmidhēnī* is to be served by means of all those verses that contain the term '*Manu*'.—Or again, just as in the case of the *Ahargaṇa*, —when it is laid down that the 'Ṛjīṣa is thrown into water',—what is thrown into water is the *Ṛjīṣa* of everyone of the 'Days', without distinction;—similarly, in the case in question also, all the verses with the term '*Manu*' should be taken up."

SŪTRA (73).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, AS MANY ALONE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS MAY BE NECESSARY; BECAUSE THEY ARE SUBSERVIENT TO THE MAIN PURPOSE; AND THE PURPOSE MAY BE SERVED BY A FEWER NUMBER; TO THAT EXTENT ALONE LIES THE FORCE OF THE INDICATIVE MARK.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that all the verses of the Tenth *Maṇḍala* that contain the term '*Manu*' should be brought together; in fact, only as many should be brought in *as may be necessary.*—"Why?"—*Because they are subservient to the main purpose*; the *Sāmidhēnī* verses are taken up only with a view to accomplish the purpose in view;—and that purpose is served by only a few verses; so that the purpose in view having been accomplished,—even though there might be other verses containing the indicative mark in question, yet they are not to be taken up, simply because there is no need for them.

Says the Opponent—"Whether or not a certain thing is subservient to a purpose depends upon scriptural texts;—in the present instance, certain verses indicated by a definite mark have been laid down as to be used as *Sāmidhēnī*; so that it must be taken as an injunction of the use of *all* those verses that contain that mark."

The answer to this is as follows:—It is true that in all cases the subservient character of a thing depends upon scriptural texts; but as a matter of fact, in the case in question it is not the *Sāmidhēnis* that have been enjoined by the text in question; what it does is to mention the peculiarity—that they should be '*Manu's* verses'—of those *Sāmidhēnis* which, under well-defined limits, are already admissible at the sacrifice under the General Law. This peculiar feature, thus mentioned, qualifies only those *Sāmidhēnis* that had come in by virtue of the General Law, and having qualified these, it has its purpose fully served and therefore rests there; so that there is no possibility of any more verses containing the indicative term '*Manu*' coming in than the number that are admissible under the General Law (which number is *Fifteen* only). Hence out of the verses that contain the indicative mark only a few are to be taken up, not all.—Nor can it be right to repeat the principal act (sacrifice) for the sake of the subservient factor, for the purpose of affording an opportunity for the coming in of the other verses containing the indicative mark.—By selecting only a few of the verses the performance would become simpler and more expeditiously finished.

Further, the indicative mark itself favours this same view.—"How so?"—The indicative mark has been mentioned as a qualification for the *Sāmidhēnis*; so that, even though all the verses containing that mark may not be taken up,—yet if only those are admitted that have that mark, not any verses having other marks,—even so the indicative mark becomes duly honoured, not ignored.

From all this it follows that only so many verses are to be taken up as are necessary, not all.

SŪTRA (74).

AS REGARDS THE 'ĀGNĒYA', THERE IS INJUNCTION OF ALL.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—"just as in the case of the text 'one lays the bricks with *Āgnēya* hymns', *all* those hymns are used that have that indicative mark, not only a few,—so should it be in the present case also".—This has got to be refuted. The answer to this is as follows—In the case of the '*Āgnēya*', it is only right that all should be used.—"Why?"—(*a*) Because there are in that case, many bricks;—(*b*) because with each hymn we have the term 'lays'; so that, when there are many bricks to be laid, and the number of hymns is less than that of the bricks, there can be no incongruity in the use of all the hymns. In the case in question however, the peculiar feature laid down is with regard to verses whose number is well-defined [*fifteen* only; hence it would be highly incongruous to use more than *fifteen* verses; and the number of verses containing the term '*manu*' is very much larger than *fifteen*]; so that the reason put forward becomes annulled. The analogy cited, therefore, is not correct.

SŪTRA (75).

INASMUCH AS THE 'ṚJĪṢA' IS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR, IT IS ONLY RIGHT THAT THE WHOLE OF IT SHOULD BE DISPOSED OF.

Bhāṣya.

The other argument urged is that—"Just as at the *Ahargaṇa*, the entire *Ṛjīṣa* is thrown into the water, so here also all the verses should be used without any distinction".—This has got to be refuted. The answer to this is as follows:—*Inasmuch as the 'Ṛjīṣa' is the principal factor*, it is only right to take the text as laying down the disposal of the whole *Ṛjīṣa*, without any distinction; the disposal, in this case, should be done to the whole *Ṛjīṣa*; if it were not done to any part of it, that part of it would be bereft of its embellishment; hence that *Ṛjīṣa* which is connected with all the 'Days' should be thrown in its entirety. In the case in question however, what is laid down is subservient to the purpose in view; hence the reason put forward becomes annulled; and the analogy of the *Ṛjīṣa* that has been cited is not correct.

ADHIKARAṆA (20): *The 'Māna' (Measuring) and the 'Upāvaharaṇa' (Gathering up) are to be done on a piece of cloth.*

SŪTRA (76).

THE 'MEASURING' AND THE 'GATHERING UP' OF THE SOMA SHOULD BE DONE, AT THE ARCHETYPE, ON A PIECE OF CLOTH,—ON THE STRENGTH OF THE DIRECT DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma,* the 'measuring' and 'gathering up' (of Soma) have been laid down.

In regard to this there arises the question—May this 'measuring' be done on anything, and the 'gathering up' done by anything, without restriction? Or should the 'measuring' be done on a *piece of cloth* and the 'gathering up' also by the *piece of cloth*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"The 'measuring' and the 'gathering up' may be done on and by anything that may be suitable for the purpose; this absence of restriction making things simpler and expediting the performance".

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The 'measuring' should be done on a piece of cloth, and the 'gathering up' also should be done by a piece of cloth.—"Why?"—*On the strength of the Direct Declaration*; there is the Direct Declaration to the effect that 'one measures on a piece of cloth, and gathers up by a piece of cloth'; and on the strength of this declaration, both are restricted (to the *Piece of Cloth*).

Or, there can be no occasion for the question to arise at all, when there is a clear declaration to the effect that the 'measuring' and the 'gathering up' are to be done on and by a piece of cloth. The explanation of the *Sūtra* is that it sets forth this well-ascertained fact, for the purpose of raising the further discussion (in the next *Adhikaraṇa*); and where something is stated only as introductory to a further discussion, there is no need for stating the '*Pūrvapakṣa*' or the '*Siddhānta*'.

ADHIKARAṆA (21): *At the 'Ahargaṇa', it is necessary to secure another piece of cloth.*

SŪTRA (77).

AT THE 'AHARGAṆA', THERE SHOULD BE SECURING OF (ANOTHER) PIECE OF CLOTH,—ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING NEED FOR IT.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Dvādashāha* sacrifice; the 'gathering up' of *Soma* has to be done at it, in accordance with the General Law, as laid down in the text 'Gather it up by a piece of cloth'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—For the purpose of this 'gathering up', should a separate piece of cloth be secured (for each 'day') or not ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—"It hould uot be so secured;—why ?—because there is no declaration to the effect that 'another piece of cloth should be brought in'; and in the absence of any such declaration, we do not recognise the necessity of bringing up a separate piece of cloth; hence no separate piece of cloth should be brought in".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*At the 'Ahargaṇa'*, another piece of cloth should be brought in, *because there is need for it*; as there are several 'days' in the '*Ahargaṇa*'; and 'the gathering up by a piece of cloth' is to be done on each of those days, under the General Law; so that if a separate piece of cloth were not brought in every day, the 'gathering up' would not be accomplished. Hence a separate piece of cloth should be brought in every day.

ADHIKARAṆA (22): *The separate piece of cloth is to be secured only for the 'Gathering up'.*

SŪTRA (78).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IT SHOULD BE SECURED WITH A VIEW TO THE 'MEASURING', BECAUSE AT THE ARCHETYPE, THE 'GATHERING UP' IS FOUND TO BE DONE BY THAT SAME PIECE OF CLOTH."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the same '*Ahargaṇa*', we are considering a further question. It has been explained that a separate piece of cloth is to be secured as there is need for it.—The question that arises now is—Is the piece of cloth to be secured with a view to the 'Measuring'? Or with a view to the 'Gathering up'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"It should be secured with a view to the 'measuring';—why?—*because at the Archetype the 'Gathering up' is found to be done with that same piece of cloth*;—at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we find that the 'gathering up' is done by that same piece of cloth in which the 'measuring' has been done;—and at the Ectype things have to be done as at the Archetype, according to the General Law;—hence the piece of cloth should be brought in at the time of the 'measuring'."

SŪTRA (79).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT SHOULD, IN REALITY, BE SECURED WITH A VIEW TO THE 'GATHERING UP'; AS THERE IS NO DIRECT DECLARATION; AT THE ECTYPE, IT HAS TO BE DONE BY A SEPARATE PIECE AS THERE IS ACTUAL NEED FOR IT.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that it should be secured with a view to the 'measuring'; in fact, it should be secured for the 'gathering up'.—"Why?"—*Because there is no Direct Declaration*; we do not find it declared anywhere that the piece of cloth should be brought in for the '*measuring*'; and in the absence of any such declaration, we cannot be certain that it *must* be done for the 'measuring' alone. When a certain thing is used for a definite purpose, it is only right that, being needed for that purpose, it should be brought in at the time that it is needed, not at any other time; in the case in question, the need for a fresh piece of cloth arises at the time of the 'gathering up'; and hence the right course is that it should be secured for, and at the time of, the 'gathering up'.

It has been argued that—" At the Archetype that same piece of cloth is used for the *gathering up* which has been used for the *measuring,*—and hence, according to the General Law, the fresh piece of cloth should be brought in at the time of the *measuring* ".—This has to be refuted; and our answer to this is as follows:—There is no such declaration as that 'the *gathering up* should be done by that same piece of cloth on which the *measuring* has been done'; it is done so at the Archetype only because there is need for it and it can be so done, because the 'Day' is only one; so that the piece of cloth not being otherwise engaged, it is used for the 'gathering up' also;—what is done only by reason of the needs of the situation cannot be applied elsewhere under the General Law,—as it is something not amenable to verbal authority. Further, in the case in question, there being several 'days', the same piece of cloth could not possibly be used for both the purposes.—From all this it follows that the fresh piece of cloth should be brought in at the time of 'gathering up'.

End of Pāda vi of Adhyāya X.

ADHYĀYA X.

PĀDA VII.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *At the Jyotiṣṭoma, each limb of the animal forms a distinct offering.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE ANIMAL SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A SINGLE 'OFFERING', BECAUSE THE WHOLE OF IT HAS BEEN ENJOINED."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the Animal *Agniṣomiya* (dedicated to *Agni-Soma*) has been enjoined—'Who, being initiated, sacrifices the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does the whole animal form one 'offering'? Or is each limb of it a distinct 'offering'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"The whole animal forms a single 'offering'.—Why?—*Because the whole of it has been enjoined*; it is the whole animal that has been enjoined as to be offered to *Agni-Soma*,—each of its limbs is not 'what is *dedicated to Agni-Soma*'; hence what should be done is that out of the substance in the shape of the animal, slices should be offered to *Agni-Soma*. If the limbs were to be treated as 'offering', then it would be necessary to take the term 'animal' as figuratively indicating the *limbs*.—From all this it follows that the whole animal forms a single 'offering'.—This is also indicated by the following text—'*Atho khalvāhuḥ kāpēyā dakṣiṇasya pūrvam padasyāvadēyam tat sarvasya pashoravattam bhavati; atho khalvāhuḥ gopāyanā dakṣiṇasya pūrvam padasyāvadēyam tat sarvasya pashoravattam bhavati*'; what is said here ('*sarvasya pashoravattam bhavati*') shows that the whole animal forms a single offering.—From this also it follows that the whole animal forms a single 'offering'."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, EACH LIMB FORMS AN OFFERING; BECAUSE EACH HAS BEEN ASSIGNED SEPARATELY,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE CUP.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

It is not right that the whole animal forms a single 'offering'; as a matter of fact, each limb is a distinct offering.—Why?—*Because each has been assigned separately*; each limb has been separately assigned by means

of such texts as—'First of all, he slices out of the heart, then the tongue, the chest, the arms, the sides, the arms'; where the *slicing* laid down is out of various substances in the shape of the *Heart* and the rest. This cannot be possible unless the animal is cut up; hence it follows that for the purpose of getting at the *Heart* and other limbs, the animal has to be cut up; and when the animal has been cut up, the shape of the animal can no longer be there. Thus then, it comes to this—'When the sacrifice is being performed, one should help it by means of the substance in the shape of the animal,—but it is not possible to accomplish the sacrifice by bodily introducing the animal into it,—hence it is only indirectly that the animal's body can help the sacrifice,—consequently the 'offerings' are to consist of the Heart and other limbs forming parts of the substance in the shape of that animal,—and the offerings are to be made out of those limbs';—*as in the case of the 'Cup'*; for instance, in connection with the Soma-sacrifice, it is laid down 'Takes up the Cup dedicated to *Indra-Vaya*,—takes up the Cup dedicated to *Mitra-Varuṇa*,—takes up the Cup dedicated to the *Ashvins*',—where each *Cup* forms a distinct 'offering'; the 'offering' consisting of the *Soma-juice* in each Cup, not of the entire *Soma-creeper*; similarly in the case in question also (the offering consists of the parts of the animal, not the entire animal).

As for the 'injunction of the whole animal', this can be explained also on the basis of the limbs constituting the 'offering',—even so the whole animal forming the 'offering' indirectly through the limbs.

As for the indicative text that has been cited, that can be explained all the more easily on the basis of there being several 'offerings' consisting of the limbs.—How?—When it speaks of one slice helping the other, it shows that the whole of the animal is not meant to be sliced out as a single 'offering'.

Adhikaraṇa (2): *The Sacrifice is to be performed with the Heart and other specified particular limbs of the Animal.*

SŪTRA (3).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—" Inasmuch as each limb is a distinct offering, there should be repetition of the act; hence there should be 'offering' out of all the limbs."

Bhāṣya.

We have understood that each limb forms a distinct 'offering'.—The question that arises now is—Is the sacrifice to be accomplished by the offering of any one of the limbs? Or should offerings be made out of all the limbs? Or should there be specification—the offering being made out of a few specified limbs only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—" The offering should be made out of all the limbs,—hence the act of offering should be repeated.—Why?—*Because each limb is a distinct offering*; each of the limbs described in the text speaking of the 'slicings'—Heart, Tongue and the rest,—form so many distinct offerings; so also do the other limbs (not so mentioned) which become included indirectly, as forming parts of the animal's body; hence offerings should be made out of all these limbs. Some of them are specially characterised by the shape of the animal;—under the circumstances, if the offering were made out of any one limb only, all that is characterised by the shape of the animal would not become included; so that the 'shape of the animal' would not have been made an accessory of the sacrifice. The shape of the animal becomes such an accessory only when it characterises and qualifies a flesh-lump endowed with several qualifications,—not otherwise. If however all the limbs forming part of the animal's body were made a single offering, then the enjoined offering of the whole would be accomplished without the repetition of the act of offering. But when each limb is regarded as a distinct offering,—if one were to make the offering out of a single limb, one would naturally abandon some of the limbs; while if he were to repeat the act of offering, he would be able to take in all the limbs.—From all this it follows that offerings should be made out of all the limbs.

" Says the Opponent (to the *Pūrvapakṣa*)—' When all the particular parts of the body are meant to accomplish the sacrifice, then the sacrifice could be accomplished by means of any *one* of them'.

" The answer to this is as follows—The sacrifice may be accomplished; but the particular limbs have been spoken of as connected with the *sacrifice*; what is spoken of, however, as connected with the sacrifice is the *shape of the animal*; and this *shape of the animal* becomes an accessory of the sacrifice when the particular limbs are used; and it is for this reason that the declaration of the procedure speaks of the parts of the body; but it is

not ascertained what particular part is taken up and what not; consequently *all* come to be taken up for the purpose, by following what has been said in the declaration of procedure. If any particular part has not been taken up, it is assumed that even without that, the sacrifice is performed in accordance with the injunction; so that, having become qualified by the *shape of the animal*, nothing more is brought in; but in that case it would mean a disregard for this latter.—Hence we conclude that offerings should be made out of *all the limbs*,—the Heart and other specified ones, as also others not so specified."

SŪTRA (4).

[*Objection to Pūrvapakṣa*]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE SHOULD BE SPECIFICATION, BECAUSE OF THE SPECIFIC MENTION,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'ĀJYABHĀGA'.

Bhāṣya.

The offerings should be made out of the Heart and other specified limbs, not out of the rest.—Why?—*Because of their specific mention*; the Heart and other limbs have been specifically mentioned, in the passage beginning with 'These are the eleven offerings out of the animal'.—As regards the text in question, it cannot be taken as an injunction of these same offerings; as these are already known to be admissible under the General Law;—nor can it be taken as a mere reiteration, as such a reiteration would be useless; —the reiteration too is without any details;—all which shows that the text is meant to preclude those not mentioned (and to specify those mentioned). For instance, when it is said 'one should not go', or 'one should not eat', it is a clear prohibition; in the same way in a case of Preclusion and Specification also there is prohibition. *As in the case of the 'Ājyabhāga'*; as in connection with the *Gṛhamēdhīya*, it has been explained in *Adhyāya V*, that the mention of '*Ājyabhāga*' as one alternative serves the purpose of preclusion; the same should be the case in the present instance also.—Hence the text is to be taken as a preclusion and specification.

SŪTRA (5).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *reiterated*]—"IN FACT, WHAT THE SPECIFIC MENTION IS INTENDED TO DO IS TO DECLARE THE FACT OF THOSE SAME BEING 'DOUBLE OFFERINGS';—BECAUSE THE ANIMAL CONSTITUTES 'FIVE OFFERINGS'."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the view just set forth.

"It is not right that there is preclusion and specification; as this always involves three incongruities—(*a*) abandoning the natural meaning of the words, (*b*) assuming another meaning, and (*c*) rejecting of what is known to be admissible.—It has been argued that, on account of the specific mention, it should be so;—but that is not right; because *what the specific*

mention is intended to do is to declare the fact of those same,—Heart and the rest,—*being 'double offerings'*. The text in question does not mean that 'the offerings out of the animal are only eleven, not more, and that each of the offerings is offered twice'; what is meant is that 'of the eleven offerings each is offered twice'.—How so?—It is not the *offering* (or slicing) that is reiterated in the text, because it is not yet something already known. —'But how can it be regarded as not already known?'—*Because the animal constitutes five offerings*; what the text actually declares is that there are five offerings out of the animal; hence it cannot be regarded as a reiteration. In fact, the text has served its purpose by enjoining that 'of these, each is to be offered twice'; and it does not bar the offering of other slices.—Hence we conclude that offerings are to be made out of all the limbs."

SŪTRA (6).

[*Pūrvapakṣa-arguments continued*]—"FURTHER, IF THE TEXT IN QUESTION PRECLUDED THE OTHER LIMBS, THE DIRECT PROHIBITION OF THE 'SHOULDER', 'HEAD', 'ANŪKA' (?) AND 'THIGHS' WOULD BE SUPERFLUOUS. IF, HOWEVER, OFFERINGS ARE TO BE MADE OUT OF THESE ALSO, THEN THE PROHIBITION SHALL APPLY TO THE 'DOUBLE OFFERING' OUT OF THESE."

Bhāṣya.

"For the following reason also, the text cannot be taken as precluding the other limbs.—'For what reason?'—Because there is prohibition of the 'shoulder', 'head', '*anūka*', and 'thighs'. This prohibition of these would have some sense only if there were no preclusion of these; the prohibition of these is actually there, in the text—'One does not offer out of the shoulders, nor out of the head, nor out of the *Anūka*, nor out of the lower thighs'. If these limbs had been already precluded by the other text, the prohibition of the 'shoulder, head, *anūka*, and thighs' would be wholly superfluous.—If, however, they are not already precluded by the other text, then, inasmuch as these limbs—shoulder and the rest—could be things out of which the offerings would be made, the prohibition would be of the '*niravadāna*' of these limbs.—What is '*niravadāna*'?—It is offering after taking a piece out of the particular limb;—i.e. it is the 'double offering' that is prohibited.—From all this it follows that the sacrifice is performed with all the limbs."

SŪTRA (7).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE MUST BE PRECLUSION; BECAUSE THEY ARE SPOKEN AS 'ANAVADĀNĪYA' (NOT FIT TO BE OFFERED).

Bhāṣya.

The term '*api vā*' ('as a matter of fact') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

There must be preclusion; and offerings should not be made out of all the limbs.—"Why?"—Because only thus can the re-declaration have any sense.—"But it has been pointed out that Preclusion always involves three incongruities."—The answer to that is that there is no incongruity in the present case.—"Why?"—The 'offering' (slicing) in general is made admissible by the General Law, for being *offered into the Fire*; and it is this *offering* that is connected by the text in question with the *Heart* and other limbs; so that it is through Syntactical Connection that the Heart and other specified limbs become connected with the *Homa* (throwing into Fire); and none of the other limbs of the animal's body becomes connected with any deity.—It will not be right to argue that—"the connection of the Heart and other specified limbs with Deities being mentioned in the Direct Declaration itself,—such connection of the animal's body with the Deities would be secured only if the other limbs also were made oblations by being thrown into the Fire";—because the connection of the animal's body with the Deities is secured also when the Heart and other specified limbs are offered out of that body.—Hence we conclude that the other limbs are precluded.

Further, there is the term '*anavadānīya*' ('not fit for being offered'), in the text—'*Mārutyānavadānīyān surāgrahāmshcha ājisṛdbhyo harati*'.—If there is preclusion, then alone could any limb be 'unfit for offering'; otherwise, all the limbs would be 'fit for offering', and the term '*anavadānīya*' ('unfit for offering') would have no sense. Hence we conclude that there must be Preclusion.—"The mention of 'unfitness for offering' may be taken as referring to the Horns and Hoofs."—Not so, we reply. Because the Horns and Hoofs are inherently *unfit for offering*; and if there were '*haraṇa*', 'taking up', of what is inherently so unfit, then the Dative ending in '*ājisṛdbhyaḥ*' could not be explained; as the Horns and Hoofs are never meant to be '*ājisṛt*'.—"They might be used for securing the services of men."—It has been already explained that one should not utilise for his own purposes things that are meant for Deities. Hence the term 'unfit for offering' cannot be taken as referring to Horns and Hoofs.

SŪTRA (8).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS FOUND MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH THE NON-BRĀHMAṆA.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also there should be Preclusion.—"For what reason?"—There is a text showing that there is 'eating' (of a limb) by the non-Brāhmaṇa—'*Kakubho rājaputraḥ prāsnāti dhruvagopaḥ*'; here the eating of the '*Kakub*' (a particular limb) by the *Kṣattriya* has been mentioned.—According to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, no such limb could be available of the animal used at the sacrifice, as all the limbs will have been offered, as what is prohibited is only the 'double offering'.—For this reason also, there should be preclusion.

SŪTRA (9).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS MENTION OF 'COOKED' AND 'UNCOOKED'; SO THAT THE REST OF THE LIMBS WOULD NOT BE AUXILIARY TO THE SACRIFICE; JUST LIKE THE 'LETTING GO'.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also there should be Preclusion.—"For what reason?"—*Because there is mention of 'cooked' and 'uncooked'*;—we find the limbs spoken of as 'cooked' and 'uncooked', in the text—'He looks upon the two kinds of limbs, *cooked and uncooked*'. If there were no preclusion, it would not be possible to see any 'uncooked' limbs; on the other hand, if there is Preclusion, the limbs other than the Heart and the rest specially mentioned would not be auxiliaries to the sacrifice;—just as in the case of the text 'They let go the *Pātnīvata* after it has been washed', this *letting go* is not an auxiliary to the sacrifice. The limb in question would not be offered, and as such would remain *uncooked*; hence it would be possible to see some *uncooked* limbs.—For this reason also there should be Preclusion.

Adhikaraṇa (3): *At the Jyotiṣṭoma, the offering to Sviṣṭakṛt should consist of such 'Three Limbs' as are not auxiliaries to the sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (10).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Offerings should be made to Sviṣṭakṛt out of the sacrificial auxiliary,—as at the Archetype."

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is the animal to be offered to *Agni-Soma*,—spoken of in the text, 'One who, being initiated, sacrifices the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*'. At that sacrifice, the *offering to Sviṣṭakṛt* comes in under the General Law; in connection with that offering, we read—'Offers the sacrifice to *Sviṣṭakṛt* with *Three Limbs*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Should the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt* be made out of such limbs as are auxiliary to (have been used at) the sacrifice? Or out of those that have not been so used?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"It should be offered out of the limbs that have been used at the sacrifice.—How so?—Because by so doing, the words of the text would be followed, as at the Archetype; because it is only when the three limbs used at the sacrifice are offered to *Sviṣṭakṛt* that the connotation of the term 'three' becomes duly followed."

SŪTRA (11).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, there should be modification by the 'Three limbs',—as in the case of 'Reeds'.

Bhāṣya.

The offering should be made out of the three limbs that have not been used at the sacrifice; thus there would be a 'modification' (of those limbs that have been used at the sacrifice); and it is not that *any three* limbs might be used. If it were admitted that the offering could be made out of *any three* limbs, then there would be no need for the mentioning of the 'limbs' again in the injunction of the offering, as it would be already known; and the injunction, in that case, would be only for the sake of laying down the number 'three', the injunction being 'one should offer out of three';—in that case there would be no connection between the term '*tri*' ('three') and the term '*aṅga*' ('limbs'); so that the compounding of the two would be impossible.

Further, if there is no one action common to the three limbs,—or if there is no quality common to them,—there can be no relation of *qualification and qualified* between the terms '*tri*' and '*aṅga*'; so that, on that account

also, there would be no such connection between them as that 'those are the *three limbs* which three limbs are connected with the number *three*'; unless there is some peculiarity, there can be no action taken, and to that extent, the information remains incomplete—as to which *three limbs* are meant.—"How is it under your view?"—We explain:—The compound '*tryaṅgaiḥ*' is a collective compound, the 'communism' of the two factors consisting either in *common action* or *common quality*,—the *three limbs* of which the collective compound has been formed have been thus mentioned—'*Yad doṣṇaḥ pūrvārdhāt agnayē samavadyati, gudasya madhyataḥ shroṇyā jaghanataḥ*' ['One offers collectively the upper half of the *arms* to *Agni*, out of the middle of the *anus*, and out of the lower half of the *loins*']; the word '*Samavadyati*' denotes *joint* offering; and the 'communism' consists in all three being connected with the one deity *Agni*, and also with the common action of *offering*. Hence it is these three limbs here spoken of (arms, anus, and loins) that are meant to be the 'three limbs' out of which the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt* is to be made;—and these have not been used at the sacrifice. Thus, on the strength of this direct declaration, we conclude that the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt* is to be made out of such limbs as have not been used at the sacrifice;—*as in the case of 'reeds'*; just as in the case of the text 'the *grass* consists of *reeds*', it leads the *Kusha-grass* to be set aside by the *reeds*, so in the case in question also, the character of being used at a sacrifice would be set aside.

Says the Opponent—"As a matter of fact, the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt* is only of the nature of the disposal of things that have been used at the sacrifice;—and if the offering were made out of things other than those so used, there would be no 'disposal' of the things used; hence those limbs that have not been used at the sacrifice cannot be used in the place of those that have been so used."

The answer to this is as follows:—Though the things used are what are disposed of, yet it cannot be otherwise; under the normal course, the 'Disposal' would be effected through the things used at the sacrifice;—it is as against this that the text in question lays down the offering, in this particular case, of such things as have *not* been used at the sacrifice;—the sense being that it is these latter that should be offered by way of 'disposal'; because these also have served their purpose and as such have to be disposed of. Those that have been actually used at the sacrifice are hereby excluded from the *Sviṣṭakṛt*-offering; but they may be disposed of anywhere else one may wish to do so.

Adhikaraṇa (4): *The 'Adhyūdhnī' is a modification of the 'Iḍā'.*

SŪTRA (12).

[Siddhānta]—The 'Adhyūdhnī' should be treated as a modification of the 'Iḍā-portion' which is eaten by the Hotṛ,—just like the 'Three Limbs'. [The term '*Adhyūdhnī*' stands for the limbs other than the Heart and other specified limbs].

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is the animal offered to *Agni-Soma*, spoken of in the text—'One who, on being initiated, sacrifices the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*'.—In connection with that, it has been declared that 'They present the *Adhyūdhnī* to the *Hotṛ*-priest'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this '*adhyūdhnī*' a modification of the *Hotṛ's* share in the *Iḍā-cake* (which is eaten by him at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*)? Or is it not a modification, being an entirely distinct share allotted definitely to the *Hotṛ*?

Question—On what grounds could it be regarded as a modification (of an already-known Portion)? And on what grounds could it be taken as a distinct share assigned to the *Hotṛ*?

Answer—If the text in question is taken as enjoining the *Adhyūdhnī*, then the mention of 'presenting to the *Hotṛ*' is a mere reiteration,—and in that case what is enjoined would be a modification of the already known Portion. On the other hand, if the text is taken as enjoining the 'presenting to the *Hotṛ*' in reference to the *Adhyūdhnī*, then it is a restrictive injunction (assigning to the *Hotṛ* a distinct Portion).

The most reasonable view that presents itself is as follows:—The *Adhyūdhnī* should be treated as a modification of the Portion eaten by the *Hotṛ* (at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*).—"Why"?—Because the *Adhyūdhnī* is something quite new (not having been previously enjoined), and hence, not being the remnant of any offering to deities, it is not yet known as to be eaten in the manner of the *Iḍā*; hence it could not be taken as *reiterated* in the text in question; consequently it has to be taken as *enjoined*;—thus then the *Adhyūdhnī* comes to be *directly declared* as the share to be presented to the *Hotṛ*, and hence sets aside the '*Iḍā-portion*', which could come in only by virtue of the implications of the General Law;—*as in the case of the 'Three limbs'*;—i.e. just as the 'Three Limbs', which have not been used at the sacrifice, set aside those that have been so used,—so in the present case also.

SŪTRA (13).

[*Pūrvapakṣin's argument against the Siddhānta*]—"IT REALLY FORMS PART OF THE REMNANT; HENCE THERE SHOULD BE RESTRICTIONS; AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'CHARIOT'."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('really') implies the rejection of the view set forth above —to the effect that the *Adhyūdhnī* is a modification of the *Iḍā*-portion.

"The *Adhyūdhnī* could be a modification of the *Iḍā*-portion only if it were something new (not already known);—as a matter of fact however, it forms part of the *Iḍā*-itself.—'How so?'—The text '*Anasthibhiriḍām vardhayanti*' ['They enlarge the *Iḍā* by means of such pieces of flesh as are boneless'] clearly declares the 'presentation' (of the *Adhyūdhnī*), [as it is only by the additional limbs not already offered that there could be any subsequent enlargement; and it is the additional limbs that constitute the '*adhyūdhnī*']; —it is only the connection with the particular priest *Hotṛ* that is not already known; hence it is this connection alone that is enjoined by the text in question,—the sense being that 'when they present the *Adhyūdhnī*, they should present it to the *Hotṛ*, not to anyone else', which means that they provide the *Hotṛ* with a fresh *eating-portion* (in addition to the *Iḍā*, which comes to him through the General Law). Further, the words '*hotrē*' and '*haranti*' being in close juxtaposition ('present to the *Hotṛ*'), the syntactical connection between them is clear; while in the other case, the connection between '*adhyūdhnīm*' and '*haranti*' is interrupted by the intervention of the word '*hotrē*', and as such, it would have to be assumed. Hence the text must be taken as restricting this new portion (*adhyūdhnī*) to the *Hotṛ*;—*as in the case of the chariot*; in the case of the text '*Yajuryuktam rathamadhvaryavē dadāti*' ['He gives the chariot consecrated with the *Yajuṣ* to the *Adhvaryu*'], —inasmuch as the *chariot* is already known from another text, and the words '*adhvaryavē*' and '*dadāti*' are in close juxtaposition,—it is taken as restricting the gift to the *Adhvaryu*;—similarly the text in question should be taken as restricting the portion (*adhyūdhnī*) to the *Hotṛ*".

SŪTRA (14).

[*Siddhāntin's answer to Pūrvapakṣa-argument*]—BUT IT CANNOT BE SO, AS THERE IS NO INJUNCTIVE TEXT TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('but') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

As a matter of fact, the text cannot be taken as restricting the share (to the *Hotṛ*); it must be taken as laying down the modification of the *Iḍā*-portion.—"Why?"—There is no injunctive text to the effect that there

should be the *Adhyūdhnī*-portion even where there is the *Iḍā*-portion at the same time.

"But we have pointed out the text—'They enlarge the cake with boneless pieces of flesh'."

The answer to this is that this text is a mere reiteration, the boneless-pieces having been already enjoined elsewhere—'*Yadu parishiṣyatē tat samavatta-dhānyāmānayati, yat hṛdayam prāsyati, jihvām vakṣaḥ, tanimam atastasyā vaniṣṭum*'.—Hence it follows that the text cited by the opponent is only a reiteration. Then again, the *adhyūdhnī* is not mentioned in the text at all; hence it cannot be regarded as enjoined elsewhere as to be used;—and when it is not so enjoined elsewhere, it must be taken as enjoined in the text in question ('*adhyūdhnīm hotrē haranti*') in reference to the 'presentation to the *Hotṛ*'.

It has been argued that in this case it would be necessary to assume a syntactical connection (between '*adhyūdhnīm*' and '*haranti*') which is interrupted (by the intervention of the word '*hotrē*')".—We shall certainly assume such a connection when we find—(*a*) that the '*adhyūdhnī*' is not something already enjoined elsewhere, (*b*) that the text, therefore, cannot be a reiteration, and (*c*) that it would be meaningless if the said assumption were not made. In this way, the injunction would be of the 'presenting' which is expressed by a word contained in the text itself; otherwise, in the other case, what would be enjoined would be the connection between the *Adhyūdhnī* and the *Hotṛ*, not the *presenting* which is expressed by a word of the text itself.

For this reason also the *Adhyūdhnī* should be regarded as a modification of a former eating-portion.

SŪTRA (15).

[*Pūrvapakṣin's objection*]—"IN FACT, IT WOULD BE A MERE GIFT, AS THERE IS NO CONNECTION WITH THE TERM 'EATING-PORTION'."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*api vā*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the view just set forth.

"If it be as explained above, and the *Adhyūdhnī* has not been enjoined in any other text as to be presented even when the *Iḍā*-portion is there,—then, it comes to this that what the text in question enjoins is something entirely new to be 'presented', in the shape of the *Adhyūdhnī*; and in that case it cannot be treated as the modification of an eating-portion; as all that the words '*adhyūdhnīm haranti*' expresses is the mere *giving away* of the thing to the *Hotṛ*; nor is there any connection laid down with the term '*bhakṣa*' ('eating-portion'). Hence the *Adhyūdhnī* cannot be regarded as the modification of an eating-portion."

SŪTRA (16).

[*Answer to the Pūrvapakṣin's argument*]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT MUST BE THE MODIFICATION OF AN EATING-PORTION, AS THERE IS NO 'GIVER',—ALL (THE SACRIFICER AND THE PRIESTS) BEING EQUAL IN RELATION TO THE REMNANTS.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('as a matter of fact') implies the rejection of the view just set forth—that "it is a mere *gift*, not the modification of an eating-portion". It cannot be a case of 'giving away', because there is no 'giver'; the animal, in fact, has been dedicated by the Master of the sacrifice in the sense that 'saving the *sacrifice*, I shall not use this animal for any other purpose of mine own'; so that there being no longer any *ownership* over the animal, there can be no *giving* away (of any part of it).—"Why is there no *ownership*?"—Because all *are equal in relation to the Remnant*; as regards the Remnants of the sacrifice, the Sacrificer stands on the same footing as the *Hotṛ*, neither of them is the *owner* of the substance. Hence there can be no *giving*.

"When there is no connection with the term 'eating-portion', how can the *Adhyūdhnī* be regarded as an eating-portion?"

It follows the presence of the Dative ending (in '*hotrē*'); this Dative ending has the sense of 'for the sake of'; so that what the words of the Text mean is that 'the *adhyūdhnī* is for the sake of the *Hotṛ*', 'it is the *Hotṛ* who is wanted by it as its recipient', which means that 'it benefits the *Hotṛ*'; it can do so only when it is eaten and thereby imparts strength to the person, thus conferring upon him a perceptible benefit; and to the extent that it confers this benefit, to that extent does the Dative ending become justified;—otherwise, if the benefit conferred were an imperceptible one (as it would be, if it were a case of mere *gift*), the signification of the Dative would become ignored.

From all this it follows that the *Adhyūdhnī* is a modification of the *eating-portion of Iḍā*.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *The 'Vaniṣṭu' is the modification of an Eating-portion.*

[Like the '*adhyūdhnī*', the '*vaniṣṭu* is one of those limbs of the animal that are not among those that have been specifically mentioned as 'offerings'—i.e. *the Heart, the Tongue, etc.*]

SŪTRA (17).

LIKE THE 'ADHYUDHNI', THE 'VANIṢṬU' ALSO IS FOR THE AGNĪD-PRIEST.

Bhāṣya.

In connection, with the same animal *dedicated to Agni-Soma*, we read—'*Vaniṣṭuragnīdhē*' ['The *Vaniṣṭu* to the *Agnīd*-priest'].—The details of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* are applicable to the present case also; as there so here, the question is—when the *Vaniṣṭu* is spoken of as 'for the *Agnīd*', is it to be treated as the modification of an eating-portion? Or, does the text restrict this additional share as to be given to the *Agnīd*-priest?

Similarly the apparent *Siddhānta* is the same as that of the previous *adhikaraṇa*,—that, being enjoined as something not already known, it must be regarded as the modification of an eating-portion;—as before, the same objection is urged here also—"it being already enjoined in another text, the present text must be taken as restricting the additional share to the particular Priest";—as before, the answer to this is that, in as much as the *Vaniṣṭu* is not mentioned in the text 'they enlarge the *Iḍā* with boneless pieces', it is not something already enjoined, and hence it should be taken as enjoined in the text in question.

Says the Opponent—"As a matter of fact, the *Vaniṣṭu* also having been already spoken of, it is something that is already known."

Answer—All that has been said in the other text is—'*Vaniṣṭum prāsyati*' ['Throws the *Vaniṣṭu*']; so that what is enjoined there is the mere throwing in of the *Vaniṣṭu* into the *Iḍā*, by way of an embellishment of the latter; so that it does not become the *Iḍā* itself;—nor is it mentioned anywhere in connection with the term '*bhakṣa*' ('eating-portion'); hence it is the mere 'throwing in' that is enjoined,—and not that it is to be included in the 'eating-portion';—nor again, is there any connection, in the preceding text, with the Dative ending. So that, when the text in question speaks of it as '*agnīdhē*', (being 'for the *Agnīd*'), the Dative ending clearly enjoins the *eating* (of the *Vaniṣṭu*).

Thus we conclude that, there being a possibility of the case of the *Vaniṣṭu* not being quite analogous to that of the *Adhyūdhnī* dealt with in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Sūtra* lays it down that the two cases are exactly analogous; and thus sets aside all notions of the two cases not being quite alike on any point of the *Adhikaraṇa*.

Adhikaraṇa (6): *The Maitrāvaruṇa also has a share in the 'Eating Portion'.*

SŪTRA (18).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"There can be no 'Eating portion' for the Maitrāvaruna, as he is not connected with the Archetype."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is the *animal dedicated to Agni-Soma*, mentioned in the text 'One who, on being initiated, sacrifices the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*'; at this offering there is a priest called '*Maitrāvaruṇa*'.

In regard to this Priest, there arises the question—Has this Priest a share in the 'Eating of Remnants' which has to be done in accordance with the General Law?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"This Priest has no connection with the Archetype; hence, if he were to do the *Eating*, it would not be done in the manner of the Archetype. Hence we conclude that *these can be no eating-portion for the Maitrāvaruṇa, as he is not connected with the Archetype.*"

SŪTRA (19).

[Siddhānta]—As a matter of fact, it should be there; as he is the substitute for the Hotṛ and the Adhvaryu, being invested with their functions.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, there must be an eating-portion for the *Maitrāvaruṇa*; in the matter of giving directions, he is the substitute for the *Adhvaryu*; and in the matter of recitations, he is the substitute for the *Hotṛ*, as is clearly laid down in the text—'Therefore the *Maitrāvaruṇa* gives the directions and makes the recitations';—thus, being invested with the functions of these two priests, the *Maitrāvaruṇa* naturally gets a share in the 'Eating'. Hence we conclude that he must have a share in the eating-portion.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The Maitrāvaruṇa has only one share.*

SŪTRA (20).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"HE SHOULD HAVE TWO SHARES, AS HE PERFORMS TWO FUNCTIONS."

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the same *Maitrāvaruṇa* priest, there arises the further question—Has he two shares? Or only one share?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"He should have two shares; being a substitute for the *Adhvaryu*, he obtains the *Adhvaryu's* share; and being a substitute for the *Hotṛ*, he obtains the *Hotṛ's* share; hence he should have two shares."

SŪTRA (21).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IN AS MUCH AS HE IS ONLY ONE, HE SHOULD RECEIVE ONLY ONE SHARE; AS THE SHARE HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

The *Maitrāvaruṇa* should not have two shares; he should have only one.—"Why?"—*Because the share has not been declared*; it has not been declared that the *Adhvaryu's* share is to go to the *Maitrāvaruṇa*, or that the *Hotṛ's* share is to go to him. If these two had been so declared, then, even though the requisite embellishment would have been secured by a single share, yet, on the strength of the said declaration, he would receive the second share also. As a matter of fact, however, the share comes to the *Maitrāvaruṇa* only by virtue of the General Law;—hence, as the *Maitrāvaruṇa* is only one, a single share will suffice to accomplish that archetypal condition, and no second share could be indicated by the General Law;—hence the Priest in question should have one share only.

Adhikaraṇa (8): *The Pratiprasthātṛ Priest has no share in the Eating-Portion.*

SŪTRA (22).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The Pratiprasthātṛ also should have a share, on account of his Cooking the Omentum."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the same animal-sacrifice to *Agni-Soma*, the '*Pratiprasthātṛ*' priest is spoken of.

In regard to him, there arises the question—Is this Priest to have a share in the eating of Remnants? Or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"He is to have his share;—why?—because when he cooks the omentum,—in accordance with the text 'The *Pratiprasthātṛ* priest cooks the omentum',—he performs the functions of the *Adhvaryu*; hence he should have his share in the eating-portion."

SŪTRA (23).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, he can have no share, because the action is different, and because the whole of it is offered away.

Bhāṣya.

The *Pratiprasthātṛ* can have no share in the eating-portion.—"Why?" —Because at the sacrifice wherein he acts for the *Adhvaryu*, there is no remnant of the substance offered; what he does is the cooking of the omentum; and the whole of it is offered away; so that, there, being no remnant, what is there to be eaten? At those sacrifices where there is a remnant,—that is, those in which offerings are made out of the Heart and other specified limbs,—this Priest does not act for the *Adhvaryu*;—as a matter of fact, the transcendental result connected with the *omentum* is entirely different (from that connected with the Heart, etc.), because it is connected with a subsidiary act; and what the General Law indicates is that that priest alone becomes entitled to the eating-portion who has worked at the sacrifice the substance used at which is to be disposed of by that eating; in this way the eating would come to help in the sacrifice; if, on the other hand, the eating were done by a priest who has done work other than any connected with the sacrifice, as he would have rendered no service, his eating would not help the sacrifice in any way, and hence it would be no part of it. It is for this reason that the General Law does not justify eating at a sacrifice other than the one at which the man has worked.

Says the Opponent—"At the subsidiaries of the sacrifice also, the *Pratiprasthātṛ* does act for the *Adhvaryu*; as he does the work of *slicing*, as laid down in the text—'Placing it towards the right, the *Pratiprasthātṛ* slices it'."

Under the present *Adhikaraṇa*, we are considering the case in relation to that Vedic Recensional Text where this text (regarding the *Pratiprasthātṛ* doing the *slicing*) does not appear. [So that this does not affect the *Siddhānta* at all].—Or [there is another explanation]—this *slicing* (spoken of in the text) is a totally different act from that connected with the Archetype. At the Archetype, the actual slicing as constituting the beginning of the act of *offering* having been spoken of by the term 'sacrifice', what is spoken of by the subsequent text is only the number 'two', not the act of *slicing*; in the text quoted by the Opponent, on the other hand, what is laid down is the act of *slicing* by the *Pratiprasthātṛ*, not the actual act of *offering*; in fact, in this case the *slicing* that would be done would be the beginning of the act of *offering*. So that at the Archetype, when the *offering* is going to be done, the *Adhvaryu* would naturally do the *slicing*, even though not actually enjoined to do so;—the *slicing*, in fact, has got to be done, either by the *Adhvaryu* himself or by someone else; and as the *Adhvaryu* himself is close by, he does it; it does not necessarily form a 'function' (or 'duty') of the *Adhvaryu*. What is done as a matter of course is not what is rendered admissible by the General Law;—and in the case in question, it is only as a matter of course that the *slicing* is done either by the *Adhvaryu* or by someone else; so that all that the text quoted does is to restrict this 'someone else' to the *Pratiprasthātṛ* only.—From all this it follows that even though doing the *slicing*, the *Patiprasthātṛ* does not perform the 'functions of the *Adhvaryu*'; and hence he should not have a share in the eatings at the subsidiary sacrifices.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *The text ' Ājyabhāgau yajati ' lays down the ' Gṛhamēdhīya ' as a distinct sacrifice by itself.*

SŪTRA (24).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—" AS THE ARCHETYPAL PROCESS WOULD NATURALLY COME INTO THE ECTYPE, THE DECLARATION OF IT AGAIN WOULD BE SUPERFLUOUS."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifices, we read—' *Marudbhyo gṛhamēdhibhyaḥ sarvāsām dugdhē sāyamodanē* ' [where the ' *Gṛhamēdhīya* ' offering is laid down];—in this connection it is declared—' *Ājyabhāgau yajati* ' [' Offers the two *Ājyabhāgas* '].

In regard to this latter, there arises the question—(*a*) Is this a mere reiteration of the two *Ājyabhāga-offerings* already admissible under the General Law ?—or (*b*) the General Law, as well as this text, both enjoin one and the same act ?—or (*c*) is this text meant to be purely commendatory ?—or (*d*) does it lay down two additional and distinct acts ?—or (*e*) is it meant to serve the purposes of Preclusion ?—or (*f*) does the General Law indicate the admissibility of all else, save the two *Ājyabhāga-offerings* ?—or (*g*) does the General Law make the two *Ājyabhāga-offerings* only admissible ?—or (*h*) does the General Law not come in at all, and the *Gṛhamēdhīya* is an entirely distinct sacrifice by itself ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* (A) is as follows :—" At the ectype in question, the two *Ājyabhāga-offerings* connected with the archetype come in by the General Law itself ; hence the declaration of the same over again could serve no other purpose ; it could only be taken as a teaching reiterated by the Teacher as a friendly advice ; so that we need not trouble our minds over the question of the acts being distinct ; it is clearly known that it is a mere reiteration ; so please proceed to the consideration of some other subject.—Why so ?—Because the question raised is already settled ; while there may be another subject which is not as well known. Just as in ordinary experience, when people say—' Bring up the Brāhmaṇas that are there in this house,—*Dēvadatta, Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra* ',—the latter sentence is regarded as a mere reiteration ; similar should be the case with the text in question ".

SŪTRA (25).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—" OR, THE SAME ACT MAY BE LAID DOWN BY MEANS OF TWO TEXTS,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE ' ĀGNĒYA '."

Bhāṣya.

" If the only capacity that the text had were to reiterate what has been already declared, then it could not serve any other purpose. When however,

it has the capacity of doing something else also, then, why cannot it be suspected of doing this something else? As a matter of fact, it has this capacity—that the text in question and the General Law conjointly declare the one fact that 'the *Gṛhamēdhīya* is to be performed in the manner of the archetype,—this similarity to the archetype consisting in the fact that the two *Ājyabhāgas* are to be offered'. In connection with the Archetype, it has been declared that 'the two *Ājyabhāgas* are to be offered'; so that in doing this, the man accomplishes his purpose by means of the archetypal sacrifice;—then again, in the text in question—'Offers the two *Ājyabhāgas*',—the same method is extended to the ectype. So that the sacrifice performs its functions in such a manner as to make one and the same act spoken of by means of the two texts.—*Just as in the case of the Āgnēya*;—the deity that is invoked with the words '*agnimagna āvaha*' is the same that is spoken of in the words '*ātmānamāvaha*';—or again, in the case of the expression 'Here is the *stick*,—strike with the *stick*', one and the same stick is spoken by means of the word 'stick' used twice;—in the same manner, the text 'Offers the *Ājyabhāgas*' lays down the offerings in connection with the Archetype,—and this same text appearing again in connection with the Ectype also lays down the same offerings,—the full sentence being completed by the idea that 'the *Gṛhamēdhīya* sacrifice is to be equipped with these same offerings',—and no distinct offering is laid down; nor is it a mere reiteration of what is already admissible under the General Law."

SŪTRA (26).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—"BUT THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE AS THE TEXTS ARE DISTINCT."

Bhāṣya.

The term 'vā' ('but') implies the rejection of the view just set forth.

"The case in question is not analogous to the *Invocation of Agni*. In the latter case, the text '*Agnē āvaha*' has spoken of *Agni the carrier*; while in the text '*Agnimāvaha*', *Agni* is spoken of as *one to be carried*; so that the two texts do not serve the same purpose. In the case in question, on the other hand, the presence of the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings (at the *Gṛhamēdhīya*) is indicated by the single General Law that 'the Ectype is to be performed in the manner of the Archetype'; so that the declaration over again (in the text in question) that 'the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings are to be offered' would be doing what has been done already; and such a text would be meaningless and superfluous. Hence the conclusion should be that it is a mere *reiteration*.—'But it has been explained that a mere reiteration is superfluous'.—It is not so, we reply; it will serve the purposes of a commendatory declaration,—the sense of the commendation being—'by doing this the man would be offering the *Ājyabhāgas* and thereby the sacrificial character (of the *Gṛhamēdhīya*) would be accomplished'".

SŪTRA (27).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (D)]—" IT MUST BE IN ADDITION ; AS THAT WOULD SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE ;—IT BEING NOT POSSIBLE FOR IT TO BE TAKEN EITHER (*a*) AS A COMMENDATORY DECLARATION, OR (*b*) AS DESCRIBING AN ACCESSORY DETAIL, OR (*c*) AS A MODIFICATION BASED UPON DIRECT DECLARATION,—IT COULD SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE ONLY WHEN TAKEN AS LAYING DOWN DISTINCT FRESH ACTS.

Bhāṣya.

" Or, the text may be taken as laying down two distinct additional acts,—not as a mere reiteration to the effect that 'the said *Ājyabhāga*-offerings must be made'; in fact, it should be taken as actually enjoining the two sacrifices as to be performed.—'Why ?'—Because a mere reiteration is useless; specially as, the two texts being different, they cannot be taken as speaking of one and the same act.

Question—'Why cannot the text be taken (*a*) as a commendatory declaration, or (*b*) as a description of accessory details, or (*c*) as laying down a modification ?'

" *Answer*—(*a*) For the simple reason that the words express no commendation, the text cannot be taken as a commendatory declaration.—'There is the term *for the purpose of accomplishing its sacrificial character*, which expresses commendation'.—*Answer*—When a certain thing has been enjoined by one sentence, it has no need for a commendation that is expressed by another sentence. Hence the text should be taken as laying down a distinct sacrifice, not as a commendatory declaration.—'But there is no distinct sacrifice named *Ājyabhāga*'.—*Answer*—It can be a sacrifice having the *Ājyabhāga* for its accessory.—(*b*) Nor does the text contain any description of accessory details (of the previously-enjoined sacrifice), as there is in the sentence 'One offers the *Ājyabhāgas equipped with water* ('*apsumantāvājyabhāgau yajati*').—Nor is there any other way of interpreting the text; as there is in the case of the text 'One should not offer any oblations before this', where, in supersession of this prohibition, there is the other text 'The oblation that one offers before this', which deprecates the said offering, and then goes on to add 'Pours the offering with the *Sruva*'.

" Such being the circumstances, the text would be serving a useful purpose only when explained as before. Hence it must be taken as laying down distinct offerings, as in this case it would be laying down something new; otherwise it would not supply any fresh information at all."

'But what is there to indicate that the act laid down is a distinct one ?'

" What indicates it is the reason that 'the repeated mention of one and the same act would be useless, as it would supply no particular information',—as explained under *Sūtra* 2. 2. 2.

" For all these reasons we conclude that the text in question lays down two distinct sacrifices named '*Ājyabhāga*', in addition to the principal

sacrifice (of the context),—these distinct sacrifices being hitherto unknown and made known here for the first time."

SŪTRA (28).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (E)]—IT MIGHT BE URGED THAT "THE TEXT MAY BE TAKEN AS NEGATIVING (OTHERS)".

Bhāṣya.

"You think that the text contains the injunction of a distinct act; but that is not possible; when the name '*ājyabhāga*' is actually mentioned, the action spoken of cannot be understood to be any other than the *Ājyabhāga* itself. If the distinct act were taken as one having the *Ājyabhāga* for its accessory, then this would involve the necessity of taking the term '*ājyabhāga*' in a figurative sense; and no significance would attach to the special name '*ājyabhāga*'. Hence the text cannot be taken as laying down distinct acts. It may however be taken as negativing other acts, by 'preclusion'; just as in the case of the text—'Five five-nailed animals are fit for eating',—the mention of the five animals, Hare [Porcupine, Alligator, Tortoise, and Rhinoceros] is taken as meaning the negation (prohibition) of the 'eating of others':—similarly in the case in question also, the mention of the *Ājyabhāga-offerings* will mean the preclusion of the other accessory details".

SŪTRA (29).

[*Refutation of Pūrvapakṣa (E) by Pūrvapakṣin (D)*]—"THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE; AS IT IS NOT SPOKEN OF".

Bhāṣya.

"As a matter of fact, we do not find, in the text, any negativing word, nor the mention of any other accessory details; and no authority can attach to any such meaning of a sentence as is not expressed by its constituent words; because it is only the meaning of the component words that is the basis of the meaning of the sentence; and the latter can have no existence apart from the former. This is what has been made clear under *Sūtra* 1. 1. 25. Hence the text cannot be taken as preclusive; specially as Preclusion is always open to three objections:—(1) the acceptance of what is not expressed by the words, (2) the assumption of the meanings of other words, and (3) the rejection of what is actually expressed by the words.—From all this, it follows that it is best to take the text as laying down distinct acts".

SŪTRA (30).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (F)]—IT MIGHT BE URGED THAT "THE ĀJYABHĀGAS ARE NOT TAKEN IN [BY THE GENERAL LAW]".

Bhāṣya.

"If you think that the text contains the injunction of distinct acts,—then the incongruity involved in that view has been already pointed out; and that

is enough to discount it.—What then should be the explanation ?—Well, the *Ājyabhāga* offerings have been mentioned (in the text) by their very names (as coming into the *Gṛhamēdhīya*), while the other accessories come into it only under the General Law ; when it is found that the *Ājyabhāga* offerings come in directly through their own names, the General Law can indicate nothing regarding their admissibility into the *Gṛhamēdhīya*, and it will only indicate the admissibility of the other accessory details which have not been taken in by any other means.—'What will be the advantage in taking the text thus ?'—The advantage will be as follows :—(*a*) It will not be necessary to assume that the text and the General Law function jointly ;—(*b*) it will not be necessary to admit of a commendation by a distinct text (the one in question) of what has come in by virtue of the General Law ;—(*c*) when precisely the same name is used, it will not be necessary to take the re-mention of the name as laying down distinct acts ; just as, when it has been asserted that '*Dēvadatta* stands here', it is not said again 'he stands while standing' : all that it is understood to mean is that the person is named '*Dēvadatta*' ;—and (*d*) lastly, it will not be necessary to assume *Preclusion*, which is beset with three objections.—Hence we conclude that the text serves to take in the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings (as coming into the *Gṛhamēdhīya*), which are not taken in by the General Law".

Says the Opponent—'Why have recourse to this elaborate process ? If the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings had not been taken in by a direct text, the General Law would certainly have been able to take them in ; when they are already laid down by a direct text, what is the need for the elaborate assumption that they are *not* taken in by the General Law ?'

"*Answer*—There is certainly no good reason for having recourse to the elaborate assumption ; but what is done by an elaborate process cannot be regarded as *not done* ; an elaborate process is certainly open to objection ; but even though the objection may be there, the General Law cannot take in the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings. If a man goes to a village through the pasture-land, he certainly incurs the inconveniences of passing through the pasture-land ; but it is not that he does not reach the village. Hence we conclude that the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings, not being taken in by the General Law, are taken in by the text in question."

SŪTRA (31).

[*Refutation of Pūrvapakṣa* (*F*)]—"THIS CANNOT BE ; BECAUSE OF EQUALITY."

Bhāṣya.

"What has been urged above is not possible. If the General Law were to deal with each of the Archetypal accessories separately in detail, then it might be that it would not deal with the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings on the ground of their being already taken in by the direct text, and would deal with and take in the other accessories ;—as a matter of fact, however, the General Law does not deal with the accessories separately ; all that it deals

with is the transcendental result connected with the Archetype,—its indication being that 'the result is brought about by *this*, the Ectype, in the same manner as by *that*, the Archetype'; and this being the form of the indication, the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings also become included in this. Under the circumstances, it comes to this that the text laying down the *Ājyabhaga*-offerings does what has been already done (by the General Law) and hence becomes superfluous.—Thus then, the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings being *equal* to (standing on the same footing as) the other accessories, the text cannot be taken as taking in the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings which have not been taken in by the General Law."

SŪTRA (32).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (G), *and its refutation*]—THERE WOULD BE THE SAME OBJECTION AGAINST THE ĀJYABHĀGAS ALONE BEING TAKEN IN (UNDER THE GENERAL LAW).

Bhāṣya.

The following view may be put forward (as *Pūrvapakṣa* (*G*)]—" What the General Law indicates is the *Ājyabhāga-offerings* only, as constituting the *Gṛhamēdhīya* sacrifice, when performed in the manner of the Archetype; the question having arisen as to how the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings are to be made, —the answer is that 'it is in such and such a manner (as at the Archetype).' Just as in the case of the text 'There are seventeen *Sāmidhēnis* at the *Adhvarakalpas*', the number 'seventeen' does not find place in any other sacrifice;—or, in the case of the sentence 'Bring the *Shimshapā* tree', no other tree is brought up, and the *Shimshapā* alone is understood to be spoken of by means of the term 'tree';—similarly in the case in question, the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings alone should be understood to be taken in by the General Law".

Our answer to this is as follows:—*There would be the same objection against the Ājyabhāgas alone being taken in under the General Law*;—the idea that the *Ājyabhāgas* alone are taken in is equal to (open to the same objections as) the idea that they are not taken in; as for the other accessories, their non-inclusion (under the General Law) might be possible if the General Law dealt with the accessories separately; but no such non-inclusion is possible when all that the General Law indicates is the fulfilment of the archetypal transcendental result (as explained above).

SŪTRA (33).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE TEXT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS SHOWING DISTINCTNESS, AS THE INCLUSION SERVES A USEFUL PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

From all the above it follows that the *Gṛhamēdhīya* is a distinct sacrifice not laid down elsewhere.—" Why?"—*Because the inclusion serves a useful*

purpose ;—the inclusion spoken of in the text 'Offers the *Ājyabhāgas*' comes to serve a useful purpose. If the *Gṛhamēdhīya* were a sacrifice already enjoined elsewhere, then this text would be superfluous. Thus then, the *Gṛhamēdhīya*, having all its needs fulfilled by the *Ājyabhāgas* directly enjoined, does not take in the other accessories (of the Archetype) on the basis of the General Law. As a rule, when an Ectype has got a new accessory laid down for itself, it does not take in any archetypal accessories, except through Syntactical Connection with that new accessory.—"Why so ?"—What is required to be known (in regard to the Ectype) is the manner in which it should be performed ;—as regards the Archetype, it is known that the manner in which it is to be performed is through the accessories, which, therefore, are all needed by the declaration of procedure ;—in regard to the Ectype however, it is not definitely known what accessories it will take in ; and they have got to be assumed and then wanted ;—it is however not reasonable to assume a relationship when something definitely known is already there ;—hence here also the accessories become taken in on the basis of the General Law ;—after these Archetypal accessories have been taken in,—with a view to save the injunction of the accessories relating to the Ectype itself from superfluity,—both sets of accessories are combined and taken in by a single all-embracing declaration of Procedure.

Adhikaraṇa (10): *The 'Sviṣṭakṛt' and other rites are to be performed at the Gṛhamēdhīya.*

SŪTRA (34).

From among those also, that would come in which is specially mentioned.

Bhāṣya.

The *Gṛhamēdhīya* is again the subject-matter of discussion. In regard to this, we have seen that, having all its needs fulfilled by the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings, it does not take in any other accessories (from the Archetype).—What is to be considered is—is this absolutely so that it does not take in any other accessories at all ?

Such being the notion (derived from the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*), the *Siddhānta* is set forth in the *Sūtra*—*From among those also, that would come in which is specially mentioned.* What has been said regarding the *Gṛhamēdhīya* not taking in any accessories, is true of cases where no specific mention is made ; in the case in question, we do find a specific mention of certain accessories,—e.g. of the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings [and these do come in) ; —similarly whenever an accessory is specifically mentioned by a direct declaration, and such specific mention is found by us, we conclude that that should come in which is so specifically mentioned ; e.g. such accessories as are mentioned in the texts, '*Agnayē samavadyati*', '*Iḍāmupahvayati*'.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): [A Hypothetical Discussion]. *At the 'Gṛhamēdhīya' there is no Eating by the 'Prāshitra' and other Priests.*

SŪTRA (35).

THE MENTION OF THE 'SVIṢṬAKṚT' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PRECLUDING THE EATING,—BECAUSE THE CONDITIONS ARE THE SAME.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Gṛhamēdhīya* sacrifice; in regard to which we have understood that it is a distinct sacrifice by itself.—In connection with this sacrifice, it is declared that 'One makes an offering to *Agni-Sviṣṭakṛt*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does, or does not, the specific mention of the '*Sviṣṭakṛt*' only preclude all other details relating to *Remnants* as also the *Eating*?

Objection (to the question)—"In as much as the *Gṛhamēdhīya* is a distinct sacrifice by itself, there can be no *Eating of Remnants* at it [as such Eating could come in from the Archetype only by virtue of the General Law]".

Answer—This discussion is a hypothetical one, on the assumption (taken for granted for argument's sake) that the *Gṛhamēdhīya* is *not* a distinct sacrifice [it is based entirely upon an Archetype].—In fact, what we are considering is the purpose served by the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*:—That is, if there were preclusion, by the text in question, of the other details relating to the Eatings of Remnants, then the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings would preclude only the sacrificial offerings, nothing else. Hence it becomes necessary to find out if the specific mention of the *Sviṣṭakṛt* precludes, or not, the *Eatings of Remnants*.

The apparent answer to the question raised is that when the *Sviṣṭakṛt* has been specifically mentioned, then the Eatings of Remnants do become precluded.—Why?—*Because the conditions are the same*;—the conditions relating to the *Sviṣṭakṛt*-offering and the *Eatings* are similar,—both serving the purpose of embellishing the Remnants; [and as such both should be absent at the *Gṛhamēdhīya*]; but of these, the *Sviṣṭakṛt*-offering has been specifically mentioned (as to be offered at the sacrifice);—hence this one embellishment only of the Remnants should be there, not any others; and hence the *Eatings* become precluded.

SŪTRA (36).

[*Pūrvapakṣin's argument against Siddhānta*]—"IN FACT, THERE CAN BE NO PRECLUSION,—BECAUSE IT IS ACTUALLY SEEN MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH THE IḌĀ."

Bhāṣya.

"Just as, on the specific mention of the *Sviṣṭakṛt*, and on the other details relating to remnants not being found so mentioned, it is understood

that there should be no Eatings,—exactly in the same manner, on seeing that the *Eating* is actually mentioned, it should be understood that the *Eating* should be there. When there is a conflict between *Mention* (Assertion) and *non-Mention* (Non-assertion), greater authority attaches to the *Mention* (Assertion).—'Where is the *Eating* found mentioned ?'—In the text '*Idāmupahvayati*', where '*Upahvāna*' stands for *permission*; and this is possible only when there is to be *Eating*, not when there is no *Eating*.—Hence there can be no preclusion of the *Eating*."

SŪTRA (37).

[*Objection answered by Siddhāntin*]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE MUST BE PRECLUSION ; BECAUSE IT IS FOUND TO BE PRECLUDED BY AN INJUNCTION.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, there must be preclusion ; when conditions are equal, what is inferred (merely indicated by the General Law) is set aside by what is directly laid down.

As for the 'seeing' that has been cited, it must pertain to that *Eating* which is preceded (sanctioned) by Injunction. The declaration is in the following form—'*Atha idāmēvāvadyati, na prāshitramupahūya prāshnanti*' ['He slices the *Iḍā* ; they do not obtain the Prāshitra's permission before they eat ']—[where it is clear that there is no *Eating* by the *Prāshitra*].

It is not necessary for us to find out and explain the purpose of the present *Adhikaraṇa*, which is purely hypothetical. In fact, it only shows the purpose that is served by the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* ; and the purpose of this purpose need not be explained. What is to be actually done has been already explained in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *The 'Prāyaṇīya' and the 'Ātithyā' should end respectively with the 'Shamyu' and the 'Iḍā'.*

SŪTRA (38).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE MATTER OF ENDING WITH THE 'SHAMYU' AND THE 'IḌĀ', THERE SHOULD BE OPTION; AS OTHERWISE, THE PROHIBITION OF THE 'PATNYANUYĀJA' WOULD BE MEANINGLESS".

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—(*a*) '*Shamyvantā prāyaṇīyā santiṣṭhatē, na patnīḥ samyājayanti*' ['The *Prāyaṇīyā* becomes complete when ending with the *Shamyu*;—they do not make the wives offer the sacrifice'];—(*b*) '*Iḍāntā ātithyā santiṣṭhatē, nānuyājau yajanti*' ['The *Ātithyā* becomes complete when ending with the *Iḍā*;—they do not perform the *Anuyājas*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question,—(*b*) Is it meant that the *Prāyaṇīyā* may be regarded as complete, either with all the Terminuses duly performed, or with the *Shamyu* only? Or that it must always end with the *Shamyu*?—(*b*) Similarly, may the *Ātithyā* be regarded as complete either with all the Terminuses duly performed, or with the *Iḍā* only?—Or must it always end with the *Iḍā*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"In the matter of ending with the *Shamyu* and the *Iḍā*, there should be option;—why?—because there is prohibition of *Patnyanuyāja*.—There is the clear declaration to the effect that 'the Prāyaṇīyā becomes complete when ending with the *Shamyu*'; then there is the other declaration to the effect that 'they do not make the wives offer the sacrifice'. If the *Prayaṇīyā* must always end with the *Shamyu*, then *the prohibition of the Patnyanuyāja would be meaningless.* Hence this prohibition of the *Patnyanuyāja* should be taken as laying down the completing of all the Terminuses.—How so?—At the *Prāyaṇīyā*, they do not perform the *Patnīsamyāja* alone, and nothing else;—similarly at the *Ātithyā*, they do not perform the *Anuyājas* alone, and nothing else. Hence the two (prohibitive) texts should be taken as distinct sentences precluding those details that should not be performed. [Hence, the performance where these details are omitted forms one option; and that in which they are not omitted forms another option]".

SŪTRA (39).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT IS ONLY A DESCRIPTION OF THE EXISTING STATE OF THINGS; AS THE ACT IS NOT WHAT IS ENJOINED BY THE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that there should be option; in fact, there is only one alternative, that it should end with the *Shamyu*; as there is a specific declaration to that effect, there can be no second alternative; there is no declaration of any such other alternative. The prohibition of the *Patnyanuyāja* cannot be taken as laying down the completion of all the Terminuses; it is, in fact, only the description of an existing state of things; it describes things as they exist; just like the statement that 'Fire is not to be installed in the sky or in heaven'. Thus the two sentences—'The *Prāyaṇīyā* becomes complete with the *Shamyu*' and 'They do not make the wives offer the sacrifices'—are to be construed and Syntactically Connected with one another.—Similarly also with the two sentences—'The *Ātithyā* becomes complete with the *Iḍā*', and 'They do not offer the *Anuyājas*'.—The purpose served by the description is that the course of action laid down becomes eulogised with very little effort.

"There is the prohibitive text, which may be taken as laying down the completion of all the terminuses."

This would involve an assumption for which there is no justification in the Veda; and such an assumption would be as wrong as the abandoning and ignoring of what has been actually laid down in the Veda.

From all this it follows that the *Prāyaṇīyā* must end with the *Shamyu* and the *Ātithyā* must end with the *Iḍā*.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *The 'Prāyaṇīya' should end with the first 'Shamyu'; and the 'Ātithyā' should end with the first 'Iḍā'.*

SŪTRA (40).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"BY REASON OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROHIBITIVE TEXT, THE PROHIBITION SHOULD PERTAIN TO WHAT COMES AFTER THE SECOND."

Bhāṣya.

The same texts form the subject-matter of the present *Adhikaraṇa*—(*a*) '*Shamvantā prāyaṇīyā santiṣṭhatē,—na patnīḥ samyājayanti*' ['The *Prāyaṇīyā* becomes complete, ending with *Shamyu*;—they do not make the wives offer sacrifices'];—(*b*) '*Iḍāntā ātithyā santiṣṭhatē,—nānuyājān yajati*' ['The *Ātithyā* becomes complete, ending with *Iḍā*;—they do not offer the *Anuyājas*'].—There are two *Shamyus* and two *Iḍās*.—The question that arises is—(*a*) When the *Prāyaṇīyā* 'ends with *Shamyu*', does it end with the *first Shamyu* or with the *second*?—Similarly, (*b*) when the *Ātithyā* 'ends with *Iḍā*', does it end with the *first Iḍā*, or with the *second*?

The apparent conclusion is that the sacrifices should end with the *first Shamyu* and the *first Iḍā*;—why?—because when one finishes the sacrifices with the first *Shamyu* and the first *Iḍā*, he duly obeys the injunction of the *Veda* (that the sacrifice should 'end with *Shamyu*' or 'end with *Iḍā*]; and when once the Vedic injunction has been duly obeyed, why should one perform any subsequent details?

Against this, there is the following view [*Pūrvapakṣa* (*A*)]—"When one finishes the sacrifices with the second *Shamyu* and the second *Iḍā*, then also he obeys the Vedic injunction. Such being the case, if one were always to end with the *first* ones [never adopting the other course of ending with the second ones], it would mean that he does not quite comprehend the meaning of the text; in fact, we shall be rightly comprehending the meaning of the text if we take it as declaring that the ending could also be done with the second *Shamyu* and the second *Iḍā*.—Thus then, if one finishes the sacrifices with both *Shamyus* and both *Iḍās*, he derives great benefit. Hence we conclude that there should be no restriction,—the finishing may be done with the *first* or with the *second*".

As against all this, we have the following view [*Pūrvapakṣa* (*B*)]—"The ending should be with the *second Shamyu* and the *second Iḍā*;—why?—because *of the effectiveness of the prohibitive text*; i.e. it is only in that case that the Prohibition of the *Patnī-samyāja* or of the *Anuyāja* could have any sense; if the ending of the *Prāyaṇīyā* were not done with the *second Shamyu*, there would be no likelihood of the *Patnīsamyāja* being performed; similarly, if the ending of the *Ātithyā* were done with the *second*

Iḍā, there would be no likelihood of the *Anuyājas* being performed; [so that in this case the prohibitive texts would be prohibiting what is not possible; hence they would be meaningless]; from this it follows that the sacrifices should be finished with the *second Shamyu* and the *second Iḍā*.—*Objection*—'It has been already explained that the prohibitive text contains only a description of the existing state of things.'—*Answer*—Such interpretation of the texts is not justifiable, so long as there is any other way of taking them; hence the *ending* would never be done with the *first Shamyu* or the *first Iḍā*. —*Objection*—'What you urge in the shape of the prohibitive text is a mere indication; a mere indicative however proves nothing; you should point to some reason'.—*Answer*—The reason is as follows:—So long as there is no specification, any detailed performance that ends with the *Shamyu* should be regarded as 'ending with *Shamyu*'; similarly with the term 'ending with *Iḍā*';—all that the injunctions lay down is that the detailed performance should 'end with *Shamyu*', or 'with *Iḍā*';—when such is the injunction, it precludes all other details (besides the *Shamyu* or the *Iḍā*).—'How?'—When the detailed performance has been laid down as ending with the *Shamyu*, or with the *Iḍā*,—and the performance is actually done in this manner, there is no need for the other details;—when not needed, they cannot be taken as connected with the performances;—consequently, it follows that there is no likelihood of their being adopted.—*Objection*—'If such be the case, then the *ending with the first Shamyu*, or with the *first Iḍā*, accomplishes nothing more (than what would be accomplished by the *ending with the second*)'.—*Answer*—There is no force in this objection; a sentence need not be taken as serving a distinct purpose simply with a view to save it from being useless; it is enough that the sentence lays down *the ending with the second*.—From all this it follows that the sacrifices should end with the *second Shamyu* and the *second Iḍā*."

SŪTRA (41).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN AS MUCH AS THE FIRST ONE BECOMES ADMISSIBLE (FIRST), ON THE BASIS OF DIRECT DECLARATION, THERE SHOULD BE REJECTION (OF THE SECOND).

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the sacrifices should end with the *second Shamyu*, or with the *second Iḍā*; they should, in fact, end with the *first* ones.—Why?— —The text does not enjoin the detailed performance ending with the *Shamyu*, or that ending with the *Iḍā*; all that is enjoined is the *ending* of the sacrifices,—the sense being that 'the sacrifice *should end* with the *Shamyu*, or with the *Iḍā*'; that is, when the performance has begun, it should *end* with the *Shamyu*, or with the *Iḍā*; it does not mean that the performance *should begin*; a performance is spoken of as 'ending' only when the performers have been there actually going on with it;—so that there being nothing to show with what—the first or the second ones,—the performance should begin,—the performance could not *begin* either with the

first ones or with the *second* ones;—as for the 'ending' that has been enjoined, it becomes accomplished as soon as one has got at the first *Shamyu*, or the first *Iḍā*—[so that there can be no need for proceeding any further to the *second* ones].—As for the prohibition, it has been already explained as being a description of the existing state of things.

SŪTRA (42).

IN AS MUCH AS THE PROHIBITIVE TEXT SPEAKS OF 'HURRY', IT CANNOT HAVE ROOM ANYWHERE ELSE.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the performance should not proceed after the first *Shamyu* or the first *Iḍā*.—"For what reason?"—The prohibitive text quoted is found to be accompanied by 'hurry'.—"How so?"—The passages in question stand thus—(A) 'The *Dēvas* and the *Asuras* approached Truth; the *Dēvas* got half of the Truth, and the *Asuras* got the other half; the Truth, being expounded by the *Asuras*, went over to the *Dēvas*; they offered the *Prāyaṇīya sacrifice*, it ended with *Shamyu*; the *Asuras* came to the sacrifice; hence they value *hurry* in the matter of sacrificial performances and make it end with *Shamyu*';—(B)—'They performed the *Ātithyā*, which ended with the *Iḍā*; then the *Asuras* came to the sacrifice; hence they value *hurry* at the performance and make it end with *Iḍā*'.—When people are in 'hurry', they adopt what comes *first*, and do not wait for what comes later. Thus there can be no other room for the Prohibition; from which it follows that the performance should not be proceeded with after the *first Shamyu* or the *first Iḍā*.

Adhikaraṇa (14): *The text 'Ṣaḍupasada upasādyantē' lays down distinct 'Upasads'.*

SŪTRA (43).

[Pūrvapakṣa (A)]—"In regard to the Upasads what has been specified should not be performed."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, in connection with which we read—'*Ṣaḍupasada upasādyantē*' ['The six *Upasads* are performed']; in reference to these *Upasads*, it has been declared that 'They are *without the Prayājas* and *without the Anuyājas*'.

In regard to these texts, there arises the following question—Does the text mean that (*a*) that much of the *Upasads* should be omitted as has been prohibited (by the text), and the rest of it all should be performed ?—or that (*b*) that much should be done as is enjoined by the text in question, and all the rest omitted ?—or that (*c*) the *Upasads* herein laid down are entirely different acts ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* (A) is as follows:—"*In regard to the Upasads, what has been specified should not be performed*; the text 'without *Prayājas* and without *Anuyājas*' has its purpose served by prohibiting the *Prayājas* and the *Anuyājas*, and hence it does not preclude all the rest of the original *Upasads*, which come in under the General Law; and hence all the original *Upasads* should be performed without any distinction [save that the *Prayājas* and the *Anuyājas* are to be omitted]."

SŪTRA (44).

[Pūrvapakṣa (B)]—"By the specification of the particular accessory detail relating to the 'Sruva', all the rest should be taken as precluded."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not right that, leaving aside the *Prayājas* and the *Anuyājas* that have been prohibited by the text in question, all the rest of the original *Upasads* should be performed;—in fact, that much alone should be done as has been enjoined in the text ('Pour the *Āghāra*-oblations with the *Sruva*'); what the text enjoins is the 'Pouring of the *Āghāra*-oblations with the Sruva',—this offering, thus enjoined, precludes everything else; the 'offering of the Āghāra-oblations with the *Sruva*' herein laid down is exactly the same as the original offering; and hence when the same is reiterated without the addition of any the least detail in the text in question, it means that all the rest becomes precluded."

SŪTRA (45).

[*Refutation of Pūrvapakṣa (B) by Pūrvapakṣin (A)*]—" IN FACT, NOTHING IS PROHIBITED; AS IT IS A COUNTER-EXCEPTION FOLLOWING UPON A PROHIBITION."

Bhāṣya.

" It is not right that that alone should be done which is enjoined in the text, and nothing else should be done; in fact, everything should be done, except what has been prohibited. What has been declared is that 'they are to be *without Prayājas and without Anuyājas*'; this text, having prohibited these *Prayājas* and *Anuyājas*, has its purpose entirely served, and hence it cannot preclude anything else.—The opponent has urged that 'the *offering of the oblation with the Sruva* has been enjoined without any qualifications'.—But this is a mere counter-exception, and it does not *preclude* anything. The full passage stands thus: 'One should not pour any oblation beforehand; if one offers an oblation beforehand, he should make another mouth; *he should pour the Āghāra oblation with the Sruva*'; what this means is that 'one should not pour any oblation beforehand—i.e. before the archetypal libations'; these libations, beginning with the *Āghāra*, are the *mouth* of all sacrifices; if therefore one should offer any such offering relating to the *Upasads* as the *Agni* and the rest, he should make another mouth for it;—he should pour the *Āghāra*-oblation with the *Sruva*'.—Hence we find that, having referred to the possibility of the offering of all the oblations save the *Āghāra* and the rest, the last sentence sets forth the counter-exception and reiterates that *the Āghāra-oblation* must be offered; the meaning being that 'he does nothing else, except the offering of the *Āghāra*, and it is not that he does not offer the *Āghāra*'.—Thus we find that there is no preclusion of anything; so that, with the sole exception of what has been prohibited, everything else should be done."

SŪTRA (46).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, THERE IS NO PERFORMANCE OF THE REST OF THE SACRIFICE; AS THE PRINCIPAL DEITY IS ONE TO WHOM NO OFFERING IS TO BE MADE.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, the *Upasads* laid down in the text in question ['The six *Upasads* should be performed'] are entirely distinct acts; so that there is to be no performance of the rest of the Archetypal *Upasads*; and all that the second sentence—'They are without *Prayājas* and without *Anuyājas*'—does is to describe the existing state of things.—There is the following passage which lays down that *the principal deity is one to whom no offering is to be made*, and then goes on to lay down other important duties:—'One should not offer any oblations before the one to *Agni*, *Agni* being the mouth';—having

said this, it goes on—'if one offers any other oblations beforehand, relating to the Ectype, he would be making a *mouth* other than Agni,—while *Agni* is the real mouth ;—he pours the *Āghāra*-oblations with the *Sruva* ; he does not make any offerings to any other deity—to *Agni, Anika, Soma, Shalya* or *Viṣṇu-tējana*'.—This sentence, thus having all its needs fulfilled by the laying down of the *Āghāra*, does not become connected with any of the details of the Archetypal (original) *Upasads* ; which means that all the principal deities of the original *Upasads*, which would come in (under the General Law) as the recipients of offerings, become declared—by the words 'he makes no offerings to any other'—to be such as no offerings can be made to them ; so that at the *Upasads* (laid down as distinct acts), it is *Agni* alone to whom the first offerings are made.

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *The text 'Vāruṇenaikakapālēna, etc.' lays down a distinct 'Avabhṛtha'.*

SŪTRA (47).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'AVABHṚTHA', THE 'GRASS' HAVING BEEN FORBIDDEN, ALL THE REST OF THE RITE SHOULD BE PERFORMED."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is the *Avabhṛtha*-rite, laid down in the text—'*Vāruṇēnaikakapālenāvabhṛthamabhyavayanti*' ['They proceed to the *Avabhṛtha* by offering to *Varuṇa*, the cake baked upon one pan']; in connection with this *Avabhṛtha*, there is a declaration to the effect that 'He offers the *Prayājas* without Kusha-grass; he offers the *Anuyājas* without Kusha grass'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—At the *Avabhṛtha* herein laid down—(*a*) is every detail to be done in the same manner as at the original *Avabhṛtha* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*,—with the sole exception that *Kusha-grass*, which has been prohibited, should not be used?—Or (*b*) does the text preclude all other details of the original *Avabhṛtha*, with the exception of the two *Ājyabhāgas*?—Or (c) is this *Avabhṛtha* entirely distinct (from the original *Avabhṛtha*)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* (A) is as follows:—"Saving the use of the *Kusha-grass*, *all the rest of the Rite should be performed.*—Why?—Because the *Kusha*-grass has been prohibited; the text 'He performs the *Anuyājas* without *Kusha*-grass' has its purposes served by prohibiting the use of *Kusha*-grass; and as such, it cannot exclude anything else coming in by virtue of the General Law; and all the rest of the Rite should be performed.—It might be argued that 'there is the declaration to the effect that *one offers the two Ājyabhāgas*, which serve to preclude all the rest of the Rite'.—But, as a matter of fact, the said declaration of the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings has been taken to be for the purpose of laying down an additional accessory detail by the text '*Apsumantāvājyabhāgau*'."

SŪTRA (48).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"INASMUCH AS AN ACCESSORY DETAIL OF THE ĀJYA-BHĀGAS HAS BEEN LAID DOWN, THERE SHOULD BE PRECLUSION OF EVERYTHING ELSE."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not right that the rest of the Rite should be performed; as a matter of fact, *there should be preclusion of everything else.*—Why?—Because

the *Ājyabhāgas* have been spoken of in the text '*Apsumantāvājyabhāgau*'.—'It has been already pointed out that this text is for the purpose of laying down the additional detail in the shape of *apsumat*'.—That is not possible, we reply. The presence of the *apsumat* is already indicated by the indicative text and by the order of sequence, in connection with the following passage—'*Apsvagnē sadhiṣṭava, apsu mē somobravīt*'; through the presence of these two *mantras*, the *Ājyabhāgas* are already equipped with '*apsu*'; and as this text speaks of no accessory details, it should be taken as preclusive of all other accessory details.—As regards the text, 'He offers the *Prayājas* without *Kusha-grass*, he offers the *Anuyājas* without *Kusha-grass*',—this would be taken as laying down the *Prayājas* and *Anuyājas* previously precluded by the other text. Hence there should be preclusion of the other accessory details."

SŪTRA (49).

[*Refutation of Pūrvapakṣa* (*B*) *by Pūrvapakṣin* (*A*)]—"BUT INASMUCH AS THE PROHIBITION IS OF ONLY A PART OF THE PRAYĀJAS, IT CANNOT BE A SUPPLEMENTARY SENTENCE; HENCE IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A DESCRIPTION OF THE EXISTING STATE OF THINGS."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('but') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

"It is not right that there should be preclusion; as it has been already explained that preclusion is always beset with three incongruities.—Further, the words 'He offers the Prayājas without *Kusha*' cannot be treated as a 'supplementary sentence'. If the sentence is taken as containing the injunction of *the offering of Prayājas* ('*Prayājān yajati*'), then it should be possible to perform the *Prayājas with Kusha* also; and in that case the term '*apavarhiṣaḥ*', 'without Kusha', would be inconsistent. On the other hand, if the sentence is taken as containing only *the prohibition of Kusha*, then there would be no injunction of the performance of the *Prayājas*;—and in that case, the said prohibition would be meaningless.—If, then, the sentence were taken as predicating both (the injunction of the performance of *Prayājas*, as also the prohibition of *Kusha*),—this would involve syntactical split. Nor can the sentence be taken as merely supplementary; as it is a single sentence.—From all this it follows that there cannot be preclusion of the rest of the Rite."

SŪTRA (50).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE MENTION OF THE 'ĀJYABHĀGAS' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS THE DESCRIPTION OF AN EXISTING STATE OF THINGS,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'GṚHAMĒDHĪYA'.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, the *Avabhṛtha* in question is a distinct act; it should be treated in the same manner as the *Gṛhamēdhīya* above (under Sū. 10. 7. 24 *et. seq.*);

—the act being construed along (and syntactically connected) with the directly-declared *Ājyabhāgas* ;—and thereby having all its needs fulfilled, it cannot be connected with any other accessories related to the original (archetypal) sacrifice.—The conclusion thus is that the *Avabhṛtha* in question is a distinct act.

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *At the 'Vājapēya' and other sacrifices, the Post should always be of 'Khadira' wood.*

SŪTRA (51).

WHEN FROM AMONG SEVERAL MUTUALLY INCOMPATIBLE THINGS, ONE IS SPECIALLY MENTIONED, THERE SHOULD BE RESTRICTION; AS THUS ALONE DOES THE MENTION SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE; SPECIALLY BECAUSE THE PARTICULAR THING HAS BEEN SPECIFIED BY THE VEDIC TEXTS;—JUST AS IN THE CASE OF 'REEDS'.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Vājapēya* sacrifice, laid down in the text—'*Sharadi vājapēyēna svārājyakāmo yajēta*' ['Desiring self-sovereignty, one should perform the *Vājapēya* sacrifice during the autumn'];—in connection with this sacrifice, we read—'The Post shall be of *Khadira* wood'.

(A) In regard to this, there arises the question—Can the Post at the *Vājapēya* be made of any of the three kinds of wood, *Khadira*, *Palāsha*, and *Rohitaka* (which are the three laid down as optional alternatives in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, which is the archetype of the *Vājapēya*)?—Or must it be of *Khadira*-wood only?

(B) Similarly, in another connection, we read—'*Bṛhat* is the *Sāman* used';—and in regard to this, there arises the question—May the *Sāman* used be either *Bṛhat* or *Rathantara*? Or must it be *Bṛhat* only?

(C) Similarly, in connection with the *Traidhātavyā*, we read—'The middle one is made of barley'; and in regard to this, there arises the question—Can the middle one be made either of *Barley* or *Vrīhi*? Or must it be of *barley* alone?

To all these questions, the *natural answer* is as follows:—*When, from among several mutually incompatible things*, any one is *specially mentioned, there should be restriction*; that is, (*a*) The Post should be of *Khadira-wood* only,—(*b*) the *Sāman* should be the *Bṛhat* only,—and (*c*) the middle one should be of *Barley* only.—"Why?"—*As thus alone does the special mention serve a useful purpose*; that it is only when there is such restriction that the special mention of the *Khadira*, the *Bṛhat* and the *Barley* has some sense; otherwise, it would be a mere reiteration of what is already known, and as such, superfluous. Inasmuch as the *Khadira*, the *Bṛhat* and the *Barley* have been *specified by the Vedic texts*, they must exclude the other possible alternatives, (*a*) *Palāsha* and *Rohitaka*, (*b*) *Rathantara*, and (*c*) *Vrīhi*;—*just as in the case of 'Reeds'*; that is, when we have the specific mention of *Reeds* in the text 'The grass consists of Reeds', *Kusha* becomes excluded; so should it be in the case in question also.

SŪTRA (52).

[*Pūrvapakṣin's objection against the Siddhānta*]—"INASMUCH AS BOTH HAVE BEEN INDICATED, IT SHOULD NOT BE SO",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

You (*Pūrvapakṣin*) may raise the following objection—"The General Law indicates the admissibility of both the alternatives,—*Khadira and Palāsha, Bṛhat and Rathantara,* the *Barley and Vrihi*; both being thus equally indicated by the General Law, what is there that can exclude the *Palāsha* and other alternatives? The mention of the *Khadira* cannot preclude the other alternatives; because preclusion, as already explained, is beset with three incongruities. Hence it follows that there should be no restriction, there should be option."

SŪTRA (53).

[*Objection against the Pūrvapakṣin's argument*]—IF THAT BE SO, THEN, THE SAME SHOULD BE THE CASE WITH THE 'REEDS' ALSO.

Bhāṣya.

If you argue that—"inasmuch as both the alternatives are indicated, both should be equally admissible," then, in the case of the 'Reeds' also, though they are specially mentioned, the *Kusha* should not be excluded.—To this argument of the *Siddhāntin*, the opponent supplies an answer in the following *Sūtra*.

SŪTRA (54).

[*Pūrvapakṣin's answer to the Siddhāntin's objection*]—"IN THE CASE OF THE REEDS, IT WOULD BE SO BECAUSE WHAT IS INCOMPATIBLE CANNOT BE ADOPTED."

Bhāṣya.

"If you think that the reasoning put forward by us applies to the case of the Reeds also and thereby makes that also open to the same objection,—then our answer is that there would be no objection to the case of the Reeds; as in that case *it would be so*, i.e. *Kusha* would become excluded; why?—*because what is incompatible cannot be adopted*; i.e. when the Reeds have been taken up, it is not possible for the *Kusha* to be taken up, as the latter is not compatible with the Reeds; hence it is only right that the *Kusha* should be excluded."

SŪTRA (55).

[*Objection to the Pūrvapakṣa*]—THE SAME SHOULD HAPPEN IN THE OTHER CASE ALSO.

Bhāṣya.

The same should happen in the other case also;—i.e. in the case of the *Khadira* and the rest also (which are mutually incompatible); when one (e.g. the *Khadira*) has been adopted, the *Palāsha* and the rest, which are incompatible with the *Khadira*, cannot be adopted; and hence they would naturally become excluded [which is just what the *Siddhānta* is].

SŪTRA (56).

[*Pūrvapakṣin's answer to the objection*]—"IN THAT CASE THE DECLARATION WOULD BE FUTILE",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

"If you think that the *Palāsha* and the rest would become excluded on account of the adoption of what is incompatible with them,—then, in that case the injunctive declaration (in the form of the General Law that the Ectype is to be performed in the same manner as the Archetype) would be futile; because the General Law makes the *Palāsha* and the rest also admissible; in fact, it applies equally to the *Khadira*, etc. and to the *Palāsha* and the rest. This has been made clear under *Sūtras* 10. 7. 30-31.—It cannot be argued that—'The declaration of the entire procedure becomes connected with the *Khadira*, etc. and thereby restricts the use to these; being declared by the declaration of procedure, the *Khadira* betakes itself, in due course, to the Animal-sacrifice';—it will not be right to argue thus, because, as a matter of fact, the declaration of the entire sacrificial procedure would affect the sacrifices qualified by some kind of wood; and in this connection, the *Palāsha* and the rest all become admissible under the General Law, and hence cannot be excluded by the *Khadira*, etc.—From all this it follows that there should be *option*."

SŪTRA (57).

[*Refutation of the Pūrvapakṣa*]—INASMUCH AS THE ADOPTION OF THE THING IS FOR A DEFINITE PURPOSE, BOTH CANNOT BE ACCEPTED AS ADOPTABLE.

Bhāṣya.

When the declaration of procedure becomes connected with the directly-enjoined *Khadira*, it does restrict the use to that wood; and the declaration having its needs supplied by that connection, there could be no room

for the coming in of the *Palāsha*; hence what is included in the declaration of procedure is the sacrifice as *qualified by the Khadira*, not as *qualified by the Palāsha*; and consequently it is the *Khadira* alone that can come in, not the *Palāsha*.

Similarly with the *Bṛhat* and the *Barley*. [Restriction to (*a*) *Khadira*, (*b*) *Bṛhat*, and (*c*) *Barley* is the *Siddhānta* view; hence '*rathantarē*' is a wrong reading for '*bṛhati*'.]

From all this it follows that the use is to be restricted to the (*a*) *Khadira*, (*b*) the *Bṛhat*, and (*c*) the *Barley*,—and these cannot be treated as optional alternatives with (*a*) *Palāsha*, (*b*) *Rathantara*, and (*c*) *Vrīhi*.

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *At the 'Prospective' sacrifices, the Substance and the Deity of the original Archetype become excluded.*

SŪTRA (58).

INASMUCH AS ALL ACCESSORY DETAILS ARE MEANT TO SERVE A DEFINITE PURPOSE, ANY ONE OF THEM CAN BE ADMITTED ONLY WHEN A CORRESPONDING ACCESSORY IS NOT ALREADY THERE.

Bhāṣya.

There are certain 'prospective sacrifices' laid down in such texts as—'Desiring effulgence, one should offer a cake baked on eight pans, dedicated to *Agni*',—'Desiring Brahmic glory, one should offer a cake of *Shyāmāka* corn, baked on eleven pans, dedicated to *Agni-Soma*',—'Desiring offspring, one should offer a cake baked on eleven pans, dedicated to *Indra*'.

In regard to all such sacrifices, there arises the question—Are the (archetypal) Substance and Deity that would come into these sacrifices by virtue of the General Law, to be excluded? Or not excluded?

The *Siddhānta* on this question is as follows:—As a matter of fact, whenever such sacrifices are enjoined, they are enjoined along with their own Substance and Deity; while the General Law comes in at a much later stage; so that the Substance and the Deity that become admitted to the sacrifices along with their own injunctions, are such as are not included under the General Law at all. Consequently, the need for a Substance and a Deity being already thus satisfied, the sacrifice does not require any other such accessories; and hence the General Law, under the circumstances, would indicate the admissibility of accessories other than the said Substance and the Deity. So that what has been declared under Sūtra 10. 7. 30,—that that alone is adopted which has not already come in—stands vindicated.

SŪTRA (59).

[*Pūrvapakṣa argument against Siddhānta*]—"IT WOULD BE AN ADDITIONAL (ACCESSORY)",—IF THIS IS URGED (then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*).

Bhāṣya.

"If your view is that the Substance and the Deity having been laid down by the direct injunction, the General Law would indicate the admissibility of accessories other than those,—then, that is not so; as a matter of fact, *it would be an additional accessory.* It has been explained under *Sūtra* 10. 7. 31. that the General Law applies equally to all accessories,—it does not stand in need of anything,—all that it requires is the method due

to the thing; from this it follows that in the case in question, the General Law indicates the admissibility of the (archetypal) Substance and Deity also; and when it is so indicated, then, on the basis of such declaration, the accessory thus indicated should be in addition to that enjoined by the injunction; one set of Substance and Deity being directly enjoined by a text, and the other being indicated by the General Law."

SŪTRA (60).

[*Answer*]—NOT SO; AS THERE IS NO NEED FOR IT.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the additional accessory should be brought in.—"Why?"—Because *there is no need for it*; i.e. there is no useful purpose that could be served by the additional accessory.—It is true that the Substance and Deity indicated by the General Law are not precluded by the direct injunction (of another Substance and Deity); but such accessories are wanted, not for their own sake, but for the sake of something else,—i.e. for the due fulfilment of the act of *sacrifice*;—now this act of *sacrifice* is found to be declared as to be accomplished by means of one Substance and one Deity,—in the text 'Desiring effulgence, one should offer the cake baked on eight pans, dedicated to *Agni*', and so forth. Under the circumstances, if it were assumed that it stands in need of the help (of another Substance and Deity), this would be contrary to the said injunction. When too the sacrifice has been accomplished by means of the Substance and Deity directly enjoined, there can be no use for any other Substance and Deity that could be indicated by the General Law; so that, even though declared in this manner, they cannot be used, as the purpose will have been already served.

ADHIKARAṆA (18) : *At the animal-sacrifice to Soma-Pūṣan, the Post shall be of Khadira wood only.*

SŪTRA (61).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—WHERE ONE ACCESSORY IS ENJOINED IN THE MODIFIED FORM, THE ARCHETYPAL ACCESSORY CANNOT COME IN; IF IT COULD COME IN, THEN THERE WOULD BE AN UNREASONABLE OPTION.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with a certain sacrifice, we read—'The Post is to be of *Udumbara* wood'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the wood used at the Archetype for the making of the Post excluded from this sacrifice? Or is it included?

The view that presents itself (as the *Siddhānta*) is as follows:—*When one accessory* (Post)—'*one accessory*', i.e. the accessory that is meant for the same purpose as the *Khadira* and other kinds of wood,—*is enjoined in the modified form*,—that it should be of *Udumbara* wood,—then the archetypal accessory—i.e. the *Khadira* and other woods—*cannot come in*; just as, in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, there was exclusion of the Archetypal Substance and Deity, similarly in the present case also, there should be exclusion of the wood used for the Post at the archetype.

In case the archetypal accessory did come in, this would mean an option between two alternatives separately laid down,—one enjoined by the Direct Injunction and the other indicated by the General Law;—and this would not be right. For this reason also the archetypal accessory cannot come in.

SŪTRA (62).

[*Pūrvapakṣa objection against Siddhānta*]—"ALL THAT IS LAID DOWN (SHOULD BE ADOPTED)",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

"If you think that *option* would be open to objection, then let there be *combination* (of both the woods);—the animal may be tied to both the Posts (one of *Udumbara* and the other of *Khadira*);—such a course would be in due accordance with the General Law."

SŪTRA (63).

[*Siddhāntin's answer*]—THAT CANNOT BE; AS IT IS NOT LAID DOWN IN CONNECTION WITH THE ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be as suggested. As a matter of fact, what the Direct Injunction lays down is tying to the Post made of *Udumbara* wood *only*; similarly in connection with the Archetype what is laid down is tying to the Post made of *Khadira* wood *only*,—the text being '*Khādirē badhnāti*' ('Ties to the Post made of *Khadira*').—In support of the view that the tying is to be done to the Post made of *both* kinds of wood, there is neither any Direct Injunction, nor the text relating to the Archetype. So that there is no authority for the *combination* of both. Hence we conclude that the wood of which the Post is made at the Archetype becomes excluded from the sacrifice in question.

ADHIKARAṆA (19): *Persons desiring Brahmic Glory should offer Vrīhi-corn only.*

SŪTRA (64).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AT THE ECTYPAL SACRIFICE, THERE SHALL BE NO RESTRICTION, BECAUSE THE MENTION IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF LAYING DOWN THE QUALIFICATION,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'PṚṢADĀJYA'; SPECIALLY BECAUSE BOTH HAVE BEEN LAID DOWN; IT IS ONLY WHEN (THE VRĪHI IS USED) THAT THE DECLARATION OF THE QUALIFICATION CAN BE APPLICABLE."

Bhāṣya.

There are these texts—'*Saumāraudram ghṛtē charunnirvapēt shuklānām vrīhīṇām brahmavarchasakāmaḥ;—Saumāraudram charunnirvapēt kṛṣṇānām vrīhīṇām abhicharan;—Nairṛtam charunnirvapēt kṛṣṇānām vrīhīṇām—sauryapañcharunnirvapēt shuklānām vrīhīṇām*'. ['Desiring Brahmic glory, one should offer white *Vrīhi* cooked in Clarified Butter, to *Soma-Rudra*;—Desiring to injure others, one should offer cooked black *Vrīhi*, to *Soma-Rudra*;—One should offer cooked black *Vrīhi*, to *Nirṛti*;—One should offer cooked white *Vrīhi*, to *Sūrya*'.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—May all this offering be made of *Vrīhi* or *Yava*? Or must it be of *Vrīhi only*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*At the Ectypal sacrifice*,—if any one of several mutually incompatible things is specially mentioned,—*there shall be no restriction*;—i.e. the offering may be made of *Vrīhi or Yava*.—Why so?—*Because the mention is for the purpose of laying down the qualification*; i.e. when the *Vrīhi* is specially mentioned, it is for the purpose of laying down its qualification (*white, black*, etc.), and not for the purpose of connecting it with the particular sacrifice; so that what is meant is that the *Vrīhi* that is offered should be *white* (or *black*); as for the *offering*, that may be made of both.—Just as in the text 'One should perform the *Anuyājas* with *Pṛṣadājya* (Mixed Clarified Butter)', the 'Clarified Butter' has been taken to be mentioned for the purpose of laying down its 'mixed character'; so in the present instance also, the *Vrīhi* has been mentioned for the purpose of laying down its '*white*' character,—not for the purpose of connecting it with the *offering*, and precluding all other things (*Yava* and the rest).—Similarly, such declarations as—'Even though the sacrificer belong to the clan of *Four-Slices*, yet the omentum should be prepared in *five* slices',—are justifiable only if they do not exclude any archetypal accessory; so that it is only when the 'Four Slices' are not excluded by the 'Five Slices', that the qualifying phrase, 'even though the sacrifice happen to belong to the clan of *Four-Slices*', comes to have some sense. This also saves the injunction of the

qualification from being useless (as it would otherwise be).—That this is the correct view is shown also by the fact that *both have been laid down*; i.e. the *Vrihi* and the *Yava* are both equally indicated by the General Law to be admissible; and as such they should be treated as optional alternatives.—*It is only in the event of Vrihi being used that the declaration of the qualification becomes applicable*; in the event of *Vrihi* not being used, the said declaration would naturally cease to apply.—From all this it follows that there should be option."

SŪTRA (65).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THERE SHOULD BE RESTRICTION, AS BOTH SERVE THE SAME PURPOSE; SPECIALLY BECAUSE THE SPECIFICATION IS DONE BY DIRECT DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

Vrihi and *Yava* both serve the same purpose; hence when the *Vrihi* has been specifically mentioned, there is no room for the coming in of *Yava*.—"But it has been pointed out that the *Vrihi* has been mentioned for the purpose of laying down the qualification".—That cannot be right; if the *Vrihi* had been really mentioned for the purpose of laying down the qualification, then there would be no restriction; but as a matter of fact, it has not been mentioned for the purpose of laying down the qualification; as is clear from the presence of the Genitive Ending in the word '*vrihiṇām*',—an ending which denotes connection with the *modified sacrifice* (Ectype),—the denotation of the basic noun being entirely different; so that what the Direct Declaration by the Genitive expresses is the qualification of the modified sacrifice; on the other hand, the fact of the qualification belonging to a sacrificial accessory is expressed by *Syntactical Connection*;—Direct Declaration is always more authoritative than Syntactical Connection;—hence by Direct Declaration the *Vrihi* becoming connected with the *offering*, must exclude the *Yava*, which would serve exactly the same purpose.

SŪTRA (66).

ALSO BECAUSE OF INCOMPATIBILITY, AS IN THE ORDINARY WORLD.

Bhāṣya.

Then again, the two (*Vrihi and Yava*) are mutually incompatible.—"How?"—When several things are spoken of as accomplishing the same purpose, they are always regarded as mutually incompatible; and things that are mutually incompatible cannot function jointly;—*as in the ordinary world*; for instance, when it is said 'one should not eat fish with milk', the meaning is that, even though the fish be possessed of (excellent) qualities, yet it is not eaten with milk (which becomes excluded);—in the

same manner, even when the *Vrihi* is endowed with qualities, it must exclude the *Yava*.

SŪTRA (67).

ALSO BECAUSE THE QUALIFICATION BELONGS TO THE SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

Objection—"If the *Vrīhi* is connected with the *modified sacrifice*, how can it be connected with the qualification?"

Answer—The *Vrīhi* has no connection with the qualification, either through Direct Declaration or through Syntactical Connection; nor is the qualification connected with the *Vrīhi*; as a matter of fact, *the qualification belongs to the sacrifice*; it is the *sacrifice* that is spoken of as qualified by 'whiteness' and by 'blackness'; so that when the whole becomes construed together as one sentence, the *substance* (*Vrīhi*) and the *qualification* (whiteness or blackness) become connected with the same purpose at the particular sacrifice; and this also sets aside the objection based upon the diversity of purpose.

SŪTRA (68).

FROM AMONG A NUMBER OF MUTUALLY INCOMPATIBLE THINGS, WHERE ONE HAS BEEN SPECIALLY MENTIONED,—IF THERE WERE OPTION, IT WOULD BE ONE NOT SANCTIONED BY THE SCRIPTURES.

Bhāṣya.

From among a number of mutually incompatible things, where one is specially mentioned by Direct Declaration, while another is only indicated by the General Law,—this latter, in the presence of the Direct Declaration, cannot have any scriptural authority; so that if there were an option, it would be most unreasonable.—Hence there must be *restriction*.

SŪTRA (69).

AS REGARDS THE 'PṚṢADĀJYA', COMBINATION IS POSSIBLE; HENCE THE MENTION HAS BEEN TAKEN AS LAYING DOWN A QUALIFICATION.

Bhāṣya.

In the case of the *Pṛṣadājya*, it is only right that there should be combination; because in that case, the Clarified Butter (*Ājya*) is not incompatible with anything; so that the use of the Butter is not a partial (optional) alternative; hence there is a combination of the Butter and the Curd. Inasmuch as the *Curd* is put in for the purpose of bringing about the 'mixed' (*pṛṣat*) character in the Clarified Butter, the Curd also is not a partial (optional) alternative; hence it has been combined with the Clarified Butter.

SŪTRA (70).

[*Objection*]—"THE DECLARATION 'EVEN THOUGH THE SACRIFICER BELONG TO THE CLAN OF FOUR SLICES, ETC.' IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH RESTRICTION".

Bhāṣya.

It has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that "if in such cases there were restriction, then the mention of 'four slices' in the text 'If the sacrificer belong to the clan of Four Slices' could not be justified".—This has got to be refuted. [This is done in the following *Sūtra*] :—

SŪTRA (71).

IT WOULD APPLY TO ANOTHER SACRIFICE, AS THE SAME REASONING IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THAT CASE,—THE SACRIFICES BEING ENTIRELY DIFFERENT.

Bhāṣya.

The mention of 'Four Slices' would be applicable to another sacrifice,—i.e. to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*; the meaning being—'Even though *at the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, the Sacrificer is one belonging to the clan of *Four Slices*, yet, the omentum should be made of Five Slices',—so that there are 'Four Slices' used at one sacrifice, and 'Five Slices' at a totally different sacrifice.—Hence, even though in cases like the one in question, there is Restriction, yet there is no incongruity in the mention of 'Four Slices'.

Adhikaraṇa (20): *The injunction that 'The omentum should be made into five slices' is applicable to the subsidiary offerings also.*

SŪTRA (72).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"It should be as it is actually declared",—if this is urged [the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is the animal sacrificed to *Agni-Soma*, as laid down in the text—'If one, on being initiated, sacrifices the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*';—in connection with this animal-sacrifice, we read—'Even though the Sacrificer belong to the clan of *Four-Slices*, the omentum should be made of five slices';—[Special clans appear to have had distinguishing marks; for instance, the number of hair-tufts on the head; the number of *cake-slices* at sacrificial rituals also appears to be such a distinguishing mark].

In regard to this, there arises the following question—In connection with the fulfilment of the transcendental result following from the subsidiary offerings, does the mention of 'five slices' in connection with the omentum exclude the (previously-mentioned) 'four slices'? Or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"If such a question is raised, our answer is that there can be no doubt in the matter at all;—why?—when the mention of 'five slices' occurs in connection with a certain sacrifice, it is in connection with the same sacrifice—not with any other,—that it can exclude the 'four slices'. And just as it does not exclude the latter in connection with any other sacrifice,—so in the same manner, the mention of 'five slices' will not exclude it in reference to the transcendental results following from the subsidiary offerings also."

SŪTRA (73).

[Siddhānta]—That cannot be; because the injunction is one only.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be as suggested. *The injunction is one only*—in the form, 'If, on being initiated, one sacrifices the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*'.—Under the same context, the 'five slices' have been laid down; hence on the basis of 'Context', the 'five slices' must appertain to the transcendental result following from the subsidiary offerings.

Says the Opponent—"On the basis of *Syntactical Connection*, the *five slices* should appertain to the *omentum* only".

Not so, we reply. The omentum being a material substance, no useful purpose would be served by connecting the 'five slices' with it.

Says the Opponent—"The declaration of procedure relating to the omentum would include the character of *having five slices*; so that there would be no incongruity".

Answer—Even so, the connection of 'five slices' with the transcendental result following from the subsidiary offerings would be duly established.

"How?"

There is only one injunction laying down the subsidiary offerings as also the omentum-offering;—if the 'five slices' are connected with that injunction, it must be connected with the subsidiary offerings also.

"But on account of its connection with the omentum, it is the *omentum*—and not the subsidiary offerings—that should have *five slices*."

Answer—There is no such declaration as that 'it is the omentum only that is *five-sliced*'; what the declaration means is that 'the omentum must be *five-sliced* only'; and as a matter of fact, such declarations emphasise that in connection with which the term 'only' is used, as against things other than that. So that mere connection with the omentum cannot exclude the 'five-slices' from factors to which it is as applicable as to the omentum; because there is no word connoting such exclusion.

From all this it follows that in connection with the subsidiary offerings, the 'four-slices' should not be there [as it is excluded by the mention of the 'five slices'].

Then again, it is only when the 'five-slices' is applicable to subsidiary offerings like those in question that another injunction becomes comprehensible—such as 'He slices each of them twice'.—The *omentum* has been mentioned only as indicating 'offering-materials' in general; and it is this particular material that is so mentioned because it is the first to be used on the occasion concerned. It is not the omentum that is enjoined here; if that were what is enjoined, there would be syntactical split.

The conclusion thus is that in connection with the subsidiary offerings also, the 'five slices' alone should be adopted.

End of Pāda vii of Adhyāya X.

ADHYĀYA X.

PĀDA VIII.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *When there is a prohibition, relating either (a) to what has been indicated by the General Law, or (b) to what has been laid down without reference to any particular sacrifice,—it should be treated as an 'Exception' (Paryudāsa).*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" WHEN THERE IS A PROHIBITION, RELATING TO WHAT IS INDICATED BY THE GENERAL LAW, OR TO WHAT HAS BEEN LAID DOWN WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY PARTICULAR SACRIFICE,—THERE SHOULD BE OPTION; AS IT IS A CASE OF PROHIBITION OF WHAT IS ADMISSIBLE."

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) We find Prohibitions relating to a detail indicated as admissible by the General Law; (*b*) as also those relating to what has been enjoined without reference to any particular sacrifice. (*a*) As an example of prohibition of what has been indicated by the General Law, we have the text—'At the *Mahāpitṛyajña*, one does not appoint the *Hotṛ* or the *Ārṣēya*';—(*b*) as an example of what has been laid down without reference to any particular sacrifice, we have the text—'Let the expression be *āshrāvaya*, which has four letters,—*Shrauṣaṭ*, which has four letters (in the form *shra-u-ṣa-ṭ*),—*Yāja*, which has two letters,—*Yē-yajāmahē*, which has five letters,—the syllable *vaṣaṭ*, which has two letters; this is *Prajāpati*, the seventeenth, connected with sacrifices' [Here the use of the phrase *yē-yajamahē* has been laid down, without reference to any particular sacrifice];—and relating to this, there is the *prohibition*—'One does not use the phrase *yē-yajāmahē* at the *Anuyājas*'.

In regard to all this, there arises the following question—Is this prohibition—of what is indicated by the General Law, and of what is laid down without reference to any particular sacrifice—to be taken as laying down an *option*? Or as laying down an *exception* ('*Paryudāsa*')?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"It should be treated as a case of *option*; because both, the admissibility as well as the prohibition, are authoritative; both admissibility and prohibition are supported by authority. For instance, (*a*) the authority for admissibility consists in the declaration (General Law)—'The *Mahāpitṛyajña* should be performed in the manner

of its Archetype' [and at the Archetype, there is appointment of the *Hotṛ* and the *Ārṣēya*];—(*b*) similarly for the admissibility of the phrase '*Yē-yajāmahē*', the authority consists in the declaration—'This is *Prajāpati*, the seventeenth, connected with sacrifices';—both these declarations are authoritative, independently of the Prohibitions.—(*a*) The Prohibition relating to (*a*) also has its authority in the declaration—'One does not appoint the *Hotṛ*, nor the *Ārṣēya*, he leaves them to Death';—(*b*) similarly the Prohibition relating to (*b*) has its authority in the declaration—'One does not use the phrase *yē-yajāmahē* at the *Anuyājas*'. By virtue of the former declaration (*b*), the use of the phrase '*yē-yajāmahē*' is admissible at all sacrifices; and it is prohibited in reference to the *Anuyājas* in the prohibitive text 'One does not use the phrase *yē-yajāmahē* at the *Anuyājas*'. Thus from the declaration that 'the phrase *yē-yajāmahē* should be used', it follows that that performance is fruitful at which the phrase '*yē-yajāmahē*' is used; while from the prohibition that 'the phrase *yē-yajāmahē* should not be used', it follows that that performance is fruitful at which the phrase *yē-yajāmahē* is *not* used. And inasmuch as both are authoritative, it follows that *both* the performances are fruitful; which means that they should be treated as optional alternatives.—Similarly in the case of *the appointment of the Hotṛ and the Ārṣēya*.—Thus we conclude that, inasmuch as *it is a case of prohibition of what is admissible, there should be option*."

SŪTRA (2).

[*Objection against the Pūrvapakṣa*]—IT SHOULD BE TREATED AS A CASE OF (PROHIBITION OF) WHAT IS ONLY POSSIBLE IN AN ORDINARY WAY,—" IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*]".

Bhāṣya.

If the Pūrvapakṣin thinks that there should be *option*,—that cannot be right. As a matter of fact, *it should be treated as a case of prohibition of what is only possible in an ordinary way*. In cases where we have a prohibition relating to what is possible only in a general sort of way (not under any authority)—e.g. 'Poison should not be taken', 'The finger should not be presented before a serpent', 'The foot should not be placed upon thorns' and so forth,—what is meant is that these acts are not to be done at all; it does not mean that there is to be option (that one may or may not take poison, and so forth). On the analogy of such cases, we conclude that, as between an Injunction and a Prohibition, the Prohibition is more authoritative; the Prohibition comes in only after the Injunction is there; and as a general rule, whenever an assertion is made contrary to what is there already, it sets aside this latter. Hence the conclusion is (*b*) that the phrase *yē-yajāmahē* should *never* be used at the *Anuyājas*, and (*a*) that at the *Mahāpitṛyajñā*, the appointment of the *Hotṛ* and the *Ārṣēya* should *never* be done.

SŪTRA (3).

[*The Pūrvapakṣin's answer to the objection*]—"THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE THERE ARE EQUAL REASONS,—BOTH THE COURSES BEING SANCTIONED BY SCRIPTURAL AUTHORITY."

Bhāṣya.

"It cannot be as suggested above. There are equal reasons in support of the *admissibility* and of the *prohibition*; because *both are sanctioned by scriptural authority*,—the admissibility as well as the prohibition. That is to say, the admissibility of the course is there, even while the Prohibition is there,—and the Prohibition also is there even while the admissibility is there. Under similar circumstances, in ordinary experience, when both admissibility and prohibition are there in the usual course, one course is found to be beneficial and the other harmful,—so that people adopt that course which is beneficial. In scriptural matters, however, no such benefit or harm is visible; hence whatever is found to be declared by texts is accepted as right; hence both admissibility and prohibition are adopted. Consequently, in every such case there should be option."

SŪTRA (4).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT; BECAUSE OPTION IS MOST IMPROPER; IT SHOULD THEREFORE BE TAKEN AS A PART OF THE INJUNCTIONS.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*api tu*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

As a matter of fact, the prohibition should be taken as supplementary,—(*a*) to other indications of the General Law, and (*b*) to the injunction without reference to any particular sacrifice.—(*b*) The prohibitive sentence is not to be construed as that 'The phrase *Yē-yajāmahē* should not be used at the *Anuyājas*'; the construction is simply as 'not the phrase *Yē-yajāmahē*'; the negative '*na*' being construed with the term '*anuyāja*', not with the verb '*Karoti*' ('use').—"What if that is so?"—The expression '*na anuyājēṣu*' ('not at the *Anuyājas*') remains incomplete as a sentence, and thus remaining deficient, it becomes connected with a part of the preceding sentence, the full sentence thus being—'What has been said regarding the using of the phrase *Yē-yajāmahē* is not to apply to the case of the *Anuyājas*', which is the same thing as saying that 'the phrase '*Yē-yajāmahē* is to be used at all sacrifices, *except at the Anuyājas*';—hence the whole is an injunction *with the Anuyājas excepted*, and there is no prohibition at all; so that there is no room for option.—(*a*) Similarly, in connection with the *Mahāpitṛyajña* also, it is gathered, from the General Law regarding the

Ectype being performed in the manner of the Archetype', that *the appointment of the Hotṛ and the Ārṣēya* should be made; but when it is followed by the words that 'one does not appoint the *Hotṛ* and the *Ārṣēya*', the idea obtained is that 'the *Mahāpitṛyajña* should be performed like the Archetype, *excepting the appointment of the Hotṛ and the Ārṣēya*'; the negative '*na*' being construed with 'appointing' (expressed by the verbal root in the word '*Vṛṇītē*'), what is expressed by the conjugational ending is a mere reiteration; the sense being—'What has been said regarding the sacrifice being performed *in the manner of the Archetype* is *with the exception of the said appointment*'.

Question—"Why should the negative *na* be construed (*b*) with the '*anuyājas*' and (*a*) with what is expressed by the root in '*vṛṇītē*' (i.e. the 'appointing')?"

Answer—*Because option is most improper*; it is not right to adopt an option.—"Why?"—In the case in question, when it is said that 'one uses the phrase *Yē-yajāmahē* at sacrifices',—if it be understood to mean that 'a sacrifice cannot be performed without using the phrase *Yē-yajāmahē*', then the prohibitive sentence ['one should not use the phrase *Ye-yajāmahē* at the *Anuyājas*'] would have no sense; or if the prohibition would be admitted, then the injunction would have no sense;—hence it follows that recourse to option is most improper.

"It is just because one or the other injunction would have no sense that option has to be accepted."

Answer—In a case where one or the other injunction would otherwise become meaningless, there may be some reason for having recourse to option; but only when no sense can be got out of it in any way. In the case in question, however, the injunction (negative) serves the purpose of making an *exception* of connection with the *anuyājas*. Hence there is no reason for admitting an option.

Says the Opponent—"If the negative '*na*' is construed with the word '*anuyājēṣu*', then there should be a compound; because in such cases the compounding of the negative term with a noun is compulsory,—as declared by the revered *Vārtikakāra, Kātyāyana*, in the words '*Vāvachanānarthakhyañcha svabhāvasiddhatvāt*'."

Compounding in such cases is not compulsory,—'it is only optional', says the revered *Pāṇini* under *Sūtra* 2. 1. 11; and it is the word of *Pāṇini* that is authoritative, by reason of its saying what is true and right,—not the word of *Kātyāyana*, which is not true and not right; as one who says untrue things may speak of things without actually seeing them.

From all this it follows that the sentences in question should be taken as laying down *exceptions*.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The negation contained in such texts as 'Na tau pashau karoti' is to be taken as a 'declaration' (Arthavāda).*

SŪTRA (5).

WHEN IT IS SOMETHING NEW, IT MUST BE A COMMENDATORY DECLAMATION.

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, at which there are two *Ājyabhāga* offerings; in connection with these latter it is declared—'*Na tau pashau karoti, na somē*' ['One does not do these at the *Pashu*-sacrifice, nor at the *Soma*-sacrifice'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does this sentence lay down an *exception*? Or a *prohibition*? Or is it only a declaration?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"The present text cannot be taken as laying down an *exception*, in the same manner as in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*;—why?—because the statement is found in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices; where then is there any possibility of its applying to the case of the *Soma*-sacrifice? In fact, if the *Soma*-sacrifice were excepted, there would be no such connection (of the *Ājyabhāgas*) with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices as 'with the exception of the *Soma*'. Hence the only way in which the statement can be taken is as a prohibition of the *Ājyabhāgas* in reference to the *Soma*-sacrifice, wherein they would be admissible under the General Law.—It might be argued that the *Soma*-sacrifice is something quite new (and it is not the Ectype of any Archetype); hence the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings could not be admissible at it by virtue of the General Law.—The answer to this is that the term '*Soma*' would be merely indicative of all those sacrifices, such as the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and the rest, that are related to *Soma*,—the sense of the prohibition being that 'the *Ājyabhāga* offerings should not be made at any of these sacrifices'."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*When it is something new, it must be a commendatorg declamation*; inasmuch as the *Soma*-sacrifice is entirely new (and not an Ectype of any Archetypal sacrifice), the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings cannot come into it by virtue of the General Law; hence the sentence in question cannot be taken as a prohibition.—It might be argued that—"the term '*Soma*' could be indicative of the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and other sacrifices (connected with *Soma*)".—This is open to this same objection that it involves such an *indication*.—Then again, even if such an indication were accepted, the sentence would contain the prohibition of what is otherwise admissible; so that it would be a case of *option*; and it has been already explained that recourse to option is not right. Hence recourse could be had to option only if no other way were possible; it is however possible for the

sentence '*na tau pashau karoti*, etc.' ['one does not do them at the *Pashu*-sacrifice'] as a commendatory declaration.

"What would be the sense of this *commendation* ?"

It is this that at the *Soma*-sacrifice, *as at the Pashu-sacrifice*, the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings are not made; after being anointed, the Sacrificial Post is spoken of as the 'Sun'—in the text '*Āditya yūpaḥ*',—on the ground of its resembling the Sun in *brightness*; similarly in the case in question, there is the commendation in the sense—why the said offerings should not be made at the *Pashu*-sacrifice—[This is a case of *Arthavāda*, Declamatory Statement, in the form of citation of an analogous instance].

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *Negations contained in such texts as 'Nātirātrē ṣoḍashinam gṛhṇāti' are to be taken as setting forth option.*

SŪTRA (6).

NEGATION FOLLOWING AFTER INJUNCTION WOULD BE PROHIBITION (PRATIṢĒDHA).

Bhāṣya.

Question—" In *Adhikaraṇa* (1), the negative term '*na*' has been shown to denote *exception* (*Paryudāsa*),—in *Adhikaraṇa* (2), it has been shown to denote *commendatory declamation* (*Arthavāda*);—what is the distinguishing feature of *Prohibition* (*Pratiṣēdha*, which forms the third connotation of the negative term) ? "

In answer to this the distinguishing feature of Prohibition is set forth in the *Sūtra*—*Negation following after injunction would be Prohibition*; e.g. the negation contained in the text—'*Nātirātrē ṣoḍashinam gṛhṇāti*' ['One does not take up the *Ṣoḍashin* at the *Atirātra*'] [which follows after the injunction '*Atirātrē ṣoḍashinam gṛhṇāti*', 'one takes up the *Ṣoḍashin* at the *Atirātra*'],—cannot be taken as laying down an *exception*; it could be so taken only if the construction were 'One takes up the *Ṣoḍashin* at the *Atirātra, except at the Atirātra*',—and such a construction would be impossible!—Nor can the sentence be taken as commendatory of anything. Hence the only construction possible is 'One does not take up' [a pure Prohibition; and this means that in view of the Injunction and the Prohibition both being there, the *taking up of the Ṣoḍashin* should, in actual practice, be treated as *optional*].

Objection—" It is not possible for the Injunction and the Prohibition of the same act to be accepted, as the two are mutually incompatible ".

Answer—On the strength of the Direct Declaration of the Veda, the Prohibition would be operative after having set aside the Injunction, and the Injunction would be operative after setting aside the Prohibition; there is no other way out of it; hence in either case one of the two notions would have to be regarded as *wrong*,—the Injunction being wrong when the Prohibition is *not wrong*, and the Prohibition being *wrong* when the Injunction is *not wrong*.

" In that case, it should be either Injunction *in all cases*, or Prohibition *in all cases*."

Answer—It has been already explained that one or the other of these two notions has to be regarded as *wrong*, on the strength of the Direct Declaration and on the ground of their being mutually incompatible; but what this means is that when, in any particular case, the entire procedure comes to be declared, it adopts only one of the two alternative notions, and

does not adopt the other; so that the end in view becomes accomplished by the adoption of either one of the alternatives [which are thus *optional*].

"But the absence of the other alternative (which is equally authoritative) would make the performance defective to that extent."

Answer—True, there would be this defect; but even in the presence of this defect, the performance is regarded as duly accomplished,—on the authority of the Direct Declaration. Hence there can be nothing wrong in this.

In a case where any other construction of the sentence would be possible, no *option* would be admissible;—as for instance, in the case of the sentence '*Nānuyājēṣu yēyajāmaham karoti*' ['One does not use the phrase *yēyajāmahē* at the *Anuyājas*'] [Vide Adhikaraṇa (1), above].

Adhikaraṇa (4) : *Such negations as 'Anāhutirvai jartilāḥ' should be treated as declamations.*

SŪTRA (7).

Only if no other Injunction were there [could option be admitted]; when there is such other Injunction, the statement should be regarded as declamatory; because of futility, and because it is to be construed along with the other.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with *Agnihotra*, we read—(*a*) '*Jartilayavāgvā juhuyāt, gavēdhukayavāgvā juhuyāt,—na grāmyān pashūn hinasti, nāraṇyān*' ;—(*b*) '*Atho khalvāhuranāhutir vai jartilāshcha gavēhukāshcha ;—payasā' gnihotram juhuyāt*' [(*a*) 'One may offer libations of the gruel of *Jartila-grains*,—one may offer libations of the *gruel* of *Gavēdhuka-grains* ;—one may not kill tame animals, nor wild ones'; (*b*) 'They say that *Jartila-grains* are unfit for offering ; so also are *Gavēdhuka-grains* ; one should perform the *Agnihotra* with *milk*']. ['*Jartila*' is *wild sesamum*.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the sentence, 'One may offer libations of *Jartila-gruel*, one may offer libations of *Gavēdhuka-gruel*', an *injunction*,—and the sentence, '*Jartila-grains* and *Gavedhuka-grains* are unfit for offering', a *prohibition* [and consequently the two are to be treated as *optional* alternatives] ?—or are both these sentences only declamatory statements,—the only Injunction in the case being that 'one should perform the *Agnihotra* with milk' ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows :—" The sentence 'one should offer libations of *Jartila-gruel*' should be treated as an *Injunction*; because the injunctive word ('*juhuyāt*', 'should offer, etc.') is clearly present in it ; similarly, it is also clear that the sentence '*Jartila-grains* are unfit for offering' is a *prohibition* ;—the sentence 'one should perform the *Agnihotra* with milk' is an entirely distinct injunction,—this also is quite clear. So that the upshot of the whole is that—(*a*) 'one may offer libations, *either* of *Jartila-gruel, or of Gavēdhuka-gruel*,—or (*b*), of *Milk*, and of neither of the former two'.—This cannot be treated as a case of *exception* ; because the negative word '*na*' is not capable of being connected either with '*Jartila*-gruel' or with '*Gavēdhuka*-gruel',—it being compounded with the term '*āhuti*' (in the word '*anāhutiḥ*') ;—even if the negative term were assumed to have the capacity of being connected with '*Jartila*-gruel' or with '*Gavēdhuka*-gruel', no such connection as '*ajartilayavāgvā jartilayavāgvā vā juhuyāt*' would be possible. Further, if this construction were possible, and it were treated as a case of exception, the Injunction would be wholly useless, as the whole of the '*Jartila*-gruel' would have fallen under the exception. In the event of

the injunction being that of *milk*, there would be no sense in the *exception*, as there would be nothing to indicate the possibility of the use of either of the two *gruels*.—From all this it follows that this should be treated as a case of *option*."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta* :—By reason of the prohibition of what had been enjoined, there would have been option if there were no other Injunction available ;—when, however, there is another Injunction in the sentence, 'one should perform the *Agnihotra* with milk', the other statements,—that regarding the libations of *Gavēdhuka* and also that regarding the unfitness (of *Jartila*, etc.) for offering,—should be treated as commendatory declamations ;—(*a*) *because of futility* ; that is, any prohibition (of offering the *Jartila*) would be entirely futile, when the injunction is of offering *milk* ; because this very injunction implies that the *Jartila* or the *Gavēdhuka* is not fit for offering.—"But how can they be *unfit for offering*, when they are actually offered at sacrifices ?" —It follows from the fact that *it is to be construed along with the other* ;— i.e. the *injunction* of offering the *Jartila* and the *Gavēdhuka*, as also the *prohibition* (of these), is to be construed along with the other injunction—that 'one should perform the *Agnihotra* with milk' ; so that the whole forms a single sentence ; and the declaration regarding the offering of *Jartila-gruel* or *Gavēdhuka-gruel* becomes connected with the deprecatory statement that '*Jartila* and *Gavēdhuka* are unfit for offering' ; and this deprecation is for the purpose of commending the injunction of *Milk*.—"How so ?"—The sense of the whole context is as follows—'Offerings of *Jartila* and *Gavēdhuka* are excellent in so far as they do not involve the killing of any tame or wild animals ;—but even though they are so excellent, they are *no-offering* (i.e. unfit as offerings) in comparison with the offering of milk ;—so that the milk-offering is very much more excellent'.—Further, the statement that 'one should offer libations of *Jartila-gruel*' is not made with a view to the actual offering of the substance ; in fact, it is made only for the purpose of stating the prohibition that follows. If it were taken as an injunction of the doing of a certain act, then certain factors would have to be assumed ; while by being connected with the prohibition, it becomes a deprecatory statement which tends to the glorification of something else (Milk) ; the order of sequence also becomes preserved in this case. The present case is to be treated like that of the sentence '*Viṣam bhakṣayītavyam na kadāchit*' ['Poison is to be taken never'],—where the *assertion* of the 'taking of poison' (contained in the words '*viṣam bhakṣayītavyam*') is made only for the purpose of prohibiting it (by the subsequent phrase '*na kadāchit*'),—and not with a view to its being actually carried into effect.

Adhikaraṇa (5): *In connection with the 'Traiyambaka' offerings, the statements regarding 'Pouring' and 'Non-pouring' should be regarded as commendatory declarations.*

SŪTRA (8).

BECAUSE THEY STAND ON THE SAME FOOTING AS THE FOREGOING STATEMENTS.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifices, there are certain offerings of cakes baked upon one pan, named '*Traiyambaka*' by reason of being made with the mantra '*Tryayambakam yajāmahē*, etc.';—in reference to these offerings, there are the following declarations—(A) '*Abhighāryāḥ nābhighāryāḥ iti mīmāmsantē—yadabhighārayēt rudrāyāsyē pashūnabhidadhyāt; yannābhighārayēt na rudrāyasyē pashūnabhidadhyāt; atho khalvāhurabhighāryā ēva, na hi haviranabhighṛtamasti*' ['Are the libations to be *poured* or *not to be poured*?—thus do they ponder; if one pours a libation, he puts the animals into the very mouth of Rudra; if he does not pour it, he does not put the animals into Rudra's mouth; and they say that the libations should be poured; as an offering is not an offering until it has been poured'];—(B) '*Hotavyamagnihotranna hotavyamiti mīmāmsantē brahmavādinaḥ; yadi juhuyāt yathāpūrvamāhutīrjuhuyāt; yanna juhuyāt agniḥ parāpatēt; tūṣṇīmēva hotavyam; yathāpūrvamāhutīrjuhoti, nāgniḥ parapatati*' ['Expounders of the Veda ponder over the question as to whether *Agnihotra*-offerings should be made or not made; if one makes the offerings, he should make them as before; if he does not make the offerings, the Fire comes down upon him; one should make the offering in silence; the offerings should be made as before, and the Fire does not come down upon him'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—(A) Are the *Trayambaka*-libations to be poured or not to be poured? (B) Is the *Agnihotra-offering* to be made or not to be made?—Are these to be treated as Injunction and Prohibition? Or are these stated only for purposes of commendation?—[Read '*utārtha*' for '*nārtha*'].

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—"We assert that the texts should be taken as injunctions and prohibitions; because they have the form of these; as a matter of fact, the texts in question have clearly the form of *injunction* and *prohibition*; so that by Direct Declaration we understand them to mean that a certain act is *to be done* and a certain act is *not to be done* (prohibited); and it would be only through Syntactical Connection that they could be understood as commendatory declamations;—and Direct Declaration is always more authoritative than Syntactical Connection.—Nor can the text be taken as containing an *exception*.—Hence we conclude that—what

the text (B) contains is (1) an Injunction, (2) a Prohibition, and (3) again an Injunction—(1) 'the *Agnihotra* should be offered,—(2) the *Agnihotra* should not be offered ;—(3) if it is to be offered, it should be offered in silence' ;—and what the text (A) contains is the Injunction and Prohibition that—'the *Tryambaka*-offerings are to be poured—and the *Tryambaka*-offerings are not to be poured ; and in the event of their being poured, etc. ; '—this has been reiterated again in order to guard against the idea that the assertion of these being poured is commendatory,—this idea originating from the presence of the prohibition of the *pouring*."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta* :—These texts stand on the same footing as those dealt with in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.—"What is this *sameness of footing* ?"—It consists in this that at first there is the Injunction, then the Prohibition, and then these two are connected with something else that follows ;—this is exactly what has been found to be the case in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*: that is, the Injunction that is found is not for the purpose of anything to be done, and the Prohibition that is found is not for the purpose of avoiding anything ;—in fact, the two have been set forth only for the purpose of being pondered over and discussed ; thus it has been clearly asserted that 'The Veda-expounders ponder over the two views that the *Agnihotra* should be offered and that the *Agnihotra* should not be offered' ;—and this 'pondering over' these views serves the purpose of eulogising the other injunction in regard to which there is no such doubt or pondering, inasmuch as the meaning of the words is quite clear and it is not necessary to make any assumptions. While, if the two statements were taken as Injunction and Prohibition, it would be necessary to make certain assumptions.

The sense of the commendation is as follows—(A) 'The pouring of libations is so excellent that one does not mind the serious drawback that when one pours the libations, he puts the animals into the very mouth of *Rudra*' ;—and (B) 'When one makes the offerings, he should offer them as before,—if he does not make the offerings, *Agni* comes down upon him ;—so excellent is the making of offerings in silence that by so doing, both the undesirable contingencies become avoided'.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *In connection with the 'Ādhāna', the sentence beginning with 'upa' is indicative of option.*

SŪTRA (9).

THE SENTENCE BEGINNING WITH 'UPA' SHOULD ALSO BE TREATED LIKE THAT.

Bhāṣya.

There is the rite of *Ādhāna* (Fire-installation); in connection with which there is the following declaration—'*Ya ēvamvidvām vāravantīyam gāyati, ya ēvamvidvān yajñāyājñīyam gāyati, ya ēvamvidvān vāmadēvyam gāyati*' ['One who knowing this sings the *Vāravantīya-sāman*,—who, knowing this, sings the *Yajñayajñīya-sāman*,—who, knowing this, sings the *Vāmadēvya-sāman*']; with reference to this we read—'*Upavītā vā ētasya agnayo bhavanti yasyāgnyādhēyē brahmā sāmāni gāyati*' ['If the *Brahman-priest* sings the *Sāmans* at the Fire-installation of a man, his Fires become abandoned by him'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—What is the meaning of this latter sentence beginning with '*Upa*' ('*Upavītā vā ētasya, etc.*')? Is it *Prohibition*? Or *Exception*? Or *Commendation*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"It cannot be an *exception*, because the singing of *Sāmans* by the Brahman-priest is totally unknown (not laid down anywhere). In fact, the declaration of what does not exist is to be taken as a commendatory declaration,—as in the case of the declaration '*Prajāpati* alone was there, and he cut out his own fat'."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—This reference to the Brahman-priest cannot be commendatory of anything; nor can any useful purpose be served by a commendatory declamation contained in a sentence other than the one in which the commended action has been enjoined. Hence *this sentence beginning with 'Upa' should be treated like that*;—"what is it that is meant by '*that*' here?"—It is the sentence 'Takes up the *Ṣoḍashin* at the *Atirātra*'; and what is meant is that just as this sentence (followed by the sentence 'at the *Atirātra* one does not take up the *Ṣoḍashin*') has been taken (under Sū. 6) as enjoining an act and then prohibiting it (and hence indicating *option*) [so should it be in the present case also].—"How?"—As *singing by the Brahman-priest* is totally unknown, the sentence cannot be taken as a *prohibition* of that *singing*; hence no significance can attach to the term '*brahman*', which would mean that what is prohibited is *Sāma-singing* in general (which is absurd).—It might be urged that "in that case the term 'brahman' may be regarded as a wrong reading".—But it is not so; as a matter of fact, the term '*brahman*' signifies the *Brāhmaṇa*, and as such stands for the *Udgātṛ*-priest [who does all the *Sāma-singing*;

so that the prohibition can apply to that *singing*;—and thus there being both *injunction* and *prohibition*, there should be *option*; as under *Sūtra* 6].

SŪTRA (10).

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE PROHIBITION, THERE SHOULD BE NO PERFORMANCE (OF THE SĀMA-SINGING)",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

The following argument might be urged—"Inasmuch as there is deprecation of *Sāma-singing* itself, there should be no performance of the *Sāma-singing*; because what is deprecated should not be done."

SŪTRA (11).

THAT CANNOT BE; AS IT IS SANCTIONED BY THE VEDIC WORD.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be as suggested; as from the deprecation of an act, it follows that *it should not be done*,—so from the fact of an act being spoken of as *to be done*, it follows that *it should be done*;—there is no other Injunction available of anything else as to be done, for whose commendation there could be a deprecation. Hence it follows that the Injunction is for the purpose of the act being *done*, and the Prohibition is for the purpose of the act being *avoided*. [So that this is a clear case of *option*.]

———

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *Prohibitions like 'The Initiated Person shall not make a gift' are to be taken as laying down 'Exceptions'.*

SŪTRA (12).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"THE PROHIBITION OF (*a*) GIVING, (*b*) OFFERING LIBATIONS, AND (*c*) COOKING, BY THE INITIATED PERSON MUST BE TAKEN AS THE PROHIBITION OF ALL (*a*) GIVING, (*b*) OFFERING LIBATIONS, AND (*c*) COOKING; AS THERE IS NO DISTINCTION."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we read—'The initiated person does not make gifts, or offer libations or cook'.

In regard to this, there arise the following questions—(*a*) Is this a prohibition of all kinds of *giving, offering libations and cooking* ?—Or (*b*) of only such of these acts as are not connected with sacrifices ?—Or (*c*) of even those connected with sacrifices, which are indicated by the General Law ?—Or (*d*) does it lay down an *exception* (*Paryudāsa*) ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* (A) is as follows—"It is the prohibition of all kinds of *giving, offering libations* and *cooking*.—Why ?—Because *there is no distinction*; there is no word in the text expressing any distinction; hence it should be taken as the prohibition of all kinds of the acts mentioned."

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"IN FACT, WHAT IS LAID DOWN SHOULD PERTAIN TO ONLY SUCH ACTS AS ARE NOT CONNECTED WITH SACRIFICES; BECAUSE IN CONNECTION WITH SACRIFICES THESE HAVE BEEN CLEARLY ENJOINED."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the view just set forth.

"In fact, the prohibition cannot be one of all kinds of the acts in question;—'Of which ones then ?'—*What is laid down should pertain to only such acts as are not connected with sacrifices*;—'why ?'—*because in connection with sacrifices they have been clearly enjoined*; there is clear injunction of such acts as *giving* and the rest in connection with sacrifices;—hence the Prohibition in question has to be taken as pertaining to such acts only as have not been so clearly enjoined."

SŪTRA (14).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—" AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN FROM AMONG THOSE CONNECTED WITH SACRIFICES, THOSE ALSO THAT COME IN ONLY BY IMPLICATION (SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE PROHIBITION), BECAUSE OF NON-DISTINCTION."

Bhāṣya.

" As a matter of fact, even from among those connected with sacrifices, *those that come in by implication*,—i.e. by virtue of the General Law—should also be taken to be prohibited; because these are only 'implied', not *directly enjoined*,—while the Prohibition is *directly* laid down."

SŪTRA (15).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, INASMUCH AS IT IS SUPPLEMENTARY TO A SENTENCE, IT SHOULD MEAN THE 'EXCEPTION' OF SOMETHING ELSE; IF IT WERE A 'PROHIBITION', THERE WOULD BE OPTION.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' signifies emphasis.

The prohibitive text should be treated as supplementary to another sentence; that is, the prohibitive text in question should be taken as making an exception, in reference to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, of all the three acts of *giving*, *offering libations* and *cooking* that have been mentioned without any distinction; and as such it would be supplementary to another sentence; that is, the sentence in question—'The Initiated Person does not make gifts'—is supplementary to (to be taken along with) the sentence 'One should make gifts every day'; similarly with the statement regarding the *offering of libations* and *cooking*. [The meaning thus is that 'one should do the acts of *giving*, etc. every day, *except when he is initiated*'].

If the sentence were not taken as laying down an *exception*,—and if it were taken as containing a *Prohibition*, then there would have to be *option*; and this would be most improper, as already explained above.

From all this it follows that the sentence lays down an *exception* ('*Paryudāsa*').

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The 'Vartma-homa' (Roadside-offering) excludes the Āhavanīya Fire.*

SŪTRA (16).

WHAT HAS BEEN LAID DOWN AS A SPECIAL RULE IS TO BE TAKEN AS FAR REMOVED FROM WHAT HAS BEEN LAID DOWN AS A GENERAL RULE; BECAUSE IT IS DOUBTFUL; AND BECAUSE OPTION IS NOT PROPER.

Bhāṣya.

(A) In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we read—'*Vartmani juhati*' ['Offers the libation on the road']. (B) Similarly in connection with the *Rājasūya*, we read—'*Valmīkavapāmupagṛhya juhuyāt*' ['One should collect the anthill and pour the libation upon that'].—Then, there is the general declaration to the effect that 'When they pour libations into the *Āhavanīya* Fire, then thereby one's desired ends become accomplished'—[which lays down the general rule that libations have to be poured into the consecrated *Āhavanīya* Fire].

In regard to all this, there arises the question—Do these two texts mean—(A) that 'at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* all the libations should be offered *on the roadside*', and (B) that 'at the *Rājasūya*, all the libations are to be offered *on the anthill*'? Or do they mean that there is to be option between these two receptacles (Roadside and Anthill) and the *Āhavanīya* Fire?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"Inasmuch as the *Roadside* and the *Anthill* have been laid down as serving the purpose of the offering of libations, no 'combination' (of either of these two, with *Āhavanīya*) is possible; as the offering of the libations is accomplished by either *one* of them singly. That these serve the purpose of the offering has already been declared.—'How?'—There is the well-recognised principle that 'when a thing already accomplished and another yet to be accomplished are spoken of together, the former subserves the purposes of the latter'. Nor can the 'Roadside' be taken as entirely excluding everything else; as in that case all offerings into the *Āhavanīya* Fire would become excluded (which cannot be right). On the other hand, if we admit *option*, the offering into the *Āhavanīya* is preserved at least partially. [Hence this must be taken to be a case of option]".

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*What has been laid down as a special rule is to be taken as far removed from*—i.e. unconnected with—*what has been laid down as a general rule*;—*because it is doubtful*.—"How is it *doubtful*?"—If the General is for the purpose indicating the Particular, then, it is already there in the Particular; if it is not for the purpose of indicating it, then it is not there; it is in this sense that it is 'doubtful'. Or, it may be 'doubtful' in the sense that the General is not compatible with the Particular. Or it may be 'doubtful' in the sense that it subsists in that one Particular as well as in other Particulars.—Such

being the case, the General Rule should not be operative when the Particular one is there.—" Why ? "—*Because option is not proper.*

" Why is option *not proper* ? "

Answer—If the texts in question be taken as laying down the fact of the Roadside (and the Anthill) being the receptacle of the *offering*,—and *option* is admitted,—it would mean the ignoring of the said declaration under one of the optional alternatives ; so that the option would involve the assumption of something contrary to authoritative evidence.—If then, it be held that the texts in question do not lay down the fact of the Roadside and the Anthill being receptacles of the *offering*,—(and option is admitted) then also, under one of the optional alternatives, they would come to be used as such receptacle, which again would be contrary to authority ; and in this case there would be the further incongruity that the mention of the *Roadside*, though actually present in the text, would have to be regarded as *not-significant*.—It might be argued that—" The presence of one alternative would be due to the needs of the situation, this need consisting in the accomplishment of the *offering*, and that is accomplished by the *Āhavanīya* Fire ".—But that cannot be ; if the accomplishment of the offering were the only thing needed, then it would naturally be accomplished by means of the *Āhavanīya* Fire ; in the present instance, however, it is further enjoined that the *Roadside* and the *Anthill* are to be the receptacle of the offering ; and this could not be accomplished by the securing of the *Āhavanīya* Fire ; and this not being done, it would mean the rejection of the declaration of the entire procedure.

Says the Opponent—" Even though the fact of the Roadside and the Anthill being the receptacle is also enjoined, yet, inasmuch as this fact would only be a qualification of the *offering*, it would only improve the nature of the offering,—the omission of it would however not make the offering defective ; because the said improvement could be effected through some other receptacle. Hence we conclude that there should be *option* ".

Answer—This is not possible ; what is enjoined in the text is the connection between the *offering* and the receptacles in the shape of the *Roadside* and the *Anthill* ; and it is this connection which is the principal factor, not the *offering* ; so that until that connection has been brought about, the act would not have been done in accordance with the Injunctions.

Says the Opponent—" Even when the connection is enjoined, there are really two things that are enjoined,—one being the *object* to be accomplished, and the other the *means* by which that object is to be accomplished ; of these two, the object to be accomplished is the principal factor ; and that is the *offering*. From this it follows that there should be option. Even when the *connection* is what is enjoined, it is essential that the offering should be there ; and when the *offering* is there, the *Āhavanīya* Fire would naturally be there ".

Answer—It is not so ; because the *Āhavanīya* Fire is not a part and parcel of the *offering* ; as in particular cases, it is not there at all.

" How is it possible for it *not* to be there ? "

Because in special cases it is not applicable.

" Why is it not applicable ? "

When the *Roadside* and the *Anthill* are the receptacles of the *offering*, the fact of the *Āhavanīya* Fire being the receptacle does not come before the mind ; nor can it be carried into practice ; because when a certain act has been recognised as having the *Roadside* and the *Anthill* for its receptacle, it cannot be recognised, or performed, as having the *Āhavanīya Fire* for its receptacle.

Says the Opponent—" What the (injunctive) Verb means is that ' the act signified should be done in the manner in which it may be possible to do it ' ; hence (inasmuch as it *is* possible for the offering to be made into the Fire), the *Āhavanīya* Fire would set aside the *Roadside* and the *Anthill* and become the receptacle of the offering."

Answer—This might be possible if the injunction (and use) of the *Āhavanīya Fire* were not possible without the setting aside of the *Roadside* and the *Anthill*. As a matter of fact, the act in question can be done in two ways :—(1) by rejecting the *Roadside* and the *Anthill*, and (2) by adopting them. If they were rejected, it would mean the ignoring of the Locative ending in the word '*vartmani*' (' on the roadside ') ; hence it is better to adopt them.

The Opponent—" If the said receptacles were adopted, then that would involve the ignoring of the (injunctive) ending in the expression '*āhavanīyo bhavati*' (' The *Āhavanīya* should be there ') ".

Answer—We *shall* ignore it ; it may be that the notion of the *Āhavanīya* is there ; but why cannot the idea be there that it cannot be used ? And what cannot be used will not be used.

Says the Opponent—" That which is called the *general notion* makes the act applicable to every one of the particular factors included in that general notion ; so that it lays down the use of the *Āhavanīya* at the *Vartma-homa* and other offerings, as also at other rites. Thus then, the *Āhavanīya* comes to be enjoined at the Roadside Homa and other rites. The notion of '*Āhavanīya*' therefore that there is regarding the *Homa* at the Roadside cannot be ignored ; hence it can gain a footing only ofter setting aside the *Roadside Homa* and other rites ".

The answer to this is as follows :—It is not so ; a term denoting a *genus* cannot denote *individuals* ; if it denoted them, it could not apply to the *cow* born to-day ; as there has been no *previous* perception of that cow. To the *genus*, the term is applicable, because it has been perceived before (in the shape of the individuals already previously seen). It is for this reason that the *genus* does not denote the *individuals*. Consequently in regard to the *Vartma-homa* (Roadside *Homa*), there is no notion of '*Āhavanīya*'.—Even if it did denote it, it could not do so by direct denotation. Even if the genus did denote the individuals, it could not denote it by *direct denotation*, it could do so only by indirect indication ; and indirect indication would be set aside by direct denotation. From this it follows that, inasmuch as the *Roadside* and other places have been declared by Direct Declaration to be the place for the *Vartma-homa* (Roadside Homa) and other offerings, it is impossible for the *Āhavanīya* Fire to be recognised as the receptacle of those offerings and to be made such a receptacle in practice.

Says the Opponent—"It may be the other way about; the *Āhavanīya* fire having been already recognised as the locus of the offering, there can be no notion of the *Roadside* being such a locus".

Answer—It might be so; but the notion of 'roadside' and the rest in regard to particular offerings is obtained by *direct denotation*; while that of the *Āhavanīya Fire* can be got at only by *indirect indication*; and it has been already pointed out that the notion derived from Direct Declaration is more authoritative than that derived from indirect indication.

"But the notion of '*Āhavanīya*' in regard to the generic entity is also *direct*."

Answer—The notion of the 'roadside' also that one has in regard to a generic entity is *direct*; as it is enjoined in regard to a particular *Homa*, and it does not qualify anything connected with what is *not-homa*.—From all this it follows that the *Āhavanīya Fire* shall be used for all the offerings except the Roadside and other specified libations.

Adhikaraṇa (9): *The injunction of 'Seventeen Sāmidhēnī verses' relating to the 'Vaimṛdha' and other ectypal sacrifices is only a 'supplementary statement'.*

SŪTRA (17).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*continued*]—"When an isolated injunction is declared in its unaltered form in connection with a particular sacrifice, it should be taken as serving the purpose of excluding the archetypal accessories; as in the case of the 'Ājyabhāga-offerings'."

Bhāṣya.

Without reference to any sacrifice, it is declared—'One should recite seventeen *Sāmidhēnīs*';—this is excluded from the archetypal Sacrifice by the number '*fifteen*' which has been specially enjoined in connection with that sacrifice, and hence becomes relegated to the Ectypal sacrifices;—then again, in another text, the same number 'seventeen' has been mentioned with special reference to the following ectypal sacrifices—'*Vaimṛdha, Adhvarakalpa, Pashu, Chāturmāsyas, Mitravindā, Traidhātavī and Āgrayaṇēṣṭi*'.

We proceed to consider the question—What is the meaning of the reiteration of the number 'seventeen' in reference to these particular ectypes?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*When an isolated injunction*,—which has not been declared in the context of any particular sacrifice,—*is declared again in its unaltered form* in reference to a particular ectype,—it serves the purpose of excluding the whole lot of accessories relating to the archetype; so that the meaning of the injunction that 'at the *Vaimṛdha* and other sacrifices, one should recite seventeen *Sāmidhēnīs*' is that no other archetypal accessory should be adopted; it does not mean that 'it is *only* at the *Vaimṛdha*, etc.—and at no other ectypes—that the number of *Sāmidhēnīs* is to be seventeen'; because this number has been distinctly laid down in another text as appertaining to the other ectypes; and hence it cannot be set aside."

SŪTRA (18).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*concluded*]—"If there were a mention of modification, it might be for the sake of that."

Bhāṣya.

"In case any modification of the *Sāmidhēnī* verses had been mentioned, the reiteration in question might have been taken as meant for that;—as a

matter of fact, however, no such modification has been heard of ;—hence it follows that the reiteration is for the purpose of excluding the archetypal accessories."

SŪTRA (19).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE PREVIOUS SENTENCE ; BECAUSE AN ISOLATED INJUNCTION IS NOT TAKEN IN BY THE SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the above view.

The sentence in question should be taken as *supplementary to the previous* sentence,—i.e. to the isolated injunction; hence the sentence in question—'in connection with these particular ectypes (*Vaimṛdha*, etc.), one should recite seventeen *Sāmidhēnīs*'—means that *this is not to be so at the other ectypes.*—"In reference to the other ectypes, this number has been directly laid down, and as such it cannot be set aside".—The answer to this is as follows—It is true that the number has been directly laid down in connection with the *Sāmidhēnīs*; but *this is not taken in by* the sacrifice ; because it has no connection with any sacrifice (the declaration being found to be without reference to any particular sacrifice). Nor does the declaration of the entire sacrificial procedure take in the number in question, when there is the other sentence (the one in question) which connects it with the particular ectypes, *Vaimṛdha* and the rest only. There is this distinct declaration to the effect that the number 'seventeen' which has been spoken of in the isolated passage (without reference to any particular sacrifice) appertains to the *Vaimṛdha* and the rest ;—hence ectypes other than these cannot take in the said number. In fact, when it is not taken in by any sacrifice, the number 'seventeen' relating to the *Sāmidhēnīs*, being useless, would not be adopted at all.—From all this it follows that the declaration relating to the *Vaimṛdha* and the rest is supplementary to, and to be taken along with, the previous isolated injunction.—*Objection*—"In this case there is a syntactical split—(1) 'There are seventeen *Sāmidhēnīs*', and (2) 'they are to be recited at the *Vaimṛdha* and the rest'".—*Answer*—As a matter of fact, there are two distinct sentences here, and the second sentence (the one in question) lays down a particular detail in connection with that same thing which has been spoken of in the first sentence ; this is what is meant by its being a 'supplementary sentence'.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *Injunctions like 'Pṛthivyai svāhā' should be taken as laying down the use of the syllable 'svāhā' in connection with those offerings in relation to which the use of the syllable has not been laid down.*

SŪTRA (20).

MANTRAS CANNOT BE TAKEN AS SUPPLEMENTARY SENTENCES, BECAUSE WHAT IS LAID DOWN IS A SUBSIDIARY DETAIL.

Bhāṣya.

In reference to the *Darvihoma* we read—'*Pṛthivyai svāhā—Antarikṣāya svāhā—Vāyavē svāhā*'.—There is also an isolated declaration—'*Vaṣaṭkārēṇa vā svāhakārēṇa vā dēvēbhyo 'annam pradīyatē*' ['Food is offered to Deities with the syllable *vaṣaṭ*, or with the syllable *svāhā*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the former text supplementary to the latter, the meaning of the two sentences taken together being that 'Inasmuch as food is offered to deities with the syllable *Svāhā*, the *mantras* used should be *Pṛthivyai svāhā—Antarikṣāya svāhā*'?—Or is the former sentence not supplementary to the latter,—and what is meant (by the latter sentence) is that 'the syllable *svāhā* is to be used even at those sacrifices in connection with which the use of that syllable has not been laid down'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"in accordance with the principle arrived at in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, the first sentence must be taken as supplementary to the second".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*Mantras cannot be taken as supplementary sentences*; because there can be no syntactical connection between an *injunctive* and a *non-injunctive* sentence,—the *injunctive* sentence being a *Brāhmaṇa-text*, while the *non-injunctive* sentence is a *mantra-text*.—Further, in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* it was found that there was no connection with any sacrifice, while in the present instance, such connection is manifest, in the sentence—'Food is offered to deities with the syllable *vaṣaṭ* and the syllable *svāhā*',—as the *offering* is the principal act here.—Then again, *a subsidiary detail is laid down*,—the sense being that 'at the *Darvihoma*, the *mantra* used should be in the form *Pṛthivya svāhā*, not in the form *Svāhā pṛthivyai*.—From all this it follows that at other *Darvihomas* also, the syllable *svāhā* should be used.

SŪTRA (21).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS FOUND IN THE CASE WHERE IT HAS NOT BEEN LAID DOWN.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, even at those *Darvihomas* in connection with which the use of the syllable *svāhā* has not been directly laid down, we find the syllable actually used; as shown by the following text—'*Ghṛtēna dyāvāpṛthivī āpṛṇēthāmiti audumbaryā vishākhē juhoti āntrāt avasrāvayati bhūmiprāptē svāhā karoti*'; this clearly shows that the syllable '*svāhā*' is to be used.

SŪTRA (22).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS PROHIBITION.

Bhāṣya.

In some cases there is prohibition also—'*Na svāhēti vachanam karoti, mantrañcha nāha*'; and the prohibition of a thing is possible only when its use is possible.

From all this we conclude that the *mantra* is not a *supplementary sentence.*

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *The 'Agni' and the 'Atigrāhyas' should be taken as appertaining to the Ectype.*

SŪTRA (23).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"INASMUCH AS THERE IS DIRECT INJUNCTION OF THE 'AGNI' AND OF THE 'ATIGRĀHYĀ' IN RELATION TO THE ECTYPE, THERE CAN BE NO INDIRECT INDICATION OF IT.

Bhāṣya.

There is the declaration—(*a*) '*Ya ēvamvidvānagniñchinutē*' ['One who knowing this lays the Fire']; and again '*Upaṣṭambhanam vā ētad yajñasya yadatigrāhyāḥ*' ['The *Atigrāhyas* serve as promoters of the sacrifice'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is,—or is not—the admission of the *Agni* and of the *Atigrāhyas* into the Ectype indicated by the General Law?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"There can be no indirect indication of the *Agni* and of the *Atigrāhyas* in regard to the Ectype. The compound '*Agnyatigrāhyam*' is made up of '*Agni*' and '*Atigrāhyas*',—these do not come into the Ectype (by virtue of the General Law).—Why?—*Because there is direct injunction of them in relation to the Ectype*, in the following passage—'*Athāto'gnimagniṣṭomēna yajati, tamukthēna, tamatirātrēṇa, tam chatūrātrēṇa, tam pañcharātrēṇa, tam ṣaḍrātrēṇa, tam saptarātrēṇa, tamaṣṭarātrēṇa, tam navarātrēṇa, tam dasharātrēṇa*'; and again, '*Yat pṛṣṭhyēti gṛhṇīyāt prāñcham yajñam pṛṣṭhāni saṅgṛhṇēyuḥ yadukthēti gṛhṇīyāt*, etc.'—When the *Agni* and the *Atigrāhyas* have thus been directly enjoined in reference to an Ectype, it cannot be indicated by the General Law as admissible at another Ectype."

SŪTRA (24).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"SO ALSO IS THE 'TAKING UP' DURING THE MONTH."

Bhāṣya.

"Then again, there is the text—'The *Atigrāhyas* are taken up month after month.' If the *Atigrāhyas* were already admissible under the General Law, it would not be necessary to lay down this monthly 'taking up'."

SŪTRA (25).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT IS INCLUDED, AS IT STANDS ON THE SAME FOOTING.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the *Atigrāhyas* is actually included under the indications of the General Law; there is no difference between this and other accessories; so that there is no reason why the other accessories should be included and this one should not be included.

SŪTRA (26).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

We find texts indicative of the same conclusion—(*a*) '*Kaṅkachitam chinvīta, Shirṣachitam chinvīta yaḥ kāmayēta sushīrṣāsmin lokē sambhavēyam*';—again (*b*) '*Pañcha aindrānatigrāhyān gṛhṇāti*'.—Here the texts speak of the particular features—of *being of the shape of the Kaṅka* and of *belonging to Indra*—of the *Atigrāhyas*; and this clearly shows that it is admissible at the Ectype under the General Law.

SŪTRA (27).

THE INCLUSION WOULD BE PARALLEL TO THE INJUNCTION.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 23) that "there is an injunction of the *Atigrāhyas* in reference to an Ectype (hence it cannot be subject to indication under the General Law)"—This has got to be refuted; and the refutation is that, in regard to that Ectype with reference to which it has been directly enjoined, this injunction would be parallel,—i.e. in regard to the Archetype and to that particular Ectype,—whereas in connection with the other Ectypes, it would come in by virtue of the indications of the General Law.

SŪTRA (28).

THE MENTION OF THE 'MONTHLY TAKING UP' IS MEANT TO PROHIBIT REPETITION.

Bhāṣya.

Question—"What explanation is there of the 'Monthly Taking up' (referred to under Sū. 24)?"

Answer—That is for the purpose of prohibiting repetition; the meaning being that 'they are taken up, *not day after day*, but only month by month'.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *The 'Four-Slice oblation' is to be made up by the joining of the 'Upastaraṇa' and the 'Abhighāraṇa'.*

SŪTRA (29).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"THE 'FOUR-SLICE' OBLATION, SHOULD BE OUT OF THE PRIMARY SUBSTANCE,—BECAUSE THE VERY ORIGIN OF IT IS FOR THAT PURPOSE, AND BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT IS CONNECTED WITH THE 'OBLATION-OFFERING'; AS FOR THE OFFERING OF CLARIFIED BUTTER, THAT COULD BE ADDITIONAL; AS IT DOES NOT STAND ON THE SAME FOOTING, ITS ORIGIN BEING AS A SUBSIDIARY FACTOR; JUST AS IN ORDINARY LIFE."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, we read—'*Chaturavattam juhoti*' ['Offers the four-slice-oblation'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this 'four-slice-oblation' to be made up with the '*Upastaraṇa*' and the '*Abhighāraṇa*' [there being only *two slices* taken out of the primary substance, *Cake*]?—Or are all the 'four-slices' to be taken out of the primary substance itself,—the '*Upastaraṇa*' and the '*Abhighāraṇa*' being additional offerings?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*Because the very origin of it is for that purpose*,—i.e. the making of the Cake is for the purpose of being offered as an oblation, in accordance with the text 'The Cake baked on eight pans and dedicated to *Agni* is not omitted on the Moonless and the Full Moon days',—and it has also been laid down that 'what is to be offered as an oblation has got to be made four-sliced',—and lastly, it is the *Cake*, along with the '*Upastaraṇa*' and '*Abhighāraṇa*', that is meant to be offered as an oblation,—therefore the 'four-slicing' is to be done to the Cake. *As for the offering of Clarified Butter* [*viz.*: *Upastaraṇa* and *Abhighāraṇa*], *that would be additional, as it does not stand on the same footing*, as the Cake; because when the Cake is used as an oblation, the Clarified Butter comes in as its *subsidiary factor*. Thus then, though, along with the Clarified-Butter-offerings, the offering becomes 'six-sliced' yet, in so far as the actual oblation is concerned, it has been made only 'four-sliced';—as for instance, *in ordinary life*, when it is said that 'Devadatta is *prasthabhuk* (Eater of a seer)',—even though along with the vegetables and other edibles, what he eats is actually more than a *seer*, yet, so far as the *eating* is concerned, it is only the *seer* that is mentioned,—the vegetables, etc. being regarded as only aids to the *Rice* (of which a *seer* is eaten)."

SŪTRA (30).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS A DECLARATION OF ITS BEING AN EMBELLISHMENT."

Bhāṣya.

The '*Upastaraṇa*' and the '*Abhighāraṇa*' have been actually declared in the following passage as being embellishments of the main oblation—'*Yadupastṛṇāti abhighārayati amṛtāhutimēvaīnām karoti*'; from this it follows that the 'four-sliced oblation' to be offered is to be made out of the principal substance (Cake) as embellished with '*Upastaraṇa*' and '*Abhighāraṇa*'."

SŪTRA (31).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE ALONG WITH THOSE TWO; BECAUSE IN CONNECTION WITH 'SVIṢṬAKṚT', IT HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF AS MADE UP BY TWO 'ABHIGHĀRAṆAS' AFTER A SINGLE SLICING.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, *it should be along with those two*; i.e. the 'four-sliced oblation' is to be made up by securing *two* slices out of the *Cake* [the other two 'slices' consisting of the *Upastaraṇa* and the *Abhighāraṇa*];—*because in connection with the Sviṣṭakṛt it has been spoken of as made up by two 'Abhighāraṇas' after a single slicing* (of the Cake),—in the text '*Sakṛdupastṛṇāti sakṛdavadyati dvirabhighārayati chaturavattasyāptyai*' ['One does the *Upastaraṇa* once, the *slicing* once, and does the *Abhighāraṇa* twice, in order to obtain the four-sliced-oblation'];—this shows that the 'four-sliced oblation' is made up by two *Abhighāraṇas*; in the other case (i.e. if there were to be 'four slices' out of the Cake itself) then, altogether, what would be obtained would be '*six*-slices'.

Says the opponent—"This text that you have put forward is a mere indicative; please put forward some direct reason."

Answer—All that the text 'Offers the four-sliced oblation' says is that the *oblation* should consist of the four-slices; it says nothing as to whether it is to consist of the *Cake* or the *Curd-Butter-Mixture* (*Sānnāyya*). There is no such declaration as that 'One should make four slices out of the substance meant for the offering'; all that is said is that the 'four-sliced oblation' is to be offered; and if there were no such connection between the enjoined 'four-sliced oblation' and the 'offering', then the former would be absolutely useless.

The opponent might argue thus—"It would serve a useful purpose by becoming included in the declaration of the entire procedure."

Answer—But that cannot be possible; so long as there is the direct declaration—'offers the four-sliced oblation'—which lays down the direct

relationship of the *offering*,—there can be no room for any other 'declaration of procedure' ;—In this direct declaration, there is no such distinction made as that 'the *slices* are to be obtained from what is meant for that purpose, and not from what is not meant for that purpose'; all that it says is that 'an oblation consisting of *four-slices* should be offered',—the *four slices* being obtained either from what is meant for that purpose or from what is not meant for that purpose. In acting in accordance with this, the Direct Declaration becomes duly honoured; while in the other case, it is only Syntactical Connection that would be followed; and what is laid down in the injunction '*Slices twice* out of the offering material' would have to be regarded as an optional alternative to the offering of the 'four-sliced oblation'. Further, the declaration quoted above could, in this case, either be a description of what does not exist, or be taken as setting up another optional alternative. But in reality as, in one case, the thing would be non-existent, there cannot be *option*.

From all this it follows that the 'four-sliced oblation' should be made up with the '*Upastaraṇa*' and the '*Abhighāraṇa*'.

SŪTRA (32).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS A PASSAGE WHERE THE OBLATION HAVING BEEN SPOKEN OF AS ONE COMPOSITE WHOLE, ALL ITS COMPONENTS ARE DETAILED IN DUE ORDER.

Bhāṣya.

There is the following passage—'*Chatvāri vaitāni dēvadadhānyavadānāni, Yadupastṛṇāti tadanuvākyāyai, Yat pūrvamavadānam tad yājyāyai, Yaduttaram tad dēvatāyai, Yadabhighārayati tad vaṣaṭkārāya*' ; here the *four slices* of the 'four-sliced oblation' having been described, the several components thereof have been detailed, in the shape of *Anuvākyā* and the rest,—which shows the inclusion of *Upastaraṇa* and the rest. From this it follows that the 'four-sliced oblation' is to be made up with the '*Upastaraṇa*' and the '*Abhighāraṇa*'.—The term '*dadha*' in this passage ('*dadhāni*') denotes share, as is found also in such assertions as '*Kaṅkatāya dadham, Nāpitāya dadham*'; so that the expression '*dēvadadhāni*' means *shares of the Deities*.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *The 'Four-sliced oblation' is essential at the 'Upāmshuyāja' also.*

SŪTRA (33).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"LIKE THE NUMBER 'SEVENTEEN', THIS SHOULD BE RESTRICTED."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, there is the *Upāmshuyāja*;—then there is the injunction that 'the four-slice-oblation is to be offered'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Should the four-sliced-oblation be offered at the *Upāmshuyāja*—or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*Like the number 'seventeen', it should be restricted*: in the case of the number 'seventeen', which has been laid down in an isolated text, and mentioned again in connection with a few specially named Ectypes, it has been decided that, on the strength of the supplementary sentence, the said number should be restricted to those named Ectypes (Vide *Sūtras* 17 *et seq.* above); in the same manner, the 'four-sliced oblation' also, dependent as it is upon '*Upastaraṇa*' and '*Abhighāraṇa*', should be restricted to those two latter, where the offerings consist of Vegetables and Curd-Butter;—and hence it should not be offered at the *Upāmshuyāja* (where there is no *Upastaraṇa* or *Abhighāraṇa*)."

SŪTRA (34).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, INASMUCH AS IT IS AN ACCESSORY OF THE OFFERING MATERIAL, IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS REALLY MEANT TO BE SO.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the view just set forth.

It is not right that there should be no 'Four-sliced oblation' at the *Upāmshuyāja*; as a matter of fact, the 'Four-sliced oblation' has been enjoined as an accessory of the *Homa-offering*; and as such, it should find place at the *Homa-offering* in connection with the *Upāmshuyāja* also;—hence at this sacrifice also the 'Four-slices' should be secured.

It has been argued that there can be 'Four slices' only out of Vegetables and Curd-Butter, because it is based upon the *Upastaraṇa* and the *Abhighāraṇa*.—But as a matter of fact, the mention of *Upastaraṇa* and *Abhighāraṇa* is not supplementary to the 'Four-sliced oblation';—in the same manner in which the sentence 'one should recite *seventeen Sāmidhēnis*

is to the *Mitrabinda* and others, on the ground of the sequence of the number 'seventeen'. In the present instance, the sentences are not to be construed as—'Four slices should be made,—how ?—by doing *Upastaraṇa* and *Abhighāraṇa*'; they are to be construed to mean—'one should offer the substance equipped with the *Four slices*,—there should be *Upastaraṇa* of the substance, as also *Abhighāraṇa* of it';—in a case where the offering of the 'Four-sliced oblation' is accomplished by means of the *Upastaraṇa* and *Abhighāraṇa* of the offering-substance, the 'four slices' need not be got out of the principal substance (Cake); while in a case where the 'Four-sliced oblation' is not accomplished without the slicing of the principal substance, the four slices have got to be made out of that substance. In the present case, what is meant is that a 'Four-sliced oblation' should be offered in *Homa*,—not that the four slices should be got at from this or that substance.—From this it follows that the 'Four-sliced oblation' should be offered at the *Upāmshuyāja* also.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *The mention of the 'Āgnēya' and 'Aindrāgna' is a reiteration of those relating to the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa.*

SŪTRA (35).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"THE TEXT BEGINNING WITH THE WORD 'PURODĀSHĀBHYĀM' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS THE INJUNCTION OF THE TWO CAKES FOR THOSE ENTITLED TO IT,—BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN ENJOINED BY THAT INJUNCTION; AS IN THE CASE OF THE VAISHYASTOMA."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Puroḍāshābhyām asomayājinam yājayēt—yāvetau āgnēyashchaindrāgnashcha*' ['For one who is not a Soma-sacrificer, one should perform the sacrifice with only the two cakes—the one dedicated to *Agni* and the other dedicated to *Indra-Agni*'].

In regard to this, there arises the following question—(*a*) Is this sentence supplementary to the general injunction of the performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*,—[i.e. the injunction 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*'],—the meaning of the two together being—'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*,—with these two cakes (one dedicated to *Agni* and the other dedicated to *Indra-Agni*), if he happens to be one who is not a Soma-Sacrificer'?—Or (*b*) does it contain the injunction of two entirely distinct acts,—the meaning being that 'one should perform the sacrifice with those two additional cakes as described'?—Or (*c*) is it an injunction meant for the performance of the subsidiary details,—the meaning being that 'the Priest should perform the sacrifices with these two cakes'?—Or (*d*) is it an injunction of time,—the sense being that 'one should perform the sacrifice with these two cakes at the time that he is not engaged in the *Soma-sacrifice*'?—Or (*e*) is it the injunction of the offering of the cake dedicated to *Indra-Agni*, and the reiteration of that of the cake dedicated to *Agni*?—Or (*f*) is it the reiteration of both these cakes?—These are the various views possible on the subject.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* (A) is as follows—"It is supplementary to the general injunction of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*,—i.e. to the injunction, 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*'; and the sense of the two sentences is that—'If one who is not a *Soma-sacrificer* should desire heaven, he should perform the sacrifice with these two cakes.'—Why so?—*Because they have been enjoined by that injunction*; it is the two cakes already enjoined by the general injunction that have been referred to in the text in question: hence they do not constitute additional offerings; all that the text does is to connect, by Direct Declaration, the activity of the man who is not a *Soma-sacrificer* with the two cakes. It is not the *time* that is laid down;

as this could only be *indirectly indicated*; and *Direct Declaration* is more authoritative than *Indirect Indication*. And further, in that case it would come to this that either the two named Cakes would not be offered by the *Soma-sacrificer*, or the *Sānnāyya*-offering would not be offered by one who is *not a Soma-sacrificer*. That is to-say, if it is the *Non-Soma-sacrificer* that is predicated (by the sentence in question) with reference to the two cakes, then this *Non-Soma-sacrificer* would have nothing to do with the offering of *Sānnāyya* (Curd-Butter); and in that case the presence of the particle '*ēva*' ('only') becomes justified; the sense being that 'the *Non-Soma-sacrificer* should sacrifice with the said *two cakes only*, not with the *Curd-Butter*';—on the other hand, if it is the *two cakes* that are predicated with reference to the *Non-Soma-sacrificer*, then these cakes would have no connection with the *Soma-sacrificer*; and in that case the presence of the particle '*ēva*', ('only') would have to be regarded as wrongly placed,—the proper place for it being after '*asomayājinam*', and the sentence should read as—'*Puroḍāshābhyamasomayājinamēva*' ['The *non-Soma-sacrificer only* should sacrifice with the two cakes']; just as we find in the following text—'*Yamēva vidyāḥ shuchimapramattam mēdhāvinam brahmacharyopapannam Yastē na druhyēt katamachcha nāha, tasmai mām bruyā nidhipāya brahman*'; [Says the Veda—'O Brāhmaṇa, expound me to that keeper of treasures whom you know to be pure, vigilant, intelligent, equipped with the qualities of the Religious Student, one who hates you not, and who does not disclose it to anyone'],—that the particle '*ēva*' is wrongly placed,—it should have followed '*Shuchim*'; the meaning being 'one whom you know to be *pure only*'; while the form used is '*Yamēva vidyāḥ shuchim*'; so also in the text in question, the particle '*ēva*' is wrongly placed.—Thus then, we find that under both the possible constructions, the sentence in question is supplementary to the general injunction; in both ways therefore we have the above *Pūrvapakṣa*.—*Just as in the case of the Vaishyastoma*, the sentence '*The Vaishya* should perform the sacrifice of the *Vaishyastoma*' has been regarded as supplementary to the general injunction, so should also the sentence in question be."

SŪTRA (36).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)—*continued*]—"BUT THE GENERAL INJUNCTION DOES NOT PERTAIN TO ANY SUCH ACT AS IS NOT ESSENTIAL; IT IS RELATED TO WHAT IS ESSENTIAL; HENCE THE SENTENCE IN QUESTION CANNOT BE TAKEN AS SUPPLEMENTARY."

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('but') implies the rejection of the above view.

"It is not right that the sentence in question is supplementary to the general injunction; the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* are essential (compulsory) sacrifices, as is clear from the declaration 'One should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices *as long as he lives*'; and at these sacrifices, the two

cakes in question (*Āgnēya* and *Aindrāgna*) are essential, as helping in the fulfilment of the desired result.—It cannot therefore be right that these should be taken as laid down for the *Non-Soma-sacrificer*, who is a variable factor (not inseparable from the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*).—Why?—Because it cannot be right that the two *Cakes* must always be there at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, and yet be helpful to the *Non-Soma-sacrificer* only. As a matter of fact, the injunction of the *Cakes* is related to the entire composite sacrifice of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* which is essential and compulsory. Hence the mention of the *Non-Soma-sacrificer* cannot be supplementary to the general injunction; it contains, in fact, the original injunction of two entirely distinct offerings. The construction of the sentences is not that 'the *Non-Soma-sacrifice* is predicated of the two *cakes* that have been enjoined in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*; in fact, the construction is that 'if the *Non-Soma-sacrificer* desires heaven, he should offer the cake dedicated to *Agni* and the cake dedicated to *Indra-Agni*', so that these two offerings are what are predicated and enjoined; and when they are so enjoined, they must be distinct from the corresponding offerings (under the ordinary *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*); and in that case the expression '*Yau ētau*' in the sentence in question (which seems to identify the two cakes mentioned with the two cakes offered under the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*) can refer only to the detail relating to those two cakes.—This case is analogous to the case of the text '*Ētasyaiva rēvatiṣu vāravantīyamagniṣṭoma kṛtvā, etc.*' [Vide *Sūtra* 2. 2. 27, where the singing of the *Vāravantīya-Sāman* has been found to be a distinct act].—The term '*ēva*' ('only') also shall, in this case, have the sense of '*punaḥ*' ('again'); just as in the sentence '*Kṣirēṇa bhuktvā dēvadattaḥ kṣirēṇaiva bhuñjīta*', where the meaning is that 'having eaten with milk, he should eat *again* with milk'; so in the case in question also, the meaning is that 'The two cakes that have been laid down by the injunction of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, for both the *Soma-sacrificer* and the *Non-Soma-sacrificer*, are *again* enjoined for the Non-Soma-Sacrificer',—which means that 'The sacrifice for the Non-Soma-Sacrificer should be performed with the *two cake-offerings*, the details relating to which should be those same that relate to the corresponding cakes forming part of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*'."

SŪTRA (37).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)—*continued*]—"IF IT WERE AS SUGGESTED IN PŪRVAPAKṢA (A), THERE COULD BE NO CONNECTION WITH WHAT IS ONLY A PART; BECAUSE THE PERFORMER IS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR."

Bhāṣya.

"Even if the sentence in question were supplementary to the General Injunction (of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*), no connection would be possible between the two cakes and the performer in the shape of the *Non-Soma-*

Sacrificer. If the sentence is supplementary to the General Injunction, the performer would be indicated as the predominant factor; this predominance cannot be possible unless there is a result (accruing to the performer; which fact alone makes him the predominant factor);—the *two cakes* however which form part of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices are not conducive to any result;—nor can a result be assumed on the strength of the Direct Declaration; because the declaration is amenable to another construction.—For this reason also the sentence in question cannot be supplementary to the General Injunction."

SŪTRA (38).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)—*concluded*]—"IN THE CASE OF THE VAISHYASTOMA, IT IS SO BECAUSE IT IS A COMPLETE WHOLE IN ITSELF."

Bhāṣya.

"It has been asserted that it should be like the *Vaishyastoma.*—But in the case of the *Vaishyastoma*, it is only right that it should be so, as it is not the part of anything else [it is a whole by itself], and hence it can be conducive to results; nor is there, in that case, any connection between what is essential (compulsory) and what is not-essential. Hence the case in question is not analogous to that of the *Vaishyastoma.*"

SŪTRA (39).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—"IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PERTAINING TO THE PERFORMER."

Bhāṣya.

[Says *Pūrvapakṣin (C)*]—"If you think that the sentence cannot be supplementary to the General Injunction,—we assert as follows:—It cannot be taken as the original injunction of two distinct acts; as in that case, the expression '*Yāvētau*', being incomplete by itself, would have to be taken in its indirect indicative sense.—'Then what should be the explanation?'—It should be taken as an injunction meant *for the performer of the subsidiary acts*,—i.e. the person who performs the subsidiary, not the primary, act. The verb in the text is '*Yājayēt*' with the causal affix, which directly means that the act denoted is to be done by the person who is only the *prompting agent*; and it is only by indirect indication that it signifies the performer of the sacrifice itself. Another advantage of this explanation would be this, that any relationship between the *essential* and the *non-essential* would not have to be postulated;—nor would it be necessary to assume the result as following from a part of the sacrifice; and lastly, the injunction addressed to the *prompter* of the sacrifice,—in the text laying down that 'the *Non-*

Soma-sacrificer is to be made to offer the sacrifice',—would be conducive to some sort of prosperity."

SŪTRA (40).

[*Refutation of Pūrvapakṣa* (*C*)]—NOT SO; BECAUSE IT BEING ALREADY KNOWN AS SERVING A SUBSIDIARY PURPOSE, NO USEFUL PURPOSE CAN BE SERVED BY LAYING IT DOWN AGAIN.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be, as has been just suggested, that the injunction is one for the performer of the subsidiary act; as a matter of fact, the performer of the subsidiary act, who is subordinate to the performer of the main act, is already included under the injunction of this main act;—nor do we find any separate result as following from the subsidiary act;—nor is it possible to assume such a result,—as the *Parasmaipada* ending used precludes such an assumption. There can be no useful purpose served by the enjoining of what is already known (as included in another injunction). What is possible is that the sentence may be a reiterative reference to what is already known by implication, for the purpose of laying down the offering of the two Cakes.—It cannot be taken as a case of *Preclusion*; as that is always beset with a threefold incongruity. Lastly, it is impossible for the Soma-sacrificer to be there without the performer of the subsidiary acts. From all this it follows that the sentence contains the original injunction of two distinct acts [as set forth under *Pūrvapakṣa* (*B*)].

SŪTRA (41).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (D)]—"IN FACT, THE SENTENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN, ON THE BASIS OF THE INDICATIVE WORD, AS AN INJUNCTION OF TIME, IN CONNECTION WITH THE TWO ACTS; AS SUBSIDIARY DETAILS ARE SUBJECT TO THAT LAW."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the above view.

"The sentence in question cannot be taken as the original injunction of two distinct acts; what is really declared in it is the *time* for the two acts; and it is not possible for it to be taken as enjoining the *two cakes* for the *Non-Soma-Sacrificer.*—Why?—*Because it is subject to that law;* the 'law' referred to is that embodied in *Sūtra* 4. 4. 6; that same law is applicable to the present case also; the meaning therefore of the sentence is that 'these *two cakes* are to be offered during the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, at that time at which the *Soma-Sacrifice* is not performed.'—'What would be the advantage of this explanation?'—There would be no incongruity of having to assume a distinct result; because when the statement is taken as pertaining to the whole composite sacrifice itself—[Read '*Samudāyapara iṣyatē*',

as in MS. (*C*)],—then there would be only one result following from all the acts taken together.—It is quite possible for the particular indicative in the shape of *the Non-performance of the Soma-Sacrifice* to indicate a definite point of time; so that the meaning is that at the time thus indicated, one should offer the *two cakes*, not the *Curd-Butter-mixture*."

SŪTRA (42).

[*Refutation of Pūrvapakṣa* (*D*)]—BUT IF THE CURD-BUTTER-MIXTURE IS FOR THE SOMA-SACRIFICER, THEN THERE CAN BE NO INHERENT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE TWO CAKES,—BECAUSE THE TIMES ARE DIFFERENT.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('but') implies the rejection of the above view.

If the Curd-Butter-Mixture is for the Soma-Sacrificer, then the declaration in question cannot be taken as indicating the time. As a matter of fact, the *Curd-Butter-Mixture* is really for the Soma-Sacrificer; when this is absolutely certain, there can be no casting of doubt on that fact. There is this saying to that effect—'If the scriptures are authoritative, then people have reached the highest state' (?).—There is the direct declaration to the effect that 'The *Non-Soma-Sacrificer* should not use the Curd-Butter-Mixture'.—Such being the case, the sentence in question cannot be taken as indicating the time.—Why so?—Because no *relationship* is known to subsist between the *Curd-Butter-Mixture* and the *two cakes*;—as *the times are different*; the *two cakes* are offered before the Soma-Sacrifice, while *the Curd-Butter-Mixture* comes in after that sacrifice; and then too, as it is already there, no effort need be made for that mixture.—For these reasons, the sentence in question, pertaining as it does to a different point of time, cannot be taken as indicating time; it has to be taken as enjoining distinct acts [as set forth under *Pūrvapakṣa* (C)].

SŪTRA (43).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (E)]—"OR, INASMUCH AS IT HAS BEEN ALREADY ENJOINED ELSEWHERE, WHEN IT IS DECLARED AGAIN, AND A QUESTION ARISES REGARDING THIS,—THIS SECOND DECLARATION SHOULD BE TAKEN AS LAYING DOWN THE DEITY-PAIR; THAT THE ĀGNĒYA IS NOT MEANT TO BE ENJOINED HAS BEEN FOUND TO BE THE CASE IN REGARD TO THE ONE-DEITY OFFERING."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*api vā*' ('or') implies the rejection of the above view.

"The sentence cannot be taken as the injunction of a distinct act; it is only a reiteration of the *Āgnēya Cake, which has been already enjoined*

elsewhere; as a matter of fact, the *Āgnēya Cake* has been already enjoined in the text—'*Yadāgnēyo'ṣṭākapālo' māvāsyāyām paurṇamāsyāñchāchyuto bhavati*'. But the sentence in question can be taken as the injunction of the *Aindrāgna Cake*; as this (cake dedicated to the *joint deity*, Indra-Agni) has not been enjoined in connection with either of the two sacrifices (*Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa*). So that the sentence may be taken as enjoining the *Aindrāgna Cake* in connection with the *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice,—wherein it is not already known to be admissible. As for the *Āgnēya*, it has been mentioned as not really meant to be laid down (by the text in question);—as it has been already enjoined in the other text (quoted above) in connection with both the *Darsha* and the *Pūrṇamāsa*; further, it is also found mentioned in yet other texts—(*a*) 'Quarters the *Āgnēya Cake*'; again (*b*) in connection with the *Sākamprasthāpya*—'After having offered the two *Ājyabhāgā* offerings, one offers the *Āgnēya Cake*'.—[So the sentence contains the mere reiteration of the *Āgnēya*, but the *injunction* of the *Aindrāgna* Cake.]

SŪTRA (44).

[*Refutation of Pūrvapakṣa* (*E*)]—"IN FACT, BĀDARĀYAṆA HOLDS IT TO BE AN INJUNCTION."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the above view also.

It is not right that 'the sentence contains a *reiterative reference* to the *Āgnēya* Cake, but an *injunction* of the *Aindrāgna* Cake'; in fact, it should be taken as the injunction of time relating to both the Cakes.—"Why?"—Because the teacher *Bādarāyaṇa* has held the opinion that the offering of the *Curd-Butter-mixture* comes before the *Soma-sacrifice* also; we find this mixture laid down for the *Non-Soma-sacrificer* also, in the text—'*Tadu sannayēt*'; again, '*Tathēhasmāhurgopāyanāḥ sānnāyyamēvāsomayājinaḥ*'. From all this it follows that the text serves the purpose of laying down the time.

SŪTRA (45).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, ON ACCOUNT OF THE COGNITION OF WHAT HAS BEEN FORBIDDEN [THE TEXT CAN BE ONLY A REITERATIVE REFERENCE TO BOTH THE CAKES].

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('as a matter of fact') implies the rejection of the view just set forth.

The sentence is not an injunction of time;—nor is it the original injunction of two distinct acts;—nor is it a reiterative reference to the *Āgnēya* and an injunction of the *Aindrāgna* Cake;—the fact of the matter is

that it is a reiterative reference to both the Cakes.—"How so?"—As a matter of fact, the sentence is meant to lay down the Curd-Butter-Mixture for the Soma-Sacrificer (as held by the *Pūrvapakṣin* himself); hence it cannot be an injunction of the *Aindrāgna* Cake either; because if it were so taken, there would be a syntactical split. In fact, the sentences are to be explained as follows:—'These two Cakes are known as to be offered by the *Non-Soma-Sacrificer*,—and for the *Soma-Sacrificer*, the Curd-Butter-Mixture also,—but the *Non-Soma-Sacrificer* should be made to offer the two Cakes *Āgneya* and *Aindrāgna* only, while the *Soma-Sacrificer* should be made to offer the Curd-Butter-Mixture'. Thus, while one sentence lays down the Curd-Butter-Mixture for the *Soma-Sacrificer*, the other lays down the two Cakes for the *Non-Soma-Sacrificer*. For these reasons (since both the Cakes are found to be already enjoined elsewhere) the text in question should be taken as a mere reiterative reference to the two Cakes.

SŪTRA (46).

TO THE SAME EFFECT WE FIND AN INDICATIVE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

Another text also indicates this same conclusion, and shows that no distinct acts are laid down in the sentence in question.—"How?"—There is the text—'*Chaturdasha paurṇamāsyām āhutayo hūyantē, trayodasha amāvāsyāyām*' [which speaks of *fourteen* offerings at the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice and *thirteen* at the *Darsha* sacrifice]. If the text in question laid down two distinct offerings, then the number of offerings at the two sacrifices would be more (than 14 and 13).

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *The 'Dhruvājya' (Clarified Butter contained in the Dhruvā-vessel) is the material offered at the Upāmshuyāja.*

SŪTRA (47).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN CONNECTION WITH THE SACRIFICE LAID DOWN IN THE TEXT 'UPĀMSHUYĀJA IS TO BE OFFERED IN THE INTERVAL',—INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO DIRECT DECLARATION OR INDICATION OF THE OFFERING-MATERIAL, IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE ANYTHING THAT ONE MAY LIKE."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Upāmshuyājamantarā yajati*' ['*Upāmshuyāja* is to be offered in the interval'].

In regard to the substance to be used at this sacrifice, there arises the question—Is there no restriction? Or is the choice limited to any one substance?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"No form of substance is found to be declared anywhere,—hence it may be taken that one may do as one likes. —*Objection*—'But the form of the substance has been declared in the text *Ājyasyaiva nāvupāmshu paurṇamāsyām yajan*' [where *Ājya*, Clarified Butter, is spoken of as the substance to be offered at the *Upāmshuyāja*]: hence *Clarified Butter* should be the substance used at the *Upāmshuyāja*.'—*Answer*—Even so, there is *no restriction*, any Clarified Butter may be taken up and offered at the sacrifice."

SŪTRA (48).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE THAT CONTAINED IN THE DHRUVĀ-VESSEL, AS THIS IS THE SUBSTANCE CONNECTED WITH ALL.

Bhāṣya.

The offering should be made out of the Clarified Butter contained in the *Dhruvā-vessel*, and not any and every Clarified Butter.—Why?—*Because this is the substance connected with all*; i.e. the said Clarified Butter is connected with all sacrifices, as declared in the following text—'The Clarified Butter that is contained in the *Dhruvā* is what has been obtained for the purpose of all sacrifices'.—Hence the offering in question should be made out of the Clarified Butter contained in the *Dhruvā-vessel*.

Adhikaraṇa (16): *At the 'Upāmshuyāja', the deity is the same as that at the Original Primary Sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (49).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The same should be the case with the Deity also."

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the Deity of the *Upāmshuyāja*, there arises the question—Is there no restriction? Or is there a restriction?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"Just as, under the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, there is no restriction regarding the *substance*, so in the same manner, there should be no restriction regarding the deity.—*Objection*—'But *Agni* and *Soma* have been enjoined as the Deities.'—*Answer*—That text is more like a narrative statement than like an Injunction.—*Objection*—'In that case we should take the deities to be enjoined in the texts *Viṣṇurupāmshu yaṣṭavyaḥ, etc. etc.*'—*Answer*—It has been already explained that the texts referred to serve the purpose of avoiding the defect of '*Jāmi*' [Vide *Sūtra*, 2. 2. 9 *et. seq.*], and as such, are purely declamatory.—From all this it follows that there can be no restriction regarding the deity at the *Upāmshuyāja*."

SŪTRA (50).

[Siddhānta]—It should be one of those related to the entire performance—on the basis of the Context.

Bhāṣya.

There can be no sacrifice without a Deity;—there can be no idea of the deity unless there is a declaration to that effect;—the deity enjoined in connection with one sacrifice can have no connection with another sacrifice;—hence we should connect the *Upāmshuyāja* with someone of the several deities connected with the *Context* and thus deduce the required deity; and as the needs of the situation would be met by one deity, we may take it to be anyone of those connected with the Context.

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *At the 'Upāmshuyāja', the deities should be Viṣṇu and the rest, and it should be performed during the Paurṇamāsa sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (51).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"PRAJĀPATI SHOULD BE THE DEITY, BECAUSE OF THE CHARACTER."

Bhāṣya.

It has been explained that the deity should be one of those connected with the Context.—Now there arise the following questions:—As among those connected with the Context, is there no restriction?—Or should it be *Prajāpati*? or *Agni*? or *Viṣṇu*? Should the *Upāmshuyāja* be performed during the *Darsha* sacrifice? Or during the *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, the deity being *Viṣṇu* only? Or should the *Upāmshuyāja* be performed at both (*Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa*) and there should be option regarding the deity? Or should the *Upāmshuyāja* be performed during the *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice only, Viṣṇu and the rest being the deities?—These are the views possible here.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* (A) is as follows—"*Prajāpati should be the deity*;—why?—*because of the character*; the 'character' of '*Upāmshu*', *silence*, belongs to *Prajāpati* alone; as is clear from the declaration that 'At the sacrifice, whatever is done in connection with *Prajāpati* should be done in silence';—and inasmuch as the sacrifice in question is named '*Upāmshu*', it follows that verily *silence* is its characteristic; that is to say, there is to be no *loudness* in connection with the sacrifice itself or in connection with its accessories; from this it follows that *Prajāpati* is the deity connected with it; as it is *Prajāpati* who has the character of 'silence'; if there were any other deity, *loudness* would come into the sacrifice."

SŪTRA (52).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"BUT THERE IS NO INDICATION OF THE DEITY; THE EXPRESSION IN THIS CONNECTION IS EXTREMELY WEAK; HENCE THE DEITY SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY PRIORITY OF CLAIM."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('but') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

"It is not right that *Prajāpati* should be the deity at the *Upāmshuyāja*; in fact, the deity should be *Agni*, who is the most important among the deities connected with the Context.—The character of 'silence',—declared in the text 'One should offer sacrifices to *Prajāpati* in silence',—does not

indicate *Prajāpati* as the deity (of the *Upāmshuyāja*).—'But *silence* is a character belonging to *Prajāpati*, as declared in the text that *whatever is done for Prajāpati should be done in silence*'.—The answer to this is as follows—This text has the form of a reiterative reference, and hence it must be regarded as a mere declamation commendatory of the injunction that 'The offering to *Prajāpati* should be made *in silence*'.—*In this connection*,—i.e. at the *Upāmshuyāja*—*the expression is extremely weak* [i.e. not sufficiently expressive]. From all this it follows that *Prajāpati* cannot be the deity at the *Upāmshuyāja*; that deity should be *Agni* who is the most important among those connected with the Context."

SŪTRA (53).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—"IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE VIṢṆU; BECAUSE OF THE DECLARATION OF THE 'HAUTRA-MANTRA'; FOR THIS SAME REASON, THE SUBSTANCE OFFERED SHOULD ALSO BE THE SAME AS THAT AT THE DARSHA SACRIFICE; AS IT IS AT THIS SACRIFICE THAT THE SAID 'HAUTRA' IS FOUND TO BE USED."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the above view.

"It is not right that *Agni* should be the deity; in fact, *Viṣṇu should be the deity,—because of the declaration of the 'Hautra-Mantra'*; in connection with the *Darsha*-sacrifice, the *Hautra-Mantra* laid down as to be used is that related to Viṣṇu—viz.: the *Mantra*—'*Idam viṣṇurvichakramē pratadviṣṇuḥ stuvatē vīryēṇa*'; this declaration has some sense only if *Viṣṇu* is the deity at the *Upāmshuyāja*.—Even so would the declaration of the *Mantra* at the *Darsha-sacrifice* have some sense if the *Upāmshuyāja* were performed at the *Darsha-sacrifice*."

SŪTRA (54).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (D)—*continued*]—"IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE PERFORMED AT THE PAURṆAMĀSA, AS THAT IS WHAT IS MENTIONED IN THE MAIN TEXT;—THE MANTRA, BEING THE SUBSIDIARY FACTOR, SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR."

Bhāṣya.

"It is admitted that *Viṣṇu* is the deity, but we do not accept the view that the *Upāmshuyāja* is to be performed at the *Darsha-sacrifice*; because the text enjoining it lays it down as to be performed on the Full-moon Day (*Paurṇamāsī*)—'*Ājyasyaiva nāvupāmshu paurṇamāsyām yajan.*' Under the circumstances the mere *Mantra-text* cannot drag it down to the *Darsha-*

sacrifice; because the *Mantra* in question has been laid down in connection with the *Upāmshuyāja*; from which it follows that the *Mantra* is to be used where the *Upāmshuyāja* is performed;—*not* that the *Upāmshuyāja* is to be performed where the *Mantra* is used; because it is for the *Upāmshuyāja* that the *Mantra* has been laid down, not the *Upāmshuyāja* for the *Mantra*."

SŪTRA (55).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (D)—*concluded*]—"FURTHER, AT THE ECTYPE OF THE DARSHA-SACRIFICE, THE IMMEDIATE SEQUENCE BETWEEN THE CAKE AND THE CURD-BUTTER-MIXTURE IS SHOWN."

Bhāṣya.

"For the following reason also the *Upāmshuyāja* is not to be performed at the *Darsha-sacrifice*:—*At the ectype of the Darsha-sacrifice*,—i.e. at the *Sākamprasthāpya*,—we find immediate sequence between the Cake and the Curd-Butter-Mixture.—'How?'—In the text '*Ājyabhāgābhyām pracharyāgnēyēna puroḍāshēnāgnīdhē sruchau pradāya saha kumbhībhirabhikrāmannāha*',—the immediate sequence of the *Āgnēya* cake that is indicated is to the Curd-Butter-Mixture, not to the *Upāmshuyāja*. From this it is clear that the *Upāmshūyāja* is not to be performed at the *Darsha-sacrifice*."

SŪTRA (56).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (E)]—"IN FACT, WHAT IS LAID DOWN SPECIFICALLY IN REFERENCE TO THE 'PAURṆAMĀSĪ' IS THE DEITY AGNI-SOMA; HENCE THE SACRIFICE IN QUESTION SHOULD BE TAKEN AS TO BE PERFORMED AT BOTH."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the above view.

"It is not right that the *Upāmshuyāja* should be performed at the *Paurṇamāsa-sacrifice*; in fact, it should be performed at both (*Darsha* and *Paurṇamāsa*), and there should be an option regarding the Deity.—Why so?—Because the *Upāmshuyāja* has been laid down in the text, 'Offers the *Upāmshuyāja* in the interval', in a general way, without reference to any particular sacrifice.—As for the text quoted above—'*Ājyasyaiva nāvupāmshu paurṇamāsyām yajan*', this only lays down a particular deity in connection with the *Paurṇamāsī*. From all this it follows that when the *Upāmshuyāja* is performed on the *Paurṇamāsī*, the deity is *Agni-Soma*,—and when it is performed on the *Darsha*, the deity is *Viṣṇu*,—on the basis of the *Mantra-text*; thus there is to be option regarding the deity."

SŪTRA (57).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT HAS BEEN ENJOINED AFTER PROHIBITION ; HENCE VIṢṆU SHOULD OCCUPY THE SAME POSITION.

Bhāṣya.

What has been asserted,—to the effect that the *Upāmshu* should be performed at both sacrifices (*Darsha* and *Paurṇamāsa*), and that there should be option regarding the deity,—is not right ; as a matter of fact, the *Upāmshuyāja* should be performed at the *Paurṇamāsa* only, and therein the deities should be *Viṣṇu* and the rest (specially named).—Why so ?—*Because it has been enjoined after prohibition.*—" What is the meaning of this *being enjoined after prohibition* ? "—What is meant is that it has been enjoined in connection with the *Paurṇamāsa*, leaving aside the *Darsha*.—" How ? "—Starting with the words '*Ājyasyaiva nāvupāmshu paurṇamāsyām yajan*', the text goes on to say—'*Jāmi vā ētad yajñasya kriyatē yadanvañchau puroḍāshau, Upāmshuyāja-mantarā yajati*' ; from this it is clear that it is to be performed at the *Paurṇamāsa*. It is in this same connection that there is the text—'*Viṣṇurupāmshu yaṣṭavyo 'jāmitvāya, prajāpatirupāmshu yajṣṭavyo 'jamitvāya, agnīṣomāvupāmshu yajṣṭavyāvajāmitvāya*'.—From all this it follows that the *Upāmshuyāja* is to be performed at the *Paurṇamāsa* and *Viṣṇu* (*Prajapati* and *Agni-Soma*) are the deities at it.

SŪTRA (58).

TO THE SAME END THERE IS AN INDICATIVE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the *Upāmshuyāja* should not be performed at the *Darsha*.—"For what reason ? "—There is a text pointing to the same conclusion.—" How ? "—There is the text declaring that ' Fourteen oblations are offered at the *Paurṇamāsa*, and thirteen at the *Darsha* ' ; [according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*] the number of oblations at the *Darsha* would be *fourteen*, not *thirteen*. Hence it follows that the *Upāmshuyāja* is not to be performed at the *Darsha*.

SŪTRA (59).

WHAT IS NOT SUBSIDIARY, IF MENTIONED ONLY ONCE, CANNOT COME IN AT BOTH ; AS THERE CAN BE NO CONNECTION.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the *Upāmshuyāja* should not be performed at the *Darsha* :—*What has been mentioned only once*,—if it is *not a subsidiary*—*cannot come in at both*. It is only a subsidiary which subserves the purposes of a primary act that can come in at both ;—the sacrifice in question, however,

is a primary act, not subsidiary;—as such, when it is mentioned in connection with the *Pūrṇamāsa*, it cannot come in at the *Darsha*;—*because there can be no connection*; i.e. one primary cannot be connected with another *primary*.

SŪTRA (60).

INASMUCH AS ACCESSORIES ARE SUBSERVIENT TO OTHERS, IT IS THE COMING IN OF THESE THAT INDICATES THE MARKS OF INJUNCTION.

Bhāṣya.

Inasmuch as accessories are subservient to others, it is the coming in of these at the Primaries *that indicates the marks of the Injunction*,—not the coming in of the Primaries, as these are not subservient to others.—How so?—This is clear from the text—'*Apsumantāvājyabhāgau yajati, ēkādasha prayājān yajati ēkādashānuyājān*'.—For this reason also the *Upāmshuyāja* is not to be performed at the *Darsha*.

SŪTRA (61).

ALSO BECAUSE IT HAS NOT BEEN MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH THE ECTYPE.

Bhāṣya.

The *Upāmshuyāja* has not been mentioned in connection with the *Sākamprasthapya*, an ectype of the *Darsha*.—How?—The text is—'*Ājyabhāgābhyām pracharya āgnēyēna cha purodāshēnāgnīdhē sruchau pradāya saha kumbhībhirabhikrāmannāha*',—which shows that what comes after the *Āgnēya cake* is the *Curd-Butter-Mixture*, not the *Upāmshuyāja*. From this also it follows that the *Upāmshuyāja* is not to be performed at the *Darsha*.

Adhikaraṇa (18): *The Upāmshuyāja is to be performed at that Pūrṇamāsa also where there is only one Cake.*

SŪTRA (62).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*continued*]—"It should be at that Paurṇamāsi alone where there are two cakes; because of the mention of the 'interval' ('antarā')."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, there is the text—'*Upāmshuyājamantarā yajati*' ['One performs the *Upāmshuyāja* in the interval'];—it has been found that the *Upāmshuyāja* should be performed at the *Pūrṇamāsa* only and at that the deities are *Viṣṇu* (*Prajāpati* and *Agni-Soma*);—after the *Soma-sacrifice*, there is performed the *Pūrṇamāsa-sacrifice* with *two Cakes*, and prior to the *Soma-sacrifice*, the *Pūrṇamāsa* that is performed is with *one Cake* only.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the *Upāmshuyāja* to be performed at that *Pūrṇamāsa* only where there are *two Cakes*? Or at that where there are *two Cakes*, and also at that where there is *one Cake*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*It should be performed at that alone where there are two Cakes*;—why?—*because of the mention of the 'interval'*; the *Upāmshuyāja* is found mentioned along with the term 'interval', in the text, 'One performs the *Upāmshuyāja* during the *interval*';—inasmuch as the 'Cakes' have been spoken of in the preceding sentence, this 'interval' must mean the *interval between the two Cakes*;—such an 'interval' is possible only when there are *two Cakes*, not when there is only *one* Cake; so that if the *Upāmshuyāja* were performed where there is only *one* Cake, it would mean the doing of what is not in accordance with the injunctions. Hence it should be performed only where there are *two Cakes*."

SŪTRA (63).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*continued*]—"Also because it is for the purpose of avoiding the 'Jāmi'."

Bhāṣya.

"For the following reason also the *Upāmshuyāja* should be performed only where there are two Cakes.—For what reason?—It is found to be declared as serving the purpose of avoiding the defect of '*Jāmi*', in the text—'*Jāmi vā ētad yajñasya krīyatē yadanvañchau puroḍāshau, Upāmshu-*

yājamantarā yajati, viṣṇurupāmshu yaṣṭavyo'jāmitvāya, prajāpatirupāmshu yaṣṭavyo'jāmitvāya, agnīṣomāvupāmshu yaṣṭavyāvajamitvāya';—'*Jāmi*' is *similarity*; it is this *similarity* between two Cakes that has been declared to be a defect, in the text '*Jāmi vā ētad yajñasya kriyatē yadanvañchau purodāshau*'; after a *Cake* has been made, what follows as *similar* to it must be a *Cake*; the remedy for a defect can be adopted only when the defect is there; and [as this defect of two similar Cakes is possible only where there are *two Cakes*] it follows that the *Upāmshuyāja* should be performed where there are *two Cakes*."

SŪTRA (64).

[OBJECTION TO PŪRVAPAKṢA]—IF IT BE HELD THAT IT IS FOR THAT ONLY,—THAT CANNOT BE; AS THE FACT IS THAT IT IS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

If it is your view that—"because of the mention of the *interval*, the *Upāmshuyāja* can be performed only at that *Pūrṇamāsa* where there are *two Cakes*",—then, that is not so; because *the fact is that it is the predominant factor*; as a matter of fact, the *Pūrṇamāsa* is the predominant, and the 'interval', the subordinate, factor;—the *Upāmshuyāja* has been enjoined as part of the *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice;—and the 'interval' is subordinate even to the *Upāmshuyāja*;—the *One-Cake Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice also is a '*Pūrṇamāsa*';—so that what is there by reason of which the *Upāmshuyāja* could not be performed at the *One-Cake Pūrṇamāsa*? As for the accessory detail of 'interval', this would not be adopted at it simply because it is not possible to adopt it. So that even when there is no 'interval' at the *One-Cake Pūrṇamāsa*, the *Upāmshuyāja* should be performed.

SŪTRA (65).

ALSO BECAUSE THE CONNECTION WOULD BE WITH WHAT HAS NOT BEEN ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

Under the view in question, it would be necessary to assume that 'the *Upāmshuyāja* has the *interval* for its accessory', which would involve the assumption of the connection of the *Upāmshuyāja* with the *interval*, which has not been '*enjoined*' or declared as such; i.e. we do not find the *interval* enjoined anywhere at all. From this also it follows that the *Upāmshuyāja* should be performed at that *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice where there is only one Cake.

SŪTRA (66).

[PŪRVAPAKṢIN'S ANSWER TO THE ABOVE OBJECTION]—" BUT IT WOULD COME IN BY THE ORIGINAL INJUNCTION ITSELF ; BECAUSE THE THING IS THERE WITHOUT SETTING ASIDE THE ACCESSORY,—BECAUSE THE 'INTERVAL' IS ACTUALLY ENJOINED,—BECAUSE IT IS CONTINGENT,—AND BECAUSE IT IS ONLY IN THE ABSENCE OF IT THAT IT COULD BE DONE WHERE IT HAS NOT BEEN HEARD OF."

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('but') implies the rejection of the objection set forth above.

"It is not true that the *interval* has not been enjoined as an accessory ; in fact, the *Upāmshuyāja* comes into the *interval* by virtue of the original injunction itself ; i.e. the *interval* has been declared to be the accessory of the *Upāmshuyāja* in the original injunction itself—'One performs the *Upāmshuyāja during the interval*'.—Thus it is without setting aside this accessory that the thing (*Upāmshuyāja*) can come in ; so that it could not come in where there would be only one Cake (and hence no *interval*). Nor would it become futile if not performed where there is only one Cake ; because the 'interval' is actually present in cases where there are two Cakes.—*Without it*,—i.e. if there were no such thing as *interval*,—*if there were no declaration* of a case with two Cakes, then alone could the *Upāmshuyāja* be performed in a case where there is only one Cake ; as a matter of fact, however, there *is* the *Pūrṇamāsa with two Cakes*, where there is room for the *Upāmshuyāja* :—hence there should be no performance of the *Upāmshuyāja* at a *Pūrṇamāsa* where there is only one Cake."

SŪTRA (67).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT SHOULD BE AT BOTH ; AS SUCH IS THE INJUNCTION.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('as a matter of fact') implies the rejection of the above view.

As a matter of fact, the *Upāmshuyāja* should be performed at both kinds of *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice,—i.e. also at that where there is only one Cake—(as at that where there are two Cakes).—"Why ?"—*Because such is the injunction* ; as a matter of fact, the *Upāmshuyāja* has been laid down as to be performed also where there is only one Cake ; because that also is '*Pūrṇamāsa*' sacrifice (just as much as that where there are two Cakes), and that is all that is found in the injunctive sentence, '*Ājyasyaiva nāvupāmshu paurṇamāsyām yajan*'; in fact, if the term '*paurṇamāsi*' (as here used) were excluded from cases where there is only one Cake, it would

be an outrage upon it. From all this it follows that the *Upāmshuyāja* should be performed at that *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice also where there is only one Cake.

SŪTRA (68).

INASMUCH AS ACCESSORIES ARE SUBSERVIENT TO THE PRINCIPAL ACT, THE DECLARATION SHOULD BE TAKEN AS QUALIFIED BY THE PHRASE 'WHEN POSSIBLE',—AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'UPAVĒṢA'.

Bhāṣya.

The 'interval' has been declared to be an accessory, which must be subservient to the principal act of the *Upāmshuyāja*; the sense therefore is that the 'interval' should help in the performance of the *Upāmshuyāja*;—as a matter of fact, however, this 'interval' cannot help the sacrifice when it is performed at the *Paurṇamāsa* with only *one Cake* [as in this case no *interval* is possible];—and yet, as this also would be a case of '*Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice', the *Upāmshuyāja* that has been laid down as to be performed 'at the *Paurṇamāsa*' must be performed at that performance of the *Paurṇamāsa* also where there is only one Cake;—and having been laid down as to be performed 'in the interval', the *Upāmshuyāja* is also recognised as to be performed 'in the interval';—at the '*One-Cake Paurṇamāsa*', however, there can be no 'interval';—hence the injunction laying down the 'interval' as an accessory should be taken as qualified by the phrase 'when possible'.—*This would be as in the case of the 'Upavēṣa'*; in the case of the injunction 'One places the Pans with the *Upavēṣa*', it is understood to mean that this is to be done 'when the *Upavēṣa* is there';—similarly in the case in question, the *Upāmshuyāja* would be performed 'in the interval' when the 'interval' would be there.—From all this it follows that it should be performed at the 'one-cake' *Paurṇamāsa* also.

SŪTRA (69).

FURTHER, THERE WOULD BE NO TRANSGRESSION OF THE TIME, AS THE 'TWO CAKES' ARE MERE INDICATORS.

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"The *Upāmshuyāja* has been declared to have the 'interval' as an accessory;—hence, at the *One-Cake-Paurṇamāsa*, as this 'interval' would not be there, the *Upāmshuyāja*, even though performed, could not bring about its result, as it would be defective for want of the said accessory:—and as it would be fruitless, it should not be performed. The injunction of the *Upāmshuyāja* as to be performed 'in the *interval*' does not contain the qualifying phrase 'where there is *interval*'; in fact, the injunction is in the unqualified form, which is applicable to

all cases of the *Paurṇamāsa*,—that at which only one Cake is used as well as that at which two Cakes are used. Hence at the *One-Cake Paurṇamāsa*, it would not be performed; simply because there would be no need for it (the 'interval' not being there).—It might be argued that—'in that case, inasmuch as the performance of the *Upāmshuyāja* would not be possible at it, the *One-Cake Paurṇamāsa* should not be performed at all'.—That does not affect the case; the performance may be there, but it will be fruitful only when there would be *two Cakes* (and hence the requisite 'interval')."

The answer to the above is as as follows:—There would be no performance of the *Upāmshuyāja* at the *One-Cake-Paurṇamāsa*, if such performance were really defective (and hence fruitless);—as a matter of fact however, it is *not* defective, because the 'interval' has not been declared as an *accessory* of the sacrifice; it has been mentioned only as *an indicator of time*, the sense being that it is to be performed at the time intervening between the offering of the two Cakes.—"How so?"—It is in reference to these 'two Cakes' that we have the following injunction—'*Jāmi vā ētad yajñasya kriyatē yadanvañchau purodāshau, upāmshuyājamantarā yajati*' ['It becomes a serious defect, *Jāmi*, in the sacrifice if two Cakes follow such other in close succession,—the *Upāmshuyāja* is performed *in the interval*']; which means that the *Upāmshuyāja* should be performed in such a manner as to separate the two Cakes,—i.e. *at that particular time*.—And *of this time, there would be no transgression*, even at the *One-Cake-Paurṇamāsa*.—"Why?"—The time that is indicated as 'between the two Cakes' (i.e. the 'interval' between them) is the same as that which comes after the *first* Cake; under the circumstances, even though at the *One-Cake Paurṇamāsa*, 'two Cakes' would not be there, yet the first Cake, *Āgnēya*, would be there; so that the time following after this *Āgnēya* Cake would be that time which has been indicated by the term 'interval'. For instance, when it is said—(*a*) 'Come at the *Nāga-time*', (*b*) 'Come at the *Shaṅkha-time*', (*c*) 'Come at the *Paṭaha-time*',—though a certain village may not have a '*Nāga*' or '*Shaṅkha*' or '*Paṭaha*', yet the time indicated is understood to be just the same, and the 'Coming' is done at that time;—in the same manner, it should be in the case in question also.—From all this it follows that the *Upāmshuyāja* should be performed at that *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice also where there is only *one Cake*.

SŪTRA (70).

AS FOR THE 'AVOIDING OF JĀMI', IT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PRAISE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 63) that "it is for the purpose of avoiding the *Jāmi*"; this has got to be refuted. The refutation is as follows:—What has been referred to is in praise of the *Upāmshuyāja*, expressed figuratively, and the 'avoidance of *Jāmi*' has not been laid down as the

result following from it.—"How so?"—It is only when an act has been enjoined that its purpose (or result) is laid down.—It may be argued that "the *Upāmshuyāja* itself may be regarded as enjoined".—But that would involve the incongruity of the injunction of two things (syntactical split). Nor again is the 'avoiding of *Jāmi*' a result desirable in itself.—From all this it follows that it is mere praise; in the same manner as the *Upastaraṇa* and *Abhighāraṇa* have been spoken of as 'bringing about immortality', in the sentence, '*Amṛtam vā ājyam, martyam haviḥ, yadupastṛṇāti abhighārayati amṛtāhutimēvainām karoti*'.

From all this it follows that the *Upāmshuyāja* should be performed at that *Paurṇamāsa* also where there is only one Cake.

End of Pāda viii of Adhyāya X.

End of Adhyāya X.

ADHYĀYA XI.

PĀDA I.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *The result of the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa is brought up collectively by the six main sacrifices that comprise it.*

SŪTRA (1).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE ACTS THOUGH SEPARATE, SHOULD BE REGARDED AS 'ONE ACT',—BECAUSE THEY ARE RELATED TO A (SINGLE) PURPOSE, AND BECAUSE THEY ARE NAMED BY A SINGLE TERM.

Bhāṣya.

Under Discourse X, the treatment of 'Exclusion' and 'Inclusion' has been finished; now under Discourse XI, we are going to deal with *Tantra* (Common, Centralisation) and *Āvāpa* (Uncommon, Decentralisation).—That is called '*Tantra*' (common, centralised) which, done once, benefits several things; e.g. one lamp lighted among several *Brāhmaṇas*; and that is '*Āvāpa*' (uncommon, decentralised) which helps several things through repetition; e.g. the applying of Sandal-paste to those same several *Brāhmaṇas*.—In this connection they quote the following verse—'That which is *common* is *Tantra*; it is not prompted by the needs of other things; so also is *Prasaṅga* (an extended *Tantra*), which has its own injunction present'.—'*Sādhāraṇam bhavēt tantram*', *That which is common is 'Tantra'*,—this has been already explained;—'*Parārthē tvaprayojakaḥ*', '*It is not prompted by the needs of other things*';—i.e. that which has been laid down for the sake of something else, and is performed for the purposes of, and is helpful to, that thing,—is not prompted by any other thing; e.g. the *killing of the animal* is laid down for the sake of the *sacrifice*, and is performed for the purposes of the sacrifice, and it also helps in the acts of the 'removal of blood and excreta', though these latter are not the prompters of that *killing*.—'*Ēvamēva prasaṅgaḥ syāt*', '*So also is Prasaṅga*'; but there is this difference that in the case of *Prasaṅga*, *its own injunction is present*; though there is another injunction of its own, yet, its purposes having been served by the injunction of the other thing (i.e. the common factor of the *Tantra*), it is not done over again (by virtue of its own separate injunction). For example, the *Prayājas* have their performance laid down by the Injunction of the *Pashu-sacrifice* as also by the injunction of the '*Pashu-puroḍāsha*'; but when they are performed for the purposes of the *Pashu-sacrifice*, they help, by that same performance, the *Pashu-puroḍāsha* also,—and are not performed again for the purposes of this latter (though there is

a separate injunction to this effect). [*Prasaṅga* is dealt with in detail under Pāda i of Discourse XII.]

[*This is by way of Introduction*]—

We now proceed to explain the subject-matter of the Discourse. It has been declared that *Tantra* (Common) and *Āvāpa* (Uncommon) are going to be dealt with. This is what we proceed to do now.

At the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, there are six main component sacrifices—the *Āgnēya* and the rest; the attainment of Heaven has been declared to be the result of these, in the text 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices'.

The question that arises is—Does this result proceed from all the six sacrifices *in common* (collectively)?—Or from each of them severally?

There are similar questions in regard to all *composite* sacrifices, the *Chāturmāsya* and the rest.

Preliminary Objection—"The text quoted does not speak of *Heaven* as the result at all;—the term '*svargakāmaḥ*' ('desiring heaven') denotes the *Person*; the term '*yajēta*' ('should perform the sacrifice') denotes the *performance of the sacrifice*,—and it is these two factors (*Person* and *Performance of the sacrifice*) that are connected together by means of the sentence;—what word then is there which speaks of the *Result*?"

The answer to this is that the Result is spoken of by this same term '*svargakāmaḥ*' ('desiring heaven').

"But this term denotes the *Person*."

There is no *person* of the name of '*svargakāma*'.

"But that person is *svargakāma* who has the desire (*kāma*) for heaven (*svarga*)."

This is exactly what we do not know—who is the person *having the desire for heaven*: because it is just possible that the man who is *desiring heaven* (at one time) may be *not desiring heaven* (at another time).

"In that case, the term may be taken as indicating the time—the sense being that 'one should perform the sacrifice *at the time that he has the desire for heaven*'."

But here also there cannot be any particular time at which a man must necessarily have the *desire for heaven*; as a matter of fact, all sorts of desires appear in man at all sorts of times without any restriction; so that no particular point of time can be taken as indicated by the term 'desiring heaven'.

"In that case, the term '*svargakāmaḥ*' may not denote the *Person*, nor the *time*; it may be taken as indicating the fact that *desire for the particular result* is the incentive to action,—the sense being that 'one should perform the sacrifice when the desire for the particular result Heaven has appeared in him'; just as in another case it is understood that 'one should perform a certain sacrifice when the Pan is broken'."

This view has been completely refuted above under *Sūtras* 6. 2. 9-10. Such acts as the *Agnihotra* and the like are essential, compulsory,—if then these were laid down as to be performed on the appearance of certain conditions, then this *essential* character of theirs would be lost; and this would

militate against those injunctions which lay down these acts as *essential*, to be performed 'as long as one lives', as also against such indicative texts as '*Apa vā ēṣa....atipātayet*' (which are indicative of the essential and compulsory character of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices).

The only alternative left therefore is that the term '*svargakāma*' ('desiring heaven') be taken as laying down the *Result*.

Question—"But how can this sentence enjoin the Result?"

Answer—The sentence '*Svargakāmo yajēta*' ('Desiring heaven one should perform sacrifice') can mean either—(*a*) that 'the *man desiring heaven* is enjoined to perform the sacrifice', as in the sentence '*Lohitoṣṇīṣāḥ ṛtvijaḥ pracharanti*' ('The red-turbaned priests go along', the *red-turbaned priests* are enjoined to go along),—or (*b*) that 'the performance of the sacrifice is enjoined for *the man desiring heaven*',—as in the case of such sentences as 'The dirty man should bathe', 'the hungry man should eat' [the *bathing* is enjoined for the *dirty man*, and the *eating* for the *hungry* man]. If it be, as in (*a*), that 'the man desiring heaven is enjoined to perform the act',—then, even though thus enjoined, the man may not take up the act; for what man is there who would undertake so much trouble for a purpose not his own? The injunction of the act therefore would be futile. On the other hand, if it be, as in (*b*), that 'the sacrifice is enjoined for *the man desiring heaven*', then as the act of sacrificing would be helpful to the man, he would perform it as conducive to his own purpose; and in this case the injunction of the act would come to serve a useful purpose. Further, if the sentence is taken as an injunction of the *sacrifice*, the direct denotation of the words is retained;—whereas if the *man desiring heaven* is taken as enjoined, what is retained is the indication of Syntactical Connection.—From all this it follows that the sacrifice is helpful to the man desiring heaven. If the sacrifice were conducive to bringing to the performer such benefits as several sons, cattle, landed property, food-grains and so forth,—and were to bring to him any one of these,—then no significance would attach to the term '*svargakāmaḥ*' ('desiring heaven'), and it would stand for the mere *man* (as the agent); and in this case also, this term would be entirely superfluous; as the *mere man* (as the *agent*) is already signified by the verb itself.—From all this it follows that *Heaven* is the result following from the *sacrifice*.

Now, in regard to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices and other such acts, which comprise several minor sacrifices, there arises the question—Does the result follow from all these component sacrifices *in common* (collectively)? or severally?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—"It follows from them *severally*.—Why?—All these minor sacrifices, *Āgnēya* and the rest (which go to make up the *Darsha-Purṇamāsa*), are principal acts, laid down by separate independent injunctions, and as such require separate results also;—and when in close proximity to them, some such definite result as 'Heaven' is mentioned, it becomes connected with each of the said acts, as each of these requires a separate result for itself.—Hence it follows that there is a separate result following from each of the principal acts."

In answer to this, the following *Siddhānta* is set forth:—*The acts, though separate, should be regarded as 'one act', because they are related to a single purpose and because they are named by a single term*;—that is to say, though the *Āgnēya* and other sacrifices are distinct from each other, they should be regarded as 'one act';—why?—*because they are related to a single purpose*; 'purpose' is *result*,—and to the result all those sacrifices are related—i.e. connected—*collectively*.—In the term '*aika-karmyam*' ('one act'), the term '*karma*' ('act') really stands for the *result*, in the sense that it is the *Result* that is *brought about* (*kriyatē iti karma*); hence the sense is that those sacrifices of which the Result is one, are 'one act',—and *the character of being one act* is '*aikakarmya*', which term thus means 'one result'.

"How do you know that the *Āgnēya* and other sacrifices are related to the result *collectively*?"

Because they are named by a single term; there is the single term ('*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*') which signifies all these sacrifices *collectively*, and it is through this term that the sacrifices have been connected with the Result, in the sentence '*Darshapūrṇamāsābhyām svargakāmaḥ yajēta*' ['Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices'];—and from this it follows that the result follows from all the sacrifices *collectively*, not *severally*. For instance, when it is said that 'The well should be dug *by the village*',—inasmuch as the *well-digging* is laid down through the *collective* noun 'village', it is a *single* well that is dug by the villagers *collectively*, and each villager does not dig a separate well;—the same should be the case with the text in question.

SŪTRA (2).

[*Objection*]—"THE PURPOSE VERILY SHOULD VARY WITH EACH ACT, LIKE AUXILIARY DETAILS."

Bhāṣya.

"There is no such universal rule as that 'whatever is related to a collective term pertains to the components collectively'; because some such thing may pertain to them severally also; e.g. when such expressions are used as '*Gaṇāya snānam*' ('Bath for the clan'), '*Gaṇāya anulēpanam*' ('Sandal-paste for the clan'), such auxiliary details as 'sandal-paste' and the like, even though spoken of in connection with the collective noun '*Gaṇa*' ('tribe'), is not connected with the components of the tribe collectively,—it is, on the other hand, connected with each individual member of the *clan*; so that the *Bathing* and the *Sandal-paste* are repeated with each member. Thus then, the reason put forward,—*being related to a collective term*—cannot prove either that 'like auxiliary details, the Result should vary with each component sacrifice', or that 'like the well, it should be common to all'.—It is necessary therefore to bring forward some other reason which would lead definitely to one conclusion."

This reason is set forth in the following *Sūtra*:—

SŪTRA (3).

AS SUCH IS NOT THE INJUNCTION, IT CANNOT BE SO.

Bhāṣya.

In the case in question the Result is not enjoined in reference to the sacrifice, in the sense that 'one should perform the sacrifice *with heaven*';—in fact, it is the *sacrifice* that is enjoined in reference to the Result, in the sense that 'one should attain heaven *by means of sacrifice*'.—Why so?—The injunctive affix in the word '*yajēta*' ('should sacrifice') enjoins the *sacrifice* by *direct denotation*, while it could enjoin the *Result* only indirectly through *Syntactical Connection*; and so long as Direct Denotation is possible, Indication through *Syntactical Connection* cannot be admitted; as what is expressed by Direct Denotation is the more important of the two.

"What would happen if the Result were enjoined?"

If the Result were enjoined, then what is signified by the root '*yajati*' (i.e. the sacrifice) would be merely referred to: as there cannot be any connection between two things when both are enjoined or predicated;—this *reference* could be only to the *Āgnēya* and other sacrifices which happen to be spoken of in close proximity to the sentence; now these sacrifices have been laid down as independent of, and separate from, each other; so that the Result could be related to them only severally.—On the other hand, if it is the *sacrifice* (signified by root '*yajati*') that is enjoined and predicated, then the *Āgnēya* and other sacrifices come to be enjoined by means of a collective name as to be performed for the purpose of securing the Result;—and when they are thus enjoined, their *collective character*, which is pointed out by their proximity to each other, becomes duly significant and emphasised; specially as there is no reason why it should not be significant.

"If the *sacrifices* are enjoined and predicated, then they cannot be qualified by the name '*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*', as there can be no qualification for what is enjoined or predicated; the reason for this being that the qualification also cannot but be enjoined, and there can be no connection between two enjoined things."

What is the need for a 'qualification' here at all?—when as a matter of fact, in close proximity to the *Āgnēya* and other sacrifices whose detailed form is clearly laid down, there appears the sentence 'one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices', where no detailed form is perceptible, which fact leads to the conclusion that the term '*yajēta*' ('perform sacrifices') cleary denotes the *group* (of sacrifices, *Āgnēya* and the rest).

"In that case why should the term '*darshapūrṇamāsa*' be there at all?"

It may be regarded as useless; and as such a mere reiterative reference; just like the assertions—'The divinity Indra has rained', 'The *Ātithyā* ends with the *Iḍā-Cake*', 'One does not perform the *Anuyājas*'.

Or, it may be more reasonable to take what is indicated by Syntactical Connection to be what is enjoined by the sentence in question; if what is *directly denoted* were taken as the *enjoined*, then the term '*darsha-*

pūrṇamāsa' would become superfluous (as just shown); on the other hand, if what is expressed by Syntactical Connection is taken to be enjoined, then the term '*darshapūrṇamāsa*' comes in useful as a qualification. As for the *Sacrifice*, even though it is already known as bringing about (the result), yet it is mentioned again; and the cognition of the *Sacrifice* is due to the fact that the term '*darshapūrṇamāsa*' denotes a *Sacrifice*; so that in this case there is nothing that is superfluous. For this reason we conclude that this latter is the more reasonable view of the case.

SŪTRA (4).

INASMUCH AS THE 'AUXILIARY' IS SUBSERVIENT TO ANOTHER, —AND THERE IS INJUNCTION OF IT,—IT SHOULD COME IN WITH EACH ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL FACTORS.

Bhāṣya.

As for the agreement (put forward under Sū. 2) that it would be 'like auxiliary details',—an auxiliary (like the *Sandal-paste*) is always enjoined as subserving the purposes of something else, in the form of embellishing the Person; in this way it serves a visible purpose; any other explanation would involve the necessity of assuming an invisible (transcendental) result. Thus then, the 'clan' or 'group' would come to serve the purpose of characterising the person; and it is quite capable of characterising the person, through its connection with him. Now, as a matter of fact, what is connected with the action, is not the *characterising*, but the *characterised*, factor; for instance, in the case of the sentence 'Bring in the *white-robed man*', where the 'white robes', which are mentioned as characterising the man, are not connected with the action of 'bringing up'; in the same manner, in the case in question, the *clan* or *group* will not be connected with the act (sacrifice); it is only the *persons* that would be so connected. It is for this reason that *auxiliaries* like *sandal-paste* and the rest vary with each principal factor.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *All the subsidiaries operate collectively.*

Bhāsya.

In regard to the subsidiary details of a sacrifice, we proceed to consider the question—Do subsidiaries operate *collectivly*? Or *severally*?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—

SŪTRA (5).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF SUBSIDIARIES HOWEVER, AS THERE IS DIVERSITY OF WORDS, THERE SHOULD BE DISTINCT RESULTS, AS IN THE CASE OF SACRIFICES."

Bhāṣyā.

"As in the case of the main sacrifices, there is a single result following from them collectively,—not so in the case of subsidiaries; *in the case of subsidiaries* there is a distinct purpose served by each, so that there is a distinct result following from each of the subsidiaries.—Why?—Because *there is diversity of words*; i.e. because there are distinct injunctions;—e.g. the subsidiary sacrifices have been enjoined as separate from each other, by such distinct mutually independent injunctions as '*Samidho yajati*', '*Tanūnapātam yajati*' and so forth; as such, these subsidiaries require distinct purposes to be served by each of them severally, not collectively; as no such collective functioning has been anywhere spoken of.—For this reason these subsidiaries are recognised as related to distinct purposes, —*as in the case of sacrifices*;—i.e. just as in the case of the sacrifices enjoined separately, each of them is recognised as related to a distinct result."

SŪTRA (6).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN THAT CASE, THERE IS A DIFFERENCE OF PURPOSE; IN THIS CASE, ON THE OTHER HAND, AS THE PURPOSE SERVED IS ONE AND THE SAME, ALL SHOULD BE REGARDED AS 'ONE ACT'.

Bhāṣya.

In the case of *sacrifices*, it is only right that there should be distinct results; as in their case actual texts have spoken of distinct results—'Desiring *Brahmic Glory*, one should offer cooked rice to *Sūrya*', 'Desiring *offspring*, one should offer the cake baked on eleven pans to *Indra-Agni*'.—*In this case* (of *subsidiaries*) however, *the purpose served is one and the same*,—i.e. all the subsidiaries serve the same one purpose, of helping the principal act; it is with a view to supplying the requisite help that the subsidiaries have been laid down; thus all of them serve one and the same purpose.

"If all of them serve the same purpose, they should be treated as so many optional alternatives."

The answer to this is going to be given under *Sūtra* 17 below, where it will be shown how the case cannot be treated as one of *option*.

The conclusion therefore is that, inasmuch as all the subsidiaries serve one and the same purpose, their result must be one only.

SŪTRA (7).

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIVERSITY OF WORDS, IT CANNOT BE SO",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued above (under Sū. 5) that—"inasmuch as there are distinct injunctions relating to the subsidiaries, there should be distinct results following from them". This has got to be refuted; it has been refuted already by showing that they actually serve one and the same purpose.

"It cannot be refuted thus. It is quite possible for all the subsidiaries to help the Principal Sacrifice and yet serve distinct purposes; just as the several active agencies—Nominative and the rest,—help the *action* and yet each agency serves a distinct purpose."

[If that refutation will not refute it] then it may be refuted as follows—If the sentences speaking of the *Samit* and other subsidiary sacrifices laid down their performance,—the sense being that 'the *Samit* sacrifice *should be performed*', 'the *Tanūnapāt* sacrifice *should be performed*',—then there could arise the desire to find out the purpose served by them; and this desire, when arising, would naturally arise separately in regard to each sacrifice. As a matter of fact however, it is not the *performance* that is laid down; it is merely the form of the sacrifices that is described—'such and such a sacrifice comes in here'.—"Why so?"—Because there is no ending in the sentence in question expressing actual *performance*, and because the *performance* has been laid down elsewhere.—"Where else has the *performance* of these been laid down?"—We shall show that under the next *Sūtra*.—Thus then, if there is no desire to find out the purpose served by the subsidiaries, whence could there be any purposes?—Where too any diversity among them?

SŪTRA (8).

INASMUCH AS THE PERFORMANCE (OF THE MAIN ACTS) IS FOR PURPOSES OF ACTION, THERE SHOULD BE THE SAME IDEA (IN CONNECTION WITH SUBSIDIARIES ALSO), BECAUSE THESE ARE FOR THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

When the *performance* of the main sacrifices is laid down, the same idea should be there with the subsidiaries also; i.e. the performance of the

subsidiaries also should be regarded as declared by that same declaration which has laid down the performance of the principals,—i.e. the declaration 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices'.—Why so?—Because *it is for purposes of action*, i.e. for the purpose of actual operation. As a matter of fact, it is for the bringing about of the result that the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices have been laid down, the sense being that 'one should bring about heaven by means of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*'.—On this there arises the desire to know—how this is to be done?—This desire is fulfilled by the injunctions of the *Samit* and other subsidiary sacrifices—'one should perform the *Samit* sacrifice', 'one should perform the *Tanūnapāt*',—'and this brings about the desired result'.—"Why should there be this idea?"—*Because these are for that purpose*; i.e. these injunctions of the *Samit* and other subsidiaries are for that purpose,—being, as they are, required by it,—specially because they have no results of their own, and have been mentioned in close proximity to a sacrifice which is spoken of as leading to a particular result.—In fact, this (performance of the subsidiaries) constitutes the 'Procedure' of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices in the fulfilment of their result;—without the procedure, the injunction of a sacrifice cannot be effective; hence what is actually enjoined is the *performance of the main sacrifice along with its procedure.* Thus it is established that the performance of the subsidiaries is enjoined by that same text which enjoins the performance of the main sacrifice. Such being the case, it is only right that the subsidiaries also should be regarded as enjoined under one and the same name; so that, just as there is only one result from all the main sacrifices by reason of their being connected with one name, so should it be in the case of the subsidiaries also.

Says the Opponent—"This cannot be right."—Why?—

SŪTRA (9).

"BECAUSE THE INJUNCTION OF THE PERFORMER RELATING TO THE MAIN SACRIFICE AND THAT RELATING TO THE SUBSIDIARIES ARE FOR DIFFERENT PURPOSES."

Bhāṣya.

"The injunction of the Performer relating to the main sacrifice is 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices';—that relating to the subsidiaries is 'He should perform these sacrifices *along with their subsidiaries*';—these two *are for different purposes*; i.e. the injunction of the main sacrifice is for the purpose of obtaining the Result, while that of the subsidiaries is for the purpose of accomplishing the main sacrifice. In fact, all main sacrifices have to be *enjoined* in regard to the Result, and to be *referred to* in regard to the subsidiaries;—but it is not possible for both *injunction* and *reference* to be done at one and the same time;—consequently it is not possible for one and the same text to enjoin the main sacrifices as well as their Procedure. So that the subsidiaries cannot be included under the injunction of the main sacrifices."

Answer—What has been said under Sū. 8 is not objectionable, it is quite right.

"How so?"

SŪTRA (10).

BECAUSE EVERY ACTIVITY IS PRECEDED BY THE WORD.

Bhāṣya.

'*Ārambha*', 'activity', is synonymous with '*vyāpara*', 'operation', and '*kriyā*', 'bringing about'. What is laid down by the sentence in question is the *performance* of the sacrifice,—the injunctive verb '*yajēta*' meaning that 'one should bring about Heaven by means of sacrifice', which means that one should operate, act, for the purpose of obtaining Heaven;—it is not known, however, what this *operation* is;—now in close proximity to the said injunction, we find a series of actions, the *reinstalling of the Fire* and the rest, mentioned;—hence because the information is wanted and because the actions happen to be mentioned in close proximity, it is understood that these are the actions constituting the *operation* by which the sacrifice brings about Heaven. In this way the injunction of this operation (which is the *Procedure*) does not involve any syntactical split.

Or, there need be nothing incongruous in the same injunction laying down the main sacrifices in regard to the Result, and the subsidiaries in regard to the main sacrifices.—"How so?"—What the sentence lays down is the *fulfilment of Heaven by means of the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, which is something not already known, and the same sentence also declares the same along with particular details; just as in the case of the text, '*Ētasyaiva rēvatīṣu vāravantīyam agniṣṭomasāma kṛtvā pashukāmo yajēta*' [which lays down the main sacrifice and also its particular details].

From all this it follows that the performance of the subsidiaries is enjoined by that same text which lays down the performance of the main sacrifice.

Adhikaraṇa (3): *The Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa and other sacrifices should always be performed along with all their subsidiaries.*

Bhāṣya.

What is going to be considered is—When the *Agnihotra* and such other acts are performed, are they to be performed along with only a few of their subsidiary details, or with all subsidiary details?

"Of this inquiry, how much has already been done?"

Under *Sūtra* 6. 3. 1, the consideration was concentrated upon the *essential and compulsory acts*, laid down in such texts as 'One should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* as long as one lives',—and it was in reference to this *life-long* (hence essential, compulsory) performance that it was considered whether it is to be done along with all the subsidiaries, or not?—[and the conclusion arrived at was that it is not necessary to perform all the subsidiaries, only so many may be performed as one may be able to perform].—What we are going to consider on the present occasion is the same question in regard to such performance of the sacrifices as are undertaken for the purpose of acquiring a definite result,—in accordance with such texts as 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*'; the question being—whether this (voluntary, prospective) performance of the sacrifice that is laid down by this text is to be done like the performance of the *compulsory Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* (with only such subsidiaries as one may be able to perform),—or all the subsidiaries should be performed.

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—

SŪTRA (11).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"It may be completed with a single subsidiary, its requirements being fulfilled thereby; as in the case of different sacrifices; among those admissible, it would be as in the case of the 'Uttarā' (later ones)."

Bhāṣya.

"The sacrifice may be *completed*—performed—even with the help of a part only of the subsidiaries.—Why?—*Because its requirements are fulfilled thereby*; the need for information regarding the procedure that arises on being told that 'for the purpose of obtaining heaven, one should perform

the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*', is supplied even by means of a single subsidiary,—'the procedure to be adopted is that one should perform the *Samit* sacrifice'; similarly it might be supplied by two or three subsidiaries; the performer shall obtain the benefit of as many subsidiaries as he may be able to perform.—*Just as in the case of different sacrifices—Saurya, Āryamaṇa, Prājāpatya, Nairṛta* and the like,—the performer obtains the results of just those sacrifices which he is able to perform.—The mere fact of all the subsidiaries being mentioned in proximity to the main sacrifice does not mean that all the subsidiaries have to be performed.—*Among those admissible, it would be as in the case of the 'Uttarā' (later ones)*;—there is the text, 'With speech controlled, he milks three cows, then giving up the speech-restraint, he separates himself and milks the later ones in silence'; and in this case, the performer milks as many cows as he possesses, and the needs of the term '*uttarā*' ('later ones') becomes duly filled by it;—similarly in the case in question, the performer may perform as many subsidiaries as he may be able to do."

SŪTRA (12).

[*Objection to the Pūrvapakṣa*]—'IT CANNOT BE SO, AS THE RESULT CANNOT FOLLOW',—IF THIS IS URGED (AGAINST THE PŪRVAPAKṢA) [then the answer of the Pūrvapakṣin is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

[*Objection to the Pūrvapakṣa*]—If it is your view that sacrifices with subsidiaries may be performed along with a part only of those subsidiaries,—then *that cannot be so*.—Why?—In that case *the result cannot follow*; i.e. unless a man performs *all* that has been laid down for the person desiring heaven,—'the man desiring heaven should do this',—the said result (*Heaven*) cannot follow; because the declaration that 'One desiring heaven should perform this sacrifice' means that all those rites of Fire-installation and the rest should be performed which have been laid down.

SŪTRA (13).

[*Objection answered by Pūrvapakṣin*]—"NOT SO; BECAUSE OF CONNECTION WITH THE SACRIFICE; HENCE THE PURPOSE WOULD NOT INVOLVE ANY INCONGRUITY IN THE DECLARATION."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not right that a deficiency in the subsidiaries should lead to deficiency in the Result.—Why?—*Because of connection with the sacrifice*;

as a matter of fact, the result is connected with the *main sacrifice*,—not with the *subsidiaries*,—as is clear from the text—'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices'; the subsidiaries come in only as needed by the main sacrifice; and this need can be satisfied even by a single subsidiary, as already pointed out above.—Such being the case, the *purpose*,—i.e. (*a*) the help accorded (to the main sacrifice) by the subsidiaries, as also (*b*) the *result*, in the shape of Heaven and the like,—*would not involve any incongruity in the declaration*; that is to say, if the *Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices were taken as serving the purpose of bringing about the *result*, this would not be incompatible with the declaration '*Darsha-Purṇamāsābhyām svargakāmaḥ*' ('Desiring to obtain heaven by means of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices');—and the *Samit* and other subsidiaries also, if regarded as helping the said two sacrifices, would not be incompatible with the declarations laying down these subsidiaries.—From this it follows that the absence of subsidiaries does not necessarily mean the absence of results."

SŪTRA (14).

[*Objection to the Pūrvapakṣa*]—'ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING ONLY ONE TEXT [IT CANNOT BE AS SUGGESTED IN THE PŪRVAPAKṢA]',—IF THIS IS URGED (AGAINST THE PŪRVAPAKṢA) [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

If it is your view that "the result follows from the *Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa* (the main sacrifices), not from the *Samit* and other subsidiaries",—then this cannot be right;—why?—because *there is only one text*: there is one text which lays down the performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* and of the subsidiaries,—this text being 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices';—it is this text that has laid down the connection of the Result; what reason then is there to show that the Result follows from the *Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa*, not from the others (e.g. the subsidiaries)?

SŪTRA (15).

[*Objection answered by the Pūrvapakṣin*]—"NOT SO; BECAUSE THE PURPOSES ARE DISTINCT; IF THEY WERE EQUAL, THERE WOULD BE NO 'SUBSIDIARY CHARACTER' AT ALL."

Bhāṣya.

"It is only the *Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices,—not all the subsidiaries,—that are connected with the Result.—How do you know that?—What

we learn from the text—'Desiring heaven one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices'—is that the means of securing Heaven are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, not the *Samit* and other subsidiaries; these latter come in only by reason of the needs of the former sacrifices; the 'need' is that of the *procedure*—in what manner should Heaven be brought about by means of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice?—there is no need of the *means* or *instrument*, as this has been already pointed out by the term '*darsha-pūrṇamāsābhyām*'. From this it follows that the *Samit* and other subsidiaries have no connection with the result.—In fact, if these subsidiaries were connected with the result, they would be *equal* to the *Āgnēya* and other main sacrifices; and being thus equal, their *subsidiary character* itself would disappear; and in that case the assertion itself—that 'there may be performance of the main sacrifices along with a part of the *subsidiaries* also'—would become impossible."

[*Another explanation of Sūtras* 14 *and* 15.]

Some people read *Sūtra* 14 as '*aikakarmyāt*' ['On account of there being only one action'] (instead of '*aikashabdyāt*', as above);—according to these people, the meaning of the two Sūtras taken together is as follows—If it is your (Pūrvapakṣin's) view that "the subsidiaries are performed only for the purpose of equipping the main sacrifices with subsidiaries, and hence all (main sacrifices and subsidiaries) should be taken as *one act*, so that only one subsidiary may be performed, and with that one alone, the main sacrifice would become 'equipped with a subsidiary'," [so far is the representation of the Pūrvapakṣin's idea], [then follows the refutation of this idea in *Sūtra* 15]—*this cannot be so*:—why?—*because the purposes are distinct*; i.e. the help rendered by the several subsidiaries is distinct; if the main sacrifice is equipped with only *one subsidiary* the help rendered to it is small, whereas if it is equipped with several subsidiaries the help rendered to it is large.—How do you know this?—*If they were equal, there would be no subsidiary character at all*; if the help rendered by one and that rendered by several subsidiaries were the same, then only one would be the subsidiary to the main sacrifice, and the others would not bear the subsidiary character at all; i.e. they would cease to be subsidiaries; and in that case, the declaration of these would be meaningless.—It would not be right to regard these as optional alternatives;—this is what is explained in the following *Sūtra*. From all this it must be concluded that when there is a larger number *subsidiaries*, there is a larger result.

SŪTRA (16).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—(a) INASMUCH AS THE INJUNCTION IS A SINGLE DECLARATION,—(b) AS THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ENJOINED BY TURNS,—(c) AS THEY HAVE BEEN SPOKEN OF AS CONSTANT FACTORS,—(d) AS THEIR USE INDICATES THEIR ADMISSIBILITY ALL AT ONCE,—THEY SHOULD COME IN EXACTLY AS DECLARED,—LIKE THE 'NIVĪTA':—CONSEQUENTLY THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that only a part of the subsidiaries may be performed; in fact, there should be performance of all the subsidiaries;—why?—*because the Injunction is a single declaration*; the performance of the subsidiaries has been laid down by the single declaration 'One should perform the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices'; and, as already explained above, the performance of the subsidiaries is due to the needs of the main sacrifice: now, are these needs supplied by all those operations consisting of fire-installation and the other subsidiaries? Or by only some of these? It cannot be the latter,—why?—*because they have not been enjoined by turns*; as a matter of fact, the subsidiaries in question have not been enjoined by turns; i.e. it is not said that 'in some cases, one should perform the *Samit* and in another case, the *Tanūnapāt*'; they have, on the other hand, been laid down *as constant factors*; and as they have been spoken of so should they be correlated to the needs of the main sacrifice.—It might be argued that—"Even though all have been spoken of as constant factors, it may be that only some of them are needed by the main sacrifice."—But that cannot be right.—Why?—*Because their use indicates their admissibility all at once*; i.e. by virtue of their *use*, which consists in the help rendered to the main sacrifices, the subsidiaries should come in all at once, like pigeons in their covers; and there can be no differentiation as to this one coming in and that one not coming in;—hence all should come in.—*They should therefore come in exactly as declared, like the 'nivīta'*; in the case of the text 'The Priests operate with cloth worn in the *Nivīta* form', as no particular priests are differentiated, all the Priests operate 'with cloth worn in the *Nivīta* form', on the ground that they are all in touch with the performance;—it should be the same with the case in question also, and hence *the performance of all should be undertaken.*

SŪTRA (17).

IN THIS WAY WOULD THE INJUNCTION OF THE ACT BE FULFILLED.

Bhāṣya.

It is only when it is done as above that the number of oblations laid down in the following text becomes compulsory, not optional—

'There are fourteen oblations at the *Paurṇamāsa* and thirteen at the *Darsha*'.

SŪTRA (18).

IN THE CASE OF DIFFERENT SACRIFICES, THERE IS REPEATED DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under *Sūtra* 11) that it should be as in the case of different sacrifices.—In the case of 'different sacrifices' it is only right that there should be separateness; because after the declaration of the *Saurya* sacrifice—'Desiring Brahmic glory, one should offer cooked rice to Sūrya,'—there is another declaration of the *Aindrāgna* sacrifice—'Desiring offspring, one should offer the cake baked on eleven pans to *Indra-Agni*.'—"What if it is so?"—It is because this is so that it is understood that these sacrifices are to be performed independently of each other, and not jointly; and that because it is only after the complete injunction of the former sacrifice that there follows a separate injunction of the latter sacrifice.—In the case in question, however, by reason of the fact that *the injunction of the whole set is a single declaration*, the only right course is that all the subsidiaries should be performed together collectively; and hence there is no analogy between this case and that of 'different sacrifices'.

SŪTRA (19).

IN THE CASE OF THE 'UTTARĀ' ('LATER ONES'), AS THERE IS NO DECLARATION, AND AS THE PURPOSE IS SERVED BY THE PARTICULAR DETAILS,—IT FOLLOWS THAT IN MILKING ONE'S COWS ONE SHOULD DO AS ONE PLEASES.

Bhāṣya.

It has been asserted (in Sū. 11)—"among those admissible it could be as in the case of the *Uttarā* (later ones)".—It is only right that in the case of the 'later ones', one should milk as many cows as one possesses;—*because there is no declaration*; i.e. in this case the *milking of the 'later ones'* has not been *enjoined*, it has been only *referred to*;—why?—because the injunctive sentence has served its purpose by laying down the *particular details*—of *resuming speech* and so forth; and as such, it has not the capacity to lay down the *milking of the 'later ones'*; in fact, if this also were enjoined (by the same sentence), there would be a syntactical split.—As for *reference*, it is always to something that is already known to be

admissible; and the needs of the situation imply that there should be milking of as many cows as one possesses, which also implies that there should be no milking of cows not belonging to the performer.—"But how can there be a milking of all the cows one may possess (during a sacrificial performance)?"—This we are going to explain later on, under 11. 1. 49.—From all this it follows that *one may milk as many as one pleases*; one should milk as many cows as one happens to possess.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): '*Prospective' acts may be repeated over and over again.*

Bhāṣya.

In regard to 'prospective' sacrifices [sacrifices laid down as to be performed for the obtaining of a definite reward], there arises the following question—Is the prospective sacrifice to be performed only once? Or may it be repeated again and again by a person desiring a larger reward?

On this question, the *Siddhānta* is as follows:—

SŪTRA (20).

IN THE CASE OF A SACRIFICE, THERE SHOULD BE RESULTS FOLLOWING FROM EACH PERFORMANCE, AS IN THE CASE OF AGRICULTURAL OPERATIONS,—BECAUSE THEY ARE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE PERFORMANCE.

Bhāṣya.

In the case of a prospective sacrifice, there should be a distinct result following from each performance of it,—because results *are brought about by the performance*; as a matter of fact, results are brought about by the performance of the sacrifice.—"How do you know this?"—Before the performance of the act, the result is not there;—if it were there already, there would be no need for the performance of the act;—that it comes after the performance is learnt from the Vedic text;—what does not exist before the act, and comes after the act, is regarded as brought about by that act; —*as in the case of agricultural operations*,—i.e. grains are brought about by agricultural operations.—Under the circumstances, if what is not already there is brought about by the sacrifice, then this should be so again and again, as in the case of grains.

SŪTRA (21).

THUS TOO THERE WOULD BE A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PARTICULAR POSITION ASSIGNED TO THE PERFORMANCE, BY VIRTUE OF ITS BEING SOMETHING TO BE DONE.

Bhāṣya.

It is only when this is done that it is possible for the actions when performed repeatedly to be assigned a particular position; and then alone would texts like the following be justified—'Of these, for those who perform the sacrifice first, *Gauḥ* is the *Atirātra*; for those who perform it for the second time, it is *Āyuṣ*'; such expressions as 'performing first' and 'per-

forming a second time' are possible only when there is repeated performance.—From this it follows that one may repeat the sacrifice as often as one likes.

SŪTRA (22).

[*Pūrvapakṣa argument against Siddhānta—continued*]—"BUT IT SHOULD BE ONCE ONLY; AS THE PURPOSE IS FULFILLED THEREBY,—AS IN THE CASE OF SUBSIDIARIES."

Bhāṣya.

"As a matter of fact, the Prospective Sacrifice should be performed *once only*;—why?—*because the purpose is fulfilled thereby*,—i.e. the purpose of the injunction is served by the single performance of the sacrifice; and when it has been so fulfilled, there can be no need for doing it again.—'What is the *purpose of the Injunction*?'—It is the result accruing to the performer of the sacrifice, and the result accruing to the performer of the Homa-offering.—'How so?'—The *act* to be performed is spoken of by the verbal root in such injunctive verbs as '*yajēta*' ('should sacrifice'), '*jūhuyāt*' ('should pour oblations');—the *performer* is spoken of by the affix in the verb; as between these two, the performer is the predominant, and the action, the subordinate, factor;—there being the general principle that the basic root and the affix conjointly express what is denoted by the affix; such use also as '*pachati dēvadattaḥ*', where the nominative comes after the verb, is possible only when the performer is the predominant factor; it is for this reason that the result is spoken of as accruing to the performer of the *sacrifice* and the performer of the *Homa*. The man has become such a performer of the sacrifice and of the Homa by doing the acts only once;—under the circumstances, any second or later performance would be entirely useless,—the purpose having been already fulfilled,—*as in the case of subsidiaries*; i.e. the subsidiaries are performed only for the purpose of making the Main Sacrifice equipped with subsidiaries, and when this is accomplished by the single performance of the subsidiaries, these are not repeated; and it should be the same in the case in question also.'

SŪTRA (23).

[*Pūrvapakṣa argument—concluded*]—"SUCH IS THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS IN ORDINARY LIFE ALSO."

Bhāṣya.

"*In common parlance also*, the signification of words is the same; when, for instance, it is said 'Bring fuel,' the man asked to do so brings it only once, not again and again."

SŪTRA (24).

[*Pūrvapakṣa arguments refuted*]—IN FACT, IN THE RELATIONSHIP IN QUESTION, ONE SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO DO AS HE PLEASES;—AS THERE IS NO DECLARATION; IN THE INJUNCTIONS THERE COULD BE ONLY GENERAL DECLARATIONS.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, it cannot be that in the matter of the relationship between the *act* and the *man* seeking for reward, the man should undertake the act once only; *he should be understood to do as he pleases*,—he may do the act once or several times; if he desires large rewards, he would do it several times; while if he is contented with a small reward, he would do it only once.—Why so?—Because *there is no declaration*; i.e. what is declared in the sentence is not the result accruing to the performer of the *Sacrifice* or of the *Homa*.—As for the principle that 'the basic root and the affix jointly express what is denoted by the affix', this is true only of such names (nouns) as are based upon the presence of some action,—e.g. 'cooker', 'chopper' and the like;—in the case of *Verbs*, neither the Agent nor the Action is the predominant factor; the predominant factor in all verbs is *Being*, and as such what it expresses is the *Being* (coming into existence) of something; as what is required is a number of contributory causes possessed of this *Being*;—so that when the verb '*yajēta*' ('should sacrifice') is there, it is required to know—(*a*) *by what one is to sacrifice*—(*b*) *for what purpose*,—and (*c*) *how*. In case the performing Agent were the predominant factor, as there would be no *action* to be done, there would be no need to find out its contributory causes. For instance, in regard to the term 'Cooker,' one does not need to know—*by what*—*for what purpose*—and *how*. In fact, what is expressed is the *Being* or *bringing into existence* of the *Result*, not of the *Action*; as the *Action* is spoken of with the Instrumental Ending,—as we find in the case of such expressions as '*Udbhidā yajētā*,' '*Balabhidā yajētā*'. If the *Action* were meant to be what is *brought into existence*, then it should have been spoken of with the Accusative-Ending.—It is *Heaven* which is the result desired to be attained; as it is this that is spoken of along with the term '*Kāma*' ('Desire'), in the compound '*Svargakāmaḥ*' ('Desiring heaven'). Thus the meaning of the injunction comes to be this—'Desiring heaven, one should bring about this heaven by means of the Sacrifice'; what is to be *brought into existence* is clearly something not already extant; as what is already extant cannot be *brought into existence*. If then, a non-existing thing has to be brought into existence, it could be brought about again and again; as we find in the case of agricultural operations. Hence we conclude that when a man is seeking for a result, he should repeat, as often as he pleases, the act calculated to bring about that result. If there were any rule whereby the act should be done once only,—then in the case of the in-

junction of the *Gauḥ* (as the *Atirātra*)—'Of these, those who perform the Sacrifice for the first time, etc.,'—these sentences would have to be regarded as optional alternatives to the sentence 'Perform the sacrifice for the second time'; and this would involve a syntactical split, the construction necessitated being—'Those who perform the sacrifice for the second time, for these, the *Gauḥ*, Cow, is the *Atirātra*' (which would be absurd).

SŪTRA (25).

IN THE CASE OF SUBSIDIARIES, IT IS SO ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING A SINGLE 'WORD'.

Bhāṣya.

As for the argument (urged in Sū. 22) that "it should be as in the case of subsidiaries,"—in the case of subsidiaries, it is only right that they should be performed only once,—as *there is a single word*; i.e. in that case there is a single 'word' (text) laying down the main sacrifices and the subsidiaries,—the subsidiaries being included by the requirements of each case; as we have explained already; and these requirements are met by the subsidiaries once for all; hence there is no reason for these being re peated again and again.—In the case in question, however, the action (Sacrifice) in question is productive of the Result which has not been in existence; and hence there is no incongruity in a fresh result appearing after each performance; so that the reason put forward is found to be fallacious and hence there is no analogy to the case of subsidiaries.

SŪTRA (26).

IN ORDINARY LIFE, THE ACTION IS DETERMINED BY THE NEED.

Bhāṣya.

It has been urged (under Sū. 23) that "it would be as in ordinary life"; but *in ordinary life*, the *action* is determined by the *need*; so that if there is need for it, the man brings the fuel repeatedly even though he has been told to bring it only once,—and even though told to bring it repeatedly, he brings it only once (if the needs are met by it),—and even though told to bring fuel, he may not bring it at all (if he finds that all the fuel needed is already there).—In the case in question, however, where matters are determined by verbal texts, the action undertaken has to be in strict accordance with the texts; hence the example of 'ordinary life' is not germane to the point at all.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): '*Threshing*' *and such acts have to be repeated till the Rice is obtained.*

SŪTRA (27).

THE ACTIONS ARE SUBSERVIENT TO THE PURPOSE,—AND THE PURPOSE IS PERCEPTIBLE; HENCE THE ACTIONS SHOULD BE REGARDED AS COMPLETED ONLY ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

In the case of actions with a visible purpose,—such as are laid down in the texts (*a*) 'Threshes the *vrīhi* corn', (*b*) 'Pounds the rice', and so forth,—the performance should be repeated (*a*) till the Rice is obtained and (*b*) till the Flour is obtained.—Why so?—Because in these cases, the purpose to be served (the result to be obtained) is a perceptible one,—in the shape of *Rice* and *Flour*; it is these that are needed; as what has got to be secured is the Cake (which cannot be got without the Rice and the Flour). Hence it is understood that the performance of the acts (of *Threshing* and *Pounding*) is for the said purpose only. Under the circumstances, if the act of *Threshing* were abandoned after *once* raising the pestle and letting it fall upon the grains,—or if the *pounding* were abandoned after once rubbing the pounding stone up and down,—then the purpose to be served by these acts would not be accomplished at all. Hence *the actions should be regarded as completed only on the accomplishment of the said purpose*, i.e. they should be repeated till the *Rice* and the *Flour* have been secured.

Adhikaraṇa (6): *Such 'Threshing' and other acts as are meant for bringing about 'unseen' results should be performed only once.*

SŪTRA (28).

Where the mere act is enjoined, and there is no visible result, the action would be complete by doing exactly as laid down.

Bhāṣya.

In a case however where no visible result is effected,—e.g. in the case of the injunction 'Filling the mortar of *Udumbara* wood with all kinds of herbs he threshes the grain, and places it therein',—the obtaining of Rice is not what is meant,—there being no injunction of any such thing as the *Cake* for which the Rice would be required;—hence, in this case, the single performance of the act fulfils the purposes of the injunction, and there need be no repetition of it.—There are some people however in whose opinion the action of 'Threshing' stands for that raising and letting fall of the mortar which brings out the Rice; and according to these people, even in the case cited, the act has to be repeated till the Rice is obtained.—This opinion, however, is not a sound one; because we find the term 'threshes' ('*avahanti*') used even where there is no *rice* concerned; e.g. in such expressions as—'*Kaṣāyamavahanti*', '*Kiṇvamavahanti*'.—Nor can such usage of the term '*avahanti*' be treated as figurative; as there is nothing to distinguish it from the other use of it; as in both cases etymologically the term '*avahanti*' is understood to signify the act of *Threshing* only; nor is the term as a whole (apart from its etymology) known to have any other signification. As a matter of fact, in most cases the term is used in the sense of that *threshing* which brings out Rice. Hence the opinion (of some people) referred to must be wrong.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *Subsidiaries like the 'Prayāja' should be performed only once.*

Bhāṣya.

With reference to the *Prayāja* and other such subsidiaries, we proceed to consider the following question—Should these be performed only once? or should there be repetition, even though no such repetition has been enjoined?

In accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the preceding *Sūtra*, the answer to this question is that *there should be only one performance.*

As against this *Siddhānta*, there is the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—

SŪTRA (29).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IF THE ACT IS REPEATED, THERE WOULD BE LARGENESS IN THE RESULT BY INFERENCE—AS IN THE CASE OF SACRIFICES."

Bhāṣya.

"There should be repetition;—why?—because when there is repetition, larger results follow.—'How do you know that?'—*By inference.*—'What is that Inference?'—It is this—Before the performance of the Subsidiary there was no help rendered to the Main Sacrifice,—such help comes about after that performance,—hence it is concluded that the help has been rendered by the Subsidiary;—and if it is so done, then the Subsidiary should be performed again and again;—*as in the case of sacrifices*; i.e. just as in the case of such sacrifices as the *Saurya* and the like, the result is brought about by the Sacrifice and hence the repetition of the Sacrifice brings about larger results,—so should it be in the case in question also."

SŪTRA (30).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE ONLY ONCE; BECAUSE THE INCENTIVE IS ONE ONLY.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, the subsidiary should be performed once only, not repeatedly;—"why?"—*because the incentive is one only*; the only incentive to the performance of subsidiaries consists in the help that they render to the main sacrifices.—"What is it?"—It is that whereby the main sacrifices bring about the result.—Now this help having been rendered by the subsidiary performed once, the main sacrifices, thus helped, bring about the results; so that there need be no further performance of the subsidiary. If, on the other hand, the help has not been rendered, then there is all the less reason for its repetition; because when the subsidiary has not rendered any help in its first performance, what hope can there be that it will render it when performed again?

SŪTRA (31).

IF THERE WERE UNCERTAINTY, THEN THERE WOULD BE NO LIMITATION OF THE EXTENT OF THE SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

If there were uncertainty,—as to the subsidiary being performed once or several times,—then there could be *no such limitation of the extent of the sacrifice* as we find asserted as a settled fact, in the declaration—'There are *fourteen* offerings at the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice, and *thirteen* at the *Darsha*';—Even if there were such a statement, it could be only partly true; and that would militate against the exact form of the sacrifice.—Hence there should be no repetition.

SŪTRA (32).

INASMUCH AS THE RESULT IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY ACTION, THERE WOULD BE DIVERSITY OF RESULTS IN THE CASE OF SACRIFICES.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (in Sū. 29) that "it should be as in the case of sacrifices".—But in the case of sacrifices, it is only right that there should be repetition; *because the result is brought about by action*; in the case of sacrifices, the result is brought about by the undertaking of the act; so that by another undertaking, another result would be brought about.—In the case of the subsidiary, on the other hand, the only well-defined result is that it should render the main sacrifice capable of bringing about the desired result; and if this has been done by a single performance, there need be no other performance;—so that the reason put forward is found to be fallacious; and hence the citing of the example of 'sacrifices' is not right.

SŪTRA (33).

[OBJECTION]—"IT IS NOT SO; THE REPETITION IS POSITIVELY USEFUL; THE REPETITION WOULD BE USELESS IF THE PURPOSE SERVED WERE ONE AND THE SAME; AS IN THE CASE OF 'EATING ONCE'; THERE IS HOWEVER NO LIMIT TO THE PURPOSE SERVED, AND INASMUCH AS IT SERVES THE PURPOSE OF INCITING EFFICIENCY IN THE MAIN SACRIFICE,—THERE SHOULD BE NO RESTRICTION."

Bhāṣya.

Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*—"It has been argued (by the *Siddhāntin*) that the purpose having been served by the single performance, a repetition would be useless.—Our answer to this is as follows:—*The repetition*, of the whole host of subsidiaries, *is positively useful*,—and such repetition is not useless.—How so?—*The repetition would be useless if the purpose served*

were one and the same; i.e. if the repeated performance of the subsidiary served the same purpose as its single performance, then the repetition would be useless;—just *as in the case of 'eating once'*; the eating, if repeated at once (immediately after the first eating), brings about the same satisfaction (no more or less); and hence it is not repeated.—In the case in question, however, *there is no limit to the purpose served*; i.e. there is no such idea as that 'the subsidiary renders just this much of help'.—'But there is the idea that it renders just as much help as enables the Main Sacrifice to bring about the result'.—True, that is so; but *inasmuch as it serves the purpose of inciting efficiency in the main sacrifice, there should be no restriction*; i.e. the Subsidiary is meant for inciting that *efficiency* in the Main Sacrifice which leads to the accomplishment of the result;—this result of the Main Sacrifice can have no limit;—being larger when the help rendered by the subsidiaries is larger, and smaller when the help is smaller. If the subsidiary is repeated, the help rendered by it is certainly larger,—as it is the effect of that; hence *there should be no restriction*—as to the performance of the subsidiary being *once* only or *repeated*."

SŪTRA (34).

[*Pūrvapakṣin's answer to Siddhānta argument in Sū.* 31]—"ON ACCOUNT OF SEPARATENESS, THERE WOULD BE LIMITATION ON THE BASIS OF THE INJUNCTION."

Bhāṣya.

"It has been argued (by the *Siddhāntin* in Sū. 31) that repetition would be incompatible with the statement of the exact number of oblations.—The answer to this is that *on account of the separateness* of the help rendered, it is only reasonable that there should be repetition; the statement of the precise number of oblations can be a mere reiterative reference; and this reference is to the injunctions of the oblations,—of *fourteen* oblations at the *Paurṇamāsa*, and of *thirteen* at the *Darsh*;—so that the precise number mentioned cannot pertain to the oblations, it can pertain figuratively only to the injunctions of the oblations."

SŪTRA (35).

[*Siddhāntin's answer to the Pūrvapakṣa objections*]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE NO REPETITION, AS THE DECLARATION OF PROCEDURE IS ONE ONLY, AND ALL HAVE BEEN ENJOINED SIMULTANEOUSLY,—AS THE ACTION HAS NO RESULT OF ITS OWN;—AND YET IT IS PERFORMED, AS IT HELPS THE MAIN ACTION.

Bhāṣya.

In reality there should be no repetition of the subsidiaries;—why?—*because the declaration of procedure is one only*; i.e. there is only one declara-

tion of the subsidiaries and the main actions;—and this being only one, they *are all enjoined simultaneously*; the form of the injunction being—'one should perform such and such a sacrifice along with its subsidiaries';—such being the case, the sacrifice having become equipped with its subsidiaries, through the single performance of these latter, there can be no need for performing them again.—"But there would be larger help rendered by the repeated act."—If the subsidiaries were to render invisible help, then, in that case the possibility of larger help could be inferred; as a matter of fact, the help that the subsidiaries render is the visible one of rendering the Main Sacrifice 'equipped with subsidiaries'; and this 'equipment with subsidiaries' remains just the same even when there is repetition,—and it is this, that is related to the Result;—the injunction being that 'one should perform the *sacrifices along with subsidiaries*', not that 'one should perform the subsidiaries'; the only purpose served by the subsidiaries is that they bring about the said 'equipment' in the main sacrifice.

The above explanation of the *Sūtra* is open to the following objection:—At the time that the *Prayājas* (subsidiaries) are performed, neither the Main Sacrifice nor the resultant *Apūrva* is there;—at the time that the Main Sacrifice or the resultant *Apūrva* is there, the *Prayājas* are not there;—so that, at the time that the *Samit* and the rest are there without the 'unseen' factor, the 'Equipment of subsidiaries' is not there; how then could there be any help (rendered by the subsidiaries)?—Further, if the *Sacrifice* were the only factor in the subsidiaries, and there were no *Apūrva*,—then it would mean that there is nothing, no General Law, to indicate the performance of the *Iṣṭis* and the *Pashubandhas* as subsidiaries of the *Soma-sacrifice*. When there is no *Apūrva*, there is no need for the Procedure; and the procedure of the *Sacrifice* itself being already known, no procedure would be indicated by any General Law;—and this would not be compatible with the following declarations—(*a*) 'For him there are a hundred *Prayājas*',—(*b*) 'One offers the *Samiṣṭayajuṣ*',—(*c*) 'Having offered the *Paridhis*, he offers the *Hāriyojana*'.

In view of these objections, the *Sūtra* should be explained as follows:—*There should be no repetition of the subsidiaries, as the declaration of procedure is only one*; there is only one declaration of procedure relating to the subsidiaries and the Main Sacrifices; and as this is one only, there is simultaneous injunction of the whole set of subsidiary and main sacrifices;—of the main sacrifices, there is no repetition,—why?—because what has been laid down in the text 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*' is fulfilled by the single performance of the Main Sacrifices (like the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*);—and when the purpose of the injunction has been accomplished, the result invariably follows; so that there can be no need for repeating the sacrifice. Similarly in the case of subsidiaries also, when they have been performed once, the injunctions of those have been fulfilled;—those having been fulfilled, the result that had been understood as following from the subsidiaries, should be regarded as accomplished; and such being the case, any repetition of it would be useless.—As for the argument that the repetition would

bring about larger results,—that cannot be right; the help rendered by the subsidiaries is effective in the bringing about of that result which follows from the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices,—and not in the appearance of any fresh result; if a fresh result were brought about by the subsidiaries, that would be the result of the subsidiaries themselves; as a matter of fact, however, subsidiaries have no results of their own; all that they do is to render some sort of an imperceptible help to the main sacrifices in the bringing about of their results;—this help having been rendered by the first performance, there can be no *largeness of results* due to the repeated performance of the subsidiaries.

SŪTRA (36).

[*Objection*]—" REALLY THERE SHOULD BE REPETITION; AS 'SINGLENESS OF PERFORMANCE' HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF IN CONNECTION WITH 'CHOPPING', 'SPRINKLING' AND 'SLICING'."

Bhāṣya.

"Really *there should be repetition* of the subsidiaries.—Why?—Because (*a*) in connection with the *Pitṛyajña*, we read—'The grass is chopped *once*';—(*b*) in connection with the *Anuyāja*, it is said 'Sprinkles the *Paridhis once*';—(*c*) in connection with the *Sviṣṭakṛt*, it is said—'From the second half, one slices *once*'.—All these declarations would have some sense only if there were repeated performance of subsidiaries (in other cases).—From this it follows that there should be repetition."

SŪTRA (37).

[*Objection answered*]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE NO REPETITION; AS (IN THE CASES CITED) IT HAS GOT TO BE SPECIALLY MENTIONED.

Bhāṣya.

On account of reasons already adduced, there should be no repetition of subsidiaries.—It has been argued that "the declaration of 'singleness' in connection with *Chopping*, etc., indicates that there should be repetition in other cases".—Our answer to this is as follows—Even when there is no repetition of subsidiaries, *Singleness* has got to be declared in connection with the *Chopping*, etc., because at the *Darsha-Purṇamāsa* the grass used is that *Chopped repeatedly*, and as this is the archetype of the *Pitṛyajña*, at this latter also the grass would appear to be 'repeatedly chopped'; it is with a view to exclude this possibility that the *singleness* of the *chopping* has got to be emphasised.—Similarly in connection with the *Prayājas*, the *sprinkling* has been laid down as to be done 'thrice';—the same would come in at the *Anuyājas* also; hence with a view to exclude this 'threefoldness', it is necessary to stress the *singleness*.—

Similarly 'Two slicings' having been laid down without special reference to any sacrifice, the same becomes admissible at the *Sviṣṭakṛt* also; hence in order to exclude this, *singleness* has got to be emphasised.—From all this, it follows that it is not reasonable to deduce that there should be repetition simply from the declaration of 'singleness' in connection with 'chopping', 'sprinkling' and 'slicing'.

Adhikaraṇa (8): *The Plural number in terms like 'Kapiñjalān' stands for Three: 'Kapiñjala-nyāya'.*

Bhāṣya.

There is the text —'*Vasāntāya kapiñjalān ālabhatē*' ['Sacrifices the *Kapiñjala-birds* to *Vasanta*'].—In regard to this, we consider the following question—should *three* or *four* or *five* birds be sacrificed, by option? or should only *three* be sacrificed? On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—

SŪTRA (38).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*continued*]—"As the plural number makes all admissible, there should be option."

Bhāṣya.

"The animals should be sacrificed optionally.—Why?—Because *all are admissible*; all the several numbers are made admissible by the presence of the Plural Number; i.e. all the numbers are equally expressed by the Plural ending; as it is so used everywhere.—It is impossible to adopt all the numbers simultaneously; hence there should be option (among the several numbers signified by the Plural ending).

"*Objection*—'This would involve the absurdity that the same term would have several denotations, which cannot be right.'—*Answer*—True, it is so; but this contingency has to be adopted, as there is no way out of it.—'If it is admitted because there is no way out of it, then it should not be admitted if there is a way out of it; there is, however, this way out of it—that 'the Plural ending be taken as really standing for *Three* and as applying to *Four* and other numbers by reason of the presence in these of *Three*.'—This cannot be right; if the Plural ending really denoted *Three*, then there could be no such expressions as '*chatvāro brāhmaṇāḥ*' ('*Four* Brāhmaṇas') [where the Plural ending in '*brāhmaṇāḥ*' appears along with the number *Four*]; as, *ex hypothesi*, the word '*brāhmaṇāḥ*' would mean *Three* Brāhmaṇas, while the word '*Chatvāraḥ*' would mean *Four*; and there can be no co-ordination between 'Three' and 'Four'; and there can be no such assertion as 'Four is Three'.—So also with the other numbers.—'The said co-ordination would be possible figuratively; just as in the case of the expression *Nyagrodhaḥ Kṣētram* (*The Banyan-tree is the field*); *Three* will indirectly (figuratively) indicate *Four*, by reason of concomitance.'—That may be so; but indirect (figurative) indication would have to be admitted.—'What can be done? It will have to be admitted, as there is no way out of it'.—But so long as there *is* a way out of it, it should not be admitted; and there is this way out of it that the Plural Number denotes *plurality*, and as all the numbers in question (*Three* onwards) are *plural*, the required co-ordina-

tion would be *direct* (not figurative).—'If *Plurality* were so understood as expressed,—what would be that *plurality*?'—*Plurality* would be *increase, aggregation, excess*.—'How?'—The root '*bamhati*' which denotes *increase* drops the nasal 'm' (according to *Uṇādi-Sūtra*, 1. 29), and it is from this root that the term '*bahu*' is derived; '*bahu*' thus means *increased, in excess*;—all these numbers, *Three* onwards, are *in excess*, and hence expressed by the term '*bahu*'.—'This *bahu* in the sense of *in excess*, is a relative term; what is *in excess* in relation to one thing or number would be *not-in-excess* in relation to another'.—True, that is so; where a thing is *in excess* in relation to one thing is never *not-in-excess* in relation to that same thing. For instance, the 'Northern' *Kuru-Country* is so called in relation to the 'Southern' *Kuru-Country*; but that does not mean that there is no other Country to the north of the former; and yet, as having a fixed correlation, the country does not abandon its 'Northern' character. Similarly 'Three' and the higher numbers are '*bahu*' ('plural') in relation to 'Two', and they never cease to be 'plural'.—'But how do you know that the plurality of *Three* and the rest is in relation to *Two*?'—*Answer*—There is such relationship only among things of the same kind: when for instance, it is said that 'Devadatta is strong', what is meant is, not that he is *powerful* in relation or comparison to the *Elephant* or the *Lion*, but in relation to things of the same kind, that is, *men*. Similarly a Number can have *Plurality* only in relation to a *Number*; this correlation cannot be with 'one'; because there is no *plurality* perceived in *two things*;—*Plurality* however is actually perceived in all the numbers, from *Three* onwards; from this it is concluded that *plurality* is in relation to *Two*.

"This *Plurality* is what is expressed by the Plural Number (in '*Kapiñjalān*').—'How?'—Because it is present when the other is present and absent when the other is absent; for instance, in 'Three' onwards, the Plurality is there, and so is the Plural Number,—while in 'Two' and 'One', there is no Plurality andno Plural Number. In fact, it is only in this sense that the name '*Bahuvachana*' ('Plural Number') becomes applicable (the term '*bahuvachana*' exactly meaning 'expressive of *many*'). To the same end is the declaration of authoritative persons—'*Bahuṣu vachanam*' ['The plural number is used when there is a plurality of things'] (*Pāṇini* 1. 4. 21).—If 'three' were all that was expressed by the Plural Number, then the authoritative person should have used the words '*Triṣu bahuvachanam*' ['The Plural Number is used when there are *three things*']; as this would have been simpler and more definite.

"From all this it follows that the birds spoken of are 'many' as in relation to 'two'; and it is established that Plurality subsists in the numbers 'Three' and onwards.—In this way no term would have more than one meaning; and as all numbers would be included under 'many', there would no indirect figurative indication anywhere.

"It might be argued that—'when only *three* is meant' the Plural Number alone is used without any additional word (as in *Brāhmaṇāḥ*, or *Kapiñjalān ālabhēta*), while when it stands for *four* or more, it is accompanied by another word, as '*chatvāro brāhmaṇāḥ*', (*Four Brāh-*

maṇas)'.—This however would not be true; as in the case of *Three* also, we find the additional word—e.g. '*Trayo lokāḥ*' ('*Three* Regions'), '*Trayo vēdāḥ*' ('*Three* Vedas'). If the Plural Number, without an additional word, denoted 'Three', then there would be no such discussion as the present one, in regard to the exact signification of the sentence '*Vasantāya kapiñjalān alabhēta*'; just as in regard to this same sentence we do not proceed to discuss whether what are to be sacrificed are *Kapiñjalas*, or *peacocks* or *pigeons*;—and why?—simply because we are sure that neither *peacocks* nor *pigeons* are denoted by the term '*Kapiñjala*'. Similarly in the case in question, if we were sure that the Plural Number denotes *three*, and no other number, then, as in the former case, there need be no discussion at all".

SŪTRA (39).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"'BUT SUCH USE IS ACTUALLY FOUND',—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*]."

Bhāṣya.

"It might be argued that—'The Plural Number is actually found to be used in the sense of *Four* onwards;—in such expressions as *Four Brāhmaṇas*; hence the present discussion becomes necessary.'

[The answer to this is as follows]—

SŪTRA (40).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"SO ALSO IN THE PRESENT CASE."

Bhāṣya.

"In the case in question also, the term '*Kapiñjala*' is found used in the sense of the *Pigeon* and the *Peacock*; for instance, when a large *pigeon* is described, it is said 'This is a *Kapiñjala*, not a pigeon'; similarly when a small peacock is described, it is said 'This is a *Kapiñjala*, not a peacock'."

SŪTRA (41).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"'THAT IS FIGURATIVE USE',—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*]."

Bhāṣya.

"Says the Opponent—'In the cases cited, the term '*Kapiñjala*' is used figuratively; and no questions can be raised regarding the figurative use of words'.

"[The answer to this is as follows]—

SŪTRA (42).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"SO ALSO IN THE OTHER CASE."

Bhāṣya.

"In regard to the *other case*,—that of the expression 'Four Brāhmaṇas'—it has been pointed that it is a figurative use of the Plural Number; and so no question can be raised against the figurative use of words.

"Then again, what is expressed by the *number* (Singular, Dual, or Plural) is that number which is related to the thing denoted by the basic noun,—as in the word '*brāhmaṇāḥ*';—or, in some cases, it is the denotation of the basic noun itself that is expressed by the Number,—as in the case of the words '*ēkaḥ*' (One), '*dvau*' (Two); the number *Three* however is not denoted by the basic noun (in the expression '*chatvāro brāhmaṇāḥ*'); nor is it the number related to it; hence no such expression as '*Chatvāraḥ*' can be possible.—It might be argued that—'among *four*, *three* also comes in as its part; and the Plural Number would be in relation to that *three*'.—But *two* also is included in *Four*, and so also is *one*; so that the *Dual* Number and the *Singular* Number also might as well be used. For all these reasons, we conclude that the Plural Number is used in regard to *Four*, not because it includes *Three*, but because *Four* itself is *Plural*. Thus then, the conclusion is that all numbers, from *Three* onwards to *Parārdha* (the highest conceivable number), are denoted by the Plural Number; and when all are denoted by it, the expression '*Kapiñjalān ālabhēta*' must mean the sacrificing of all these number of birds; consequently, there must be option."

SŪTRA (43).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO THE VERY FIRST; THIS CAN BE PASSED OVER ONLY WHEN THERE IS SPECIAL REASON FOR IT.

Bhāṣya.

It should be restricted to the very first,—i.e. to *Three* [which is the *first* number to be signified by the Plural Number].—"Why so?"—Because when one takes up *Four*, he cannot but take up *Three*, for the simple reason that the *Three* are included in the *Four*. So that when these have been taken up,—what the word ('*Kapiñjalān*') expresses has been taken up; i.e. what has been asserted by the words '*Kapiñjalān ālabhēta*' is the *sacrificing of a plurality of birds*,—and *a plurality of birds* have been sacrificed when *three* have been taken up and sacrificed.—Under the circumstances, the 'Three' *can be passed over only when there is special reason for it*; i.e. if there were some special reason why one should not do quite what is expressed by the words, and why the number 'Three' must be passed over, then alone could it be passed over (and a larger number taken up);—as a matter of fact however, there is no such special reason;—hence it must be restricted to *Three*.

"The desire for larger results would be the reason (for sacrificing a larger number of birds)."

It is not so; it is only in cases where several alternative courses are laid down,—of which some are simple and some elaborate,—that it is inferred, from the very fact of the more elaborate course having been laid down, that it would be conducive to larger results; as in the case of the passage—'*One* cow should be given,—*six* may be given,—*twelve* may be given,—*twenty-four* may be given'.—In the case in question, however, there is only one alternative laid down—*the sacrificing of a plurality of birds*; and this is as applicable to *Three* as to *Four* and higher numbers; so that if one were to abandon the simple course of sacrificing only *three* birds, and adopt the more elaborate course of sacrificing *four* or more birds, he would not deserve any larger results; as there is no difference in the denotation of the words of the text (as pertaining to *Three* or to *Four* and the rest). For instance, when 'it is said *Pashumālabhēta* '('one should sacrifice an animal'), if one were to sacrifice a very large or a very valuable animal, he could not obtain any higher result. In fact, if one were to go beyond what is actually enjoined (in the expression '*Pashumālabhēta*' or '*Kapiñjalān ālabhēta*') and sacrifice a larger number than what is precisely laid down, with a view to secure more meat for himself,—he would certainly be incurring a sin, if there were sin involved in killing animals at sacrifices; even if there were no such sin involved, the man would come to be looked down upon by all cultured men as 'killing animals with a view to secure more meat for himself, even after having fulfilled the behests of the injunction.'

From all this it follows that *only three* Kapiñjala birds should be sacrificed.

SŪTRA (44).

WE FIND OTHER TEXTS ALSO INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

A text in another connection also indicates the same conclusion that has been established by reasonings. This text is—'(1) *Kṛṣṇā yāmyāḥ*, (2) *avaliptā raudrāḥ*, (3) *nabhorūpāḥ parjanyāḥ*, (4) *tēṣāmaindrāgno dashamaḥ*'—If each of the first three always stands for only *three*, then alone can the *Aindrāgna be the tenth*; otherwise (if the former stood for more than three) then the assertion of the *Aindrāgna* being the *tenth* would be only partly true.—From this it follows that the number must be restricted to *Three*.

SŪTRA (45).

(A) ALSO BECAUSE IT IS ONLY THUS THAT THERE WOULD BE APPROXIMATION TO THE ARCHETYPE; (B) ALSO AS IN THE PREVIOUS CASE.

Bhāṣya.

(A) The archetype is the animal-sacrifice to *Agni-Soma*, where the number is *one* only; which is what would be admissible in the case in

question, under the General Law; so that there is *approximation* to this number *one*, if the number *Three* is adopted; the adoption of any higher number would remove it further from the archetypal number 'one'.

(B)—There is the following indicative text also, found in connection with the *Gṛhamēdhīya*—'*Odanānuddharati*', and then later on, the term '*madhyamasya*' ('the middle one') is used without any other word, which shows that what is meant is the 'middlemost' from among *Three*; in the case of higher numbers, we always find an additional word, '*Pañchānām madhyamaḥ*' (' middlemost of five,') '*aṣṭānāmmadhymaḥ* (middlemost of eight).

ADHIKARAṆA (9) : *In the case of the injunction 'Uttarāḥ dohayati', there should be milking of all the cows.*

SŪTRA (46).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF THE 'LATER ONES', IT CANNOT BE AS MANY AS ONE MAY POSSESS; BECAUSE THE INJUNCTION MUST LAY DOWN WHAT IS NOT ALREADY KNOWN."

Bhāṣya.

There is *milking* of cows for preparing the Curd-Butter-Mixture;—in connection therewith, it is declared—'Having milked three cows, with speech controlled, one should give vent to speech and without touching them, milk the later ones'. ['*Vāgyatastisro dohayitvā visṛṣṭavāk ananvārabhya uttarā dohayati*'].

The question that arises is—Is this an injunction? or a mere reiterative reference?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"Laying down something not already known, it must be regarded as an Injunction; a mere reiterative reference would be useless".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—

SŪTRA (47).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE DONE WITH AS MANY AS ONE MAY POSSESS; THE INJUNCTION BEING OF SOMETHING ELSE, THE WORDS IN QUESTION SHOULD BE TAKEN AS REITERATIVE REFERENCE.

Bhāṣya.

The sentence 'He milks the later ones' should be regarded as a reiterative reference, not an Injunction; because there is an entirely different Injunction here in the form of the clause 'Should give vent to speech, without touching them'. This being an injunction, if the sentence in question also were an injunction, then there would be syntactical split—(*a*) 'should milk the later ones', (*b*) 'should not be in touch with them'.

Question—"Where has this 'milking of the later ones' been previously *enjoined*—to which the text in question is a *reference*?"

[The answer to this is given in the following *Sūtra*]—

SŪTRA (48).

BECAUSE WHOLESALE MILKING HAS BEEN ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the wholesale milking of the cows has been enjoined in the following text—'*Nāsyaitām rātrim payasā agnihotram juhuyāt,*

kumārāshcha na payo labhēran' ['On this night milk shall not be offered at the *Agnihotra*, nor shall the boys get any milk'] [which means that all the milk is to be held back in order to facilitate wholesale milking].

Objection—" This sentence contains only the prohibition of giving milk to the boys ".

Answer—There is no visible purpose served by the prohibiting of giving milk to the boys; so that (if the sentence is taken as a prohibition) it would be necessary to assume an *unseen* result.

" But under the other view also it would be necessary to have recourse to indirect (figurative) indication ".

Yes; but it is simpler to have recourse to a function of the words themselves than to assume an unseen factor. Hence the sentence quoted should be taken as enjoining the wholesale milking of the cows; this is what is indirectly indicated by the prohibition of milk (for the boys).

The milking of the 'later ones' (which are included in the wholesale milking) having been thus enjoined by this sentence, the words ('milks the later ones', '*uttarāḥ dohayati*') must be taken as a reiterative reference to that same *milking*.

SŪTRA (49).

ALSO BECAUSE A LARGE QUANTITY IS REQUIRED.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *mantra*—'*Bahudugdhī indrāya, dēvēbhyo haviḥ*' (where a large quantity of milk is spoken of); and this would be saved from being only partially true only if all the cows were milked; and the *large quantity* is always dependent upon the capacity (of the man).

SŪTRA (50).

FURTHER, IN CONNECTION WITH THE AGNIHOTRA, THERE IS THE RULE REGARDING THE USE OF BARLEY-GRUEL, WHICH IMPLIES WHOLESALE MILKING.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Agnihotra*, we read—'*Nāsyaitām rātrim payasāgnihotram jūhuyāt, yathānyasyai dēvatāyai dadyāt tādṛk tat syāt, yavāgvā jūhuyāt*' ['On this night, one should not offer milk at the *Agnihotra* . . . . *one should offer Barley-gruel*']; this shows that all the milk has to be kept for making the *Curd-Butter-Mixture*.

SŪTRA (51).

SO ALSO THERE IS THE PROHIBITION OF MILK FOR THE BOYS.

Bhāṣya.

This has been already explained above (see, also, under 11. 1. 19.).

SŪTRA (52).

THERE IS ALSO THE ALL-EMBRACING INDICATIVE TEXT WHICH CONNECTS IT WITH THE DEITIES AFTER HAVING CONNECTED IT (WITH MEN AND CALVES).

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Vatsabhyashcha ha vā ētā manuṣyēbhyashcha purā āpyāyayantē, athaitarhi dēvēbhya ēvaitā āpyāyayanti*' ['At first, they satisfy the calves and the men, then the same satisfy the deities'];—this text indicates the milking of all.—How so ?—What the text says is that 'Those same that originally satisfied the calves and the men, later on, satisfy the deities';—and what satisfies the calves and the men is (the milk of) *all the cows*;—hence this text is indicative of the milking of all.

ADHIKARAṆA (10) : *Though the 'Āgnēya' and other main sacrifices are distinct from each other, the 'Āghāra' and other minor acts in connection therewith are performed 'in common'.*

Bhāṣya.

At the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, the *Āgnēya* and the rest are the *main sacrifices*,—of these, the '*Āghāra*' and the rest are *subsidiaries*.

In regard to these latter, we proceed to consider the question—Are these subsidiaries to be performed separately in connection with such of the main sacrifices? or, are they to be performed in connection with all of them 'in common'?

In this connection, what has been already discussed under *Sūtras* 11. 1. 29. *et. seq.* [is that the subsidiaries are to be performed only once]. But the question discussed and settled there was in regard to the entire *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices; while on the present occasion, it is going to be considered in regard to each of the (six) main sacrifices (that constitute the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*).

On this question this *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—

SŪTRA (53).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"INASMUCH AS THE SUBSIDIARIES ARE SUBSERVIENT TO THE MAIN SACRIFICES,—WHEN THERE IS DIVERSITY OF MAIN SACRIFICES, THERE MUST BE DIVERSITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SUBSIDIARIES".

Bhāṣya.

In the performance of the subsidiaries, there must be diversity,—i.e. the performance should vary with each Main Sacrifice;—and with each Main Sacrifice, there should be a distinct performance of the subsidiaries—why?—Because *they are subservient to the main sacrifices*,—i.e. because they are *subservient to a Principal*; as a matter of fact, the subsidiaries are enjoined as serving the purposes of a Principal, in order to make the Principals equipped with subsidiaries;—and when the subsidiaries are connected with the Principals, it is not meant that they should be so connected all together; because what are enjoined are, not the Principals, but the subsidiaries; and no accessory of what is not itself enjoined by a sentence can be meant to be predicated by that sentence; e.g. in the sentence '*Graham sammārṣṭi*' ('washes the cup'), the *singleness* of the *cup* is not meant to be predicated [because it is not the *cup*, but its *washing*, that is enjoined in the sentence]. Such being the case, the connection of the subsidiaries should be made with each one of

the Principals separately; if they were performed only once, they would be connected with the Principals as a whole non-distributively; just like the connection of the *Prāyaṇīya* and the *Udayanīya* with the *Ēkādashinī* (see above, *Sūtra* 10. 6. 6. *et seq.*).—It has been declared too (under *Sū.* 11. 1. 16) that the connection should be made with all together, jointly.—From all this it follows that there should be a distinct performance of the subsidiaries in connection with each Principal (Main Sacrifice)".

SŪTRA (54).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"THERE WOULD BE DISTURBANCE OF THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE, IF THERE WERE SIMULTANEITY".

Bhāṣya.

"There is a certain order of sequence among the Main Sacrifices; and in that same order have they got to be accompanied by the subsidiaries;—if then the subsidiaries were performed only once 'in common' connection with all the main sacrifices, [this could be done only *after* all the Main Sacrifices had been performed], and this would mean that the *Agnīṣomīya* (which is the second of the Main Sacrifices) would be commenced before the *Āgnēya* (the first of the Main Sacrifices) had become equipped with subsidiaries; and this would be a 'disturbance of the order of sequence' among the Main Sacrifices.—On the other hand, if the subsidiaries were performed separately with each of the Main Sacrifices, then the *Agnīṣomīya along with the subsidiaries* would come in only after the *Āgnēya* had been completed *along with the subsidiaries*; so that there would be no disturbance in the order of sequence.

"Another party says—If the subsidiaries were performed *in common*, then, during the time that the *Tanūnapāt* (the second of the subsidiaries) is helping the *Āgnēya* (the *first* Main Sacrifice), the *Samit* (the *first* subsidiary) would be helping the *Agnīṣomīya* (the *second* sacrifice); and thus there would a disturbance of the order of sequence in the help rendered.

"Further, such details as *Aṅgārāpohana* etc. and *Samsparshi* and the like are actually performed separately, in connection with each Main Sacrifice; and these details do not differ in any way from the *Subsidiaries*, *Āghāra* and the rest."

SŪTRA (55).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, THERE SHOULD BE SIMULTANEITY; BECAUSE THINGS STANDING ON THE SAME FOOTING HAVE BEEN ENJOINED BY THE SAME TEXT, AND BECAUSE WE PERCEIVE NO DIFFERENCE.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('in fact') introduces a different view.

It is not the right view that the performance of the subsidiaries should be different with each Main Sacrifice; as a matter of fact, *there should be*

simultaneity; i.e. there should be only one performance; and the subsidiaries, performed once, become connected with all the Main Sacrifices simultaneously;—because when the things (subsidiaries) standing on the same footing, are laid down by the same text, *we do not perceive any difference* in the matter of their subserving the purpose (of the Main Sacrifices). All the subsidiaries stand on the same footing, as regards (*a*) their *performer*, (*b*) *place* (of performance), and (*c*) *time* (of performance);—(*a*) there are four Priests (as performers) at the Sacrificial Performances of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*,—(*b*) 'the level ground' is the *place* laid down for the performance of those sacrifices, in the text 'One should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices on level ground',—and (*c*) the *time* for the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* has been laid down in the text 'One should perform the *Paurṇamāsa* on the *Full Moon Day* and the *Darsha* on the *Moonless day*';—and it is going to be shown under Sū. 11. 2, 7 that the Place, Time, and Performer of the subsidiaries are the same as those of the Main Sacrifices.—Further, it is by means of a single text—'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*'—that the Main Sacrifices have been enjoined as leading to the Result.—"What if that is so?"—What follows from this is that in bringing about the result, there is *joint functioning* (of the subsidiaries),—which means that the desire in the mind of the person desiring heaven is for performing the subsidiaries simultaneously, not for performing all of them with each one of the Main Sacrifices. In fact, if the *Āghāra* and other subsidiaries were performed with a desire to perform all, then we could perceive no difference in them,—standing, as they do, on the same footing, as having the same Performer, Place and Time,—as to whether they appertain to the *Agnisomīya* or to the *Āgnēya*; and yet it is possible for them to subserve the purposes of all; hence they do come to subserve the purpose of all, and consequently, they should not be repeated.

SŪTRA (56).

AS THEY WOULD BE SERVING ONE AND THE SAME PURPOSE, IT WOULD INVOLVE NO DISORDER.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 54) that "if there is simultaneity, there would be disturbance of the order of sequence".—Our answer to that is as follows:—*As they would be serving one and the same purpose, it would involve no disorder*; i.e. there would be no disturbance of the order of sequence;—"why?"—because *they would be serving one and the same purpose*;— it has been said already that the subsidiaries function jointly; so that they are performed together, not separately one by one; so that the performance of any one of them would serve no purpose at all;—and it is only when there is connection with each one of several things that there can be an order of sequence; hence in the performance of the subsidiaries, there can be no 'order of sequence'; whence then could there be any 'disturbance of the order of sequence'?

As for the disturbance in the order of sequence of the *help* rendered by the subsidiaries,—there also, the *Āghāra* does not help the Main Sacrifices as soon as it is performed, for the simple reason that at that time the Main Sacrifices themselves are not there (not having been performed);—it is only when all the subsidiaries have been performed, that the 'Unseen Forces' (set going by them) join together and render their help to the Main Sacrifices;—that the subsidiaries also function jointly has been shown under *Sūtra* 11. 1. 6. So that there is no disturbance of the order of sequence in regard to the help rendered by the subsidiaries.

SŪTRA (57).

THERE IS ALSO A TEXT INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION,—SAYS KĀMUKĀYANA.

Bhāṣya.

There is also a text indicative of the same conclusion—that has been arrived at by means of reasoning,—so has thought the Teacher *Kāmukāyana*.—"What is that text?"—It is this—'There are fourteen oblations at the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice and thirteen at the *Darsha*'; if there were repetition, the number of oblations would not remain restricted to *Thirteen* or *Fourteen*.

As for the argument (urged under Sū. 54) that "as in the case of the *Samsparshi*, so also in the case of such subsidiaries as are *indirectly* helpful, there may be repetition",—our answer is as follows:—

SŪTRA (58).

IN VIEW OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE, THERE MAY BE SEQUENCE ONLY IN CASE OF INABILITY,—BECAUSE AN EMBELLISHMENT SERVES THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *General Principle* that 'subsidiaries functioning jointly should be performed together'; hence they should, as a rule, be performed together in all cases.—It is only in case of *inability*,—as in the case of '*Dharma—samsparsha*',—that there may be sequence, and hence separate performance; for instance, a single performance of the *Aṅgārāpohana* cannot serve for the cooking of all things; nor would the *pasting* of one cake bring about the pasting of all the cakes;—*because an embellishment serves that purpose*; i.e. the *Aṅgārāpohana* has been laid down as an embellishment for the cooking;—it is for this reason that in the case of those subsidiaries which are directly and visibly helpful, they should be repeated with each Main Sacrifice; otherwise the sacrifice itself could not be accomplished. [But this cannot be so in the case of the subsidiaries in question, which are helpful only indirectly—through an intervening *Apūrva*.]

SŪTRA (59).

[OBJECTION]—" EVEN THOUGH ' UNTOUCHED ' [IT SHOULD BE REPEATED], AS IT IS FOR THAT PURPOSE ".

Bhāṣya.

" The *Āghāra* and other subsidiaries, even though ' untouched ', should be repeated with each Main Sacrifice.—' Why ? '—*Because it is for that purpose*; the special fact is clearly recognised that when something is done in close proximity to another, it is for the sake of this latter;—the subsidiaries beginning with the *Āghāra* and ending with the *Ājyabhāga* are close to the *Āgnēya*, and those beginning with the *Sviṣṭakṛt* are close to the *Agnīṣomīya*;—this distinction is clearly perceived;—and so there must be difference among the subsidiaries. From this it follows that in close proximity to the *Upāmshuyāja* and other sacrifices the subsidiaries beginning with the *Āghāra* are to be performed *before*, and those beginning with the *Sviṣṭakṛt* are to be performed *after*, the said *Upāmshuyāja*;—such would be the distinction among the ' *Samsparshi* ' details themselves."

SŪTRA (60).

[*Answer*]—IN FACT, IT WOULD BE ON ACCOUNT OF CAPACITY ; LIKE THE LAMP.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—" This special feature is perceived that the details appertain to that in close proximity to which they are found; and that hence there should be repetition ".—This is not right;—why ?—*because of capacity*;—they have the *capacity* to help all the sacrifices, even though they may be performed in proximity to only one of them;—*like the lamp*; when several Brāhmaṇas are dining, though the lamp may be placed near one of them, it would benefit all of them.—Hence we conclude that there should be no repetition.

SŪTRA (61)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*reasserted*]—" IN ORDINARY LIFE, IT IS DETERMINED BY THE NEEDS OF EACH CASE ; WHERE THERE IS AN INJUNCTION, IT SHOULD BE PERFORMED ALONG WITH EACH PRINCIPAL ".

Bhāṣya.

" We have not hitherto answered the details of the *Siddhāntin's* argument; this is what is done now.—It has been asserted that it would be *like the Lamp*;—but that is not right; because *in ordinary life, it is determined by the needs of each case*, whether the lamp shall be lighted in one place or in several; if it is found that by being lighted in one place, it

illumines all, then it is lighted in one place only,—and if it does not illumine all, it is lighted in several places. In this case the capacity of the lamp (to illumine or not to illumine all) can be perceived. In the case in question on the other hand, the capacity of details can be ascertained only by the Injunctions bearing upon them,—as to whether they do, or do not, help the Main Sacrifices; this cannot be determind by Perception. Injunction there is none, as to the subsidiaries helping any *one* of the Main Sacrifices; it is only through proximity that it is learnt that it helps that to which it is proximately placed.—Hence there should be repetition".

SŪTRA (62).

[*Siddhāntin's argument reiterated*]—ACCORDING TO KĀMUKĀYANA, THERE SHOULD BE A SINGLE PERFORMANCE (OF THE SUBSIDIARIES); AS OTHERWISE, THERE WOULD BE INCOMPATIBILITY WITH THE LIMITATION FIXED.

Bhāṣya.

It has been pointed out (in Sū. 57) that the teacher Kāmukāyana holds the opinion that there should be a single performance, so that there may be no incompatibility with the limitation of the number of oblations fixed at 'fourteen' and 'thirteen'.—What is the *Pūrvapakṣin's* answer to that?

This *Sūtra* is meant to recall a former argument.

SŪTRA (63).

[*Pūrvapakṣin's answer to above*] "THE SUBSIDIARIES BEING SUBSERVIENT TO ANOTHER, THE DECLARATION OF 'SINGLE PERFORMANCE' SHOULD BE IGNORED".

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vidhi*' here stands for the *subsidiary*, in the sense that it is *what has been enjoined*—'*vidhīyatē iti*'.

Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*—"*The subsidiary being subservient to another*,—when it has been found that when one act is done in proximity to another, it helps this latter, then it must follow that the performance of subsidiaries should be repeated; such being the case, the limitation of the number of oblations to 'fourteen' and 'thirteen' cannot be right. It may be that the assertion of 'fourteen' and 'thirteen' oblations—in the text 'There are fourteen oblations at the *Paurṇamāsa* and thirteen at the *Darsha*',—is a merely figurative statement, and it cannot be treated as an *injunction* of the definite numbers; the real numbers being always indicated by the totality of the oblations offered;—it can be taken only as a reiterative reference;—such reference may be figurative; as it is always made to what is already known; and what is already known is

the number of the injunctions of the oblations, not of the oblations themselves; hence the sentence is a mere reference to these."

SŪTRA (64).

[*Pūrvapakṣa argument answered*]—THERE BEING NO SEPARATION OF CONTEXT, THERE SHOULD BE A SINGLE PERFORMANCE,—SAYS BĀDARĀYAṆA; AS IN THE CASE OF INJUNCTIONS.

Bhāṣya.

Bādarāyaṇa has held the opinion that there should be a single performance (*in common*) of the subsidiaries.—"Why?" Because *there is no separation of context*; there is one and the same context for all the Main Sacrifices, as they function jointly; this has been already explained above; and there is no idea as to the subsidiaries being subservient to any one of these sacrifices in particular.—It has been argued that "this relationship to a particular sacrifice is ascertained by the fact of the subsidiaries being performed in proximity to one of the main sacrifices".—But this cannot be right.—"Why?"—The particular connection indicated by *proximity*—which means 'Order of Sequence',—is set aside by the indications of the 'Context' [which latter is more authoritative than 'Order'];—*as in the case of Injunctions*; in the case of Injunctions (of the subsidiaries), by reason of the Context being the same, all the subsidiaries are treated as equally subservient to *all the main sacrifices*,—and not only to that particular one in proximity to which they appear,—and this for the simple reason that 'Order' is set aside by 'Context'.—Further, the mere chance of their appearing in proximity to one cannot connect the subsidiaries with that one alone; because, in any case,—even if they were subservient to all,—they could appear in proximity to any *one* only [it is not possible for their being mentioned along with every one of them]. Hence no particular relationship can be determined entirely on the ground of proximity.—It follows from all this that the performance of the subsidiaries should be 'in common' (only once for all Main Sacrifices).

Bādarāyaṇa is mentioned with a view to commending the view, not to show that it is only one of several alternative theories.

SŪTRA (65).

"IN SOME CASES, IT HAS BEEN DEFINITELY ENJOINED,—HENCE IT CANNOT BE SO (IN ALL CASES)",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

[Says the opponent]—"It is not right that there should be a single performance.—Why?—Because in some cases the single collective performance is laid down directly in so many words—'*Saha avaghnanti, saha*

piṣanti' ['They thresh collectively, they pound collectively']; and it is only when the idea is there that 'there should be no repetition in any case', that this text can be taken as specifying that 'such *non-repetition*, i.e. single collective performance, is right in this case only, not in any other case'."

The answer to this is as follows:—

SŪTRA (66).

NOT SO; BECAUSE THE INJUNCTION HAS BEEN ACTUALLY LAID DOWN.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the text quoted should be taken as *specificatory*; it is only when something already recognised as to be done is reasserted that such reassertion can be taken as specificatory;—in the case of the text quoted ('*Saha avaghnanti, etc.*'), *collective performance* is not already recognised as to be done;—how so?—because the offering in question has been laid down as to be done *separately*;—i.e. the offering has been laid down as to be performed separately in connection with the *Āgnēya* and *Agnīṣomīya* sacrifices; so that the 'Threshing' and 'Pounding' also in connection with these come to be recognised as to be done separately. Hence it becomes necessary to definitely *enjoin* the collective performance. From this it follows that the mere injunction of *collective* performance in one case need not mean that in other cases there should be *separate* performance.

ADHIKARAṆA (11) : *The First and Third 'Black-necked' animals are to be offered together.*

Bhāṣya.

Somewhere in the Veda, we read—'*Āgnēyam kṛṣṇagrīvamālabhēta, saumyam babhrum, āgnēyam kṛṣṇagrīvam purodhāyām spardhamānaḥ*' ['One aspiring after Priesthood should sacrifice to *Agni* a black-necked animal, the tawny one to *Soma*, the black-necked one to *Agni*'].

In regard to this we consider this question—Should the offering of the first and third 'black-necked animals' be made together? or separately?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—

SŪTRA (67).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AS ALREADY EXPLAINED, THERE SHOULD BE SIMULTANEITY IN THE CASE OF THINGS STANDING ON THE SAME FOOTING, AMONG WHOM THERE IS NO DISTINCTION PERCEIVED."

Bhāṣya.

"It has been already explained that *in performance there should be simultaneity, in the case of things standing on the same footing, because they have been enjoined by one and the same word* (Sū. 11. 1. 55). In the case in question, the two 'black-necked animals' being offered to the same deity, and hence both together, there is no difference perceived between them;—that they are to be offered together follows from the fact of both leading to the same result;—hence the offering of both should be done together."

SŪTRA (68).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THERE SHOULD BE SEPARATENESS,—BECAUSE THERE IS DIFFERENCE IN TIME, AND BECAUSE THE INJUNCTIONS ARE INTERCEPTED; IN THE INJUNCTION OF PARTICULAR THINGS THAT SAME IS THE TIME FOR THE OFFERING.

Bhāṣya.

The right course is that the offerings should be made separately, not *in common* (the two together).—"Why?".—*Because there is difference in time.*—"Why difference in time?"—*Because the injunctions are intercepted*; i.e. the two injunctions of the offering of the 'black-necked animals' are *intercepted* by the injunction of the offering to *Soma* (of the tawny animal); now in accordance with the order of the injunctions, the offering to *Soma* should be done *before* one of the offerings of the

'black-necked animals', and *after* the offering of the other 'black-necked animals'.—Under the circumstances, if the two offerings were made together, the said order of sequence of one or the other of the two offerings would be militated against;—if both offerings of the 'black-necked animals' were made before that of the 'tawny animal' to *Soma*, the authorised order of the second offering would be outraged; while, if both offerings of the 'black-necked animals' were made after that of the 'tawny animal' to *Soma*, the order of the first offering would be outraged.—From this it follows that the offerings should be made separately.

SŪTRA (69).

TO THE SAME END IS THE INDICATIVE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

The text is—'*Abhitaḥ saumyam āgnēyau bhavataḥ*' ['On two sides of the offering to *Soma* should come the two offerings to *Agni*'].

SŪTRA (70).

"IT IS AN INJUNCTION",—IF THIS BE URGED, THAT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE IT IS ONLY THE ASSERTION OF THE EXISTING STATE OF THINGS.

Bhāṣya.

If it be held that the text quoted refers to the injunction of the offerings (where the two injunctions of the two *Āgnēya* offerings come on two sides of the offering to *Soma*),—this would mean the abandoning of the direct meaning of words.

From all this it follows that the two offerings should be made separately.

End of Pāda i of Adhyāya XI.

ADHYĀYA XI.

PĀDA II.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *The performance of the Āgnēya and other Main Sacrifices is to be 'in common', as regards Time, Place and Performers.*

SŪTRA (1).

THE MAIN SACRIFICES HAVE THE SAME PLACE, TIME AND PERFORMERS, BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN ENJOINED UNDER A SINGLE NAME.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, the *Āgnēya* and the rest are the Main Sacrifices.—In connection with these, (*a*) the place, (*b*) time, and (*c*) performers have been thus laid down—(*a*) 'One should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices *on level ground*', (*b*) '*On the Fullmoon Day* one should perform the *Paurṇamāsa Sacrifice* and *on the Moonless Day*, the *Darsha* sacrifice',—(*c*) 'At the performance of the *Darsha* and *Paurṇamāsa* there are *four Officiating Priests*'.—Also in connection with the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifice—(*a*) 'At the *Chāturmāsya* one should make the *Vaishvadēva* offering *on ground sloping to the East*', (*b*) 'One should make the *Vaishvadēva* offering *during the Spring*', (*c*) 'At the performance of the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifices, there are *five officiating Priests*'.

In regard to this we proceed to consider the following question—Are the Place, Time and Performers 'Common' to all the Main Sacrifices (composing the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*)? Or, are they different?

What has got to be specially considered in this connection is—Are the Place, Time and Performers auxiliaries to the Injunctions of the Main Sacrifices? That is—'The Cake baked on eight pans is to be offered to *Agni*', and so forth being the injunctions of the *Āgnēya* and the other Main Sacrifices, are the Injunctions of place, etc.—'should perform on *even* ground' and the rest—supplementary to the said injunctions (of the Main Sacrifices),—the meaning being that 'The *Āgnēya* and the other Main Sacrifices to be performed are such as should be performed *on even ground*, on the *Fullmoon Day*, etc. etc.'?—Or are the Place, Time and Performers part and parcel of the Performance?—that is part and parcel of that Performance of the *Āgnēya* and the rest which is undertaken for obtaining the results of those sacrifices?

"What would be the outcome of this consideration?"

If they are part and parcel of the Performance, then they should be treated as 'common'; if they are auxiliaries to the Injunction of the sacrifices, then they should be treated as different (separate) with each of the sacrifices.

The most reasonable answer to this question that presents itself (as the *Siddhānta*) is as follows:—*The Main Sacrifices have the same place, time and performers*,—i.e. these are 'common' to all the Sacrifices.—This is the conclusion (put forward as the *Siddhānta*).—On the basis of this principle, they offer the following explanation—The Place, Time and Performers are part and parcel of the performance of the sacrifices.—"Why?"—Because there can be no performance apart from Place, Time and Performers; and when one thing is not possible apart from another, the latter is regarded as part and parcel of the former;—hence the Place, Time and Performers should be regarded as part and parcel of the Performance; and when they are part and parcel of the Performance, they must be held to be 'common' to all the Main Sacrifices.—"Why?"—*Because they have been enjoined under a single name*;—i.e. because they have been enjoined under a single name in the text 'One desiring heaven should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices'; it follows that the result following from them is one and the same; and when the result is one and the same, they should all be performed together;—so that we do not perceive to which one of the Main Sacrifices the said Place, Time and Performers appertain;—and when this is not perceived, it is only right that they should be regarded as 'common'.—Thus we conclude that the Place, Time and Performer are 'common' to all the six Main Sacrifices.

SŪTRA (2).

[*Pūrvapakṣa—argument against Siddhānta*]—"IF IT WERE NOT AUXILIARY TO THE INJUNCTIONS, THEN THE SACRIFICES WOULD BE RECOGNISED AS CONNECTED;—INASMUCH AS THEY SERVE THE PURPOSES OF DEFINITION, AND BECAUSE IT IS AN INJUNCTION OF THE OTHER FACTORS, THESE SHOULD BE CONNECTED WITH EACH OF THE MAIN SACRIFICES SEPARATELY."

Bhāṣya.

"*If it were not auxiliary to the Injunctions*,—i.e. if the injunction of the Place, etc. were not auxiliary to the Injunction of Sacrifices,—then the sacrifices, *Āgnēya* and the rest, could be recognised as connected, without distinction, in common, with the Place, Time and Performers;—as a matter of fact, however, it is actually auxiliary to the Injunction of the sacrifices. [Hence there is no ground for the 'common' relationship].—'How so?'—The Place, Time and Performers are taken as enjoined by the texts 'The *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* should be performed *on level ground*', etc.—because they are not already known from any other source; and when these are what are enjoined by these texts, the term '*Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*' (as contained in the text) should be regarded as merely *referring* to the *Āgnēya* and other main sacrifices (composing the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*);—otherwise (if this were taken as an *Injunction* of the *Darsha-Pūrṇa-*

māsa), the single text would contain the injunctions of several things [thus involving a syntactical split]. If then, the text contains a mere *reference* to the *Āgnēya*, etc. their joint performance cannot be taken as meant to be signified; in fact, if it were meant to be signified, there would be syntactical split, the meaning being—(*a*) that the Place, etc. appertain to the *Āgnēya* and the rest, and (*b*) that these are to be performed together, jointly.—'Why so?'—Such texts as 'The *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* should be performed *on level ground*' are capable of enjoining only the Place and other details relating to the *Āgnēya* and other Sacrifices; because *they serve the purposes of definition*; i.e. it is understood that the purpose they serve is the defining of the details (of Place, etc.);—the term '*darsha-pūrṇamāsa*' denotes a composite sacrifice,—and the *composite* being for the purpose of defining (indicating) the components, can, through proximity, serve that purpose of defining them.—'But even so, there would be recourse to indirect figurative indication.'—It is better to have recourse to such indirect indication than to take a sentence as serving several purposes (having several meanings); as, if there are several meanings, there can be no expressiveness; while indirect indication makes it quite expressive; being, as it is, one of the well-recognised ordinary forms of expression.

"Further by Direct Denotation, the Place, etc. would be enjoined in regard to the composite sacrifice; as a matter of fact, however, there is no connection between Composite Sacrifice and the Place, etc.; the details of *Level Ground* and the rest are active agents; and an active agent is connected with the action, not with the qualifications of the action; so that, for this reason also, there should be indirect (figurative) indication; just as in the case of the text '*Paurṇamāsīmabhimṛshēt*', ['One should touch the *Paurṇamāsī*'], the term '*paurṇamāsī*' is taken as figuratively indicating the substance offered at the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice.

"Further, *because it is an injunction of the other factors*,—of *Place* and the rest,—*they should be connected with each of the main sacrifices separately*, as there are peculiar conditions perceptible which justify this conclusion.

"*Question*—'By what are the *level ground* and other details enjoined in regard to the *Āgnēya* and other sacrifices?'

Answer—"By the verbs in the texts—'*Samē yajēta*' ('should sacrifice on level ground'), '*Paurṇamāsyām yajēta*' ('should sacrifice on the Full Moon day'); the verbal root in the verb '*yajēta*' refers to the *sacrifice* (already enjoined elsewhere) and in reference to this sacrifice the injunctive affix enjoins the *level ground* and other details; the *performers* also—who are spoken of, by the words 'he is unfailing', for the purpose of laying down the entire form of the sacrifice,—are enjoined by the same (injunctive affix).—Or, the Nominative Agent, even though not actually mentioned in the Third Person, is always understood as implied by the universal verb 'to be'."

This argument of the *Pūrvapakṣin* is left unanswered here; and a different discussion is introduced.—"Why is it that before one discussion

has been concluded, another is started ?"—The reason for this lies in the fact that at the stage at which the foregoing discussion has reached, there arises out of it a question which embodies the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the new discussion; that is why it is introduced at this stage [though it is only the *Pūrvapakṣa* that is stated here, the thread of the discussion being resumed much later, in *Sūtra* 7 below].

Adhikaraṇa (2): *The restriction of being performed 'on level ground' and the rest applies to the subsidiaries also.*

SŪTRA (3).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"There should be no restriction in regard to the subsidiaries; as the restrictions have been laid down in reference to the Main Sacrifice."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the subsidiaries, we proceed to consider the question.—Do the same Place, Time and Performer appertain to these also? Or is there no restriction regarding these in the case of the subsidiaries?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*There should be no restriction in regard to the subsidiaries*;—why?—*because the restrictions have been laid down in reference to the Main Sacrifice*;—it is with reference to the Main Sacrifices, *Āgnēya* and the rest, that the 'level ground' and other details have been laid down as auxiliary to the injunctions of the main sacrifices; and as such they cannot apply to anything else. Hence (in connection with subsidiaries) there should be no restriction;—just as the *Substance* and the *Deity* that have been laid down in connection with the Main Sacrifices do not find place at the subsidiaries,—so also the Place, Time and Performer (that have been laid down in connection with the Main Sacrifices, should have no connection with the subsidiaries.)

[The answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa* and the consequent discussion is postponed to *Sūtra* 7, and] the text resumes the thread of the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, at the point left off (on p. 703 of the text),—and the following is the answer to the arguments of the *Pūrvapakṣin* (of the first *Adhikaraṇa*) under *Sūtra* (2).

SŪTRA (4).

[*Siddhāntin's answer to Purvapakṣa argument set forth in Sū.* 2]—If the sacrifice had some connection with the injunction, then it might be as suggested; [but it is not so]; because they are enjoined under a single name and are connected with the main purpose.

Bhāṣya.

If the *Āgnēya* and other sacrifices were connected with the Injunction of the 'level ground' and other details, then these details might

be taken as auxiliary to the Injunction of the main sacrifices; and in that case the 'level ground' and other details might have appertained to the main sacrifices separately and severally;—as a matter of fact however, the main sacrifices have no connection with the injunction of the details in question.—"Why?"—*Because they are enjoined under a single name and are connected with the main purpose*; that is, there is a single term ('*darsha-pūrṇamāsa*') denotative of the *Āgnēya* and other main sacrifices taken *collectively*, and it is with this single term with which the 'Level Ground' and other details are connected by the text 'One should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa on Level Ground*'; and these are not connected with the terms '*Āgnēya*', etc. which are denotative of the sacrifices *severally* as mentioned in the text 'The cake baked on eight pans is *Āgnēya*'. The *Pūrvapakṣa* view would involve the abandoning of directly perceptible connection with the sacrifices *collectively* and the adopting of the indirect one with the sacrifices severally; and this too only through indirect indication. If, on the other hand, the connection (of the details) is made with the main purpose, then both these incongruities become avoided.

"What is the 'main purpose'?"

It is the principal result, and the operation tending to accomplishing that result.

"What is that?"

The performance of the *Āgnēya* and other main sacrifices.

"How is it known that the 'Level Ground' and other details are connected with the said performance?"

The answer to this is as follows:—The text 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices' declares that the performance of the *Āgnēya* and other main sacrifices taken together is for the purpose of bringing about the result; if then, in connection with that same purpose, the 'level ground' and other details are enjoined again by Direct Assertion,—the sense conveyed would be that 'The *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices that one should perform, one should perform on level ground'; and this would not involve the assumption of any connection with the Main Sacrifices *severally*,—nor any recourse to Indirect Indication. Hence it follows that the injunction of the details (*Level Ground*, etc.) is in reference to the *performance* of the sacrifices; and this *performance* is common to all the sacrifices in question; as we do not perceive any peculiarity whereby it would pertain to any *one* of the sacrifices singly.—Thus we conclude that the Place, Time and Performer are '*common*' (to the *Āgnēya* and other main sacrifices).

SŪTRA (5).

THERE IS ALSO AN INDICATIVE TEXT POINTING TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

There is another text also which points to the same conclusion—'*Ugrāṇi ha vā ētāni ghorāṇi havīṃṣi yadamāvāsyāyām sambhriyantē, āgnēyam pratha-*

mam, aindrē uttarē';—the '*collecting*', and the *order of sequence* herein spoken of are possible only when they are all performed at the same time. This also shows that the details in question are 'common'.

SŪTRA (6).

THERE IS DIRECT DECLARATION OF THOSE, LIKE THAT OF THE MAIN SACRIFICES; (AS THE DECLARATION OF AN ACTION) IS SUBSERVIENT TO SOMETHING ELSE; ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS NO DECLARATION OF THE ACTION.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the re-assertion should be taken as enjoining the performance.—"For what reason?"—*There is direct declaration of the* 'Level Ground' and other details,—*like that of the Main Sacrifices.*—"How?"—because *the declaration of an action is subservient to something else*;—i.e. the declaration of action (sacrifice) that we have in the word '*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsābhyām*' is subservient to something else, as the word contains the Instrumental Ending; and as this word is in co-ordination with the word '*Yajēta*', the *Yaji* (sacrifice) also must be subservient to something else. Thus then, it comes to this—'One should accomplish something by means of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice'.—*Also because there is no declaration of the action*; i.e. the action has not been declared,—what is to be done has not been declared; that is, the Main Sacrifice has not been declared; in its place there have been declared the 'Level Ground' and other details;—and inasmuch as these details have been declared in place of the Main Sacrifice, the 'declaration of these' has been spoken of (in the *Sūtra*) as being 'like that of the Main Sacrifice'; but those details themselves are not the main sacrifices.—Under the circumstances, if the text in question were taken to be a re-assertion of the declarations of *Āgnēya* and other main sacrifices, then that would deprive them of the character of being a reiterative reference to their 'subsidiary character'; as their 'subsidiary character' is not spoken of in that text; in fact, all that the sentences do is to describe the mere origination of the details;—nor do they indicate *anything to be accomplished*, by virtue of which, and in relation to which, the said subsidiary character, even though not spoken of, yet implied,—could be taken as *referred to.*—In the injunction of performance, on the other hand, the subsidiary character also becomes declared, as also the Result, as what is *to be accomplished*. Hence the text in question should be taken as the re-assertion of that injunction of performance.—From all this it becomes established that the details in question are 'common'.

[*Here ends Adhikaraṇa* (1); *and the next Sūtra resumes the thread of Adhikaraṇa* (2), *the Pūrvapakṣa only of which was set forth under Sūtra* 3, *but left unanswered.*]

SŪTRA (7).

[SIDDHĀNTA *of Adhikaraṇa* (2)]—IN FACT, THE SUBSIDIARIES SHOULD BE TAKEN AS LAID DOWN ALONG WITH THE MAIN SACRIFICE, BECAUSE THAT IS THE PROCESS; HENCE THERE SHOULD BE SAMENESS OF PLACE.

Bhāṣya.

The following is the answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* in regard to the *Subsidiaries* set forth above (under Sū. 3),—which was left unanswered. When it is settled that the place and other details are part and parcel of the performance, then there comes up the following final *Siddhānta*, which is therefore set forth after the said conclusion.

It has been argued that—"in regard to the subsidiaries, there can be no restriction regarding Place, Time and Performer".—This is not right; as a matter of fact, in regard to the subsidiaries, there must be restriction regarding Place, Time and Performer,—as consisting in the 'level ground', 'the Full-moon and Moonless days' and 'the Four Priests'.—"Why so?"—Because *the subsidiaries also should be taken as laid down along with the Main Sacrifice*, which has been laid down for the bringing about of the Result.—"How so?"—*Because that is the process*; i.e. the performance of the subsidiaries constitutes *the process*, whereby the Main Sacrifices bring about the Result; the term '*vidhāna*' (in the *Sūtra*) stands for the *process*, the *procedure*. Hence it is that in the text 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices', what is laid down is the performance of the Main Sacrifices along with the subsidiaries; and as the performance has been laid down herein, by the reassertion of that same there is the injunction of the 'level ground' and other details. From this it follows that the subsidiaries also have the same Place, Time and Performers as the Main Sacrifices.

SŪTRA (8).

"AS THE SUBSTANCE AND THE DEITY",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya

It has been argued (under Sū. 3) that—"just as the Substance and the Deity of the subsidiaries are different from those of the Main Sacrifices, so should their *Place*, etc. also be different".—This has got to be refuted.—This *Sūtra* only reasserts the argument to be refuted. [The refutation is as follows.]

SŪTRA (9).

NOT SO; BECAUSE IT IS AUXILIARY TO THE INJUNCTION OF THE MAIN SACRIFICES; AND THE PECULIARITY SERVES THE PURPOSE OF RESTRICTION.

Bhāṣya.

It is not so;—Why?—*because it is auxiliary to the injunction of the Main Sacrifices*; i.e. the injunction of Substance and Deity is auxiliary to the

injunction of the Main Sacrifices; hence it is that the particular Substance and Deity are restricted to the Main Sacrifices—'At this sacrifice (*Āgnēya*), the *Agni* is the Deity, and *Cake* is the substance,—and at this sacrifice (*Agniṣomīya*), Clarified Butter is the Deity and *Agni-Soma* the Deity.'—Similarly in regard to the subsidiaries, there are such restrictions of Deity and Substance as—'One performs the *Prayājas* with *Clarified Butter*,' 'One makes the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt* out of the Remnant';—and what is laid down in connection with one thing cannot be connected with another.—In the case in question (which is of *subsidiaries*, not of *Deity and Substance*), in as much as the Place and other details are part and parcel of the performance, and the performance is common to (includes) the whole lot,—the Details must be treated as 'common' (and not restricted to any *one* sacrifice). This reason therefore that has been cited by the opponent is found to be entirely fallacious; hence the case in question is not at all analogical to that of the *Substance* and *Deity*.

SŪTRA (10).

ON ACCOUNT OF THE INHERENCE OF THOSE THAT INHERE THEREIN, THE SUBSIDIARIES SHOULD BE 'COMMON'; BUT THERE IS DIFFERENCE ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR DIFFERENCE; AND HENCE IN PERFORMANCE, THERE SHOULD BE DIFFERENCE IN THE ACTIONS; SPECIALLY AS THEY HAVE BEEN SPOKEN OF AS 'MAIN SACRIFICES.'—THERE IS ALSO AN INDICATIVE TEXT POINTING TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

If the Substance and Deity were the same for the subsidiaries and the Main Sacrifices, then, by reason of the 'inherence' of those Subsidiaries and Main Sacrifices that inhere in those same Substances and Deities, there would be no difference in them; and in that case the performance might be 'common'.—As a matter of fact, however, *there is difference on account of their difference*; i.e. when there is difference between the Substance and Deity of the subsidiaries and those of the Main Sacrifices, then, on account of that difference, there should be *difference in the performance of the actions*; i.e. inasmuch as we perceive a difference in the performance of the act of sacrifice, there should be diversity in that performance.

There is also an indicative text pointing to the same conclusion; and which can be explained only on the basis of this conclusion; that text being—'There are fourteen oblations offered at the *Paurṇamāsa* and thirteen at the *Darsha* sacrifice'. From this also it is clear that there is diversity between the Substance and Deity of the Subsidiaries and those of the Main Sacrifices.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *In connection with the Darsha-Purṇamāsa and other 'group-sacrifices', the subsidiaries should be performed separately in connection with each group.*

Bhāṣya.

(A) In the '*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*' Sacrifice, there are two groups: (1) '*Darsha*, and (2) *Purṇamāsa*';—(B) Similarly in the *Rājasūya*, there are two groups: (1) *Iṣṭis*, the *Anumati*, etc. and (2) *Soma-Sacrifices*, the *Pavitra*, etc.;—(C) In the *Chāturmāsya* also, there are the *Vaishvadēva* and other groups.

In regard to this the following question is considered—Should all the subsidiaries be performed 'in common', (A) for the *Darsha* and the *Paurṇamāsa*,—(B) and for the *Iṣṭis* and *Soma-Sacrifices*, at the *Rājasūya*, —and (C) for all the groups at the *Chāturmāsya* ?—or should they be performed separately ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—

SŪTRA (11).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN CONNECTION WITH (A) THE IṢṬI, (B) THE RĀJASŪYA, AND (C) THE CHĀTURMĀSYAS,—THE SUBSIDIARIES SHOULD BE PERFORMED 'IN COMMON'; AS EACH OF THESE IS 'ONE SACRIFICE'."

Bhāṣya.

"In connection with each of these three 'group-sacrifices', the subsidiaries should be performed 'in common'.—Why ?—Because each of them is a 'single sacrifice', i.e. bringing about a single result; the *one result* following from such 'group-sacrifices' has been spoken of in connection with each—(A) '*Desiring heaven*, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices',—(B) '*Desiring sovereignty of heaven*, one should perform the *Rājasūya*',—(C) '*Desiring heaven*, one should perform the *Chāturmāsya* Sacrifices'. Inasmuch as the result is one, the performance should be one, as we perceive no peculiarity (whereby there could be separate performances with each group); hence the performance of the subsidiaries should be 'in common'."

SŪTRA (12).

[*Objection to Pūrvapakṣa*]—ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCE IN TIME, IT CANNOT BE SO.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be right that the subsidiaries should be performed 'in common'; as a matter of fact, the performance should be separate, (with each member of the *group*).—Why ?—*Because of the difference in time*; in some cases, there is difference in *place*; (A) at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, there is difference in *time*—'The *Paūrṇamāsa* should be performed on the Full Moon Day and the *Darsha* should be performed on the Moonless Day';—(B) at the groups of the *Chāturmāsya* also, there is difference in *time*—'One should perform the *Vaishvadēva* in the spring, the *Varuṇapraghāsa* during the *rains*, and the *Sākamēdha*, during the winter';—(C) at the *Rājasūya*, there is difference in *place*—'The Cooked Rice is offered to *Bṛhaspati* in the house of the Brahman-priest, the Cake baked on eleven pans is offered to *Indra* in the king's house, the Cooked Rice is offered to *Āditya* in the Queen's house".—On account of this *difference in time* and *difference in place*, we perceive a clear distinction to the effect that those subsidiaries for which the full Moon Day is the time are helpful to the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice, not to the *Darsha* sacrifice,—as, if performed in this latter, they would be defective (regarding *time*). Hence it follows that the performance of the subsidiaries in connection with the *Paurṇamāsa* should be separate from that in connection with the *Darsha*.

SŪTRA (13).

[*Pūrvapakṣin's answer to the objection.*]—"IT IS NOT SO, BECAUSE IT IS ONLY A PART; AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'ANIMAL-SACRIFICE'."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not right that there should be separate performance.—Why ?—*Because it is only a part*; the subsidiaries have been enjoined as to be performed where the Result is expected to appear; because the subsidiaries help the Main Sacrifices in the bringing about of the Result;—the Result too is connected with the injunction of the sacrifice as one composite whole, as is clear from the following texts—(A) 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* sacrifice', (B) 'Desiring sovereignty of heaven, one should perform the *Rājasūya* sacrifice', (C) 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifices';—and the Result is not connected with the injunction of the parts (separate groups) of the sacrifices, as laid down in the following—(A) 'One should perform the *Paurṇamāsa* on the Full Moon Day', (B) 'One should perform the *Vaishvadēva* during the spring', (C) 'The Cooked Rice should be offered to *Bṛhaspati* in the house of the Brahman-Priest'.—And when the subsidiaries are not admissible at these part-performances, how can they be

performed separately with each of these parts?—As for the composite sacrifice, there can be only one performance of it, as it is conducive to a single result. In connection with whatsoever part (group) the subsidiaries may be performed, they would certainly become related to the composite sacrifice as a whole; as the composite has no existence apart from its component parts.—*As in the case of the Animal sacrifice*, though there is diversity of time regarding the component offerings,—'They offer the omentum at the Morning Extraction, the Cake at the Midday Extraction, and the Limbs at the Third Extraction,'—yet, the subsidiaries are not repeated with each of these severally; similar should be the treatment of the case in question also."

SŪTRA (14).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT,—INASMUCH AS THE GROUPS ARE DISTINCT ACTS, AND THEIR PROCEDURE HAS BEEN ENJOINED AS TO BE PERFORMED 'IN COMMON'—THE INJUNCTION SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PERTAINING TO THEM ALONG WITH THE SUBSIDIARIES.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the performance of the subsidiaries should not be 'in common';—why?—*because the groups are distinct acts and have been enjoined as to be performed 'in common'*.—These acts are distinct—i.e. the group called '*Paurṇamāsa*' is quite distinct from the group called '*Darsha*'; so also in the other cases; and there is difference between them also regarding Place and Time—'One should perform the *Paurṇamāsa* on the Full-Moon Day, etc. etc'. There are distinct injunctions also regarding the Place and Time of the subsidiaries of these sacrifices.

Objection.—"It has been already pointed out that in this case subsidiaries do not come in at all; whence could there be any injunction regarding the place and time of the subsidiaries?"

Answer.—It has been already explained that in connection with the performance of the sacrifices, the 'even ground' and other details become enjoined by the reassertion in another text; this reassertion, in the form 'One should perform the *Darsha-Purṇāmāsa* on even ground', appertains to the performance of the composite sacrifice as a whole; while the reassertion in the form 'One should perform the *Paurṇamāsa* on the Full Moon day' appertains to only a part (the *Paurṇamāsa* section) of that whole. Such being the case, the time (Full Moon Day) has been laid down for the performance of the *Paurṇamāsa*, and the performance of the subsidiaries cannot be separate from that of the Main Sacrifice to which they belong;—hence the Full Moon Day must be the time for the performance of the subsidiaries of the *Paurṇamāsa*, and the Moonless Day must be the time for the performance of the subsidiaries of the *Darsha*; as this distinction (between the two groups) is clearly perceived, they must be distinct.

SŪTRA (15).

THERE IS AN INDICATIVE TEXT ALSO, POINTING TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'There are fourteen oblations offered at the *Paurṇamāsa*, and thirteen at the *Darsha*'; if the subsidiaries were performed 'in common' (between the two groups, *Darsha* and *Paurṇamāsa*), then there would not be *fourteen* oblations at the *Paurṇamāsa* and *thirteen* at the *Darsha*; it is only when the performances are distinct, that there would be the two numbers of offerings at the two sacrifices.—From this it follows that the performances should be separate.

SŪTRA (16).

IN THAT CASE, IT WOULD BE THE SAME IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMPONENT PARTS.

Bhāṣya.

When the principle is as explained above, then, *in connection with the component parts*,—i.e. the acts constituting the *Iṣṭi* (*Darsha-Purṇamāsa*) and other sacrifices in question,—there being difference regarding Place and Time, the performance would be separate.—It is thus alone that there can be any sense in the assertion that at the two constituents of the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifice,—the *Anīkavat* and the *Sāntapanīya*,—the 'grass' used should be common,—the 'grass' at the *Sāntapanīya* being the same as that as the *Anīkavat*; as otherwise (if the whole performance were *common*) the fact of the *grass* being the same would be already a settled one, and hence its reassertion would be wholly meaningless.—From this also it follows that there should be separate performances.

SŪTRA (17).

AS REGARDS THE 'ANIMAL-SACRIFICE', AS THERE IS ONLY ONE INJUNCTION, THE PERFORMANCE IS 'IN COMMON', ONLY SPOKEN OF SEPARATELY.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 13) that "it should be as in the case of the Animal-Sacrifice".—Our answer to that is as follows:—*As regards the Animal Sacrifice*, it is only right that the subsidiaries should be performed only once; because in that case, there is only one performance 'in common'; and the separate mention is due to the declaration of the offerings.—That the performance is to be once only follows from the fact

that there is only one injunction;—the only Injunction in this case is—'Taking up the cup dedicated to the *Ashvins*, covering up the Sacrificial Post, one sacrifices the *Savanīya* animal dedicated to *Agni*'. As a matter of fact, the subsidiaries are included in the injunction of the whole 'Sacrifice', not in the injunction of the 'offering'. In this case the Main Sacrifice is separated by the two 'offerings' having been laid down as to be performed at different times; so also do those subsidiaries become separated which are performed for the sake of that main sacrifice; there is therefore no reason why these should be performed again.—Thus then, there is no analogy between the case of the 'Animal Sacrifice' and the case in question.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The subsidiaries should be performed separately in connection with each of the three Groups constituting the 'Adhvarakalpā' sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (18).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"SO SHOULD IT BE AT THE 'ADHVARAKALPĀ', AS THE PECULIARITY PERTAINS TO ONE TIME."

Bhāṣya.

There is the following text—'*Agnāvaiṣṇavam prātaḥ aṣṭākapālam nirvapēt, sārasvatam charum, bārhaspatyam charum; agnāvaiṣṇavam ēkādashakapālam madhyandinē sārasvatam charum bārhaspatyam charum; agnāvaiṣṇavam dvādashakapālam aparāhnē sārasvatam charum bārhaspatyam charum; yasya bhrātrvyaḥ somēna yajēta*' [where the '*Adhvarakalpā Iṣṭi*' is described as consisting of the following three 'groups'—(1) Three offerings made in the morning,—(*a*) to *Agni-Viṣṇu*, of cake baked on *eight* pans, (*b*) to *Sarasvatī*, of Cooked Rice, and (*c*) to *Bṛhaspati*, of cooked rice;—(2) three offerings made at midday, (*a*) to *Agni-Viṣṇu*, of cake baked on *eleven* pans, (*b*) to *Sarasvatī*, of Cooked Rice, and (*c*) to *Bṛhaspati*, of Cooked Rice;—(3) three offerings made in the afternoon,—(*a*) to *Agni-Viṣṇu*, of cake baked on *twelve* pans, (*b*) to *Sarasvatī*, of Cooked Rice, and (*c*) to *Bṛhaspati*, of Cooked Rice].

In regard to this, we proceed to consider the following question—In connection with all the three groups of offerings laid down as to be performed at the different times,—are the subsidiaries to be performed only once 'in common'? Or separately with each group?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—"*So should it be at the Adhvarakalpā*; i.e. the performance should be 'in common', as at the Animal-sacrifice.—Why?—*Because the peculiarity pertains to one time*; i.e. of these three groups performed at three different times, there is one particular detail which has been laid down as *pertaining to one time*,—in the text '*Purāvāchaḥ pravadito nirvapēt*' [which lays down an offering to be made *prior to the Dawn*].—'How do you know that this lays down the time for the making of all the offerings?'—All the offerings, as leading to one and the same result, must form one and the same 'Context',—specially as the sacrifice has been enjoined as one whole under a single name, as bringing about the result—'This is the *Adharakalpā Iṣṭi*, by which one attains the sacrifice'; from this it follows that when the *morning-offerings* (the First Group) are performed at the said time ('prior to the Dawn'), the other two groups, which have been originally laid down as to be performed at the later times of 'Midday' and 'Afternoon', also would become 'anticipated' and performed 'prior to the dawn'; and when these become 'anticipated', all the subsidiaries prior thereto also

would become 'anticipated', according to the principle enunciated under *Sūtra* 5. 1. 24;—and when these become 'anticipated', they become applicable 'in common' to all; and this applicability 'in common' should appertain to the subsequent subsidiaries also.—'Why so?'—In case all are performed 'in common', this 'common' performance does not involve any infringement of the order of sequence of these 'common' performances. If there were an infringement of the order of sequence, the latter group would have to be taken up only after the completion of the entire set of details relating to the first group. And such an offering, when there is an 'anticipation' as described above, involves an infringement of the order of sequence; as in this case, the 'sprinkling' and other details relating to the First group would not be performed until all the details ending with the '*nirvāpa*' (offering) have been performed in connection with the latter group.—Further, when the actions have been started together, there is naturally a desire to perform them simultaneously;—this desire being there, whatever comes in (as to be done) has to be 'in common' to all, because no ground for discrimination is found".

SŪTRA (19).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"THE MENTION OF THE WHOLE AS 'IṢṬI' INDICATES THAT IT IS ALL ONE".

Bhāṣya.

"The whole has been spoken of as *one*, in the text 'This is the *Adhvarakalpā Iṣṭi*'; in reality, it is not *one sacrifice*; in fact, there are *several sacrifices*; and if these are performed simultaneously, then it is only at the end of all that the effort comes to an end; and in this sense alone would the mention of it as 'one' be justifiable. For this reason also the performance should be 'in common'."

[*Siddhānta*]—As a matter of fact, it is not right that the performance should be 'in common', in fact, it should be separate.—"Why?"

SŪTRA (20).

AS A MATTER OF FACT,—INASMUCH AS THE GROUPS ARE DISTINCT ACTS, AND THEIR PROCEDURE HAS BEEN ENJOINED AS TO BE PERFORMED,—THE INJUNCTION SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PERTAINING TO THEM ALONG WITH THE SUBSIDIARIES.

[The words are the same as those of Sū. 14, above.]

Bhāṣya.

The offerings in question—to *Agni-Viṣṇu* and the rest,—are so many distinct acts;—and *the procedure of these has been enjoined*, in reference to

various points of time,—Morning, Midday, and Afternoon;—this injunction of the acts in question should be taken as pertaining to them along with their subsidiaries. Thus, on account of the difference in the *time*, we do perceive a distinction among them; consequently, they should be performed *separately*.

As for the argument that "the peculiarity pertains to one time" (Sū. 18);—our answer to that is as follows:—

SŪTRA (21).

IN FACT, THE TIME SPOKEN OF PERTAINS TO THE FIRST.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, the text '*Purāvāchah pravadito nirvapēt*' mentions the time of the offering of the *first sacrifice*.—" But by 'Context', the time should apply to all".—Context never specifies the scriptural details; what it does is to indicate their use; all that Context has the capacity to do is to indicate that 'this comes in at this point',—not that 'this belongs to that, and that belongs to that other'.—As a matter of fact, from among the three groups of 'offerings', it is only that which is the first in order of sequence which is recognized as related to the time indicated in the text ('*Purāvāchah*' etc.) so that the peculiarity does not pertain to the one time; and as there is diversity of time, the acts also should be performed separately.

SŪTRA (22).

THE USE OF THE TERM 'IṢṬI' IS DUE TO THE FACT OF THERE BEING ONLY ONE RESULT,—AS IN OTHER CASES.

Bhāṣya.

As regards the argument (urged in Sū. 19) based upon the application of the single name '*iṣṭi*',—we find that even different actions, when bringing about one and the same Result, are spoken of as *one act*, on the basis of the sameness of the Result; and that is so because every effort ends with the obtaining of the Result.—This we find in the case of several other *Iṣṭis*, such as '*Sarvapṛṣṭhēṣṭi*', '*Mṛgāreṣṭi*', 'The *Iṣṭi* named *Sumanas*'.

Adhikaraṇa (5): *The 'Vasā-oblations' should be offered separately, when the deities are different; but 'in common' when there is the same Deity.*

SŪTRA (23).

In the case of sacrifices with one and the same deity, the 'Vasā-homa' should be performed 'in common'; because the actual offering is made at the same time.

Bhāṣya.

The subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa* consists of those Animal-sacrifices where all the offerings are made to one and the same deity; such, for instance, as 'Seventeen animals should be sacrificed to *Prajāpati*'.—The Archetype of this sacrifice is the *Agniṣomīya-animal-sacrifice*, at which there is an offering called '*Vasā-homa*' ['Fat-oblation'], laid down in the text 'At the end of the half-verse of the *Yājyā* one offers the *Fat*';—this *Vasā-homa* is admissible also at the former sacrifice of seventeen animals to *Prajāpati*.

The question that arises in regard to this is—Should the *Vasā-homa* be performed *separately* with each of the *seventeen* animals? Or only once 'in common' for all?

The view that presents itself as the rational one is the following—*In the case of sacrifices to one and the same deity, the Vasā-homa should be performed 'in common', because the actual offering is made at the same time*;—i.e. in the case of those animal-sacrifices which have only one deity, the *Vasā-homa* should be performed 'in common'.—Why?—*Because the actual offering is made at the same time*;—the offering of all this is done at the same time, that time being laid down as—'They offer it after having performed the *Vaishvadēva* sacrifice';—the deity also at these is one only, *Prajāpati*; hence they constitute a single offering;—and the offering being one only, and the time for all being one and the same,—viz.: 'the end of the half-verse of the *Yājyā*',—when the *Vasā-homa* is performed at this time, there is no differentiation discernible whereby it could be connected with any *one* of the offerings; hence the performance should be 'in common'.

SŪTRA (24).

When there is diversity of time, and diversity of Deities, there should be repetition.

Bhāṣya.

In cases where there are different deities,—for instance, at the *Ēkādashina*-sacrifices, where there are diverse offerings, the time indicated by 'the end of the half-verse of the *Yājyā*' is diverse; and in connection with these, there is this differentiation discernible that the *Vasā-homa* is appertenant to that offering whose 'half-verse of *Yājyā*' has been completed. Consequently, in this case the performances are separate.

Adhikaraṇa (6): *At the 'Yūpaikādashinī', the 'Yūpāhutis' should be offered 'in common'.*

(SŪTRA 25).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"At the close, the 'Yūpāhuti' should be similarly treated."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is the *Yūpaikādashinī*, laid down in the text—'*Ēkādasha yūpān chhinatti*';—the Archetype of this *Yūpaikādashinī* is the *Agnī-ṣomīya-animal-sacrifice*, at which there is an offering made called the '*Yūpāhuti*', [and under the general Law, this becomes admissible at the *Yūpaikādashinī* also].

The question that arises is—when this *Yūpāhuti* is offered at the *Yūpaikādashinī* [which consists of *eleven* offerings]—is it to be offered separately with each of these eleven offerings? Or, only once 'in common' to all?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*At the close, the Yūpāhuti should be similarly treated*;—i.e. just as in the case of the offerings to several deities, the *Vasā-homa* is performed separately, so the *Yūpāhuti* also should be performed separately.—Why so?—There is the declaration—'Having churned out the Fire in close proximity to the Post, one offers the *Yūpāhuti*';—the 'close proximity' of the several Posts must be diverse;—so that if it were not offered in 'close proximity' to any one Post, to that extent, that offering would become defective. Hence the *Yūpāhuti* should be offered separately".

SŪTRA (26).

In fact, it is only the negation of the other.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the *Yūpāhuti* should not be offered separately; it should be offered 'in common'.—Why?—*Because it is the negation of the other*; i.e. the text quoted is only the negation of the usual *Āhavanīya* Fire (wherein all offerings are made), not the injunction of the 'close proximity' (of the Post).—"How do you know that?"—There is the general rule that 'Oblations are to be poured into the *Āhavanīya* Fire', so that this *Āhavanīya* Fire is what is recognized as to be used at all offerings.—Then, it having become necessary (in order to preclude this *Āhavanīya*) to speak of the 'Churning of the Fire';—this 'churning' comes to be recognised as to be performed at the *Prāgvamsha*, at which the performance has been commenced;—so that (with a view to exclude this *Prāgvamsha*) it becomes necessary to speak of the 'close proximity of the Post' (as the place of the

Churning).—Now if both these—the *churning of the Fire*, and the *proximity of the Post as the place for the churning*—were taken as enjoined by the text quoted, this would involve a syntactical split; specially as the *Churning* is done for its own sake as also for the sake of another;—hence one of the two, either the *Churning* or the *close proximity*, should be taken as not meant to be emphasised; and our opinion is that it is the *Churning* that is meant to be emphasised, not the *close proximity*.—"Why?"—Because in reality, the text is meant to be injunctive of the *Churning*. It has been declared thus—'The oblation should be offered in such a way as not to leave off the Post,—they do not offer the oblation into the Fire of the Initiated'; from which it is clear that it has been considered wrong to offer the oblation into 'the Fire of the Initiated';—hence for the avoidance of this, another alternative has been laid down—'Having recited the *Vaiṣṇavī* verse, without leaving off the Post';—and yet considering it to be wrong to omit the *Homa* altogether, the Text goes on to say—'The Homa must be offered,—one offers it in the house of the man himself';—as both these alternatives are inacceptable, the Text has negatived them and has added a third alternative—'*Having churned the Fire in close proximity to the Post*', one should offer the oblation in such a way as to fulfil both the conditions—the oblation is offered, and it is not offered in the 'Fire of the Initiated'. Now then, if the 'proximity of the Post' be taken as what is meant to be emphasised (and enjoined), then the 'churning' could not be regarded as emphasised (and enjoined); and in that case the course to be adopted comes to be that 'the *Āhavanīya Fire* itself should be carried to the proximity of the Post, and the oblation offered into it',—by virtue of the general rule that 'oblations should be offered into the *Āhavanīya* Fire';—but in this case the prohibition 'not in the Fire of the Initiated' would have no bearing on the matter at all.—If, on the other hand, the *churning of the Fire* is taken as what is emphasised (and enjoined) by the text, then the *Āhavanīya Fire* becomes negatived; because the Fire that is *churned out* is different from the *Āhavanīya* Fire; in this case, the meaning comes to be—'The oblation is offered,—and it is not offered into the *Āhavanīya*'.—From all this it follows that what is enjoined is the *churning*, not the *proximity*,—the latter being only *referred to*.—"Where has it been already known,—that the present is a mere *reference* to it?"—It is already known by reason of its being the easier method of performance; it would be difficult to hunt out the Fire and also the Post, hence it is far easier to churn out the Fire in proximity to the Post itself and offer the oblation there. There are cases of *reference* to what is recognised through reason also [and it is not confined to that alone which is *enjoined* by texts].—Under the circumstances, there is nothing wrong if the oblation is offered 'in proximity' to the Post.—"Why cannot the *churning* alone be done (near the Post, thereby carrying out the Injunction), and the oblation offered, as usual, into the *Āhavanīya* Fire?"—In this case an invisible (transcendental) result would have to be assumed as following from this course of action.

From all this it follows that the *Yūpāhuti* should be performed 'in common'.

SŪTRA (27).

ALSO BECAUSE SPOTS ARE NOT ENJOINED BY THE SCRIPTURES.

Bhāṣya.

Further, any such spots as 'in proximity' cannot be the objects of scriptural injunctions,—because 'proximity' is a relative term (and as such indefinite). If (in order to avoid this) it be held that the spot *nearmost* to the Post is what is enjoined, then the lighting of the Fire so close to the Post would lead to the Post itself being burnt; and this would certainly be something very incongruous. Nor is it possible to 'churn' the Fire on the spot *nearmost* to the Post; for this reason also no significance can attach to the term 'close proximity'.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The 'Avabhṛtha' should be performed in the Water, along with its subsidiaries.*

SŪTRA (28).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"AT THE AVABHṚTHA, FOR THE MAIN OFFERING, THERE SHOULD BE MODIFICATIONS OF THE FIRE; THERE IS NO REASON FOR THE SUBSIDIARIES TO BE CONNECTED WITH THE FIRE THROUGH THAT."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is the *Avabhṛtha-rite*; in regard to this we read—'*Apsu avabhṛthēna charanti*' ['They perform the *Avabhṛtha* in water'].

Regarding this, we proceed to consider the following question—Is only the Main offering of the *Avabhṛtha* to be made in *water*? Or the subsidiaries also?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*At the Avabhṛtha, for the main offering only should there be modification of the Fire*; i.e. the Main offering alone should be made *in the water*.—Why?—*Because there is no reason for the subsidiaries to be connected with the Fire through that*,—that is no reason why the subsidiaries should be connected with the Fire through the Main Offering. The text 'Offers oblations into the Fire' has laid down the Fire as the receptacle of every kind of *Homa*; so that it is applicable as much to the subsidiaries as to the Main Offering. As for the *Water*, it has been enjoined specifically in connection with the Main Offering only, in the text, 'They perform the *Avabhṛtha* in Water';—the term '*avabhṛtha*' signifies that sacrifice at which the substance in the shape of *the cake baked on one pan* is offered to the *Deity Varuṇa*,—this being declared in the originative injunction of the *Avabhṛtha*, which stands thus—'They proceed to the *Avabhṛtha* with the Cake baked on one pan, offered to *Varuṇa*'. What is enjoined here is not the *proceeding*,—in fact, the *proceeding* to the water is got at only by implication; what is enjoined is the '*pracharana*', *performance* (of the *Avabhṛtha*);— there is no *place* of the name of '*avabhṛtha*' to which they could 'proceed' with the 'cake baked on one pan, offered to *Varuṇa*';—nor is there any such thing as 'cake baked on one pan offered to *Varuṇa*', the 'proceeding' whereby could be spoken of;—hence we conclude that what is laid down here is the connecting of 'the cake baked on one pan' with the particular deity (*Varuṇa*);—this 'connecting' is what constitutes a 'sacrifice', and it is this *sacrifice* that is denoted by the term '*avabhṛtha*';—it is for this sacrifice specifically that the *water* has been laid down as the receptacle; how then can there be any possibility of the *water* being the receptacle of the subsidiary offerings?"

SŪTRA (29).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"JUST LIKE THE SUBSTANCE AND THE DEITY."

Bhāṣya.

"Just as the *substance*—cake baked on one pan—and the *Deity*—*Varuṇa*,—enjoined in connection with the Main Offering, do not become connected with the subsidiaries,—similarly the *water* also (enjoined in connection with the Main sacrifice, cannot be connected with the subsidiaries)."

SŪTRA (30).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT IS ALONG WITH THE SUBSIDIARIES THAT IT SHOULD BE PERFORMED (IN WATER); BECAUSE THE DECLARATION OF PROCEDURE IS ONE ONLY.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, it is along with its subsidiaries that the *Avabhṛtha* should be performed in water.—"Why?"—*Because there is only one declaration of procedure*; the *water* that is laid down here is not for the *Avabhṛtha*, but for the *performance* (of the *Avabhṛtha*); as the expression used is not '*apsu avabhṛthē*', but '*apsu avabhṛthēna*'; both these terms are expressive of active agencies, and the two are not related to one another as 'qualification and qualified'; both these are connected, not with one another, but with the verb '*charanti*' ('perform');—this verb '*charanti*' ('perform') is used with reference to the *Performance*;—from all this it follows that the *water* is part and parcel of the Performance;—the *Performance* also is one indivisible whole, comprising the Main offerings and the subsidiaries, as has been explained under Sū. 11. 2. 7. Thus we conclude that it is the entire *Avabhṛtha* along with the subsidiaries that has been laid down as to be performed *in water*; so that the subsidiaries also should be performed in *water*.

SŪTRA (31).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

There is a text also indicative of the same conclusion—'Having thrown the straw into the water, one pours the *Āghāra*'. If the subsidiaries were meant to be performed into Fire, then this text would have to be taken as enjoining both—*Pouring of Āghāra in water* and *Throwing in of the straw*; and this would involve a syntactical split.—On the other hand, if the conclusion explained above is accepted, then the mention of the 'water' (in connection with the *Pouring*) would be a mere *reference*, and the injunction

would be that of the *Throwing in of the straw* only; and this would not involve any incongruity.

It has been argued (under Sū. 29) that "it should be as in the case of the Substance and the Deity".—Our answer to this is as follows :—

SŪTRA (32).

IT IS BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE OF WORDS THAT THERE IS SETTING ASIDE OF THE DEITY.

Bhāṣya.

The words are different: the term '*avabhṛtha*' stands for the Main Offering, and the subsidiaries are spoken of by means of such terms as '*āghāra*' and the rest ;—the Substance and the Deity have been laid down in connection with the term '*avabhṛtha*', in the text 'They proceed to the *Avabhṛtha* with the cake baked on one pan, offered to *Varuṇa*'; it is for this reason that these two (Substance and Deity) are not connected with the subsidiaries. As for *water*, however, it has been laid down as part and parcel of the performance as a whole. So that the reason put forward is found to be fallacious; and the argument is no argument at all.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The subsidiaries should be performed separately at the Northern and the Southern altars.*

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Varuṇapraghāsa*-sacrifices, separate 'altars' have been laid down—'They install separate fires, they make separate platforms';—in connection with this, we read—'The *Adhvaryu* keeps eight offerings on the northern altar, and the *Pratiprasthātṛ* keeps the *offering to Maruts* alone on the southern one'.

In regard to this, we proceed to consider the question—Should the subsidiaries be performed separately at the Northern Altar and again at the Southern Altar? Or those same that have been performed at the Northern Altar help also at the Southern one [and there is to be a single performance 'in common']?

The most rational view (*Siddhānta*) is as follows:—

SŪTRA (33).

AT THE VARUṆAPRAGHĀSA SACRIFICES, IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOUTHERN ALTAR, THE WHOLE SHOULD BE REPEATED, BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE IN PLACE.

Bhāṣya.

The subsidiaries should be performed separately (at the two altars).—"Why?"—*Because of the difference in place*; the place differs in the two cases,—in one case it is the *northern*, and in the other, the *Southern* Altar; so that those Main Offerings that are performed at the Northern Altar can be helped by only those subsidiaries that are performed at that same altar, as has been explained under *Sūtra* 11. 2. 7;—and those subsidiaries performed at the Northern Altar cannot help the *offering to Maruts* (which is the main offering at the Southern Altar); hence for the sake of this latter offering, it is necessary to perform the subsidiaries separately, at the Southern Altar.

SŪTRA (34).

"THERE IS NO INJUNCTION", IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*.]

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"If it is your view that the subsidiaries should be performed separately because of the difference in place,—then, that cannot be right; because *there is no injunction* here of the 'offering to

Maruts'; it is only when the sacrifice is enjoined with a view to a result that it takes in the subsidiaries. In the case in question, the 'offering to *Maruts*' has not been enjoined with a view to the Result; as a matter of fact, its injunction is contained in a totally different context—'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifices';—thus then, when the main offering (to Maruts) itself is not enjoined in the present context, there can be no possibility of the subsidiaries being performed here; under the circumstances, how could there be any question of the subsidiaries being performed *separately* or *in common*?"

SŪTRA (35).

[*Answer*]—IT WOULD BE AS IN THE CASE OF THE PAURṆAMĀSĪ.

Bhāṣya.

There would certainly be a possibility of the performance of the subsidiaries; *as in the case of the Paurṇamāsī*; in the text 'One should perform the *Paurṇamāsa* on the Full Moon Day', the result of the sacrifice has not been laid down;—the result having been laid down elsewhere, in the text 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices';—and yet, on the Full Moon Day the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice is performed along with its subsidiaries; the same should be done in the case in question also.

SŪTRA (36).

"THERE IS INJUNCTION OF THE PERFORMANCE",—IF THIS IS URGED—[then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*.]

Bhāṣya.

The following might be urged by the Opponent—"What has been enjoined by the verb 'should sacrifice' in the case of the *Paurṇamāsī* is the *Performance* (of the sacrifice);—and *Performance* is meant to include the Main offering as well as the subsidiaries; and *time* also is part of the Performance;—it is for this reason that on the Full Moon Day, the Main sacrifice is performed along with the subsidiaries".

Our answer to this is as follows:—

SŪTRA (37).

SO HERE ALSO.

Bhāṣya.

In the present case also, what is enjoined is the *performance* of the 'offering to *Maruts*'—by the verb '*āsādayati*', 'keeps'; and just as (in the case of the *Paurṇamāsa*) Time is part of the Performance, so is Place

also.—Hence it follows that on the Southern Altar, 'offering to *Maruts*' should be performed along with its subsidiaries.

Objection—"As a matter of fact, the term '*āsādayati*', 'keeps', does not denote the *sacrifice*; how then can it signify the *performance* of the sacrifice?"

Answer—The *keeping* spoken of is only for the purpose of the sacrifice, as at the Archetype; as it is only thus that it serves a visible purpose: otherwise, it would have to be assumed to serve an invisible (transcendental) purpose. And when the 'keeping' is for the purposes of the *sacrifice*, the sacrifice must be performed.—Thus then, the text in question indirectly becomes an injunction of the sacrifice; just as in the case of such texts as 'One should offer Cooked Rice to *Sūrya*', 'One should offer the tawny animal to *Soma*'.—From this it follows that in the case in question also, the performance of the 'offering to Maruts' is enjoined; and hence the performance of the subsidiaries being admissible, it should be done separately.

SŪTRA (38).

"BUT IT IS 'KEEPING'",—IF THIS IS URGED—[then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*.]

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"The term '*āsādayati*', 'keeps', denotes, not the *sacrifice*, but the *keeping*.—'But it would indirectly indicate the *sacrifice*'.—It cannot be right to abandon Direct Denotation and have recourse to Indirect Indication.—'But such recourse will be necessitated by the fact that the *Āsādana* serves a visible purpose'.—It would be so if the *Āsādana* really served a visible purpose. If the pouring of the offering to *Maruts* were definitely known as to be performed in the Southern Fire, then alone would the *keeping* of the substance near it serve a visible purpose; but the said pouring is not so definitely known.—At the Archetype, inasmuch as the *Āhavanīya* Fire is one only, the pouring of the oblation is definitely known as to be done therein; hence the *keeping* of the substance near it is regarded as serving a visible purpose. In the case in question, however, it is not so;—and when it is not possible for it to serve a visible purpose, it is better to accept the direct denotation. Hence it follows that what is expressed by the verb '*āsādayati*' is *keeping*, not *sacrifice*."

SŪTRA (39).

[*Answer*]—NOT SO; BECAUSE IT FORMS 'ONE SENTENCE' WITH THE SENTENCE SPEAKING OF THE NORTHERN ALTAR.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the '*Āsādana*' does not serve an unseen purpose.—"Why?"—*Because it forms 'one sentence' with the sentence speaking of the*

Northern Altar ;—i.e. inasmuch as the sentence 'The *Pratiprasthātṛ* keeps the *offering to Maruts* at the Southern Altar' forms 'one sentence' with (is construed along with) the group of words connected with the Northern Altar, —as found in the sentence 'He keeps the eight offerings on the Northern Altar',—it follows that this *keeping* is not meant to serve an *unseen* purpose. —"How is that ?"—As a matter of fact, the ordinary notion is that the offering of the oblations might be done, without any restriction, in either one of the two *Āhavanīya* Fires ; and as the *keeping* is meant to keep pace with the offering, the same idea holds regarding this *keeping* also. What the text in question therefore does is to restrict the particular *Āhavanīya* Fire to be adopted ;—the restriction that is imposed is always on what is previously known ;—the *Āhavanīya* is known to subserve the purpose of the offering of oblations, not any unseen purpose ;—hence it follows that the 'keeping' is for the purpose of the 'offering of oblations'.

Another party comes forward with the following explanation :—The term '*āsādayati*' as found in the first sentence speaks of the *keeping* of the offerings at both altars ;—at the Northern Altar it is clearly for the purposes of *Homa* ; hence when the same word is used in the second sentence in connection with the Southern Altar, it cannot but be meant to be for the purposes of *Homa* ;—hence it follows that at both altars, the 'keeping' is for the purpose of *Homa*.—It might be argued that—"It is the *āsādana*, *keeping*, alone that is enjoined ; and it may be regarded as serving a visible purpose whenever it is found to actually serve a visible purpose,—and where it is not possible for it to serve a visible purpose, it may be regarded as serving an unseen purpose".—This however is not possible ; as this would involve the simultaneity of *injunction* and *reference* ; that is, where it is for a visible purpose, it would be *referred to*, being already known as to be done on the basis of the Archetype,—while where it serves an unseen purpose, it would be *enjoined* ;—but both these cannot be there at one and the same time. Hence the suggestion made is not right.

"If it is for the purposes of *Homa*, why is the sentence regarded as the injunction of the *sacrifice*, not the mere *keeping* ?"

The answer to this may be that it would be the *Homa* elsewhere.—But that cannot be right ; because the *keeping* is for the purpose of *Homa* ; and what is *kept* in one place cannot be offered in *Homa* in another place.

Further,

SŪTRA (40).

BECAUSE IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO SPEAK OF IT.

Bhāṣya.

It is not necessary to speak of the *keeping* for purposes of *Homa* ; for when the *Homa* is there (to be performed), the *keeping* comes in from the Archetype itself. It is necessary however to speak of the *sacrifice* ; it is possible for this *sacrifice* to be spoken of by means of the term 'keeping', through indirect indication. Consequently in the case in question also, the term 'keeps' ('*āsādayati*) signifies the *performance of the sacrifice*, as in the

case of the '*Paurṇamāsī*' ;—and from this it follows that the performance should be separate.

SŪTRA (41).

THE SCRIPTURAL DECLARATION ALSO IS TO THE SAME EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

It is only under this conclusion arrived at above by means of reasonings that the scriptural declaration would be explicable ; this declaration being—'Then the *Pratiprasthātṛ* does what the *Adhvaryu* does' ; and again, 'That wherein the *Homas* are offered is also called *Dēvatāyāja*' ;—all this shows that the sacrifice to deities is to be offered at the Southern Altar also ; and this is possible only if the term '*āsādayati*' signifies the *sacrifice*.—For this reason also the conclusion should be as above.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *At the Northern and the Southern Altars, the Performer shall be the same.*

SŪTRA (42).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"SO ALSO THERE IS DIVERSITY OF PERFORMERS."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the same subject, we proceed to consider the question —Are the Performers at the two altars to be different? Or the same?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*So also there is diversity of performers*; i.e. just as the subsidiaries are to be performed separately, [so also are the Performers to be different]; so that one set of performers should deal with the eight offerings with their subsidiaries at the Northern Altar, and another set at the Southern Altar. In this way the main sacrifices along with their respective subsidiaries would be performed in their own rightful places; and hence those performers who have been distinguished as having worked at the Northern Altar do not render any help at the Southern Altar; hence at this latter there should be an entirely different set of performers."

SŪTRA (43).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT SO; BECAUSE OF INHERENCE.

Bhāṣya.

It is not so; i.e. it is not right that like the subsidiaries, the Performers also should be separate; as a matter of fact, the Performers should be 'common'.—"Why?"—*Because of inherence*; it is by virtue of a direct declaration that the Performers come into the performance,—the declaration being 'The five Priests are the performers at the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifices'; even though this declaration connects the Performers with the sacrifice as a whole, the component parts also of the sacrifice become connected with the same Performers;—as regards the *Varuṇapraghāsa* sacrifices also, as they are the component parts of the *Chāturmāsya*, they also are accepted as connected with the same five Performers;—the performance of the several *Varuṇapraghāsa sacrifices* is to be treated as one only, because they all come in at one and the same time, and because they have the same beginning and end. —Such being the case, only that much of these should be done separately as is actually laid down as to be so done, nothing more than that; the Performers have not been laid down as to be different; hence they should be 'common'.

The following argument might be urged here—"When the main sacrifices have been declared to be different, the subsidiaries have to be regarded as different, even though this may not be declared in so many words.—Why?—Because the subsidiaries follow in the wake of their respective Principals;

so that, just as by reason of the *Prayājas* being different from the *offering to the Maruts*, they are performed separately,—in the same manner, by virtue of the Performers being 'subsidiaries', why cannot they be regarded as separate, like the *Prayājas* and other subsidiaries ?"

The answer to this is as follows :—Even though several things may be equally 'subsidiaries', yet the help rendered by one kind of subsidiaries may be totally different from that rendered by another kind ; for instance, (*a*) the subsidiaries of the kind of the *Prayājas* help through imparting an 'unseen' (transcendental) benefit ;—(*b*) those of the kind of the 'grass' help by serving as the receptacle of the sacrificial materials ;—(*c*) those of other kinds help by embellishing the receptacles. Thus these subsidiaries vary with variations in the Sacrifice, the Place and the Receptacles. As for *Performers*, they help by accomplishing the action ; hence, even though the Places be different, if the primary help rendered is recognised to be the same, they can accomplish the action (even at different places) 'in common', and hence they need not vary.

"What do you mean by 'Primary help' ?"

What is meant is as follows—(A) As for the *Hotṛ Priest*, he is called the 'Performer of the Sacrifice' by virtue of his sitting in front of the *Gārhapatya Fire* and behind the *Āhavanīya Fire* and invoking the *Adhvaryu* by reciting the *Yājyā* and *Anuvākyā Mantras* ; while he is still seated at the said place, he can very well invoke the *Pratiprasthātṛ* also, who, in his own turn, is officiating at the sacrifice, like the *Adhvaryu* ; and hence he need not be different in the two cases.—(B) Similarly, as the place of the *Utkara* is the same, the *Agnīdhra-Priest*, while seated at that same place, can help both the said performers by means of the '*Pratyāshrāvaṇa*' ('Reciting of certain texts) ; hence he also need not be different in the two cases.—(C) Similarly, the *Brahman-Priest* also, seated to the south,—which place is common to both the *Āhavanīya Fires*, the 'south' of the Northern Fire being the same as the 'South' of the Southern Fire,—can help both the said performers by seeing what is done and what is not done and addressing the words of 'permission' ; hence he also may remain the same.—As for the *Adhvaryu* and the *Pratiprasthatṛ*, they have been held to be different by virtue of the special declaration to that effect ; hence there is no incongruity in that.—From all this it follows that there need not be separate sets of Performers.

SŪTRA (44).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS TO THE SAME EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

There is also an indicative text pointing to the same conclusion—'He gives an old bull as the Sacrificial Fee' ; this shows that there is only one Fee ; and this is possible only when the Performer is one and the same. In another case, as there would be no Fee, they would not help in the sacrifice. "But they might help, on account of the gift of the *Anvāhārya*".—It is not understood where the *Anvāhārya* is to be given and where the Bull is to be given ; as a matter of fact, inasmuch as no difference is perceptible,

it should be the Bull in both cases. What is enjoined as to be secured must be taken as meant to be *one*,—if the word is used in the Singular Number (as it is in the present case, the *Fee* being spoken of as '*dakṣiṇām*'); hence the Fee is to be *one*, which means that the Performers should be 'common'.

SŪTRA (45).

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE PLATFORM"—IF THIS BE URGED —[then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

The following might be urged—"The presence of the Platform is found to be declared as the reason (for separate priests), in the text—'Within the platform the *Hotṛ's* foot is different from that outside the Platform'; the same foot of the *Hotṛ* cannot help in both places; hence there must be separate performers".

SŪTRA (46).

NOT SO; AS IT IS ONLY THE PLACE.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be as has been urged;—why?—because *it is only the place*; i.e. 'the Hotṛ's foot' has not been laid down here as helping the Platform; it is only the place, the exact spot, that is laid down,—meaning that the *Hotṛ* should stand on such a spot that one foot is on the Platform and the other outside the Platform.—"Why so?"—Because it is 'one sentence'; the whole of the text in question should be treated as 'one sentence', because this would be in keeping with proximity, and also because the whole really expresses a single idea. If the 'Hotṛ's foot' were enjoined as part and parcel of the Platform, then the placing of one foot on the Platform would have fulfilled the injunction; so that there would be no need for any restriction regarding the other foot.—"But it would be necessary to lay down the second foot also; how else could the second also be understood to be there by the mention of the '*one* on the Platform'?"—Because there is no incongruity; if it were known from any other source that both the feet should be *on the platform*, then the assertion of one being there would be preclusive of the other; there is however no such idea of both being *on the Platform*; hence there is just a possibility of the second also being there. Thus there is a syntactical split.—If, on the other hand, the text is taken as laying down a particular spot, then as this indication of the spot is done by both the feet jointly, the resultant idea is one only; and hence it becomes a case of 'one sentence'.—From all this it follows that the 'Hotṛ's foot' is not of help to the Platform, and hence it cannot be an object of injunction in both sentences.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *At the Northern and Southern Altars, the 'Aparāgnika-homas' should be performed separately.*

SŪTRA (47).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AS THEY ARE OFFERED IN ONE AND THE SAME FIRE, THE PERFORMANCE SHOULD BE 'IN COMMON' IN THE CASE OF OTHERS."

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the same matter of altars, we proceed to consider the following question—Are the *Aparāgnika-homas* to be performed *separately*? or 'in common'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—"The performance should be 'in common'.—Why?—*Because they are offered in one and the same Fire*; in the case of the *Paurvāgnika-homas*, it has been held that the performance should be separate, because of the diversity of the Fires; in the case in question however, that reason is not present, as all the *Homas* concerned are offered in one and the same Fire;—hence the performance of these should be 'in common'."

SŪTRA (48).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE PERFORMANCES SHOULD BE SEPARATE, AS THE PERFORMERS ARE DIFFERENT.

Bhāṣya.

There should be several separate performances.—"Why?"—Because *the performers are different*; the subsidiaries of the 'offering to the *Maruts*' are performed by the *Pratiprasthātṛ* priest, while the others are performed by the *Adhvaryu*;—under the circumstances, if they were performed 'in common' (which would mean that they are all performed by the same Priest), one or the other set would be performed by the wrong priest, and to that extent, the performance would be defective. Hence it follows that the performances should be separate.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *At the 'Vājapēya', the laying down of 'killing at the Brahmasāman' is not meant to preclude the rest of the Sacrificial Performance, —it is meant to postpone the further embellishments.*

SŪTRA (49).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN THE ANIMALS DEDICATED TO PRAJĀPATI HAVE BEEN LET LOOSE AFTER BEING 'WASHED', IT MEANS THE ABANDONING OF THE SACRIFICIAL PERFORMANCE, BECAUSE OF THE SIMILARITY OF WORDS, AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'ĀRAṆYA'; CONSEQUENTLY, THE SENTENCE BEGINNING WITH THE TERM, 'BRAHMASĀMNI' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS THE INJUNCTION OF A DISTINCT ACT."

Bhāṣya.

In reference to the 'Animals dedicated to *Prajāpati*' at the *Vājapēya* sacrifice, we read—'They let them loose after they have been washed;—one should kill the animal at the *Brahma-sāman*'.

The question that is going to be considered is—When it is said that 'they let them loose after they have been washed',—does this mean the preclusion of the rest of the Rites,—the sentence that follows, 'One should kill the animal at the *Brahma-sāman*', being the injunction of a totally different act? Or, is the first sentence meant to preclude only the *embellishments* (of the Animals), subsequent to the 'washing'—and the second sentence is meant to bring up those previously omitted embellishments again at a later time?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*It means the abandoning of the sacrificial performance*,—i.e. it is meant to preclude the rest of the rites,—*because of the similarity of words, as in the case of the 'āraṇya'*;—in the case of the text, 'They let loose the *wild* animals after they have been washed', it has been concluded under *Sūtra* 9. 4. 52 that it is meant to preclude the rest of the Rites;—and the words of the text under consideration are similar to those of that text.—'What is the *similarity* between these two texts?'—What is found in the case of that text is—(*a*) that certain actions have been enjoined in the text 'One sacrifices *Kapiñjala* birds to *Vasanta*',—(*b*) that at all those actions the details of the Archetype become admissible,—(*c*) that from among these archetypal details, those ending with 'washing' have been reasserted in the text 'They let them loose after they have been washed'; and as such a reassertion without any qualifications is preclusive in its character, it is concluded that it is meant to preclude the rest of the Rites;—

similarly in the case in question also, it is found—(a) that certain actions have been enjoined in the text 'Should sacrifice the animals dedicated to *Prajāpati*',—(b) that at all these actions, the archetypal details are admissible,—(c) that there is an unqualified reassertion of the details ending with 'washing'; which must be preclusive of the rest of the Rites.—Since this is so, therefore the text 'Should sacrifice at the *Brahma-sāman*' should be regarded as the injunction of an act distinct from the previous one,—this distinct act being the sacrificing, at the *Brahma-sāman*, of the seventeen animals dedicated to *Prajāpati* ?"

SŪTRA (50).

IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PRECLUDING THE EMBELLISHMENTS; AS THE SENTENCE BEING ONE, THE SACRIFICE MUST BE ONE AND THE SAME.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the text should not be taken as precluding the rest of the sacrificial performance; what is meant is that those embellishments which would normally come in after the 'washing' are put off for the time, and are to be brought in at the time of the *Brahma-sāman*'.—"Why so ?" —Because *the sentence being one, the sacrifice should be one and the same*;—i.e. the whole of the text—'They let them loose after they have been washed,—one should sacrifice at the *Brahma-sāman*'—is 'one sentence'.—"How do you know that ?"—In connection with the word 'sacrifice' (in the latter part of the text), we do not find the mention of any Substance or Deity [which must mean that the action spoken of by the term 'sacrifice' has for its substance and deity the same that have been mentioned in the earlier part of the text];—as a matter of fact, it is only when the *sacrifice* meant is one and the same that there can be such 'one sentence'; as it is in that case alone that the 'sacrificing' only has to be laid down, the Substance and the Deity having been already mentioned (in the preceding words).—In case the two were distinct sentences,—the first preceding the rest of the performance and the second enjoining another sacrifice,—then this would mean a syntactical split; and it would, in this case, be necessary to lay down (afresh) the Substance and the Deity.—As for the argument that "what has gone before would be connected with the second sentence",—the needs of the first sentence having been already satisfied, it could not be connected with the second sentence.—From this it follows that the two parts form 'one sentence'.—"But even if the sacrifice be one and the same, if the first part precluded the subsequent embellishments, and the second part enjoined the same, then the meanings being different, there would be syntactical split".—Not so; the mere assertion of the 'sacrificing at *Brahma-sāman*' implies the omission of what follows the *washing*; so that it does not need to be enjoined (by the first part); all that is done is that in reference to the said omission, the *sacrificing* alone is postponed; so that the fact of the *sacrifice* being one and the same does not involve a syntactical split at all.

SŪTRA (51).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS FOUND THAT THERE IS NO 'POURING' OF THE FAT.

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Savyā vā ētarhi vapā yadanabhighṛtā, brahma vai brahmasāma, yat brahmasāmni ālabhatē, tēnāsavyāstēnābhighṛtā*'; [where 'the non-pouring of the fat' has been spoken of].—If the first sentence in question were preclusive of the subsequent embellishments, then alone it would so happen that the *Juhū* vessel having been emptied by the *Savanīya offering*, there would be no 'remnant of the *Prayājas*',—so that in this case alone would 'non-pouring' be possible. If, on the other hand, the said sentence were preclusive of the rest of the performance, then 'the sacrificing at *Brahmasāman*' would be a distinct act; at which the *Prayājas* are performed over again; of which the 'remnant' would be there, with which the 'pouring' could be done; so that the mention of 'non-pouring' would be inexplicable in that case.—For this reason also the sentence should be taken as precluding the subsequent embellishments.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *At the 'Ahīna', the 'letting loose of the Bulls' is meant to be preclusive of the rest of the Performance.*

Bhāṣya.

There is an '*Ahīna*' sacrifice named '*Pañchashāradīya*', laid down in the text—'*Mārutīyaḥ pañchashāradīyo, yaḥ kāmayēt bahu syāmiti sa ētēna yajēta*' ['There is the *Pañchashārādīya* sacrifice to the *Maruts*; one who is desirous of becoming many should perform this sacrifice'];—in connection with this sacrifice we have the following declarations—(*a*) '*Vaishākhyāmavāsyāyām saptadasha mārutīstrivatsā apravītā upākaroti*'; (*b*) '*Saptadasha prashnīn ukṣṇaḥ tān paryagnikṛtān prokṣitānitarā ālabhantē prētarānutsṛjanti*'; (*c*) '*Tataḥ samvatsarē rājīvā ānayanti tānshchaivokṣṇaḥ tān paryagnikṛtānītarā ālabhantē prētarānutsṛjanti*'.

[The *Pañchashāradīya* sacrifice is completed in five years; during the first year, the sacrifice is performed on that Moonless Day on which the asterism of *Vishākhā* falls; at this the animals dealt with are seventeen young female animals and seventeen bulls;—after all these have been washed and besprinkled, the female animals are laid down as to be killed and the bulls as to be let loose; the same process is repeated during the second, third and fourth years;—then comes the declaration that three animals having been killed on each day, five should be killed on the last day.]

In regard to the 'letting loose' of the Bulls, there arises the same question as above—Is the 'letting loose' meant to preclude the rest of the sacrificial performance, as in the case of the '*Āraṇya*'? Or is it meant to preclude only the subsequent embellishments for the time being,—being taken up again at the *Sutyās*, this resuming being laid down in the last sentence, 'They kill three bulls on each day and five on the last day'?—If it is meant to be preclusive of the rest of the performance, then, each year, fresh bulls would have to be brought in; if, on the other hand, it is meant to preclude only the embellishments, then, the same bulls would be kept for five years, being 'embellished' again and again, and being sacrificed only at the final *Sūtyas*.

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—

SŪTRA (52).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE SAME SHOULD BE THE CASE WITH THE PAÑCHASHĀRADĪYA SACRIFICES."

Bhāṣya.

"If you wish to know how the *Pañchashāradīya* sacrifices are to be dealt with, the answer is that *the same should be the case with the Pañchashāradīya sacrifices*; i.e. they should be regarded as the *Prājapatya offerings*

(have been regarded in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*); i.e. the 'letting loose' should be taken as precluding the embellishments; as in this way, the idea is in keeping with the context; otherwise, the idea of the context would be abandoned and an entirely foreign conception brought in. It is only thus too that the expression '*tānshchaiva ukṣṇaḥ*' ('those same bulls'), which refers to the bulls previously mentioned in the same context, becomes understandable; as also the laying down of the expiatory Rite—'If the Bull happen to be lame (*Kuṭa* ?), or one-eyed, one should offer cooked rice to *Bṛhaspati*; if it should fall down, one should offer cooked rice to *Vāyu*; if it should die, one should offer cooked rice to *Nirṛti*'; these contingencies can come about only when the animals are kept (year after year, not if fresh ones are brought in every year).—From all this it follows that the 'letting loose' of the Bulls is to be treated as precluding the embellishments."

SŪTRA (53).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT SO; BECAUSE IT FORMS 'ONE SENTENCE' WITH THE INJUNCTION.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the 'letting loose' of the Bulls is preclusive of the embellishments; as a matter of fact, it precludes the rest of the performance itself—Why?—*Because it forms 'one sentence' with the Injunction*;—the Injunction of the sacrifice in question is—'*Saptadasha mārutīḥ pṛshnīḥ upākaroti*' [which lays down the sacrifice of seventeen young she-animals to *Maruts*]; it is this text that contains the mention of the substance as well as the Deity;—with this injunction, the sentence '*saptadasha pṛshnin-ukṣṇaḥ*' ('seventeen young bulls') forms 'one sentence', and is syntactically connected.—"How do you know that?"—The sentence 'seventeen young bulls' is incomplete (having no verb), and it is completed with the help of the preceding injunction, which supplies the missing words '*mārutānāla-bhatē*' [thus completing the sentence 'Sacrifices seventeen young bulls to *Maruts*'].

"This would be a clear case of '*anuṣaṅga*' (supplying of ellipsis); and in that case there are two distinct independent sentences;—how then can it be said that 'it forms *one sentence* with the Injunction'?

Answer—If the former sentence is supplementary to the latter, then it involves an '*anuṣaṅga*',—while if the second sentence is supplementary to the former, then it is a case of 'one sentence'; as a matter of fact, we shall take the second sentence as supplementary to the former; the right course is that the second sentence should be regarded as supplementary to the former sentence,—not the former as supplementary to the latter. If the second is supplementary to the first sentence, then all that is needed is the *inter-dependence* of the two sentences; while in the other case, it would be necessary to assume this *interdependence*, as also the *Anuṣaṅga* (supplying of the ellipsis); and there would be a connection with what is expressed by the

particle '*cha*', the meaning being—'Sacrifice seventeen young female animals to *Maruts, and also* seventeen young bulls'. It is not necessary however to add the signification of the particle '*cha*'; as the fact of the two being taken together is secured by the combination of the two sentences. —The upshot of all this therefore is that there is only 'one sentence' in the case, laying down thirty-four actions,—seventeen of these being let off after the *washing*, and the other seventeen being dealt with as at the archetypal sacrifice.—Similarly with the subsequent injunctions.—When once the animals have been let off, it is not right that they should be used again in another performance; firstly because the performer has no longer any proprietary right over them, and also because they will have become stale.—From all this it follows that, as in the case of the '*āraṇya*' (wild) animals, so here also, the sentence should be taken as precluding the rest of the performance.

Under the circumstances, there should be a different set of Bulls each succeeding year; so that there being no previous bulls there, there would be no 'abandoning of what is related to the context';—as for the expiatory Rite, it would fall due prior to the 'letting off' of the embellished Bulls. The declaration of dependence also would be in reference to other similar Bulls 'young' and 'dedicated to Maruts',—the previous bulls not being there;—just as in the case of such expressions as '*Tāmēva yavāgūm tryaham pibati, tānyēva auṣadhāni, sa ēva tittiriḥ*'.

SŪTRA (54).

ALSO BECAUSE THE EMBELLISHMENTS ARE FOUND MENTIONED.

Bhāṣya.

The following text shows that the embellishments are to be performed every year—'*Tān prayagnikṛtān prokṣitān itarā ālabhantē pretarānutsṛjanti*'.—"This might be a mere description".—Not so; in that case there would be syntactical split—the two statements being 'Performs the washing' and 'Lets off those that have been washed'.—Further, the *washing* of the 'she-calves' and the 'bulls' have been spoken of simultaneously; as regards the she-calves, there would be only *reference*, as it is already known from other sources, while, as regards the others (the Bulls), it would be *enjoined*, as it is not known from other sources.—This however cannot be right; while the embellishments are there, both these are impossible; over the sacrifice one has perfect right; hence in both cases there should be sacrifices.

Adhikaraṇa (13): *The 'Abhiṣēchanīya' and the 'Dashapēya' should be performed separately.*

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Rājasūya*, two *Ēkāha* sacrifices are performed—the *Abhiṣēchanīya* and the *Dashapēya*.

In regard to this we proceed to consider the question—Are these to be performed 'in common' or separately ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—

SŪTRA (55).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*continued*]—"At the 'Dashapēya', as there is 'anticipation' of the Purchase, there should be 'anticipation' of all that precedes it; hence the performance of these should be 'in common'."

Bhāṣya.

"Of these two, the subsidiaries should be performed 'in common'.—Why ?—Because the 'Purchase' connected with the *Dashapēya* is 'anticipated', as laid down in the text 'For the *Dashapēya* and the *Abhiṣēchanīya*, one purchases the *Soma* together at the same time'; as a matter of fact, the *Abhiṣēchanīya* comes before the *Dashapēya*; hence if the Purchase of the *Soma* for both is done at the time of the *Abhiṣēchanīya*, it means the 'anticipation' of the Purchase connected with the *Dashapēya*. The 'anticipation' of the *Purchase* leads to the 'anticipation' of all those details that go before the *Purchase*, according to the principle evolved under *Sūtra* 5. 1. 24. From this it is clear that the performance of these two *Ēkāha* sacrifices is begun 'in common'; and when they have commenced 'in common', it is only right that their completion also should be 'in common'. Hence we conclude that the performance of the two sacrifices should be 'in common'."

SŪTRA (56).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*concluded*]—"The declaration of similarity points to the same conclusion."

Bhāṣya.

"There is the declaration to the effect that—'The two sacrifices, the *Dashapēya* and the *Abhiṣēchanīya* are similar'; and the *similarity* of the sacrifices can only be due to the similarity of their *procedure*; as by themselves they are distinct."

SŪTRA (57).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE IS NO 'ANTICIPATION', BECAUSE IT IS ON ACCOUNT OF THE SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS THAT THE TWO ARE LAID DOWN AS TO BE DONE TOGETHER.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, there is no 'anticipation' of the Purchase at all.—Why ?—*Because it is on account of the special requirements*; i.e. one Purchase is prompted by the actual requirements, while the other is done only because it is so laid down. In connection with the *purchasing of Soma* which is done before the performance of the sacrifice begins, there are the following details :—At the time of securing the accessories of the sacrifice, there is a conversation between the sacrificer and the *Soma-vendor*,—the determining of the price of the *Soma* and the buying of it ; from the very nature of these details, it is absolutely necessary to perform them ; for, if all this were not done, it would not be right to undertake the performance of the sacrifice at all.—"Why ?"—Because in that case it is just possible that at the time of the actual performance there may be no *Soma* at all ;—or the Vendor may not agree to give it at the price offered ; so that in that case the sacrifice could not be performed.—It is for this reason that it has been laid down that all this should be done together, at one and the same time (for both the sacrifices in question).—"Why so ?"—Because this first Purchase is the main purchase,—it having been nearly completed at that time, the payment of the price only remaining to be done.—As for the other details—such as the pronouncing of the *Mantra* '*Kalayā tē krīṇāmi*' and so forth,—these are mere details ; specially as the Vendor is not an independent agent. Such being the case, if the Purchase were done at different times, the subsidiaries also would be performed at those same times.—In the conversation held between the Vendor and the Purchaser, the root '*Krī*' has been used in the sense of *purchasing*; as is also found in such ordinary expressions as '*Dēvadattēna saha asmābhiḥ dhānyam krītam*' ['Paddy has been purchased by us along with Devadatta'], where the transaction has been completed and hence a reference is made to it.—All this is outside the pale of the sacrifice.—Hence there can be no 'anticipation' (of the Purchase); it has to be performed separately at its own proper time in both cases.

SŪTRA (58).

ALSO BECAUSE THE 'AVABHṚTHA' IS FOUND IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORMER (OF THE TWO SACRIFICES).

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, we find the *Avabhṛtha* mentioned in connection with the 'former'—i.e. with the *Abhiṣēchaniya*,—in the following text—'*Samānam vai ētad yajñam vichchhindanti yadabhiṣēchanīyasyāvabhṛthamabhyava-*

yanti ' [' If they separate the *Avabhṛtha* from the *Abhiṣechanīya*, they disturb the even tenor of the sacrifice ']; this connection between the *Avabhṛtha* and the *Abhiṣēchanīya* is possible only if there are separate performances; otherwise, the *Avabhṛtha* would have to be performed at the end of the *Dashapēya*.

SŪTRA (59).

THE INITIATIONS ALSO ARE FOUND CONNECTED WITH THE LATTER (OF THE TWO SACRIFICES).

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Dashapēya* also, we find the Initiations mentioned separately; it being declared that 'they should increase the number of Initiations at the *Abhiṣēchanīya*, so that on the tenth day the *Dashapēya* becomes accomplished; at which the *Soma* is purchased at the same time and the *Initiation is done at the same time* '.—If the two were not performed separately, then the Initiations of the *Dashapēya* would be done at the *Abhiṣēchanīya* also; and in that case the said declaration would not be compatible.

As for the argument urged (in Sū. 56) that—" The declaration of similarity points to the same conclusion ",—our answer to that is as follows:—

SŪTRA (60).

THEY ARE 'SIMILAR' BY REASON OF THE TIME BEING THE SAME.

Bhāṣya.

The two *Soma-sacrifices* are performed during the same season; so that after one year it is in reference to this *sameness of time* that there is the declaration of 'similarity' with regard to the latter of the two. Such a declaration would have no sense if the performances were not separate.—From all this it follows that the two sacrifices in question should be performed separately.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *In the text 'Vāruṇyā niṣkāsēna tuṣaishchāvabhṛthamabhyavayanti', the 'Avabhṛtha' is laid down as a distinct sacrifice.*

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Varuṇapraghāsa* sacrifices, we read—'*Vāruṇyā niṣkāsēna tuṣaishchāvabhṛthamabhyavayanti*' ['They proceed to the *Avabhṛtha* with the *smearings of the Vāruṇī* and the Chaff'].

[At the *Varuṇa-praghāsa*, the eighth substance is this 'Curdled Milk for Varuṇa' this substance along with the Ram made of barley-flour having been offered, they offer the ninth substance, a cake baked on one pan; then they perform the *Avabhṛtha* with the smearings left in the vessel that contained the Curdled Milk, as also the Chaff of the barley of whose flour the Ram had been made.]

In regard to this, we proceed to consider the following question—Does this mean the postponement of the previously-mentioned offering? Or the injunction of a distinct act?

SŪTRA (61).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" AT THE AVABHṚTHA,—INASMUCH AS THE 'SMEARINGS' ARE PART OF IT, THERE SHOULD BE 'ANTICIPATION' OF THE OFFERING, AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'ANIMAL'."

Bhāṣya.

"This is a case of '*anticipation*' *of the offering*;—why?—*because it is a part of it*; the *Curdled Milk* has been laid down as to be offered to *Varuṇa*, in the text—'Curdled Milk is for the *Maruts*; *Curdled Milk is for Varuna*';—this Curdled Milk is found to be offered to Varuṇa on two occasions—one part of it is offered in place of the *Āvāpa*, and another part, after the *Samiṣṭa-yajuṣ*;—in both cases the deity is *Varuṇa*;—hence it follows that there should be 'anticipation' of the offering;—*as in the case of the 'Animal'*; i.e. out of the *Savanīya* animal, 'they offer the fat at the morning extraction, the cake at midday and the limbs at the evening extraction.' 'What is the use of introducing the term, *Avabhṛtha* at all (in the *Sutra*)?'—It is a merely—a figurative reference,—on the basis of the place and the deity being the same (in the case of the '*Avabhṛtha* and the *offering to Varuṇa in question*).—'Why cannot the term be treated as transferring the details (of the *Avabhṛtha* to the *offering to Varuṇa*),—like the term '*agnihotra*' (see 7. 3. 1.)?'—Because it cannot be so taken; it is not possible for one and the same sentence to lay down '*anticipation*' *of the offering* and also the *transference of details*; in fact, after having laid down *the anticipation of the offering*, it has no capacity left for laying down the *transference of details*."

SŪTRA (62).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE SEPARATION; BECAUSE OF CONNECTION WITH A WELL-KNOWN NAME.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, there should be no '*anticipation*' *of the offering*; what is meant is the *separation*—of the *smearings*; and the action laid down in the text is an entirely different one.—"Why?"—*Because of connection with a well-known name*;—i.e. because of connection with the well-known name '*avabhṛtha*', in the sentence '*Niṣkāsēnāvabhṛthamabhyavayanti*'.—"It has been already explained that the use of the name is only figurative, for the purposes of *reference*".—If it were a mere *reference*, then it would not prompt any activity and hence it would be useless; while, if it transfers the details, then it serves a distinctly useful purpose.—"But even in that case the use of the term would be figurative".—Yes; but even a figurative term, if prompting activity, serves a useful purpose; just as such figurative expressions as—'*agnau tiṣṭhati*' ['stands in fire'], '*avaṭē tiṣṭhati*' ['stands in the pit'].—"But such usage involves the incongruity of a term having several significations".—There is no such incongruity in the case of the term laying down an entirely new action; just as in the case of the text, '*Ētasyaiva rēvatīṣu vāravantīyamagniṣṭomasāma kṛtvā pashukāmo hyētēna yajēta*'.—"But how can the text in question lay down an entirely new action?"—The answer to this is as follows:—What is declared in the text is that 'they proceed to the *Avabhṛtha* with the smearings of the curdled milk offered to *Varuṇa* and with the Chaff';—as a matter of fact, however, it is not possible for the *Avabhṛtha* to be 'proceeded to';—hence the meaning is understood to be that 'with a view to performing the *Avabhṛtha* with the *smearings* and the *Chaff*, they *proceed to the water*'; this being analogous to such assertions as 'with a view to making a cloth, they weave the yarns'.—the same idea might be said to be indicated indirectly (figuratively); like such assertions as 'those who knowing this *proceed to* the *sattra*' [where also 'proceed' stands for 'perform'].

SŪTRA (63).

IF IT IS URGED THAT "IT MAY BE AN ACT OF DISPOSAL",—THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF ACTION.

Bhāṣya.

It might be argued that—"Inasmuch as the *smearing* is only the remnant of what has been offered at another sacrifice, the 'proceeding to *Avabhṛtha*' may be regarded as merely an act of *Disposal*".

That cannot be.—"Why?"—*Because of the presence of action*; i.e. we find the substance spoken of as connected with a positive (fruitful) action, as is clear from the use of the Instrumental Ending (in '*niṣkāsēna*'); if it were a mere Disposal, this would have been signified by the use of the Accusative

Ending, because in that case, the *substance*, not the *action*, would be the predominant factor ; as is found in the case of the text '*Chātvālē kṛṣṇaviṣāṇām prāsyati*' ['Throws the Black Horn on the dust-heap'].

Or the term ['*Karmasamyogāt*' in the sūtra] may be taken to mean *connection with action, through the term* '*avabhṛtha*' ; if it were an act of Disposal, then the term '*avabhṛtha*' would be meaningless ; because the only purpose that this term could serve is to transfer the details of the *Avabhṛtha sacrifice* ;—but it is not possible to transfer the Details of a positive primary sacrifice to a mere *Disposal* ; as there is no similarity between the two.—In that case the only meaning possible would be 'One disposes of the substance by the *Avabhṛtha*' ;—as a matter of fact, however, there is nothing that has been 'disposed of' by the *Avabhṛtha*, which could be transferred.

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *The 'Udayanīya-offering' out of the 'Prāyaṇīya-smearings' is a positive act by itself to which the 'smearings' is subsidiary.*

SŪTRA (64).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"THE CASE OF THE UDAYANĪYA ALSO IS TO BE TREATED LIKE THAT."

Bhāṣya.

"In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read —'Out of the *Prāyaṇīya*-smearings one offers the *Udayanīya*."

[The question being as before]—there is the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"As in the case of the *Avabhṛtha*, so here also, the *smearings* should be treated as the accessory detail; as here also there is connection with a primary act of the name of *Udayanīya*,—in the text 'out of the smearings of the *Prāyaṇīya* one offers the *Udayanīya*';—the *Udayanīya* however cannot be offered; so here also, it is only the relationship (connection) that is laid down;—the meaning being that 'He makes up the offering material out of the smearings of the *Prāyaṇīya*, for the purpose of performing the *Udayanīya*';—or it may be taken figuratively, as before.—Further, the presence of the Accusative Ending indicates the predominance of the *action*, and the Locative Ending in '*niṣkāsē*' indicates the subordinate character of the *smearings* (*niṣkāsa*). If it were an act of Disposal, the *action* would be the subordinate and the *smearings*, the predominant factor; and in that case the *action* would be connected with the Instrumental Ending and the *smearings* with the Accusative Ending.—'The Locative is used also in connection with the predominant factor; for instance, in such expressions as *Svāgārē gāvo vāsyantām, prāvārē kusumāni*'.—Such is the case when the substance has been already known, from other sources, as the predominant factor; in a case however where the matter is amenable to verbal authority only, the substance can be regarded as the subordinate factor; because these endings are case-endings expressive of active agencies, and active agencies are subservient to actions, because they are well-established entities,—and when entities *already established* are spoken of along with those *to be accomplished*, the former are subservient to the latter; on the ground that they serve a visible purpose; if *what is to be accomplished* were taken as subservient to a *well-established entity*, it would be necessary to assume a transcendental purpose served by it;—but while a visible purpose is possible, there can be no justification for assuming a transcendental purpose."

SŪTRA (65).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—" OR, IT MAY BE AN ACT OF DISPOSAL; AS THERE IS NO CONNECTION WITH THE ACTION."

Bhāṣya.

" Or, the *Udayanīya* may be regarded as an act of Disposal; the *smearings* being the subordinate factor.—Why so ?—Because *there is no connection with action*; i.e. the 'smearings' has no connection with the *Udayanīya-offering*; in fact, the 'smearings' is connected with the *Nirvāpa* '*offering*,' as is clear from the words '*niṣkāsē nirvapati*'.—'Inasmuch as the *Udayanīya* is the most important factor in the context, the right thing is to connect the *smearings* with that'.—Not so; if it is connected with the predominant factor, then it remains incomplete,—as to what is it that the *Udayanīya* does to the *smearings*. This information has to be supplied by the word '*nirvapayitavyam*' ('should be offered'), the complete idea thus obtained being 'one offers the *Udayanīya*'; and it has been already pointed out that the *Udayanīya* has no connection with the *smearings*. We are forced therefore to adopt the construction which gives the sense that 'for the purpose of performing the *Udayanīya* one secures the offering-material in the *smearings* of the *Prāyaṇīya*'. The 'smearings' too is a remnant of the *Prāyaṇīya*-offering; in fact, the very term '*niṣkāsa*' ('smearings') is denotative of the *remnant*; it stands for that substance which has been left smeared in the *Ukhā*-vessel;—an act of 'Disposal' consists in the using of the remnant for some other purpose; and such an act becomes a part and parcel of the main act, and as such, must have its connection with the main sacrifice duly *perceived*—or *inferred*, if it is an *indirectly* helpful accessory; the Locative Ending also has been found to be used in the sense of predominance.—From all this it follows that the act in question is one of Disposal.—' But even so, it should be treated as the injunction of a distinct act, as in the case of the *Avabhṛtha*'.—It might be so, if the act had not been already enjoined (elsewhere); as a matter of fact however, the *Udayanīya* has been already enjoined in the text—'*Ādityaḥ prāyaṇīyashcharurbhavati āditya udayanīyo dishām prajñātyai*'; and it is recognised that it is for the performance of this *Udayanīya* that the 'smearings of the *Prāyaṇīya*' come to be offered.—From all this it follows that the text in question cannot be taken as the injunction of a distinct act."

SŪTRA (66).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT MUST BE A POSITIVELY FRUITFUL ACT,—BECAUSE THE THING IS AN AUXILIARY, BEING ENJOINED BY A TERM EXPRESSING THAT IDEA; LIKE THE ACT OF 'SHRAYAṆA'.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the 'offering of the smearings' should be treated as a positively fruitful act,—not as an act of 'Disposal'.—" Why ?"—

Because the thing is an auxiliary; the 'smearings' is an auxiliary to—a subsidiary detail of—the 'offering'.—"How do you know that?"—Because *it has been enjoined by a term expressing that idea*; i.e. because it has been enjoined by a term—i.e. the Locative Ending—which is expressive of that idea;—the Locative Ending is used in the sense of the receptacle; and the *receptacle* of the action and the agencies conducive to that action is that which operates in the way of *holding* (containing) them; hence it must be auxiliary (subservient) to it.—"As a matter of fact, the *smearings* cannot *hold* or contain anything; the *containing* is done by the *Dish*".—This case is to be taken as similar to that of the *Cooking Pot*; the *Cooking Pot* contains the *Rice* and the *Ground* contains the Pot; and yet the Pot does not cease to be the *container*.—It might be argued that the *smearings* do not render any visible help.—But the same may be said of the Cooking Pot also.—Then again, the offering-substances serve the useful purpose of accomplishing the *Udayanīya*; if then, these substances are embellished by the *smearings*, then the *smearings* also serve a useful purpose. If, on the other hand, it is the *smearings* itself that is embellished, and no other purpose is served by it, then it would do nothing.—"But that also has accomplished the *Prāyaṇīya* offering, and the embellishment done for that purpose would certainly serve a useful purpose."—Not so; because the embellishment of *what is being used* is superior to the embellishment of *what has been used*.

Further, if this were an embellishment of the *smearings*, and as such a part of the *Prāyaṇīya*,—then this would militate against its proximity to the *Udayanīya*.—From all this it follows that through its connection with the *smearings*, the act in question renders an invisible help to the offering-substances used at the *Udayanīya*;—*as in the case of the 'Shrayaṇa'*; just as in the case of the declaration—'*Payasā maitravaruṇam shrīṇāti, dhānābhirhāriyojanam*'—the act of '*shrayaṇa*' renders help to the *Soma-sacrifice*.

End of Pāda ii of Adhyāya XI.

ADHYĀYA XI.

PĀDA III.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *Such details as the 'Making of the Platform' may be done at a time other than the time of the Principal Sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (1).

INASMUCH AS SUBSIDIARIES ARE PERFORMED AT THE SAME TIME AS THE PRINCIPAL, THEY MAY BE PERFORMED AT ANOTHER TIME WHEREVER THERE IS A DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

Under *Sūtra* 11. 2. 7, it has been explained that the subsidiaries are to be performed at the same time, at the same place and by the same performers as their Principals. This is what is recognised as to be done everywhere. But *wherever there is* a declaration to that effect, *they may be performed at another time*; i.e. wherever there is a declaration to that effect, they may be performed at another time, at another place and by other performers; e.g. (*a*) 'At the *Darsha* sacrifice, one makes the platform *on the previous day*', (*b*) 'They perform the *Avabhṛtha* in *water*', (*c*) at the *Agnī* sacrifice, in the *Sautrāmaṇī*, there are distinct sacrificial fees prescribed—in the form of a *Mare* (*Baḍavā*)—; which shows that the performer is different.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The Ādhāna, 'Fire-installation', is to be performed 'in common'.*

SŪTRA (2).

INASMUCH AS THE THING IS BROUGHT ABOUT AT A TIME OTHER THAN THAT OF THE SACRIFICIAL PERFORMANCES, THE OPERATION SHOULD BE TAKEN AS APPERTAINING TO ALL; AS IT HAS ITS OWN TIME.

Bhāṣya.

We find the *Ādhāna*, Fire-installation, laid down in the text—'The *Brāhmaṇa* should install the Fire in spring,—the *Kṣathriya* in the summer, and the *Vaishya* in the autumn';—and it is an acknowledged fact that this Rite is for the purpose of performing sacrifices.—"Why so?"—Because it has no result of its own; the use of the Fires installed lying in such actions as 'the offering of oblations into the *Āhavanīya* Fire', 'the Cooking of offering materials in the *Gārhapatya Fire*', 'the Cooking of the *Anvāhārya*, etc. in the *Dakṣiṇāgni Fire*'.

In regard to this, we proceed to consider the question—Is this *Fire-installation* to be done separately for the purposes of every sacrifice that one may be going to perform?—Or should it be done once only 'in common', for the purpose of all kinds of sacrifices that one may have to perform——*Iṣṭis, Animal-sacrifices, Soma-sacrifices, and Darvihomas*?

The only rational view (*Siddhānta*) is as follows:—*Inasmuch as the thing*—Fire—*is brought about at a time other than that of the Sacrificial Performance*,—such, for instance, as 'spring', 'summer' and 'autumn',—*the operation*,—of *installation—should be taken as appertaining to all*.—"Why?" —Because *it has its own time*; the Fire-installation has its own distinct time, in the shape of *spring* and the rest; and it has not been laid down as to be performed at the time of any particular sacrifice; hence there can be no such discrimination as that 'the Installation is for the purposes of this sacrifice, not for those of this other'; and when there is no such discrimination possible, the only right conclusion is that the Installation should be regarded as 'common' to all sacrifices.

"There is this discrimination possible that the Fire-installation is for the purpose of that particular sacrifice which is the first to be performed after it."

Certainly this discrimination is possible; but mere *immediate sequence* cannot be a reason (for connecting the one with the other); because, even if the *Fire-installation* were for the purposes of all sacrifices, its performance must come before some one sacrifice, as simultaneity is not possible. So that 'immediate sequence to some one sacrifice' is a reason that would be applicable to both the conclusions—that 'the Installation is for the pur-

poses of all sacrifices' and that 'it is for the purposes of the one sacrifice only';—and being equally applicable to both, it cannot be regarded as a sound reason.

Then again, it is not with the *Installation* of Fire that sacrifices are begun; in fact, they are begun with the *Fetching* of Fire; in case they did begin with the *Installation*, then it might be regarded as the beginning of that particular sacrifice which would have been begun with it,—and not of any other sacrifice; as the one sacrifice would have come in between the two (the Installation and the other sacrifices);—and with the finishing of that one sacrifice, the Installation also would come to an end,—just like the Fetching. As a matter of fact, however, no sacrifice is begun with the Installation; as at the time of the Installation the time of the sacrifice has not arrived; all the texts laying down the sacrifices pertaining to times later than that of the Installation.

"What is it then that is done by means of the Installation?"

The substance, in the shape of the particular Fire, is secured; just as one would secure Iron or Gold, with the view that 'when I have my own Iron or Gold, I shall do with it anything that may present itself', and then in time, he makes (out of the iron) the things he requires, such as the *Axe* and the like;—similarly in the case in question; the man secures the Fire with the view that 'when I have got my own Fire, I shall perform with it any sacrifice that may present itself'. There is no ground for making any such discrimination as that 'it is for the purpose of this, and not for that of the other'; and as a matter of fact, it is fit for being used for the purpose of all sacrifices. Hence it follows that the *Installation* is for the purpose of all sacrifices.

Then again, these several kinds of sacrifices,—*Essential* (compulsory), *Prospective* and *Contingent*,—have their respective times according to circumstances; all these have need of the Fire installed in the *spring*; it is not possible, during any other season, to install the Fire 'in the spring'; this 'want of connection' (incongruity) would be there if the Installation were done separately for each particular sacrifice. If, on the other hand, the Installation is for the purposes of all sacrifices and hence 'common', then there is no such incongruity.—For this reason also the Installation should be 'in common' for all sacrifices.

Adhikaraṇa (3): *In connection with the 'Agnīṣomīya' and other sacrifices, the 'Post' is set up 'in common' for all.*

SŪTRA (3).

The Post also; as it is not set up at the time of the sacrifice.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there are three animal-sacrifices —*Agnīṣomīya*, *Savanīya* and *Anubandhya*;—in connection with these, there is the *Post*, laid down in such texts as—'He ties the animal to the Post of *Khadira*-wood', 'He ties it to the Post of *Palāsha*-wood', 'He ties it to the Post of *Rohitaka*-wood'.

In regard to this, we proceed to consider the question—Is the *Post* to be set up separately for the tying of each of the three Animals? Or is it to be set up 'in common' for all?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"It should be set up separately;—why?—because in the *Agnīṣomīya*, the *Post* is included by the declaration of its procedure; so that, according to the General Law, it should have to be set up at the other two animal-sacrifices also; because the declarations of procedure are complete with each particular sacrifice, and hence indicate the setting up of the Post separately for each such sacrifice. Consequently, the Post should be set up separately."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*The Post also* should be set up 'in common',—*because it is not set up at the time of the sacrifice*; as a matter of fact, the Post is not set up at the time of the performance of the animal-sacrifice; it is set up at a different time, as laid down in the text—'He cuts out the Post during the Initiations, or after the purchase of the *Soma*'. When it is set up at that time, there is no reason for making any discrimination, such as—'it is for the tying of this animal, not for that'; while it is possible for all the three animals to be tied to it. Hence it should be regarded as serving the purposes of all the three animals.

SŪTRA (4).

Also there is a text indicating that there is only one Post.

Bhāṣya.

There is a text which shows that there is only one Post pertaining in common to all the three animals;—in connection with the *Savanīya* animal, it is said—'*Trivṛtā yūpam parivīya*', which lays down the encircling of the Post with a threefold thread;—if there were several Posts, then, inasmuch as the previous Post will have served its purpose (in connection with the first

sacrifice of the *Agniṣomiya*),—the said Post would come into the second (*Savanīya*) animal, under the General Law, and there would be no need for separately laying down the 'encircling with the threefold thread'. If, on the other hand, the Post is *common* to all the three, then its embellishments also would be 'common', so that the 'encircling' done in connection with the *Agniṣomiya* animal would have served its purpose in that connection, and that same 'encircling' would not be admissible at the *Savaniya*; consequently it becomes necessary to enjoin it; and this is what is done.—For this reason also the Post is 'common'.

Adhikaraṇa (4): *The Embellishments of the Post are performed 'in common'.*

SŪTRA (5).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The Embellishments however should be repeated; because they are done at the time of its use."

Bhāṣya.

There are certain embellishments of the Post done in course of the performance of the animal-sacrifices,—such as, *Besprinkling, Anointing, Setting-up,* and *Encircling.*

In regard to these, we proceed to consider the question—Are these embellishments to be done separately with each of the animals? or 'in common'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*The embellishments—of the Post—should be repeated,*—and they should not be treated as to be done once only 'in common', like the Post itself.—Why so?—*Because they are done at the time of its use*; the 'use' is the tying of the animal; and it is at the time of this *Tying* that the embellishments in question are done;—and there is this ground for the differentiation that the embellishments are for the purpose of that animal, at the time of whose *tying* they have been done; and as the time for the other two animals has not yet arrived, the embellishments could not be performed for the sake of the latter two animals.—From this it follows that the embellishments should be repeated (with each animal), just like the '*Sammārjana*' of the Fire."

SŪTRA (6).

[Siddhānta]—As a matter of fact, they have their own time, as they have the Post for their objective; and they have been enjoined for the Post; in the case of all things, another time is adopted only when there is a declaration to that effect.

Bhāṣya.

The embellishments would truly have to be repeated if they were performed at the time of use. As a matter of fact however, *they have their own time*, i.e. they are performed at the time of the Initiation.—How do you know this?—*Because they have the Post for their objective*; the embellishments are not meant for bringing about the *use*, it is the *Post* that is brought about by them; and it is the *Post* that is for the purpose of the *use*. This Post has to be brought about at the time of the Initiations, according to the text—'One cuts out

the Post during the Initiations' ;—and it is by means of the embellishments that the Post is brought about or prepared ;—hence the embellishments are to be performed at the time of the Initiations.

"It is only the *cutting* of the Post, not the *making* of it, that has been declared as to be done *during the Initiations*."

Answer—There is no worldly object named 'Post', of which the *cutting* is laid down in the text ; hence what we learn from the text is that 'by the acts of *cutting* and the rest one *makes* the Post, during the Initiations' ;—the 'cutting' alone has been mentioned because it is the principal act in the process of Post-making,—and it has been mentioned only by way of indication ; that it is so is clear from the fact that mere 'cutting' does not make the thing a 'Post'.

Such being the case, it is clear that the embellishments are done during the time of the Initiations.

In the case of all things it is only when there is a declaration to that effect, that another time is adopted ; as for instance, in the case of such declarations as 'After the offering to *Agni-Maruts*, they perform the *Anuyājas*'.

From all this it follows that like the *Post* itself, its embellishments also should be regarded as 'common'.

There is another explanation of the expression '*Yūpakarmatvāt*' (in the *Sūtra*):—The embellishments of *cutting*, etc. form part of the process of *making the Post* ; i.e. it is the Post that is made by the process of Planing and the rest, just as the '*Samrāt*' (supreme sovereign) is brought about by the *Vājapeya* sacrifice ;— hence if the Post has been made once, if it is made again, such making would be useless ; hence there should be no repetition (of the act of Post-making).

"If this be so, then the same Post would have to be used at the *Nirūḍha-Pashu-sacrifice* also."

Yes, that would be so, if there had been no prohibition of the sacrifice by the term '*niriṣṭi*' ; there is, however, that prohibition ; hence it is not so ; just as another action is not done with the Kusha-grass that has been used already at one action.

Or the term '*Yūpakarmatvāt*' may mean that the sacrifice for which the Post had been made having been finished, the Post also has become *finished*, come to an end.

SŪTRA (7).

THERE IS A TEXT WHICH SHOWS THAT THERE IS A SINGLE MEASUREMENT.

Bhāṣya.

There is the text declaring—'Having encircled the Post with the three-fold thread, one sacrifices the *Savanīya* animal' ; which mentions the details

connected with the Post beginning with the 'encircling'; this shows that the Post is fixed up in the pit only once for all; if it were not so, it would have begun with 'Besprinkling' which is the most important detail.—It might be argued that "it has been so mentioned with a view to immediate sequence". —But that cannot be so; as the sequence is already fixed by what is done at the archetype.

From this also it follows that the embellishments are 'common'.

Adhikaraṇa (5): *The 'Svaru' is common to the three Animals.*

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Svaru*, mentioned in the text '*Yūpasya svarum karoti*' ['He makes the *Svaru* of the Post'].

In regard to this, there is the question—Is this *Svaru* one only, common to all the Animals? Or should it be separate, one for each of the animals?—[When the Post is being hewn out, the piece of wood that falls out first is used as the *Svaru*—says the *Bhāṣya* at the end of *Sūtra* 9].

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—

SŪTRA (8).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The 'Svaru' should be complete with each performance; as it has no time of its own."

Bhāṣya.

"The *Svaru* should be regarded as complete with each performance, *as it has no time of its own*; as a matter of fact, there is no particular time laid down for the making of the *Svaru*; whichever *Svaru* one takes up at the time of a sacrificial performance,—in accordance with the declaration 'One anoints the Animal with the *Svaru* or the *Svadhiti*',—for the purpose of anointing a particular animal, that *Svaru* is regarded as being for the purposes of that Animal-sacrifice; this the differentiating feature that we perceive; hence it follows that there is a different *Svaru* in connection with each of the three animals.—'There is the text declaring that *one makes the Svaru of the Post*, which means that there is a definite time for the making of the *Svaru*'.—It is not so; this *making* also falls within the scope of the performance of the sacrifice [and the time cannot refer to the *Svaru* by itself].—Then again, the term '*Svaru*' in the text 'makes the *Svaru*' stands for the *use* of the *Svaru*; hence what the text means is that 'one makes *use* of the *Svaru*',—because it is not known what the *Svaru* is, while it is well-known that the *use* of the *Svaru* lies in anointing the Animal.—'But we find a text laying down the *Disposal* of the *Svaru* at the end of the sacrifice—*On the completion of the Soma-sacrifice, one offers away the grass-bedding, as also the Svaru for the purpose of securing harmlessness for the sacrifice*'.—True, there is this *Disposal* of the *Svaru*; but that is for *Svaru* in general, not for any particular *Svaru*.—Under these circumstances, there is a doubt as to whether the *Svaru* that appears at the end of the *Soma-sacrifice* is the same that had been taken up at the *Agnī-ṣomīya*-animal-sacrifice and which had since been used 'in common' in connection with the other two animals,—or it is the one that has come at the time of the *Anuban-*

dhyā under the General Rule ?—When there is this doubt, the right view is that what appears at the end of the *Soma-sacrifice* is that which comes in at the time of the *Anubandhyā*,—and not that which had been used 'in common'.—Why so ?—Because of the reason stated in the *Sūtra*.—Further, the mere *appearance* of a certain thing does not prove anything ; such appearance being assumed wherever possible. Hence the appearance of the *Svaru* would be of that one which came in at the time of the *Anubandhyā*,—just as the appearance of the 'grass-bedding' is of that which came in at the time of the *Anubandhyā*."

SŪTRA (9).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE COMMON ; AS THAT ALSO IS COMMON IN THE WAKE WHEREOF THE SVARU COMES IN.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the *Svaru* should vary with each performance ; in fact, *it should be common*.—Why ?—The Post, in the wake whereof the *Svaru* comes in, is common to all the animals ; and because the Post is 'common', it is only right that the *Svaru* also should be 'common' ;—just as one and the same Post is common to all the animals, so the *Svaru* also should be common to all, specially as we do not perceive any peculiarity whereby it could be connected with any *one* of them only.

Objection—"The view just set forth is not right. In the case of the Post, it is right that it should be held to be 'common', because there is the declaration of the 'anticipation' of subsidiaries, and hence no grounds for differentiation are perceptible ; in regard to the *Svaru*, however, there is no declaration of its 'anticipation', on the basis of which, the non-perception of grounds for differentiation would indicate its 'common' character.—As for the sentence '*Yūpasya svarum karoti*', this falls within the scope of the Performance ; the meaning being that 'when one takes up a thing for using as *Svaru* in the *anointing*, he does so out of the Post' ;—the fact of one thing being 'common' does not necessarily prove that another thing is also 'common' ; because out of one and the same Post, there may be many pieces ;—further, those details which come into the Performance by virtue of the General Law, being different, bring into the performance their own auxiliaries, in connection with each performance separately ; because differentiating peculiarities are perceptible ; hence there must be diversity (among the *Svarus*)."

Answer—Though there is no direct declaration of the 'anticipation' of the *Svaru*,—nor does the 'anticipation' of one thing mean the 'anticipation' of another,—yet what has been asserted is not right ; as what has been asserted is right only in a case where the two things are not related to one another, —not in a case where they are related ; in the case in question (for instance), the *Piece* of wood (*Svaru*) comes out of the Post ; and hence its 'anticipation' naturally follows from the 'anticipation' of the Post ; hence wherever the Post is, the *Svaru* also is there.

As for the statement that "the text '*Yūpasya svarum karoti*' is connected with what falls within the scope of the performance",—this also is not right; in connection with every object, there are two points of time,—one at which it is *brought in*, and the other when what has been brought in is *used*;—when an object has got to be brought in for the purposes of a performance,—this performance is never taken up until that object has been brought in; for instance, it never happens that before bringing in the *Vrīhi*-corn, one begins the performance of the sacrifice and then begins to look for the *Vrīhi*-corn; if one were to do this, there would be no performance at all.—As for the *Svaru*, it is produced out of the *Post* when this latter is being hewn out; hence wherever there is this *hewing*, the *Svaru* (piece of wood) also is there.—As for the argument that there may be many *Svarus* out of a single Post,—this would be so if one did not take up that particular piece which came out first; as a matter of fact, however, it has been laid down that the piece of wood taken up as *Svaru* should be the one that comes out first; hence in view of the declaration that when the Post is being hewn out, the piece of wood that falls out first should be used as the *Svaru*,—as there cannot be more than one such piece,—it is not possible that there should be many *Svarus* out of a single Post.

SŪTRA (10).

ALSO BECAUSE ITS 'DISPOSAL' IS FOUND TO APPEAR AT THE END OF THE SOMA-SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

In the text—'On the completion of the *Soma-sacrifice*, one offers away the grass-bedding, as also the *Svaru*, in order to secure harmlessness for the sacrifice',—the 'Disposal' of the *Svaru* is found mentioned as coming at the end of the *Soma-sacrifice*; and this is possible only if it is 'common' to all the animals; if it appertained to each of the animals separately, then the said disposal would come in at the end of the *Agni-ṣomiya*.—From this also it follows that the *Svaru* is 'common' (to all the three animals).

SŪTRA (11).

[*Objection*]—"BUT THE TIME MENTIONED MAY PERTAIN TO THE 'SVARU' ITSELF, AS TO THE PRASTARA."

Bhāṣya.

This argument that had been brought forward before has got to be refuted—[This refutation follows in the next *Sūtra*.]—

SŪTRA (12).

THAT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE THIS ITSELF IS THE ORIGINATIVE INJUNCTION IN THE CASE OF THE PRASTARA, IT IS SO BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

The offering of the *Svaru* that is spoken of is not that of the *Svaru* coming in at the time of the *Anubandhyā*.—Why ?—Because the sentence quoted is itself the originative injunction of the offering—'At the completion of the *Soma-sacrifice* one offers away the grass-bedding and also the *Svaru*, for securing harmlessness for the sacrifice'; from this it appears, on the basis of the order of sequence, that the 'offering' is to be of that *Svaru* which came in at the time of the *Agnī-ṣomīya* animal.—Now if this *Svaru* were common, then, it would be right for it to be mentioned as to be treated in a particular manner by being offered into the Fire, at the end, after all that had to be done with it had been finished in connection with all the three animals. If, on the other hand, it were different with each of the animals, then the said disposal should have appeared at the end of the *Agnī-ṣomīya-offering* (the very first of the three).—"Why cannot we take the text to mean that 'the *Disposal*, which became due at the end of the *Agnī-ṣomīya-offering*, should come at the end of the *Soma-sacrifice*' ?"—That cannot be; as in that case, two distinct peculiarities of the *offering* would be laid down by the text—(1) offering into the Fire, and (2) that at the end of the *Soma-sacrifice*;—this would involve a syntactical split;—hence such cannot be the meaning of the text.—As for the argument that "it would be as in the case of the *Prastara*",—our answer is that *in the case of the Prastara, it is so, because of the Direct Declaration*; the offering of the *Prastara* has been definitely laid down in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices—'One offers the *Prastara* with the *Āshīrmantras*': and thence, under the General Law, it becomes admissible in the case of each Animal; consequently it is only right that it should be found to be spoken of as appearing at the time of the *Anubandhyā* animal.—Such however is not the case with the offering of the *Svaru*. Hence there can be no analogy between the two cases.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *At the 'Dvādashāha', the 'Throwing away of the Black Horn' should be done on the Last Day.*

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, among the observances of the Initiated sacrificer, it is laid down that 'He scratches the body with the Black Horn';—and in regard to the same Black Horn, it is again laid down that 'After the fees have been taken away, he throws the Black Horn into the *Chātvāla*'.—Both these (using of the Black Horn and its being thrown away) become admissible, under the General Law, at the *Dvādashāha* (which has the *Jyotiṣṭoma* for its archetype).

Regarding this we proceed to consider the question—May this *Throwing away of the Black Horn* be done either on the *first* or on the *last* day (optionally)? Or must it be done on the *last* day only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AS REGARDS THE THROWING AWAY OF THE BLACK HORN AT THE AHARGAṆA-SACRIFICE, IT MAY BE DONE OPTIONALLY EITHER ON THE FIRST OR ON THE LAST DAY, AS THERE IS INCOMPATIBILITY OF DETAILS."

Bhāṣya.

"There should be option,—the Throwing Away being done either on the First or on the Last Day.—"Why?"—*Because there is incompatibility of details*;—if the Throwing Away were done on the First Day, then there could be no 'scratching with Black Horn' on the subsequent days, though this 'scratching' is one of those details which have got to be performed on those days before the carrying away of the fees;—on the other hand, if the Throwing Away were done on the Last Day, then, on the preceding days, there could be no 'scratching by the Hand', which is one of the details to be performed on those days after the carrying away of the Fees—[as the Horn would be there in the hand];—thus in both cases there is *incompatibility of details*. Hence there should be option."

SŪTRA (14).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE HORN MUST BE THERE [ON ALL DAYS], AS THERE ARE 'MORNING-EXTRACTIONS' IN THE MIDDLE; THE USE OF THE HAND HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED; SPECIALLY BECAUSE HAVING BEEN ENJOINED, IT HAS BEEN ALREADY IN USE.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that there should be *Option*; as a matter of fact, *the Horn must be there on all days*; i.e. 'scratching with the Horn' should be a fixture throughout the *Ahargaṇa*-sacrifices, and its 'Throwing away' should be done only on the Last Day.—"Why?"—*Because there are 'morning-extractions' in the middle*; i.e. in course of the *Ahargaṇa*, there are several 'Morning-Extractions', and by adopting the Horn at all, the accessory detail of 'scratching with the Horn' would be preserved at all of them.

"At the other two (Midday and Afternoon) Extractions, the accessory detail is 'scratching with the Hand', and this would be set aside (by the retaining of the Horn)."

This does not affect the case. It is nowhere declared that 'the scratching should be done with the *Hand*'; wherever this scratching is done with the *Hand*, it is only because of the needs of the situation, the *hand* being the nearest thing available; and what is prompted by the needs of a situation cannot form the subject of an Injunction.

"Even so, at the later two extractions, it is the Hand that should be recognised as to be used, by reason of its being the nearest thing available."

Our answer to this is as follows—*Because, having been enjoined, it has been already in use*; i.e. the 'scratching' having been laid down as to be done at the end of the 'Morning-Extraction', at the other two extractions also it is 'scratching with the Horn' that should come in, *because it has been already in use*; and when a thing has been in use, its abandoning will be contrary to sound practice.—"How is it then that it is abandoned at the Archetype?"—Because at that time the Horn is not there.—"Why is not another Horn brought in for the purposes of *scratching*"?—The previous Horn has been thrown away in order to relieve the sacrificer of the trouble of holding it; if, then, another Horn were to be brought in, the Holding of that could only be for a transcendental purpose, and such a transcendental purpose will thus have to be assumed.—In the case in question, however, the Horn has to be held at the later 'Morning-Extraction', and it being there, there is no reason why it should be abandoned.—Thus then, on the first day, after the carrying away of the fees, the scratching should have to be done with the *Horn* itself.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *At the 'Rājasūya', speech should be given vent to when the 'offerings-maker' has been called for the last time.*

SŪTRA (15).

SO ALSO, AT THE SACRIFICE WHERE SEVERAL GRAIN-SEEDS ARE USED, THE 'GIVING VENT TO SPEECH' SHOULD BE DONE WITH THE (LAST) CALLING OF THE 'OFFERING-MAKER'.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Rājasūya*, there is a sacrifice at which several kinds of grain are used—such as—'*Agnayē gṛhapatayē āshūnāmaṣṭākapālam nirvapēt, Somāya vanaspatayē shyāmākam charum, Savitrē prasavitrē satinānāmaṣṭākapālam*'.—Then again, it has been explained under Sū. 5-2-13 that at *the sacrifice with several kinds of grain*, only one mortar is to be used; for this reason, the threshing of the various kinds of grain has to be done separately, one after the other.—In connection with the Archetypal sacrifice, it has been declared that—'When going to fetch water, he stops speaking, which he gives vent to along with the offerings-maker', where the term 'offerings-maker' stands for the time (at which the offerings-maker is called), as explained under *Sūtras* 3-2-5 and 6.—At the sacrifice in question, there are several points of time at which the 'offerings-maker' is called.

On this point therefore there arises the same question as in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*—May the 'giving vent to speech' be done optionally either at the *Last* or the *First* calling of the 'offerings-maker'? Or must it be done at the *Last* only?

Here also the *Pūrvapakṣa* is the same as before—that is, if 'the giving vent to speech' were done at the first *calling*, then the condition of 'no speech' would be absent at those rites that are performed before the calling of the offerings-maker; while if it is done at the last *calling*, then the condition of 'speaking' would be absent at those rites that are performed after the calling of the offerings-maker. [Hence on account of this 'incompatibility of details' there should be *Option*.]

The *Siddhānta* also is the same as before: *Speaking* has not been enjoined: and when 'no speech' has been enjoined, as it has been observed already [it should be observed till the last occasion, i.e. the last calling of the offerings-maker].

This *Adhikaraṇa* is only by way of transferring the conclusions on one topic to another topic.

Adhikaraṇa (8): *At the 'Agnīṣomīya', speech should be given vent to on the occasion of calling the offerings-maker in connection with the Cake-offering.*

SŪTRA (16).

The same rule holds good regarding that Animal-sacrifice which is accompanied by the Cake.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Agnīṣomīya-animal sacrifice*, there is an offering of the *animal*, and also of the *Cake*; in connection with the former, the procedure adopted is that of the Animal-offerings, and in connection with the latter, that of the Cake-offerings.

In regard to this also there is the same question—Is the 'giving vent to speech' to be done at 'the calling of the offerings-maker' in connection with the Animal-offerings? Or at that in connection with the Cake-offerings?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* and *Siddhānta* of the preceding *Adhikaraṇas* have to be applied here also.

This *Adhikaraṇa* also is only by way of transferring the conclusions on one topic to another topic.

Objection—"At the Animal-offerings, there is no *offerings-maker* at all,—this person being needed only in connection with vegetarian offerings".

Answer—This discussion is a hypothetical one, raised on the assumption that there is an *offerings-maker* in the case of all offerings.

Adhikaraṇa (9): *At the 'Agnichayana' (Erecting of the Fire-altar), the 'Agni-vimoka' (Disconnection of the Fire) should be done at the completion of the Main Sacrifice.*

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Agni* (Fire-altar) we read—'*Agnim yunajmi shavasā ghṛtēna*—with this *mantra* he pours the oblations, and thereby *connects* the Fire itself' [where the 'connecting' of the Fire is laid down];—and again '*Imam stanam madhumantam dhayāyām*,—with this *mantra* he pours the oblation of *Agni-vimoka* (Fire-disconnection)' [where the 'disconnecting' of Fire is laid down].

In regard to this the question going to be considered is—Is the 'connecting of the Fire' for the purposes of the Main as well as the Subsidiary Sacrifices, and hence the 'disconnecting', should be done at the end of all these sacrifices? Or is the 'connecting' for the purposes of the *Main* Sacrifice only, and hence the 'disconnecting' should be done at the end of the Main Sacrifice?

SŪTRA (17).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The 'connecting of the Fire' done at the time of Soma should be taken as being for the purposes of the Main along with the Subsidiary Sacrifices, because every embellished action serves the purposes of all; consequently the 'disconnecting' should be done at the end of all."

Bhāṣya.

"The 'connecting' is for the purposes of the Main as well as the Subsidiary Sacrifices; hence the 'disconnecting' should be done at the end of all these.—Why so?—Because the following declaration is without reference to any particular sacrifice—'*Agnim yunajmi shavasā ghṛtēna*—with this *mantra* one pours the oblation and thereby connects the Fire itself'; and there is no such declaration as that this 'connecting' is done for the purpose of this or that sacrifice; whence it follows that it is for the purpose of all sacrifices without any distinction.—Further, it is in the Fire thus 'connected' that all the Subsidiary and Main Sacrifices are offered; for this reason also it should be taken as being for the purpose of all. This is what has been explained under *Sūtra* 3. 7. 2.—Thus then, inasmuch as the 'connecting' is for the purpose of all sacrifices, the 'disconnecting' should be done at the end of

all; as it is only at the end of all that the purposes of the 'connecting' are fulfilled, and 'disconnecting' represents the complete fulfilment of the purposes of the 'connecting'."

SŪTRA (18).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE DONE AT THE END OF THE MAIN SACRIFICE, AS IT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF THAT.

Bhāṣya.

The 'disconnecting' should not be done at the end of all the sacrifices; it should be done at the end of the Main Sacrifice only; because the 'connecting' is found to be spoken of in connection with the Main Sacrifice, in the text—'*Pañchabhiryunakti pāṅkto yajño yāvānēva yajñastamālabhatē*', from which we learn that the 'connecting' is done for the purpose of accomplishing the sacrifice. From this it follows that the 'connecting' is for the purposes of the Main Sacrifice.—If the 'connecting' is for the purposes of the Main Sacrifice, then it is at the end of the Main Sacrifice that the purposes of the 'connecting' become fulfilled; hence it is then that the 'Disconnecting' should be done.—As for the injunction without reference to any particular sacrifice, it comes to be regarded as serving the purpose of a particular sacrifice (the Main one) by becoming joined to a particular sacrifice.

[According to the *Vārtika*, what is stated in Sū. 17 is the *Siddhānta* and the view set forth in Sū. 18 is the *Pūrvapakṣa.*]

SŪTRA (19).

SIMILARLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE AVABHṚTHA, THERE WOULD BE NEGATION OF THE PURPOSE OF THE MAIN SACRIFICE,—AS THE PURPOSE WILL HAVE BEEN ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED.

Bhāṣya.

It being as described above, it would be right that there should be negation, in connection with the *Avabhṛtha*, of the *appointment of the Ārṣēya* and the *appointment of the Hotṛ*,—as is done in the text 'One does not appoint the *Hotṛ*, nor the *Ārṣēya*', as has been laid down quite in accordance with reason. Because the *appointment of the Hotṛ* has been done for the sake of the *Soma-sacrifice*, in accordance with the text—'When one appoints the *Hotṛ*, he appoints the *Jagatī*'.

In the absence of the principle of the above *Siddhānta* (Sū. 18), this *appointment of the Hotṛ* would be taken as being for the purpose of the Subsidiary as well as the Main Sacrifices; and as such, it would have to be done at the *Avabhṛtha* also. As a matter of fact however, the *appointment of the Hotṛ*, which is related to the Archetype, does not come in at all, as its purpose has been already accomplished; hence the said negation would be altogether

uncalled for.—In accordance with the principle of the *Siddhānta* (Sū. 18) however, that also is for the sake of the Main Sacrifice itself ; and in that case also there is connection with the sacrifice, as described in the passage, '*yadvṛtā*, etc.'.—If it is for the purpose of the Main Sacrifice, then at the end of this latter, its purpose having been accomplished, the *appointment of the Hotṛ* becomes admissible at the *Avabhṛtha* ; hence it becomes necessary to lay down its negation, and this is actually laid down.—Thus then, the 'connecting' being for the sake of the Main Sacrifice, there should be 'disconnecting', at the end of the same.

SŪTRA (20).

AT THE AHARGAṆA, IT SHOULD BE DONE EVERY DAY ; AS IT IS FOR THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Ahargaṇa*, in connection with the *Dvādashāha*, there are 'connecting' and 'disconnecting' every day, as is clearly shown by the text—'*Sa vā aharaharyunakti aharaharvimuñchati*'. This declaration has some sense only if the 'connecting' is for the purpose of the Main Sacrifice ; otherwise, the 'connecting' would be done on the first day only, and the 'disconnecting' would be done on the last day only ; as it is only then that all would have been completed.

Adhikaraṇa (10): *The 'Inviting of the Subrahmaṇyā', which is done at the time of the 'Upasads', should be done separately with each of the 'Days' of the Dvādashāha.*

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Dvādashāha* sacrifice, there is 'Inviting of the *Subrahmaṇyā*' done at the time of the *Upasads*; in regard to this we proceed to consider the question—Is this 'Inviting' to be done separately or 'in common'?

The apparent view being that as each of the 'Days' is a distinct act by itself, the 'Inviting' should be done *separately* with each,—as against this, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*.

SŪTRA (21).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The Subrahmaṇyā should be 'in common', because it has a different time of its own, like the Initiation."

Bhāṣya.

"*The Subrahmaṇyā should be done 'in common'*;—why?—*because it has a different time of its own*; as a matter of fact, it is done at a time other than that of the sacrificial performance; and no differentiating peculiarity is perceived; and when no such peculiarity is perceptible, the only right course is that it should be done 'in common';—*like the Initiation*; just as the Initiation, having a distinct time of its own, is done 'in common', so should be the *Subrahmaṇyā* also."

SŪTRA (22).

[Siddhānta]—That which is done at that same time should be repeated; because of the peculiar relationship that it bears to the Performance.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, that '*Subrahmaṇyā*' which is done *at that same time*, in course of the same *Dvādashāha*, *should be repeated*.—Why?—Because it bears a peculiar relationship to the Performance; as shown by the words '*Adya sutyām āgachchha*' ['Come to the *Sutyā* to-day'] (which are addressed to the *Subrahmaṇyā*);—where it is clearly said 'to-day', and it cannot mean either *tomorrow* or *the day after*. Then again, the words (of calling) have to be addressed in accordance with what is done at the Archetype. Hence the 'calling' in question should be repeated.

SŪTRA (23).

"IT IS NOT PART OF THE PERFORMANCE",—IF THIS IS URGED [then, the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"If it is your view that, 'on account of the specific mention of *to-day*, there should be repetition',—then, this is not right;—why?—because the mention of 'to-day' is not part of the Performance; in fact, no significance attaches to the term, as at the Archetype there is only one '*day*'; hence the connection of 'to-day' is only a settled fact; consequently, not forming part of the performance, it comes into the sacrifice in question (*Dvādashāha*) only by virtue of the General Law; so that the words '*Adya sutyām āgachchha*' ['Come to the *Sutyā to-day*'] means nothing more than 'Come to the *Sutyā*'; and the character of '*Sutyā*' belongs equally to all the 'Days'. Hence the 'Inviting' in question should be 'common'."

SŪTRA (24).

IT SHOULD BE (SEPARATE), BECAUSE OF THE INDICATION OF THE PERFORMANCE; AS IN THE CASE OF DIFFERENCE OF 'PERFORMERS'.

Bhāṣya.

There should be separate performances (of the Inviting); even though what is signified by the term 'to-day' may not be intended to be emphasised, yet when the act is done on a certain day, it can help only that Main Sacrifice which is performed on that same day, not any that may be performed on another day;—*as in the case of the difference of Performers*; in the case of the declaration—'The *Adhvaryu* keeps the eight offerings on the northern platform, and the *Pratiprasthatṛ* keeps on the southern one that which is going to be offered to the *Maruts*,'—those details that are performed in connection with the *northern platform* do not render any help to 'what is going to be offered to the *Maruts*',—because of the difference in *place*; and just as these do not help, on account of the difference of *place*, so in the case in question, the 'Inviting' would not help anything that is done at another time,—on account of the difference of *time*.

SŪTRA (25).

IF IT IS ARGUED THAT—"INASMUCH AS THE DEITY REMAINS 'INVITED' [THERE NEED BE NO REPETITION] AS IN THE CASE OF THE FIRE",—THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT IT ENDS WITH EACH ACT, BEING MEANT FOR THAT.

Bhāṣya.

The following argument might be put forward—"The deity (*Subrahmaṇyā*) that has been 'invited' on one day becomes 'embellished' by that

invitation ;—the deity concerned is one only ;—hence another 'invitation' of these would be entirely useless ;—*as in the case of the Fire* ; when the Fire has become 'embellished' by one performance of the 'Installation', it is not embellished over again, in connection with any act."

This is not right ; because *each act is complete in itself*, so that the 'Inviting' serves the purposes of that Performance during which it has been done ; and the 'invitation' comes to an end at the end of that Performance ; just as in the case of the *Besprinkling of Fire* and other embellishments performed at the time of the *Sutyā*.—Hence the conclusion is that the 'Inviting' should be repeated.

SŪTRA (26).

"IT SHOULD BE LIKE THE FIRE",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"It has been argued by us that—'just as in the case of the Installation of Fire, the Installation is *common* to all performances, so should it be in this case also'. What is the answer to that ?"

This *Sūtra* is meant only to reiterate a former argument.

SŪTRA (27).

NOT SO ; BECAUSE IT FORMS PART OF THE PERFORMANCE.

Bhāṣya.

The case of the 'Invitation' is not analogous to that of the 'Fire-installation' ; because the 'Fire-installation' has its own time ; it is done at its own time (independently of the performance of any particular sacrifice) ; hence we do not perceive any peculiarity in it (whereby it could be related to any particular sacrifice). The 'inviting' in question, however, is done at the time of the performance (of the *Dvādashāha*) ; hence we perceive in this the peculiarity that it must be for the purpose of that sacrifice during the performance of which it is done.—Hence this is not similar to 'Fire-installation'.

SŪTRA (28).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

The following text also indicates the same conclusion, that the 'Inviting of the *Subrahmaṇyā*' should be done every day—'*As each Day comes to an end*, he enters the abode of the *Agnīdhra-priest*, and directs the *Subrahmaṇya-priest* to *invite the Subrahmaṇyā*' ;—this direction is meant to bring about the actual performance of the act of 'inviting'.—From this also it follows that the 'Inviting' is to be done every day.

SŪTRA (29).

"IT SHOULD BE LIKE THAT",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

The term 'that' refers to the case of the '*Yūpāhuti*' (dealt with under 11. 2. 25-26). The argument of the Opponent is as follows—"Just as *that*, i.e. the performance of the *Yūpāhuti* at the *Yupaikādashinī* is 'common', so should *this*—'inviting'—also be 'common'.—'What is the similarity between *this* (Inviting) and *that* (*Yūpāhuti*) ?'—Whenever the *Yūpāhuti* is performed, it must be in close proximity to a particular Post, as it is impossible to get at 'proximity' to all the Posts in common;—and though performed near one particular Post, the *Yūpāhuti* serves the purposes of all the Posts;—in the same manner the *Inviting* also, though done in proximity to a particular *Sutyā*-performance, may yet serve the purposes of all the *Sutyās*."

SŪTRA (30).

IT CANNOT BE SO; BECAUSE THAT HAS NOT BEEN ENJOINED, AND BECAUSE THE PRESENT CASE IS SUBJECT TO A DIFFERENT PRINCIPLE.

Bhāṣya.

The case of the 'Inviting' is not similar to that of the '*Yūpāhuti*'.—Why ?—(A) *Because that has not been enjoined*; in the case of the *Yūpāhuti*, there is no injunction of the oblation being offered 'in close proximity' to the Post; in fact, the 'proximity' is not meant to be emphasised at all; and it has been explained under *Sūtras* 11. 2. 26 and 27, that the text in question laying down the *Āhuti* is only meant to be preclusive of the *Āhavanīya* (as the receptacle of the oblations);—and (B) *because the present case is subject to a different principle*; there is a different principle applicable to the present case; that principle being that 'by reason of the difference in time, when no differentiating peculiarity is perceived, there should be repetition of the act (of *inviting*)'.—Hence the analogy cited is not correct.

SŪTRA (31).

"THE PROCEDURE BEING THE SAME",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Someone may urge the following—"In the present case the procedure of the *Dvādashāha* has been found to be *common*;—the procedure ending with the *Vasatīvarī* also is that of the *Dvādashāha*; hence on the ground of this similarity, the case should be treated as that." ['*Vabhṛthā . . . cha*' not found in many MSS.]

SŪTRA (32).

THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE THE WHOLE OF IT IS PERFORMED AGAIN; AS IN THE CASE OF THE MAIN SACRIFICES.

Bhāṣya.

What has been urged cannot be right.—Why?—*Because the whole of it is performed again*; the entire procedure is repeated, consisting of the following—*Abhiṣava, Pavamāna, Grahachamasa, Stotra, Shastra and the rest*;—*as in the case of the Main Sacrifices*; i.e. just as the Main Sacrifices are performed every day, so (the *inviting* also). The question that arises is whether there should be only one performance as of the *Vasatīvarī*, or there should be several performances as of the *Stotra, Shastra*, etc.—The only right answer to this is that there should be several performances; as it is thus alone that it renders help to all the sacrifices; while if it were done once only, it would help that sacrifice alone at which it would be done, the time of all the others being different.—From all this it follows that the act of 'inviting' should be repeated.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *The 'Place', 'Implements' and 'Priests' employed at one performance may be employed at another, if desired.*

SŪTRA (33).

IN REGARD TO WORLDLY THINGS, ONE MAY DO AS ONE LIKES; AS THERE IS NO LOSS EITHER OF THE EMBELLISHMENTS OR OF THE PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

Worldly things are the subject-matter of consideration here:—For example: (*a*) *Place*, as laid down in the text 'One should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices *on level ground*',—(*b*) *Performers*, as laid down in the text, 'There are four priests at the performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices,'—and (*c*) *Implements*, such as the *Sruk* and the rest.

In regard to these, we proceed to consider the question—Are these to be secured separately for each performance? or may sacrifices be performed with those same that have been employed at a previous performance, or with those newly bought in (it being a matter of option)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"For each performance,—fresh *place*, fresh *performers* and fresh *implements* should be secured;—why?—because cultured people do not perform any act with anything that has been used already and is hence unfit for use."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*In regard to worldly things, one may do as one likes*;—i.e. one may employ the same things that have been employed before, or one may secure fresh ones; there should be no restriction.—"Why?"—*Because there is no loss either of the embellishments or of the purpose*; i.e. at the previous performance, no embellishments had been brought about in the Performer and other things which would be lost if fresh ones were employed;—nor is there a loss of the purpose; as the performance can be equally well accomplished by means of the fresh ones also.—For this reason, there should be no restriction.

It has been argued that "cultured people do not perform sacrifices with things that are unfit for use".—As a matter of fact however, cultured people do employ the things (Place, Implement, and Performer) that have been previously employed; hence what has been urged does not affect the case.

"But there is the rule that the Priest and the Teacher should not be separated [and this precludes the employment of new Priests]."

But this is a rule applying to *men* (in ordinary life), not to the *sacrifice*; as it does not occur either in connection with, or in the context of, any particular sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *The Implements should be retained till the end of one's Life.*

Bhāṣya.

In regard to *Places* and *Performers*, it has been settled that one may employ the same or secure new ones. We are next going to consider the case of the *Implements*.

SŪTRA (34).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE SACRIFICIAL IMPLEMENTS SHOULD BE RETAINED, BECAUSE THEIR 'DISPOSAL' HAS BEEN PRESCRIBED;—AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'ṚJĪṢA'.

Bhāṣya.

As for the Sacrificial Implements, *they should be retained*, till the very end.—"Why?"—*Because their disposal has been prescribed*; the disposal of the implements has been prescribed in connection with the *Paridhānīya-Rite*—'They burn the *Agnihotrin* along with the Fires and the *Sacrificial Implements*'; for this purpose the Implements have to be retained [as this would be possible only if the Implements were retained till the end];—as *in the case of the Ṛjīṣa*; in connection with the *Ahargaṇa* sacrifices, the *Ṛjīṣa* of every one of the 'Days' is retained for the purposes of 'disposal' at the *Avabhṛtha* laid down in the text 'They throw the *Ṛjīṣa* into water'.

SŪTRA (35).

[*Pūrvapakṣa-argument against Siddhānta*]—"IT IS REALLY AN EMBELLISHMENT OF THE SACRIFICER; WHAT HAS BEEN DECLARED IS ONLY THE PURPOSE OF THOSE; HENCE ONE MAY DO AS ONE PLEASES, BECAUSE THEY ARE FOR A DEFINITE PURPOSE".

Bhāṣya.

"What has been spoken of is not a 'Disposal' of the Implements, it is an embellishment of the Sacrificer, which has been declared as the purpose of those Implements.—'How do you know that?'—Because the Implements have been spoken of by means of a word with the Instrumental Ending and the Sacrifice is spoken of by means of a word with the Accusative Ending [in the text '*Āhitāgnim agnibhiḥ dahanti yajñapātraishcha*']. Hence in this case *one may do as one pleases*; i.e. what may be thrown into the cremation-fire of the Sacrificer may be those same Implements that have been used by him, or they may be others;—*because they are for a definite purpose*; i.e.

the Implements serve a useful purpose; and that purpose can be served by any Implements one may choose."

SŪTRA (36).

[*Answer by Siddhāntin*]—IN FACT, THERE SHOULD BE RETENTION OF ONLY THE PRINCIPAL IMPLEMENTS; BECAUSE THERE IS NO FIXED TIME FOR DEATH.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, all the *Principal* Implements—i.e. the original Implements, secured for the first time,—should be retained, and it is not that there is no restriction.—" Why so ?"—*Because there is no fixed time for Death*; 'Death' is an event of which the exact time is not known; so that it might so happen that the Implements might have been thrown away and just at that time Death might come about; and in that case the embellishment of the Sacrificer's dead body (by being burnt along with the Implements) would not be accomplished.—" Even so, they may be retained only till another sacrificial performance has been undertaken (and fresh implements secured), and by means of these implements of the latter sacrifice, the said act (of burning the body along with the implements) might be accomplished".—But while the former implements are there, the bringing in of other new ones would be wholly useless. Hence the right course is to retain the principal implements.

SŪTRA (37).

[*Objection*]—" ONE WHO DIES ON THE DAY OF THE SACRIFICE, SHOULD ALONE BE ENTITLED (TO HIS BODY BEING BURNT ALONG WITH THE IMPLEMENTS),—AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'UPAVĒṢA'."

Bhāṣya.

" Or, the right course would be, not that the Principal Implements should be retained, but that if a Sacrificer should happen to die on the day of the sacrifice, he alone should be entitled to the embellishment in question; as he will have the Implements ready close by himself;—*as in the case of the 'Upavēṣa'*; just as it is only one who is offering the Curd-Butter-Mixture that is entitled to the holding of the *Upavēṣa*, as for him alone is the *Upavēṣa* close by."

SŪTRA (38).

[*Answer*]—NOT SO; BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN INDICATED BY THE SCRIPTURES.

Bhāṣya.

What has been suggested cannot be right.—" Why ?"—*Because it has been indicated by the scriptures*, that the *Upavēṣa* should be held only by one

who is offering the Curd-Butter-Mixture, not by anyone else; it is only for the purpose of preparing the Curd-Butter-Mixture that the 'Tree-Branch' is brought in, and it is out of this Tree-Branch that the *Upavēṣa* is made, and this Branch would not be available for one who is *not* offering the Curd-Butter-Mixture.—Further, the injunction of the embellishment in question does not pertain to any fixed time,—either the day of the sacrifice or any other day; because it has been laid down without reference to any other act,—the injunction simply being that 'they burn the *Agnihotrin* along with the Fires and the sacrificial Implements'.—Nor again is the presence of the Sacrificial Implements impossible on any other day,—in the way in which the *Upavēṣa* is impossible for any other performer; as the presence of the Implements can be secured at any time by means of Retention.—Hence the case of the *Upavēṣa* is not analogous to the present case.

SŪTRA (39).

[*Objection—continued*]—"THERE SHOULD BE PRODUCTION, BECAUSE OF THE PROMPTER,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'ĀSHIRA'."

Bhāṣya.

"Or, there need be no retention; at the time of the embellishment (Cremation) new Implements should be *produced*, (secured),—*because of the prompter*; i.e. the prompting cause of such production is there in the shape of the embellishment;—*as in the case of the* '*Āshira*'; at the *Ṛtapēya* sacrifice, there is the declaration that 'Both of them live on Clarified Butter', and by virtue of this, in a case where there is no cow for being milked for the purpose of this observance, another cow is to be brought in for purposes of the *Āshira*',—according to the text '*Anyām yajamānasya vratadughāmāṣhirē duhanti*' ['For the purposes of the sacrificer's observance, they milk another cow']; the same should be done in the case in question also."

SŪTRA (40).

[*Objection—continued*]—"'BUT IN THAT CASE THE NAME WOULD BE INAPPLICABLE'—IF THIS IS URGED—[then the objector's answer is as in the next *Sūtra*]."

Bhāṣya.

"In case you urge that—under the circumstances explained under the preceding *Sūtra*, the name 'sacrificial implement' would not be applicable, because it is only the implements that have become connected with a sacrifice that become 'sacrificial', while the new ones got in (at the time of the sacrificer's death) would not have been so connected with a sacrifice",—[then our answer would be as follows]—

SŪTRA (41).

[*Objection—concluded*]—" So also at the ' Āshira '."

Bhāṣya.

" In connection with the *Āshira* also, the other cow that is brought in cannot be the ' *vrataduḥ* ' (cow milked for purposes of the observance) for the sacrifices; so that the name ' *vratadhuk* ' becomes inapplicable, and yet, just as in that case another cow *is* actually brought in, so, in the case in question also, other implements should be brought in. Or, you have to explain why what is done in one case cannot be done in the other."

That explanation (says the *Siddhāntin*) is as follows :—

SŪTRA (42).

[*Siddhāntin's answer to the objection*]—In that other case, the absence is due to the scriptures; at the Archetype there is the desire to bring about one substance; in the present case however, there is injunction of a thing with a view to a transcendental result.

Bhāṣya.

In that other case, the absence is due to the scriptures; i.e. in that case the inapplicability of the name, due to the absence of the *cow milked for observance*, has been brought about by the scriptural text ' Both live on Clarified Butter '; when there is *the desire to bring about one substance*, the injunction that ' For the sacrificer they milk another cow for his observance at the *Āshira* ' becomes applicable to the *Ṛtapēya*, under the General Law; and it would be turned away from that by reason of impossibility, while the *Āshira* cow would be brought in; it is for this reason that the inapplicability of the name is tolerated.—In the case in question, on the other hand, what has been laid down is with a view to a transcendental result, and it is not what is brought in from anywhere else; the burning too of the Body along with the sacrificial implements has been laid down directly, without any sort of reservation. The presence too of those implements is easy to be secured by just retaining those that have been in use. In this case therefore, the admissibility of the incongruity of the name being inapplicable would be without justification or reason whatsoever.

From all this it follows that the Implements should be retained.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *The Retention of the Implements should commence from the Fire-installation.*

Bhāṣya.

The preceding *Adhikaraṇa* has been left in its incomplete form [only in the sense that certain *Pūrvapakṣa* arguments have not been answered;—this is done later on, under Sū. 45]. For the time being we proceed to consider another matter.—It has been declared that the Sacrificial Implements should be retained; the question we are going to consider is—Should the Implements be retained from the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice onwards? or from the Fire-installation onwards?

SŪTRA (43).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE RETENTION SHOULD COMMENCE FROM THE PURṆAMĀSA ONWARDS; BECAUSE THE IMPLEMENTS ARE FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE ARCHETYPE".

Bhāṣya.

"The Implements should be retained, commencing from the *Paurṇamāsa* onwards.—'Why?'—*Because they are for the purposes of the Archetype*; these Implements have been mentioned without reference to any sacrifice; hence they are taken as subservient to the purposes of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*; therein are they brought into existence; and their retention should commence from the time that they are brought into existence. Hence it follows that their retention should commence from the *Paurṇamāsa*."

SŪTRA (44).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD COMMENCE WITH THE FIRE-INSTALLATION; AS THERE IS NO INCONGRUITY IN IT; SPECIALLY AS DEATH CANNOT BE THE OCCASION.

Bhāṣya.

The Retention is to commence, not from the *Paurṇamāsa*, but from the Fire-installation;—why?—*because there is no incongruity in it*; even though the Implements have been laid down as to be used at the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice, yet under the General Law, they become admissible at the *Pavamāna-offerings*; so that, if they are retained from this latter onwards, there is no incongruity in this;—*specially as Death cannot be the occasion*; i.e. if the Sacrificer were to die before the Full Moon Day (when the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice is performed), then the embellishment of his body would not be done;

—on the other hand, if the Implements have been retained since the Fire-installation, there is no incongruity in it. From this it follows that the Retention should commence with the Fire-installation.

SŪTRA (45).

IN REALITY, IT IS AN ACT OF 'DISPOSAL', AS IN THE CASE OF OTHER THINGS.

Bhāṣya.

This is an answer to objections against the *Adhikaraṇa* which was left incomplete (after Sū. 42).

It has been argued above (under Sū. 35) that the Implements (by being burnt) serve a useful purpose—in the shape of bringing about the embellishment of the Sacrificer.—This however is not right.—As the act in question is one of the 'Disposal', into the sacrificer's body, of the Fires and of the Implements.—How so ?—*As in the case of other things*, smeared with Soma-juice, the '*going to Avabhṛtha*' is an act of 'Disposal',—the grounds for its being so regarded are the same,—viz. those things also have been used at various sacrifices and are as such fit for *disposal* ; the case with the Fires and the Implements also is the same ; hence there is 'disposal' of these latter also.—"But in both cases we find the Instrumental ending (which makes such interpretation impossible)."—Not so ; the 'disposal' of the Fires and the Implements does not consist in their being thrown upon the Sacrificer's body,—nor is the burning itself of the *Agnihotṛn* himself (who is immortal); while the Instrumental ending is used in connection with the act of *burning*; which shows that the Fires and the Implements occupy only a subordinate position ;—the *burning* being accomplished by means of these.—If only *throwing in* were meant, then the Accusative ending would have been used; as we find in such expressions as '*Dakṣiṇē pāṇau juhūmāsādayati*'.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *The 'Prajāpatya'-offering should be made after all other Soma-offerings.*

SŪTRA (46).

THE OFFERINGS MADE ACCORDING TO THE INJUNCTION—'THEY OFFER THE PRAJĀPATYA OBLATIONS AFTER THE SOMA-OFFERINGS'—SHOULD COME AFTER ALL THE SOMA-OFFERINGS, AS THERE IS NO SPECIFICATION, AND BECAUSE IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO LAY DOWN THE TIME OF THE ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Vājapēya* sacrifice, certain animals are 'dedicated to Prajāpati';—in reference to these animals, we read—'*Upariṣṭāt somānām prājāpatyaishcharanti*' ['They offer the oblations to Prajāpati *after the Soma-offerings*'].

In regard to this, we proceed to consider the question—Should the offerings be made at the time of the *Ārbhava*?—or after the *Soma-offerings* made with *Shastra-hymns*?—or in place of the modificatory sacrifices?—or after *all the Soma-offerings*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* (A) is as follows:—"They should be made at the time of the *Ārbhava*.—Why?—Because at the archetypal sacrifice, the offering has been made at the time of the *Ārbhava*; and as at the Archetype, so in the case in question also, they should be made at the same time. If this is so done, then there is no disturbance in the subsidiaries.—If, on the other hand, the offerings were made after all the Soma-offerings, then there would be disturbance in the performance of the details laid down in the following two texts—(*a*) 'They perform the *Anuyājas* after the offering to *Agni-Maruts*', (*b*) 'Having thrown in the *Paridhis*, they throw in the *Hāriyojana* Cup'; as in the said case the *Anuyājas* could not be performed 'after the offering to *Agni-Maruts*'; and the *Paridhis* would be offered *after* the offering of the *Hāriyojana* oblation.—And all this would mean a reversal in the order of the subsidiaries, without any authoritative declaration to that effect.—If however, the offerings were made at the time of the *Ārbhava*, then there would be no such incongruity."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—When it is declared that 'They offer the *Prājāpatya* oblations after the *Soma-offerings*,' the offering should be made after *all* the Soma-offerings.—Why?—*Because there is no specification*; when the term '*Somānām*' ('of the Soma-offerings') is used, and there is no specific mention of any particular *Soma-offerings*, it must mean *all* Soma-offerings.—As regards the argument that "the time of the *Ārbhava* should come in from the Archetype (by virtue of the General Law)",—*it is not necessary to lay down the time of the Archetype*, if it is already indicated by the General Law; if there were an injunction of

such time, it would be doing what has been already done, and as such purposeless.—From all this it follows that the said offering should be made after *all* the *Soma-offerings*.

SŪTRA (47).

IF IT BE URGED THAT "THIS WOULD ENTAIL A REVERSAL OF SUBSIDIARIES, WITHOUT ANY DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT", [the answer is as below].

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—"under the above explanation, there would be a reversal of subsidiaries, without any declaration to that effect".—What is the answer to that?

This *Sūtra* is meant only as a reassertion of the objection.

SŪTRA (48).

THERE IS ONLY 'POSTPONEMENT', ON ACCOUNT OF CONNECTION; IN THE OTHER CASE, THERE IS MERE TIME.

Bhāṣya.

The objection urged,—that "there is reversal of subsidiaries",—does not affect the case.—"Why?"—Because when the offering of the Animal has been 'postponed' (put off), it is only right that there should be 'postponement' of the *Anuyājas* and of the *Throwing in of the Paridhis*;—*on account of connection*; that is, all these latter are duly connected with the animal-offering. Nor is there any order of sequence meant to be emphasised as between the *Anuyājas* and *the offering to Agni-Maruts*, or between the *Hāriyojana* and *the Throwing in of the Paridhis*; the *Throwing in of the Paridhis* is not a subsidiary of the *Hāriyojana*,—or the *Hāriyojana* of the *Throwing in of the Paridhis*;—nor are these two subsidiary to any other Main Sacrifice.—Similarly if the *offering to Agni-Maruts* and the *Anuyājas* were subsidiaries of one another,—or both of them of a third Main Sacrifice,—then, by reason of the order of sequence rendering some help to the performance, the said order might be meant to be emphasised. As a matter of fact, however, the *Anuyājas* are subsidiary to the Animal-sacrifice,—the *offering to Agni-Maruts* is subsidiary to the Soma-sacrifice,—the *Throwing in of the Paridhis* is subsidiary to the Animal-sacrifice,—and the *Hāriyojana* is subsidiary to the Soma-sacrifice; hence any order of sequence among these can serve no useful purpose; hence it cannot be meant to be emphasised.

In the other case, there is mere time; in the texts—'they offer the *Anuyājas* after the offering to *Agni-Maruts*', 'offers the *Hāriyojana* oblations after having thrown in the *Paridhis*'—the 'offering to *Agni-Maruts*' and the 'throwing in of the *Paridhis*' have been mentioned as indicative of *time*; even though the indication is not actually present, the time meant to be

indicated does not fail to be indicated; e.g. when it is said that 'one should come *at the Agnihotra-time*', the exact time is understood all the same, even though the *Agnihotra* may not be there.—"But this involves recourse to *Indirect dedication*".—Not so; because it is the Time that is directly denoted in this case; the affix '*Ktvā*' (and its variant 'lyap' present in '*prahṛtya*') has been laid down as denoting the time that has gone before;—and the term '*ūrdhvam*' ('after') might denote either Time or Place; but the sense of Place being incompatible here, it is taken as expressing Time.

SŪTRA (49).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"ON ACCOUNT OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE TIME OF THE ARCHETYPE, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS COMING AFTER THOSE SOMA-OFFERINGS THAT ARE MADE WITH SHASTRA-HYMNS";—IF THIS IS URGED—[then the answer is as below].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"If your view is that the offerings in question should be made after *all the Soma-offerings*,—that cannot be right; the right view is that it should come after those Soma-offerings that are accompanied by *Shastra-hymns*.—Why?—*Because of the proximity of the time of the Archetype*; by so doing the offering in question would be performed in close proximity to the Archetypal-offerings; nor would there be any unwarranted reversal of the subsidiaries.—"What is the time meant?'—It is that which comes after the *Vaishvadēva* offering at the *Third Extraction*."

SŪTRA (50).

[*Pūrvapakṣa (B) refuted*]—NOT SO; AS THIS WOULD BE AGAINST THE DIRECT DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

If it were as suggested above, then it would militate against the Direct Declaration that '*after the Soma-offerings* etc., etc.', which does not specify any particular *Soma-offerings*; as the offering in question will have been offered *before* (not *after*) some of the *Soma-offerings*—Nor again is it possible for mere 'proximity' to indicate the time of the Archetype.

SŪTRA (51).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—"IT SHOULD COME IN PLACE OF THE MODIFICATORY SACRIFICES"—IF THIS IS URGED—[then the answer is as below].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"If it is your view that it is not right for the offering to be made after those *Soma-sacrifices* which are accompanied by

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The 'Modificatory' Fire cannot be regarded as 'Ahavanīya'.*

SŪTRA (24).

[PURVAPAKṢA]—"IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE 'ĀHAVANIYA', AS IT IS CONNECTED WITH 'ĀHUTI' (OBLATION-OFFERING)."

Bhāṣya.

"*The 'Modificatory Fire'* [i.e. the Prospective Fire that has replaced the Permanent Fire in the hearth] *should be regarded as the 'Āhavanīya'*;—why?—*because it is connected with 'āhuti' (oblation-offering)*; that Fire is called '*Āhavanīya*', *which is approached and then has oblations offered into it* ('*ētya hūyatē yasmin*');—and *oblations are actually offered* in the Fire in question;—hence it must be regarded as the '*Āhavanīya*'."

SŪTRA (25).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT MUST BE ANOTHER; BECAUSE THIS HAS BEEN TAKEN OUT AND BROUGHT IN.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, another Fire should be the *Āhavanīya*; the 'Modificatory Fire' cannot be the *Āhavanīya*;—why?—*because this has been taken out and brought in*; this Fire is an ordinary one, which is 'taken out' and 'brought in'—as is clear from the injunctions 'One should bring it in out of the Frying Furnace', 'One should bring it in out of the *Prādāvya*'.—The name '*āhavanīya*' is based upon *consecration*, it being applied only *after* certain consecratory embellishments have been performed,—and never *before* that.

As for the argument that "the Fire is connected with *Āhuti* (oblation-offering)",—oblation-offerings have been laid down as to be done after the '*Āhavanīya*' character has been established,—as is clear from the injunction, 'Offers oblations in the *Āhavanīya*'; the oblations being laid down as to be done in the well-established *Āhavanīya*; so that the name '*āhavanīya*' is not based upon the fact of *Āhutis* (oblations-offerings) being made in it.—From all this it follows that the *Modificatory Fire* cannot be the *Āhavanīya*.

The purpose of this *Adhikaraṇa* is that the details of the '*Āhavanīya*' are not to be performed in connection with the *Modificatory Fire* in question.

Adhikaraṇa (9): *In connection with the Modificatory Fire, there is to be no Installatory Consecration.*

SŪTRA (26).

[Purvapakṣa]—"In connection with that Fire, the Consecration rites should be performed,—as they have been enjoined."

Bhāṣya.

"*In connection with that*—the Modificatory Fire—the consecration-*rites* of installation—should be performed;—*as they have been enjoined*;—i.e. the consecration-rites have been enjoined as being for the performance of all acts,—*Fire-installation* being a necessary accessory to all acts; if therefore these were not performed in the case in question, then the act concerned, being wanting in that accessory, would be futile."

SŪTRA (27).

[Siddhānta]—As a matter of fact, they should be omitted; it is a substitute.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, they—i.e. the consecration-rites—*should be omitted.*—why?—*because it is a substitute*; the Fire in question has been declared to be *in the place* of—a substitute for,—the consecrated Fire; and this peculiar declaration sets aside the *Consecrated Fire*; and when the Consecrated Fire has been set aside, why should the consecration-rites be performed again?—They might have been done for the purpose of making the Fire *consecrated*; but what is required in the case is an *unconsecrated* Fire. Hence it follows that those rites should be omitted.

Shastra-hymns,—then, it may come in place of the Modificatory Sacrifices.—'What is the *place of the Modificatory Sacrifices*?'—The Terminuses beginning with the *Ukthya* are the modifications of the *Agniṣṭoma*-terminus;—the place of those terminuses is *after* the offering of the *Agniṣṭoma*;—and the offering in question may come in at this place; the place for all later offerings is *after* the regular offerings;—the offering in question is also a later offering;—hence this also should come at that same place."

SŪTRA (52).

NOT SO; BECAUSE THE INJUNCTION IS DISTINCT.

Bhāṣya.

What has been suggested cannot be right.—"Why?"—*Because the Injunction is distinct*; that is, the actions are different; the two actions—*Animal-sacrifice* and *Soma-sacrifice*—are entirely distinct;—the place referred to is the place for the *Soma-offerings*, not for the *Animal-offerings*.

From all this it follows that the time for the offering in question is *after all the Soma-offerings*.

Adhikaraṇa (15): *In the case of the 'Savanīya Cake', there is 'Utkarṣa' (Postponement) of the Deity.*

SŪTRA (53).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—" On the 'postponement' of the Sūktavāka, there should be no 'postponement' of the Deities of the Soma-offerings, because these are not subsidiary to the Animal-sacrifice; just as (in other cases), when there is 'postponement', there is no connection."

Bhāṣya.

Whenever the *Anuyājas* are 'postponed', they lead to the 'postponement' of the *Sūktavāka* also;—at this the deities of the *Savanīya cakes* are named thus—'*Bhṛjjannindrāya, harivatē dhānāḥ, pūṣaṇvatē karambham*' etc., etc.—

The question that arises is—Is the recital of these names of deities also 'postponed' with the 'postponement' of the *Sūktavāka* ? Or not ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is—"*On the 'postponement' of the Sūktavāka there should be no 'postponement' of the deities of the Soma,*—i.e. of the *Savanīya* —Why ?—*Because these deities are not subsidiary to the Animal-sacrifice*; the *Anuyājas*, being subsidiary to the Animal-sacrifice, can, on being 'postponed', lead to the 'postponement' of the subsidiaries of the Animal-sacrifice only, not of the subsidiaries of the Soma-sacrifice;—the *Savanīya deities* are subsidiary to the *Soma*; hence there should be no 'postponement' of these. —*Just as in other cases, when there is 'postponement' there is no connection*; just as, when the *Sūktavāka* is recited at the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice, when the deities of the *Darsha* sacrifice are carried along with it, these deities have no connection,—and *vice versa*;—and why is that ?—because the one is not subsidiary to the other;—similarly (and for the same reason) in the case in question, there should be no 'postponement'."

SŪTRA (54).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, there should be 'postponement', because of the presence of the sentence;—when the procedure is the same, if there is no connection, it is because no useful purpose is served by it.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the right course is that there should be 'postponement';—why ?—*because of the presence of the sentence*; as a matter of fact, the passage

mentioning the names of the Deities of the *Soma*-sacrifice is a part of the *Sūktavāka*—'*Bhṛjjanindrāya harivatē dhānāḥ puṣaṇvatē karambham sarasvatīvatē parivāpam*', all this being connected (syntactically) with the words, '*Ayam yajamānaḥ*';—similarly again, '*Indrāya harivatē dhānābhiḥ pūṣaṇvatē karambham sarasvatīvatē parivāpēṇa*', this being (syntactically) connected with the words—'*Sūpasthā adya dēvo vanaspatirabhavat*';—the names of these deities, when recited in the *Sūktavāka*, serve a useful purpose; if they are removed out of the context of the *Sūktavāka*, and they stand by themselves alone, they would be meaningless.—At the *Savanīya-offerings*, however, the *Sūktavāka* is not recited, wherein the names could be recited. The *Sūktavāka* is related to the *Animal-sacrifice*; hence the deities of that sacrifice are related to it naturally; hence it is only right that there should be a recital of the names of the deities of that sacrifice, and accordingly these should be 'postponed' when the *Sūktavāka* is 'postponed'. In this way the Vedic text becomes duly obeyed.

As for the argument that—"When there is postponement there is no connection",—*when the procedure is the same, if there is no connection, it is because no useful purpose is served by it*; the *Darsha* and the *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices have the same procedure,—hence the recital of the *Sūktavāka* is common to both;—it comes in in accordance with the needs of each case; there is no need for reciting the names of the deities of the *Darsha*-sacrifice at the *Paurṇamāsa*-sacrifice,—and *vice versa*; and the reason for this lies in the fact that it is only the deities to whom offerings have been made that are referred to (by the recital of these names), and at one sacrifice its own deities have been offered to, not any others. Hence the citing of the case of there being no connection where there is postponement—has no bearing on the case in question.

End of Pāda iii of Adhyāya XI.

ADHYĀYA XI.

PĀDA IV.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *In connection with the Rājasūya, at the 'Agnā-vaiṣṇava' and other offerings, the subsidiaries should be performed severally.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AS THERE IS ONE AND THE SAME INJUNCTION,—IN CONNECTION WITH THE RĀJASŪYA,—AT THE SEVERAL SACRIFICES WHOSE TIME AND PLACE ARE NOT SPECIFIED,—THE SUBSIDIARIES SHOULD BE 'COMMON', AS THERE IS COHERENCE."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Rājasūya*, there are certain Main Sacrifices whose time and place have not been specified,—e.g. '*Trisamyuktē dvē*' and so forth.

In regard to these the following question arises—At these Main Sacrifices, are the subsidiaries to be performed 'in common'? or severally?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"In connection with the *Rājasūya*, at the several Main Sacrifices of which the place and time are not specified, the subsidiaries should be performed 'in common'.—Why—*Because there is coherence* among them; i.e. they bring about the Result, jointly, not severally.—'How do you know that?'—*Because there is one and the same Injunction*; all these Main Sacrifices have been spoken of by means of the single (collective) name '*rājasūya*' used in the singular number in the word '*rājasūyēna*', and thereby connected with the Result; from which it is clear that it is the composite whole that brings about the result.—And the entire procedure is subservient to that act which is meant to be performed with a view to the obtaining of the result;—and the 'Procedure' consists of the *subsidiaries*; hence we conclude that the subsidiaries should be performed 'in common'."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT,—INASMUCH AS THERE IS A DISTINCT 'PERFORMANCE' CONNECTED WITH EACH 'FEE', THE SUBSIDIARIES SHOULD BE PERFORMED SEVERALLY, AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'IṢṬIS'; AS FOR THE 'COMPOSITE WHOLE', IT IS DUE TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE RESULT,—WHICH, BEING ONE ONLY, IS MENTIONED BY A SINGLE TERM.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the subsidiaries should be performed 'in common'; in fact, they should be performed severally.—Why?—*Because there is a distinct 'performance' connected with each 'Fee'*;—in connection with the sacrifices in question we find distinct 'sacrificial Fees' laid down—(A) '*Agnāvaiṣṇava ēkādashakapālaḥ, aindrāvaiṣṇavashcharuḥ, vaiṣṇavastrikapālaḥ—vāmano dakṣiṇā*';—(B) *Somāpauṣṇa ēkādashakapālaḥ, aindrāpauṣṇashcharuḥ, pauṣṇashcharuḥ,—shyāmo dakṣiṇā*' [At (A), the Fee consists of the 'dwarfish' bull, and at (B), it consists of the 'dark' bull];—when the Fees are distinct, the corresponding Performers also should be distinct; so that the Priests, whose services have been secured by the gift of the 'dwarfish bull' and who are the performers of the first 'triad of sacrifices' (A), can have no connection with the second 'triad' (B); similarly those whose services have been secured by the gift of the 'dark bull' who are the performers at the second 'triad' (B), can have no connection with the first 'triad' (A).—Thus then, there being distinct *Performers*, the subsidiaries also should be distinct;—*as in the case of the 'Iṣṭis'*; the subsidiaries performed at the time of the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice render no help to the *Darsha* sacrifice, on account of the difference in time; in the same manner, in the case in question, the performers or subsidiaries of one sacrifice can have no connection with the other; hence the subsidiaries should be performed separately (with each of the two *Triads*).

As for the argument that—"The Injunction being one and the same, the coherence of the latter is also meant",—the answer to that is this:—*As for the composite whole, it is due to the accomplishment of the Result*; i.e. it is by reason of the accomplishment of the Result that the whole is regarded as one composite whole,—*because the Result is one only*; i.e. the two triads of sacrifices have been spoken of together as a composite whole only because they bring about a single result,—not because there is *common* (joint) performance; *as in the case of the 'Iṣṭis'*; just as in the case of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, even though the two sacrifices (*Darsha* and *Pūrṇamasa*) are performed separately, yet they are spoken of as a composite whole in such texts as 'Desiring heaven one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices'.

SŪTRA (3).

ALSO THERE IS A TEXT POINTING TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

There is a text in another context which points to the same conclusion: '*Pūrvam trisamyuktamuttaram trisamyuktam*', here the two 'triads' are spoken of as 'former' and 'latter'; and this order of sequence would be possible only if the two were performed separately.—"Even though they formed part of a single performance, there would be an order of sequence in relation to the Main Sacrifice'.—Not so; from the sentence that follows this text it is clear that the order of sequence meant is between the two Main Sacrifices *along with their subsidiaries*,—that sentence being—'*Yat pūrvam trisamyuktam virajananam tat, yaduttaram trisamyuktam pashujananam tat*'; this connection of the Results is with the two 'Sacrificial Triads' as *along with their subsidiaries*, and not by themselves alone. Hence this is a clear indication of the *Siddhānta* view.

Adhikaraṇa (2): *At the Rajasūya, the Performers (Priests) are 'common'.*

SŪTRA (4).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"There should be no restriction",—if this is urged—[then the answer is as below].

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the same (*Rājasūya* sacrifice), we proceed to consider the following question—Are the Performing Priests to be the same till the end as those who began the sacrifice?—Or is there no restriction as to whether they are to be the same or different?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"There should be no restriction, since the Performer varies with each Fee; that is, those Priests whose services have been secured by the Fees prescribed for the *Pavitra* are for the purpose of working at the *Pavitra* and they come to an end at the end of the *Pavitra*; so that at the rites that follow, one may employ any performers one chooses,—the same or others. Hence there can be no restriction."

SŪTRA (5).

[Siddhānta]—Not so; because of being enjoined.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that there should be no restriction; in fact, those same who did the work in the beginning should go on till the end.—Why?—*Because of being enjoined*; at the very outset, at the time of 'appointment', the Performing Priests have been *enjoined* by the Sacrificer to the following effect—'Please perform for me this group of Rites named *Rājasūya*';—this appointment is done before the sacrifice is commenced; and as no differentiating peculiarity has been perceived, this 'appointment' must be held to be 'in common';—hence those whose services have been secured by this 'appointment' must continue for the purpose of all the rites (composing the *Rājasūya*).

Says the Opponent—"If the Priests were appointed for the whole composite sacrifice, then it would be as just explained; but if the 'appointment' has, at first, been made for the performance of the *Pavitra*, then the Priests so appointed would be for that one rite only, not for all."

Answer—Which of these two alternatives is the right one?—Undoubtedly that the 'appointment' is for the whole composite sacrifice; as it is only thus that the functions of the Priest are fulfilled without obstruction; otherwise (if the appointment had been made for the *Pavitra* only), the same Priests might not necessarily be there to work at the subsequent rites,—and

others too may not be available,—so that the performance would be obstructed.

SŪTRA (6).

THERE WOULD BE SIMPLICITY ALSO.

Bhāṣya.

If it is as explained, *simplicity* is secured; otherwise there would be 'appointment' at every rite, which would make it much too elaborate.—Then again, it is essential that there should be no separation between the Priest and the Sacrificer.—From all this it follows that the Priests are appointed for the whole composite sacrifice, and hence they should be held to be 'in common'.

SŪTRA (7).

ALSO BECAUSE THE PURPOSE IS ONE AND THE SAME.

Bhāṣya.

The Fees given in connection with the component rites also serve the one purpose of accomplishing the whole Composite Sacrifice; there is no purpose served by the performance of the component alone. It is with a view to the fact that the *Composite* should be accomplished by means of the *Components*, that the Priests are 'appointed' at the Component rite; but they have fulfilled their purpose only when the Composite Sacrifice has been accomplished. For this reason those same Priests should continue to perform the rites till the very end of the whole sacrifice.

Says the Opponent—"If the *Components* are only for the accomplishment of the *Composite*, then there should be 'payment for services' (Fee) for all Components once only; why should it be done over and over again?"

The answer comes in the following *Sūtra*:—

SŪTRA (8).

THE REPEATED DECLARATION IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PARTICULAR DETAILS.

Bhāṣya.

When it is possible to make the 'payment for services' in both ways,—with each component separately, or only once for all,—one particular method has been specifically laid down—as that it should be made with each component rite,—and this is done for the sake of specifying particular things and numbers (of things to be given)—such as 'The dwarfish bull is the Fee', 'at the *Abhiṣechanīya*, one gives Ten Thousand'; and the sense is that if the Fees are given in this manner, it leads to prosperity.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *At the 'Avēṣṭi' sacrifice, the subsidiaries are to be performed separately.*

SŪTRA (9).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AT THE AVEṢṬI, IT SHOULD BE DONE 'IN COMMON', BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the same *Rājasūya*, there is the *Avēṣṭi* sacrifice, laid down in the text—'The Cake baked on eight pans, to be offered to *Agni*, at which Gold is the Fee; the Cooked rice to be offered to *Bṛhaspati*, at which *Shitipṛṣṭha* is the Fee'.

In regard to this *Avēṣṭi*, we proceed to consider the question—Are the subsidiaries to be performed at it separately? Or 'in common'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*At the Avēṣṭi it should be done in common*; i.e. the performance of the subsidiaries should be held to be 'in common',—*because we find indicative texts*; we find an indicative text which points to the fact that the performance should be 'in common', that text being—'If the *Brāhmaṇa* performs the sacrifice, he should place the *offering to Bṛhaspati* in the middle, and then after having poured the various oblations, he should do the Pouring: if a *Vaishya* does it, he should place the *offering to Vishvēdēvas* in the middle;—if a *Kṣattriya* does it, he should place *the offering to Indra* in the middle'; this *placing* of the offerings is possible only if the performance is taken as one whole,—and it can be taken as *one* whole only if there is one performance 'in common';—hence the performance must be one and 'in common'.—'What you are putting forward is only an indicative text; what is the direct evidence bearing upon the matter?'—The direct evidence is afforded along with the Injunction, in the text—'*Athaitā dishāmavēṣṭayaḥ imam vā atha tam lokam' punarupāvarohanti*'.—Further, the *Avēṣṭi* has been spoken of in the following text as a single performance—'*Ētayā annādyakāmam yājayēt*' ['By this, one should sacrifice for the man desiring food']."

SŪTRA (10).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THROUGH DIRECT DECLARATION, IT IS CONNECTED WITH THE DESIRE FOR A CERTAIN RESULT.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the performance shall not be 'in common'.—Why?—The reason has already been given above (Sū. 2)—that a distinct Performer is connected with each Fee.

As for the argument that "we find indicative texts",—our answer to that is as follows:—*Through Direct Declaration*, the sacrifice in question is

connected with the Desire for a certain result,—it being so mentioned in the text 'By this one should sacrifice for the man *desiring food*'. It is true that the said indication is there; but there are no distinct Fees here; the Fees in connection with the *Rājasūya* are not admissible here. Then again, the text quoted '*By this sacrifice* etc.' speaks of the *Avēṣṭi* by means of a word in the singular number, as leading to a certain result (Food), which also is indicative of the subsidiaries being performed together; it is only thus that the said declaration would be explicable;—hence the indicative quoted is to be taken as based upon the said facts.

SŪTRA (11).

IF IT IS URGED THAT "IT IS BASED UPON THE FACT OF THE AVĒṢṬI ITSELF SUBSERVING THE PURPOSES OF THE SACRIFICE",—THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF THE CASTES.

Bhāṣya.

You may argue that "the indicative text may be taken as based upon the fact of the *Avēṣṭi* subserving the purposes of the sacrifice, so that it may be an auxiliary to the main sacrifice of the Context".—This however is not possible.—Why?—*Because of the mention of the castes*—'If the *Brāhmaṇa* performs the sacrifice,—if the *Vaishya*,' etc.;—at the main sacrifice itself there is no *Brāhmaṇa* or *Vaishya*,—as the *Rājasūya* can be performed by the *Kṣattriya* only, as declared in the text—'The *Kṣattriya* should perform the *Rājasūya*'. This shows that the text has no connection with the fact of the *Avēṣṭi* subserving the purposes of the Main sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The offerings of the 'Pavamāna-Iṣṭi' are to be made severally.*

SŪTRA (12).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"IN THE CASE OF THE PAVAMĀNA OFFERINGS, THERE SHOULD BE PERFORMANCE 'IN COMMON'; BECAUSE THERE IS ONLY ONE DECLARATION OF PROCEDURE."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with 'Fire-installation', there are the *Pavamāna offerings*, laid down as follows—'One should offer the cake baked on eight pans to *Agni-Pavamāna*, to *Agni-Pāvaka*, to *Agni-Shuchi*'.

In regard to this, we proceed to consider the question—In connection with these offerings are the subsidiaries to be performed 'in common'? Or severally?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*In the case of the Pavamāna offerings, there should be performance 'in common'*—" Why?"—*Because there is only one Declaration of Procedure*; the Declaration of Procedure in regard to these offerings is—'*Ahno nirupyāṇi*' ['They are to be offered during the day'], and this indicates a *common* joint performance;—and as no differentiating peculiarity is perceived, the performance should be 'in common'."

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS."

Bhāṣya.

"There is the following text indicative of common performance—'*Samānavarhīmṣi bhavanti*'; which is a reiteration, as it depicts an existing state of things."

SŪTRA (14).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE DIVERSITY OF PERFORMANCE, ON ACCOUNT OF DIRECT DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

There should be no 'common' performance in this case; in fact, there should be separate performances; and when there is this *difference*, the performance should be different in the first of the sacrifices from that in the later two—the performance being 'common' as between these two.—

"Why so?"—*On account of Direct Declaration*; there is this declaration—'If one desires to be wealthier and happier, for him the offering to *Agni-Pavamāna* should be made first, and then the later two offerings *with the same grass* should be offered to *Agni-Pāvaka* and *Agni-Shuchi*, etc., etc.'. What is there that a Direct Declaration cannot do? There is no burden too heavy for it. Hence it should be done as here declared.

"There is the argument based on *the Declaration of Procedure being one*;—what is the answer to that?"

What has been adduced by the Opponent is not a 'declaration of procedure'; it only lays down the *time*—'They are to be offered *during the day*'; hence it provides no reason in support of the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

SŪTRA (15).

IN A CASE WHERE THEY ARE DONE TOGETHER, IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE THE REITERATION OF A SETTLED FACT.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued above that "the declaration that 'they have the same grass' indicates that they are to be performed together".—Our answer to this is as follows:—*In a case where they are done together, it would be the reiteration of a settled fact*;—for instance,—there is this other declaration—'If one desires Brahmic glory, for him all the offerings should be made'; in this case there *is* joint performance; and when there is this joint performance, the declaration that 'they have the same grass' certainly becomes the reiteration of a settled fact;—the *joint performance* coming in as the answer to the question *what are to be offered*. The term '*nirupyāṇi*' is found to be used in the Plural Number; and as this *Plurality* appertains to the *offerings* that have been enjoined as to be secured, it must be taken as meant to be emphasised; when there is only one performance, such performance cannot be endowed with *plurality*; hence it follows that they should be performed together in the case referred to in the text cited ('If one desires Brahmic glory etc.'). [But the same cannot be true of the case in question, where the performance must be *separate*, as explained under Sū. 14].

[This Adhikaraṇa as presented by Maṇḍana Mishra is in the reverse order; according to him 'common' performance is the *Siddhānta*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *At the 'Dvādashāha, (a) the 'Dīkṣā', (b) the 'Upasat' and (c) the 'Sutyā' should each occupy Twelve Days.*

Bhāṣya.

We read—'For one desiring offspring, the *Dvādashāha* sacrifice should be performed'.

In regard to this, we proceed to consider the following—(A) Is each of the *Twelve* 'Days' of this sacrifice to consist of twelve distinct performances of each of the two—the *Dīkṣā* and the *Upasad*,—and with the *one* performance of the *Sutyā*, have twenty-five 'daily performances' each day—[having a total number of 300 'Days'] ?—Or (B) All these are to be done together on each of the twelve days themselves—(thus there being a total of 12 'Days' only] ?—Or (C) Should there be '*dīkṣā* on four days, *Upasads* on the other four days, and the *Sutyā* on the remaining four days ?—Or (D) Should each of the three—*Dīkṣā*, *Upasad*, and *Sutyā* be multiplied in its own place [so that there being 12 days for each, there would be a total of 36 'Days'] ?

[At the *Dvādashāha*, 'Twelve-Day-Sacrifice', each 'Day' constitutes a distinct act; the procedure transferred to this *Dvādashāha* is that of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, including *Dīkṣā*, *Upasad*, and *Sutyā*;—in order to preclude the number of these three as performed at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, it has been declared in regard to the *Dvādashāha* that 'there are to be twelve *Dīkṣās* and twelve *Upasads*';—the question is: what does this mean ? There are three possibilities:—(A) that the *Dīkṣā* should be performed on twelve days, then the *Upasads* on the next 12 days, and then the *Sutyā* on the last day, there being thus 25 days devoted to each of the twelve 'Days' of the *Dvādashāha*, which thus occupies 300 days ?—Or (b) all the three—*Dīkṣā*, *Upasad* and *Sutyā*—are to be done during all the twelve days of the Main *Dvādashāha* itself, which would thus occupy only 12 days ?—Or (c) that the performance of the three —*Dīkṣā* and the rest—is to be divided among the 12 days of the Main Sacrifice,—the *Dīkṣā* on the first four days, then the *Upasads* on the next four days, and finally the *Sutyā* on the last four days;—in this case also there being only 12 'days' taken.—Or (D) that the *Dīkṣā* should be done on 12 days, then the *Upasads* on the next 12 days, and then the *Sutyā* on the next 12 days—thus 36 days being taken up by the entire performance.]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* starts off with the following *Sūtra*:—

SŪTRA (16).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"AT THE DVĀDASHĀHA EACH 'DAY' SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY ITSELF,—EACH BEING A DISTINCT ACT; BECAUSE SUCH IS THE CASE AT THE ARCHETYPE".

Bhāṣya.

"'Each day', along with the *Dīkṣā* and the *Upasads*, should be completed by itself; i.e. there should be *twelve times twenty-five* (300) perform-

ances.—Why so ?—*Because such is the case at the Archetype*;—i.e. because at the *Archetype*, i.e. the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, each 'Day' is completed by itself along with the *Dīkṣā and the Upasad*; and the 'Day' in question, having the 'Day' of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* for its Archetype, must be a distinct act, and hence require the details separately for itself;—hence, as at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, each 'Day' should be completed by itself, along with the *Dīkṣā* and the *Upasad*."

SŪTRA (17).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"OR, ON THE DAYS OF THE MAIN SACRIFICE ITSELF SHOULD EACH BE PERFORMED ALONG WITH ALL ITS DETAILS,—AS AT THE MIDDAY EXTRACTION; BECAUSE SUCH IS THE DIRECT DECLARATION."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not as has been suggested, that there should be *twelve times twenty-five* performances; in fact, they should all be done on the twelve days of the Main sacrifice itself.—Why so ?—Because *such is the Direct Declaration* bearing on the 'Days'. In the very name '*Dvādashāha*', the number 'twelve' has been directly mentioned as relating to the 'Days';—this number would be militated against if there were *twelve times twenty-five* performances. Hence it follows that on each of the *twelve days*, each Main sacrifice should be performed; and as the subsidiaries are performed at the same time as the corresponding Main Sacrifice, all the *Dīkṣā* and *Upasads* of the Main Sacrifice should also be performed on the same day.—*As at the Midday Extraction*; there is the declaration that 'they make the *Sāntapanīya*-offering at the Midday Extraction', which shows that the subsidiaries also are performed at Midday; similarly should it be in the present case also.—Hence it follows that the details should be performed on the twelve days of the Main Sacrifice itself."

SŪTRA (18).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—"OR, BECAUSE OF THE CONNECTION OF THE REṢULT AND THE PERFORMER, THERE SHOULD BE JOINT PERFORMANCE,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'ĀGNEYA' AND 'AGNĪṢOMĪYA'.

Bhāṣya.

"Or, it is not right that the twelve 'Days' should be performed on the twelve days of the Main Sacrifice itself; in fact, *there should be joint performance*; i.e. the *Dīkṣā* on four days, the *Upasads* on the next four days, and the *Sutyās* on the last four days.—Why ?—*Because of the connection of the Result and the Performer*; i.e. the Main Sacrifices in question are jointly related to the Result and the Performing Priests; their relation to the Result being due to their connection with the collective name '*Dvādashāha*', which denotes the Sacrifice as one composite whole; and the relation to the Performer is

due—at the *Sattra*,—to the fact of the Sacrificer himself being the Performing Priest,—and at the *Ahīna*,—to the fact of there being a single Fee; to which facts also is due the fact of one and the same result accruing to the Performers;—and when a number of acts have the same Performers, it follows that they are to be performed together:—*As in the case of the Āgnēya and the Agniṣomīya*; the *Āgnēya* and the *Agnīṣomīya*, leading to the same result, and having the same performers, are performed together;—and when they are performed together, as there is no ground perceived for discrimination, it follows that the performance of the *Dīkṣā* and the *Upasads* must be 'common'.—Then again, the declaration regarding the *Dvādashāha*, 'Twelve Days', has got to be obeyed. So that by adopting this view, both ends are accomplished—*joint performance* as well as the number of 'days'. Thus this view is the most reasonable one."

SŪTRA (19).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE SHOULD BE MULTIPLICATION IN THEIR OWN PLACES; BECAUSE THE DECLARATION IS OF THE TIME OF THE MAIN ALONG WITH THE SUBSIDIARY SACRIFICES.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the view just set forth, is not right.—Why?—*Because the declaration is of the time of the Main along with the Subsidiary sacrifices*;—if the declaration had been of the time of the Main Sacrifices *only*,—not of the Subsidiaries,—then it might have been as suggested; as a matter of fact, however, what has been declared, in the text—'Twelve *Dīkṣās*, Twelve *Upasads*',—is the time of the Main Sacrifices along with the subsidiaries; as what it mentions is the time for the *Dīkṣās* and for the *Upasads*, separately. If then it were done on the four days, that would militate against this declaration. Hence it follows that there should be *multiplication* of the details *in their own places*.

SŪTRA (20).

THE NUMBER 'TWELVE' IS IN REFERENCE TO THEM.

Bhāṣya.

'In reference to them',—i.e. in reference to the *Dīkṣā*, the *Upasads* and the *Sutyā*;—first of all come the *Dīkṣās*, and there are *twelve* of these then and there;—then come the *Upasads*;—there are *twelve* of these also, then and there;—after these comes the *Sutyā*, which also becomes multiplied (into *twelve*), then and there;—and it is in reference to each of these that we have the number 'Twelve'.

SŪTRA (21).

THE NUMBER OF 'DĪKṢAS' AND 'UPASADS' IS DISTINCT, BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN DIRECTLY DECLARED AS DISTINCT.

Bhāṣya.

Further, having declared that 'For the sake of one desiring offspring, one should perform the *Dvādashāha* sacrifice', the '*trivṛt*' and other details have been proceeded with; this also shows that the number 'Twelve' is in reference to those. As a matter of fact, all the previous details ending with the *Vasatīvarī* are 'common', because of their time being different; those beginning with the *Avabhṛtha* come later, as they are subservient to the Relinquishing of the Initiation; says the text—'*Apsu dīkṣām pravēshayitvā dēvāḥ svargam lokamāyan, yadapsu snāti tāmēva dīkṣāmālabhatē, atha yadapo'-vabhṛthamabhyavayanti tāmēva dīkṣām punarapsu pravēshayanti*' [where it is declared that with the *Avabhṛtha*, they throw the Initiations into the water]. —The *Dīkṣā* had come into existence 'in common', and hence its 'relinquishment' also should be 'in common', as no differentiating reason is perceived.

SŪTRA (22).

TO THE SAME END THERE IS AN INDICATIVE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

In this way, the following declaration also becomes justified—'The *Dvādashāha* lasts for *Thirty-six days*',—which appears in another context.

SŪTRA (23).

EVEN WHEN THE INJUNCTIONS ARE DISTINCT, THERE MAY BE 'COMMON PERFORMANCE', DUE TO THE CONNECTION OF TIME BEING WITH THOSE COMPOSING ONE COMPOSITE WHOLE.

Bhāṣya.

As regards the argument that it would be 'as in the case of the *Āgnēya* and the *Agnīṣomīya*',—it is only right that in the case of the *Āgnēya* and the *Agnīṣomīya*, *even though the Injunctions are distinct*, there *should be 'common performance'*,—i.e. they should be performed together;—why?—because *the connection of time is with those composing one composite whole*; i.e. the time mentioned appertains to the Main and subsidiary sacrifices forming one composite whole, as is clear from the declaration that 'On the Full Moon Day, one should perform the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice along with its subsidiaries';

—it is for this reason that the performance in this case is 'in common',—the Main as well as the Subsidiaries being performed on the Full Moon Day itself.—In the case in question however the reason, that 'the time mentioned pertains to the Main along with the Subsidiaries', does not apply.—Hence the conclusion is that at the *Dvādashāha*, the Main and Subsidiary sacrifices are not to be performed on the *twelve days* (of the Main Sacrifice (itself),—as in the case of the *Paurṇamāsa*.

ADHIKARAṆA (6) : *Those subsidiaries whose time is not distinct from that of the Main Sacrifices should be performed separately.*

Bhāṣya.

We now proceed to consider the case of those Subsidiaries whose time is *not* distinct from that of the Main sacrifices—Should these be performed 'in common'? Or *separately*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows :—"They should be performed 'in common';—why?—because thus alone would the *Declaration of Procedure*,—'for one desiring offspring one should perform the *Dvādashaha*', which expresses joint performance,—be followed. This is what has been explained under *Sūtra* 11. 1. 64."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta* :—

SŪTRA (24).

IT SHOULD BE SEPARATE, BECAUSE THERE IS DIFFERENCE OF THAT ; IN THE PERFORMANCE, THE ACTIONS SHOULD BE SEPARATE, BECAUSE THEY ARE SIGNIFIED BY THE NAME OF THE MAIN SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

There should be separate performance ;—why ?—*because there is difference of that* ;—'that' stands for the *time* spoken of in the preceding *Sūtra* ; hence the meaning of the phrase is *because there is difference of time* ; when there is difference in *time*, the *performance* must be separate ; as happens in the case of the *Darsha* and the *Paurṇamāsa* ;—in the case in question also, there is *difference of time*,—'today', 'tomorrow', 'day after tomorrow' ;—hence here also *the actions should be separate*; i.e. the performance should be separate.—"How do you know that there is difference of time among the Subsidiaries ?"—*Because they are signified by the name of the Main Sacrifice* ; as a matter of fact, the Subsidiaries are included under the denotation of the name of the Main Sacrifice ; so that they are known to be such as are performed at the same time as the Main Sacrifice ;—if the Main Sacrifice is to be performed *today*, its subsidiaries also should be performed *today* ;—if the Main is to be performed *tomorrow*, the subsidiaries also should be performed *tomorrow* ;—if the Main is to be performed on *the day after tomorrow*, the subsidiaries also should be performed on *the day after tomorrow.* —Thus there should be separate performances.

SŪTRA (25).

AN INDICATIVE TEXT ALSO POINTS TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'The *Days* are completed with the end of the *Patnīsamyāja*'; this shows that each of the 'Days' ends with the *Patnīsamyāja* separately.

SŪTRA (26).

THE DECLARATION OF THE 'SUTYĀ TOMORROW' ALSO POINTS TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

There is the declaration—'*Samsthitē samsthitē'hani . . . . . prēṣayati*' (which speaks of the '*Sutyā*' as coming 'tomorrow');—the reduplicated phrase '*Samsthitē samsthitē*' indicates the difference of the several *Subrahmaṇyās*.

SŪTRA (27).

THERE IS DIFFERENCE OF ANIMALS ALSO.

Bhāṣya.

We find *difference of animals* also spoken of in the text—'The one animal that is in excess should be offered to *Indra-Agni*';—there could be no 'excess' of the animal, if there were not *several* animals; as a matter of fact, there are *eleven* animals and *twelve* 'days'; and all this is possible if the 'sacrificing' of the animals is done separately; if it were done 'in common', then all the *eleven* would be sacrificed at one and the same time.—From this also it follows that the Performance should be separate.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *At the time of the Upasads, the 'Inviting of the Subrahmaṇyā' should be done without any modifications.*

SŪTRA (28)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AT THE ADDITIONAL SUTYĀS, ALL SHOULD BE MENTIONED IN THE SUBRAHMAṆYĀ; BECAUSE OF THE CONNECTION AT THE ARCHETYPE; AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'ĀVĀHANA'.

Bhāṣya.

There is 'Inviting of the *Subrahmaṇyā*' done at the time of the *Upasads*, with the words '*Chaturahē sutyāmāgachchha maghavan*';—this becomes admissible at the *Dvādashāha* by virtue of the General Law.

In regard to this we proceed to consider the question—At the *Dvādashāha*, are the various *Sutyā-days* to be specifically mentioned in the *Mantra* used for the Inviting? Or should the *Mantra* be used in the same form in all cases?

[At the Archetype, the first *Sutyā* comes on the *thirteenth* day, beginning from the very first day; on the fourteenth day comes the second *Sutyā*; so on and on, the last (twelfth) *Sutyā* comes on the *twenty-fourth* day; at the first *Sutyā*, the words used for the Inviting of the *Subrahmaṇyā* are '*Chaturahē sutyāmāgachchha maghavan*'.—When, under the General Law, this *Mantra* comes to be used at the *Dvādashāha*, which is an ectype related to the said Archetype, should the word '*Chaturahē*' be changed into '*Chaturdashāhē*' in the case of the second *Sutyā* coming on the 14th day—'*Pañchadashāhē*' in the case of the third *Sutyā* coming on the 15th day, and so on,—the *Mantra* thus being used *twelve* times over with each *Sutyā*? Or should the same form with '*Chaturahē*' be retained for all *Sutyās*, and hence the *Mantra* should be used once only 'in common' for all the *Sutyās*?]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*At the additional Sutyās*, mention should be made of all the 'days';—why?—*because of the connection at the Archetype*; at the Archetype, the *Sutyā* 'day' has been mentioned in the Mantra;—all the other *Sutyā* 'days' have that Day for their Archetype; and all these should be mentioned.—*Objection*—'There is only one Deity in the case, *Indra*, who has been duly 'embellished' by the single mention of the *Sutyā* 'Day', and it remains so embellished throughout; hence any further mention of the 'day' would be superfluous'.—*Answer*—The embellishment brought about by the mention of the 'day' *today* can belong only to that main sacrifice which is performed *today*; hence for the sake of securing the embellishment on subsequent days, the mention should be made again and again.—*As in the case of the Āvāhana*; in the case of the text—'*Āgneyam kṛṣṇagrīvamālabhēta*, etc.', even though throughout the Deity is one only, *Agni*, yet, as the acts (offerings) are different, the sub-

sidiaries are performed separately. It should be the same in the case in question also."

SŪTRA (29).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, AS THE MANTRA IS EXPRESSIVE OF INDRA, THE MENTION SHOULD BE ONCE ONLY; BECAUSE THE TIME SERVES THE PURPOSE OF INDICATING, AND ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS NO DIFFERENTIATION.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, there should *not* be mention of all; the *Mantra* should be used in the same unmodified form.—"Why?"—Because *the mantra is expressive of Indra*; it is *Indra* who is embellished here by the mention of the 'Day'; and once embellished, he remains embellished, and does not need to be embellished again.—"But here he has been embellished in connection with the *Chaturaha* only, because the words are '*Chaturahē sutyāmāgachchha maghavan*'".—*Time* is not what is meant to be emphasised here; all that is meant to be emphasised is 'come O Indra'! If the *time* were meant to be emphasised, then there would be syntactical split—(*a*) 'Come O Indra!'—(*b*) 'Come on the *Chaturaha*'. The root '*āgachchha*' (come) with the particular ending cannot denote both these syntactical relationships.—"Why should the emphasis be laid on the connection of *Indra* with *Coming*, and not on the connection with the Time?"—That is so because the syntactical connection between '*maghavan* (*Indra*)' and '*āgachchha*' (come) is direct; while that between '*chaturahē*' and '*āgachchha*' is indirect, as the word '*sutyām*' has come between these two latter words (in the *Mantra* '*Chaturahē sutyāmāgachchha maghavan*').—"The connection between '*sutyām*' and '*āgachchha*' is also direct (no word coming between these); so that this also may be meant to be emphasised".—There is no incongruity in this, as there the character of '*Sutyā*' is not incompatible.—"But the term '*Chaturahē*' points to a particular *Sutyā*".—Not so.—"Why?"—*Because the time serves the purpose of indicating*; the mention of the *Chaturaha* as the time is meant only to serve the purpose of indicating the *Sutyā* (in general), the meaning being 'Come to the *Sutyās*, *Chaturaha* and the rest'. The reason for this lies in the fact that the Deity does not actually *come*, it only becomes the recipient and hence the predominant factor in the *sacrifice*. So that it is the fact of the *Sutyā* being a subsidiary to the *sacrifice* that is indicated by the term '*Chaturahē*'; and this subsidiary character subsists equally in all the *Sutyās*; hence the term '*Chaturahē*' becomes an indicator of all, by reason of that particular *Sutyā* being the first (most important) among them; as we find in such expressions as '*Iḍāntā ātithyā santiṣṭhatē*', '*Nānuyājān yajati*'.

Also because there is no differentiation:—It has been argued that "it should be as in the case of the *Āvāhana*".—Our answer to this is as follows:—The time has been differentiated in that case, the two 'black-necked' ones

having been intervened by the '*Saumya*'; so that a differentiating peculiarity is actually perceived—which indicates that the Deity in question is to be invited in connection with the *first* 'black-necked' animal, not in connection with the latter one.—In the case in question, however, the time of the several *Sutyās* has not been differentiated,—nor have they been intervened by anything,—hence there is no differentiating peculiarity perceptible in this case; and it has been already explained that the mention of '*Chaturaha*' does not serve the purpose of specifying any particular *Sutyā*.

From all this it follows that the *Mantra* should be used in its unmodified form throughout.

Adhikaraṇa (8) : *At the Vājapēya, the 'Shūla' and other things are common to the seventeen animals dedicated to Prajāpati.*

SŪTRA (30).

AT THE 'ANIMAL SACRIFICES', THE 'KUMBHI', THE 'SHŪLA' AND THE 'VAPĀSHRAPAṆĪ' SHOULD BE HELD TO BE IN COMMON, AS THEY ARE ALL-PERVADING.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Vājapēya*-sacrifice, in connection with the animals dedicated to Prajāpati, the *Kumbhī*, the *Shūla* and the *Vapāshrapaṇī* should be held to be 'in common'; *as they are all-pervading*;—one and the same *Kumbhī* is used for the cooking of the omentum of all the animals;—one and the same *Shūla* serves for the cutting of the Heart of all the animals;—and one and the same *Vapāshrapaṇī* is used in connection with the omentum of all the animals.—Hence all these should be held to be 'in common'.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *Even in the case of animals dedicated to diverse Deities, the Kumbhī and other things are to be held 'in common'.*

SŪTRA (31).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN THE DEITIES ARE DIFFERENT, THEY SHOULD BE DIFFERENT; AS THERE WOULD BE UNCERTAINTY."

Bhāṣya.

"At the *Ēkādashina* sacrifices (where eleven animals are sacrificed to eleven distinct deities), the *Kumbhī* and other things should be different;—*because there would be uncertainty*;—if the flesh, etc. of all the animals were placed in the same *Kumbhī* (Pot), then there would always be uncertainty as to which slices are of which animals; similarly with the heart and other limbs, and also the omentum."

SŪTRA (32).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, A DISTINGUISHING MARK MAY BE MADE, IF NECESSARY.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the articles should not be different.—Why?—Because the offerings are made together.—As for the argument that "there would be uncertainty",—*if necessary*, some distinguishing mark may be made, which would enable the slices to be distinguished.

Adhikaraṇa (10): *The Kumbhī (Pot) also should be held to be 'in common'.*

SŪTRA (33).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Inasmuch as it would be impossible for the omentum to be offered, it should be different; because it is an offering to be made at its own Yājyā."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not possible for the *Kumbhī* (Pot) to be 'common'; *because it would be impossible for the omentum to be offered*; in connection with the Archetype it has been declared—'With the half-verse of the *Yājyā* one offers the omentum'; at the Archetype, the omentum has been offered at the end of the half-verse *of its own Yājyā*;—in the case in question also it should be offered in the same manner. And yet it is not possible to put a distinguishing mark on the omentum (of the several animals when put into the same vessel). [Hence the separate offerings in question would be impossible]."

SŪTRA (34).

[Siddhānta]—As a matter of fact, it should be held to be 'in common', because it is a 'disposal'; specially as there is no mention of 'own'.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the *Kumbhī should be held to be 'in common'*, *because it is a disposal*; the omentum (Fats) in question are 'remnants', and the act in question is of the nature of 'disposal';—and a *disposal* cannot serve to prompt the securing of the substance in question [there being 'disposal' only when the substance is already there, to be *disposed of*];—how then can the disposal prompt the securing of the vessel for holding that substance?—Further, the omentum (Fats) of the several animals are entirely mixed up, and they all become offered at the end of the half-verse of their own *yājyā*.

Objection:—"It may be possible for the offering to be made at the end of the half-verse of other *yājyās* also."

Answer—There is no mention of 'own'; it has not been declared that 'the offering should be made at the end of the half-verse of *one's own Yājyā*, and not at the end of the half-verse of other *Yājyās*'.—So that if the offering is made at the end of the half-verse of other *Yājyās*, it would be neither harmful nor beneficial.

From all this it follows that the *Kumbhī* also should be held to be 'in common'.

SŪTRA (35).

"THEN ONCE ONLY," IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"If it is your view that there is no mention of 'own',—then, in that case, there may be only one offering at the end of the first half-verse of the *Yājyā*; in this way the 'association' shall be maintained, and yet the offering will have been made *at the end of the half-verse of the Yājyā*."

This objection is answered by the following *Sūtra*.

SŪTRA (36).

NOT SO, BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE IN TIME.

Bhāṣya.

It is not that there may be only one offering at the end of the first half-verse of the *Yājyā*; in fact oblations should be offered at the end of each half-verse.—"Why?"—*Because of the difference in time*; the 'ends of half-verses of *Yājyās*' are diverse; and the locative ending in the word '*Yājyārdhārchāntē*' denotes *occasion*,—the sense of the *container* or *receptacle* being impossible;—and if the *occasion* repeats itself, that which is contingent upon that occasion must be repeated; as we find in the case of the injunction 'offers libations on breakage'.—From this it follows that an oblation should be offered at 'the end of the half-verses' of *all Yājyās*.

ADHIKARAṆA (11) : *When the animals belong to diverse species, the 'Kumbhī' and other pots should be different.*

SŪTRA (37).

IN THE CASE OF DIVERSE SPECIES, THERE SHOULD BE DIFFERENCE, BECAUSE THERE IS DIVERSITY IN THE COOKING.

Bhāṣya.

When the animals sacrificed at the *Ēkādashina* are of diverse species (some *goats*, some *sheep* and so forth), *there should be difference* in the *Kumbhī* and other things ;—*because there is diversity in the cooking* ; the cooking of the flesh of sheep and that of goats is '*diverse*',—by the time that goat's flesh becomes *cooked*, sheep's flesh becomes melted away (being very much softer than the former) ;—under the circumstances, if both were cooked in the same *Kumbhī*, the slices would become mingled up. Hence we conclude that the vessels should be different.

SŪTRA (38).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND AN 'INCREASE'.

Bhāṣya.

We find that at the *Sautrāmaṇī* sacrifice, there is an increase in the number of '*Shūlas*' in connection with the Bull, Goat and Sheep,—as in the text—'*Shūlaishcha māsarēṇa chāvabhṛthamabhyavayanti*' [where the *Shūla* is mentioned by means of the word '*Shūlaiḥ*' in the Plural].—For this reason also, these should be different.

Adhikaraṇa (12): *At the 'Ashvapratigrahēṣṭi', there should be a distinct set of 'Four Pans' in connection with each Cake.*

SŪTRA (39).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"In connection with cakes of equal number, the Pans also should be treated like the 'Kumbhī'."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Ashvapratigrahēṣṭi* it is laid down that as many horses have been accepted so many 'cakes baked on four pans' should be offered—'*Yāvato'shvān pratigṛhṇīyāt tāvatashchatuṣkapālān vāruṇān nirvapēt*'.

In regard to this, we proceed to consider the following question—Should all the Cakes be baked upon the same set of 'four pans' long enough (to contain all the Cakes)?—Or should a different set of 'four pans' be used for each of the Cakes?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*The Pans should be treated like the Kumbhī*; that is, just as in the case of the animals dedicated to Prajāpati, there is a *common Kumbhī* (*Adhikaraṇa* 10), so also in the case of the Cakes of the same number (as the Horses) the Pans should be *common*;—and the reason for this lies in the fact that the required *association* is maintained, and all the Cakes become equally embellished 'on four pans'."

SŪTRA (40).

[Siddhānta]—They should be distinct with each main factor, as at the Archetype.

Bhāṣya.

There should be a distinct set of 'four pans' for each Cake; only thus would it be done *as at the Archetype*; at the Archetype, i.e. at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, there are distinct pans with each Cake; so in the present case also they should be made distinct, with a view to following the General Law.—Further, if the Pans were 'common', then not a single one of the Cakes would be 'embellished on four pans'; all of them would be baked on parts of the Pans; and this would militate against the use of the term 'Pan'.—Hence we conclude that the Pans must be different.

SŪTRA (41).

ONLY THUS WOULD THERE BE 'PRATHANA' (LAYING) OF ALL.

Bhāṣya.

There is the declaration—'One lays (spreads out) the Cake to the same size as the Pan'; this would be impossible if the Pans were *common*. For this reason also they should be different.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *In the case of the 'Thumping of the Corn', the Mantra shall not be repeated with each stroke.*

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* we read—'They thump the *Vrihi* corns';—the *Mantra* to be used at this Thumping is—'*Avarakṣo divaḥ sapatnam vadhyāsam*'.

In regard to this, we proceed to consider the question—Should the *Mantra* be repeated with each stroke (of the Thumping)? Or only once, at the beginning?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*The Mantra* should be repeated with each stroke.—Why?—Because one *stroke* is a different act from the other *stroke*; as the effort ends with each stroke;—when they are distinct acts, a differentiating condition is duly perceived, in the form of the idea that the *Mantra* belongs to that act along with which it is used;—and when this differentiating condition has been perceived, there must be difference. Hence it follows that the *Mantra* should be used with each stroke."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—

SŪTRA (42).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED THAT IN THE CASE OF A SINGLE SUBSTANCE, THE EMBELLISHMENTS FORM A SINGLE ACT.

Bhāṣya.

In cases where there is a single substance,—such as *Vrihi*,—*the embellishments* have been explained to form a *single act*,—that is, from the first stroke down to the preparation of the Rice, it forms a single act; as explained under *Sūtra* 5. 2. 5.—*Objection*—"It has been pointed out that each *stroke* forms a distinct act."—*Answer*—In the case in question, there is repetition of the same one act,—the Result being accomplished by such repetition only, as in the case of the Soma-sacrifice. But at the *Soma*-sacrifice,—as the purpose served by the *Mantra* is diverse, when the act is repeated, the *Mantra* is used more than once;—wherever the purpose served by the *Mantra* is diverse, there is repetition of it,—as for instance, of the *Lokampṛṇā* at the *Agni-sacrifice*;—where, however, the purpose served by the *Mantra* is one only, any repetition of that *Mantra* would be useless;—in the case in question the purpose served by the *Mantra* is one only.—"How do you know this?" The *Mantra* is of the nature of an 'instrument';—the *instrument* has been understood to serve the purpose of bringing about the thing required;—in the case in question, the thing to be brought about is *the whole lot of strokes collectively*; as it is collectively alone,—not severally,—that they

accomplish the purpose (of the preparation of rice) ;—what is desired to be accomplished is the sifting of the rice out of the Vrīhi-corn put into the mortar ; and it is this that is to be brought about. Thus it is the action of *the whole lot of strokes* that is aided by the *Mantra* ; and hence a repetition of it would be useless ; consequently the *Mantra* should be used only once.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *At the 'Nānābīja-Iṣṭi', the Mantra should be repeated with each stroke.*

SŪTRA (43)

WHEN THERE IS A DIFFERENT SUBSTANCE, THERE SHOULD BE REPETITION: AS IT HAS BEEN LAID DOWN FOR THAT PURPOSE; BECAUSE IT HAS ALREADY SERVED ITS PURPOSE; AND BECAUSE THE SAME ACT IS REPEATED [THE MANTRA SHOULD BE REPEATED], AS IT IS AN ACCESSORY OF THAT.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Rājasūya*, there is the '*Nānābīja-Iṣṭi*' (a sacrifice at which several kinds of grain are offered), laid down in the text—'*Agnayē gṛhapatayē ..... charum*' [where the grains laid down are the *Āshu* and the *Shyāmāka*]; the act of 'Thumping' along with the *Mantra* comes into the *Iṣṭi* by the General Law.

In regard to this also [the question being the same as in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*], the *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"in accordance with the principle of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Mantra* should be used only once, as for all the grains all that is wanted is *the removal of the chaff*, and this is accomplished by the single recital of the *Mantra*."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*When there is a different substance*,—a different kind of grain,—*there should be repetition of the Mantra*;—why?—*because it has already served its purpose*; i.e. the *thumping* done to the former grain has already served its purpose; because it is of the nature of a *Direct Helper*, and hence it embellishes that grain alone with which it comes into direct contact; and if it has embellished the former grain,—then, for the embellishment of the latter grain, it should be repeated; and when the act of 'Thumping' is repeated, there should be repetition of the *Mantra* also; because *it is an accessory to that*;—in connection with the other kind of grain also, the *Mantra* is an accessory of the act of *Thumping*; as it has been laid down for that purpose; i.e. it has been enjoined by the General Law bearing upon every one of the acts as to be repeated with each. Hence there should be a repetition of the *Mantra* with each kind of grain.

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *At the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa and other sacrifices, the Mantra is to be repeated with each act of 'Putting in' and the like.*

SŪTRA (44).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF THE ACTS OF 'PUTTING IN', 'LOPPING,' 'SPREADING' AND 'TAKING UP OF CLARIFIED BUTTER',—IT SHOULD BE AS IN THE CASE OF A SINGLE SUBSTANCE; AS THE PURPOSE SERVED IS ONE ONLY."

Bhāṣya.

(A) At the *Darsha-Pūrṇamasa*, there is the act of 'Putting in of four handfuls',—for which the *Mantra* laid down is '*Dēvasya tvā* etc.';—(B) similarly at the same sacrifice there is 'Lopping of grass' for which the *Mantra* is '*Varhirdēvasadandāmi*';—(b) similarly there is the act of 'spreading', for which the *Mantra* is '*Ūrṇamradasantvā stṛṇāmi*';—(D) lastly, there is the act of 'Taking up of Clarified Butter', for which the *Mantra* is '*Dhāmanāmāsi*'.

In regard to all this, there arises the question—Is the *Mantra* to be used only once? Or is it to be repeated with (*a*) each *handful*, (*b*) each *lopping*, (*c*) each *substance* (*spread out*), and (*d*) each *taking up*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—"*In the case of the acts of 'Putting in', 'Lopping', 'Spreading' and 'Taking up of Clarified Butter', it should be as in the case of a single substance, as the purpose served is one only*;—i.e. in the case of the acts enumerated, the *Mantra* should be used *as in the case of a single substance*, i.e. it should be used only once;—'Why so?'—*because the purpose served is one only*;—(A) in the case of the 'Putting in of Handfuls', the only purpose served is the preparation of the offering-substance;—(B) in the case of 'lopping', the only purpose served is the obtaining of grass sufficient to spread on the Platform;—(C) in the case of 'Spreading', the only purpose served is the covering up of the Platform;—(D) in the case of the 'taking up of Clarified Butter', the only purpose served is the securing of as much Clarified Butter as would be used at the sacrifice;—and the *Mantra* is to be used for as much of these acts as suffices to serve the said purpose,—as already explained above [and as the whole series of each of these acts serves to accomplish the particular course, the *Mantra* should be used *only once* in connection with the whole series of the acts in question]."

SŪTRA (45).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT SHOULD BE AS IN THE CASE OF DIVERSE SUBSTANCES; BECAUSE IT EMBELLISHES EACH ONE OF THEM.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, it should be as in the case of diverse substances,—not as in the case of a single substance; i.e. there should be separate repetitions of the *Mantra.*—"Why?"—*Because it embellishes each one of them*; when a quantity of grain has been 'put in' as one 'handful', that quantity has become embellished by that act; because the act of 'Putting in' is of the nature of a *Direct Helper*;—similarly the second 'putting in of a handful' also embellishes another quantity of the grain;—if then the *Mantra* were not used at this second 'Putting in', these grains would be deprived of the embellishment due to the use of the *Mantra.*—Similarly in the case of the other acts (of *Lopping* and the rest).—From this it follows that in the case of every one of these acts, the *Mantra* should be repeated.

Adhikaraṇa (16): *In the 'Washing of the Platform', the Mantra is not to be repeated with each washing.*

SŪTRA (46).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"In the case of the 'washing of the platform,' the Mantra should be repeated; because the act is done over again."

Bhāṣya.

The 'Washing of the Platform' has been laid down in the text—'He washes it thrice'; in connection with which the *Mantra* to be used is '*Vēdirasi varhiṣē tvā*, etc.'

In regard to this, we proceed to consider the question—Should the *Mantra* be repeated with each repetition of the act?—Or only once?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*In connection with the washing of the Platform, the Mantra should be repeated*;—why?—*because the act is done over again*; in the case in question there is this distinguishing feature that the *Mantra* subserves the purpose of that act alone where it is used;—hence it follows that there should be repetition of the *Mantra*."

SŪTRA (47).

[Siddhānta]—As a matter of fact, it should be used once only, because the substance is one and the accessory has been laid down for one only.

Bhāṣya.

The Mantra should be used once only;—why?—*because the substance is one only*; the substance concerned is one, in the shape of the *Platform*; this is embellished by the single recitation of the *Mantra*; there is nothing else to be done by the *Mantra* (for which it should be recited again).

Objection—"It is through the *act* that the *Mantra* embellishes the Platform; and the act is different (in the three cases)."

Answer—The *act* is not different; it is the same act repeated, *repetition* being its qualification. The affix '*Kṛtvasuch*' is used in the sense of the *repetition* of the same act, not in the sense of *different* acts. The *act* (of *washing*) has to be equipped with the *Mantra* and the *Repetition*;—it has become *equipped with the Mantra* by the single recital of this latter; it is only for securing its *repetition* that it is done again.

The conclusion therefore is that the *Mantra* is to be used only once.

Adhikaraṇa (17): *The 'Kaṇḍūyana-Mantra' should be used only once.*

SŪTRA (48)

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"In the case of 'scratching,' the act should be regarded as distinct with each limb (scratched), as the act is different."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is 'scratching' of the itching parts of the body,—for which the Mantra is '*Kṛṣiṣu syāma kṛṣa, etc.*'—When there is itching in several parts of the body at the same time, then there arises the question—should the *Mantra* be repeated with the scratching of each itching limb ?—Or should it be recited once only ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows :—"The *Mantra* should be repeated with each limb ;—why ?—*because the act is different*; the 'scratching' done to each limb is a distinct act ; as the activity of the man is complete with each, the peculiar feature that leads to the conclusion that the *Mantra* should be repeated."

SŪTRA (49).

[Siddhānta]—As a matter of fact, it should be regarded as one act,—the injunction pertaining to the time only.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, it cannot be as suggested above ; because it is not the 'scratching' that is enjoined in this case, the 'scratching' is done only on account of the need arising for it :—"What if it is so ?"—If the 'scratching' were enjoined, it would have to be regarded as serving an unseen (transcendental) purpose ;—as the injunction is useful only when what is enjoined is not already known [and it is only the transcendental result that would not be known in this case] ;—and as with each act (of 'scratching') the said result would vary, it would have to be assumed that there are *several* acts ; and in that case a distinguishing feature would be perceived [which would justify the repetition of the Mantra with each act].—When, however, as a matter of fact, the 'scratching' is only indicated by the actual need for it that arises there (in the shape of the itching in the body), then in that case the *act* that one wishes to do would be that (series of acts) by which the *itching* would be allayed ;—and there would be nothing to distinguish one part of this entire process from the other [and hence there would be nothing to justify the repetition of the *Mantra*].—"When one itching limb has been *scratched*, it has become embellished by that *scratching*,—and after that another itching limb would be *scratched* [and

this would be a distinct act of *scratching*]."—*Answer*—The activity in this case is not for *scratching the body*, but for *allaying the itching*; and this *itching* (*which is a sensation*) is in the conscious *soul*, not in the body; hence there is nothing to distinguish one (*itching* or *scratching*) from the other. Consequently the conclusion is that the *Mantra* should be recited only once.

ADHIKARAṆA (18): *At the Jyotiṣṭoma, in connection with 'sleep' and the like, the Mantra is not to be repeated.*

SŪTRA (50).

IN CONNECTION WITH (*a*) SLEEP, (*b*) RIVER-CROSSING, (*c*) RAIN-WETTING, AND (*d*) LOOKING AT AN UNCLEAN THING,—THE SAME CONCLUSION HOLDS GOOD.

Bhāṣya.

With reference to the Jyotiṣṭoma—(*a*) the *Mantra*, '*Tvamagnē vratapā asi, etc.*' has been laid down in connection with 'sleeping';—(*b*) the *Mantra*, '*Dēvīrāpaḥ, etc.*' in connection with 'river-crossing';—(*c*) the *Mantra*, '*Udantarīrojo dhattē, etc.*' in connection with 'rain-wetting';—(*d*) the *Mantra*, '*Adabdham chakṣuḥ, etc.*' in connection with 'looking at an unclean thing'.

The question that arises is—when one—(*a*) sleeps again after having risen from sleep,—or (*b*) crosses several streams of a river, one after the other,—or (*c*) is wetted by rain over and over again,—or (*d*) looks at several unclean things at one and the same time,—should there be a repetition of the *Mantra* concerned? Or should it be recited only once?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"inasmuch as each of the repeated acts is a distinct act, there should be repetition of the *Mantra*".

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—In the case of *sleeping* and the rest also, it should be the same as in the case of *scratching*;—i.e. the Mantra should be recited only once. When the man recites the *Mantra* in connection with *sleep*, it refers to *sleeping* throughout the night, not to only one instalment of sleep. Similarly, it is with reference to *the crossing of all the streams*, to all *rain-wettings* and to all *unclean things*. And as in each case the reference is made to the entire series at one and the same time, there is nothing to indicate with which particular action the *Mantra* is connected.—Hence there should be no repetition of the *Mantra*.

Adhikaraṇa (19) : *At the retirement of the Initiated sacrificer the Mantra is not to be repeated.*

SŪTRA (51).

In the case of Retirement, till the purpose has been accomplished.

Bhāṣya.

When the Initiated Person is retiring to rest, in connection with his starting, there is the *Mantra*, '*Bhadrādabhishrēyaḥ prēhi, etc.*'.

In regard to this, we proceed to consider the question—Should the Sacrificer repeat the *Mantra* each time that he retires to rest ? or only once, at the beginning ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"inasmuch as each *retirement* is perceived to be a distinct act, the *Mantra* should be repeated with each Retirement."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta* :—*In the case of Retirement, till the purpose has been accomplished* ; it is for some purpose that the man *retires*,—and till that purpose has been fulfilled, it is all a single act of 'Retirement' ; hence the *Mantra* should be recited only once.

ADHIKARAṆA (20): *There should be repetition of the 'Uparava-mantra'.*

SŪTRA (52).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'UPARAVA-MANTRA' SHOULD BE HELD TO BE 'COMMON', BECAUSE OF THE PLURAL NUMBER,—AS IN COMMON PARLANCE."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is the following *Uparava-Mantra*—'*Rakṣohaṇo valgahano vaiṣṇavān khanāmi*' [laid down for the digging of the four pits called '*uparava*'].

In regard to this there arises the question—Should this *Mantra* be recited only once in common for all the Pits? or should it be repeated with each Pit separately?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*The Uparava-mantra should be held to be in 'common'*,—i.e. it should be recited only once;—why?—*because of the plural number*; we find the word '*vaiṣṇavān*' in the plural number; if the *Mantra* were meant to be repeated with each Pit, then the word with the plural ending would not be applicable to the single Pit;—*as in common parlance*, the plural number is not used with reference to any *single* thing.—Further, as a matter of fact, the Mantra, on being recited once, is capable of applying to all the Pits; and when it can do this, its repetition would be useless.—Hence it should be recited only once."

SŪTRA (53).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT SO; BECAUSE IT HELPS DIRECTLY. IT IS ONLY AMONG SUCH ACTS AS ARE NOT DIRECTLY HELPFUL THAT THERE BEING NO DISTINCTION PERCEPTIBLE, THE RECITAL IS DONE ONCE ONLY, AS THE TIME IS ONE.

Bhāṣya.

Not so; i.e. the *Mantra* should not be held to be 'in common'.—Why?—*Because it helps directly*; the act of *digging* (of the Pit) is directly helpful; and it is recognized as to be related to that particular Pit which it has helped.—The *Mantra* also is directly helpful; because the end of the *Mantra* coincides with the beginning of the *act* (of *Digging*);—hence when the *Mantra* has been used in helping the digging of one Pit, the embellishment brought about by that *Mantra* belongs to that *Pit* alone, not to all the Pits. Hence in the

case in question, the *Mantra* is to be recited, *not once only* [but once with each of the four Pits].

It is only among such acts as are not directly helpful that, there being no distinction perceptible, the recital is done once only ;—i.e. those Mantras that are related to acts that are not directly helpful,—e.g. the *Mantra* '*Devā brahmāṇaḥ, etc.*' used in connection with the Inviting of the *Subrahmaṇyā*,—as the *Upavasathya day* is the one time for them, and no other distinction is perceptible,—they are recited once only.

As for the argument that "the word with the plural ending cannot signify any *single* thing", what is really meant to be signified by the word is what is denoted by the basic noun ; as for the *ending*, that denotes the *objective character* (of the Pit) ; and there is nothing that is denoted separately by the plural number itself ; in fact, it does not deserve to be denoted separately, as there is no term that can denote it.—Or the plural number may apply to a *single* thing, the plural number being explained as signifying *reverence*. Thus there is no incongruity in the *Siddhānta* view.

SŪTRA (54).

IN THE CASE OF THE 'HAVIṢKṚT,' THE 'ADHRIGU,' THE 'PURONUVĀKYĀ,' AND THE 'MANOTĀ,'—THERE SHOULD BE REPETITION, BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE IN TIME.

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* sets forth the counter-instances to what has been said in the last three *Sūtras* ;—being an answer to the question—Why has the *Sūtra* (53) added the phrase '*Kālaikatvāt*', 'as the time is one'?—The answer is provided in this *Sūtra* which cites certain cases where *the time not being one* there is repetition.

Or this *Sūtra* (54) may be taken as setting forth a distinct *Adhikaraṇa* as the following :—

ADHIKARAṆA (21) : *There should be repetition of the Mantras connected with the 'Haviṣkṛt', etc.*

SŪTRA (54).

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there are *Savanīya-cakes* offered at each 'Extraction' ; at these there is invitation of the Haviṣkṛt (the sacrificer's wife, who prepares the offering) [for which the *Mantra* is '*Haviṣkṛdēhi, etc.*'] ;—(*b*) in connection with the *Vājapēya*, there are the 'Sacrificial animals', and also the 'animals dedicated to *Prajāpati*', in

reference to which there is the direction addressed to the *Adhrigu-priest* [this direction being in the form of the *Mantra*—'*Daivyāḥ shamitāraḥ, etc.*']; (c) there is the *Puronuvākyā-Mantra* ['*Agnē naya supathā, etc.*'] related to the 'two black-necked goats';—and (d) there is the *Manotā-hymn* ['*Tvam hyagnē prathamo manotā, etc.*'].

In regard to these, we proceed to consider the following question.—In these cases, is the *Mantra* to be recited only once? Or is it to be repeated?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"in order to preserve the joint character of the actions, the *Mantra* should be recited only once."

In answer to this, there is the following *Siddhānta*:—*There should be repetition*;—why?—*because of the difference in time*;—when the '*Inviting of the Haviṣkṛt*', or the '*Directing of the Adhrigu*', is done at the *Morning-Extraction*, a distinctive feature is perceived whereby it is recognized that the *Haviṣkṛt* referred to is one who makes the Cakes for the *Morning Extraction* and the *Adhrigu* is one connected with the *sacrificial animals*.—Similarly, inasmuch as the two 'black-necked goats' are separated by the '*Saumya* animal', it is understood that the *Puronuvākyā* and the *Manotā* appertain to the former of the two goats.—In all these cases the time is different, and by reason of this difference in time, a distinction is perceived; hence there should be repetition.

SŪTRA (55).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS REVERSAL OF THE ADHRIGU.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the *Adhrigu*, there is this further peculiarity, that there would be '*reversal*'. That is, if the *mantra* were used 'in common', —then, if those details relating to the *Adhrigu* which come before the details of 'the animals dedicated to Prajāpati',—e.g. the *mantra* '*Āshrutapratyāshrutē ajaidagniḥ, etc.*',—were performed at the *Morning Extraction*,—then the section ending with the *Paryagnikaraṇa* would not be abandoned;—if, in order to avoid this incongruity, the said details were performed at the *Brahmasāman*, then there would be 'reversal', by performing, *after* the *Adhrigu*, of what should have been done *before*.—For this reason also there should be repetition.

Further—

SŪTRA (56).

BECAUSE OF THE DECLARATION OF WHAT IS GOING TO BE DONE.

Bhāṣya.

There is the following declaration of the *Adhrigu*—'*Ārabhadhvam-upanayata*', which speaks of what is going to be done at the time; if this were said at the *Morning Extraction*, then as that would not be the proper time for the act spoken of, the sentence would be unable to express that idea;

—if the declaration is meant to be a *direction*,—then too, the Direction is for the purpose of bringing about activity ; yet, in connection with the ' animals dedicated to Prajāpati ', the sentence is not used for prompting activity,—because there is an intervention of a large lot of actions ; so that the notion of ' Directing ' is lost sight of ; and thereby also the sentence becomes inexpressive. For this reason also the *Siddhānta* is that there should be repetition of the *Adhrigu-mantra*.

End of Pāda iv of Adhyāya XI.

End of Adhyāya XI.

ADHYĀYA XII.

PĀDA I.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *The 'Prayāja' and other rites connected with the Agnīṣomīya animal help the Cake.*

Bhāṣya.

'*Tantra*' (Common, Centralization) and '*Avāpa*' (Uncommon, Decentralization) have been dealt with under Discourse XI. Now under Discourse XII is going to be explained '*Prasaṅga*', 'Extended Application'. The exact signification of the term '*Prasaṅga*' has been already explained above (under *Sūtra* 11. 1. 1) in the words—'[That which is common is *Tantra*; it is not prompted by the needs of other things]; so also is *Prasaṅga* which has its own injunction present'.—In short, when something done in one place is helpful in another place also, it is a case of '*Prasaṅga*' (Extended Application); for instance, when the Lamp lighted in the house illumines the public road also.—It is this *Prasaṅga* that we are going to consider now.

In connection with the *Agnīṣomīya-animal-sacrifice*, there is an offering of *Pashu-puroḍāsha* (Meat-cake), laid down in the text—'Having offered the omentum of the animal sacrificed to *Agni-Soma*, one should offer the Meat-cake baked on eleven pans, dedicated to *Agni-Soma*'.—The question in regard to this is—Should the subsidiaries (*Prayāja, etc.*) be performed in connection with this Meat-cake-offering separately ?—or is it to be taken as helped by those same subsidiaries as they have been performed in connection with the main Animal-sacrifice ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is stated in the *Sūtra* itself :—

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—" WHEN THERE IS A CONGREGATION OF SUCH MAIN SACRIFICES AS HAVE COMMON ACCESSORY DETAILS,—THERE IS A COMMON PROCEDURE AMONG THOSE THAT ARE SIMILARLY ENJOINED; AMONG THOSE NOT SO SIMILAR, THERE SHOULD BE DIVERSITY; BECAUSE IT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF UNDERTAKING THE PERFORMANCE; AND THAT IT IS FOR THAT PURPOSE IS DUE TO THE DIRECT DECLARATION OF TIME."

Bhāṣya.

"The term '*tantra*' stands for that set of accessory details which is 'common'—such as the '*Ājyabhāga*' and the rest for the first half, and

'*Sviṣṭakṛt*' and the rest for the second half;—those Main sacrifices that have such a common set of accessory details are called '*tantrin*';—*when there is a congregation of such Main Sacrifices*,—i.e. when they are such as are to be performed at the same time and place and by the same performers,—then, *among those that are similarly enjoined*,—i.e. among those that are enjoined by the same sentence,—*there is a common procedure*; as we find in the case of the *Darsha-Purṇamāsa* and the *Chitrā-Iṣṭi*.—*Among those not so similar there should be diversity*; i.e. among those that are not similarly enjoined,—i.e. are enjoined by distinct sentences,—there should be diversity of procedure; as we find in the case in question itself,—of such injunctions as, 'One should sacrifice the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*', 'One offers the Meat-cake baked upon eleven pans, dedicated to *Agni-Soma*'.—'Why should it be so?'—*Because it is for the purpose of undertaking the performance*; '*vidhi*' is *procedure*, the performance of the subsidiaries;—the '*prakrama*' of it is *proceeding with it*; it is for the sake of *undertaking* the said performance; i.e. it is recognized that the *undertaking of the performance* is for that purpose; i.e. it is understood that the undertaking of the performance is for the purpose of the *Animal-offering*, not for that of the *Cake*.—' But how is it recognized that the undertaking of the performance is for the purpose of the *Animal-offering*?'—*That it is for that purpose is due to the direct declaration of time*; it is by Direct Declaration that the time is indicated,—the time for the Animal-offering being indicated as *after the bringing up of the animal dedicated to Agni-Soma*; it is in reference to that time that it has been enjoined; the time for the Cake-offering being after the offering of the omentum. So that 'the undertaking of the performance' that is done on the occasion of the Animal-sacrifice is recognised to be for the purpose of the *Animal-offering* only. As for the *Cake*, it is not even known as yet (as to be offered); hence its procedure should be entirely distinct.—There is an indicative text also which points to the fact that the procedure in question is for the purpose of the Animal-offering—'*Yadēkādasha prayājān yajati pashumēva tat prayajati*' and '*Yadēkādashānuyājān yajati pashumēva tadanuyajati*';—the presence of the particle '*ēva*' indicates *emphasis*,—the sense being that it is the Animal-offering *only*, not the *Cake-offering*."

SŪTRA (2).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"THE PROCEDURE SHOULD BE DIFFERENT, ALSO BECAUSE OF THE MODIFICATION OF THE ACCESSORY AND THE TIME."

Bhāṣya.

Further, the *Prayājas* and *Anuyājas* connected with the Animal-sacrifice are all such as undergo modifications regarding Accessories and Time; for nstance, (A) at the *Animal-offering*, both the *Prayājas* and the *Anuyājas* are eleven in number,—while at the *Cake-offering* there is need for only five *Prayājas* and three *Anuyājas*;—the *Anuyājas* at the *Animal-offering* are performed with the *Curd-Butter-Mixture*, while the *Cake-offering* needs only

Clarified Butter;—(B) similarly there is modification regarding *Time* also: The *Prayājas* connected with the *Cake-offering* are performed when the offering-substance is close at hand, while those connected with the *Animal-offering* are performed while the *animal* is actually standing there,—as laid down in the text, 'They offer the *Prayājas* over the standing animal'.—Thus if both these (Prayājas and Anuyājas) were not done *separately* for the *Cake-offering*, they would not be done properly. For this reason also, there should be separate performance."

SŪTRA (3).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE PROCEDURE OF THE MAIN OFFERING ITSELF; BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN ENJOINED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE PROCESS; SPECIALLY AS THE PURPOSE OF THE PROCEDURE IS NOT DISTINCT.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, the procedure of the *Cake-offering* should not be performed separately; *it should be accomplished through the Procedure of the Main offering itself*,—i.e. the Procedure of the Animal-offering itself would help the *Cake-offering*.—"Why so?"—*Because it has been enjoined in the middle of the Process*; as a matter of fact, the Cake-offering has been laid down in the middle of the process of the Animal-offering, in the text.—'*Agnīṣomīyasya vapayā pracharya agnīṣomīyam pashupuroḍāshamēkādashakapālam nirvapati*'.—"What if it is so?"—It means that *the purpose of the Procedure is not distinct*;—the term '*tantrārtha*' stands for the *purpose of the Procedure*, i.e. *the help rendered by the subsidiaries*,—and this remains non-distinct, i.e. the same, in the case of the Animal-offering and the Cake-offering; because the condition of 'proximity' is the same in both cases; the subsidiaries performed in connection with the Animal-offering are in proximity to the Cake-offering also; and by virtue of this proximity, they also help the Cake-offering,—like the Lamp; i.e. just as the Lamp lighted in the house illumines the public road also.

Objection—"The example cited is not appropriate; the help rendered by the Lamp is visible and is hence recognized by Direct Perception; the help rendered by the subsidiaries, on the other hand, is imperceptible; how can it be recognized?"

Answer—This latter also is visible (cognisable) through the scriptures, and can be recognized on the authority of the scriptures; the scriptural text bearing on the case being—'They (the subsidiaries) should be performed as in the case of the *Darsha-Purṇamāsa* sacrifices'. If, then, they are done 'as in the case of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices', why should they not help? In the case of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, they have rendered the help when performed at the same time and place and by the same performers as the Main sacrifice; so in the case in question also, they are

performed in the same manner; and hence it follows that they render the same help here also.

Says the Opponent—"The subsidiaries in the case in question are not quite like those in the case of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*; they have been performed at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* in connection with the Main sacrifices; here also they should be performed like that; they are however done, not in connection with the *Cake*, but in connection with the *Animal*; hence they cannot be regarded as done, in regard to the Cake, 'in the manner of the Archetype'."

The answer to this is as follows:—In regard to the Archetype, the teaching is not *verbal*,—there being no such declaration as that 'the subsidiaries should be performed in reference to the Main Sacrifices'; in fact, it is so done simply because of the exigencies of the situation; simply because it is desired to perform them in that manner;—what is done at the Archetype under the stress of exigencies cannot be made admissible elsewhere (at the ectypes) by virtue of the General Law; because it is only the procedure of the action that is needed at these latter; hence only that much is brought in under the General Law which has been actually enjoined by a text; not anything beyond that. Thus it is that, even though not performed in reference to the Main Sacrifices, the subsidiaries may be regarded as performed 'in the manner of the Archetype'.—From all this we conclude that help is actually rendered by *Prasaṅga* (Extended Application).

Opponent—"Such being the case, this '*Prasaṅga*' is in no way different from '*Tantra*'."

Not so; what is 'common' in the case of '*Tantra*' is the subsidiary itself, while in the case of '*Prasaṅga*', it is the *help rendered by the subsidiary* that is 'common'; as a matter of fact, this *help* too is not exactly *common*; what happens is that the help rendered to one benefits the other also.

SŪTRA (4).

EVEN ON ACCOUNT OF 'MODIFICATION', THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFERENCE; AS THE PURPOSE SERVED IS NOT MODIFIED.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued above that "the procedure should be different, also because of the modification of the Accessory and the Time" (Sū. 2). Our answer to this is as follows:—*Even on account of a 'modification' there would be no difference, as the purpose served is not modified*; the 'purpose served' is *the help rendered by the subsidiaries*;—this is not modified; it remains the same as at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*.—"How do you know that?"—*Answer*—The *Prayājas* and *Anuyājas* that are performed are related to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*;—the names '*Prayāja*' and '*Anuyāja*' are well known; all these come into the sacrifice in question by virtue of the General Law and are in close proximity;—it is also only reasonable that words should refer

to things in the same context ;—nor is it right to take a word as having more than one meaning ;—hence it follows that the *Prayājas* and *Anuyājas* are those related to the *Darsha-Purṇamāsa*, and that the help rendered by them is also related to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* ; in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, this help is well known ; if the *Prayājas* and *Anuyājas* rendered help other than that related to the context (benefiting the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*), then, by reason of their doing what is not related to the context, they would not become admissible under the General Law ; they would, in fact, be something entirely new,—just like the 'anointing with *Guggulu*' at the *Sattra*. —If then, they did not come in under the General Law, then one and the same text would have two functions,—of laying down the *Prayājas*, as well as this modification of the *Prayājas* ;—and yet a single text, appearing only once, cannot enjoin two things. If, under the circumstances, these *Prayājas* were something entirely new (unknown),—then the details related to the Archetype would also come in by virtue of the General Law ; and in that case it would not be possible for the number of oblations at the *Vaishvadēva* to become 'Thirty', as described in the text—'*Nine Prayājas,—nine Anuyājas,—two Ājyabhābgas*,—eight offerings one takes out for *Agni*, and then offers to the *Vājins*,—in order to make up the number *Thirty*'.

From all this it follows that, even though there is modification of the Accessories, the help rendered to the Archetype remains unmodified ; and this help, as rendered there, benefits the *Cake-offering* also ; so that even on account of the modification of the Accessory and the Time, there is to be no difference in the Procedure. Thus it is that this help is sought after by both, the Animal-offering as well as the Cake-offering ;—at both of these the subsidiaries are performed 'in the manner of the Archetype' ;—hence, by being performed once, they help both.

"For what purpose then is the *modification* ?"

It is for the purposes of the *Animal-offering* ; the said modification is found mentioned among the *Prayājas* and *Anuyājas* related to the Animal-offering ;—and the subsidiaries are not common to the Animal-offering and the Cake-offering ; the fact of the matter is that these subsidiaries belong to the *Animal-offering* only,—and yet even so, they benefit the *Cake-offering* also, on account of proximity ; as already explained above.

Then again, even when the *Anuyājas* are performed with the *Curd-Butter-Mixture*, they may be regarded as performed with 'Clarified Butter', because the 'mixed character' does not destroy the nature of the 'Butter' ; for instance, when a man is told to feed *on milk*, if the milk given to him is mixed with sugar, that does not involve an infringement of the former statement ; as mixed with the sugar also, the milk remains *milk* all the same.—Similarly, when a man performs the eleven *Prayājas*, the *five* of these that he performs are those same that are related to the Archetype, and if the *six* others that he performs are other than those related to the Archetype, this latter act of his does not mean that the former *five* have not been performed.—So also if the *Prayājas* are performed while the *Animal* is standing there, they may be regarded as performed in connection with the *Cake*,—all that has happened is only that the original order of sequence has

been abandoned; but the *order of sequence* is only an accessory detail;—and it is not right for the Main act to be repeated for the sake of an accessory detail; as the *Main act* cannot be under the influence of the Accessory Detail; it may be that the abandonment of the order of sequence necessitates an Expiation; but there cannot be repetition of the Main act.—"In that case, the Expiation would have to be done".—It is certainly done,—the oblation offered with the *mantra* '*Ayāshchāgnē*, etc.' being declared to be an expiation for all sins (of omission and commission).—Or even the Expiation may not be necessary, as the abandoning of the order is due to certain circumstances. Thus then there is no incongruity at all.

SŪTRA (5).

ALSO BECAUSE IN THE CASE OF SOME, IT CANNOT BE DONE.

Bhāṣya.

In the case of some of the details, it is not possible for them to be done separately; as for instance, the Bringing up of the Fire to the Platform, and the *Vratopāyana* (Restricted Feeding). When the Platform has been set up once and remains undemolished, it cannot be set up again; for a thing that has been made once need not be made again, so long as the one made continues to exist.—It might be argued that "a second Platform can certainly be set up".—This would be sheer fool-hardiness; and secondly, the second one set up would be not quite straight (as the exactly straight position would be taken up by the Platform already in existence); and this would lead to a confusion of the quarters;—and it would also involve separate altars, which is not countenanced by the scriptures; and lastly, it would mean the abandonment of the principle that 'the subsidiaries should be performed at the same time and place and by the same performers as the Main sacrifices'.—Thus then the said *Bringing up of the Fire* being for the purpose of securing the *Āhavanīya Fire*,—and this having been secured by the first *Bringing up*,—it cannot be secured over again in the same manner in which it has been already secured.—It might be argued that "one can set up another *Āhavanīya* Fire".—But as a matter of fact, so long as the first *Āhavanīya* remains unextinguished, there can be no second *Āhavanīya*; because *firstly*, the *Gārhapatya* Fire and the *Āhavanīya* Fire are both located in the same place;—and if the *Āhavanīya* were removed, the *Gārhapatya* would be left alone; just as, when out of the Clarified Butter contained in the *Dhruvā-vessel*, which is common to all offerings, the Clarified Butter for the purposes of the *Upāmshuyāja* has been taken out, what is left becomes useful for the offerings to other deities;—and *secondly*, the process suggested would bring about the anomaly of two separate Altars, as in the previous case; and this would involve all those incongruities that have been pointed out above.—Similarly the *Vow* taken up once cannot be taken up again, unless the former has been given up; and it cannot be given up until the final completion of the Main sacrifice.

SŪTRA (6).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS A TEXT INDICATING THE SAME FIRE.

Bhāṣya.

The following text shows that the Animal-offering and the Cake-offering are related to one and the same Fire—'*Madhye'gnērājyāhutīrjuhoti, puroḍāshāhutīḥ pashvāhutīshcha*' [' At the centre of the Fire, one offers the oblations of Clarified Butter, those of the *Cake* and those of the *Animal* ']. This means that there can be no separate *Bringing up of the Fire*; from which it follows that the Procedure of the *Animal-offering* is applicable to (and helps) the *Cake-offering.*

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The 'Two Ājyabhāga-offerings' should be made in connection with the 'Cake offering'.*

SŪTRA (7).

ACCORDING TO JAIMINI, WHEN THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF THE EXTERNAL PROCEDURE COMING IN, THE INTERNAL PROCEDURE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the same 'Meat-cake', there arises the following question —Should the '*Ājyabhāga-offerings*' be made or not?

[There is the distinct prohibition—'These two *Ājyabhāga*-offerings are not made at the Animal-sacrifice'; thus, when they are absent at the Animal-sacrifice, they cannot come into the Cake-offering by 'Extended Application' (*Prasaṅga*) by virtue of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*; hence, the conditions of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* not being fulfilled, the matter remains in doubt.]

It is remarked, in this connection, that what has got to be considered here is—Does the 'General Law' become set aside by the 'Declaration of Procedure'? Or the 'Declaration of Procedure' by the 'General Law'? —If the 'General Law' is set aside, then the *Ājyabhāga-offerings* should not be made; while if the 'Declaration of Procedure' is set aside, then the said offerings should be made.—What then is the right course?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"It is the 'General Law' that is set aside.—Why?—Because the 'General Law' is *inferential* (functioning indirectly) while the 'Declaration of Procedure' is *directly perceptible*; and what is *perceptible* is certainly more authoritative than what is *inferential*; and the setting aside of the *inferential* is more reasonable than that of the *perceptible*. Such being the case, the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings should not be made; as they could come in only by virtue of the General Law, and this, having been set aside in this case, is not operative at all."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The opinion of the revered Teacher Jaimini is that the *Ājyabhāga*-offerings should be made in the case in question.—"Why?"—Because *when there is possibility of the external procedure coming in, the internal procedure should be excluded*; in a case where the adopting of the action's own procedure brings in the procedure of another action, the former should be excluded; e.g. the procedure of the Animal-sacrifice becomes excluded in the case of the *Prayājas* related to the Cake-offering;—where however, no such external procedure is likely to come in, it is not right to exclude it; e.g. when *Dēvadatta* gets on to *Yajñadatta's* conveyance, it is only *Dēvadatta's conveyance* that goes away, not his clothes and ornaments.—In the case in question, the adopting of the *Ājyabhāgas* does not bring in any part of the procedure of the Animal-sacrifice; hence, it is not right to exclude it; hence, they should not be excluded. As regards the argument that "the 'Declaration of Proce-

dure' is directly perceptible",—as a matter of fact, the 'Declaration of Procedure' is not operative in this case at all; all that the said Declaration could do would be to bring in the subsidiaries,—and the Meat-cake-offerings have all their subsidiaries in the subsidiaries of the Animal-sacrifice itself: hence, even though it is directly perceptible, it does not take in the *Ājyabhāgas*; the Declaration of Procedure, as a rule, takes in only that subsidiary which is close by in the context;—the *Ājyabhāgas* however are not present at the Animal-sacrifice at all, having been preceded by the Prohibition 'one should not offer the *Ājyabhāgas* at the Animal-sacrifice or at the Soma-sacrifice'.—Then again, it has been already explained that the 'Declaration of Procedure' takes in only such subsidiaries as are already there, while the 'General Law' brings them into existence and also takes them in; hence, it is this latter that is the more authoritative of the two.

Adhikaraṇa (3): *At the Soma-sacrifice, the Platform related to the Darsha shall not be erected.*

SŪTRA (8).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Inasmuch as they serve different purposes, there should be erection of the second Platform at the Soma-sacrifice for the ectypes of the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the Soma-sacrifice, there are certain rites related to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* which are performed on the Major Platform.—In regard to this, we proceed to consider the following question—For the performance of these rites, should another Platform be erected?—or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"A separate Platform should be erected;—why?—because the General Law indicating the erection, the erection of such a Platform would be in accordance with that Law.—'The Platform of the Soma-sacrifice itself would accomplish all that is necessary, through *Prasaṅga* (Extended Application)'.—It could not accomplish it;—why?—*because they serve different purposes*; the two Platforms in question serve two entirely different purposes—the one related to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* is used for the securing and keeping of the offering-materials, while that related to the *Soma* is used for the *moving about*; so that in this case, there could be no 'extended application'; as there is 'extended application' only in cases where the subsidiary of the Original sacrifice serves the same purpose as the intervening subsidiary; as for instance, the *Prayājas* related to the *Animal-sacrifice* find 'extended application' in the Cake-offerings. This condition is not fulfilled in the case in question; hence the second Platform should be erected."

SŪTRA (9).

[Siddhānta]—As a matter of fact, there should be no erection; as it would only vitiate (the other).

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the Platform related to the *Darsha* should not be erected at the *Soma*-sacrifice.—"Why?"—*Because it would only vitiate the other*; i.e. if another Platform were erected, it would only mean that the Soma-Platform already erected is defective, and it would not accomplish any purpose of its own.—"It would serve the purpose of keeping the offering-materials".—That however could very well be done on the Major Platform itself.—"But that is for a totally different purpose, as we have already pointed out".—Even while serving that different purpose, it could certainly serve

the purposes of a receptacle for the offering-materials;—it has been laid down that the offering-material should be kept *upon the Platform*;—the Major Platform also is a *platform*;—and there are no conditions laid down as that the materials should be kept on a Platform which serves that purpose alone. —From all this it follows that the Darsha-Platform should not be erected at the *Soma-sacrifice*.

Adhikaraṇa (4): *At the Soma-sacrifice, the oblations relating to the Sāvana-Animals, etc. should be offered with the Sruva and other implements used at the Darsha-sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (10).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"In regard to the Implements, there should be 'Extended Application', because they are for the purpose of offering oblations."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Soma-sacrifice*, there are certain rites related to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* which would appear to be connected with the Ladles and Cups used at the Soma-sacrifice,—such rites for instance, as the '*Sāvana Animal*', the '*Sāvana Cakes*', the '*Sauma Cooked Rice*'.

In regard to these we proceed to consider the question—Should the oblations at these Rites be offered with their own Ladles and Cups? Or with the *Sruva* and other implements used at the *Darsha-sacrifice*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*In the case of implements, there should be 'Extended Application'*;—why?—*because they are for the purpose of offering oblations*;—the implements in question only serve the purpose of the offering of oblations,—and this purpose can be served by the said Cups and Ladles also;—the Rites in question too, are included within the sphere of the *Soma-sacrifice*; hence, the oblations at these should be offered (as at the *Soma*) with the Cups and Ladles."

SŪTRA (11).

[Siddhānta]—The right course is to use the Implements in question,—as they have been in use already; it is only if they could not be used that there could be 'Extended Application'.

Bhāṣya.

The right course would be to use the implements used at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*,—and it is with these that the oblations should be offered;—why?—*because they have been in use already*; the implements in question are there, having been already used; it has been declared that—"if they were to obtain the *Soma* before having taken up the Clarified Butter, they would destroy the sacrifice, and if they obtain the *Soma* after having taken up the Clarified Butter, then they would not destroy the sacrifice'; so that (for the taking of the Clarified Butter) first of all the *sruva* and other

implements of the *Darsha* have to be used,—they have to be washed and cleaned and then the Clarified Butter is to be taken up with them; hence, these implements are there already, having been used in connection with the Clarified Butter. *It is only if they could not be used that there could be 'extended application'*; in a case where the subsidiary of the sacrifice included in the sphere of the *Soma-sacrifice* is one that has not been used, then alone is there an 'extended application' of the subsidiary of the *Soma-sacrifice*, for serving the purposes of that subsidiary; because it is only when one has not got the thing of his own that he obtains it from another; it is only when *Dēvadatta* has not got his own conveyance near at hand that he rides in *Yajñadatta's* conveyance; if his own conveyance is at hand, he goes on his own; because the pleasure that he derives from riding in another's conveyance is not at all like that which he derives from riding in his own conveyance. Similarly, the excellence that is acquired by the Cakes through the use of the implements of the *Darsha-sacrifice* is not attained through the use of the Cups and Ladles; because in the case of the former the articles are of wood used at the Archetype, and hence it is possible to perform the *Washing* and other Embellishments; in the case of the Cups and Ladles, on the other hand, they have to be omitted. Further, those implements that are related to the *Soma* itself have no connection with the *Cakes*.

"In case the implements of the *Darsha* had not been used, would it be possible for the *Cups and Ladles* to come in by 'extended application'?"

Not so, we reply; even so, what would come in by 'extended application' would be the implements of the *Darsha* itself. There is 'extended application' only in cases where the subsidiary performed in connection with the Main Sacrifice becomes performed (i.e. helpful) also for the other sacrifice; e.g. when the *Prayājas* are performed in connection with the *Animal-sacrifice*, they help the Cake-offerings also.—In the case in question however, if the Cups and Ladles are used, the others do not become *used* by that use; certainly when the *Soma* is offered, it is not the *Cakes* that become *offered*.—For these reasons, there can be no 'Extended Application' in this case.

"What happens then?"

We explain:—*There would be 'extended application' if they had not been in use*; i.e. if the use of the implements in question were not possible,—or if it were actually prohibited,—then alone would there be an 'extended application' (of the *Soma*-accessories).

Then again, the right course is that in the case in question, the *Darsha-implements* should be used, not the Cups and Ladles (of the *Soma*).—"On what grounds would this be the *right course*?"—The implements in question come into the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* in accordance with scriptural texts, and therefore they become transferred to the *Cake-offering* by the General Law. The touch of the scriptural text is quite distinct. On the other hand, in connection with no sacrifice has the offering of oblations been laid down as to be done with the Ladles and Cups; so that such offering could be made only if there were an actual need for doing it; when there is no verbal declaration to that effect, an act can be done only if there is actual need for it.

There is the following text which also indicates the use of the *Darsha*-implements in question at the Soma-sacrifice—' *Yunajmi tē pṛthivīm jyotiṣā sahēti dhruvāmabhimṛshati, yunajmi vāyunāntarikṣēṇa tē saha ityupabhṛtam, yunajmi vācham saha divā suryēṇēti juhūm* ' [where three implements are mentioned—*Dhruvā*, *Upabhṛta* and *Juhū*, all which are connected with the *Darsha-sacrifice*].

From all this it follows that at the *Soma-sacrifice*, the oblations should be offered with the implements in question.

Adhikaraṇa (5): *The 'Meat-Cake' shall not be cooked at the 'Shāmitra Fire'.*

SŪTRA (12).

The Meat-cake shall not be cooked at the Shāmitra Fire, as the other has been in use already.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the same Cake, we proceed to consider the question—Is it to be cooked at the *Shāmitra* Fire or at the *Shālāmukhīya* Fire?

The same Principle—'The other being already in use'—is applicable here also. It has been laid down that the *cooking* of offering-materials should be done at the *Gārhapatya Fire*; and this is already in use, it having been declared that 'The *Shālāmukhīya* Fire itself becomes the *Gārhapatya* after this';—hence, the cooking in question should be done at this *Shālāmukhīya Fire.*

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this would make the Main *Soma-sacrifice* defective ;—the erection and location of the *Havirdhāna Carts* have been made with suitable *mantras* and in accordance with certain strict rules ; and all this would become nullified (by the removal of the *Havirdhāna*) ; it is possible that the *erecting* and *locating* might be done again ; but this would involve a repetition not sanctioned by the scriptures.—As a matter of fact, *it is only when it causes no defect* in the Main act, that ' Extended Application ' may be right ; because it is the character of the Main act from which all the rest derive their sustenance, each according to the texts bearing upon it,—all the rest being, as they are, entirely dependent (on something else). If, for some reason, the purposes of these subordinate factors are not accomplished by the means laid down in the scriptures, then those purposes might well be left unfulfilled,—or any other means might be employed ;—but they could not accomplish their purposes by upsetting the Main sacrifice.—" But why cannot the Preparation be made at the very place where the *Havirdhāna* has been located? "—In that case the said acts (involved in the ' Preparation ') would become defective—" That may be so ; those acts are subordinate factors and as such they must follow the predominant factor just as it happens to be ; e.g. the *Meat-cake* follows the *Prayājas* of the *Animal-sacrifice*, even though these latter appear at a different time ".—The answer to this is as follows :—In the case cited, it is right that it should be so ; because the *Prayājas* have been performed already, and what has been already done cannot be done again simply to preserve the order of sequence (of something else). In the case in question however, the *Preparation* is still to be made ; and if it is possible to make it fully equipped with all its details, it should be made as so equipped ;—as a matter of fact, it *is* possible to make it so equipped by securing another cart ; hence, it follows that the said Preparation should not be done in one of the *Havirdhāna* Carts.

SŪTRA (16).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND THE ' CARTS ' SPOKEN OF (IN THE PLURAL NUMBER).

Bhāṣya.

We find a *plurality* of Carts spoken of in the text—' *Anāmsi pravartayanti* ' [' They set up several Carts '].—From this also it follows that another cart (other than the *two Havirdhāna Carts*) should be secured.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *At the 'Prāyaṇīya and other offerings, there should be separate 'Keeping of Vigil' in connection with the Initiation.*

SŪTRA (17).

THAT WHICH IS CONNECTED WITH THAT [CANNOT APPLY], ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCE OF TIME.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Soma-sacrifice*, the 'Keeping of Vigil' has been laid down as to be done at the time of the Initiation—'*Yām prathamām rātrim jāgarti*, etc.'. In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* also, for some people, the said 'Vigil' has been laid down as to be done on the *Aupavasathya Day*. This 'Keeping of the Vigil' becomes admissible, under the General Law, into the '*Prāyaṇīya*' and other offerings (which have the above Main sacrifices for their Archetypes).

In regard to this—[the question being—Does the Vigil kept at the time of the Initiation serve the purposes of the *Prāyaṇīya* and other minor sacrifices—or should a separate *Vigil* be kept in connection with these latter ?]—the *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "the *Vigil* that has been kept at the time of the Initiation will, by 'Extended Application', serve the purposes of these minor sacrifices [and hence it should not be done separately]".—In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*That which is connected with that*,—i.e. the *Vigil* kept in connection with the Initiation—cannot have its application extended to other acts;—why ?—*because of the difference in time*; if, as a matter of fact, the Vigil is kept for the purpose that there may be no carelessness in the safe keeping of all sacrificial accessories, then what are so guarded by the Vigil kept at the time of Initiation are only those accessories that are there at the time,—so that no other become guarded by that Vigil; hence for the purpose of the guarding of the other accessories of the *Prāyaṇīya* and other minor sacrifices, the *Vigil* should be kept separately at the time of the *Aupavasathya*.—Even if the Vigil were meant to serve only an unseen purpose (and not that of guarding the sacrificial accessories), then also the *Aupavasathya* night would be the occasion for the keeping of the *Vigil*; and when the occasion is there, whatever is due to be done on that occasion should be done.—From all this it follows that in connection with the *Prāyaṇīya* and the rest, the *Vigil* should be kept separately.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *At separate Altars, the Mantras should be recited separately.*

SŪTRA (18).

MANTRAS ALSO (SHOULD BE RECITED SEPARATELY), AS THEY HELP DIRECTLY.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Varuṇapraghāsa* sacrifices, there are two separate Altars (one for the *Adhvaryu* and another for the *Pratiprasthātṛ*); in connection with these there are certain *Mantras* that operate upon them directly,—along with *the Taking up of Clarified Butter, Besprinkling and Touching.*

The question that arises is—Should these *Mantras* be recited 'in common' for the two Altars? or separately?

This discussion bears, not upon *Prasaṅga* (the subject-matter of the present discourse), but upon *Tantra and Āvāpa* (the subject of the previous discourses).

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"the Mantras should be recited 'in common', for the purpose of honouring the Declaration of Procedure".

In answer to this, the *Siddhānta* is as follows:—*The reciting of Mantras also*—in connection with *the Taking up of Clarified Butter*, etc.—should be done separately;—why?—because *they help directly*; the *Mantras* in question are all such as help directly, as they signify the action that is present at the time; as a matter of fact, the *Adhvaryu* and the *Pratiprasthātṛ* (who are in charge of the two Altars severally) come up in connection with separate actions;—hence the *Mantras* should be recited separately.

Further, it is going to be explained under Sū. 12. 3. 24, that all the agencies operating upon actions end with the *Mantra*; and that being so, a *Mantra* must be regarded as subservient to the purposes of that Act upon which it operates; and by virtue of this differentiating condition, there should be repetition of *Mantras*.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *There shall be no 'Agnyanvādhāna' at the Dīkṣaṇīyā and other sacrifices.*

[The next few Adhikaraṇas up to Adhi. 18. deal with those *Iṣṭis* that form part of the *Soma-sacrifice*, but which have the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* for their Archetype.]

SŪTRA (19).

AT THE SOMA-SACRIFICE, THERE IS NO 'AGNYANVĀDHĀNA', AS IT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAINTENANCE.

Bhāṣya.

In course of the *Soma-sacrifice* there are certain *Iṣṭis*, like the *Dīkṣaṇīyā*; at these the rite of '*Agnyanvādhāna*' (Reinstallation of Fire) becomes admissible under the General Law. The question is—Should this Rite be performed or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"it should be performed; because only by so doing would the General Law be obeyed."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The *Agnyanvādhāna* should not be performed at the *Dīkṣaṇīyā*, etc.—why?—*because it is for the purpose of maintenance*; the *Agnyanvādhāna* is meant to be done for the purpose of maintaining (keeping up) the Fire that has been brought up; that rite has been already performed in connection with the Fire brought out for the performance of the *Soma-sacrifice*,—and the Fire has been maintained by that means; there can be no *maintaining* of what has been *maintained* already.—"But that is done without *Mantras*."—True, it is done without *Mantras*; but it has been done all the same; and what has been done once need not be done again, only for the purpose of reciting the *Mantras*.—From all this it follows that the *Agnyanvādhāna* should not be done at the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and other *Iṣṭis*.

Adhikaraṇa (11): *At the Dīkṣaṇīyā and other Iṣṭis there is to be no 'Taking of the Vow'.*

SŪTRA (20).

So also the 'Vow', because it has been already taken.

Bhāṣya.

At the said *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and the rest, there is admissible, under the General Law, the 'taking of the vow' which has been enjoined in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa.* [The question being as to whether or not this *vow* should be taken at the *Dīkṣaṇīya*, etc.] the *Siddhānta* is that, like the *Agnyanvādhāna*, this vow should not be taken;—*because it has been already taken*; that which has been taken and not yet finished cannot be taken up again; the act of 'taking up' consists in obtaining what has not been obtained; and hence it cannot be done to what has been already obtained.

SŪTRA (21).

Also because of incompatibility.

Bhāṣya.

The words pronounced by the person taking up the 'vow' are—'*Agnē vratapatē vratañcharişyāmi*' which contains the verb in the *Future* tense; and this would be 'incompatible' with the *vow* if it were already *present.*

SŪTRA (22).

"It may be like Truth-telling",—if this is urged [then the answer is as below].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"Why can it not be like 'Truth-telling'?—Just as the vow of *Truth-telling*, being a man's duty, continues throughout life, and yet it is *taken* at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa.*"

SŪTRA (23).

That cannot be; because of the connections being distinct.

Bhāṣya.

The case of the *vow* in question is not analogous to that of 'Truth-telling',—*because of the connections being distinct*; in the case of 'Truth-

telling', there are two distinct 'connections'—that of the *Man*, and that of the *sacrifice*; so that having been previously taken up as pertaining to the Man (as his general duty), it becomes taken up again in connection with the *sacrifice*.—"In the case in question also, there is *distinctness of connection*; having been taken up previously in connection with the *Soma-offering*, it may be taken up again in connection with the *Iṣṭi*".—In the case in question, there is no need for 'taking up the vow' again,—as that which has been done already in connection with the *Soma-sacrifice* will accomplish its purpose at the other sacrifice also, through 'Extended Application'.—"In the other case (of *Truth-telling*) also, the purpose could be accomplished in the same manner".—It might accomplish it if it were previously known that it is for the purpose of accomplishing a certain desire; as a matter of fact however, this fact is recognized only in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* itself (not before that); while in the case in question, this fact has been already recognized in connection with the Archetypal sacrifice. Hence the citing of the case of 'Truth-telling' cannot serve as an instance in point.

The necessity of the recognition of the accessory (of Truth-telling, e.g.) serving the purposes of the Main action lies in the fact of that being the determining factor in the deciding of the Exact Expiation;—as explained under *Sūtra* 3. 4. 12-13.

Adhikaraṇa (12): *At the 'Iṣṭis', there is to be no 'Agnyanvādhāna', even for purposes adopting the Deity.*

SŪTRA (24).

THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED ACT, EVEN FOR PURPOSES OF ADOPTING (THE DEITY), [SHALL NOT BE DONE], AS THE IṢṬI ITSELF SERVES THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been explained (under *Adhikaraṇa* 10 above) that the '*Agnyanvādhāna*' already done in connection with the *Soma-sacrifice*, accomplishes the same purpose, through 'Extended Application', at the *Iṣṭis* also.

This is now objected to—"The *Extended application* spoken of in the previous *Adhikaraṇa* has been in reference to that *Agnyanvādhāna* which is done for the purpose of *maintaining the Fire*; as a matter of fact, however, the *Agnyanvādhāna* is done, not only for the purpose of *maintaining the Fire*, but for that purpose of maintaining the Fire, as also for the purpose of *adopting the Deity*; we read in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*—'*Mamāgnē varcho vihavēṣvastu iti pūrvamagnim gṛhṇāti, dēvatā ēva tatpūrvēdyurgṛhītvā shvobhūtē yajatē*';—though the *Agnyanvādhāna* for the purpose of *maintaining the Fire* may come in, through 'Extended Application', from that performed in connection with the *Soma-sacrifice*,—yet that which is done at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* for the purpose of *adopting the Deity* should have to be done at the *Iṣṭis*."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The view set forth above is not right; as a matter of fact, that *Agnyanvādhāna* which is done for the purpose of *adopting the Deity* also would be secured through 'Extended Application' (and hence should not have to be done again).—Why?—*Because the Iṣṭi itself serves that purpose*; in connection with the *Soma-sacrifice* also, the *Dīkṣaṇīyā Iṣṭi* is found mentioned as serving the purpose of *adopting the deity*—'*Agnāvaiṣṇavamēkādashakapālam nirvapēt dīkṣiṣyamāṇaḥ, agniḥ prathamo dēvatānām viṣṇuḥ paramaḥ, yadagnāvaiṣṇavamēkādashakapālam nirvapati dēvatā yajñancha tadubhayataḥ parigṛhya dīkṣate*'.—This same *Iṣṭi*, thus serving the purpose of adopting the deity at the *Soma-sacrifice*, will serve the same purpose for the *Iṣṭis* also, by 'extended application'.

SŪTRA (25).

"IT WOULD BE LIKE THE ACCESSORIES",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"The purposes of the *Iṣṭis* would not be served in the manner suggested; the *Dīkṣaṇīyā-Iṣṭi* subserves the purposes of the

Main sacrifice, and as such it operates towards the adopting of the deity of the Main sacrifice;—the deities of the subsidiaries however, which are mere accessories, are not included under that adoption;—hence for the purposes of adopting these deities, the *Agnyanvādhāna* related to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* should be performed in connection with the *Iṣṭis*."

SŪTRA (26).

NOT SO; BECAUSE THERE IS THE 'VAISHVADĒVA' (RELATED TO 'ALL DEITIES').

Bhāṣya.

The said *Agnyanvādhāna* should not be performed; the purpose of adopting the deity will be accomplished by the *Dikṣaṇiya Iṣṭi* itself, through 'Extended Application'.—"But it has been pointed out that the *Dīkṣaṇiyā* serves the purpose of adopting the deity of the Main sacrifice only".—By subserving the purpose of the deity of the Main sacrifice, it would also take in the deities of the subsidiaries.—"How so?"—*Because there is the vaishva-dēva*; in connection with the *Soma-sacrifice*, there is the *Grahayāga*, which is '*vaishvadēva*', in the sense that *all deities* (*vishvē dēvāḥ*) are sacrificed to in this sacrifice; and the deities of the subsidiaries also are included among them; so that these also become adopted. Hence there is no need for the performance of the *Agnyanvādhāna* in connection with the *Iṣṭis*, for the purpose of adopting those deities.

SŪTRA (27).

[*Objection*]—"THERE SHOULD BE NEED FOR IT; AS THEY HAVE BEEN NAMED."

Bhāṣya.

There should need for the *Agnyanvādhāna*; as it is necessary to adopt the deities of the subsidiaries through the *Agnyanvādhāna* in connection with the *Iṣṭis*; because as a matter of fact, those deities cannot be taken as 'adopted' on the ground that sacrifices are offered to 'all deities'; because in reality, at the said *Graha-yāga*, sacrifices are *not* offered to *all deities*; the term '*Vishvē-dēvaḥ*' stands, not for *all* (*vishvē*) *deities* (*dēvāḥ*), but for a *definite group of deities*, consisting of the *Sādhyas*, the *Rudras* and the *Vasus*.—How do you know that?—*Because they have been named*; the deities meant have been actually named in the text—'*Agnir vasubhiḥ, somo raudraiḥ, indro marud-bhiḥ, varuṇa ādityaiḥ, bṛhaspatirvishvēdēvaiḥ*'; where it appears that the '*Vishvēdēvas*' are entities different from the *Vasus* and other well-known deities. If *all deities* had been spoken of by means of the term '*vishvēdēva*', then those deities would not have been different from the well-known deities, *Vasu* and the rest. Hence we conclude that the term '*vishvē-dēva*' denotes only a well-defined *group* (of deities).—Such being the case, the deities of subsidiaries

could not be included under that name; hence for the adopting of those, the performance of the *Agnyanvādhāna* would be necessary."

SŪTRA (28).

NOT SO; BECAUSE IT SERVES THE PURPOSE OF INDICATING AN EXCELLENCE.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be as suggested.—Why ?—*Because it serves the purpose of indicating an excellence*; i.e. the above-quoted description (enumeration) of the *Vishvēdēvas* cannot be regarded as indicating a *group of deities*; the description is meant to be *an indication of excellence*,—i.e. a praise of *Bṛhaspati*; the sense of the praise being that—'*Agni* is accompanied by the *Vasus* only,—*Soma*, by the *Rudras* only,—*Indra*, by the *Maruts* only,—and *Varuṇa*, by the *Ādityas* only;—but *Bṛhaspati* is accompanied by *all the deities*, those named here as well as others'.—This praise is just like the praise of the king in the words—'The Army-commander has come in with his paid army and will fight along with his own army,—but the King is accompanied by *all armies*, those mentioned as well as others'.—Further, under the interpretation suggested, it would be necessary to assume a *group of deities* bearing the name '*Vishvēdēva*', while *all deities* are understood to be actually denoted by that name.

From all this it follows that the adopting of the subsidiary deities also is acomplished by means of the *Dīkṣaṇīyā*, through 'Extended Application'; and hence the *Agnyanvādhāna* related to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* should not be performed in connection with the *Iṣṭis*.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *At the Iṣṭis, the 'Patnīsannahana' (Dressing up of the Lady) shall not be performed.*

SŪTRA (29).

THE 'DRESSING UP' ALSO [SHOULD NOT BE DONE], AS IT HAS BEEN DONE ALREADY.

Bhāṣya.

The '*Sannahana*' ('Dressing up') of the sacrificer's Lady has been laid down in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, in the text—'Dresses up the Lady with the *Yoktra*'. Under the General Law, this should be done at those *Iṣṭi* rites that are performed in connection with the Soma-sacrifice. [The question arising as to whether or not this *Dressing up* should be performed at these rites] the *Siddhānta* is that it should not be done;—why? —*because it has been done already*; at the time of the Initiation, the *Dressing up* of the Lady for the purposes of the *Soma-sacrifice* has been already done, as laid down in the text—'He dresses up the Lady with the *Yoktra* and the Initiated Sacrificer with the *Mekhalā*, with a view to joining the two'. This *dressing up* with the *Yoktra* is for the purpose of lending support to the Dress; and when this has been done in connection with the Soma-sacrifice itself, it will continue to serve that purpose till the completion of the sacrifice along with its subsidiaries, which latter also it will benefit by 'Extended Application'.

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ADHIKARAṆA (14): *At the Iṣṭis there need not be 'Feeding upon wild-growing Things'.*

SŪTRA (30).

THE 'EATING OF WILD-GROWING THINGS' SHOULD NOT BE DONE; AS THERE IS INJUNCTION OF ANOTHER.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, the 'eating of wild-growing things' has been laid down, in the text—'*Yadāraṇyāni ashnāti*, etc., etc.'. —This becomes admissible into the *Prāyaṇīya* and other *Iṣṭis*, under the General Law. [The question arising as to whether or not this eating should be done at these *Iṣṭis*] the *Siddhānta* is as follows:—Even though it is indicated by the General Law as admissible, it should not be done;—why?—*because there is injunction of another.* The 'Eating of wild-growing things' that has been enjoined in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* is meant to be for the purposes of subsistence;—in connection with the *Soma-sacrifice* also, means of subsistence have been laid down—'The *Brāhmaṇa* shall live on milk, the *Kṣattriya* on gruel and the *Vaishya* on Curdled Milk'; this also serves a visible purpose and hence is regarded as a means of subsistence; of these two means of subsistence, that connected with the *Soma-sacrifice* is found to be directly enjoined, and it is also the more important of the two,—hence this must be done; and when the *subsistence* has been secured by this means, it helps the other subsidiary rites also, through 'Extended Application'; hence the other means of subsistence becomes excluded.

Adhikaraṇa (15): *At the Iṣṭis there should be 'Eating of Remnants'.*

SŪTRA (31).

IF IT BE URGED THAT "THE SAME SHOULD BE THE CASE WITH THE EATING OF REMNANTS",—THAT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE THAT IS FOR A DIFFERENT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, there is the *Eating of Remnants*, *Iḍa* and the rest.—This is indicated by the General Law as admissible at the *Iṣṭis* performed in course of the *Soma-sacrifice*. It may be argued that, "as the 'Eating of wild-growing things' has been set aside by the means of subsistence laid down in connection with the *Soma-sacrifice*, so this Eating of Remnants also should be set aside (as this also is only a means of subsistence)".—The answer to this is that it is not so;—why?—*because that is for a different purpose*; the 'Eating of Remnants' is not meant to be a means of subsistence; it is not for the purpose of sustaining the body; it is in fact meant to be an *embellishment* (of the substance), because the substance in question is only the remnant of what has been used,—and because all these 'Eatings' are spoken of by means of words with the Accusative Ending, in such texts as '*Yajamānapañchamā ṛtvijaḥ iḍām bhakṣayanti*',—therefore in the case in question, the 'Eating of Remnants', should be done.

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *At the Iṣṭis, there is to be no gift of the 'Anvāhārya'.*

SŪTRA (32).

THE 'PURCHASE' ALSO (SHOULD NOT BE DONE), AS THEY ARE ALREADY ENGAGED.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*, the *Anvāhārya-gift* has been laid down as the 'purchase-price' (payment for services); the General Law indicates this as to be done at the *Iṣṭis* performed in course of the *Soma-sacrifice*. [The question arising as to whether or not that gift should be made at these *Iṣṭis*] the *Siddhānta* is that it should not be made;—why?—*because they are already engaged*; the Priests concerned have been already engaged and their services secured by the payment of the 'purchase-price' in connection with the *Soma-sacrifice*,—in accordance with the text 'The sacrificial Fee is 1200'.—And the subsidiaries are always performed at the same place and time by the same performers as the Main sacrifice; hence the subsidiary *Iṣṭis* in question have to be performed by those same Priests that have been engaged for the *Soma-sacrifice*; consequently there can be no separate 'purchase-price' to be paid in connection with the subsidiaries; hence the *Anvāhārya-gift* has to be omitted.

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *At the Iṣṭis, the 'Eating of Remnants' shall be done as serving the purposes of 'Embellishment'.*

SŪTRA (33).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE EATINGS OF REMNANTS ALSO SHOULD BE SIMILARLY OMITTED",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

It might be argued that "the Eatings of Remnants also should be omitted at the *Iṣṭis*, just as the *Anvāhārya-gift* is omitted."

This question is raised on the basis of the possible notion that the Eating of Remnants is by way of 'Purchase-price' (for services rendered) [which alone would make it subject to the conclusion regarding the *Anvāhārya*].

SŪTRA (34).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE THOSE ARE CONNECTED WITH THE ACTIONS.

Bhāṣya.

The Eatings of Remnants should not be omitted; because they are not meant to be payment for services rendered; as a matter of fact, those Eatings of Remnants have been laid down as to be done after the completion of the functions of the priests whose services had been secured by the gift of the *Anvāhārya*; nor are these 'Eatings' sufficient as price for securing of the services [*Read* '*na chālamānamanāya*']; hence these Eatings are not meant to be the 'price' of services rendered; they are meant to be embellishments of the Remnants of substances used; and for this purpose they have to be done (at the *Iṣṭis* in question also).

ADHIKARAṆA (18): *At the Iṣṭis, there should be 'appointment' of the Hotṛ Priest.*

SŪTRA (35).

INASMUCH AS THERE IS 'APPOINTMENT' AFTER COMMENCEMENT, THERE SHOULD BE 'APPOINTMENT' OF THE HOTṚ-PRIEST AT EACH RITE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, the 'appointment' of the *Hotṛ-priest* has been laid down, in the text—'*Agnirdēvo etc.*';—the General Law indicates the admission of this at the *Iṣṭis* performed as parts of the *Soma-sacrifice*.—But in connection with the *Soma-sacrifice* itself, the 'appointment of the *Hotṛ*' has been laid down separately, in the text—'*Agnīrhotā, etc. . . . . . hotāram vṛṇītē*'.

In regard to this we proceed to consider the question—At the *Iṣṭis* in question, should or should not there be the 'appointment of the Hotṛ' that has been laid down in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—"It should not be done;—why?—The Appointment is made for the purpose of securing the man's services;—the Hotṛ's services for the performance of the entire *Soma-sacrifice* along with its accessories have been already secured by the 'appointment' in connection with the *Soma-sacrifice* itself;—there can be no need for the securing of the services of one whose services have been already secured; hence the Appointment in question should not be done."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*;—*Inasmuch as there is Appointment after commencement, there should be appointment of the Hotṛ-priest at each Rite*;—it is not right that the Appointment made in connection with the *Soma-sacrifice* will serve, through 'Extended Application', the purposes of that Appointment also which is related to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*;—as a matter of fact, *there is Appointment after commencement*,—i.e. it is after the performance has commenced that the appointment related to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* is made;—hence it cannot be meant for securing the services of the Priest;—in fact it is meant to be a mere *act* by itself; hence if it were not done, the performance would be defective to that extent. Hence the Appointment should be done separately with each of the Rites in question.

SŪTRA (36).

"THE BRAHMAN-PRIEST ALSO",—IF THIS BE URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

The Opponent says—"If it is your view that, inasmuch as the Appointment is done after commencement, the Appointment of the *Hotṛ* should

be done with each Rite,—then, inasmuch as the *Brahman-Priest* also is appointed after the performance has commenced, at the time of the bringing up of the *Praṇītā*-vessel, it follows that the appointment of this Priest also is an act by itself and as such this also should be done with each Rite;—or you should point out some difference between the two cases (of the *Hotṛ* and the *Brahman*)."

SŪTRA (37).

THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE IN REALITY, THE APPOINTMENT COMES FIRST; AS IT IS FOR THAT.

Bhāṣya.

The appointment of the *Brahman-Priest* should not be done at the Rites in question.—Why?—*Because the appointment comes first*; it is true that the appointment of the *Brahman* comes after the commencement of the Performance; but prior to this appointment, the character of 'Brahman-Priest' is not there at all; in fact all the functions of the *Brahman* come after his Appointment; hence the appointment which is for the purpose of those functions must be regarded as subserving a sacrifice, and not an act by itself; it serves in fact the purpose of securing the services of the Priest; his services however have been already secured by means of his 'appointment' done in connection with the *Soma-sacrifice*;—hence there need be no further appointment of that Priest (in connection with the *Iṣṭis*).

SŪTRA (38).

"IT RELATES TO WHAT HAS BEEN LAID DOWN",—IF THIS BE URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

The following argument might be put forward—"The making of the Platform has been laid down as to be done on the *Aupavasathya Day* in connection with the *Darsha-sacrifice*, in the text—'At the *Darsha-sacrifice*, on the previous day, he makes the Platform';—at this the commencement of the measuring out of the Platform is done by the *Brahman-priest*; so that the Brahman-priest also is one whose appointment (like that of the *Hotṛ*) is made 'after the commencement of the Performance'."

SŪTRA (39).

NOT SO; BECAUSE THERE IS NO DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

What has been laid down as to be done at the *Darsha-sacrifice*, on the previous day, is the *making*, not the *measuring out*, of the Platform,—*as there is no declaration*; the 'adopting' is done after the Brahman-priest has been 'appointed' in its own time; as the 'Appointment' is for the purposes of the sacrificial performance.—"But the measuring out of the Platform is done before its *making*, and there also the start is to be made by the Brahman-priest."

That is true; in that case here is another answer to the objection:—In the context of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, the making of the Platform has been laid down as to be done after the securing of the offering-materials;—the Appointment of the *Brahman-priest* also has been laid down as to be done before the functions of that Priest begin; and as this must serve a visible purpose, it is taken as serving the purpose of securing the services of the Priest. Such being the case, at the *Darsha-sacrifice*, the *making of the Vedi* is 'anticipated' in obedience to the direct declaration to that effect; and when this 'making' has been 'anticipated', the 'measuring out' is also 'anticipated',—so also its *commencement*, as also the *appointment* of the *Brahman-priest*; because accessories follow the time and place of their Primaries. Under the circumstances, at the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice, the appointment of the *Brahman-priest* is done at the time of the *bringing up* of the *Praṇītā*, while at the *Darsha-sacrifice*, it is done on the previous day; in both cases, before the functions of the Priest have commenced. Hence it follows that in both cases the Appointment serves the purpose of *securing the services*. Consequently this appointment of the Brahman-priest need not be done at each Rite, the services of the *Brahman-priest* having been already secured by the Appointment done at the *Soma-sacrifice*.

SŪTRA (40).

"SO SHOULD IT BE IN THE CASE OF THE HOTṚ ALSO",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"If it is your view that—'if the Appointment of the Brahman comes before the commencement of the Performance,—and before his Appointment there is nothing to be done by that priest,—hence the Brahman-priest cannot be one whose appointment has been already made',—then the same should be the case with the *Hotṛ* also; for the *Hotṛ* also there is nothing to do before his appointment; and his appointment also is not an act by itself."

SŪTRA (41).

NOT SO; BECAUSE OF CONNECTION WITH ACTION.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, even before his *Appointment*, the *Hotṛ* is connected with the definite action of *Reciting the Sāmidhēnī verses*,—as laid down in the text—'Before being *appointed*, he recites the *Sāmidhēnīs*'.—From this it is clear that the Appointment of the *Hotṛ* is for an unseen purpose; hence it should be done at the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and other *Iṣṭis* in question.—As for the Appointment of the *Brahman-priest* however, it is for a visible purpose; and as this purpose has been served by the *Appointment* at the *Soma-sacrifice*, the Appointment should not be done at the *Iṣṭis* in question.

Adhikaraṇa (19): *At the Ātithyā-Iṣṭi, the 'Besprinkling' etc. of the Grass are not to be done in connection with each Rite.*

[See in this connection *Sūtras* 4. 2. 29-30.]

SŪTRA (42).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"In connection with the Injunction relating to the Sacrifice, as the acts done to the established entities are distinct, they should be performed in connection with each Rite."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Soma-sacrifice*, we read—'The grass used at the *Ātithyā* is also that of the *Upasads* and of the *Agnīṣomīya*';—at this there are certain acts done to the entity in the shape of the *Chopped Grass*,—such as *Washing, Removal of Tips, Sprinkling of the Roots*.

In regard to these there arises the question—At the *Ātithyā* and other *Iṣṭis*, where the performances are distinct, are these acts to be performed separately with each performance? Or the other performances are helped, through 'Extended Application', by the act that has been performed in connection with the *Ātithyā* itself?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*In connection with the Injunction relating to the Sacrifice*,—i.e. the injunction relating to the *Ātithyā*,—in the form 'The grass used at the *Ātithyā* is also that of the *Upasads*'—the act that is done to the established entity should vary with each performance; as the rites of the *Ātithyā* and the rest have distinct performances of their own; and in regard to this we perceive the peculiarity that the *Washing* and other acts done at the performance of one Rite are subservient to that Rite; consequently, with every other performance, they should be repeated. In this way there is to be repetition of each of the acts. There can be no 'Extended Application' in this case, because neither the *Upasads* nor the *Agnīṣomīya* are included in the Procedure of the *Ātithyā*."

SŪTRA (43).

[Siddhānta]—As a matter of fact, it is not so; because it has been already done; specially as there is declaration of that.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the acts of Washing, etc. should not be done with each rite;—why?—*because it has been already done*; i.e. these acts have been

already done to the Grass at the *Ātithyā*; and as the Grass has become duly embellished by that, there can be no need for the performance of these acts again.—"But Embellishments subserve the purposes of Rites, and in this case the Rites are different, so that the Embellishments must appertain to that Rite alone in connection with which they are performed."—The answer to this is that though the Embellishments are subservient to the Rites, they do not become related to any one Rite directly, like the *Āskandapālikā* (?); in fact, they become so related only indirectly through the *Grass*; i.e. they become related to that Rite to which the Grass belongs. Now in the case in question, the Grass is common to the *Ātithyā*, the *Upasads* and the *Agnīṣomīya*.—"How do you know that?"—*There is declaration of that*; i.e. what the declaration 'the Grass at the *Ātithyā* is also that of the *Upasads* and the *Agnīṣomīya*' lays down is the fact of the *Grass* being common to the three Rites, and not the transference of any accessory details. That this does not refer to the remnant of another sacrifice has been explained under *Sūtra* 4. 2. 30. Such being the case, the Embellishments done to the Grass at the *Ātithyā* are useful at all the Rites in question; and hence the Acts should not be repeated with each Rite.

———

Adhikaraṇa (20): *The Mantra used at the Ātithyā for the 'Staraṇa' (Spreading out, Scattering) of the Grass should be repeated in connection with the other Rites.*

SŪTRA (44).

On account of the place being different, the Mantra should be repeated.

Bhāṣya.

At the same rite (of the *Ātithyā*) there is the *Mantra* used after the 'Spreading' of the Grass;—in regard to that we proceed to consider the question—Is this *Mantra* to be recited separately at the *Agniṣomīya*? Or will the *Mantra* recited at the *Ātithyā* itself benefit the *Agniṣomīya* also, through 'Extended Application'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* being that—"inasmuch as the *Mantra* is used in connection with the Grass that is common to both the Rites, there should be an 'extended application' of the benefits of the *Mantra* recited at the *Ātithyā* to the *Agniṣomīya*,—in accordance with the conclusions of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*",—the *Siddhānta* in answer to it is as follows:—*The Mantra should be repeated*, i.e. should be recited separately in connection with the *Agniṣomīya*.—Why?—*Because of the place being different*; the two spots are different—(a) *near the Northern Platform*, and (b) *at the Prāgavamsha*; and when the places are different, the *Spreading* should be repeated, the *Mantra* that goes with the *Spreading* is—'*Ūrṇāmradasantvā stṛṇāmi*'; so when the *Spreading* is repeated, it is only right that this *Mantra* also should be repeated; as all accessories are regulated by their Primaries.—Then again, the 'Spreading' (of Grass) is meant to be an Embellishment for the place;—and at the *Ātithyā* the place that has been embellished is that where the *Prāgvamsha* is located, not that of the Northern Platform; so that if the *Mantra* were not repeated, the Embellishment of the latter would remain defective.—From all this it follows that there should be repetition of the *Mantra* used in connection with the *Spreading of Grass.*

ADHIKARAṆA (21): *When the Grass is taken over to another spot, there shall be no repetition of the Mantras related to the 'Sannahana' and the 'Haraṇa'.*

SŪTRA (45).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"SO ALSO WITH THE 'SANNAHANA' (TYING UP) AND 'HARAṆA' (CARRYING)",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

At the *Agnīṣomīya* offering, the Grass is taken (from the place of the performance of the *Ātithyā*) to the place of the *Agnīṣomīya* ;—in connection with the (*a*) *Sannahana* (Tying up) and (*b*) *Haraṇa* (Carrying) of the Grass, *Mantras* have been prescribed [(*a*) '*Pūṣā tē granthim badhnātu*', and (*b*) '*Bṛhaspatērmūrdhnā harāmi*'].

In regard to this we proceed to consider the question—Are these *Mantras* to be used when the Grass is taken from one place to the other at the *Agnīṣomīya-offering* ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows :—"The *Mantras* relating to the *Tying up* and the *Carrying* also should be treated similarly,—i.e. like the *Mantra* relating to the *Spreading* ; that is, they should be repeated separately.—Why ?—The reason has already been explained ;—viz. the two *Mantras* are related to the two acts of *Tying up* and *Carrying*,—and the acts are repeated,—hence it follows that the *Mantras* also should be repeated. Hence there should be separate recital of the *Mantras*."

SŪTRA (46).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT SO ; AS IT IS FOR A DIFFERENT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

What has been suggested cannot be right.—Why ?—*Because it is for a different purpose* ;—when the Grass has been cut down, its *Tying up* and *Carrying* are done for the purpose of *securing* it (for the Sacrifice); and in connection with these two acts, the two *Mantras* have been laid down,—which speak of the Grass as being *acquired* ; these *Mantras* being—(*a*) '*Pūṣā tē granthim badhnātu*', and (*b*) '*Bṛhaspatērmūrdhnā harāmi*'.—When however the two acts (of *Tying up* and *Carrying*) are done for the purpose of carrying, from one place to another, of what has been already *acquired*,—inasmuch as this is a purpose totally different, and pertains to an act not connected with the Archetype,—they cannot take up the *Mantras* ;—for example, at the *Ātithyā* itself, when the Grass is carried from the place of the *Gārhapatya* to that of the *Āhavanīya*, for the purpose of being *washed*, the *Mantra* connected with *Carrying* is not recited ; the same should be done in the case in question also.

End of Pāda i of Adhyāya XII.

ADHYĀYA XII.

PĀDA II.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *The 'Vihāra' (Altar-Fire) is to be used only for Vedic performances.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"THE ALTAR SHOULD SERVE THE PURPOSES OF WORLDLY ACTS, BECAUSE IT IS CAPABLE OF DOING SO."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vihāra*', 'Altar', stands here for the Triad of Fires—*Gārhapatya, Dakṣiṇāgni* and *Āhavanīya*,—so called because of '*viharaṇa*' (act of *Flourishing*).

[The question is—Are these Fires to be used for Vedic (religious) acts only? Or for secular acts only?—Or for both?]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"This Fire-triad should *serve the purposes of*—help to accomplish—*the worldly acts*—of *Pārvaṇa, Sthālīpāka* and other rites,—and also other acts that are performed with the help of Fires, such as *cooking, burning, illumining* and so forth;—*because it is capable of doing so*; i.e. it is capable of being used for the *throwing in* of the oblations, and for the *cooking* of things.—When the Fire is brought into existence,—in accordance with the Injunction 'The Brāhmaṇa should install the Fires in the spring',—it is not in connection with any particular act; hence it should be used for each and every such act as it may be capable of accomplishing;—only thus would its *Bringing into Existence* be useful."

SŪTRA (2).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"THE PROHIBITION OF COOKING MEAT ALSO POINTS TO THE SAME CONCLUSION."

Bhāṣya.

"*The prohibition of cooking meat also points to the same conclusion*,—as that arrived at through reasoning (in the preceding *Sūtra*);—this prohibition being contained in the text—'They should not cook meat; if they did, they could make it fit for carnivorous animals'; this *cooking of meat* must mean the *ordinary cooking*, as the cooking of meat for Vedic sacrifices is done at the *Shāmitra Fire*."

SŪTRA (3).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, BECAUSE OF SPECIFICATION, THE PURPOSE SERVED MUST BE THAT OF THE VEDIC ACTS.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the said *Vihāra* (Fire-triad) should serve the purposes of the *Vedic Acts*,—not of the worldly acts.—Why so ?—*Because of specification* ; i.e. the purpose served by the *Gārhapatya* and other consecrated Fires (*Gārhapatya, Dakṣiṇāgni* and *Āhavanīya*) is clearly specified in such texts as—'*Yadāhavanīyē juhoti tēna so'syābhiṣṭaḥ prīto bhavati*' ['When one *pours oblations into the Āhavanīya*, etc.']; the information desired at the time of the bringing into existence of these Fires, as to the purpose to be served by them, is supplied by these texts; hence it follows that it is for the purpose of these (Vedic acts, like the *Pouring of Oblations*) that the Fires are brought into existence;—and hence they should not be used in connection with worldly acts.

"This may preclude such ordinary acts as the *Cooking of Food* and the like, not such acts as the cooking of the *Sthālīpāka-offering*, which also, as oblations, are capable of being poured into the *Āhavanīya* Fire."

This does not affect the case; the text quoted—'*Yadāhavanīyē juhoti*'—is restrictive in its application; in the absence of this text, it would be open to people to pour the oblations into the *Āhavanīya Fire*, as also elsewhere; hence there is this restrictive injunction (that 'Oblations should be offered *in the Āhavanīya Fire only*'); such a restrictive injunction is possible only in cases where there is likelihood of no restriction being observed; this likelihood is present in the case of *Vedic acts* alone, because for the ordinary worldly acts, the receptacle (substratum) has been definitely laid down as the *Aupāsana Fire*. Hence we conclude that it is not possible for these *ordinary* acts to be done in the *Āhavanīya Fire*.

SŪTRA (4).

ALSO BECAUSE THE 'AUPĀSANA FIRE' IS FOUND EVEN WHEN IT (THE FIRE-TRIAD) IS THERE.

Bhāṣya.

Even when the *Fire-triad* is present, the *Aupāsana Fire* is mentioned as being used,—in the text, 'When one desires that the Kingdom should descend to his offspring, *for him the oblations should be offered into the Aupāsana Fire*'. This text refers to a time when the *Rājasūya Sacrifice* has commenced; and at that time the *Fire-triad* is present there;—if then this same Fire-triad were to serve the purposes of the ordinary acts also, there would be no need for the *Aupāsana Fire* while the said *Triad* was there.

SŪTRA (5).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND NEGATION.

Bhāṣya.

The following text indicates the negation of *meat-cooking* in the consecrated Fire-triad—'*Māmsīyanti ha vā, etc. . . . . . vidyatē*'; this prohibits even the touch of meat in regard to the Fire-triad, apart from the *Pashubandha* sacrifice;—from this also it follows that this Fire-triad is not to be used in connection with ordinary acts.

SŪTRA (6).

AS REGARDS 'MEAT-COOKING', IT IS THE PROHIBITION OF WHAT HAS BEEN ENJOINED; BECAUSE OF CONNECTION WITH OBLATION-OFFERING.

Bhāṣya.

As regards the argument that—"the prohibition of cooking meat also points to the same conclusion" (Sū. 2),—the fact of the matter is that *it is the prohibition of what has been enjoined*; the *cooking of the Omentum* has been enjoined as to be done at the *Āhavanīya Fire*; and it is the prohibition of this that is contained in the text quoted ['*Māmsam na pachēyuḥ*, etc.'].—How so?—(*a*) Because the possibility of the cooking is there,—(*b*) *also because of connection with oblation-offering*,—expressed in the text 'They do not cook meat at that Fire in which they offer oblations', which is the sentence following (supplementary to) the quoted text;—it is into the *Āhavanīya* Fire that oblations are offered; hence the prohibition quoted should be taken as referring to the *cooking of the Omentum*.

SŪTRA (7).

OR, THE TEXT QUOTED MAY BE TAKEN AS SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE ISOLATED INJUNCTION 'DAKṢIṆASMIN, ETC.'.

Bhāṣya.

This is another answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument—It has been declared in the following text that the Lady is to cook the Food in the *Dakṣiṇāgni* (one of the three consecrated Fires)—'*Yadā āmayadoṣānmāmsam vratakāryē upādīyatē tadā tanna dakṣiṇāgnau shrapayitavyam*' ['If the meat is used on account of digestive troubles, then it should not be cooked on the *Dakṣiṇāgni*'] [which means that in all ordinary cases, the meat *is* to be

cooked on the *Dakṣiṇāgni* Fire]; to this sentence, which points to the cooking of meat as to be done on the *Dakṣiṇāgni* Fire, we have the supplementary statement 'apart from the meat'—which declaration is found in connection with the text '*Yā sarasvatī vēshamatī*, etc.', which speaks of the offering of oblations into the *Dakṣiṇāgni* Fire; from this it follows that the prohibition in question refers to the *Dakṣiṇāgni*.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The 'Cake-offering' should be made in connection with the 'Savanīya-animal'.*

SŪTRA (8).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THERE SHOULD BE NO CAKE IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'SAVANĪYA', BECAUSE IT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF 'COVERING UP THE HOLE', AND THIS PURPOSE IS SERVED BY OTHERS."

Bhāṣya.

[In connection with the *Agnī-ṣomīya-animal-sacrifice*, the *Cake-offering* has been enjoined;—the *Savanīya-animal-sacrifice* is an ectype (modification) of the *Agnī-ṣomīya*. The question is—In connection with the latter, *Savanīya*, should there be the *Cake-offering* or not ?]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*In connection with the Savanīya* animal *there should be no Cake*,—no Cake-offering should be made.—Why ?—*Because it is for the purpose of covering up the hole*; that the Cake is meant to cover up the holes of the Animal has been thus declared—'When the omentum is taken out of the Animal, there is a hole in it, when the Cake of barley-corn is made, it covers up that hole and renders the Animal hole-less'.—*And this purpose is served by others*; (in connection with the *Savanīya*) this purpose is served 'by others'—i.e. by the *Savanīya-cakes* [so that for the same purpose, Barley-cakes are not needed]; there is the following declaration in connection with the *Savanīya-cakes*—'At each extraction, *Savanīya-cakes* are offered, for the purpose of covering up the holes and for securing hole-less-ness'. Thus, this purpose having been already served, the other Cake becomes excluded."

SŪTRA (9).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE SHOULD BE MAKING OF THE CAKE-OFFERING; AS IT IS FOR THE SAKE OF THE DEITY.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the *Meat-Cake-offering* must be made.—Why ?—*Because it is for the sake of the Deity*; it has been explained under Sū. 10. 1. 11 that this Cake serves the purpose of embellishing the Deity, specially because like the syllable '*svāhā*', the subsidiaries are always related to a purpose.—Nor is the Cake meant for 'covering up the hole', as this statement is not in keeping with perceptible facts [the Cake does not cover up the hole made by the removal of the omentum]; hence the statement should be taken as a purely commendatory declaration, in support of the injunction of the Cake-offering. In connection with the *Savanīya* also, the same statement (regarding

the covering up of the Hole) is purely commendatory. Hence the Cake offering should be made in connection with the *Savanīya*, in accordance with the General Law.

SŪTRA (10).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

There is the declaration—'At the Morning-Extraction, they proceed with the omentum,—at the Midday Extraction, *with the Cake*,—and at the Third Extraction, with the limbs'; this sentence, which lays down the various procedures, mentions the *Cake*; for this reason also the Cake offering has to be made.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *In connection with the 'Savanīya-Cake' there shall be no 'Inviting of the Offerings-maker'.*

SŪTRA (11).

AT THE SAVANĪYA, THERE SHALL BE NO 'OFFERINGS-MAKER'; HAVING BEEN INVITED IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'ANIMAL-SACRIFICE', SHE WOULD BE THERE ALREADY AND WOULD DO THE NEEDFUL,—IF, INDEED, AT THE ARCHETYPE, SHE WERE MEANT FOR ALL THE OFFERINGS.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Savanīya-cakes*, there shall be no 'Inviting of the Offerings-maker';—why?—*because having been invited in connection with the Animal-sacrifice,*—and the *Savanīyas* fall within the *Animal-sacrifice,* —*she would be there already,* and would do the needful, simply by way of 'extended application', and there can be no need for inviting her again.

"But as a matter of fact, there is no 'offerings-maker' at the Animal-sacrifice';—the wife (who is the offerings-maker) is meant for preparing the vegetable and grain offering-materials and for threshing the corn; as is going to be explained under the *Saṁkarṣa Section* that 'the wife is spoken of as if she were equal'."

If, indeed, at the Archetype, she were meant for all the offerings;—if the wife were meant to prepare all the various kinds of offerings—Clarified Butter, Vegetable and Grains, Curd-Butter-Mixture,—then the above question would arise.

This is thus a purely hypothetical discussion.

Adhikaraṇa (4): *At the Third Extraction, the 'Inviting of the Offerings-maker' is not to be repeated.*

SŪTRA (12).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"In connection with the Cakes of the Third Extraction,—as also with the 'Saumya' and 'Āshvina' offerings,—she should be there; as these have been laid down as to be made after the animal-offering has been cooked, and hence she will have finished her work."

Bhāṣya.

[At the Third Extraction, there is an offering of Cooked Rice to *Soma* and also offerings of Cakes; the question arises—Should the *offerings-maker* be invited for the purpose of preparing this Cooked Rice?]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*In connection with the Cakes of the Third Extraction*,—as also with the Cooked Rice-offerings to *Soma* and the *Ashvins*,—the 'offerings-maker' should be invited separately;—why?—*because these offerings have been laid down as to be made after the Animal (Meat) has been cooked*; all these offerings in question have been laid down as coming after the meat has been cooked; and by that time the 'offerings-maker' connected with the Animal-offering will have finished her work and retired; hence it is necessary to invite another *offerings-maker*."

SŪTRA (13).

[Siddhānta]—As a matter of fact, being engaged in the Sacrifice, she would be free only at the end of the Sacrifice.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, it is not necessary to invite another *offerings-maker*; the one already invited would be there and do the needful.—She cannot be regarded as having done her duty and hence absolved from all further responsibility (after having cooked the Meat); because as a matter of fact, she is not so free.—Why?—Because *being engaged in the Sacrifice*; she has been engaged in the performance of the whole *Pashubandha* (Animal) Sacrifice,—not only for doing certain things in the beginning, but for helping in the fulfilment of all the accessories of the Sacrifice,—as is clear from the *Mantra*, '*Kastvā yunakti, sa tvā yunakti*, etc.', with which she has been engaged;—hence the right thing is that *she should be free only at the end of the Sacrifice*; because it is just possible that some such contingency would arise under which she might be required to do something.—From all this it follows that it cannot be necessary to invite another *offerings-maker*.

Adhikaraṇa (5): *At the Nishi-Yajña (Nocturnal Sacrifice) the Procedure of the Darsha-sacrifice is to be adopted.*

SŪTRA (14).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*continued*]—" At the Nishi-Yajña, there can be no room for the Archetypal procedure; as this Sacrifice has been directly enjoined."

Bhāṣya.

There is the following declaration—'*Agnayē rakṣoghnē'ṣṭākapālam nirvapēd yo rakṣobhyo bibhiyāt*' [' One who may be afraid of demons, should offer the Cake baked on eight pans to *Agni the Demon-destroyer* ']; in this same connection we read again—' On the Moonless Day one should perform the Sacrifice at night '.

In regard to this latter, there arises the question—At this Nocturnal Sacrifice, should the Procedure of the *Darsha-sacrifice* be adopted or not ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—" *At the Nocturnal Sacrifice, there is no room for the Archetypal procedure*; i.e. the Procedure of the *Darsha* cannot be extended to it.—' Why ? '—*Because it has been directly enjoined*;—this Nocturnal Sacrifice has been enjoined directly, in the text ' If one fears demons, he should offer, etc. etc.'—' What if it is so enjoined ? '—From this it is concluded that this *Sacrifice* has come into existence independently, by itself,—and does not form part of the Procedure of any other Sacrifice,—in the manner in which the ' meat-cake-offering ' forms part of the *Agniṣomīya-Animal-sacrifice*, as laid down in the text—'*Vapayā pracharya*, etc.' [' After having dealt with the Omentum, he offers the meat-cake baked on eleven pans, to *Agni-Soma* '];—or in the manner in which the *Vaiṣṇava* offering forms part of the *Vaishvadēva*-offering, as laid down in the text, '*Yadadho'vamṛdyēta yachcha sphya āshlishyēta tad viṣṇavē urukramāya avadyēt*' [' What falls down below and what becomes smeared in the *Sphya* should be offered to Viṣṇu-Urukrama '].—*Objection*: ' The presence of the term *amāvāsyāyām, on the Moonless Day*, clearly indicates that the offering spoken of falls within the *Amāvāsyā* (*Darsha*) *sacrifice* '.—*Answer*—The term '*amāvāsyā*' is not the name of a sacrifice; in fact, it denotes a *point of time*; by direct denotation, it stands for the particular point of time, and it is only by indirect indication that it can stand for the *Sacrifice* (performed at that time); and direct denotation is more logical than Indirect Indication. Thus then, when the Sacrifice in question is not found to be mentioned as part of the procedure of any particular sacrifice, the procedure of which sacrifice could it take in ?—It follows from this that the Sacrifice in question is independent (and must have its own distinct Procedure)."

SŪTRA (15).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—" THERE SHOULD BE A DISTINCT PROCEDURE, BECAUSE THERE IS DIFFERENCE OF TIME AND SENTENCE."

Bhāṣya.

" (*a*) *Because there is difference of time*, and (*b*) *because there is difference of sentence* [therefore the Procedure should be distinct].

" (*a*) *Difference of time*—The Nocturnal Sacrifice in question is performed *on the Moonless Day at night*, while the *Darsha-sacrifice* is performed *on the New Moon Day during the day*; if the Procedure of the *Darsha* were adopted at the Nocturnal Sacrifice, it would be defective on the point of time and hence could not benefit this latter sacrifice.—' How then can such benefit be conferred ? '—It can be conferred only in the way in which the *Prayājas* help the *Meat-cake-offering*, only when they are performed while the Animal is still there ; the reason for which has been already explained above (under Sū. 12. 1. 4), where it has been shown that ' there should be no repetition simply for the benefit of an accessory detail '.—In the present case (of the Nocturnal Sacrifice) the *Darsha-sacrifice* will not have been performed on the day ; hence its procedure should be independent (of the *Darsha*), in order to be free from that defect.—(*b*) *Also because there is difference of sentence* ;—the two sentences—' One should perform the *Darsha-sacrifice* on the Moonless Day ' and ' On the Moonless Day one should perform the sacrifice at night '—occur in two different places; one is found in the section on ' *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* ', and the other in the section on ' Prospective Sacrifices '.—' What if it is so ? '—If the two were in the same place, then, it would have been understood that the Sacrifice laid down (in the second sentence) as to be performed ' at night ', is on that same day that has been mentioned for the *Darsha-sacrifice* in the first sentence, ' one should perform the sacrifice on the Moonless Day ' ; and this would mean that the sacrifice at night is included in the Procedure of the *Darsha-sacrifice*. When however, the sentences are found in two different places, it follows that the *Moonless Day* has been laid down as the time for the Nocturnal Sacrifice in the same manner as for the *Darsha-sacrifice* (so that there is no interdependence between the two, both being equally independent). When two sacrifices are performed at the same time, there can be no question of ' extended application ' ; for instance, though the Ectypal *Iṣṭis* are performed at the same time as the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, yet they do not depend upon (or take in) the Procedure of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*.—From all this it follows that the Procedure (of the Nocturnal Sacrifice) should be different (from that of the *Darsha-Sacrifice*)."

SŪTRA (16).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—" THE ' LEVELLING OF THE PLATFORM ' AND THE ' VOW ' HOWEVER SHOULD BE THE SAME, AS (OTHERWISE) THERE WOULD BE AN INCONGRUITY."

Bhāṣya.

" The question being—if this is the absolute rule that the whole procedure (at the Nocturnal Sacrifice) should be different,—the answer is that that is not so; the two details,—of *Levelling the Platform* and *keeping the Vow should be the same*; when the *Levelling of the Platform* has been done at the *Darsha-sacrifice*, there can be no need for levelling it again, in fact, it would be only spoiling what has been already done;—as for the *Vow* (that has been taken up in connection with the *Darsha*), so long as it has not been relinquished, it cannot be taken up again; even if it were taken up, it would be only doing what has been already done and hence entirely futile.—These two details therefore should remain the same for the Nocturnal Sacrifice."

SŪTRA (17).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT SHOULD HAVE THE SAME PROCEDURE, BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN ENJOINED IN THE MIDST OF THAT PROCEDURE;—LIKE THE SAVANĪYA.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the Nocturnal Sacrifice *should have the same Procedure*,—i.e. the Procedure of the *Darsha-Sacrifice*,—and it should not be independent by itself.—" Why ? "—*Because it has been enjoined in the midst of that Procedure*; as a matter of fact, the Nocturnal Sacrifice has been enjoined in the midst of the Procedure of the *Darsha-Sacrifice*, in the sentence—' One should make the offering at night, on the *Amāvāsyā* '.—" It has been pointed out that the term ' *amāvāsyā* ' here stands for the *time* (day) not for the *sacrifice* (of that name, *Darsha*) ".—True, the term denotes *time*; but that time also forms part of the Procedure; so that being enjoined in connection with that time, the *sacrifice* also comes to be enjoined in the midst of that sȧme Procedure.—*As in the case of the Savanīya*; the *Savanīya* cakes, for instance, have not been enjoined in reference to the ' Animal-sacrifice ', and yet they are taken as enjoined in the midst of the Procedure of that sacrifice, on the ground that the place in which they are enjoined is included in the Procedure of the Animal sacrifice. Similarly the Nocturnal Sacrifice in question falling in the midst of the Procedure of the *Darsha-sacrifice*, cannot, like the *Savanīya*, stand by itself.

SŪTRA (18).

THE SAME 'FUEL AND GRASS' HOWEVER CANNOT HELP THE NOCTURNAL SACRIFICE, BY REASON OF DEFECTIVENESS; SO ALSO THE AGNYANV-ĀDHĀNA (SECONDARY FIRE-INSTALLATION), IF IT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ADOPTING THE DEITY.

Bhāṣya.

Question—"Is this an absolute rule that all the needs of the Nocturnal Sacrifice are fulfilled by the Procedure of the *Darsha-sacrifice*?"

Answer—Not so; that same 'Fuel and Grass' would not serve its purpose.—Why?—*By reason of defectiveness*; the Fuel is meant for the kindling of the Fire; if it is placed on the Fire on the New Moon Day, it cannot accomplish the kindling of the Fire at the Nocturnal Sacrifice which is performed on the (preceding) Moonless Night;—similarly the *Grass* also, which is for the purpose of being spread over the Platform. In case both these (Fuel and Grass) were applied to the Nocturnal Sacrifice, this sacrifice would certainly become *defective*; hence these two should be brought in separately.

So also the Agnyanvādhāna, if it is for the purpose of adopting the deity; if the *Agnyanvādhāna* is meant for the purpose of adopting the Deity, then that also should be performed separately (for the Nocturnal Sacrifice). The *Agnyanvādhāna* that is done at the primary sacrifice (*Darsha*) takes in the deities of the *Darsha-sacrifice*;—the *Rakṣoghna Agni* is not for the purpose of including those deities; if then, the *Anvādhāna* of that Fire is for the maintaining of the Fire, then, as this maintaining of the Fire has been done already at the primary sacrifice, it should not be done again to the Fire.—But that the *Agnyanvādhāna* in question is for the purpose of adopting the Deity is shown by the following supplementary declaration —'*Mamāgnē varcho vihavē ..... dēvatā ēva pūrvēdyuḥ parigṛhītāḥ shvobhūtē yajatē.*'

Adhikaraṇa (6): *The 'Ārambhaṇīyā-Iṣṭi' should be performed at the Ectypal sacrifices.*

Bhāṣya.

The Opponent raises the following questions :—

SŪTRA (19).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"At the Ectypal sacrifice, the Ārambhaṇīyā shall not be performed; because it falls within the time of the Archetype,—and in connection with this latter, it has been already performed."

Bhāṣya.

The question being—at the Ectypal sacrifices, should the *Ārambhaṇīyā* connected with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* be performed or not ?—the *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows :—"It shall not be performed ;—why ?—*because it falls within the time of the Archetype*; the 'Archetype' is the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, and its *time* has been laid down as—'One should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa as long as one lives*'; and all Ectypal sacrifices fall within this time ('life long') ;—*and in connection with this latter, it has been already performed*; i.e. at the beginning of the life-long performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, the *Ārambhaṇīyā* has already been performed ; and it has been explained under Sū. 9. 1. 35 that 'Inasmuch as the performance lasts throughout one's life, there is to be a single beginning once only' ;—and the *Ārambhaṇīyā*, thus performed once, would benefit the Ectypal sacrifices also, through 'extended application'; hence there should be no separate performance in connection with these."

SŪTRA (20).

[Siddhānta]—As a matter of fact, there should be performance of it, because the time is not auxiliary to it.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the *Ārambhaṇīyā* should be performed at the ectypal sacrifices.—Why ?—Because it comes in by virtue of the General Law.—"But it has been pointed out that, inasmuch as the *Ārambhaṇīyā* falls within the time of the Archetype, it helps the Ectypes by 'extended application' therefrom [and hence it should not be performed over again, separately in connection with the ectypes]".—But the time 'life-long' is not an auxiliary to the Archetype ; it is a detail belonging to the Performer, as shown under Sū. 2. 4. 2 ; i.e. the said time appertains to that 'observance'

which belongs to the Performer ; the time for the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* itself being the Moonless Day and the Full-Moon Day. From this it is clear that the Ectypes do not fall within the Procedure of the performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* ; hence the *Ārambhaṇiyā* cannot help them by 'extended application'.

Objection—"The incongruity pointed out by the *Pūrvapakṣin* was based on one thing, while the answer given by the *Siddhāntin* is on the basis of something totally different ; the incongruity pointed out was on the basis of the time 'life-long' being that of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, while the answer offered is on the basis of the idea that the said time pertains to the Performer's observance."

Answer—There are answers on the basis of other explanations also (as the following).

SŪTRA (21).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE IN THE 'BEGINNING'.

Bhāṣya.

The '*Ārambha*' (Beginning) of the Archetype is different from that of the Ectype ; at the time that the *beginning* of the Archetype comes in, the Ectype has not come into existence at all ; as it is prompted by a certain *desire* or by a particular *occasion* ;—hence the '*ārambha*', *beginning*, of the Ectype cannot be accomplished by that of the Archetype. Thus then the *Ārambha* of the two being different, the *Ārambhaṇiyā-Iṣṭi*, which is consequent upon the *Ārambha*, must be different ; so that there should be a separate performance of the *Ārambhaṇiyā* at the Ectypal sacrifices.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *When there is conflict among details of the Main sacrifices, the details performed should be those appertaining to a majority of them.*

SŪTRA (22).

WHEN THERE IS CONGREGATION OF SACRIFICES WITH MUTUALLY INCOMPATIBLE DETAILS, THE COURSE ADOPTED SHOULD BE SUCH AS TO SECURE THE DETAILS COMMON TO THE LARGEST NUMBER.

Bhāṣya.

In the '*Pañchadasharātra*' (Fifteen Days) Sacrifice, the first 'day' consists of the *one-day* sacrifice of the '*Agniṣṭut*';—then comes the 'three days' sacrifice' consisting of '*Jyotiḥ-Gauḥ-Āyuḥ*';—the remaining 'Eleven Days' are modifications of the Archetype '*Dvādashāha*' ('Twelve Days' sacrifice').—When there is a *conflict*—incompatibility—among the details of these 'Eleven Days' and those of the '*Agniṣṭut*' [these two having different details, as being modifications of different Archetypes],—the question arises—Should the details adopted be those of the 'Eleven Days', or those of the *Agniṣṭut* ?

Objection—"It has been already settled under *Sūtra* 7. 4. 15. that when there is a conflict between the indications of the General Law and those of the 'Name', the details adopted should be those of the 'One-day' sacrifice [i.e. according to *Name*]."

Answer—The conclusion arrived at there is now discussed again from another standpoint. Or we may regard the present discussion to be based upon the conflict between the indications of two 'Names' [not between those of the General Law and those of the 'Name', as under 7. 4. 15].

The *Siddhānta* on the question raised is as follows:—*When there is congregation*—in the 'Fifteen Days' sacrifice',—*of sacrifices with mutually incompatible details*,—e.g. of the 'Eleven Days' sacrifice' and the '*Agniṣṭut*',—*the course adopted should be such as to secure the details common to the largest number*,—i.e. of the 'Eleven Days' sacrifice'; i.e. the details adopted should be those of the 'Eleven Days' sacrifice'.—"On what grounds?"—On the ground of the *largest number* itself; when a large number of sacrifices is equipped with full details, the result obtained is a larger one; whereas when only one sacrifice is equipped with full details, the result obtained is a small one. Such is found to be the case in ordinary life; e.g. when in a room there are eleven lamps fully equipped with oil and wicks, the light obtained is a *strong* one, whereas in the other case (if there is only one lamp so equipped), the light obtained is a *faint* one.

"What would be the practical effect of this conclusion in the case in question?"

The effect is that while the *Subrahmaṇyā* verse at the *Agniṣṭut* (*one-day* sacrifice) is the *Āgneyī*,—that at all the other 'Days' it is the *Aindrī*. [Hence it is the *Aindrī* that should be adopted.]

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *When the conflicting details belong to an equal number of sacrifices, that belonging to the first one should be adopted.*

SŪTRA (23).

THE PRINCIPAL ONE SHOULD BE ADOPTED, BECAUSE OF ITS INJUNCTION COMING FIRST.

Bhāṣya.

In a case where the conflict is between the Detail of an equal number of Main Sacrifices, that detail should be adopted which is the principal one; e.g. there are the two details laid down in the two texts—'One should offer to *Agni-Viṣṇu* the Cake baked on Eleven Pans', and 'In the afternoon, one offers the Clarified Butter to *Sarasvatī*';—here the course adopted is that related to *Agni-Viṣṇu* which is the *principal* one;—why?—*because its injunction comes first*; i.e. because it has been enjoined before the other one; i.e. in the Vedic texts, the one bearing upon *Agni-Viṣṇu* comes first in order of sequence, hence that is the course that should be adopted; because the details appertaining to this course are without opposition from any quarter (as no other details have been enjoined previously); while as regards the other course relating to *Sarasvatī*, the details relating thereto are faced by the opposition of the injunction that has gone before it; the details relating to the second deity (*Sarasvatī*) comes in after those relating to the former (*Agni-Viṣṇu*); and when the details of the former have been already performed, the latter also has its purposes served by the same, so that the details relating to this latter become excluded.

Some people think that in every case it is the course relating to the first one that should be adopted.—According to these, in the case of the 'Fifteen Days' Sacrifice' also the details adopted should be those relating to the principal (first) one.

SŪTRA (24).

THERE IS ALSO A TEXT INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

There is a text also which points to the superiority of what comes first in order of sequence—'*Adhvarasya pūrvamathāgnēḥ upāyi hi ētat karma yadagnikarma*'; and again, '*Yathā vai pūrvāvasāyino jaghanyāvasāyinām na nīyantē nēhāvasyasi nēhāvasyasīti ēvamēvaitat*'.

Adhikaraṇa (9): *When there is conflict among the details of Subsidiaries and Primaries, the details of the Primary are to be regarded as superior in authority.*

SŪTRA (25).

When there is conflict among the details of Subsidiaries (and Primaries),—inasmuch as it is for that purpose, [it is the former that should be excluded].

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is the *Dīkṣaṇīyā-Iṣṭi*, laid down in the text—'When going to be initiated, one should offer to *Agni-Viṣṇu* a cake baked on eleven pans';—in course of this *Iṣṭi*, there is the *Sutyā* '*Day*';—the time for these two are the two *Parvans*, according to the text—'One who performs the *Iṣṭi*, or the *Animal-sacrifice*, or the *Soma-sacrifice*, should perform it on the Moonless Day or the Full-Moon Day'.—In connection with all this, there are cases where 'there is *one Initiation* and *three Upasads*' [the latter being done on the *Sutyā day*];—when there is a conflict regarding the *time*, the question arises—should the *Initiation* be performed on the prescribed *Parva-day*, and the *Sutyā* on a *Non-Parva-day*? or *vice-versa*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "the *Initiation* should be performed on the prescribed day, as that is the first to be enjoined."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—In a case where there is conflict between the details of the Subsidiary and the details of the Primary, it is the details of the subsidiary that should be excluded.—Why?—*Because it is for that purpose*; as a matter of fact, the performance of the subsidiary is made complete in its details only with a view to making the performance of the Primary perfectly complete in all its details; if then, it so happens in any case that the adoption of the details of the Subsidiary makes the Primary defective,—what would be the use of making the subsidiary complete in its details?—From all this we conclude that it is the *Sutyā* that should be performed on the *Parva-day* (prescribed), the *Initiation* being done on a *Non-Parva-day*.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *In connection with the 'Paridhi', the details of both the 'Paridhi' and the 'Yūpa' should be performed.*

SŪTRA (26).

THE PARIDHI SHOULD TAKE IN THE DETAILS OF BOTH, BECAUSE IT SERVES BOTH PURPOSES.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifices, which involve the sacrifice of animals,—we read—'They tie the animal to the *Paridhi*'.—[At the Archetype, the animal is tied to the *Yūpa*, Post.—There are certain details, such as *washing* and the rest, relating specifically to the *Paridhi*; and then there are the details prescribed in connection with the *Yūpa*.—There arises the question therefore—When the Animal is tied to the *Paridhi*, should the details performed in relation to the *Paridhi* be those laid down for the *Paridhi* itself? Or those laid for the *Yūpa* only? or both?]—The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—*The Paridhi should take in the details of both*,—i.e. the details prescribed for the *Paridhi* itself, as well as those prescribed for the *Yūpa*.—"Why so?"—*Because it serves both purposes*; because in this case the *Paridhi* serves the purpose of the *Paridhi*—viz. the Protection of the Fire,—as well as that of the *Yūpa*,—viz.: the tying and consequent helplessness of the animal;—and the performance of the details is always regulated by the purposes served by them;—hence both sets of details should be performed, all those that may not be incompatible;—for instance, (*a*) *Besprinkling with water mixed with Barley, Annointing* and *Covering*, which are the details prescribed for the *Yūpa*, and (*b*) *the Tying up of Fuel, washing, annointing* with the *Mantra* '*Juhvāvasurūrasi, etc.*', and '*Abhyāsrāvaṇa*' (the Pouring of Clarified Butter?), which are the details prescribed for the *Paridhi*.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *In connection with the 'Paridhi', there shall be no performance of such details of the 'Yūpa' as may be incompatible.*

SŪTRA (27).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF INCOMPATIBILITY, THE DETAILS RELATING TO THE 'YŪPA' SHOULD BE ADOPTED; BECAUSE OF IMMEDIATE CONNECTION."

Bhāṣya.

"When there is *incompatibility* [between the two sets of details] those relating to the '*Yūpa*' shall be adopted, not those relating to the '*Paridhi*'; *because of immediate connection*; the *Animal* is the principal factor;—as it is that which accomplishes the sacrifice; and what is immediately connected with the *Animal* is the *Yūpa*, which helps the animal directly and hence it is more intimately related to it; while the *Paridhi* is related directly to the *Fire*, and the Fire with the offering-material, so that the *Paridhi* is related to the Animal only remotely; and between what is intimately related and what is remotely related, the former is more authoritative.—Why?—Because the notion of the *intimate* comes first, and those details that serve to accomplish transcendental results, when not related directly to any such result, come to be recognised as pertaining to the subsidiaries; hence the notion regarding those turns back from the main act and falls back upon the subsidiaries, and hence becomes concentrated in the most intimate detail,—then to the next non-intimate detail; and it remains fixed upon that on which it falls first of all;—there being no reason for passing it over.—From all this it follows that when there is incompatibility, the details adopted should be those relating to the *Yūpa* specifically.—'What are these details?'—*Scraping, Raising*, and *Planting in the ground*."

SŪTRA (28).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT IS THE OTHER THAT SHOULD BE ADOPTED, AS IT IS THAT THAT HAS BEEN ENJOINED IN THAT CONNECTION.

Bhāṣya.

In the event of the details of the *Yūpa* being incompatible, *the other one should be adopted*;—why?—*because it is that that has been enjoined in that connection*;—the function of the *Yūpa*,—viz.: *tying of the animal*—has been enjoined as to be done to the *Paridhi*; the text 'They tie the animal to the *Paridhi*', fixes upon the piece of wood the character of '*Paridhi*'

and then speaks of the *tying* as to be done to it; and this latter is understood as to be done in such a way as not to deprive the wood-piece of its character of '*Paridhi*'; in fact it is always prescribed as such, as we find in the case of the text—'The stake in the farmyard becomes the *Yūpa*'.—If the *Paridhi-wood* were *scraped* and *raised* (as laid down in connection with the *Yūpa*), it would lose its character of '*Paridhi*', which must have the bark on and which must lie on the ground horizontally;—and when the wood would cease to be '*Paridhi*', the direction of 'tying the animal to the *Paridhi*' would not be followed literally.

SŪTRA (29).

IN BOTH CASES, THE CONNECTION IS WITH THE SUBSIDIARY.

Bhāṣya.

In both cases, the details are connected with the subsidiary,—and not with the Primary, in any case.—As for the Proximity ('immediate connection', spoken of in *Sūtra* 27), there can be no help rendered by such Proximity; hence it can have no effect.—It follows from this therefore that the details adopted should be those relating to the *Paridhi*.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *As between the 'Savanīya-Animal' and the 'Puroḍāsha', the former is the Principal Factor, and the Procedure of that same should be adopted.*

SŪTRA (30).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AS BETWEEN THE 'SAVANĪYA-ANIMAL' AND THE 'SAVANĪYA CAKE', THERE SHOULD BE OPTION;—IF IT IS 'ECTYPAL' IN CHARACTER; BOTH BEING SUCH AS ARE NOT DIRECTLY LAID DOWN."

Bhāṣya.

[In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the *Savanīya-Animal* has been laid down; the details of this come in from the Archetypal Animal-sacrifice, under the General Law;—similarly the offering of *Savanīya Cake* also has been laid down, of which also the details come in from the Archetypal Cake-sacrifice under the General Law.—Now then, at the *Savanīya performance*, both these details are open to adoption; which one of the two sets of details shall be adopted—that relating to the *Animal-sacrifice*? Or that relating to the *Cake-offering*?]

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—"There being a possibility of the details of the *Savanīya Animal*, as well as those of the *Savanīya Cake*, being adopted,—*there should be option*; that is, either the Procedure of the Animal-sacrifice may be adopted in connection with the *Savanīya Cakes*, or the Procedure of the *Savanīya Cakes* may be adopted in connection with the Animal-sacrifice.—Why so?—Because there is no ground for differentiation; as neither are the *Cakes* laid down under the Procedure of the *Animal-sacrifice*, nor is the *Animal* laid down under the Procedure of the *Cake-offering*; both stand by themselves, independently of one another; as is clear from the two texts—(*a*) 'Taking up the cup dedicated to the *Ashvins* ..... he offers the *Savanīya animal*', and (*b*) 'At each extraction, *Savanīya Cakes* are offered'.—Between these two, if the Procedure of either one had been directly laid down,—while that of the other were purely implied,—then, in that case, the former would be the Principal factor and the latter would be subject to 'extended application';—as a matter of fact, however, *both are such as are not directly laid down*,—the *Animal* being 'Ectypal', and so also the *Cakes*; hence even this ground for differentiation is not available. Consequently, inasmuch as both are equally admissible only indirectly under the General Law, the purposes would be served by either of the two. Hence there should be option.—*Objection*—'It is definitely known that the Animal is *Ectypal*; it is not right therefore that the *Sūtra* should have used the doubtful expression *if it is Ectypal*'.—*Answer*—Even in matters admitting of no doubt, such doubtful expressions are used; for

instance, in the following saying—'*Brāhmaṇas* learned in the Vedas who perform several sacrifices, reach the highest stages,—*if the scriptures are reliable*' [there is no doubt that the scriptures *are* reliable; and yet the doubtful expression has been used]."

SŪTRA (31).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE PROCEDURE OF THE 'ANIMAL-SACRIFICE' SHOULD BE ADOPTED (AT THE 'CAKE-OFFERING'), BECAUSE OF ITS SPECIFIC DECLARATION;—WHICH WOULD BE MEANINGLESS, IF THERE WERE OPTION.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the Procedure of the 'Animal-sacrifice' should be extended to the Cake-offerings, and there can be no option.—"Why?"—*Because of its specific declaration*; a special detail of the Animal-sacrifice has been laid down in connection with the Cake-offerings, in the following declaration—'*Sūktavākpraiṣamagnimādyati*';—this declaration would be meaningless, if there were option; because the particular detail would come in, even without this declaration, in the case of one of the options. On the strength of the said declaration,—which would otherwise become meaningless,—the particular detail in question has to be regarded as an essential feature (in the *Cake-offering*) (not admissible merely as one optional alterative). This detail could not come into the *Cake-offering* by 'extended application'; as in that case, the *Praiṣa* (Direction) would have to be pronounced by the *Maitrāvaruṇa* Priest; while there is no such Priest at the *Cake-offering*, at which there are only Four Priests, according to the text 'At the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, there are four Priests' (among whom the *Maitrāvaruṇa* is not included). At the *Animal-sacrifice*, the *Maitrāvaruṇa* Priest *is* present; hence if the Procedure of the *Animal-sacrifice* comes in, there will be no incongruity or defect; on the other hand, if the Procedure of the *Cake-offering* were adopted, either the number of Priests would have to be transgressed, or the *Praiṣa* would have to be pronounced by some one who is *not* the *Maitrāvaruṇa*; and both these contingencies would involve incompatibility with the Archetype.—From all this it follows that it is essential that the Procedure of the 'Animal-sacrifice' alone should be adopted.

SŪTRA (32).

THERE IS ALSO A 'DRAGGING ON' OF THE ANIMAL-SACRIFICE; AS THERE IS INJUNCTION IN THE MIDST OF THE PROCEDURE.

Bhāṣya.

Then again, there is a 'dragging on' of the Procedure of the Animal-sacrifice,—as is clear from the text—'They operate upon the omentum at the Morning Extraction, upon the Cake at the Midday Extraction, and

upon the limbs at the Evening Extraction' [where the *Cake* occurs in the middle] ;—it is only by reason of this 'dragging on' (of the Procedure of the Animal-offering), that this injunction of the Cake in the midst of the Procedure of that offering becomes explicable. The procedure relating to the Cakes of the Morning Extraction is finished at the Morning Extraction, as laid down in the text—'The Cakes relating to the Extractions are offered *at each extraction*'; there would be no possibility of the Animal coming in in the midst of the Procedure of the *Cake-offering*, because of the break between the *Cakes* (of the Morning Extraction) and the *operation on the limbs* (at the Evening Extraction). In the present case the only doubtful point is regarding the coming in of the *Animal* along with the Cakes of the Morning Extraction, the other Cakes, being, without any doubt, included in the midst of the Procedure of either the Cakes of the Morning Extraction, or the Animal-sacrifice.

Objection—"In accordance with the declaration that 'They proceed with the *Anuyājas* after the offering to *Agni-Maruts*', there being a 'postponement' of the *Anuyājas*, the Procedure of the Cake-offering also becomes extended on that account."

Answer—Not so ; as the said 'Postponement' is that of those *Anuyājas* that pertain to the *Animal-sacrifice*.—"How do you know that ?"—It is found that there is to be 'disposal' of the *Svaru* at the end of the *Soma-sacrifice*, as laid down in the text—'At the end of the sacrifice, they throw away the grass-bedding, as also the *Svaru*, for securing the sacrifice from *harm*' ;—this is possible only if it has been 'postponed' (brought forward) along with the *Anuyājas* of the *Animal-sacrifice* ; it is not possible for it to be brought forward along with the *Anuyājas* of the *Cake-offering* ; because of the dictum that 'what comes in by extended application cannot be postponed, because there is no connection' (*Sūtra* 5. 1. 28) ; the time for these comes after the bringing in of the offering-materials ; what has been said regarding 'postponement' also refers to that situation. The *Anuyājas* relating to the Cakes of the Morning-Extraction, however, do not relate to that situation ; hence there can be no 'postponement' of these.—From all this it follows that it is the Procedure of the Animal-sacrifice that has to be adopted.

"Why cannot there be a clear declaration to that effect ?"

This objection has been already answered ; the text in question would have two 'hands' so to say, while laying down two things—the particular *disposal* and also the particular time.

From all this it follows that the Procedure of the *Animal-sacrifice* should be adopted at the *Cake-offerings* and there can be no option in the matter.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *Where the Archetype and the Ectype have similar Procedure, that of the Ectype should be adopted.*

SŪTRA (33).

IT IS THE NEW ONE THAT SHOULD BE ADOPTED AT THE ARCHETYPE, IF IT HAS SIMILAR PROCEDURE; BECAUSE THE OTHER IS NON-ESSENTIAL, AND WOULD BE USELESS.

Bhāṣya.

Question—In a case where the Procedure of the Archetype is similar to that of the Ectype, is it the Procedure of the Archetype that should be adopted—or that of the Ectype?

Objection—" As a matter of fact, there is no Archetype whose Procedure is similar to that of the Ectype."

Answer—That is why the conditional clause '*if it has similar Procedure*' has been introduced, which makes it clear that the discussion introduced is a purely hypothetical one.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—" If the Archetype is performed first, then the Archetypal procedure should be adopted, but if the Ectype is performed first, then the Ectypal procedure should be adopted. What would be the right course to adopt in the case in question?—The right course is that the Archetype should be performed first; because the Archetype is essential (compulsory), while the Ectype is only adventitious, as it comes in only if a certain desire or a certain contingency is present;—and those that come first are always more authoritative than those that come later. Hence it is the Archetype that is performed first, and when an act is performed first, it is the Procedure of that act that comes in first, as its time has arrived.—Hence in the case in question, it is the Procedure of the Archetype that should be adopted."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*It is the new one*,—i.e. the *Ectypal* Procedure,—*that should be adopted at the Archetype*,—*if it has similar procedure*; because the Ectype is not essential; as a matter of fact, the Ectype is not essential (or compulsory), it comes to be performed only when there is a desire or a particular contingency present;—and that *desire to act* which is prompted by such contingencies always sets aside that *desire* which pertains to the *Essential Act*; because the *contingent desire* appears while the *desire for the essential* is there; and hence the former could not appear without setting aside the latter; in fact, if it did not set it aside, it *would be useless*,—the entire injunction of the Ectype would become useless.—When the desire to do a certain act has come in, the performance of that act should come first; hence it is the *Ectype* that should be performed first; and when that is performed first, it is the Procedure of that that should be adopted first,—for reasons already adduced under the *Pūrvapakṣa*.—From all this it follows that the Procedure of the Ectype should be adopted at the Archetype.

Adhikaraṇa (14): *At the 'Āgrayaṇa' only 'Flowering Grass' should be used.*

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Āgrayaṇa sacrifice*, there is an offering of Cake baked on one Pan, made to *Dyāvā-pṛthivī*;—this is an Ectype (modification) of 'the offering of Cake baked on one Pan' that is made to *Vishvē-dēva*;—in connection with this the 'Flowering Grass' has been laid down; whereas in connection with the other two offerings made at the *Āgrayaṇa* (viz. the *Aindrāgna* and the *Vaishvadēva*), the grass laid down is either *flowering* or *non-flowering*.

The question that arises is—At this sacrifice, is there to be no restriction as to the using of *Flowering* or *Non-flowering* Grass? Or must only *Flowering* Grass be used?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"inasmuch as the *Aindrāgna* offering is the foremost, there should be no restriction (as there is no restriction regarding the *Aindrāgna*)".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—

SŪTRA (34).

THE PROCEDURE BEING THE GENERAL ONE, THE ADDITIONAL DETAIL SHOULD BE EMPHASISED EVEN THOUGH LAID DOWN IN CONNECTION WITH WHAT IS NOT THE FOREMOST OFFERING; AS THERE WOULD BE NO INCOMPATIBILITY;—AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'KĀMSYA-BHOJIN'.

Bhāṣya.

The Procedure applicable to the case of the *Aindrāgna* and other offerings being the general one of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifice, the *additional detail* (*Flowering Grass*) that has been laid down specifically in connection with the one particular offering to *Dyāvāpṛthivī* (which is one of the three offerings in question, constituting the *Āgrayaṇa* Sacrifice), *should be emphasised*,—must be insisted upon as the only one to be used throughout all the offerings,—*even though it has been laid down* directly in connection with the *offering to Dyāvāpṛthivī only, which is not the foremost* among the offerings;—because such a course would not involve any *incompatibility*;—as in the case of the '*Kāmsya-bhojin*'; there is the restrictive rule regarding the Pupil that he must eat in a bell-metal dish,—but there is no such restriction regarding the Teacher's eating,—under the circumstances, if an occasion should arise for both of them to eat out of the same dish, the dish will have to be of *bell-metal*, even though this has been laid down in connection with the Pupil who is not the most important person;—because otherwise there would

be the omission of an important duty (on the part of the Pupil, if he ate out of a dish of another metal);—similarly in the case in question also [even though the *Flowering Grass* has been restrictively laid down only in connection with the offering to *Dyāvāpṛthivī*, which is not the most important offering, yet it is the qualified *Flowering Grass* that should be used in connection with all the offerings; as otherwise, if *non-flowering grass* were used throughout, *the offering to Dyāvāpṛthivī* would become defective by reason of the omission of what has been specially laid down for it].—From all this it follows that it is not right that there should be no restriction.

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *At the Āgrayaṇa, the Procedure of any one of the three offerings—Aindrāgna and the rest—may be adopted.*

SŪTRA (35).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"BY REASON OF THE INTRODUCTION OF THAT, THERE SHOULD BE RESTRICTION REGARDING THE PROCEDURE; JUST AS THERE IS RESTRICTION REGARDING THE PROCEDURE OF THE ANIMAL-SACRIFICE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE SŪKTAVĀKA."

Bhāṣya.

[It has been settled that the Grass adopted should be the particular one laid down in connection with the *Offering to Dyāvāpṛthivī*; there arises now the question relating to the rest of the Procedure—Should it be that related to that same offering? Or may it be that of any of the three offerings, there being no restriction?]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*By reason of the introduction of that,*—i.e. of the *Flowering Grass,*—it follows that the Procedure adopted should be restricted to that of the *Vaishvadēva-offering* (which is the Archetype of the offering to *Dyāvāpṛthivī*, which therefore takes in the Procedure of its Archetype, under the General Law);—just as it has been settled (under Adhi. 12) that the course adopted should be restricted to that of the Animal-sacrifice, by reason of the particular *Sūktavāka-Praiṣa* that has been laid down specifically (for the Animal-sacrifice)."

SŪTRA (36).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT SHOULD NOT BE SO; AS THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, there should be no restriction;—why?—*because there is no incompatibility*; the particular detail in question (Flowering Grass) is not incompatible with the other offerings; hence it cannot be regarded as pertaining specifically to any one offering (that to *Dyāvāpṛthivī*) only;—and when it is not so specific, then it cannot serve to restrict any one of the Procedures. In the case of the *Sūktavāka*, restriction was accepted, because the detail concerned appertained specifically to one thing, and hence it could serve as the basis for restricting one or the other.

SŪTRA (37).

ALSO BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT BEEN PRESCRIBED BY THE SCRIPTURES.

Bhāṣya.

Further, as a matter of fact, the *Flowers* have not been prescribed by the scriptures; they come in only by virtue of the General Law.—"What if that is so?"—If they had been prescribed by the scriptures, then, by reason of that indicative feature, which is peculiar to the Archetype, the Procedure would have been restricted to that of the *Vaishvadēva-offering* (which is the Archetype concerned);—or, by reason of the said Flowers appertaining to *the offering to Dyāvāpṛthivī* under the General Law itself, their assertion would be superfluous,—and in order to avoid this superfluity, it would be taken as indirectly indicating the Procedure of the *Vaishvadēva-offering* as the one to be adopted,—the idea being that 'the procedure adopted must be that wherein the *Flowering Grass* is used'.—As a matter of fact however, there is no scriptural text prescribing them.—Hence it follows that there can be no restriction regarding the Procedure to be adopted.

End of Pāda ii of Adhyāya XII.

ADHYĀYA XII.

PĀDA III.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *At the 'Aṣṭarātra' sacrifice, there should be 'combination' of 'Calf-skin' and 'Unworn Cloth'.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AT THE VISHVAJIT, 'CALF-SKIN' SHOULD BE WORN, BECAUSE OF THE NAME; OTHERWISE, IT SHOULD BE THE 'UNWORN CLOTH', ON ACCOUNT OF THE LARGER NUMBER OF 'DAYS' BEING RELATED TO THAT PROCEDURE."

Bhāṣya.

There is an *Ahīna* sacrifice of the name of '*Aṣṭarātra*' ('Eight-Day-Sacrifice');—connected with it are two *Agniṣṭomas*, named '*Vishvajit*' and '*Abhijit*', laid down in the text, '*Abhita ubhayato jyotiḥ, madhyē ṣaḍahaḥ, pashukāmo hyētēna yajēta*' ['There are two *Jyotis* at the two ends and the *Ṣaḍaha*, six-day-sacrifice, comes in the middle; one desiring cattle should perform this sacrifice'].—In connection with the first of these, 'the one-day-sacrifice', *Vishvajit*, 'Calf-skin' has been laid down as to be worn by the person who has come out of the *Avabhṛtha Bath*, in the text—'Coming out of the *Avabhṛtha*, he puts on the Calf-skin'.—At the *Jyotiṣṭoma* however (which is the Archetype of all the above sacrifices), the 'Unworn Cloth' has been laid down as to be worn.—Both of these (*Calf-skin* and *Unworn Cloth*) are admissible at the *Aṣṭarātra*.

The question is—which of these two dresses should be worn?—and the idea being that—inasmuch as both these dresses serve the same purpose, there should be option,—we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"It is the *Calf-skin* that should be worn; and it should not be a matter for option; that the *Calf-skin* should be worn is indicated by the *name* [at the Primary *Vishvajit* sacrifice, Calf-skin is worn, and the first 'day' of the *Aṣṭarātra* is also named '*Vishvajit*'; hence the 'Name' '*Vishvajit*' indicates the use of *Calf-skin*],—while the 'Unworn Cloth' comes in by virtue of the General Law [since at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* which is the Archetype, 'Unworn Cloth' is what is worn];—and 'Name', which is a form of 'word', is more authoritative than the indications of the General Law, as has been explained under *Sūtra* 7. 4. 15.—If there were nothing indicated by the *Name*, then, 'Unworn Cloth' would come in, by reason of the fact that a larger number (i.e. six) of the 'days' (of the 'Eight-Day-Sacrifice') have the *Jyotiṣṭoma* for their Archetype [and hence adopt the details of that sacrifice where 'Unworn Cloth' is worn].—But indication by the 'Name' is actually present (which points to the wearing of the *Calf-skin*);

hence the 'Unworn Cloth' cannot come in.—*Objection*—'But the text contains the expression '*abhito jyotiḥ*'—'*There are two Jyotis at the two ends*', where we have the name *Jyoti*, which indicates the details relating to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* [and this should bring in the *Unworn Cloth*]'.—Even so, as the name '*Vishvajit*' (coming first) is the more important of the two, greater authority attaches to that."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA] :—THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE TWO ; AS THE 'CALF-SKIN' FORMS THE UPPER GARMENT.

Bhāṣya.

There should be no such restriction as that *Calf-skin* alone should be worn ; as a matter of fact, there should be *combination* of both ; if both are combined, then the declaration of the Entire Procedure taking in all the details and subsidiaries becomes duly followed.—"But the indications of *Name* being more authoritative, the *Unworn Cloth* should be taken to be rejected." —It would be rejected if there were incompatibility between the two (Calf-skin and Unworn Cloth) ;—*there is however no incompatibility between the two* ;—how ?—the *Calf-skin* serves the purposes of the *Upper Garment* [the *Unworn Cloth* being the *Lower Garment*], and by custom, a man has to put on two garments.—"But, in regard to the *Upper Garment*, the term 'wear' is never used."—Not so ; the term is used even in reference to the *Upper Garment*, as we find such statements as—'wears the blanket', 'wears the deer-skin' [the *Blanket* and the *Deer-skin* being always used as *upper garments*].—From all this it follows that there should be *combination* of both [and both should be worn].

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *In the case of the 'Anunirvāpya (subsequent) Offerings' the Procedure adopted should be that of the Cake-offering.*

SŪTRA (3).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF THE 'ANUNIRVĀPYA-OFFERINGS', THE PROCEDURE SHOULD BE RESTRICTED ON THE BASIS OF THE LARGER NUMBER."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the '*Agni*', we read—'*Agniṣomīyasya pashupuroḍāshamanu dēvasūhavīmṣi nirvapati*' ['Supplementary to the meat-cake dedicated to *Agni-Soma*, one offers the *Dēvasū-oblations*'].—At the *Anubandhyā* Sacrifice also there are these *Dēvasū-oblations*.

[The question is—Which procedure should be adopted in connection with the *Anunirvāpya* (*supplementary*) *Dēvasū-offerings*—that of the *Dēvasū-oblations* ? or of the *Cake-offering* ?]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*The Procedure should be restricted on the basis of the larger number*; i.e. the number of the Supplementary Oblations being larger (*eight*), the procedure of these should be extended to the *Cake-offering*.—Then again, the declaration of the *Sviṣṭakṛt*-offering contains the term '*Sviṣṭakṛt*';—and in connection with the meat-cake-offering, as also in connection with the *Dēvasū-oblations*, we have it laid down that 'an offering should be made to *Sviṣṭakṛt*';—all this is explicable only if the procedure adopted is that of the *Supplementary Offerings*; on the other hand, if the Procedure of the *Cake-offering* were adopted, then the term '*Sviṣṭakṛt*' should not be there at all; and hence it would remain inexplicable and unincluded."

SŪTRA (4).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BY VIRTUE OF THEIR ADVENTITIOUS CHARACTER DUE TO THE PARTICULAR DECLARATION, THE CAKE-OFFERING SHOULD HAVE ITS OWN DETAILS, AND BECAUSE THE OTHER IS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

The 'subsequent offerings' are 'adventitious'—i.e. not permanent fixtures;—*because of the particular declaration*; the declaration being—'He offers it after the cake'; what this declaration means is that 'first of all there is the meat-cake-offering, after that come the *Subsequent Offerings*,—the former thus being the predominant factor, and the latter the subordinate factor. Consequently, (*a*) because the *Subsequent Offerings* are

adventitious in character, and (*b*) *because the other is the predominant factor*,—therefore the *meat-cake-offering* should have its own details.

SŪTRA (5).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS IN ITS OWN PLACE.

Bhāṣya.

Further, the 'place' of the *Meat-Cake-offering* is just after the *operation of the omentum*; hence its subsidiaries also should come in at that same 'place',—because as a rule, Subsidiaries have the same place as their Primaries. If then, the Procedure adopted were that of the *Subsequent Offerings*, then the Subsidiaries would be performed in the place of those offerings; in that case the Subsidiaries of the Meat-Cake-offering would *not* be performed in their own *place* (which is the place of the Meat-Cake-offering itself). Hence in order to secure for these subsidiaries their own place, it is necessary to adopt the Procedure of the *Meat-Cake-offering*.

SŪTRA (6).

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE MENTION OF THE 'SVIṢṬAKṚT', THIS CANNOT BE SO",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

This argument has been urged above by the *Pūrvapakṣin*; it has got to be refuted. The answer to this (as offered by some people) is as follows:—

SŪTRA (7).

THERE SHOULD BE A MODIFICATION, AS IN THE CASE OF THE PAVAMĀNA.

Bhāṣya.

If the *Sviṣṭakṛt*, which is recognised to be admissible, remains unincluded in the Procedure of the *Meat-Cake-offering*,—it could be regarded as a 'modification', on the basis of the declaration that 'one makes the offering to *Agni-Sviṣṭakṛt*', so that the words used in the offering should contain the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*';—just as in the case of the declaration—'One makes the offering to *Agni-Pavamāna*', the words used in making the offering contains the term '*pavamāna*',—so should it be in the present case also.

SŪTRA (8).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE SHOULD BE NO MODIFICATION ; IT SHOULD BE AS AT THE ARCHETYPE ; SPECIALLY AS THE TERM WOULD COME IN WHERE THERE IS INJUNCTION OF IT.

Bhāṣya.

There should be no modification ; that is, the words should not contain the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*' ; they should be as at the Archetype, through Transference (based upon the General Law).—As for the condition that the modification should be made 'on the basis of the declaration',—as a matter of fact, the declaration quoted does not lay down any modification of the words ; all that the declaration 'Makes the offering to *Agni-Sviṣṭakṛt*' lays down is the offering of the *Dēvikā*-oblations ; if, in addition to this, it were taken as laying down a modification of the words also, this would involve a syntactical split.—"How then could the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*' come in ?"—*It would come in where there is injunction of it* ; the actual injunction of the *Sviṣṭakṛt-offering* is in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* ; so that it is this offering that would be accompanied by the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*' ; and it is in reference to this that we have the declaration in question, for the purpose of indicating that same offering. It follows therefore that what the assertion 'the offering is to be made to *Agni-Sviṣṭakṛt*' means is that 'the offering is to be made to *Agni the Receiver of Remnants*'. Just as in the case of such declarations as—'The *Grass* consists of Reeds',—or 'The *Clarified Butter* consists of Fresh Butter',—what is indicated by the name of the substance indicative of the Archetype is the purpose served by the substance at that Archetype ;—so in the case in question also, the term '*sviṣṭakṛt*' points, by indirect indication, to the Deity of the Archetypal Sacrifice.

Adhikaraṇa (3): *The combination of several accessory details, serving different purposes.*

SŪTRA (9).

WHEN SEVERAL DETAILS ARE LAID DOWN IN REFERENCE TO THE SAME SACRIFICE, THERE SHOULD BE PERFORMANCE OF ALL.

Bhāṣya.

When several accessory details are laid down in connection with the same Sacrifice, *there should be performance of all*; i.e. *there should be combination*; as it is only thus that the injunction of them all serves a useful purpose; and the declaration of the entire Procedure taking in all the details also would be honoured thus;—for example in the case of such details as—'Pours straight,—Pours continuously—Pours forward'.

Adhikaraṇa (4): *When several Details serve the same purpose, there should be option.*

SŪTRA (10).

Details serving the same purpose should be treated as options; if there were combination, there would be repetition of the Main Act.

Bhāṣya.

When several Details *serve the same purpose*,—i.e. perform the same function,—*they should be treated as options*; e.g. (*a*) *Vrīhi* and *Yava* (as corns for making Cakes), (*b*) *Khadira* and other woods for making the Sacrificial Post, (*c*) the *Bṛhat-Sāman* and the *Rathantara-Sāman*;—in all these cases there should be option.—*If there were combination, there would be repetition of the Main Act*; the needful having been done by one detail, if the second were also taken up for use, there would be repetition of the Main Act; which would be improper.—Why?—The Main Act is done either for the purpose of obtaining a desirable result, or (when repeated) for helping the Result,—it is never done merely for the sake of a detail; and when the purpose is served by a single performance of the act, its repetition would be entirely useless.

SŪTRA (11).

"It might be repeated for a useful purpose",—if this be urged [then the answer would be as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"Your view is that the repetition would be useless; but it would *not* be useless; as the main act would be repeated for the purpose of finding use for the injunction of the additional Detail."

SŪTRA (12).

That cannot be; as it is not sanctioned by the scriptures.

Bhāṣya.

What has been suggested cannot be right.—Why?—*Because it is not sanctioned by the scriptures*; the repetition in question has not been laid down anywhere in the scriptures; there is, in fact, no authority for it; on what basis then could it be done?—As regards 'the finding of use for the injunction of the additional detail', this is going to be explained below, under *Sūtra* 15.

SŪTRA (13).

WHENEVER IT IS (INTENDED), THERE IS ALWAYS A TEXT SANCTIONING SUCH REPETITION.

Bhāṣya.

In some cases we have texts laying down repetition,—e.g. 'One should do both at the *Saṁsava*,' 'One should do both at the *Gosava*'; in connection with the *Ēkāha* also we read—'One should sing both *Bṛhat* and *Rathantara*'. —All these texts would not be there (in special cases) if there were to be repetition in every case where several details are laid down.—From this also it follows that there should be option in the case in question.

SŪTRA (14).

THERE IS A TEXT ALSO WHICH INDICATES AS IF THERE WERE OPTION.

Bhāṣya.

There is the following text which appears to indicate that there should be option—'At other sacrificial performances, Posts are made of *Bilva* or *Khadira* or *Palāsha* wood,—but at this particular sacrifice, it should be made of *Khadira* wood only';—this text restricts the use of the *Khadira* wood for making the Post at the *Vājapēya* sacrifice, and makes a reference to the option permitted at other sacrifices.—From this also it follows that in the case in question, there should be option.

SŪTRA (15).

THE 'USEFULNESS' WOULD COME IN AT ANOTHER TIME.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—"if there were option, the injunction of the other details would be useless".—But in reality, there would be no such *uselessness*; as the use for that would come in *at another time*, i.e. at another performance of the act; and as there would be this use for it, there can be no authority for repetition.—"But for *option* also, there is no authority."—Not so; because in the case of *option*, nothing is done which is not sanctioned by the scriptures; it has been laid down that 'One should perform sacrifices with the *Vrīhi* corn', and the sacrifice is performed with that corn; similarly there is the injunction that 'One should perform sacrifices with *Yava-corn*', and the sacrifice is performed with this corn also; but at one and the same performance both kinds of corn are not used, as there is no need for it.—"Why are both not mixed up?"—That would not be right, because what has been laid down in the scriptures is that each one of the two, *singly by itself*, serves to accomplish the sacrifice; and if the two were mixed up, it would run counter to these scriptures.

From all this it follows that there should be option.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *In the case of Expiations prescribed for the correction of defects, there should be option.*

SŪTRA (16).

IN THE CASE OF EXPIATIONS,—INASMUCH AS THEY SERVE THE SAME PURPOSE, [THERE SHOULD BE OPTION]; EVERYONE OF THEM IS RELATED TO SOMETHING THAT HAS HAPPENED; HENCE THERE SHOULD BE DESTRUCTION OF ALL THIS (BY EACH EXPIATION SINGLY BY ITSELF).

Bhāṣya.

Expiations are of two kinds—(*a*) some are meant for correcting defects that may have crept in through inadvertence, and (*b*) some are laid down as parts of a sacrificial performance, to be performed under certain contingencies.—(*a*) To the former class belong such expiations as are laid down in the following texts—'If the sacrifice should suffer disruption in regard to the verse, one should offer an oblation into the *Gārhapatya Fire*, with the *Mantra Bhuḥ svāhā*; if the disruption be in reference to a *Yajuṣ text*, he should offer an oblation into the *Dakṣiṇāgni*, with the *Mantra Bhuvaḥ svāhā*; if the disruption be in reference to a *Sāman*, he should offer an oblation into the *Āhavanīya*, with the *Mantra, Svaḥ svāhā*; if it be not ascertainable in what respect the disruption has occurred, the oblation should be offered in the *Āhavanīya* with the *Mantra, Bhūrbhuvaḥsvaḥ-svāhā*'.—The phrase '*ārtimiyāt*' means 'should suffer disruption'.—"What would constitute the 'disruption' of the sacrifice?"—The omission of what has been enjoined and the commission of what has been prohibited.—"How is it known that a certain Expiation is meant for the mending or correcting of what has suffered disruption?"—This is learnt from the sentence itself which is in the form—'if it suffers disruption, this should be done'; if even on the performance of the Expiation, the disruption or defect would still persist,—then what would be the use of performing the Expiation at all?

Some one might argue here that—"The expiation herein laid down is only a subsidiary of the sacrifice, meant to be performed when the contingency of the disruption happens [so that it falls under the *second*, not the *first*, category of Expiations]."

This person should be addressed as follows:—That act is regarded as *subsidiary* to a *Primary* act, which makes the Primary fruitful;—by the disruption mentioned, the Primary has been reduced to the position of futility; if then it were rendered fruitful by the act that is laid down, then this latter would be subsidiary to the said Primary;—if however the Primary had somehow become futile and is made fruitful by the Expiation, then, verily, it becomes admitted that it has corrected or mended the discrepancy or defect

that had come in;—on the other hand, if the Expiation does not make the Primary fruitful, then it is not subsidiary to the sacrifice; and in that case the assertion that 'it is a subsidiary to the Primary to be performed under a certain contingency' falls to the ground.—Then again, in several cases, we find it declared in supplementary texts that there is brought about a correction or mending of what had been spoilt;—such as, '*Agnirvai dēvānām pathikṛt, tamēva svēna bhāgadhēyēna upāsīran, sa ēvainam panthānamapi nayati, ya ēnam vratamālambhayati*'.—From all this it follows that the Expiations referred to are for the purpose of correcting discrepancies.

When there are several such Expiations (laid down as correcting the same discrepancy), there should be option.—Why?—Because *every one of them is related to something that has happened*—some defect that has actually crept in;—e.g. 'when there is disruption in regard to the verse, one should offer the oblation with the *Mantra, Bhūḥ svāhā*'.—From this it is clear that *there should be destruction of all this*—defect—by each and every one of the Expiations prescribed. So that when the defect has been removed by one Expiation, the second and other Expiations could only come in at other performances of the sacrifice. Hence it follows that there should be option.

The same conclusion holds good also regarding Expiations laid down in the *Smṛtis.*

Adhikaraṇa (6): *In the case of 'Contingent Expiations', there should be 'combination'.*

SŪTRA (17).

There should be 'combination' in the case of such Expiations as are not meant for correcting discrepancies.

Bhāṣya.

In the case of those Expiations which are not for the purpose of correcting discrepancies, there should be 'combination'.—"Which are those Expiations?"—They are those which are not laid down as to be performed either on the omission of what has been enjoined or on the commission of what has been forbidden; for example—'If the sun rise before one has performed his *Agnihotra*, he should offer Cooked Rice to Mitra; also a cake baked on one pan, to *Sūrya*';—'If the sun rise before one has performed his *Agnihotra*, the Husband and Wife should remain silent and fast during the day';—in this case we do not find any fault (of commission or omission) on the part of the Performer;—and when there is no fault or defect, what is there that could be corrected?;—all that the texts do is to lay down a certain act as to be done when the contingency of sun rising at a certain time appears;—such an act is 'contingent'; and inasmuch as it has been laid down in the context of a particular sacrifice, it is recognised to be subsidiary to that sacrifice; and all those that happen to be so laid down become included under the Declaration of Procedure; hence there should be 'Combination' of all these.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *At the time of the sacrificial performance, Mantras should be recited even though it happen to be a day 'unfit for Vedic Study'.*

SŪTRA (18).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS MANTRAS ARE RELATED TO SACRIFICES, THEY SHOULD BE USED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES LAID DOWN IN REGARD TO THEM; SPECIALLY AS THE RULE RELATES TO THE USE OF MANTRAS."

Bhāṣya.

[In the course of sacrificial performances, certain Mantras have to be recited;—there are certain days on which the reading of the Veda has been forbidden;—the question arises—when a sacrifice is performed on such a day, should *Vedic Mantras* be recited or not?]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—"When *Mantras* are used at a sacrificial performance, *they should be used in accordance with the rules laid down in regard to them*;—i.e. those rules that have been laid down in connection with the getting up of the Mantras, such as—'One should not read the Veda on a *Parva-day*,—one should not read the Veda during a storm,—one should not read the Veda when it is thundering'.—Why so?—*Because the rules relate to the use of Mantras*; the rules in question have been laid down in connection with the *use of Mantras*;—and the *reciting of Mantras* at a sacrifice also is a *use of the Mantra*;—hence the rules must apply to this also."

SŪTRA (19).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE RULES HAVE BEEN PRESCRIBED IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'LEARNING'; HENCE MANTRAS SHOULD BE USED AT ALL TIMES; AS THE USE OF MANTRAS IS FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE PERFORMANCES.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, *Mantras should be used at all times*,—even on days that are 'unfit for study'.—Why so?—Because the rules in question have been laid down in regard to that reading of *Mantras* which is done for the purposes of *learning* them; so that they pertain to the *learning* of the Mantras, and make the learning perfect.—"What are the perfections of the *learning*?" —Its 'perfection' consists in its being accomplished without obstacles.— "How do you know that the Rules have been prescribed in connection with the *learning* of the *Mantras*?"—Because they are found to be prescribed in reference to the time of learning the Veda, not in reference to the time

of *sacrificial performances.*—" The Rules may not pertain to the *performance*; they must pertain to the *Mantras* themselves; and when pertaining to *Mantras*, they should be applicable to all cases where *Mantras* are used ".—Our answer to this is as follows.—As a matter of fact, the Rules have not been prescribed in reference to *Mantras*; they have been prescribed in reference to the *learning*,—the sense being that ' the learning becomes duly accomplished when carried on in such and such a fashion '; the *Mantra* cannot be *accomplished* in this fashion; hence it must follow that the Rules pertain to the *learning* of the *Mantras*.—When the *Mantras* are used during a sacrificial performance, it is not for the purpose of being *learnt*,—it is for the purposes of the performance;—hence the Rules cannot apply to this case.—Then again, the performance of the sacrifice has been laid down as to be done on the *Parva-day* (Full Moon or Moonless Day),—and Reciting of the *Mantra* on that day has been forbidden;—if, in obedience to this prohibition, the sacrifice were performed without reciting the *Mantras*, then the entire effort would be futile. If (in order to avoid this) it were performed on a *Non-Parva* day, even then there would be the same difficulty (i.e. the whole performance would be futile, not being done on the day prescribed for it).—Lastly, the sense of the Vedic Rules is that *Mantras* should be used even on days ' unfit for study ',—while that they should not be so used might be the sense of a *Smṛti* rule;—and the *Veda* is certainly more authoritative than the *Smṛti*; for this reason also the restrictions laid on the use of *Mantras* should not be obeyed (at sacrifices).

Adhikaraṇa (8): *During the Sacrificial Performance, Mantras should be recited with the ordinary Textual Accent.*

SŪTRA (20).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Inasmuch as there is injunction of the 'Bhāṣika' accent, the 'Pravachana' (Textual) accent should be excluded;—as in the case of the term 'aira'."

Bhāṣya.

In the *Brāhmaṇas*, certain *Mantras* have been laid down with their '*Bhāṣika*' accent, while in the *Mantra-text* itself they are found with the ordinary 'Textual' threefold accent. This is found to be the case with the *Mantra*, '*Imāmagṛbhṇan rashanāmṛtasya*', which has been laid down (in the Brāhmana) as to be used at the *Ashvamēdha* [and where the Brāhmaṇa has laid down this use of the *Mantra*, it has given to it the accent known as '*Bhāṣika*'; while the accentuation of the same *Mantra* as found in the *Mantra Samhitā-text*, is totally different].—"What is the *Bhāṣika* accent?"—It has been thus defined—'When the *Sāmavēdins*, the *Ṛgvēdins* and the *Yajurvēdins* use the high and low tones [in accordance with the rules relating to the reciting of *Mantras* belonging to the various Vedas—such as 'Verses of the Ṛgveda should be recited *loudly*, those of the *Yajurveda* in silence, etc.'], that tone is called '*Bhāṣika*'.

[The question therefore arises that—when a certain *Mantra* is used at a sacrifice,—should it be used with the *Bhāṣika* accent? Or the *Textual Accent*?]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—"In the case of these *Mantras*, there should be exclusion of the Textual Accent,—i.e. it should not be used.—Why?—Because another accent has been laid down;—*as in the case of 'aira'*; it having been laid down that 'one should use the term *irā* in place of the term *girā*', there is exclusion of the term '*girā*'.—'But how do you know that what has been laid down is the *accent*, not merely the *Mantra-text* itself?'—There can be no need for the laying down of the *Mantra-text*, this being known from its own words; while the Accent cannot be known unless it is actually laid down; hence it is that we conclude that when the use of the *Mantra* is laid down in the *Brāhmaṇa*, it is for the purpose of prescribing the *accent* to be used [and as it is the *Bhāṣika* accent that is found in the *Brāhmaṇa*, it follows that during the performance, the *Mantra* should be used with the *Bhāṣika* accent]."

SŪTRA (21).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT IS THE INJUNCTION OF THE MANTRA-TEXT ITSELF, NOT OF THE 'BHĀṢIKA' ACCENT;—THE TEXT IS FOUND MENTIONED WITH THE 'BHĀṢIKA' ACCENT WITH A VIEW TO UNIFORMITY.

Bhāṣya.

When the *Brāhmaṇa* lays down the use of the *Mantra*, *it is an injunction of the Mantra-text itself*, not of the accent.—"How do you know this?"—We deduce it from the fact that the expression used is similar to that of the injunction of *Mantra-texts.*—"What is its similarity to that injunction?"—The similarity lies in the fact that the Brāhmaṇa has added the words—'with this he takes hold of the Horse's Rope'; it is with the *Mantra-text* that the Rope is taken up, not with the *Bhāṣika-accent*; it is the *Mantra-text* too (with the words '*Imām agṛbhṇam*'),—and not the accent—that indicates the action of *taking up.*—"Why then is the *Bhāṣika-accent* used at all (with the *Mantra* when it is mentioned in the *Brāhmaṇa* as to be used)?"—*The text is found mentioned with the 'Bhāṣika' accent with a view to uniformity*; i.e. throughout the *Brāhmaṇa-text*, the accent adopted is the *Bhāṣika* one; in the midst of this *Brāhmaṇa*-text, there occur certain Mantra-texts;—if these *Mantra-texts* occurring among *Brāhmaṇa-texts*, were read with their *Textual accents*, then there would be a break in the continuity of the *Bhāṣika* accent of the *Brāhmaṇa*-texts (preceding and following the *Mantra-text*); and it is for the purpose of avoiding this break that the *Mantra-texts* occurring among *Brāhmaṇa-texts*, are found with the *Bhāṣika* accent;—just as when singers introduce into their songs musical variations, they sing these in the tune of the main song itself, with a view to avoid the break in the continuity of the tune.—It thus follows that when the *Mantra-text* is mentioned in the *Brāhmaṇa-text*, it should not be regarded as the injunction of the use of the *Bhāṣika* accent.

[Another explanation of the *Sūtra* comes after the Bhā. on Sū. 24 below.]

SŪTRA (22).

[IN THE CASE OF 'IRĀ'] IT IS REGARDED AS A 'MODIFICATION' BECAUSE THERE IS NO REASON (AGAINST IT).

Bhāṣya.

As regards the case of the terms '*irā*' and '*girā*', it is only right that there should be a 'modification' of the term '*girā*' into '*irā*',—*as there is no reason against it*, as there is in the case in question, where the fact of the reference being to the *Mantra* has been treated as a reason for *not* taking the sentence as laying down the '*Bhāṣika-accent*'; there is no such reason why the sentence speaking of the term '*irā*' should not be regarded as

laying down the use of that term; hence in this latter case, the sentence is taken as laying down the use of the term '*irā*' (in place of '*girā*'): and hence, such use having been laid down in reference to the time of the sacrificial performance, it has been taken as setting aside the term '*girā*' which is the form found in the *Mantra-text*; and hence in that case there is *modification* (of the original term).

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *Those Mantras that have been taught only in the 'Bhāṣika' accent, should be used with that same accent.*

SŪTRA (23).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THE SAME REASONING IS APPLICABLE HERE, THE SAME THING SHOULD BE DONE ALSO WHERE IT IS NOT FOUND (IN THE MANTRA-TEXT)."

Bhāṣya.

It has been decided that when a *Mantra* has been found in the *Mantra-text* with *the Textual accent*, it should be used with that same accent; but there are cases where the *Mantra* is not found in the *Mantra-text*, and it has been laid down in the *Brāhmaṇa-text* with the '*Bhāṣika*' accent; e.g. in the case of the *Mantra*—'*Tam vai prohēt vānaspatyosi*' [where the *Mantra* '*Vānaspatyosi*' has been enjoined, and it is a *Mantra* that is not found in the *Mantra-text* (Samhitā)].—Now what is to be done in this case (regarding the use of the Accent)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—"*Inasmuch as the same reason is applicable here, the same thing should be done also where it is not found in the Mantra-text*; the reasoning put forward in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* was that 'the *Brāhmaṇa-sentence* contains the injunction of the *Mantra*, because the words are similar to it'; this same reasoning is applicable to the case in question also; even in cases where the *Mantra* is not found in the *Mantra-text*, the *Brāhmaṇa-sentence* should be taken as laying down the *Mantra* itself, not the '*Bhāṣika*'-*accent*. Hence such *Mantras* also should be used with the '*textual*' *accent* (not the '*Bhāṣika*' one)."

SŪTRA (24).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—INASMUCH AS IT HAS ITS SOURCE THERE, AND THE UTTERANCE IS ITS SOLE INDICATOR [IT SHOULD BE RECITED WITH THE 'BHĀṢIKA' ACCENT].

Bhāṣya.

Inasmuch as it has its source there,—i.e. as the *Mantra* in question has its source in the *Brāhmaṇa* itself,—it should be used with the '*Bhāṣika*'-accent;—specially because *the utterance is its sole indicator*; actual utterance (reciting) is the only indication that is possible of *Mantras*; they are recognised just as they are recited;—the Mantras in question are in their very origin connected with the '*Bhāṣika*' accent;—hence there is no ground

for attributing any other form to them; so that they must be used in that same form (i.e. with the '*Bhāṣika*'-accent).

The following is another explanation of Sū. 21—The *Brāhmaṇa-text*, '*Imāmagṛbhṇan rashanāmṛtasyētyashvābhidhānīmādattē*' is not an *injunction* of the *Mantra*, it only indicates its opening words; the words as they appear in their source (in the *Mantra-text*) appear with the 'textual' accent;—hence the injunction is of *Mantras* with that same accent.

In a case however where the *Mantra* has its source in the *Brāhmaṇa* text itself (e.g. the *Mantra* dealt with under Adhi. 9), as there is nothing in the *Mantra-text* by which it could be taken to be indicated in the *Brāhmaṇa-text*, no such indication is possible; hence such a *Mantra* has to be used in the same form (and with the same accent) in which it is found in the *Brāhmaṇa-text* itself.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *In the case of Mantras laid down as to be used in connection with certain acts, the act should be performed after the Mantra has been pronounced.*

SŪTRA (25).

INASMUCH AS THE MANTRAS ARE MEANT FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ACTS, THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE SHOULD FALL IN WITH THE END OF THE MANTRA; SPECIALLY AS IT IS THE WHOLE MANTRA THAT SERVES THE PURPOSE OF ITS UTTERANCE.

Bhāṣya.

There are certain *Mantras* that are laid down as to be used in connection with certain acts—such as 'He cuts off the branch with the Mantra, *Iṣē tvā*',—'He takes it up with the Mantra, *Dēvasya tvā savituḥ prasavē*'.

[The question arising here is—Should the act concerned be performed *after*, or *before*, the *Mantra* has been uttered ?]

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—In these cases, *the commencement of the performance*—of that act in connection with which the *Mantras* are used,—*should fall in with the end of the Mantras.*—"Why so?"—*Because it is the whole Mantra that serves the purpose of its utterance*; it is the whole *Mantra* that serves the whole purpose for which the *Mantra* is used.—"What is the *purpose of the utterance of the Mantra?*"—It is the bringing of the act concerned to the mind of the performer at the time of its performance; when a *Mantra* is uttered, it is understood that the act spoken of in the *Mantra* has to be performed;—and the act for which the *Mantra* is to be used is recognised, sometimes through the force of the words of the *Mantra* itself, and sometimes by direct declaration, such as 'with such and such a *Mantra*, '*he takes up the rope*' or '*makes the offering*'. As a matter of fact, this act comes to the mind only after the whole of the *Mantra* has been uttered; and this is enough to serve all purposes so long as it does not slip off from the mind.—From all this it follows that in the case of *Mantras* that are to be used in connection with certain acts, the commencement of the act should fall in with the end of the *Mantra*.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *In the case of the 'Vasordhārā', also the Performance shall come at the end of the Mantra.*

SŪTRA (26).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF THE 'VASORDHĀRĀ', THERE SHOULD BE COINCIDENCE OF THE BEGINNINGS, BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE TERM 'CONTINUOUS'."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the '*Agni*', we read—'*Santatam vasordhārām juhoti*' [' One pours the *Vasordhārā*-oblation continuously '].

[Here also the question is—Should the oblation be poured, before or after, the *Mantra* has been uttered ?—The point in which this case differs from the foregoing one is that the *Vasordhārā* consists, not of one oblation, but of a series of *twelve* oblations.]

The most reasonable answer that presents itself is that, according to the principle of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, the offering should be made at the *end of the Mantra*.—Against this there is the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"*In the case of the Vasordhārā, there should be coincidence of the beginnings* ;—i.e. the beginning of the performance and the beginning of the *Mantra* should be made to fall in together.—Why ?—*Because of the presence of the term 'continuous'* ; [in the term '*Santatam*'] the prefix '*Sam*' signifies *unification*,—the root '*tan*' signifies *spreading-out operation*,—thus the root '*tan*' with the prefix '*sam*' is used in a case where two things *operate in unison* (together) ;—in the case in question, the two things standing in proximity to one another are the *Mantra* and the *Performance of the Act* ; hence what is denoted by the term '*santatam*' is the *joint operation of these two* ;—and this *joint operation* is possible only when the *beginnings* of both come together. Hence it follows that there should be coincidence of the beginnings of both."

SŪTRA (27).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT IS THE 'CONTINUITY' OF THE ACT ; AS THE ACTS INVOLVED ARE SEVERAL, AND THE OTHER (COURSE) IS IMPOSSIBLE.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, what is spoken of in the text 'Pours the oblations continuously' is the *continuity of the act*,—i.e. the continuity of the act of oblation-offering only, and there is nothing said about the *Mantra*.—" But the prefix '*sam*' indicates the presence of more than one entity, and the act of *oblation-*

offering is only one entity ".—The answer to this is that it does not affect the case; *because the acts involved are several*; as a matter of fact, in the '*Vasordhārā* offering' there are a number of acts, and the 'continuity' spoken of consists in the non-cessation of the series of these several acts. That there are several acts involved is clear from the declaration 'one pours *twelve Dvādasha-oblations*'.—"But this number 'twelve' is related to the *substances* offered ".—Not so, we reply; there is no mention of the *substance* here; it is only the act of oblation-offering that is connected with a particular number, in the declaration 'He pours twelve *Dvādasha-oblations*'; which means that 'he pours so many oblations'.—Further, *the other*,—i.e. the continuity or coincidence of the *Mantra* and the *Performance*—is not possible; the *performance* of an act, having only a momentary existence, cannot *operate* along with the *Mantra*.—From all this it follows that in this case also the commencement of the act should fall in with the end of the *Mantra*.

Adhikaraṇa (12): *In the case of the 'Āghāra' also, the Performance of the Act should fall in with the end of the Mantra.*

SŪTRA (28).

So also in the case of the 'Āghāra-offering; because what is offered is a long stream.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Purṇamāsa*, there is the '*Āghāra*-offering' (which consists of pouring a stream of Clarified Butter from one part of the Fire to the other);—with reference to which also we read—'Pours the *Āghāra*-offering continuously'.—In this case also it is not possible for the act, which is momentary, to *operate along with* the *Mantra*;—and as the act of offering in this case is one only, there cannot be a continuous series of acts either (as there was in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*);—so here the '*santāna*' ('continuity') spoken of in the sentence 'pours the *āghāra* continuously'—must refer to the *substance*; the meaning being that 'the oblation offered is in the form of a long-continued stream', the term 'continuous' being used in view of the stream being a long-continued one.

Adhikaraṇa (13): *In the case of several Mantras serving the same purpose, there should be option.*

SŪTRA (29).

Inasmuch as Mantras fall in (with the beginning of the Act), there should be option, where they serve the same purpose.

Bhāṣya.

In a case where there are several *Mantras* serving the same purpose,—as for instance, for the purpose of dividing the cake, there are the following *Mantras*—'*Pūṣā vām vibhajatu*'—'*Bhago vām bhibhajatu*'—'*Aryamā vām vibhajatu*' and so on,—there should be option;—*because they fall in with the beginning of the act*; all these *Mantras* are to be used in connection with an act, and it has been explained that in the case of such Mantras, the beginning of the act should fall in with the end of the *Mantra* (see Sū. 25 above);—unless option is adopted, it is not possible for the beginning of the act to be made to fall in with the ends of all the *Mantras* concerned.—"Is there a declaration to this effect?"—No; there is a reason—*as it is the whole Mantra that serves the purpose of its utterance* (Sū. 25).—"If that is the only reason, even if all the *Mantras* are used in combination, it is the '*whole* Mantra' that is used [so that the reason adduced does not prove that there should be option]".—The answer to this is that it is true that even in the case of combining all the *Mantras*, the purposes of the utterance are accomplished; but when the purpose is already served by the use of one *Mantra*, the use of any other *Mantra* is entirely superfluous.—This is what is meant by the several *Mantras* 'serving the same purpose'. Hence it follows that, because the Mantras serve the same purpose, therefore there should be option.

As a matter of fact, this has been already explained under Sū. 10 above; and it has been introduced here only for the purpose of introducing the next *Adhikaraṇa*.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *In the case of such injunctions as 'He takes up the Abhri with four Mantras', there should be 'combination' of all the four Mantras.*

SŪTRA (30).

IN THE CASE OF MANTRAS QUALIFIED BY NUMERALS, THERE SHOULD BE 'COMBINATION', AS THEY MUST FALL IN TOGETHER.

Bhāṣya.

There are certain *Mantras* which are laid down as qualified by definite numbers—e.g. in connection with the 'Agni', there are such injunctions as 'He takes it up with *four Mantras*', 'He digs with *two Mantras*', 'He carries it with *six Mantras*';—in all such cases, there should be 'combination'.—"Why?"—Because a definite number is laid down by the text; hence it has to be adopted; this cannot be adopted unless there is 'combination'.

Says the Opponent—"Even when there is 'combination' of the several *Mantras*, the act in question can be regarded as having been done with that one *Mantra* alone with whose end the commencement of the act falls in;—it cannot be regarded as done with those other *Mantras* which are removed from its commencement, because the ends of these have not fallen in with the commencement of the act; so that even so, the number does not become adopted so far as the *act* is concerned."

Answer—This does not affect our position; it is by expressing its meaning that a *Mantra* becomes auxiliary to an act; and all the *Mantras* in question do express the same meaning (denoting as they do the same act, of *dividing* the cake, for instance).

Objection—"Even so the form of the act is really accomplished by the *Mantra* that has preceded its commencement immediately; the others can be regarded only as serving some unseen transcendental purpose."

Answer—These cannot be taken as serving some unseen transcendental purpose; in fact all the *Mantras* will speak of the same act, more than once; in fact there is such repeated use of *Mantras* used in connection with acts; e.g. '*Kuru kuru*' ['Do this, do please do this'], '*Karavāṇi karavāṇi*' ['I shall do it, certainly I shall do it']. Thus then, just as in the case of the *Mantra* speaking of an act, its utterance is regarded as auspicious, on the strength of the scriptural declaration,—so also on the strength of the declaration that 'He takes it up with *four Mantras*', the *taking up* would be auspicious when done with all the *four Mantras*. Thus then, in the case of 'combination' also there is no serving of any unseen transcendental purpose; and hence it becomes settled that there should be 'combination'.

Adhikaraṇa (15): *There should be option in the case of such Mantras as 'Uru prathasva', which have been enjoined in Brāhmaṇa-texts.*

SŪTRA (31).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*continued*]—"So also in the case of Mantras enjoined in Brāhmaṇa-texts; because all have been enjoined,—as in the case of Numbers."

Bhāṣya.

There are certain *Mantras* that have been enjoined in Brāhmaṇa-texts; such as (*a*) '*Uru prathasvēti puroḍāsham prathayati*, (*b*) '*Uru prathā uru tē yajñapatiḥ prathatām—iti puroḍāsham prathayati*'. [In these two texts, we find two distinct *Mantras* laid down as to be used in connection with the *laying of the Cake*—the first *Mantra* being '*Uru prathasva*' and the second, '*Uru prathā uru tē yajñapatiḥ prathatām*'.

[The question is—Should both these *Mantras* be used in 'combination'? Or should there be option?]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"There should be *combination*; *because all have been enjoined*; so that if any of the *Mantras* is not used, its injunction becomes transgressed;—while by 'combination' the declaration of the entire procedure including all the accessory details becomes honoured.—And as in the case of the injunction of *Mantras* qualified by numbers, so here also, all the *Mantras* would serve a useful purpose by speaking of the act more than once.—From all this we conclude that there should be 'combination'."

SŪTRA (32).

[Pūrvapakṣa—*concluded*]—"We find similar combination of the 'Yājyā' and the 'Vaṣaṭkāra'."

Bhāṣya.

"In the case of the *Yājyā* and the *Vaṣaṭkāra* there is 'combination'; such *combination* being indicated by the text '*Yājyāyā adhi vaṣaṭkaroti*'; when there is *combination*, then alone there is an order of sequence (as contemplated in this text).—From this also it follows that there should be '*combination* in the case in question."

SŪTRA (33).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE SHOULD BE OPTION ; AS 'COMBINATION' IS NOT SANCTIONED BY THE SCRIPTURES.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, in the case of the *Mantras* in question, there should be *option*, not *combination*.—" Why ? "—The reason for this has been already explained above under *Sūtra* 29.—*Objection*—" But like *Mantras* enjoined with numbers, even though conveying the same idea (serving the same purpose) they would be used for expressing the same idea more than once, and thus there would be *combination* ".—This cannot be right ;—why ?—because '*combination*' *is not sanctioned by the scriptures* ; in the case of the *Mantras* with numbers, even though doing what had been already done, the repeated expression of the same idea was admitted on the basis of the direct declaration of number ; in the case in question however, there is no such declaration of 'combination'. Hence the conclusion indicated by reasons should be accepted—that is, there should be *option*.

SŪTRA (34).

BECAUSE THE INJUNCTION IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF A DETAIL.

Bhāṣya.

As for the argument that " the 'combination' makes useful the injunction of all the *Mantras* ",—this proves nothing ; as *the Injunction is for the purpose of a detail* ; the Injunction is not for the purpose of laying down the use of *Mantras*, but *for the purposes of a detail*,—in the shape of a *commendatory declaration* ; this is what has been explained under *Sūtras* 1. 2. 41–43).

Objection—" If that is so, and the text in question does not lay down the use of *Mantras*, then what is the meaning of the assertion that 'all have been enjoined' (in Sū. 31) ? "

Under the circumstances, we can take the present *Adhikaraṇa* to be a *hypothetical* one,—based upon the hypothetical assumption that the text does contain the Injunction of the use of the *Mantras*.—Or, we may seek for another (more suitable) example.

SŪTRA (35).

IN THE CASE OF 'VAṢAṬKĀRA' THERE IS 'COMBINATION' BECAUSE THE PURPOSE SERVED IS DIFFERENT.

Bhāṣya.

The '*Vaṣaṭkāra*' is for the purposes of *offering*, while the *Yājyā* is for the purpose of indicating the Deity; hence, there is 'combination' in their case, because they serve different purposes, not because both serve the same purpose.

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *In the case of the 'Hautra-Mantras', there should be 'combination'.*

SŪTRA (36).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF THE 'HAUTRA-MANTRAS', THERE SHOULD BE OPTION, BECAUSE THEY SERVE THE SAME PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya.

There are the following '*Hautra-Mantras*';—(*a*) those in connection with the *Raising of the Post*, '*Uchchhrayasva vanaspatē, etc.*';—(*c*) those in connection with the *covering of the Post*, '*Yuvā suvāsāḥ, etc.*'.

[The question being—are all these to be used in 'combination'? or is there to be option?] the *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—"There should be option; —why?—*because they serve the same purpose*; whether speaking of *Raising* or *Covering*, they serve the same purpose; and each one of them speaks of that purpose independently of the other.—Hence there should be option".

SŪTRA (37).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE SHOULD BE 'COMBINATION' AS THEY ONLY DESCRIBE WHAT IS BEING DONE.

Bhāṣya.

As matter of fact, there should be 'combination' of the *Hautra-mantras*. —"Why?"—*Because they only describe what is being done*; it has been said above that in the case of *Mantras* used in connection with an act, there should be option; the *Mantras* in question do not belong to this category; as they are only descriptive of what is being done.—"What is the difference between these two kinds of *Mantras*?"—The *Mantras* of the former class bring about the notion that 'I am doing this', while those of the latter class give the idea that 'this should be done'.—"How so?"—What the *Adhvaryu* requires is the assertion to the effect that 'I am doing this'; as in the absence of such a notion, the performance would not commence at all; such a notion too is possible only when a similar notion has appeared before; when a man remembers that 'I have to do this', then alone he does that act.—As for the *Mantras* descriptive of what is being done, they only describe what is being done by the *Adhvaryu*;—e.g. '*Añjanti tvāmadhvarē dēvayantaḥ.*' This description is enough to bring to the *Adhvaryu* the necessary remembrance (of what is to be done); it is for this reason that it is in the form of *Description*. —Thus then being required by the performance, they are recognized as serving the purpose of reminding (the *Adhvaryu*); and in the case of a *Mantra* that serves the purpose *reminding*, what has been thus remembered and done, on the strength of the words of the *Mantra*, becomes conducive to the fulfil-

ment of a transcendental purpose; just as an act that is done in accordance with directions (addressed in accordance with injunctions).—*Objection*—" But the remembrance is obtained from the words of the Injunction itself ". —True; it does follow from the implications of the Injunctive word also; as it does also from the *Mantra*; but on the strength of the declaration of the *Mantra*, it should be done by means of the *Mantra*. When the operations have commenced, then alone there arises the need for a series of 'remembrances' (recalled ideas, of things to be done); thus it becomes possible for several *Mantras* descriptive of what is being done to be used at one and the same performance. Hence, inasmuch as the *Hautra-Mantras* are description of what is being done, there should be 'combination' of these.

SŪTRA (38).

THERE IS A TEXT ALSO INDICATING THE 'COMBINATION'.

Bhāṣya.

These are the texts—(*a*) 'He recites the first verse thrice, he recites the last verse thrice',—and (*b*) 'One should recite the *Jyotiṣmatī* verses'. It is only when several *Mantras* are used together at the same performance, that they can be called 'first' and 'last'.—From this also it follows that there should be 'combination' in the case in question.

End of Pāda iii of Adhyāya XII.

ADHYAYA XII.

PĀDA IV.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *There shall be 'combination' of Mantras for 'Japa' (Reciting), 'Stuti' (Eulogising), 'Āshiṣ' (Invoking Blessings) and 'Abhidhāna' (Addressing).*

SŪTRA (1).

IN THE CASE OF MANTRAS USED BY THE SACRIFICER, FOR 'RECITING', 'EULOGISING', 'INVOKING BLESSINGS' AND 'ADDRESSING'—NOT CONNECTED WITH ANY ACT,—THERE SHOULD BE 'COMBINATION'; BECAUSE THE 'INVOKING OF BLESSINGS' (AND OTHER PURPOSES) ARE QUITE DISTINCT.

Bhāṣya.

(A) '*Japa*', 'Reciting',—laid down in such texts as—'Speech should be closed after *reciting the Vaiṣṇavī verse*', 'Speech should be closed after *reciting the Sārasvatī verse*', 'Speech should be closed after *reciting* the *Bārhaspatya* verse'.—(B) '*Stuti*', 'Eulogy',—such *Mantras* as '*Agnirmūrdhā divaḥ, etc.*'.—(C) '*Āshīṣ*', 'Invoking blessings',—such *Mantras* as '*Āyurdā agnē asi āyurmē dēhi*'.—(D) '*Abhidhāna*', 'Addressing',—such as '*Ēṣosi*, etc.'

Question—"What is the exact signification of the term '*Japa*'?"

Answer—The root '*jap*' denotes *clear speaking*; hence '*Japa*' is that which is *clearly spoken, recited.*

"In that case, the *Mantra*, '*Agnirmūrdhā, etc.*' would also be *Japa*; as this also is *clearly spoken* or *recited*."

It is true that this also would be '*Japa*'; but it is meant to be an 'Eulogy' (*Stuti*) also,—while the *Mantra* meant by the term '*Japa*' is one that is used for *Japa* (*Reciting*) *only*. In fact, when the term '*Japa*' is used in the *Sūtra* along with the other terms '*stuti*', '*āshiṣ*', and '*abhidhāna*', it is understood to stand for those *Mantras* that are used for *Reciting* (*Japa*) *only* (and for no other purpose);—just as in the case of the sentence—'*Brāhmaṇas, Parivrājakas*, and *Brahmachārins* do not come in', (where all the persons spoken of are *Brāhmaṇas*) the term '*brāhmaṇa*' stands for those who are *mere Brāhmaṇas* (and have no other qualifications);—so is it in the case in question.

Objection—"The *Mantra* '*Idam viṣṇurvichakramē, etc.* (which is the *Vaiṣṇavī verse*) should have been cited as an example of 'Eulogising *Mantra*' (not as mere '*Reciting* Mantra')."

Not so; because the *Mantra* does not contain the term '*stuti*', nor is there any one *eulogised* by it.

"*Viṣṇu* is eulogised."

Not so; there is no useful purpose to be served by the eulogising of *Viṣṇu*; in fact *Viṣṇu* is nowhere regarded as *one to be eulogised* (by this verse);—nor has *eulogising* been enjoined anywhere (as to be done with this *Mantra*). All that is enjoined in the text—'Having recited the *Vaiṣṇavī verse*, one should close his speech'—is mere '*vachana*', *reciting*; hence that alone is what should be done; '*vachana*' and '*japa*' are synonymous terms (standing for *Reciting*); as the grammatical rule lays down the meaning of the root '*Jap*' to be 'clear speaking', '*vyakta-vāk*'. Hence it follows that when what is done is the mere *reciting* of the *Mantra*,—not *eulogising* or *invoking of blessings*,—it is an instance of '*Japa*', 'Reciting'.

Question—"What is the difference between '*Japa*' ('Reciting') and '*Abhidhāna*' ('Addressing')?"

Answer—In the case of *Japa*, there is mere *reciting* of the *Mantra*, while in that of *Abhidhāna*, another Being is *addressed* through qualities that may or may not be there;—a *Mantra* of this class is the one beginning with '*Ēṣosi tvēṣosi*'.

In the case of all these *Mantras*,—[the question arising—whether they are all to be used together in 'combination'? Or is there to be option?]—the *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "inasmuch as they serve the same purpose, there should be *option*".

In answer to this the *Siddhānta* is as follows:—There should be 'combination' of all.—"Why?"—*Because the invoking of blessings is quite distinct*, [which also implies that]—'*Reciting* is quite distinct', '*Eulogising* is quite distinct', and '*Addressing* is quite distinct'. What is expressed by the *Reciting-Mantra*, '*Idam viṣṇurvichakramē, etc.*' is not the same that is expressed by the other *Eulogising-Mantra*, '*Pāvakā naḥ sarasvatī, etc.*';—similarly in the case of all the *Mantras* concerned.—Thus then, the *Mantras* in question are found to serve different purposes (and have different meanings); hence there should be 'combination' of them all.

There is a text also which indicates the 'combination' of 'Eulogising' and 'Reciting'—viz.: 'He recites the first verse thrice, and the last verse thrice'; it is only when there is 'combination' of several *Mantras*, that there can be 'first' and 'last' among them; which is not possible when there is *option* among them.—For this reason also there should be 'combination'.

The specificatory epithet '*Yājamānēṣu*', 'used by the sacrificer', is meant only to be generally indicative (not exclusive); one and the same *Mantra* may have all the three characters—of *Eulogising*, *Addressing* and *Reciting*. For instance, in the case of the *Mantra*, '*Idam viṣṇurvichakramē, etc.*',—if it is meant to apply to *Viṣṇu*, it is *eulogising*,—if it is the narration of the event to some one else, then it is *addressing*,—if it is a self-contained statement, then it is *reciting*.

Adhikaraṇa (2): *At the 'Aindrābārhaspatya' sacrifice, there should be option among the several pairs of 'Yājyā-Anuvākyā'.*

SŪTRA (2).

In the case of the several pairs of 'Yājyā-anuvākyā', there should be option, because they serve the purpose of indicating the deity.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Aindrābārhaspatya* sacrifice, several pairs of '*Yajyā-anuvākyā Mantras* have been laid down: e.g. (1)—(*a*) '*Idam vāmāsyē haviḥpriyamindrābṛhaspatī*'—(*b*) '*Ayam vām pariṣichyatē soma indrābṛhaspatī*', is the *first* pair;—(2)—(*a*) '*Āsyā indrābṛhaspatī*'—(*b*) '*Bṛhaspatirnaḥ paripātu pashchāt*', is the *second* pair.

In regard to these two pairs, the question to be considered is—should there be *option* or *combination*?

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—*In the case of the several pairs of 'yājyā-anuvākyā', there should be option*;—why?—*because they serve the purpose of indicating the Deity*;—the Deity, which is an accessory of the sacrifice, is indicated, by the two pairs of '*Yājyā-anuvākyā*', for the purpose of the accomplishment of the sacrifice;—this purpose is served by the indication being done once only;—and when the sacrifice has been accomplished by this one indication (of the Deity), there is no need for any other indication; hence the second pair of *Yājyā-anuvākyā* can be used only at another performance of the sacrifice.—Hence we conclude that there should be *option*.

SŪTRA (3).

Also because we find texts indicative of the same conclusion.

Bhāṣya.

There is a text also indicative of the same conclusion—what text?—The following—'*Urū vai dēvānām yājyānuvākyā ēkayā pratyāgachchati gamayatyanyayā, athātra tisraḥ kāryāḥ*'; this text, which lays down *three pairs* of *Yājyā-anuvākyā* at the *Pitṛyajña*, rightly indicates their quality.—Similarly there is the text—'*Na sarvāṇi saha yajñāyudhāni prahṛtyāni, mānuṣam tat kriyatē, naikamēkam pitṛdēvam tat, dvē dvē saha prahṛtyē yājyānuvākyayoḥ rūpam*' [where also it is said that they are to be used in pairs].—From all this also it follows that there should be option.

Question—"Why should not the option (spoken of in the *Sūtra*) be taken as between the *Yājyā* and the *Anuvākyā* severally [and not as between

different pairs of the two taken together]? Inasmuch as both serve the same purpose, it follows that there should be option between them; since the indicating of the Deity is done by either one of the two".

Answer—The term '*Puronuvākyā*' is a *Name*,—so called because it is *recited first* ('*pūrvam anūchyatē*);—the term 'first' is a relative one; and can be taken only as in relation to the *Yājyā*;—this is possible only if the two are used 'in combination';—hence there should be 'combination' of both [i.e. both *Yājyā* and the *Anuvākyā* should be used together].

Objection—"When the Deity has been already indicated by one of them, there can be no need for further indication of the same, and when there is no need for it, the use of one or the other (*Yājyā* or *Anuvākyā*) has to be omitted".

Answer—On the basis of the *Name*, the sacrifice should be regarded as to be accomplished by a two-fold indication (of the Deity, done by the *Yājyā* and also by the *Anuvākyā*);—just as on the basis of the declaration 'He digs with two', it is understood that the act of 'digging' is to be accomplished by a two-fold reciting (of the *Mantra* concerned).—Hence there is no incongruity at all.

Adhikaraṇa (3): *Among the Means for the purchase of Soma—the Goat and other things,—there should be 'combination'.*

SŪTRA (4).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Among the Means of Purchase, there should be option, because they serve the same purpose."

Bhāṣya.

Several things have been laid as the 'Means of Purchasing Soma' (Price to be paid for it)—'He buys it with the *Goat*' and so forth.

[The question arising as to whether there should be *option* or *combination* among those several things]—the *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*Among the Means of Purchase there should be option*;—each of the several things has been laid down as the means of purchasing Soma, to be used as such independently by itself,—just as *Vrīhi* and *Yava* have been laid down as the means of accomplishing the sacrifice;—similarly we have the several things laid down—'Purchases it with the *goat*,—purchases it with *gold*,—purchases it with *cloth*'; all these serving one and the same purpose (of accomplishing the *purchase of Soma*);—hence there should be *option* among them".

SŪTRA (5).

[Siddhānta]—As a matter of fact, there should be 'combination'; as all the things may enter into the transaction.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('as a matter of fact') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.—It is not right that there should be option; in fact, there should be 'combination'.—"Why?"—*Because all the things may enter into the transaction*;—in the actual transaction of the Purchase, it is possible to make use of more than one thing; what is done at the transaction (by the payment of the Price) is the *securing of the consent of the Vendor*; and this is rendered easier by the giving of several things. Then again, when the several things have been prescribed, they have not been prescribed as so many alternatives; hence by making use of all the things, the Declaration of the Procedure including all details becomes duly honoured.—Then again, among the things laid down, there are several of very unequal value—such as 'Purchases with *Horse-hoof*', 'Purchases with a *pair of bulls*'; all these could secure the consent of the Vendor only in 'combination', not through

option. In fact, if they were used as optional alternatives, they would become useless.—Hence it follows that there should be 'combination'.

There is the following text also which indicates 'combination'—'*Tam vai dashabhiḥ krīṇāti, dashākṣarā virāt, virājamēva prāpnoti*';—here we have a reference to the *Purchase* (of Soma); and what is asserted here (the payment of 'ten') would be possible only if several things were given together.—From this also it follows that there should be 'combination'.—"Why cannot the text quoted be treated as a (separate) Injunction through *commendation*?"—Even so that would be contrary to (and subversive of) the form of reference that is found present in the text; and such subversion is not justifiable, so long as it can be avoided. Hence it should be treated as a mere *reference*.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *In the case of such acts of 'Disposal' as the 'Upayajana' and the like, there should be 'combination'.*

SŪTRA (6).

IN THE EMBELLISHMENT, AS IT FORMS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR [THERE SHOULD BE COMBINATION].

Bhāṣya.

In connection with *Agniṣomīya-animal-sacrifice*, the following text lays down the '*Upayajana*', minor offering, of the Anus—'One makes the minor offering of the Anus, the Anus is life itself'. At the *Ēkādishna* sacrifice (which is a modification of the *Agniṣomīya* and hence takes in the details of this latter, under the General Law), there are several '*anuses*' (as there are *eleven* animals concerned);—hence in regard to this 'anus-offering' in this connection, there arises the question—Among these eleven *anuses*, should there be *option* or *combination* ?—If the 'Minor offering' in question is a 'fruitful action', action for a purpose, then there should be *option*; if, on the other hand, it is an act of 'disposal', there should be *combination*.—Which of these two views is the right one ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"It is an *action with a purpose*.—Why ?—When an 'established entity' and an 'entity to be established' are spoken of together, the former subserves the purposes of the latter,—because in that it serves a visible purpose;—if then, the 'Minor offering' in question is an action with a purpose,—since that purpose is accomplished by a single such offering,—there should be option when there are several actions possible."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*In the embellishment, as it forms the predominant factor* [there should be combination];—the offering in question is one of *embellishment*,—i.e. it is an act of *Disposal*.—"Why ?" —Because it is the remnant of what has been used; the Animal had been brought in for the purposes of the *Agnisomīya-offering*;—when that offering has been accomplished, the remnants thereof have to be 'disposed of';—hence the *Anus*, which is a remnant of the Animal used in the said offering, having to be disposed of, the Minor offering in question is the particular manner of its disposal.

"Even in support of the view that the offering in question is *an act with a purpose*, the reason put forward (by the *Pūrvapakṣa*) was in the form of the fact that it serves a visible purpose."

That same reason is equally applicable to the case of its being an act of 'disposal'; in this case also, when the remnant is 'disposed of' in the said manner, it helps the accomplishment of the main offering. Thus then, the reason adduced does not prove either the one or the other.

When, thus, the offering in question is an act of 'disposal', there must be 'combination' (of the eleven Anuses), *because that forms the predominant factor*; that is, the act being for the embellishment of the thing,—if the *anus* of any one of the eleven animals were not so 'embellished', that animal would be deprived of that embellishment.

From all this it follows that there should be 'combination'.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *At the 'Fire-installation', there should be option in the matter of the variously numbered Fees.*

SŪTRA (7).

IN REGARD TO THE NUMBERS THERE SHOULD BE OPTION, AS THERE WOULD BE INCOMPATIBILITY WITH THE DECLARATIONS.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with *Fire-installation*, we have the following injunctions regarding the Sacrificial Fee—'*One* should be given,—*six* should be given,—*twelve* should be given' and so forth.

The question to be considered is—among these several numbers, should there be *option*? Or *combination*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "there should be *combination*, as thereby we secure a larger number of accessories, and that would be more in accordance with the Declaration of Procedure which takes in all the subsidiary details".

In answer to this there is the following *Siddhānta*:—*In regard to the numbers there should be option*;—why?—*because there would be incompatibility with the declarations*; the declaration that 'one should be given' lays down the thing qualified by the number 'one' as securing the services of the Priest; similarly the declaration 'six should be given' lays down the thing qualified by the number 'six' as serving the same purpose;—if then, the 'one' and the 'six' were *combined*, there would appear a third number 'seven', and the services would, in that case, have been secured by means of the thing as qualified by the number 'seven', and this would be incompatible with the declaration of 'one' and the declaration of 'six'.

Objection—"What the texts lay down is not the *securing of services*, but the act of *giving*—'one should be *given*', 'six should be *given*'."

Answer—The act of 'Giving' consists in the creating of the ownership of another person over a thing that belongs to one's own self; and this act is done with the view that the other person may become the *owner* of the thing *given*;—it is when the man concerned has acquired this ownership over the thing given that he performs the priestly functions (for the *giver*); and herein lies the purpose of the Giver; which thus becomes a visible one. If the act were taken to be a mere *giving* in general, then an unseen result would have to be assumed (as following from such *giving*). As a matter of fact also, we find the several numbers 'one' and the rest mentioned in connection with the securing of the services of the Priests. Under the circumstances, if any one's services are secured by means of 'seven' things, then that man's services have not been secured by means of 'one' or of 'six'; so that those people consent to serve not for 'one', nor for 'six', but for 'seven';—and thus there is *incompatibility with Vedic declarations*.—From this it follows that *in regard to the numbers there should be option*.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *In the case of 'Group-animal-sacrifices', there should be option in regard to the several 'Jāghanīs' (Legs).*

SŪTRA (8).

IT IS A PART OF THE SUBSTANCE; AS BEFORE, IT SHOULD BE TREATED AS AN ACT WITH A PURPOSE; OPTION BEING POSSIBLE, A RESTRICTION HAS BEEN MADE; AS IT IS A PRIMARY ACT.

Bhāṣya.

There is the declaration—'For the Ladies they sacrifice with the Thigh'. In connection with 'Group-Animal-Sacrifices' [where a number of animals are sacrificed, and hence there are a large number of *Thighs*], there arises the question—Should all the thighs be used in 'combination'? Or should there be *option*?—Here also the same principle is applicable; if the sacrifice concerned is an *act with a purpose*, then there should be option,—but if it is an act of 'disposal', then there should be 'combination'.

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—*It is a part of the substance; as before, it should be treated as an act with a purpose*; like the action dealt with in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, the act of 'sacrificing with Thighs, for the Ladies', should be treated as an *act with a purpose*; this act, appearing first of all at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, comes into the 'group-animal-sacrifices' indirectly through the General Law;—at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, it is done as *an act with a purpose*; as at that sacrifice, there is no 'remnant' in the shape of the 'Thigh' (there being no animal-offerings there), to be disposed of by an *act of disposal*; in fact, it is only an ordinary *Thigh* that is used there, as an optional alternative to *Clarified Butter*, which option comes into the *Agniṣomiya-animal-sacrifice*, through the General Law.—And yet in that connection we have the declaration, 'For the Ladies, they sacrifice with the Thigh'.—Under the circumstances, this declaration can be taken only as restricting the option to one thing (the *Thigh*) only;—this restriction to the *Thigh* can be only to the *Thigh* in the form in which it has come in through the General Law;—and it has come in only as a subordinate factor;—hence at the *Agniṣomīya-animal-sacrifice*, the *Thigh* is only a subordinate factor, and *the act (of sacrifice) is the predominant factor*;—and as it is at the *Agniṣomiya*, so should it be at the 'group-animal sacrifices' also. From all this it follows that at these latter also, the sacrifice in question is an *act with a purpose*; and as it is *an act with a purpose*, there can be no 'combination' of the *Thighs*, which serve the same purpose; hence there should be option.

SŪTRA (9).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*argument* (A)]—"EVEN THOUGH IT IS A SUBSTANCE, THERE SHOULD BE 'COMBINATION', AS THE SUBSTANCE IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY AN ACT; AS THAT ACT IS DIFFERENT WITH EACH ANIMAL, IT IS ONLY THUS THAT IT IS DONE AS AT THE ARCHETYPE."

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"Even though the *Thigh* is subservient to the act—there should be *combination*;—why?—*because the substance is brought about by an act*;—the substance, *Thigh*, has been brought about by the act of *quartering* the animal,—and hence there is a desire to find out a use for it;—then there is the declaration, 'For the Ladies, they sacrifice with the Thigh';—hence it becomes recognised that this is the use for the *Thigh* (that has been obtained by the *quartering*). At the 'group-animal-sacrifice', *that act is different with each animal*,—and the substance 'Thigh' is obtained by that act (of quartering) from each animal;—hence it follows that at the sacrifices in question also the Thigh is obtained for the same purpose of 'sacrificing for the Ladies';—thus does the act become done *as at the Archetype*. From this it follows that, even when the act is one *for a purpose*, there should be *combination*."

SUTRA (10).

[*Objection against Pūrvapakṣa—argument* (*A*)]—THE SAME MIGHT BE THE CASE WITH THE PAN ALSO;—IF THIS IS URGED [then the Pūrvapakṣin's answer would be as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

If you (*Pūrvapakṣin*) think that—"in as much as the Thighs have been brought about by an act, there should be combination of these",—then, for the same reason there may be *combination* in the case of the *Pan* also, where it is laid down that 'one winnows the chaff with the Cake-baking-*pan*'; the use of this *Pan* also is prompted by an act (of *winnowing*); so that the *winnowing of the chaff* should be the use for the *Pan*;—and as a necessary consequence of this, in connection with the *Group-Cake-offerings* also, *winnowing of the chaff* should be done with every one of the baking pans (which is an absurdity);—or else you should point out some difference in the two cases (of *Thighs* and of *Pans*).

SŪTRA (11).

"NOT SO; THE ACT IS FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya.

"It cannot be as urged above.—Why?—*Because the act is for another purpose*;—i.e. the employment of the Pans is for a different purpose—for

the purpose of cooking (baking) the Cake; when the Pan has been secured for that purpose, the *winnowing of the chaff* might also be done with it once in a way; just as in a case where a man has gone to fetch fuel, he brings some vegetables also by the way; but that does not mean that his going out was for the purpose of bringing the vegetables.

'But how do you know that the Pan is really brought in for the baking of the cake, and is used, only by the way, for the purpose of *winnowing the chaff*,—and that it is *not* obtained for the purpose of both the *winnowing* as well as the *baking*?'

"The reason for this has been already explained—'The coming connection is for that purpose'. If the Pans have not been brought into existence for the purpose of *winnowing the chaff*, then it is not necessary that *all the Pans* should be used for the purpose of that *winnowing*.

[The above is the *Purvapakṣin's* answer to the argument urged against him in Sū. 10].

The *Sūtra* (11) may be taken as refuting both (the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument in Sū. 9, as well as the argument against it urged in Sū. 10)—*It cannot be as suggested, as the act is for another purpose*;—as regards the *Pan* the argument has been already answered (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, under this *Sūtra* itself, see Para. 1 above); as regards the *Thigh* also, the act of *quartering of the Body is for another purpose*,—i.e. for the purpose of securing the *Heart* and other limbs, not for securing the *Thigh* itself.—Further, when the animal has been killed for the purpose of making offerings with the Heart and other limbs, the quartering of the body is for that same purpose. From this it is clear that the quartering is not for the obtaining of the *Thigh*.—When that is not so, then there can be no desire to seek for a use for the quartering;—whence then could there be any connection based upon that desire?—As a matter of fact, the *Thigh* comes in only as a bye-product of the process of obtaining the Heart and other limbs;—and this *Thigh* has been laid down as to be used in the 'Sacrifices for the Ladies';—these sacrifices are accomplished by means of a single Thigh;—hence the conclusion is that in the matter of the Thighs used at the 'group-animal sacrifices', there should be option.

SŪTRA (12).

[*Pūrvapakṣa—argument* (*B*)]—"It should be regarded as an act of 'Disposal', as it is a Remnant."

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"There could be option if the act were one *with a purpose*; it is however an act of 'disposal;—'how so?'—because *it is a remnant*; the *sacrifice* having been accomplished with the *animal*, the *Thigh* is a remnant, and there being no use for it, it has to be thrown away somewhere; and it is this *throwing away* of it that is done at the 'Ladies' sacrifice'; and it is not the *Thigh* that is enjoined by the text in question;

nor the 'Ladies' sacrifices';—both these having been already enjoined elsewhere; it is only the connection between these two that has not been laid down anywhere else; hence it is this connection that has been laid down by the text in question. Under the circumstances, the *Thigh* should be regarded as the *predominant*, not the subordinate, factor. If it were a subordinate factor, then it would have to be subordinate in several cases.—'What is the harm in that?'—That would militate against the injunction, 'One should kill the *Agnīṣomīya* animal'; as in this case this animal becomes dedicated to several deities, (not only to *Agni-Soma*),—a part of it being 'dedicated to *Agni-Soma*', and another being dedicated to the deities of the 'Ladies' sacrifices'. For these reasons, the sacrifice in question should be regarded as one of 'disposal'. It being an act of 'disposal', if the Thigh of one animal only were so 'disposed of', then that animal alone would be affected by the consequent embellishment (not all the animals).—Hence there should be 'combination' of all the Thighs."

SŪTRA (13).

[*Objection against Pūrvapakṣa* (*B*)]—IT WOULD BE SO IN THE CASE OF 'BOILED MILK' ALSO,—AS THAT ALSO HAS AN ANTECEDENT.

Bhāṣya.

If it be as suggested above, then the act spoken of in the text—'Rice cooked in Boiled Milk—Rice Cooked in Curd'—would also have to be regarded as one of 'disposal'.—Why?—*Because that also has an antecedent*; the *Boiled Milk* and *Curd* have been already come in for being offered to *Indra*; so that, when it is offered to *Viṣṇu-shipiviṣṭa*, it means that it has gone over to something else;—so that when that also has come in, the Milk and Curd come to be regarded as being for the purposes of that with which it would become connected; as such would be the sense of the declaration; hence when it goes over to something else, it would have to be an act of 'disposal', it being only a *remnant*; so that, in accordance with the reasoning propounded in Sū. 12, this act would have to be regarded as one of 'disposal'. Or you should point out some difference between this case and that put forward under Sū. 12.

SŪTRA (14).

[*All Pūrvapakṣa and other arguments propounded in Sū.* 13, *answered*]—(*A*) IT IS A CASE OF OPTION, IT BEING AN 'ACT WITH A PURPOSE',—AS THE PURPOSE IS RESTRICTIVE. (*B*) IT IS IN THE 'REMNANT' THAT THE EFFECT OF THE ACT INHERES; HENCE IT SHOULD BE AN 'ACT WITH A PURPOSE'.

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* supplies the answer to *Sūtras* (12) and (13).

(*A*)—As regards the argument (put forward in Sū. 12) that "the offering of the *Thigh* should be regarded as an act of *disposal*",—our answer to it is as

follows:—At the Archetype, there is *option* between the *Thigh* and the *Clarified Butter*;—the same option being admissible at the Animal-sacrifice, the re-assertion—contained in the text 'For the Ladies they sacrifice with the Thigh'—is mainly meant to restrict the option (to the *Thigh* only); this reassertion has thus served its purpose by excluding the *Clarified Butter*, and hence cannot serve the further purpose of excluding the *Thigh* from being used for an *act with a purpose*.—As for the argument—'because it is a remnant',—as a matter of fact, even a *remnant* can be subservient in several places if there is a declaration to that effect; as in the case of the 'Kusha-bedding'.

(*B*)—As regards the argument (put forward in Sū. 13) that—"When the Boiled Milk, which has been brought in for one thing, is used at another, it should be regarded as an act of 'disposal'",—this also cannot be right;—why?—because *it is in the Remnant that the effect of the act inheres*; what is brought by the act inheres (centres in) that Remnant which has been used.—"What is that effect"?—It is *embellishment*; this is what is brought about by the act. As for the *Boiled Milk* or the *Curd*, it has not been used anywhere, and that sacrifice also is not accomplished for the purpose of which it had been brought in.—From all this it follows that what is done with the *Thigh*, or with the 'Boiled Milk' and 'the Curd', must be an *act with a purpose*, not an act of 'disposal'.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The permanent Fire in the 'Ukhā' (Hearth) becomes modified by the 'Prospective Fire'.*

SŪTRA (15).

[*Purvapakṣa—continued*]—"IN THE HEARTH, THERE SHOULD BE COMBINATION OF THE 'PERMANENT' AND THE 'PROSPECTIVE' FIRES; AS THE 'PROSPECT' IS FOUND MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH THE KEEPING (OF THE FIRE)."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Fire-altar*, there is 'Fire in the Hearth', laid down in the text—'Produces Fire by heat'; in reference to this Fire, we read—'For one desiring Brahmic glory, one should fetch Fire from *the burning Tree-top* and keep it; for one desiring food, from *the Frying Furnace*; and for one desiring Rain, from the *lightning-fire*'.

In regard to this, we proceed to consider the question—Is there to be combination of the *Permanent* Fire (in the Hearth) and the *Prospective* Fire (brought in for the attainment of *Brahmic glory, etc.*)? Or should the *Permanent* Fire be *modified* (replaced) by the *Prospective* Fire?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*In the Hearth, there should be combination of the Permanent and the Prospective Fires.*—Why?—Because thus alone would the entire declaration of procedure including all the accessory details be honoured.—'It has been decided that when a detail is contingent at the Archetype, its modification can be due only to a particular connection (Sū. 3. 6. 10); and in accordance with this principle the *Prospective Fire* should replace the *Permanent* one'.—It cannot replace it;—why?—because *the prospect is found mentioned in connection with the keeping of the Fire*; the prospect or desire is found mentioned in reference to the keeping of the Fire, in the text—'Having fetched the Fire, one should keep it, for one desiring Brahmic glory'; it is not meant that this Fire is used for the *offering of the oblations* on behalf of one desiring Brahmic glory; so that the desired result (glory, etc.) follows only from the *keeping* of the Fire after it has been fetched from the *Burning Tree-top, etc.*, and the oblations shall continue to be offered as usual in the Permanent Fire in the Hearth;—thus, as both the Fires come in together (in the Hearth), it must be a case of 'combination'."

SŪTRA (16).

[PURVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE, IN THE ABSENCE (OF THE PERMANENT FIRE), THE PERFORMANCE WOULD BE DONE IN UNCONSECRATED FIRES."

Bhāṣya.

"If the Permanent Fire were replaced by the Prospective Fire, then the former would not be there at all; and when this is not there, *the performance*

of the act would *be done in unconsecrated Fires*—brought from the *Frying Furnace* and other sources; and this would be contrary to the principle that the 'Installation of Fire' is for the purposes of *all acts*.—For this reason also there should be combination of the two Fires."

SŪTRA (17).

[PURVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE THAT (FIRE) IS FOR PURPOSES OF THE DEITY."

Bhāṣya.

"Then again, the adoption of the Deity has been done by the *Anvādhāna* of the Permanent Fire;—if then that Fire were abandoned, then the Deities would become excluded; and it would be the mere maintenance of the *Fire* that would be accomplished by the said *Anvādhāna* of the Fire; and when this maintenance would be done by the *Anvādhana*, this latter could not serve the purpose of adopting the Deities."

SŪTRA (18).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE WOULD BE MODIFICATION (REPLACEMENT) FOR REASONS ALREADY ADDUCED.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, there should be modification (*replacement*) of the Permanent Fire by the Prospective Fire; the reasons for this have been already adduced under *Sūtra* 3. 6. 10.—The declaration that 'Oblation-offerings are made in the *Āhavanīya Fire*' is a *general one*, while the declaration that 'For one desiring Rain, the Fire should be obtained *from the Lightning Fire*' is a special one;—and a special statement should set aside the General Statement.—Why?—Because, as for the general rule, even when it is set aside in a case where a special rule is applicable, it has room for application in cases not covered by that special rule; while, as for the special rule, if it is not applied to the particular case, which is the only one to which it can apply,—there is no room for its application at all; which would mean that its injunction is entirely useless;—it is in order to guard against this contingency that the General Rule is taken as set aside by the special rule.

It has been argued (in Sū. 15) that—"the prospect is found mentioned in connection with the keeping of the Fire".—Our answer to this is as follows:—When it is laid down that 'One should fetch the Fire from the Frying Furnace and keep it', it is the *keeping* of the Permanent Fire itself which is meant for oblation-offerings, in reference to which the particular 'prospect' or desire has been mentioned, in the text—'For one desiring Food, he should fetch it from the Frying Furnace'; the term '*avadadhyāt*' (in these prospective texts) is only a *re-assertion* (of the *keeping* already laid down in con-

nection with the Permanent Fire).—If the mention of the 'prospect' were in reference to the *keeping*, then it would be the *keeping* that would be the object of the Injunction; because what has itself not been enjoined cannot be the means of accomplishing a desired result. If then, the *keeping* were the object of Injunction, then the sentence would be enjoining that *keeping* and also laying down a *special rule*; and this would mean a syntactical split. Hence the mention of the Prospect cannot be taken as being in connection with the *keeping* of the Fire.—The fact of the matter is that the injunction of the Permanent Fire for the purpose of oblation-offerings stands unaffected; what is done by the texts in question is that the same Permanent Fire is *referred to* for the purpose of laying down the *special* Fires; so that what the text (speaking of the Lightning-Fire, for instance) means is simply that 'one desiring Rain should secure, for purposes of the oblation-offering, the Lightning Fire'. Thus then, this other Fire is a contingent one, and hence when that contingency (the presence of the said desire) is there, that contingent *Lightning Fire* must replace the *permanant Fire*,—this is the only right course to be adopted.

SŪTRA (19).

ON THE BASIS OF THE DIRECT DECLARATION, THE PERFORMANCE MAY BE DONE IN UNCONSECRATED FIRES.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (in Sū. 15) that "if the Permanent Fire is not there, the performance would be done in unconsecrated Fires".—Our answer to this is as follows:—*On the basis of the Direct Declaration, the performance may be done in unconsecrated Fires*; what is there that a Direct Declaration cannot do? There is no burden too heavy for Direct Declaration. For instance, there is the injunction to offer the oblation 'at the footstep' (where certainly there is no consecrated Fire).

SŪTRA (20).

THERE WOULD ALSO BE AN INCONGRUITY, IF THERE WERE COMMINGLING.

Bhāṣya.

Further, if there were 'combination' of the Fires, there would be a *commingling* of the *Prādāvya Fire* (which is *contingent*) with the *Fire in the altar* (which is *permanent*); and this has been declared to be an incongruity, in the text—'If one's Fire becomes mingled with the *Prādāvya Fire*, he should offer a cake baked on eight pans to *Agni-Shuchi*; *as the Prādāvya Fire is very impure*'.

SŪTRA (21).

"IT MAY BE ON THE BASIS OF DIRECT DECLARATION",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"There can be nothing wrong in this *commingling*, as it would be on the basis of the Direct Declaration; and when something is done on the basis of a Direct Declaration, there can be nothing wrong in it."

The answer to this is as follows:—

SŪTRA (22).

SO ALSO IN THE OTHER CASE.

Bhāṣya.

In the other case also, the oblation-offering would be done in the unconsecrated Fires on the basis of a Direct Declaration. So that, in both cases, there would be nothing wrong—on account of the act concerned in each case being done on the basis of a Direct Declaration; hence there would be nothing wrong in either case; consequently the view that there should be replacement (of the Permanent Fire) is accepted, as that course is a *contingent* one (and hence should be accepted); so that there should be no 'combination' of the two Fires.

SŪTRA (23).

EVEN ON ABANDONMENT, THERE WOULD BE ADOPTION, AS THE ACT WILL HAVE BEEN DONE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Su. 17) that, "the Fire is for purposes of the Deity".—Our answer to this is as follows:—*Even on abandonment* of the Permanent Fire, there would be nothing incompatible in the adoption of the Deities,—*as the act will have been done*; as a matter of fact, the Deities are adopted by the *Anvādhāna* of the Fires, not by the *Fire-itself*; the text bearing on the matter being—'One who *takes up* the Fire on the previous day sacrifices to the Deity on the following day';—this *taking up of the Fire* has been done already (on the previous day), and the Deities adopted therein may very well have the sacrifice offered to them in another Fire.—Thus there is no incongruity involved (in the *Siddhānta*).

Adhikaraṇa (6): *At the 'Kauṇḍapāyināmayana' the 'Agnihotra-material' should be cooked at the 'Prājahita' (Gārhapatya) Fire.*

SŪTRA (13).

The cooking of the 'Agnihotra' should not be done at the Shālāmukhīya Fire, because the Prājahita Fire is present.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the *Agnihotra* performed in connection with the *Kauṇḍapājināmayana*, we proceed to consider the question—Should the Material to be used therein be cooked at the *Shālāmukhīya* Fire? Or at the *Prājahita* Fire?—'*Prajahita*' is the name given to the *Gārhapatya* Fire by the ancient Teachers.

Here also the same principle is applicable: The cooking of offering-materials has been laid down as to be done at the *Gārhapatya*;—this *Gārhapatya*, therefore, is in use there already;—it is only when something is not already in use that there can be extended application (Sū. 12).—There are many explanations possible here.—The *Shālāmukhīya* comes in by virtue of the General Law,—in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, this same *Shālāmukhīya* has been declared to be the *Gārhapatya*,—and indirectly through the General Law, this same *Shālāmukhīya* comes on into the *Kauṇḍapāyināmayana*; while the cooking is indicated by *Name* as to be done at the *Prājahita* Fire (which is another name for the *Gārhapatya* on which the Cooking of all materials has been laid down);—the *Name* is more authoritative than the General Law; hence, the cooking in question should be done at the *Prājahita* Fire.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The 'Vegetable-cakes' should be prepared in a cart other than the two 'Havirdhāna Carts' that come in at the Jyotiṣṭoma.*

SŪTRA (14).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE TWO HAVIRDHĀNA CARTS SHOULD SERVE THE PURPOSES OF THE PREPARATION, AS THEY HAVE BEEN ALREADY IN USE."

Bhāṣya.

After the two *Havirdhāna Carts* have been set up,—there follow certain sacrifices at which the substance offered contains vegetable ingredients,—such as, the Meat-cake-*offering*, the *Savanīya-cakes*, the *Saumya-charu.*

In regard to these, we proceed to consider the question—Are these substances to be prepared in one of the two *Havirdhāna Carts* themselves? Or should another cart be secured for that purpose?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*The two Havirdhāna Carts should serve the purpose of the preparation,*—or one of them only.—Why?—*Because they have been in use already*; the *Havirdhāna* Cart has been in use already, and it is quite capable of serving the purpose of preparing the substances in question; under the circumstances, if another cart were to be secured for that purpose, it would be a superfluous act. Hence, the substances should be prepared with the help of one of the *Havirdhāna Carts* themselves (and no other cart is to be secured)."

SŪTRA (15).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE CAN BE NO FULFILMENT (BY THAT MEANS), AS THE PLACE BEING DIFFERENT, THE MAIN SACRIFICE WOULD BECOME DEFECTIVE;—AND THERE CAN BE 'EXTENDED APPLICATION' ONLY WHEN IT CAUSES NO DEFECT.

Bhāṣya.

There can be no fulfilment of the preparation, by means of the *Havirdhāna* Carts; that is, the substances should not be prepared with the help of these carts.—"Why?"—*Because the Main sacrifice would become defective,*—[*on account of the place being different*]—the 'place' of the *preparation* is as follows:—The cart is placed behind the *Gārhapatya* Fire and in front of the *Īṣa,*—then the Priest gets upon its right wheel and makes the preparation there. Such being the place of the 'Preparation', if the Preparation were done on the *Havirdhāna Cart,*—then, this *Havirdhāna* Cart (which contains *Soma-shoots*), would have to be brought up to the place just described; and

Adhikaraṇa (10): *The 'Fire in the Hearth' is not to be kept for ever.*

SŪTRA (28).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Permanent maintenance being possible, there should be option; as there can be no prohibition without reason."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the same 'Fire in the Hearth', we proceed to consider the question—May it be kept permanently or not kept, at option? Or should it not be kept permanently at all?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"*Permanent maintenance being possible, there should be option*; i.e. one may, or may not, keep it permanently.—Why so?—*Because there could be no prohibition without reason*; there is the following prohibition of its maintenance—'It should not be kept up; if it is kept up, it creates enemies for him';—this prohibition would have some sense only if the *keeping up of the* Fire were a possibility; e.g. such prohibitions as 'one should not go', 'one should not eat', have some sense only in cases where *going* and *eating* are possible;—but there could be no such possibility of the *keeping up* of the Fire without a Direct Declaration to that effect; hence we infer the existence of a Declaration enjoining the *keeping up* of the Fire; this inferred Declaration makes the *keeping up* possible, while the aforesaid Prohibition forbids it; hence there should be *option* in the matter."

SŪTRA (29).

[Siddhānta]—As a matter of fact, the Prohibition appertains to the 'Fire of extinguished brilliance'; as there is permanent maintenance of that.

Bhāṣya.

In case there were no possibility of the *maintenance of the Fire* on the basis of an already perceptible Vedic Declaration, then alone would there be some ground for the inference of a Declaration to that effect;—as a matter of fact however, there is already a Direct Declaration relating to 'the Fire of Extinguished Brilliance', which makes possible the maintenance of the Fire in question; this declaration being—'The Āhavanīya, *of extinguished brilliance*, should be kept up permanently'; and inasmuch as the *Fire in the Hearth* has taken the place of the *Āhavanīya*, what has been declared

regarding the *Āhavanīya* becomes applicable to that also;—thus there arises the possibility of the permanent maintenance of the *Fire in the Hearth* in question;—and it is the prohibition of this that is contained in the text quoted above (to the effect that this Fire 'should not be kept up');—thus there is no ground for the inferring of a text (rendering the permanent maintenance possible).—Thus then, as there is no direct injunction of keeping up the *Fire in the Hearth*,—and there is no need for keeping it up,—it should not be kept up at all.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *At the 'Sattra' and the 'Ahīna' sacrifices, such acts as the 'Touching of the Shukra Vessel' and the like should be done by one Sacrificer only.*

SŪTRA (30).

AMONG THE HOST OF ACTS TO BE DONE BY SACRIFICERS, ONLY ONE SHOULD DO THE ACTS FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Sattra* and *Ahīna* sacrifices, there are a host of acts to be done by the sacrificers. [In regard to these the question arising as to whether these should be done by all the *Sacrificers*, of whom there are several, or by only one of them ?] the *Siddhānta* is that among these acts those that are '*parārtha*', 'for other purposes'—such as 'the Sacrificer touches the *Shukra-vessel*', 'the Post of Udumbara wood is as tall as the Sacrificer' and so on,—*should be done by only one Sacrificer*, not by all of them.—Why ?—Simply because they are for other purposes; i.e. in these cases, the act concerned confers no benefit on the sacrificer; if it did, then for the sake of securing the benefit, to himself, every sacrificer would do it. As a matter of fact, the acts are done by the sacrificer simply because they have got to be done 'by the Sacrificer'; hence, when it has been done by one, there can be no need for its being done by another; hence only one of them should do these acts.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *At the 'Ahīna', the said 'Touching of the Shukra, etc.' may be done by any one Sacrificer.*

SŪTRA (31).

THERE CAN BE NO RESTRICTION, AS THERE IS NO GROUND FOR DIFFERENTIATION.

Bhāṣya.

There can be no restriction as to which particular Sacrificer should do the acts in question,—any one of these may do them.—Why ?—*Because there is no ground for differentiation*; we do not find any grounds for differentiation,—either *in words* or *in facts* ;—hence there can be no restriction.

This is the final conclusion so far as the *Ahīna* is concerned, where there is no 'Chief' among the Sacrificers—[with the *Sattra* it is different, the Master of the House is the *Chief* Sacrificer ; hence the case of *Sattra* is dealt with separately in the next *Adhikaraṇa*].

Adhikaraṇa (13) : *At the 'Sattra', the said acts should be done by the Master of the House only.*

SŪTRA (32).

Or, the Chief one should do these, as there would be no incompatibility in that.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Sattra* however, the *Master of the House* is the one *Sacrificer* that should do the acts in question.—Why ?—*Because there would be no incompatibility in that*; if the said Sacrificer did these, there would be no incongruity in it ; he is the one Sacrificer who should not perform the functions of the 'Priests'; hence there would be some difficulty and confusion if among the *priestly functions*, there arose the question as to which *one* should perform the acts—to the performance of which all would be equally entitled.

If this method is adopted, there is some useful purpose served by the 'Master of the House',—in that he would perform those functions bearing upon the Sacrifice that are to be performed 'by the *Sacrificer*'.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *At the Sattra, embellishments like 'anointing' are to be done to all the Sacrificers.*

SŪTRA (33).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"AT THE SATTRA, IT SHOULD BE THE 'MASTER OF THE HOUSE',—AS OTHERS HAVE NO CONNECTION;—JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE TITLE 'HAUTRA'."

Bhāṣya.

The question that arises now is in regard to those *acts pertaining to Sacrificers* which are for the purpose of 'embellishing' them [and not those that are *for the purposes of the sacrifice*],—such as 'after the body has been anointed, he puts on the cloth'; the question being—are these also to be done by the *Master of the House* only? or by all the Sacrificers?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"They should be done by the Master of the House only;—why?—*as others have no connection* (with the title 'Master of the House'); so that when this course is adopted, the connection of the title with the act is not absent; i.e. it comes to serve a useful purpose. —How?—We explain:—In this connection the term '*gṛha*' ('House') stands for the *sacrifice*, not for the *House itself*; if the *House itself* were meant, then, there would be no distinction; as all the sacrificers are masters of the *house* (of sacrifice).—'But of the *sacrifice* also all of them are *masters*'.—True, that is so; and yet through the title, some sort of superiority is discernible; just as in the case of such assertions as '*Dēvadatta* is the *Brāhmaṇa* in *Mathurā*'. This superiority, in the case in question, may be due to the larger number of functions performed, or to sharing the benefits to a larger extent. The largeness in the number of functions is not possible (in case of the *Master*), as the others have a much larger number of functions to perform; *the larger sharing in the benefits* however is possible, specially because the 'embellishments of the Sacrificer' apply to him to a larger extent than to the others. Hence the conclusion is that with a view to the applicability of the title 'Master of the House', the acts meant to benefit the performers should be done by the Master of the House only.—*As in the case of the title 'hautra'*; i.e. with a view to the applicability of the title '*hautra*' the acts included under that title are to be performed by the *Hotṛ* priest only; similar should be the case in the present instance also."

SŪTRA (34).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE OF THE SCRIPTURAL DECLARATION."

Bhāṣya.

"There is the following scriptural declaration indicating the fact of larger benefits accruing to the *Master of the House*—'He who, at the *Sattra*,

is the *Master of the House* among the Sacrificers, is the propounder of the *Sattra* and acquires superior prosperity'; this would be possible only if he shared the benefits to a larger extent than the others."

SŪTRA (35).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT ALL SHOULD DO THEM; AS THE ACTS ARE FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, all the Sacrificers,—not the *Master of the House* alone—should do those acts that are for the benefit of the performers.—Why?—Because *the acts are for the benefit of all*; the acts in question have been declared (in the following text) as being for the benefit of all the sacrificers—'Desiring prosperity, they should proceed to perform the *Dvādashāha* sacrifice'. If, then, there is some one among the sacrificers who has not had the embellishments done to him,—for him, the sacrifice would be defective to that extent, and hence futile; and this would militate against the declaration that the acts are of use equally to all.

SŪTRA (36).

THE TITLE 'MASTER OF THE HOUSE' ALSO APPLIES EQUALLY TO ALL.

Bhāṣya.

Just as, though the *Master of the House* does not do anything himself, other persons do the work for him, similarly even with this, there is superiority attaching to the Master, as *Master*,—not as a sharer in larger benefits; as in reality, there is no superiority in the matter of the benefits at all.

Says the Opponent—"Through self-interest, the Sacrificers would purposely omit acts that are conducive to the fulfilment of the sacrifice."

The answer to this is as follows:—

SŪTRA (37).

WHERE THERE IS INCOMPATIBILITY, THE OTHER SHOULD BE DONE.

Bhāṣya.

In a case where there is no incompatibility between what is for the benefit of the sacrifice and what is for the man's benefit,—there it may be that the Priests would do the latter; but when they are incompatible, they would do the *other one*,—i.e. that which is for the benefit of the sacrifice.—Why?—If the act benefiting the sacrifice were not done, then the sacrifice itself would not be accomplished; on the other hand, if the act for the man's

benefit were omitted, the defect would attach to the *man*; and under the principle that 'when there is conflict among the details of subsidiaries, what is for its own purpose should be adopted' (Sū. 12. 2. 25), greater importance attaches to what is for the benefit of the sacrifice.—Hence that is what should be done.

SŪTRA (38).

AS REGARDS THE 'HAUTRA', IT IS BECAUSE IT IS FOR THE SAKE OF OTHERS.

Bhāṣya.

As regards the argument that "it is as in the case of the title *Hautra*",—in the case of the *Hantra*, the man is *for the sake of others*, the act is not for the sake of the man; hence it may be done by any *one* of them only, not by all; in this case the name would be the determining factor. In the case in question however, the title 'Master of the House' cannot bring about the exclusion of anything; so that it could be applied on other grounds also; and when it is not applied, it might well be useless, and not able to exclude any; specially as there is no declaration excluding anything at all.

SŪTRA (39).

THE OTHER DECLARATION IS A MERE ASSERTION.

Bhāṣya.

The sentence that has been cited by the Opponent—'He is the propounder of the sacrifice',—does not indicate anything at all; it is a *mere assertion*; because there is no possibility of any larger benefits accruing; because it is only when there is such possibility that there can be a text indicative of it.

Adhikaraṇa (15): *The Brāhmaṇa alone is entitled to perform the Priestly Functions.*

SŪTRA (40).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The Priestly Function should belong to all castes, because all are able to do it."

Bhāṣya.

"*The Priestly Function should belong to all castes,—Brāhmaṇa, Kṣattriya* and *Vaishya*;—why?—*because they are all able to do it*; they can all do it; they have had the requisite learning and are equally learned;—no illiterate person has been laid down as to perform sacrifices; and the repayment of debts (to 'Pitṛs, Deities and Ṛṣis) is necessary for all; the mention of the 'Brāhmaṇa' should therefore be taken merely as an indicative of all the three castes;—as already explained."

SŪTRA (41).

[Siddhānta]—It must belong to Brāhmaṇas alone, because of the Smṛti.

Bhāṣya.

The Priestly Functions should belong to Brāhmaṇas alone, not to the other two castes.—Why?—*Because of the Smṛti*; cultured people quote the following *Smṛti*—'Officiating as Priests, Teaching and Receiving of Gifts are the means of livelihood reserved for *Brāhmaṇas* only'; and it has been declared under Sū. 1. 3. 7, that *Smṛti* is authoritative. Hence *Brāhmaṇas* alone should officiate as Priests at sacrifices.

SŪTRA (42).

Also because the 'Fruit-Cup' has been laid down for the others.

Bhāṣya.

For the others,—Kṣattriyas and *Vaishyas*,—the 'Fruit-Cup' has been laid down, in the text—'If the sacrifice is performed for the *Kṣattriya* or the *Vaishya*, and he wish to eat *Soma*, he should bring the banyan-sprouts, pound them, mix them up with curd, he should offer *that* to him, not the

Soma'. In the case of such assertions as 'if the man desires to drink milk, *Takra* should be given to him', what is understood from this is, either that there is no milk available, or that the eater concerned is one not entitled to eat milk ;—so also in the case in question, on the man desiring to eat *Soma*, the *fruits* are offered to him ; here also it means either that there is no *Soma* available, or that the Eater is not entitled to eat the *Soma* ; now as a matter of fact, there is plenty of *Soma* available at the sacrifice ; hence what has been said cannot be due to no *Soma* being available ; hence it follows that the man is not entitled to eat *Soma*. When thus the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* are not entitled to eat *Soma*, they cannot perform the priestly functions,—because it is necessary for the Priests to eat *Soma*. Hence the conclusion is that the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* cannot perform the priestly functions.

SŪTRA (43).

THE SAME IS THE CASE WITH THE 'CURD-BUTTER-MIXTURE', WHERE ALSO THE EXCLUSION IS DUE TO THE FACT OF NOT BEING 'DRINKER OF SOMA'.

Bhāṣya.

Further, the text excluding the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* from partaking of the 'Curd-Butter-Mixture' states the fact of these not being 'Soma-drinkers' as the reason for that exclusion.—'Neither the *Kṣattriya* nor the *Vaishya* should drink the *Curd-Butter-Mixture, as he is a non-drinker of Soma*' ; this shows that the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* do not partake of the *Soma*.

SŪTRA (44).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'QUARTERING'.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the 'Quartering' of the Cake done at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, the *Brāhmaṇas* alone have been mentioned, in the text—'This offering-material is for the *Brāhmaṇas*, those that are gentle *Soma-drinkers* ; it is not for the *Non-Brāhmaṇa*'. It has been explained that the *quartering of the Cake* is for purposes of *Eating*,—and the *Eating of Remnants* is for the Priests only ; if then the Priestly Functions were to be performed by the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* also, then the *offering-material* could not be '*for the Brāhmaṇas*' only ; as in certain cases it would be for the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* also ; and hence the emphatic statement contained in the text quoted alone would become meaningless.

SUTRA (45).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS SO FOUND IN THE CASE OF THE 'ANVĀHĀRYA' GIFT.

Bhāṣya.

There is the '*Anvāhārya* Fee' given at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa.* In connection with this Fee, the Brāhmaṇas alone are mentioned in the text—'*Ta ētē vai dēvā ahutādā yat brāhmaṇastadanvāharati tānēva tēna priṇāti*';—the Sacrificial Fee is given to the Priests; hence it follows that *Brāhmaṇas* alone can be priests.—Hence it is that we have the *Smṛti-rule* quoted above,—and this *Smṛti* is supported by all the indicative texts quoted above.—From all this it follows that the Priestly Functions are to be performed by *Brāhmaṇas* only, not by the other two castes.

End of Pāda iv of Adhyāya XII.

END OF THE SHABARA-BHĀṢYA.

SHABARA-BHĀṢYA

Vol. III.

PRELIMINARY INDEX.

INDEX OF TEXTS QUOTED IN THE BHĀṢYA.

[*Note.*—(A) The figures within brackets refer to the (i) *Adhyāya*, (2) *Pāda* and (3) *Sūtra* of the Text;—(B) The figures in the second column refer to the pages of the Bhāṣya in the *Bibliotheca Indica*; the simple figures—20, 200, 500, etc.—refer to the pages of the *First* Volume; the figures followed by (II) refer to the pages of the *Second* Volume of the Biblio. Indica Text.]



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